WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009100030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
24 September 1971
No. 0389/71
Copy N2 so
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EDT, 23 September 1971)
Communist China: Is Mao III? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
Communist China: Drumming up Business Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Indochina: South Vietnam: Thieu Under Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cambodia: On the Road to Kompong Thom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Korea: Verbal Sparring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mixed Tidings from Brandt-Brezhnev Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
USSR: Brezhnev Widens his Personal Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Monetary Developments: Urgent Waiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1
Italy's New Regional Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
UK-Malta: Deadlock Finally Broken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Denmark: Election Results Produce No Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
India: Mrs. Gandhi Tightens the Reins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Pakistan: Bleak Prospects for Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Egypt-Israel: All Quiet on the Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Egypt: Sadat Speaks Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Yemen (Sana): A New Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Malagasy Republic: Tsiranana Rides High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Ethiopia-Japan: Growing Economic Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Breakup of East African Community Seems Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Argentina: Election Date Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Peru: Strike Increases Influence of Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
UN Developments: Security Council Takes up Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Africans Gird for Major Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The War on Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
NOTES: Philippines; International Oil; Norway; F___-] Honduras; Uruguay
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Communist China: IsMaolll?
Peking's decision to curtail sharply the tra-
ditional National Day celebrations on 1 October
almost certainly was due to a major internal polit-
ical development perhaps precipitated by the ill-
ness of Mao Tse-tung. Several Western press
services, attributing their information to diplo-
matic observers in Peking, report that prepara-
tions for the major rally scheduled for National
Day were inexplicably suspended last week; this
has since been confirmed by a spokesman of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cancellation of
these festivities is unprecedented.
Peking's decision does not appear
25X1 to have been taken by a plenary
session of the party central com-
mittee but by a smaller group of
central politburo fi ures.
The regime apparently had
intended to put on a spectacular
show. The French AFP corres-
pondent in Peking reported on
21 September that beginning in
late August thousands of parade
participants were seen daily prac-
ticing in formation at Tien An
Men Square and that workers were busily con-
structing floats for the parade. He noted that
these preparations came to an abrupt halt at the
"beginning of last week." This would suggest that
the decision to scale down the celebrations was
probably made on or about 12 September.
The most obvious explanation for the re-
gime's reluctance to put on its traditional show,
with its mandatory leadership turnout, is that a
FAR EAST
key member of the ruling politburo is seriously
ill. Mao Tse-tung last appeared on 7 August and
his designated heir, Defense Minister Lin Piao, has
not been seen since early June. Premier Chou
En-lai, Madame Mao, and other important civilian
politburo members evidently are not seriously ill
since they have made public appearances in the
past few days. Despite the fact that frequent
public absences by both Mao and Lin are not
unusual, Mao has never missed a National Day
celebration; the assumption he would not appear
Mao Tse-tung
this year has triggered intense
speculation concerning his
health. It seems highly unlikely
that Peking would delay an an-
noucement of his death for as
long as one week. Chinese Com-
munist spokesmen in Hong Kong
and at several Chinese embassies
have claimed that Mao is in ex-
cellent health.
Another possible explana-
tion is that the jockeying for po-
sition that has been under way
within the ruling politburo for
some time has taken a new turn.
Since last March, four civilian
members of the 25-member polit-
buro have dropped from public view for varying
lengths of time. They appear to be in serious
political trouble as a result of a prolonged investi-
gation into extremist policies associated with the
Cultural Revolution. Recently, there have been
tenuous indications that the investigation has
broadened to involve key military figures. Over
the past week, all but one of the military leaders
on the politburo have failed to make public ap-
pearances, a possible indication that they are
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involved either in further behind-the-scenes ma-
neuvering in Peking or, if Mao really is ill, in
discussions on maintaining leadership unity and
internal security.
The nonappearance of China's ranking mili-
tary authorities and the cancellation of prepara-
tions for the 1 October rally have coincided with
a nationwide standdown of most military flights
since 12 September. Thus there may be a relation-
ship between this unprecedented suspension of
flight activity and internal political developments.
