WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009100010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
10 September 1977.
No. 0387/71
Copy N2 51
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 9 September 1971 )
Indochina
Vietnam: Saigon Government on the Defensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Laos: One Step Backward in the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: Artful Political Dodging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Japan: The China Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Communist China: Leftists Down, But Are They Out? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Soviet Smiles for Washington, Brickbats for Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
International Economic Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NATO Plans Closer Look at Mutual Force Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Romania Solicits Diplomatic Backing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Yugoslavs Dig in for Brezhnev Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Mixed Prospects for East European Harvests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
PEKING'S DRIVE TO OFFSET SOVIET AND US INFLUENCE IN EUROPE
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0387/71 A)
Pakistan: An Excess of Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Persian Gulf Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Halcones Haunt Mexican Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Uruguay: The Great Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chile: Allende's Tour de Force . . 21
Violence Threatens Honduran Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
NOTES: Arms Control; International Aviation; Cyprus; Latin America; Ecuador; Bolivia
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2-1 SECRET IF"
FAR EAST
Indochina
Vietnam: Saigon Government on the Defensive
An increasing number of political elements
seem to have concluded that the Thieu govern-
ment has been hurt as a result of the recent turn
of events. The opposition still appears highly frag-
mented and incapable of effective, coordinated
action, but many opposition leaders and some
rejected political suitors clearly believe that now
is a good time to get in a few blows against the
government. Even the usually proadministration
Saigon newspaper, Chinh Luan, has commented
that Thieu has damaged his ability to lead the
people. So far, antagonism against the regime
does not seem particularly intense among the
people, and there have only been a few small
demonstrations that have been easily contained.
Antiregime sentiment, however, may well gather
more momentum during the remaining three
weeks before the presidential election-or refer-
endum-on 3 October.
Vice President Ky's efforts to change Presi-
dent Thieu's plans for the presidential election
and to capture the leadership of the opposition
are taking the spotlight for the moment. Ky's
threats in his remarks to foreign newsmen last
week went considerably beyond his earlier attacks
on the President. Ky, possibly prompted by the
realization that his threats might force Thieu to
take countermeasures, later issued a denial that he
had said he would destroy Thieu. Nevertheless,
Ky allowed an impression to remain that a coup is
a real possibility, in the apparent belief that this
will win him some points in the opposition
groups.
Ky's camp probably has encouraged some of
the recent protests by militant disabled veterans.
The vice president may have had prior knowledge
of plans for a protest suicide attempt in Nha
Trang last weekend. He arrived shortly before it
occurred and has received considerable publicity
because of his presence at this incident.
Some militant students and other political
factions are also protesting Thieu's election
policy. Although the President has remained
unmoved by pressure for a postponement of the
presidential election, there are signs that he is
becoming nervous about the situation.F
Thieu appears uncertain about how to
handle the inflammatory Ky, but any steps
against the vice president almost certainly would
make the situation worse.
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nam panhandle have been cut by flooding; but
logistics preparations under way in the southern
provinces for the movement of supplies and men
through the Laos panhandle during the coming
dry season probably have been affected only
marginally.
Hanoi faces a major clean-up job in the wake
of serious flooding, but assistance from China and
the USSR will replace agricultural losses. North
Vietnamese weather broadcasts indicate that rain-
fall in 1971 has been generally double the amount
of last year, ranking with the highest ever re-
corded. Aerial photography shows
extensive flooding in the delta surrounding Hanoi.
The heaviest rainfall in the Red River Delta, the
country's principal population and agricultural
region, took place during 13 to 19 August. Higher
than average rains in the extreme northwest in-
creased the flow down the Black, Clear, and Red
rivers, adding to the delta's flood stage at Viet
Tri, where the three rivers converge some 30 miles
northwest of Hanoi. North Vietnamese papers
report that many locations in the delta were "sub-
merged for several weeks" and that dikes and
dams which had been improved and strengthened
in recent years were "greatly damaged."
