WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009000040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
20 August 1971
No. 0384/71
ARMY review(s) completed.
Copy No
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 19 August 1971)
Page
Indochina
South Vietnam : And Then There Was One? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: Serving Notice on Saigon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: Stalled in the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Sino-Burmese Relations: Best Foot Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Korea: New Flexibility on Both Sides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
International Economic Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Balkan Gridiron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Guinea: US, The Next Foreign Target? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
India-Pakistan: Major Problems Persist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Syria-Jordan: The War That Wasn't . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Latin America: The China Initiative; the Cuban Question . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chile This Week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Guatemalan Terrorism Continues 19
NOTES: Australia; Arms Control; Denmark; Bahrain.Qatar; Afghanistan; Cuba;
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FAR EAST
Indochina
President Thieu has not only succeeded in
denying Vice President Ky a chance to compete
in the election, but he may also have so discour-
aged Big Minh by the heavy-handed methods of
the government's powerful political machine, that
Minh, too, will abandon the contest and leave
Thieu with an empty victory.
Ky has been disdainful of filing a formal
appeal against his disqualification with the
Supreme Court, and the final deadline for doing
so has now passed. Ky has maintained that the
court's first listing of the candidates was illegal
because it was not determined by a full sitting of
the court. He also claims that he has a constitu-
tional right to Supreme Court review without
having to submit an appeal, but neither argument
is likely to carry much weight with the court.
Although his legal options have been played out,
Ky has remained in the public eye. wearing a
somewhat unaccustomed martyr's halo. If Minh
remains in the presidential race, public sympathy
for Ky will undoubtedly be short-lived.
Minh, however, is under considerable pres-
sure from his advisers to withdraw from the elec-
tion because of alleged fraudulent electioneering
practices by the government. It now appears
likely that he will pull out, although he may delay
his decision until the last possible moment-24
August, when the second posting of the candi-
dates is announced-in the hope that the US may
somehow intervene in his favor. Minh has shown
little taste or energy for political infighting, and it
is doubtful that he would take up the role of
"leader of the opposition." Should he withdraw
as he is threatening, Ky could remain a prominent
opposition spokesman and continue to be a thorn
in Thieu's side.
Thieu's success in forcing Ky out of the
election and the substantial advantage he enjoys
over Big Minh by virtue of his control of the
government bureaucracy have no doubt assured
him of victory, but they have also tended to
discredit him in the public eye. Thieu is coming
under criticism from some independent and pro-
government elements, as well as from the opposi-
tion, with regard to Ky's disqualification. Many
government supporters apparently believe Thieu's
ham-fisted exclusion of Ky was a mistake which
could backfire and hurt the President's political
position; others are concerned that the affair
damages the country's young constitutional sys-
tem.
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If Minh now withdraws and can convincingly
argue that the election was fraudulently arranged
against him, public disillusionment will increase,
not only with the Thieu regime, but probably
with the constitutional system as well. Thieu then
could well face an opposition once again com-
mitted to more violent means of protest.
The first fairly clear indication of the reac-
tion by the public to Ky's elimination-and to
Minh's withdrawal if he goes through with it-is
likely to be provided by the Lower House elec-
tion on 29 August. If most government-backed
Lower House candidates do about as well as ex-
pected, Thieu is likely to read this as evidence
that his tactics have not damaged the domestic
position of his government. Others would not
share this view, of course, if many government
candidates seem to have won by virture of unfair
official interference in their behalf. If, however,
opposition candidates should do unexpectedly
well, perhaps winning a majority of the seats in
the House, most politically conscious Vietnamese
would probably regard this as a repudiation of
Thieu and his recent tactics.
North Vietnamese forces this week carried
out their heaviest attacks since early summer in
the area just south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Enemy troops mounted a strong ground assault
against South Vietnamese Marines, inflicting
heavy losses and forcing them from hilltop posi-
tions. North Vietnamese forces also hit the net-
work of South Vietnamese strongpoints with ar-
tillery and rockets.
Elsewhere in South Vietnam, the week was
generally quiet but evidence continues to suggest
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that the Communists plan to increase action just
before the Lower House elections on 29 August.
iFarther
south 1-here-have been new reports that Commu-
nist forces are moving closer to Saigon from the
Cambodian border area.
The Communists are capable of conducting
small attacks in many areas before the elections.
It is only along the DMZ and near Saigon, how-
ever, that they threaten to press heavier attacks
that could go beyond their limited initiatives of
recent months. It still appears that enemy mili-
tary and terrorist actions will ease on election day
when, in a shift from their usual tactics aimed at
discrediting elections, Communist cadre in some
areas will encourage voters to su ort certain
"progressive" candidates.
Cambodia: Serving Notice on Saigon
The always delicate relations between the
Cambodians and the South Vietnamese may be
subjected to new complications as a result of
Phnom Penh's efforts to reduce its military de-
pendence on Saigon. According to a plan recently
drawn up by Phnom Penh, the Cambodian Navy
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(MNK) is to assume full command and control
responsibility from the South Vietnamese Navy
for escorting and protecting all ship convoys on
the Mekong River on 1 September-rather than
gradually taking over those duties as had been
recommended by South Vietnamese and US offi-
cials. The Cambodians have let the South Viet-
namese know that they also want to assume re-
sponsibility for all riverbank security operations,
but no firm arrangements apparently have been
reached yet.