Communist China: Drumming Up Business Abroad
Peking's dispatch of several high-ranking
trade delegates abroad has highlighted China's ef-
fort to strengthen international economic and
political ties, particularly with European states.
The minister of foreign trade is to head a delega-
tion to France, Italy, and Algeria next month.
The trips to Paris and Rome are to reciprocate
similar visits to Peking during the past year and to
assess interest in increased trade, while the stop in
Algiers will concern, at least in part, utilization of
a recently concluded Chinese credit agreement.
China's deputy foreign trade minister, who
recently completed a visit to Guyana, is currently
on a tour of Scandinavian countries, meeting with
industrial representatives and political leaders.
China's minister of light industry has been visiting
Yugoslavia over the past week in conjunction
with Peking's participation in the Zagreb trade
fair for the first time in over ten years. Later this
month, Chinese textile experts are expected to
visit Italy, France, and Switzerland.
With these initiatives, the Chinese are at-
tempting to exploit foreign interest in developing
a larger China market; Peking hopes to gain sup-
port from these countries for its international
political position,. At the same time, face-to-face
contacts with foreign industrialists will further
refurbish the international business community's
confidence in China, badly damaged by Peking's
erratic behavior during the Cultural Revolution.
Wider trade relations, particularly with developed
European states, also may enable the Chinese to
obtain much-needed sophisticated equipment at
favorable prices.
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So far, there has been no public reaction in
Peking to the decision to scale down National
Day festivities. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has announced that cancellation of the
usual parade in Peking and other major ceremo-
nial activities throughout the nation is merely a
"reform" designed to change the traditional way
of celebrating the holiday. This rationale appears
singularly thin given the abruptness with which
the unprecedented decision apparently was taken,
the continuing standdown in military flight activ-
ity, and other anomalous developments, which all
convey the impression that the decision was 25X1
prompted by some major problem besetting
China's unsettled leadership coalition.
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Indochina
Opposition is mounting against President
Thieu's plan to run alone, but he seems deter-
mined to ride out the storm. Radical student
groups in Saigon are taking a leading role in the
protest movements so far. They have made fire-
bomb attacks and have caused the most violent
confrontations with police since the student and
veteran demonstrations more than a year ago.
American personnel and property have been at-
tacked in Hue and Saigon. Student protests are
focusing on Thieu's referendum policy, but other
long-term grievances, such as compulsory student
military service, are also at issue.
It is clear that Vice President Ky and his
staff are actively supporting the students and that
they still are trying hard to rally all anti-Thieu
factions, including veterans and religious, po-
litical, and military groups as well as students,
into a united front. Ky has close ties with some
veteran groups and apparently has gained ground
among the students. He also has approached Big
Minh and may have won over some members of
Minh's staff. But Big Minh himself as usual is
wary of being used by Ky, and it is questionable
whether the two will be able to cooperate.
The feeling of crisis in Saigon may have been
intensified by a number of seemingly random,
violent actions; last week, an explosion devastated
a night club in the middle of the downtown area,
and this week terrorist attacks were reportedly
made against the country's foremost labor leader
and a prominent senator. Critics are likely to
speculate that the government is somehow in-
volved in these incidents. It seems at least equally
likely, however, that they are the work of the
Communists or radical opponents of the govern-
ment bent on heightening tensions.
A surprising number of personalities and
groups who have backed Thieu in the past have
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been adding their voices to protests against the
referendum.
Stirrings of dissent also are being heard in
the National Assembly from former Thieu sup-
porters as well as from long-term oppositionists.
A Lower House bloc has adopted a manifesto
urging that all means be used to oppose Thieu's
re-election. The Upper House has passed a resolu-
tion criticizing the President's tactics and urging
him to step down while a new, contested election
is organized.