Premier Pham Van Dong's statement that
the current floods are worse than in 1945, when
hundreds of thousands died in an ensuing famine,
suggests that there has been considerable human
suffering, although Hanoi has not yet released
casualty figures. Presumably reserves of food and
other daily necessities have been drawn down to
provide relief to flood victims. Looters and specu-
lators seeking to profit from disorder are being
given stern warnings of prosecution.
Agriculture will suffer severely from the
flood. The tenth-month rice crop, usually pro-
ducing about 2.5 million tons, already had been
planted. Losses, however, are expected to be
made up by increased food shipments from China
and the USSR. Both Peking and Moscow have
pledged relief assistance.
The main rail lines between Hanoi and
China, the port of Haiphong and the North Viet-
Page 2
Laos: One Step Backward in the South
The Communists on 4 September inflicted
another setback on government forces attempting
to recapture Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau.
The North Vietnamese used a coordinated ground
and mortar attack to drive three Lao Army bat-
talions from positions on Route 23 west of the
town. The government front line is now held by
irregular battalions at Ban Phak Kout, six miles
from Paksong.
Although there is no evidence of the extent
of North Vietnamese casualties, the enemy was
subjected to heavy air strikes and artillery shell-
ings in the Paksong area. Nonetheless, they have
thwarted every government attempt to recapture
the town. Lao Army battalions, despite relatively
heavy casualties, have fought their way through
heavily fortified enemy positions, once to within
two miles of their objective, only to be driven
back by counterattacks. The Communists have
quickly shifted their forces to meet government
thrusts from the northwest, the south, and the
west. The 9th NVA Regiment, with a total
strength of about 1,400, is responsible for the
security of Paksong. Although the 9th has prob-
ably suffered significant casualties, it presumably
continues to maintain a tactical capability be-
cause of a steady stream of replacements.
On the northwest edge of the Plateau, the
four-battalion irregular task force that occupied
Ban Lao Ngam on 2 September continues to be
the target of Communist shelling attacks and
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probes. This task force is patrolling in the area
as
locate enemy positions and supply caches
targets for air strikes.
Since the beginning of the government's
south Laos offensive on 28 July, the Communists
have shown more determination to defend the
F- olovens Plateau itself than the area to the north.
fA government task force recaptured Saravane
town on 28 July without a fight, andto the
has
government battalion occupying the since been subjected to only minor harassing at-
tacks. Other government units searching for
,;apply storage areas west and southwest of
aravane have encountered only light enemy
resistance. These searches did not turn up many
large supply caches, suggesting that the enemy
r~ither did not have as many storage sites in the
area as had been believed or that the stores had
been moved or concealed.
Some Action in the North
in north Laos, the Communists continue to
concentrate on defending the hills on the
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Government-held location
Communist-held location
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northern and eastern edges of the Plaine des
Jarres. Vang Pao's irregulars last week were forced
to abandon outposts northeast and southeast of
the Plaine, although no major positions changed
hands. The North Vietnamese used shelling at-
tacks and ground probes to harass other govern-
ment positions.
Cambodia: Artful Political Dodging
After some delicate negotiations, the govern-
ment appears to have worked its way around a
potential confrontation with the National As-
sembly. Although the uneasy truce with the
Assembly could break down in short order, the
government apparently has persuaded the leg-
islature to postpone its interpellation of Finance
Minister Sok Chhong until the Assembly approves
the regime's projected economic reforms and the
multinational Exchange Support Fund (ESF) is
established. The latter is likely to take some time,
and Chhong could have a lengthy grace period.
Chief of State Cheng Heng was largely re-
sponsible for bringing the Assembly around, as
Lon Nol and Sirik Matak evidently prevailed upon
the harassed Chhong to pigeonhole his oft-
tendered resignation. In doing so, they probably
have also calmed down some members of the
cabinet who were vowing to quit if Chhong fell
victim to the Assembly or if his resignation was
accepted. It is likely that the leadership's efforts
were helped along considerably by a general
recognition in the capital that a serious political
crisis could discourage foreign backing for the
ESF and could also endanger the possibility of
obtaining additional economic assistance from
Washington.