A senior MNK officer has stated that the
Cambodians want to have immediate, complete
control of military operations on the Mekong
because they cannot work with the South Viet-
namese with the "mutual trust" that a phased
turnover would require. There are indications,
however, that the Cambodians are ill-prepared
and equipped to replace the South Vietnamese in
maintaining security along the river. The MNK,
for example, has less than half the number of
boats presently being used by the South Viet-
namese and most of them are in bad condition.
The MNK's support facilities are similarly inade-
quate.
It is likely that Phnom Penh's apparent
determination to go forward with its plans has
been influenced in large part by domestic political
considerations. In addition to trying to demon-
strate that it is becoming militarily more self-
reliant, the Lon Nol government undoubtedly
also wants to decrease the South Vietnamese
presence in order to reduce the likelihood cf
further depredations by South Vietnamese troops
operating on Cambodian soil. Despite its recent
moves, however, Phnom Penh probably
recognizes that it will have to continue to rely on
Saigon for many forms of military support for the
foreseeable future.
There are a number of indications that the
recent easing of economic pressures in Phnom
Penh is almost certainly temporary. Despite a
high level of rice deliveries since early July,
official stock figures indicate rice reserves in the
capital have declined substantially. The gov-
ernment has yet to take steps necessary to
discourage hoarding, and its ability to obtain rice
on concessional terms from Taiwan or Japan is
uncertain- Although it still is too early to' make
firm predictions about next year's harvest,
planting reportedly is lagging with only a month
or so left in the planting season.
The economy faces the prospect of further
inflation even though the price of best-grade rice
has recently declined and prices of other' com-
modities have been relatively stable.' The
government's foreign exchange position is at a
near crisis level, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) representative in Phnom Penh
believes a substantial devaluation of the riel to
be imperative. The government has nevertheless
postponed action on the potentially unpopular
reform measures proposed by the IMF, which
will have a negative impact on the willingness
of prospective donors to participate in the
Exchange Support Fund, an arrangement now
under consideration to help stabilize the
economy.
The North Vietnamese have at least
temporarily halted the government's drive to
retake Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau. Three
Lao Army battalions that were attempting to
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Laos
0 Government-held location
0 Communist-held location
approach the town from the northwest were
forced to abandon their mission after they
were hit hard by North Vietnamese units on
11 August. Elements of four battalions at-
tempting to move east along Route 23 have
been halted about four miles from Paksong by
well-entrenched North Vietnamese troops.
North of the Bolovens, the government
has decided to return elements of the civilian
government to Saravane and garrison the town
with regular army troops. The government
presence probably will be maintained only
until such time as North Vietnamese pressure
on the town increases. Initially Saravane was
considered purely a tactical target in this part
of the government's rainy season offensive in
south Laos, but the government apparently
now sees political and psychological benefits in
retaining control of the town for a time.
Developments in the North
The Communists have inflicted a setback
on government troops operating east of the Plaine
des James. On 16 August, some 100 to 200 North
Vietnamese troops overran four irregular po-
sitions about six miles west of Xieng Khou-
angville. Elements of three irregular battalions
occupying these positions withdrew to the south
and the west. Military activity was light elsewhere
in the area, with several small clashes and shelling
attacks in the north and northeast Plaine.
The government operation to retake Muong
Soui, the former neutralist headquarters west of
the Plaine, has progressed very slowly. The for-
ward movement of the three-battalion force has
been impeded by Communist harassing attacks
and bad weather which has caused mud slides
along Route 71 and has limited air sup-
port.
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Sinn-Burmese Relations: Best Foot Forward
Considerable cordiality prevailed throughout
Prime Minister Ne Win's visit to China last week,
but relations have yet to reach the warmth of
pre - Cultural Revolution days. The Chinese went
to some length to flatter Ne Win; he was honored
by a visit with Mao Tse-tung and was personally
accompanied from Pekin to Canton b Chou
En-lai.
Talks with Chinese leaders were conducted in a
"friendly and down-to-earth atmosphere," which,
according to the Burmese, did much "to put
relations back on a sound footing."
Despite this private cordiality, however,
treatment of the visit in Chinese media was rela-
tively restrained. The official New China News
Agency limited its coverage to straightforward
reporting and so far has failed to publicize
speeches made by either side. Its excerpts from
Chou En-lai's toast at a banquet on 6 August
typified Chinese public reserve. Chou expressed
pleasure that Sino-Burmese relations "have re-
turned to normal" and predicted that relations
would improve further as a result of Ne Win's
visit, but he omitted the standard reference on
such occasions to the five principles of peaceful
coexistence and failed to praise the achievements
of the Burmese Government. No mention was
made of the Sino-Burmese treaty of friendship
and nonaggression.
The visit, nonetheless, represents another
step in a return to the friendly relations that
existed prior to the 1967 anti-Chinese ripts in
Burma. Indeed, the fact that the Chinese issued
the invitation at this time suggests they' were
prepared to discuss such thorny problems as con-
tinuing Chinese support to Burmese insur a is-a
major bone of contention with Rangoon.