Despite this heavy fire, Thieu retains over-all
control of the situation. The army still seems to
be behind him, the An Quang is not on the
attack, and the various opposition elements are
having trouble agreeing on a specific alternative to
the referendum plan. The population in the coun-
tryside outside of Saigon, among whom Thieu has
cultivated support for years, is largely indifferent
to the concerns of students and other urban po-
litical factions. These considerations will work in
Thieu's favor during the turmoil of the next
couple of weeks, but it seems likely that he will
have to do a good deal of fence-mending if he
hopes to restore political stability in the cities
over the longer term.
Enemy Action Up
Communist attacks inflicted fairly sub-
stantial allied casualties in several parts of South
Vietnam last week. The most damaging assault
was conducted by a sapper unit against a major
South Vietnamese command post just west of
Tay Ninh city early in the week. The assault was
preceded by a heavy mortar and large-caliber
rocket barrage-a new twist in sapper tactics. It
accounted for 21 South Vietnamese troops killed
and 63 wounded, against 54 of the attackers
killed and seven captured.
Most Communist attacks this week were
staged by local force and sapper units, but in the
western delta the Communists are deploying
larger units against South Vietnamese troops at-
tempting to clear the U Minh Forest. In the most
vigorous enemy countereffort since the govern-
ment operations began there late last year, the
enemy is accepting heavy casualties in order to
maintain pressure on positions established by the
South Vietnamese 21st Division. This enemy
action has probably been prompted by the need
for the North Vietnamese 95th and 18B and the
Viet Cong D-2 regiments to defend important
base camps in the forest. The actions, however,
could also be in response to appeals from higher
commands for attacks in strength before Presi-
dent Thieu's referendum on 3 October.
There have been a number of exhortations
to increase military harassment and intimidate
voters in order to disrupt the balloting through-
out South Vietnam. Most of these have called for
stepped-up activities from 20 September through
5 October. Major North Vietnamese combat units
could begin larger scale offensive activities in
some regions, the DMZ area and the central
highlands for example, but these are more likely
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to occur after the monsoon rains ease in mid-
25X1 October.
Cambodia: On the Road to Kompong Thom
Government forces are resuming their drive
to reopen Route 6 to the long-isolated town of
Kompong Thom. The light enemy resistance that
the Cambodian Army's Chenla II operation has
encountered since it was launched a month ago
probably prompted Prime Minister Lon Nol to
reverse his earlier decision to halt the drive at
Kompong Thmar, at the junction of Routes 6 and
21. Four battalions from the Chenla I I task force
have now occupied Tang Krasang. They are
expected to continue the effort to clear the
remaining 15 miles between that town and
Kompong Thom.
The success of Chenla II appears to have
stimulated the army high command to begin map-
ping out similar campaigns to reopen sections of
other key highways during the dry season. A
senior army officer recently told the US defense
attache that Phnom Penh's plans call for reoc-
cupying Route 15 north of Prey Veng, reopening
Route 7 from Krek to Tonle Bet, and clearing
Route 3. The officer also said that Lon Not is still
talking about trying to retake Kratie Province,
although other Cambodian leaders recognize that
this would be a very difficult and ambitious
undertaking.
The Communists' failure to offer any sig-
nificant opposition to Cambodian units on Route
6 has been in keeping with the generally conserva-
tive military posture they have maintained during
most of the rainy season. Relying on economy-of-
force tactics, they have focused on harassing a
number of other main lines of communication. In
recent weeks, they have been particularly active
in the northwest, where they have carried out a
series of disruptive actions against Route 5 and
the rail line running from Battambang to Phnom
Penh. Enemy elements have also been putting
more pressure on Siem Reap town.
Enemy activities were capped by another
"spectacular" in the Phnom Penh area when, on
19 September, the Communists struck Esso and
Shell petroleum storage tanks with rocket and
mortar fire. The attack was the most significant
action in Phnom Penh since the raid last January
on the city's airfield. Eight of the 14 tanks at the
Esso facility and six of the 15 tanks at the Shell
facility were damaged; 2 million gallons of fuel
went up in smoke.
The damage has produced a temporary dis-
ruption of petroleum supplies for Phnom Penh's
civilian population, and gasoline rationing has
been reinstituted. Military operations will not be
affected.