Little Military Movement
Communist forces continue to lay low
throughout the country, leaving the military
initiative to the government. Cambodian Army
(FAN K) units in clearing operations along Route
6 in Kompong Thorn Province met only light
enemy resistance during the week and continued
to consolidate their positions around Kompong
Thmar. Despite the relative ease with which
FANK troops have moved up Route 6, Prime
Minister Lon Nol apparently has decided that the
drive will not be extended any farther north along
the highway toward Kompong Thom town.
The Cambodians reportedly are considering
a push southeastward from Kompong Thmar
along Route 21, however, aimed at clearing crack
Communist forces from their strongholds in the
rubber plantations that line that highway. But for
the moment, FANK troops on Route 6 are to
concentrate on pacification operations from Tang
Kouk to Kompong Thmar. In line with this, First
Deputy Prime Minister In Tam has visited re-
cently liberated villagers in areas between those
two towns to assure them that they can count on
the continuing protection of FANK.
Two FANK battalions from Kompong Thom
have begun a second clearing operation along
Route 6, south of that town. The small size of
this operation suggests that it is primarily local in
nature, and that it is not destined to link up with
the FANK units at Kompong Thmar. Although
elements of the Communist VC/KC 201st Regi-
ment apparently are located within striking dis-
tance of the battalions, they have not yet seri-
ously challenged the slow and cautious FANK
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Japan: The China Problem.
Some leaders of the ruling Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP) have dissociated themselves
from Prime Minister Sato on the China represen-
tation issue. These leaders-including former de-
fense chief Yasuhiro Nakasone, who otherwise
supports Sato-are opposing a decision to co-
sponsor US-proposed resolutions on the issue,
although the government has promised to support
them. Two major party leaders-former foreign
ministers Miki and Ohira-have publicly objected
even to supporting the resolutions, advocating
instead all possible encouragement for Peking's
admission. Ohira's stand has been seconded by
Justice Minister Maeo and Agriculture Minister
Akagi. At a weekend meeting of the top ruling
party leaders, no consensus on the question of
cosponsorship could be reached on the eve of
Foreign Minister Fukuda's departure to head
Japan's delegation to the joint economic con-
ference in Washington on 9-10 September.
ARMS CONTROL: The USSR has submitted a
proposal for the provisional agenda of the up-
coming UN General Assembly calling for a world
disarmament conference. Although the proposal
indicated that the conference could consider both
nuclear and conventional weapons, it stressed the
nuclear aspect. Support for a world conference
was contained in Brezhnev's "peace program" last
March but had not been pushed by the Soviets
prior to this week. China's recent torpedoing of
Moscow's proposed Five Power Nuclear Con-
ference as well as Moscow's desire to dramatize its
present peace program probably contributed to
the Soviet initiative. In refusing to consider the
Five Power plan Peking reiterated its support for
a world conference to discuss abolition of nuclear
weapons. The Soviets may intend their initiative
to place Moscow firmly on record as support-
ing-even championing-a world conference, and
at the same time to put China on the spot by
testing Peking's willingness to respond to the
proposal.
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Communist China: Leftists Down, But Are They Out?
The appearance in domestic propaganda last
week of the first open denunciation of the ex-
tremist May 16 Corps further attests to the grow-
ing strength of moderate forces in China's leader-
ship coalition. The criticism was a brief allegation
that May 16 elements were behind factional dis-
orders at one of Peking's leading universities in
1968. The article in Red Flag, the authoritative
party journal, called for more moderation in
educational reform. Its publication, as well as
several other recent articles by foreign journal-
ists-officially inspired-discussing the "May 16
plot," suggests that moderate elements in the
regime are cautiously laying the groundwork for
an open repudiation of the more extreme phases
of the Cultural Revolution. Eventually, there may
also be some public explanation of the kaleido-
scopic changes that have been precipitated within
the leadership by the investigation, which began
nearly two years ago, into the activities of the
May 16 extremists and their high-level backers.