There may have been a meeting of minds,
nonetheless, on the question of the Overseas
Chinese in Burma. The Chinese apparently con-
vinced the Burmese that Peking's courtship of the
Overseas Chinese, which led to the disturbances
four years ago, is over. Peking's reassurances on
this score appear to be part of a new approach to
Chinese living abroad, which, as Chou En-lai re-
cently made clear to a visiting Malaysian delega-
tion, is to encourage Overseas Chinese to integrate
themselves more completely as citizens of the
country in which they are living.
the recent resumption of Chinese
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pure ases of Burmese rice and the improved po-
litical relations will almost certainly in time lead
to greater exchanges. However, there has been no
information on a possible renewal of Chinese
economic assistance to Burma. 25X1
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Korea: New Flexibility on Both Sides
The agreement for direct bilateral talks be-
tween North and South Korean Red Cross repre-
sentatives at Panmunjom on the problem of di-
vided families is but one of many recent indica-
tions of a significant new flexibility in South
Korean foreign policy. In testimony before the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the National As-
sembly on 16 August, one cabinet officer even
acknowledged the possibility of eventual official
bilateral discussions with the North Korean Gov-
ernment. He indicated that ways are now being
studied to develop contacts gradually and move
from nonpolitical to political subjects. This is a
major shift from the position set forth in Presi-
dent Pak's Liberation Day speech a year ago when
he maintained that North-South government-
to-government contacts would be possible only in
a UN forum.
Unprecedented realism was shown in Prime
Minister Kim Chong-pil's statement on 14 August
that South Korea would not necessarily oppose
simultaneous admission to the United Nations of
both Koreas. He acknowledged that simultaneous
admission may in fact become "unavoidable" be-
cause of changes in the international situation.
The South Korean shift in attitude is
prompted in part by the government's recognition
that there is growing public criticism of President
Pak for excessive rigidity and for his failure to
make progress on the emotion-charged unification
issue-points on which the opposition candidate
scored heavily in the presidential campaign last
spring. The movement in Sino-US relations has
also had an effect.
There have recently been signs of a greater
flexibility on Pyongyang's part as well. The shift
seems to have occurred as Peking sought to reas-
sure the North Koreans that their interests would
not be sacrificed by the movement in Sino-US
relations. Not only were the Chinese apparently
able to allay Korean uneasiness during an ex-
change of high-ranking delegations in mid-July,
but they also appear to have persuaded Kim II-
song of the efficacy of dialogue. The North
Korean premier in a major policy speech on 6
August went out of his way to justify and im-
plicitly to endorse Chinese contacts with the US.
He also for the first time raised the possibility of
talks with the government in the South. This was
followed by a moderation in propaganda invective
and by the prompt and favorable response to the
South Korean Red Cross proposal.
The North Koreans appear to believe that
direct contacts will serve to project a more
"reasonable" image, and they probably hope
thereby to create an atmosphere that will hasten a
US military withdrawal from the peninsula. They
may also believe that bilateral talks at Panmun-
jom and expanded contacts could upstage the
continuing multilateral contacts under UN aus-
pices and eventually bring into question the need
for UN involvement in Korean affairs.
It i:s most unlikely, however, that either
Seoul or Pyongyang anticipates any rapid expan-
sion of contacts or significant give on substantive
issues. Policies of uncompromising hostility to-
ward each other and deep-rooted suspicions pre-
clude a dramatic easing of tension, but both for
very different reasons apparently have concluded
that the time is ripe for a show of progress
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AUSTRALIA: Prime Minister McMahon
strengthened himself both as government and
party leader when on 12 August he demanded
and received the resignation of Australia's con-
troversial defense minister, John Gorton. Gorton
also resigned as deputy leader of the Liberal
Party, thus reducing party tensions and giving the
Liberals the opportunity to close ranks and pre-
sent a less divided appearance to the public.
Gorton, who has been one of McMahon's chief
political rivals, virtually invited the action taken
against him when he published an article highly
critical of cabinet ministers past and present:
The new defense minister, David Fairbairn,
who has served in several cabinet posts since
1962, for the time being will concurrently hold
the portfolio of Education and Science. Fairbairn,
like McMahon, is grouped among the conserva-
tives in the Liberal Party as opposed to the
younger, more nationalistic and liberal politicians
such as Gorton.
EUROPE
International Economic Developments
In order to gain time to respond to the new
US economic policy, Western Europe this week
closed most of its foreign exchange markets while
national and intra-European groups met. Tokyo
maintained the yen-dollar parity by sopping up
dollars held by Japanese commercial banks and
exporters. Ottawa, viewing uneasily the rate of
exchange of its floating currency against the dol-
lar, is appealing to have Canada exempted from
the ten-percent import surcharge.
Paris and Bonn went into an EC meeting on
19 August with widely divergent views. The meet-
ing of finance ministers, central bank governors,
and other senior officials in Brussels was charged
with seeking a common policy. Just two days
earlier, the monetary committee had concluded
that a coordinated float of the five EC currencies
against the dollar would be the most likely course
of action, but the French delegate then was un-
able to speak because his government's official
position had not yet been determined.
On Wednesday afternoon, however, a French
cabinet decision rejected the possibility of a joint
float. Instead, Paris proposed an alternative action
involving the establishment of a dual rate system,
similar to that practiced with some success by the
Belgians. In effect, this would require a partial
re-establishment of a fixed parity for the mark,
which the French have long sought. Bonn has
already voiced its objection to such a solution
because of the extensive bureaucratic controls
they believe will be necessary. The Germans are
determined to continue the present mark float
pending the adoption of significant reforms to the
international monetary system, most notably
wider exchange bands against the dollar. The EC
Commission, working for a compromise, tabled a
proposal encompassing some features of the
various positions. The outcome of the EC meeting
will likely serve as the basis for discussion among
the Group of Ten countries meeting in Washing-
ton this weekend.