The
Cambodians currently have a surplus of chartered
petroleum vessels and can use some of these as
floating reserves until the stationary tanks are
repaired.
Laos: Preparing for the Future
Both sides in north Laos are preparing for
the dry season, no more than a month or so away.
Restrained by policy considerations from probing
farther eastward, Vang Pao's irregulars are digging
in on the ground they already hold and are trying
to take a number of tactically important positions
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Their logistical preparations are clearly
under way. most of the
roads east and immediately north of the Plaine
are in excellent shape despite air attacks and
monsoon rains, and =increasing amounts of
supplies are being moved to the Corn
forward positions.
25X1
25X1
on the northern edge of the Plaine des Jarres. The
irregulars lost these positions in late August.
The North Vietnamese, although they have
been avoiding large-scale attacks, have been trying
to keep the irregulars off-balance. Some enemy
troops have redeployed to contest Vang Pao's
moves north of the Plaine, but otherwise the
North Vietnamese have given no firm sign of
where or when they will start the offensive to
retake the Plaine.
PHILIPPINES: President Marcos last week rein-
stated the writ of habeas corpus in 27 of the
Philippines' 66 provinces because, he said, the
"Communist insurgency" has substantially ended.
Habeas corpus was suspended on 23 August after
grenades killed ten people at an election rally in
Manila. Marcos' action in suspending the writ
brought heavy criticism that he had overreacted
and was trying to use the bombing incident to
move against his political enemies. Although
Vang Pao's forces this summer captured
nearly 1,000 tons of supplies, including 863 tons
of food, 88 tons of ammunition, and 12 tons of
weapons. This is only about one eighth of the
amount they lost to Vang Pao in 1969. Although
the losses will set back the Communist timetable,
the supplies can be replenished within a relatively
short time.
Government forces are continuing to-expand
their control around the town of Paksong, taken
on 17 September. Several high-ground positions
have been occupied and additional government
units have been flown in. Both sides suffered
heavy casualties in the final battle; government
forces lost 58 killed and 137 wounded with 45
still missing while the enemy had 134 known
killed and 20 wounded.
Marcos' recent action will dampen the criticism,
opposition leaders have been quick to point out
that the suspension of habeas corpus is still in
effect in the populous areas of central and eastern
Luzon, Mindanao, and in other regions in which
antigovernment dissidence is strong. In particular,
the writ remains suspended in the Manila area,
scene of the most active opposition to the Marcos
regime.
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Korea: Verbal Sparring
The preliminary stage of the bilateral talks
between the North and South Korean Red Cross
delegations on the problem of divided families
began on 20 September with both sides jockeying
to gain the advantage. Pyongyang adopted a con-
ciliatory tone at the meeting and sought to up-
stage Seoul by claiming credit for proposing the
talks. The North Koreans also urged that the talks
move ahead swiftly and held out the possibility
that they could soon evolve into full-fledged bi-
lateral negotiations on the unification of Korea.
Pyongyang's position is clearly designed to im-
prove its domestic and international image, spe-
cifically in anticipation of a discussion of the
Korean question'at the current session of the UN
General Assembly.
Seoul is using the talks as leverage for re-
questing a postponement of substantive discus-
sion of the Korean question at the UN lest its
position suffer from repercussions of the Chinese
representation debate. At the same time, the
South Koreans are attempting to prevent the talks
from moving too rapidly in the direction of politi-
cal discussion. Speaking at a cabinet interpellation
on 14 September, Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil
ruled out any consideration at the talks of na-
tional unification within the next decade. Under-
scoring this official view, Seoul has drawn up a
scenario for spinning out the preliminary stage
through detailed negotiations on the place, date,
and agenda for the plenary session. The South
Koreans did press for a continuation of the pre-
liminary sessions at the meeting on 20 September,
but they may decide not to inhibit progress in
order to avoid domestic and international criti-
cism for foot-dragging on an extremely popular
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EUROPE
Mixed Tidings from Brandt-Brezhnev Meeting
Chancellor Brandt's visit to the Soviet Union
on 16-18 September produced no major break-
throughs but did provide an opportunity for a
frank exchange of views between West German
and Soviet leaders. The meeting represented an-
other step toward removing the aura of distrust
that has surrounded contacts between the two
countries and thus helped to normalize relations.
phase Berlin talks must proceed on the basis of an
agreed German text of the Four-Power accord.