Although the full ramifications of the in-
vestigation are by no means clear, it apparently
was meant to counter the efforts of Cultural
Revolution Group (CRG) leaders on the politburo
to broaden their influence in regime councils,
apparently at the expense of Premier Chou En-lai.
Ultimately, the investigation led to the purge of
CRG head Chen Po-ta-who was charged with
organizing the May 16 Corps-and has cast a pall
over the political future of Chen's closest col-
leagues, Madame Mao and Kang Sheng. Chou's
personal position correspondingly appears to have
been strengthened, and the ascendancy of Chou
and his more moderate colleagues has been
further affirmed by the latest Red Flag article.
Given wide dissemination on 3 September, the
article apparently is intended to signal that efforts
are now under way to curb further the residual
influence of ultraleftist politburo members in the
educational sphere, where their influence had
been considerable owing to Mao Tse-tung's de-
termination to radicalize the university system.
Despite the continuing setbacks to the leftist
forces, the May 16 investigation does not appear
to have reached its climax, nor has the political
pendulum in Peking swung completely to the
right. The regime has yet to take the final step of
publicly denouncing Chen Po-ta, even though it is
widely known among party cadres that the nu-
merous press articles that have appeared since last
May excoriating "sham Marxists" and "political
swindlers" have been directed implicitly at Chen.
Furthermore, Peking city party chief Hsieh
Fu-chih, who seems to have cast his lot with the
-4,,....t
_
e
has
appeare publicly on y once in the past 18
months and apparently has been dropped from
his post as public security minister.
There also are tenuous indications that the
wholesale turnover among top military and civil-
ian leaders in the sensitive Peking Military Region
is in some way associated with the infighting
within the politburo over the May 16 investiga-
tion. During the past year, the commanders of the
Peking garrisons and the Peking Military Region,
as well as the regional political commissar, have
dropped from public view. No explanation has
been offered for their disappearance and no re-
placements have been named, but both regional
commander Cheng Wei-shan and political com-
missar Li Hsueh-feng, an alternate politburo
member, were directly criticized by CRG leaders
during the Cultural Revolution. Because they
dropped from view at a time when Chen Po-ta's
case was coming to a head, their apparent ouster
probably means that the influence leftist forces at
the top have exercised over important personnel
assignments has not been entirely vitiated.
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EUROPE
Soviet Smiles tor Washington, Brickbats for Peking
Soviet reaction to the recent movement in
Sino-US relations has followed very different
courses toward China and the US respectively.
Moscow has intensified its hostile attitude toward
Peking, but has provided a moderate and balanced
public assessment of US motives. It has also taken
actions designed to underscore the necessity and
importance of US-Soviet relations and negotia-
tions. In many respects, the Sino-US activity
seems to have given added impetus to Moscow's
desire for productive dealings with the US, while
it has encouraged the Soviets to take an unyield-
inq line toward the Chinese with whom they have
little fruitful contact and who they feel are med-
dling in their East European empire.
Triggered by the invitation to President
Nixon, Moscow on 4 September made its sharpest
authoritative attack on China in more than a year.
The lengthy Pravda article by "I. Alexandrov"a
pseudonym indicating high-level party endorse-
ment-minced no words that Moscow sees mali-
cious intent in Peking's invitation. The bid to the
President was placed in the context of Peking's
new, more flexible foreign policy, which Pravda
branded as primarily motivated by "anti-So-
vietism."
The article appeared to rationalize recent
Soviet calls for greater Communist unity in the
face of improving Chinese-American relations. It
attacked Chinese efforts to undermine Soviet in-
fluence in Eastern Europe, warning that Peking
would be pleased "by a crack, if only a small
one" in relations between socialist countries.