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All the major foreign exchange markets ex-
cept Tokyo remained officially closed pending
the outcome of the series of international mone-
tary meetings this week. In small amounts of
unofficial activity to finance commercial transac-
tions in Europe, the dollar generally traded at a
two- to five-percent discount. Tourists have had
to pay upwards of ten percent more dollars for
European currencies. When the gold markets re-
opened on Tuesday afternoon, after having been
shut down for a day and a half, there was little
change in the price of gold with a rather low
volume of activity. Speculators apparently no
longer expect an increase in the official price of
gold.
In the first four days of this week the Bank
of Japan absorbed about $2.2 billion in opera-
tions to support the dollar. The rate of dollar
purchases on Wednesday fell to about half the
level of the first two days but rebounded again on
19 August amid speculation of imminent upward
revaluation of the yen. Tokyo's dollar reserves
were approaching $11 billion by close of business
on 19 August. Despite the government's per-
sistent public statements that the exchange rate
will be maintained, some flexibility is indicated
by Prime Minister Sato's request that the Finance
Ministry study the possibility of widening the
margins within which the dollar is permitted to
fluctuate. It was probably this request, made
Wednesday, that accounted for the wave of dollar
selling when the exchange market opened Thurs-
day. Japanese Government officials probably feel
that upward revaluation of the yen is inevitable,
but would like to delay any move until the Eu-
ropeans take some action.
A Canadian delegation, now in Washington,
is basing its case for exemption from the ten-per-
cent surcharge on the grounds that Canada has
not maintained unfair exchange rates or engaged
in discriminatory trade practices. The delegation,
headed by Finance Minister Benson, notes the
Canadian dollar has appreciated to over US $0.99
since it was allowed to float in May 1970, and
maintains that there are no unfair restrictions on
imports from the US.
Canada estimates that about one quarter of
its exports to the US-some $2.5-$3 billion-will
be affected by the surcharge, primarily manufac-
tures. This in turn will add to unemployment in
Canada, which presently is over six percent, and
hinder economic recovery. Canada's unique de-
pendence on the US market-and the unusual
importance of the trade sector in the economy-
makes this an issue of extreme importance to
Ottawa. The Canadians could employ such lever-
age as a toughening of regulations governing for-
eign ownership, including control of Canadian
industry by US firms; restrictions on additional
gas sales to the US; and recalcitrance in negotia-
tions for cooperative arrangements with the US in
the energy area to gain special concessions.
While many other countries have adopted a
"wait and see" attitude, India and Indonesia have
expressed concern about the impact of proposed
aid cutbacks on their economies, and Central
American countries meet today to assess the new
policy. Arab oil producers are fretting over poten-
tial losses from a floating dollar, a development
not covered by the recent five-year price con-
tracts that provided automatic adjustments only
to compensate for inflation.
Although Communist China has thus far not
commented on the new economic policy, the
USSR is engaging in a propaganda field day,
charging that the US worker will bear the brunt
of the domestic program, and that the US is
attempting to transfer its economic problems to
its allies.
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The Balkan Gridiron
Romania and Yugoslavia have become the
targets of increased Soviet-inspired propaganda
attacks in recent weeks. The ostensible reason for
these attacks is the apparent willingness of Bucha-
rest and Belgrade to use Peking as a counter-
weight to Moscow's dominance in the Balkans.
Neither the Romanians nor the Yugoslavs, how-
ever, show any sign of wilting in the face of heat
generated by this campaign.
Moscow's carefully orchestrated campaign
has emerged since the Crimea meeting on 2
August that was attended by the party chiefs of
all CEMA countries except Romania. The Krem-
lin's aim is to block Chinese attempts to erode
Soviet influence throughout Eastern Europe, but
particularly in the Balkans where Tito and
Ceausescu accept Peking's recent preachments on
the virtue of regionalism. Furthermore, the So-
viets appear especially irate over Romania's recent
attempts to exploit its ties with China in order to
widen the room Bucharest has for maneuver vis-
a-vis the USSR.
Moscow fired one of its first salvos at
Romania on 11 August, when it reprinted a Polish
article that declared "all nods of approval" for
Peking's policies "could only be considered as
harmful to the unity of the socialist community."
The phrasing, "nods of approval," was sub-
sequently repeated in East German and some
other East European news journals. The Kremlin
assigned its sharpest pronouncements, however,
to Hungarian and Slovak newspapers. Thus, the
Hungarian paper, Magyar Hirlap, reported on 13
August that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai planned
to visit Tirana, Belgrade, and Bucharest this fall,
but the article warned that if the visit should
result in an "anti-Soviet axis," an "extremely
dangerous situation" would be created in the
Balkans. Earlier, on 11 August, the Slovak youth
newspaper, Smena, directly criticized Romania's
nonparticipation in the Crimea meeting, thereby
conveying the almost certainly false impression
that Bucharest had refused an invitation. The
Slovaks also growled that "the policy of walking
on a tightrope will be paid for sooner or later."
The linkage of Romania with the disparate
Balkan heretics-Albania and Yugoslavia-is al-
most unprecedented; it indicates the deep: con-
cern that Moscow has about the potTntial
influence of China in the USSR's own backyard.
The Hungarians are also vulnerable on this issue,
since there have been rumors that they too are
interested in improving relations with Peking by
means of increased visits.