Thus, a test of wills, similar to that which charac-
'~erized the earlier Four-Power talks, continues
between Bonn and Pankow, though the impasse
will probably be broken eventually.
Brandt returned generally optimistic about
Soviet policy toward Western Europe and West
Germany, but without illusions as to Soviet will-
ingness to make his task much easier, particularly
on the inter-German negotiations. Brezhnev de-
clined to intervene with the East Germans in
support of Brandt's argument that the second-
Brezhnev and Brandt During Crimea Visit
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On East-West questions, Brezhnev projected
an image of flexibility and interest without exert-
ing any pressure on Brandt. He convinced the
chancellor that Moscow wants an early confer-
ence on European security, but agreed with 25X6
Brandt's wish to drop from the communique the
phrase "in the near future," which Soviet drafters
had suggested.
On the question of mutual and balanced
force reductions, Brezhnev reiterated the Soviet
position that the talks should not be limited to
the US and USSR or to the area of Germany and
that foreign and indigenous forces should be in-
cluded-positions generally conforming to
NATO's. In addition, he made a nod toward
NATO's concern for "balanced" force reductions
by saying that, while he objected to "balanced"
as a NATO word, reductions should be effected
"without detriment to the participants.
USSR: Brezhnev Widens His Personal Role
Following his success last spring at the party
congress, where he significantly strengthened his
personal position, General Secretary Brezhnev is
broadening his role from party boss to that of
world statesman. In the former role, he dealt
primarily with the party leaders of other Commu-
nist countries, generally leaving official Soviet
contacts with the rest of the world to Premier
Kosygin and President Podgorny. His talks last
week with West German Chancellor Brandt and
his forthcoming trip to Paris mark his emergence
in his new role for which he has clearly been
preparing himself.
Commenting on the meeting, Brandt noted
signs of Brezhnev's increased self-confidence since
the chancellor's visit in August 1970. On that
occasion, Brezhnev had many papers and read
from them frequently. This time, Brezhnev alone
saw the chancellor and, in Brandt's view, he went
out of his way to make the exchange a state-to-
state and government-to-government one. He dis-
cussed matters in a more relaxed way and only
occasionally consulted the few papers that were
in evidence.
Soviet press treatment of the Brandt-Brezh-
nev talks has left no question as to who is in
charge of this area of the USSR's foreign policy.
Large front-page pictures and prominent articles
have emphasized the extent to which Brezhnev
alone dealt with Brandt. Moreover, Pravda on 18
September also front-paged a letter from North
Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan thanking
Brezhnev for a previously unpublished message of
sympathy on the flood in North Vietnam. Ac-
cording to Le Duan, the message was sent by
Brezhnev personally in the name of the party
central committee and the "Soviet Government."
The latter is a formulation usually reserved for
Premier Kosygin or President Podgorny.
It is a measure of Brezhnev's relative lack of
firsthand experience with the rest of the world
that his Paris visit next month will be his first trip
to a non-Communist country since he became
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party chief in 1964. As the Soviet president in the
Khrushchev era, he went to Finland, Africa, Iran,
and South Asia. His only trips to Western Europe
during that period, however, were to Italy to
attend the funeral of Communist leader Palmiro
Togliatti, and a private one-day visit to the Brus-
sels Exposition in 1958.
Brezhnev's course propels the party deeper
into the realm of operational diplomacy as op-
posed to policy formulation and, like his foray
into planning problems in the Council of Minis-
ters 18 months ago, tends to encroach somewhat
Monetary Developments: Urgent Waiting
Following the meeting in London last week
of the Group of Ten, the EC Council again de-
bated on 20-21 September possible responses to
the new US economic program. It did not ad-
vance beyond the community's previous position
of urging abolition of the US import surcharge as
a condition for realigning exchange rates. Since
London and other European capitals generally
agree with the EC line, little progress is expected
toward meeting US demands at the sessions this
weekend of the Ten in Washington or the annual
IMF meeting that follows immediately.