The article restated Soviet intentions to seek
better relations with China, but unlike some pro-
nouncements prior to word of the President's
impending visit, it contained no conciliatory
passages. Terming as "mythical" China's con-
tention that it faces "a threat from the North,"
Pravda did net level some of the emotional
charges that the Soviets have made against the
Chinese in the past. Indeed, the tone of recent
Soviet comments public and private suggests that
Moscow, while deeply disturbed by the implica-
tions of improving Chinese-American relations,
does not want Sino-Soviet relations to slip back
to the nadir of the 1969 border fighting.
. And Maintains Moderate Stance Toward US
Alexandr:;v's treatment of China stands in
marked contrast to recent Soviet handling of US
reasons for improving relations with China. A
lengthy Pravda article on 10 August presented an
unusually balanced assessment of US motivation
and reserved final judgment on the US-Soviet
implications o' the cominc presidential visit until
events develo further.
Most recently, Pravda on 2
eptember presented a relatively balanced ac-
count of Secretary Rogers' speech to the Ameri-
:an Legion, specifically noting his assurance that
Washington's China policy does not mean any
lessening of interest in serious negotiations with
the USSR. The Alexandrov article appeared the
same day as Soviet publication of the new agree-
ment on Berl n, thus implicitly contrasting Mos-
cow's ability to deal with the West with the
intractable differences with China. This treatment
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suggests that not only does Moscow want to avoid
damage to its wide-ranging contacts with Washing-
ton through harsh polemics, but at the same time
may be employing the China problem to justify
internally its pursuit of detente tactics in Europe.
Soviets Intensify Bilateral Contacts
In addition, the Soviets have moved recently
to intensify their bilateral relations with the US.
This has been particularly noticeable in the area
of cultural exchange, a field in which Soviet
performance has generally tended to be somewhat
perfunctory.
On 24 August, the chief of the Cultural
Relations Division of the Soviet Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Sofinsky, expressed interest in nego-
tiating a new cultural exchange agreement before
expiration of the current one, which covers
1970-71. If the Soviets follow through, it would
mark the first time since 1959 that they have
agreed to negotiate a new agreement before
expiration of the old one.
In a visit to Soviet Minister of Culture
Furtseva on 3 September, the US ambassador
found her attitude much more forthcoming than
usual as she stressed the importance of cultural
relations in paving the way for better political
relations. Sofinsky told a new US cultural coun-
selor on the same day that he "was lucky to arrive
at a time when his work was going to be much
easier than had been the case in the past." Both
Sofinsky and Furtseva offered assurances that sev-
eral problems in current cultural exchange pro-
grams would be ironed out.
In addition, a high official of the Soviet
Chamber of Commerce recently made a plea for
closer cooperation with the US Embassy. In a
meeting requested with some urgency, he urged
greater US participation in Soviet exhibitions
next year, and even suggested a comprehensive
exhibit of US products, lamenting that the last
such US exhibit in Moscow was in 1957. The
comments of these Soviet officials mark a striking
change in tone and attitude and suggest that they
have received their marching orders to encourage
more active and visible US contacts. Moscow may
hope to demonstrate to Washington that it is
more profitable to deal with Moscow than with
the "intractable" Chinese, and may also wish to
counter the publicity being given to Sino-US
developments. In addition, the Soviets doubtless
want reassurance that US interest in bilateral
contacts has not waned.
The newest round of US-Soviet bilateral
talks will get under way in Moscow on 12 Octo-
ber, dealing with US-Soviet naval incidents. In
addition Ambassador Dobrynin has informed
Secretary Rogers that Moscow is prepared to
begin talks on outstanding bilateral maritime
issues this fall-a move which was preceded by US
relaxation of port restrictions against Soviet
vessels. It would not be surprising if Moscow
should also seek additional discussions on such
subjects as bilateral trade. This would be con-
sistent with Premier Kosygin's comments to US
representatives to the "Dartmouth Conference"
in Kiev in July, when he lamented the low level of
US-Soviet commerce.