As the Soviets have increased the pressure on
Romania and Yugoslavia, official and popular
attitudes in Bucharest and Belgrade appear
designed to convey confidence. Thus, Romanian
and Yugoslav leaders are following normal vaca-
tion plans, but their activities appear especially
attuned this year to mutual consultation.
Ceausescu particularly seems to be having a
working vacation during which his efforts are
directed both at strengthening patriotic fervor,
especially among Romania's large ethnic Hun-
garian minority, and reaffirming his regime's
independent stance.
At week's end, Moscow's tolerance of in-
creased Chinese activity in the Balkans, in par-
ticular, faced yet another test. A 15-member
Chinese military delegation had arrived in Tirana,
and it is possible that the delegation may stop
over in Bucharest as well as Bel rade on its way
back to Peking.
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ARMS CONTROL: At the Geneva disarmament
talks, 11 nonaligned nations this week gave their
official response to the US-Soviet draft conven-
tion on curbing the production and stockpiling of
biological weapons (BW). These nations would
have preferred to have the convention cover
chemical weapons (CW) as well, and consequently
they are now seeking to firm up the superpowers'
commitment to negotiate an agreement spe-
cifically on CW. A number of other points were
raised by the nonaligned, but the outloqk for
agreement on the BW convention at both the
Geneva talks and the UN General Ass+rmbly
remains favorable. The nonaligned have decided
not to push for language in the convention that
would challenge the US contention that the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 does not ban the use of
tear as and herbicides in war.
25X1
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DENMARK: Both political and press circles
expect Prime Minister Baunsgaard to call general
elections early, probably for 21 September, four
months before the deadline. The three center-
right coalition parties will probably lose some
strength, but their leaders hope that a recent
favorable trend in opinion will lead to their gain-
ing at least a majority. Their future tenure might
depend on support from the new Christian Peo-
ple's Party, which is dedicated to traditional
values and opposed to abortions and pornog-
raphy. The principal alternative is a Social Demo-
cratic minority government. Inflation, Common
Market entry, and defense policy will be key
MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Guinea : US, The Next Foreign Target?
Allegations that a US-directed spy network
has been operating in Guinea were included in the
most recent of the "confessions" of alleged fifth
columnists now being broadcast over Radio
Conakry. President Toure, however, still may not
intend to mount a major campaign against the US
for plotting against him-charges he has already
leveled at Portugal, West Germany, and France.
The most detailed allegations to date of US
involvement in Guinea's current troubles were
part of the "confession" of ex - cabinet member
Kassory Bangura. After describing his "recruit-
ment," Bangura outlined the objectives of the
"American network" as "economic sabotage" and
"implanting American influence." He also named
four other high-ranking officials, who have been
arrested, as forming part of the "network."
Nevertheless, Guinean officials-in response
to a US protest-have given assurances that the
testimony does not represent the government's
position and that Conakry desires continued good
relations with Washington. Moreover, the rela-
tively mild objectives attributed to the US suggest
that President Toure may not wish to launch an
all-out propaganda assault on the US similar to
the one he has directed against other Western
countries, notably West Germany, for the past
eight months. There has also been no attempt as
yet to specifically link the US with the invasion
of Conakry last November or to the many alleged
plots to assassinate Toure. The "confessions" of
the newly implicated officials, especially that of
Karim Bangura, a former cabinet officer and
ambassador to Washington who was closely as-
sociated with American economic involvement in
Guinea, should indicate more clearly how far
Toure will carry his attack on the US.
It would have been remarkable if the US had
escaped the current political turmoil unscathed,
given the strongly anti-Western atmosphere in
Guinea. Guinea's leaders have always regarded
Washington's NATO ties to Portugal, the country
that directed the attack on Conakry last Novem-
ber, as tantamount to proving US foreknowledge
of and acquiescence in the attack. Guinea's influ-
ential leftists have also probably pushed hard for
an anti-US campaign. The relative cordiality of
US-Guinean relations throughout the current
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51UKF,-1
purge probably results, in part, from Toure's
reluctance to drive out the last significant Western
diplomatic presence in Guinea.
At the UN, meanwhile, Security Council
members continue to debate the fate of a mission
to Guinea, proposed in response to Guinean
charges that a foreign aggression was "imminent."
To the embarrassment of most members, Guinea
announced soon after an earlier vote to send the
BAHRAIN-QATAR: On 14 August, Bahrain
assumed full independence and terminated the
protectorate treaty under which Britain had
handled its defense and foreign affairs since the
early 19th Century. At the same time, the Sheikh
announced that Bahrain would seek membership
in the Arab League and the UN; the Security
Council has already recommended to the General
Assembly that Bahrain be admitted. Iran, the
strongest Persian Gulf power, sent a message of
congratulations that amounted to recognition of
AFGHANISTAN: The government, because of
two consecutive years of drought, expects a
25-percent shortfall in the country's wheat crop
and, unless extraordinary relief measures are
undertaken, the loss of up to 70 percent of its
sheep. Moreover, Kabul's already serious balance-
of-payments difficulties are being compounded
by lower exports of karakul (lamb's wool) and
other animal products.
The new Afghan Government, which took
office in late July, has so far shown considerably
greater speed and resolve than the previous
mission that the council's action had deterred; the
"aggression" and that the mission was no longer
required. Several days later, however, Guinea
again reversed its position
25X1
Council members now are
25X1
re-examining what the mission would actually do
and its composition, although at week's end it
looked as though some sort of mission would
eventually be sent.