At the beginning of the week, reports in the
German press that Washington was seeking a
15-percent revaluation of the mark caused the
mark to rise sharply against the dollar. Because
the Bundesbank failed to intervene Monday,
many foreign exchange dealers believed Bonn
would accept a higher revaluation. The Bundes-
bank, however, did enter the market Tuesday
when the effective mark revaluation approached
10 percent. This was the first intervention by
Germany's central bank in a month, and it repre-
sents a decision to hold the effective revaluation
vis-a-vis the dollar to around 8 percent. Other
currencies also floated upward: the Belgian "fi-
nancial" franc for the first time appreciated more
than 5 percent above its old parity; the Dutch
guilder was up about 6.25 percent; and the British
on Premier Kosygin's preserves. Despite the shift
in their relative roles, however, Brezhnev seems to
be continuing to operate within the framework of
collective leadership. For example, he broke off
his working vacation in the Crimea immediately
before Brandt's visit there and made a brief trip
to Moscow, apparently for last-minute consul-
tations with his colleagues on the Politburo.
Moreover, both Kosygin and Podgorny have
extremely active travel schedules themselves-the
former to Algeria, Canada, Norway, and Den-
mark, and the latter to Hanoi and Iran.
pound rose to about 3.25 percent over the former
rate. In part, the renewed pressure on the dollar
reflected the belief that substantial European re-
valuations would be required before the US
would agree to any increase in the dollar price of
gold or remove the 10 percent import surcharge.
Official and press comments on the London
session of the Ten have ranged from characteriz-
ing it as a "dialogue of the deaf" to occasional
more hopeful analyses. The London Times, for
example, took heart from the general agreement
that currencies need realignment and that radical
remedies are required to restore equilibrium to
the US balance of payments. The paper also
noted that no one any longer envisages a huge
increase in the gold price, adding that multilater-
alism is not dead when everyone agrees on the
need for study on the international level of the
currency realignments necessary to bring about a
reversal of US deficits. Nevertheless, the political
drumfire on the US persists. There is evidence
from discussions in NATO and elsewhere that the
US program, and specifically the linkage between
remedying US payments and reducing US military
expenses in Europe, are detracting from an atti-
tude of mutual trust likely to be increasingly
necessary to upcoming discussions on East-West
issues.
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Within the community, Germany is advocat-
ing greater understanding for the US position.
The French continue privately to underscore the
"shameful American challenge," as one high Quai
official termed the new economic program, and
to lament the strong position vis-a-vis the Euro-
peans which the US has gained by "acting so
brutally." A press release issued by the EC Coun-
cil on 21 September toned down the bitter atti-
tudes held by some officials among the Six, evi-
dently because the community sees little to be
gained at the moment from emphasizing possible
retaliation. Even so, more is likely to be heard in
the immediate future about "compensatory"
measures that members might take to offset the
INTERNATIONAL OIL: The eleven members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) this week approved a resolution call-
ing for "participation" in Western oil company
operations within their respective borders. Details
are to be published on 7 October, but the pro-
gram is expected to call for an initial 20-percent
equity in oil production. The resolution probably
has been carefully formulated in an effort to
avoid any linkage to the five-year revenue pacts
laboriously worked out earlier this year between
OPEC and the Western oil companies. Never-
NORWAY: Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli's rul-
ing Labor Party suffered a drop in popularity in
local elections held on 19-20 September. Labor
received only 42.4 percent of the vote compared
with 44.0 percent in the last local elections in
1967. The only major issue in the two-day elec-
tions was Norway's proposed membership in the
European Communities. While the relatively small
Center Party, a member of the former coalition
government, scored significant gains by opposing
Norwegian membership, the election Jailed to
provide a clear-cut verdict on the issue. Last year,
import surcharge and proposed US tax legislation
designed to improve the US trade position.