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International Economic Developments
Four weeks after President Nixon's an-
nouncements the international financial markets
have settled into a relatively stable, although tem-
porary, pattern that is unlikely to be altered be-
fore the IMF meeting in late September.
Tokyo remains determined to minimize the
yen's revaluation. New restrictions have been
placed on capital flows and on the freedom of
Japanese banks to buy and sell foreign currencies.
Moreover, the Bank of Japan has been intervening
directly in the market. As a result, the yen has
floated in a relatively narrow band at about six
percent above parity.
European currencies are fluctuating within a
narrow band, established soon after the 23 Au-
gust reopening of currency markets. The markets
have remained relatively inactive, as many specu-
lators apparently are remaining on the sidelines.
The pound has appreciated about 2.5 percent
against the dollar, while the mark's value has
deviated about one percentage point from its pre -
15 August value-eight percent above nominal
parity. The French "financial" franc has ap-
preciated by four percent, while the "commer-
cial" franc has hovered near its ceiling, at times
requiring official intervention.
French and German differences are still pre-
venting the establishment of a common EC posi-
tion. In a number of bilateral meetings, in the EC
monetary comn ittee meeting at Brussels, and in a
Group of Ten deputy finance ministers meeting at
Paris, the maj,ar European countries, except
France, agreed that a realignment of their cur-
rencies is neces ary. Nevertheless, there is uncer-
tainty over ultimate US objectives and con-
siderable resentrient of US methods.
European discussions of a possible dollar
devaluation-primarily as a concession to
France-reversed the earlier decline in gold prices.
Between the Prasident's 15 August speech and 1
September, gold prices on the London market fell
from $43.00 per fine ounce to $40.65. This drop
reflected the a[ ,parent acceptance by speculators
that the official price of gold would not be in-
creased. In reaction to the recent suggestions that
the dollar be devalued, however, the price of gold
rose to $41.40 t:.y 8 September.
Canada is especially concerned about the
impact of the import surcharge, and is the first
country to take special measures to assist indus-
tries that would be hurt. Early economic indica-
tors show the Canadian economy to be experi-
encing an upturn, and Ottawa fears that the
surcharge would dampen the recovery. On 7 Sep-
tember, legislat on designed to maintain employ-
ment in industries affected by the surcharge was
introduced. In doing so, the Trudeau.government
rejected actions that could lead to a trade
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: Delegates from
around the world gathered in Montreal this week
to begin drafting the "unlawful interference" con-
vention that probably will call for the suspension
of air services to nations that tolerate air piracy.
This drafting session may also be capped by the
entry into force of the complementary "unlawful
seizure" convention opened for signature last De-
cember. That document, inspired by the US and
Canada, has already achieved nearly the requisite
ten ratifications. It would require adhering states
in which a hijacked plane lands either to extradite
or prosecute the aerial irates.
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NATO Plans Closer Look at Mutual Force Reductions
The Western allies are in the midst of prepa-
rations for a special high-level session of the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 5-6 October.
This meeting will decide how to move beyond the
bilateral soundings that have been taken with the
Warsaw Pact allies this summer regarding mutual
and balanced force reductions (MBFR). The prep-
arations to date have been marked by the cau-
tious and skeptical approach of the European
allies, based on their feeling that American sup-
port for MBFR is dictated essentially by domestic
US pressures.
The Europeans are fretting-in private con-
versations with US officials as well as in the
press-about the dependability of the US commit-
ment to the defense of Europe over the long
term. Despite reassurances from the US, the con-
vergence of recent events-particularly those as-
sociated with the financial crisis-has fed suspi-
cions that MBFR could turn out to be mainly a
cover for the large reductions in US forces.
The NAC session in October will probably
designate retiring Secretary General Brosio to
explore, in talks with Moscow and its Warsaw
Pact allies, the prospects for MBFR negotiations.