25X1
the new state; Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which
dominate Arabian Peninsula politics, also sent
their congratulations. The Sheikh's statement that
the declaration would not affect Bahrain's "readi-
ness to accede" to some federation of the Persian
Gulf amirates under the proper circumstances
apparently satisfied the demands of both Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia for eventual federation of all
the amirates. The neighboring state of Qatar is
expected to follow Bahrain's lead shortly; it, also,
will probably be recognized immediately.
administration in attempting to deal with the
economic crisis. In addition to local efforts to
minimize crop and livestock losses, Afghanistan is
seeking new foreign assistance and has ap-
proached the US and West Germany about a
moratorium on its external debt until at least
March 1972. Afghanistan's debt service obliga-
tions have risen rapidly in recent years to a record
high of $27 million, about 30 percent of exports.
Although the USSR accounts for about three
fourths of Afghanistan's total debt, Afghan offi-
cials claim the have not yet asked the Soviets for
debt relief.
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India-Pakistan: Major Problems Persist
The Indo-Soviet friendship treaty has won
wide acceptance in India, despite misgivings in
some quarters. On 14 August, the budget session
of Parliament ended with a comprehensive and
highly favorable discussion of the treaty in the
upper house. A few opposition members voiced
some doubts, but they had little impact on the
government's steadfast defense of its action.
The most commonly heard criticism is that
India has agreed to withhold recognition of the
independent government of Bangla Desh as the
price for the treaty. Prime Minister Gandhi denied
this allegation in Parliament.
~ The
opposition also worried that the 20-year duration
of the treaty may have limited India's maneuvera-
bility for too long a period. Others speculated
that closer ties with the USSR may lead to ex-
panded Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean and
possibly foreclose India's desire for an easing of
relations with Communist China.
Since the signing on 9 August, the Indian
Government has made extensive efforts to empha-
size what the treaty is not. In her Independence
Day speech on the 15th, Mrs. Gandhi pointed out
that the treaty did not mark a change in Indian
policy, implying that Indian nonalignment has
not been compromised. Defense Minister Ram has
also insisted that the treaty does not preclude any
previously held options, including the right to
develop nuclear weapons.
As Indian exuberance over the signing dis-
sipates, however, there is likely to be a growing
realization that the treaty does not address itself
to the major problems intrinsic to the crisis. The
three protagonists-India, the West Pakistani Gov-
ernment, and the East Bengal secessionists-all
remain committed to their previous positions.
Tensions may, in fact, increase in coming weeks.
As the monsoon ends, the refugee flow
could accelerate, pockets of famine may develop
in East Pakistan, and New Delhi's desire for a
"political" settlement in East Pakistan might
manifest itself in stepped-up support for the
Bengali liberation forces. 25X1
E
_: ~
A guilty verdict and a death sentence in
the current treason trial of East Pakistani leader
Mujibur Rahman would raise emotions even
higher
Last week, Pakistan proposed that the UN
Security Council create a "good offices" com-
mittee to examine the situation on both sides of
the border. Reactions from the Indian and Soviet
delegations were negative. Reference in the
Pakistani proposal to both sides of the border
runs counter to New Delhi's view that the conflict
is between Islamabad and the dissidents of East
Bengal.
In other aspects, however, it is the Pakistanis
who are posing problems for the UN. An official
note sent to Secretary General Thant protested
his expression of concern on 10 August over
Mujib's trial. Islamabad has also questioned the
planned staffing of the UN's relief operations in
East Bengal. This has caused some delay, but
apparently some UN personnel should be on the
scene by 1 September. They continue to be con-
cerned over threats to their safety made by the
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SEUIl`
Syria-Jordan: The War That Wasn't
Last week's brief crisis began on 12 August
when Syria publicized border clashes that had
occurred that day and the day before, broke
relations with Amman, and closed its airspace to
Jordanian planes. On 11 Augus
a small Jordanian
patrol-two tracked vehicles and a jeep-had
crossed less than a mile into Syrian territory and
had killed a Syrian at an observation post. The
next day, the two sides traded artillery and tank
fire in the Daraa-Ramtha area; the Jordanians
apparently knocked out several Syrian tanks, de-
spite Syria's claims to have inflicted the losses on
Jordan.
Damascus' harsh reaction caught Jordanian
officials by surprise. Border incidents are frequent
because of the concentration of forces in the area,
but the Syrian Government had previously' re-
acted with restraint. President Asad has his own
problems with the fedayeen, and had been gener-
ally sympathetic with King Husayn's efforts to
keep them in line. Syria's retaliatory measures in
this instance probably stem from two factors:: the
overaggressiveness of the Jordanian Army and
Syria's need to refurbish its pro-Palestinian cre-
dentials, particularly now that its policy of quiet
cooperation with Jordan has become more widely
known.
Jordan reacted by attempting to smooth
Syria's ruffled feathers. Public Jordanian state-
ments promised a full investigation of the "de-
plorable" incidents and urged Syria to reconsider.
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Despite these efforts, another clash took place on
13 August when an artillery duel brought on an
attack by four Syrian MIGs, but Jordan refused
to commit its aircraft and the actual damage was
slight.
There have been no further incidents, and
even the break in relations seems to have been
more technical than actual; the Syrians have al-
lowed Jordanian Embassy officials to remain in
Damascus, although the Saudis are officially rep-
resenting Jordanian interests. Syria also made it
clear that the closure of its airspace affects only
Alia, Jordan's state airline, and not other carriers,
although the Lebanese airline has canceled flights
to Amman in response to a bomb threat. Oddly
enough, on 13 August Syria relaxed its restric-
tions on vehicles crossing the border, which had
been partially closed following the fighting with
the fedayeen in July.