In recent discussions at NATO, the West Germans
have reiterated their support for MBFR but have
continued to urge a slow, orderly approach,
recommending initially limited and verifiable
reductions in order to build confidence in the
good intentions of both sides. Although the UK
still doubts that any reductions would be com-
patible with Western security, both Bonn and
London are prepared to begin a long and difficult
negotiating prccess. The French, however, remain
opposed to MBFR talks. Paris believes that the
West should make no cuts in its military forces in
Europe until the East-West political climate has
vastly improvec.
Some of he smaller allies are now assessing
more thoroughly the potential impact of MBFR
on their interests. A coalition of southern allies-
Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal-is emerging,
in opposition to any expansion of the geographi-
cal coverage of MBFR to include their territory.
Their concern is not so much that their forces
would be included, but that limitations might be
placed on the JS presence in the Mediterranean.
Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, appar-
ently are not opposed to an eventual extension of
MBFR coverage to include their territory.
The allies are likely to continue to look to
the US for leadership on NATO's MBFR position.
In spite of their hopes for detente and their
support for a Conference on European Security,
however, the a lies will continue to be tormented
with uncertainty about how Western Europe's
defense would be managed with a reduced US
presence.
Romania Solicits Diplomatic Backing
Although Soviet-inspired criticism of
Romania and Yugoslavia in bloc media has sig-
nificantly subsided in the last few weeks, covert
pressure on Bucharest apparently still continues.
The Ceausescu regime has recently made dip-
lomatic demarches in Paris, London, and Wash-
ington to obtain support, but it has not conveyed
any urgent concern. Meantime, Ceausescu used
recent trips to Romania by high-level representa-
tives of the Japanese and Spanish Communist
parties to enlarge on his adherence to an inde-
pendent course
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The three Romanian demarches were made
in Paris on 30 August, in London on 1 September,
and in Washington on 3 September. The ap-
proaches had a common theme: Soviet pressure
on Bucharest is incompatible with major trends
toward detente as exemplified by Sino-US rap-
prochement, the Berlin draft agreement, and
widespread interest in a conference on European
security.
In each instance, however, the Romanian
diplomats did not contribute much in the way of
specifics about Soviet pressure tactics. Instead,
they cited official anti-Romanian utterances in
Soviet bloc media which have included fabrica-
tions about an "anti-Soviet axis" in the Balkans
under Chinese sponsorship. Speaking with Secre-
tary of State Rogers in Washington, Ambassador
Bogdan also claimed that Moscow had exerted
economic pressure, but he added that this has
been "subtle and difficult to distinguish from
hard bargaining."
Bucharest undoubtedly is experiencing pres-
sure from Moscow and its allies. This could easily
occur in the economic sector; the Romanians
have obstructed Soviet aims but are dependent on
the USSR for some key raw materials. At the
same time, however, Bogdan invited Secretary
Rogers to visit Romania in the spring of 1972, an
indication that Soviet pressure is not yet intolera-
ble. Indeed, Bogdan described the demarches as
reflecting his government's view that not enough
has been done to make other governments aware
not only of Soviet pressure on Romania but also
of the threat such pressure poses to detente in
general.
The communique" summarizing the visit of
the Japanese party delegation amplified the
theme of a new Communist unity in which "there
is no need for any center of leadership in the
Communist movement in any part of the world."
Similarly, the Romanian-Japanese and the Ro-
manian-Spanish communique's denounced med-
dling in the affairs of another party, "including
support of factions of another party."
Each of these formulations could be con-
strued as being implicitly critical of Moscow and
to a lesser extent of Peking. Ceausescu, however,
probably sees them as serving to strengthen
Romania's claims that its policy toward the Com-
munist movement is impartial, aimed at real
socialist unity, and based on correct relations
between all parties.
Yugoslavs Dig in for Brezhnev Visit
This week Tito took his case for national
solidarity to the people in preparation for Soviet
leader Brezhnev's visit in late September. Stump-
ing Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, he made
impassioned pleas for unity and the rejection of
nationalist excesses. Tito clearly wants to produce
a convincing display of domestic cohesion as a
base for his negotiations with the Soviets, and
from first indications, he is succeeding.