Egypt moved quickly to help defuse the
crisis. President Sadat phoned Asad on 13 August,
presumably to plead for calmness, and Egypt's
war minister met with the Syrian leader the same
day. Cairo's attitude may be decisive in determin-
ing the outcome of the current meeting in Da-
mascus of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Libyan heads
of state. According to press reports, the three
leaders intend to take up the problems of friction
between Syria and Jordan as well as Jordan's
treatment of the fedayeen.
Meanwhile, the two-man Saudi-Egyptian
mediating team formed to work out an agreement
between King Husayn and the Palestinian guer-
rillas appears to be in limbo. The men had arrived
in Amman on 12 August armed with a six-point
plan that would seem to go a long way toward
meeting Jordan's needs. Among other provisions,
Page 16
it called for the fedayeen to dissolve all secret
organizations and to end their propaganda against
the government. Amman apparently objected to
the resurrection of the old pan-Arab political and
military committees to supervise the agreement
and the need to release commandos under de-
tention.
The Jordanians also had some demands of
their own, including the renewal of all Khartoum
subsidies and the ending of such economic and
political pressures as the freezing of relations and
the closing of borders by Syria and Iraq. In addi-
tion, the government insisted that the King be
recognized as the representative of all Jordanian
citizens on both banks of the river, a provision
that would rule out the formation of a separate
Palestinian state, whether on the West Bank or in
exile. The Jordanians have said that the mediating
team accepted Jordan's revisions, but it seems
more likely that the team agreed only to convey
Jordan's terms to the fedayeen and other inter-
ested countries.
If Jordan's stance remains inflexible, any
settlement is a long way off. The Palestine Liber-
ation Organization has agreed to the six-point
plan, but stressed that Amman's additions were
entirely unacceptable. For their part, the Arab
mediators probably would be content with a mere
facade of pan-Arab supervision in Jordan, as well
as lip service to the Cairo and Amman agree-
ments, which have been superseded by events.
The Jordanians, if they choose, could live with
this and other unpalatable provisions; for in-
stance, Amman could probably hold on to most
of its fedayeen detainees by charging them with
civil crimes. If the King maintains his unyielding
position, however, he may dangerously impair the
sympathy he might otherwise receive from other
Arab governments.
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Jr,U.1Rr, I
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Latin America: The China Initiative; the Cuban Question
The announcement that President Nixon will
visit China has produced a hemispheric spin-off,
causing several Latin American states to draw a
parallel between the cases of China and Cuba.
They point, for example, to Castro's presence as
one of the realities of political life in the hemi-
sphere.
In the last several years, sentiment for the
reintegration of Cuba into the Latin American
framework has manifestly grown. Mexico, which
maintained relations with the Castro government
despite the OAS sanctions imposed in 1964. was
joined in November 1970 when Chile re-estab-
lished relations with Cuba. Peru has announced
plans to establish relations with Peking, and
Bolivia is seriously considering the move. Both
nations also have the Cuban question under active
study and may soon follow the Chilean lead.
Bolivia has already formally approached Argen-
tina with a proposal that the two countries
simultaneously re-establish relations with the
Castro regime. Peru concluded a major sale of
fishmeal to Cuba in June, although the agreement
contravened an OAS ban. Even Venezuela, which
brought the charges of intervention that led to
the 1964 sanctions, presently favors a re-examina-
tion of the situation. In addition, with a formal
request for OAS consideration of the Cuban issue
only a matter of time, several of the Latin Ameri-
can countries want to ensure that they are in the
forefront of any move toward a rapprochement.
The US initiative on China caught Latin America
by surprise and most countries now are chary of a
possible future shift of US policy toward Cuba.
Chile is leading the current effort to normal-
ize relations with Cuba. A Chilean-Cuban com-
munique issued on 1 August denounced the OAS
agreements as obstructing the development of
normal relations between Cuba and the hemi-
sphere. President Allende raised the matter of
Cuba's hemispheric role during his recent visit
with Argentine President Lanusse and plans to
press the issue during a planned visit later this
month to Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. In addi-
tion, Chilean diplomats in Latin America have
been seeking support for Cuban participation in
the special Committee for Latin American Coor-
dination (CECLA), an all Latin American caucus
which coordinates hemispheric positions on trade
and economic matters.
Readmittance of Cuba to the OAS is. not
feasible under present conditions. Brazil would
resolutely oppose such a move as would several of
the Central American and Caribbean countries.
Other countries that have benefited from the re-
distribution of the Cuban sugar quota would also
be reluctant to sponsor a total rapprochement.
Castro himself is a major stumbling block to senti-
ment for complete reintegration. He is convinced
that the OAS will eventually be replaced by a
purely Latin American body and would probably
refuse readmission even if offered.
In light of these realities, recent discuslions
within the OAS have focused on the possibility of
a proposal to allow each nation to conduct bilat-
eral relations with Cuba without regard to Cuba's
relations with the hemispheric organization.
Those favoring some normalization of relations
with Cuba probably recognize that they lack the
two-thirds majority needed for a complete re-
versal of the sanctions policy. Formal consi{iera-
tion of the issue, however, may well show a
simple majority in favor of a change in present
policies, which would provide a justification for
those governments wishing to deal bilaterally
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Chile This Week
Despite continuing dissatisfaction with his
administration's performance, President Allende has
put off a cabinet reorganization until the fluid
25X1 Chilean political situation settles. Of five resigna-
tions offered, he accepted only that of the minister
of health and shifted the post from one small party
of his Popular Unity (UP) coalition to another.
The President said that the coali-
tion could claim at most only 25 percent success in
carrying out its program.
Allende's increasing inclination to express im-
patience with his followers' shortcomings indicates
that he may rely even more heavily in the future on
his own political judgment. He apparently takes few
pains to disguise either his approval of the contribu-
25X1 tion of the Communist Party (PCCh) or his resist-
ance to certain pressures from radical Socialist Party
(PS) leaders and from the proliferating political
groups supporting him.
One irritant to the President is the Socialists'
private, public, and persistent demand for rapid and
far-reaching institutional changes. They particularly
insist upon the creation of a unicameral "people's
assembly"-by resort to plebiscite if necessary-a
25X1 move that Allende considers risky now.!
Allende agrees with the
PC ath t the coalition's defeat by a united opposi-
tion in a recent by-election, although narrow, was a
signal that cannot be ignored. Another consideration
is that Allende's overtures to disgruntled leftist
Christian Democrats did not lure as many break-
aways from his chief opponents as he had hoped.
Allende is again facing a challenge from the
extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR), which is stepping up efforts to prove that
violence is the only effective means to accomplish
revolution. The political and ideological rivalry be-
tween the MIR and the PCCh has been intensified
by continued illegal armed seizures of farms and
factories and by rumors that the revolutionaries are
stockpiling arms. The PCCh fears that the M I R's
dedication to armed struggle could provoke a right-
ist or military coup attempt against the Allende
government. The use of the Trade Union Confedera-
tion building to honor MIR leader Luciano Cruz,
who died this week, was particularly galling to the
PCCh, since it resents MIR intrusions in the labor
field that the Communists consider their own baili-
wick.
On the major issue of compensation to US
copper companies, however, the hard-line stand of
the PS is gaining ground. Chilean newspapers of all
political viewpoints have criticized, as unjustified or
counterproductive to Chilean-US relations, the de-
ferral of the Export-Import (ExIm) Bank decision
on a loan to the Chilean national airline to purchase
US aircraft. Recurrent difficulties at the former US
mines, whatever their real cause, are being blamed
by the government on inherited problems deliber-
ately triggered to reduce Chile's benefit. The long
programmed winddown in US economic aid and the
ExIm Bank response are being cranked into this
campaign to prove that the Allende government is
not responsible for unpleasant developments in its
relations with the US.
Allende pays close attention to international
relations, giving high priority to demonstrations of
cordial relations with other Latin American coun-
tries. Pleased with his recent meeting with Argentine
President Lanusse, Allende will leave on 23 August
to visit Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru.
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Guatemalan Terrorism Continues
The assassination of two police officials
barely two weeks after the kidnaping of a promi-
nent right-wing politician again demonstrates the
terrorists' ability to carry out selective acts of
violence despite serious losses in leadership, per-
sonnel and safehouses caused by the Arana gov-
ernment's nine-month-old state of siege. The
Mexican Government's crackdown on some sup-
port activities of Guatemalan exiles will probably
not have any immediate effect on Communist
terrorist activity either.
A national police detective inspector and his
assistant were shot last week near the inspector's
home in Guatemala City. The assassinations were
probably carried out by the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR), although roadblocks set up in the area
failed to capture the attackers. Meanwhile, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (PGT/FAR) is still
holding Roberto Alejos, who was kidnaped on 3
August. They are demanding $500,000 ransom
and are moving Alejos from one safehouse to
another to foil government attempts to locate
him.
CUBA: The appointment of another top official
of the Armed Forces Ministry (MINFAR) to an
unnamed high-level economic post is further evi-
dence of Fidel Castro's dependence on the mili-
tary establishment as a source of personnel for
key management positions. According to a Cuban
military magazine, MINFAR's first vice minister
and chief of the General Staff, Major Diodes
Torralba Gonzalez, was selected for "an impor-
tant task in the national economy" in late July.
In addition to Torralba's new assignment, three
cabinet offices and a provincial party secretariat
are now directed by former chiefs of the General
Staff. Torralba's replacement as third-ranking of-
ficer in MINFAR is Major Senen Casas Regueiro,
formerly chief of staff of the newly formed Ha-
vana Army; Casas' brother is also a major and
The Mexican Government has been inves-
tigating the activities of a group of Guatemalan
exiles engaged in distributing propaganda on
behalf of the terrorists and in furnishing them
with materials for making bombs and manuals on
terrorism. Several members of the group have
been arrested, and two have already been expelled
from Mexico.
The Mexican moves may be a result of the
meeting between Presidents Arana and Echeverria
in May. Security and terrorism were the major
topics discussed, and Echeverria promised to
crack down on Guatemalan exiles operating in
Mexico and even told Arana that Mexico would
"cease to be a bridge between Cuba and the
insurgents of Latin America." If the Mexicans
continue their activities against illegal exile op-
erations, it may in the long run serve to weaken
terrorist capability within Guatemala, but thus far
the effect appears to have been negligible. 25X1
Major Torralba Gonzalez
holds one of the four remaining vice ministerial
slots in MINFAR.
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