Tito's success in past dealings with Soviet
leaders has been closely linked to his reliance on
firm domestic support against both implied and
actual Soviet threats. The internal upheaval
caused by the current political reform and con-
tinuing economic problems, however, might ap-
pear to Moscow as a rare opportunity to increase
Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. This summer Tito
has been unflinching in his resistance to subtle
Soviet pressures, but Brezhnev's presence in Bel-
grade will place a premium on domestic order and
unity.
Croatia presents the greatest potential for
embarrassment; nationalism flared there early last
spring. Tito, recognizing the possibility of a re-
vival, arrived in Zagreb last Monday to a tumul-
tuous-and carefully arranged-welcome. He
conducted an energetic round of personal politics
in the republic, bestowing his favor on moderates
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like Vladimir Bakaric and Mrs. Savka Uabcevic-
Kucar, and ignoring Croat leaders who waver in
facing down nationalist demands. Tito's strategy
seems to be aimed at encouraging the moderate
wing to take even stronger measures in defense of
Belgrade's policies.
Prior to visiting Croatia, the President
stopped off in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which has also
been troubled by nationalist agitation within its
Croatian minority. In speeches there, Tito
stressed the theme of national cooperation in the
partisan war against the Germans and condemned
those Yugoslavs who in the past cooperated with
foreign enemies because of national animosities.
Meanwhile Belgrade's media have been lay-
ing down a steacy barrage of complaints regarding
Soviet pressure. against the Balkan mavericks.
The latest salvo was directed against the Pravda
Alexandrov arti ae's criticism of China's improved
relations in the Balkans. Belgrade is, in effect,
warning Brezhr :v not to come in expectation of
Yugoslav concessions, and reassuring the Yugo-
slavs that the regime is willing to reject any Soviet
pressures.
Mixed Prospects for East European Harvests
Eastern Europe's total grain harvest has re-
bounded from a 1970 setback and may nearly
equal the record of 1969. This, however, is in
sharp contrast to the unfavorable prospects for
most other crops in the northern countries and in
Hungary. East Germany is in the worst position
of all the East European countries and for the
third straight year may have to increase imports
of all agricultural products.
Grain production for this year is estimated
tc be 12 percent above 1970, and in all countries
except East Germany almost certainly will exceed
the 1966-70 average level. Production of bread
grains is expected to increase 19 percent. The
picture is less clear for grains for livestock feed;
coarse grain (barley, oats, and corn) may increase
as much as six percent. However, the full impact
of unfavorable weather conditions on yields,
especially in East Germany, Poland and Hungary,
is not yet known.
Nongrain crops have not fared as well-ex-
cept in Bulgaria and Romania-because of poor
planting conditions and a summer drought. Im-
portant fall-harvest crops like potatoes, sugar
beets, late vegetables, and hay are expected to fall
below the 1966-70 average level of production.
East Germany and Poland will have an especially
acute shortage of roughage for feeding livestock
this winter. Tt e only major nongrain crops for
which a good t arvest is forecast for all countries
is oilseed.
East Eurc pe's demand for imported grain
through June cf next year will drop an estimated
1.5 million tons below the record level of 9.1
million tons imported last year. Good bread grain
harvests in the northern countries will lessen im-
imort requirements for milling-quality wheat, but a
shortage of fodder supplies will increase the
demand there or feed grain imports.
If the USSR agrees to provide as much grain
to the deficit northern area as the estimated 5.5
million tons delivered in the year which ended
last June, imports of free world grain by the
northern countries are unlikely to exceed two
million tons this year. Western sales of grain to
southern East Europe are unlikely, unless Hun-
gary's corn cop turns out to be smaller than
:,urrently forecast.
In fact, southern countries may improve
their export earnings from agricultural products
over the next 12 months. Romania and Bulgaria
will be net e.