Although the community holds that unity is
a prerequisite to international agreements on
monetary questions, France and Germany in par-
ticular remain at odds over how to shape an
internal EC system that could serve as a unit
within an international reform scheme. Many ob-
servers believe that Paris wants some devaluation
of the dollar in terms of gold in order to "offset"
any revaluation of the franc that might result
from refixing rates within the EC.
theless, further lengthy and acrimonious bilateral
negotiations are expected soon and will involve
most of the wholly owned subsidiaries of the
large foreign oil companies operating in the OPEC
countries. Some existing arrangements between
oil companies and the governments already pro-
vide for participation. Algeria, for instance, has
nationalized 51 percent of all oil operations, and
Nigeria is negotiating an agreement with one com-
pany for 51-percent participation in offshore oil
development.
the EC entry issue split the ruling bourgeois
coalition and ushered in the present minority
government. The recent election results are likely
to reinforce the Center Party's opposition to EC
entry, thus perpetuating the coalition split. Al-
though the former coalition parties could the-
oretically unite to unseat the Labor government
at any time, this is not likely to happen until the
EC question is out of the way. That is not ex-
pected to occur before 'next summer at the ear-
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Italy's New Regional Governments
Government decentralization is proceeding
despite long-standing concern that the move
would improve the Communists' political position
and increase administrative inefficiency. The new
regional governments do seem in fact to be adding
to the Communists' political standing, but the
party apparently is not operating in an authoritar-
ian or exclusive manner. The effect of the reform
on governmental efficiency seems likely to vary
considerably from one region to another.
Regional administrations throughout the
country were required by Italy's constitution of
1947, but their establishment-except in some
special cases-was long delayed. Assemblies for
the regions were not elected until May 1970. The
assemblies then elected regional executives, of
which three were Communist or Communist-
Socialist while the other twelve were centrist,
often with Christian Democratic leadership.
All of the new regional assemblies have now
enacted constitutions, and these have received the
required endorsement of the national parliament.
The statutes of the Communist-dominated regions
show no significant political differences from the
statutes of non-Communist areas.
The regions are constitutionally entitled to
legislative and administrative powers within as yet
unspecified limits in a number of fields including
urban and rural police, agriculture, forestry,
public welfare, town planning, and public works.
To assure an orderly transition from national to
regional authority in these areas, Rome will issue
decree laws to define boundaries between regional
and national competence as well as to provide
essential central government coordination and
supervision. These laws will probably be in effect
next January, although some may be delayed
until January 1973.
Regional leaders are now absorbed in the
preparation of comments on the initial drafts of
the decree laws. They have become aware that the
regions will be better able to deal with Rome if
they stand together when their interests coincide,
and they realize also that many seemingly local-
ized concerns are part of larger problems affecting
other regions, even distant ones. Consequently,
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L New regional government under
Communist domination
New regional government under
centrist domination
Previously existing regional
government
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~rl~JicJ 1
representatives of various regions have been meet-
ing from time to time on an ad hoc basis.
Officials of the three Communist-run regions
have participated in such cooperative exchanges.
They have been consulting freely with non-
Communist regions, particularly in the industrial
north, and have avoided any exclusive dealings
among themselves. Even the more conservative
Christian Democrats show little concern about
cooperating with administrators of the Commu-
nist regions.
UK-Malta: Deadlock Finally Broken
After several months of intense negotiations,
which at times appeared to be at the breaking
point, the UK and Malta agreed last weekend on
procedures and a timetable for the negotiation of
a new defense and financial agreement. The dead-
lock was broken in talks between Prime Ministers
Heath and Mintoff in London. The two leaders
agreed that financial terms should be worked out
within three months and a detailed agreement
completed within six months. Mintoff implicitly
accepted the UK-NATO cash-aid offer, which is
expected to rise to $24 million, on the under-
standing that bilateral aid from individual NATO
countries be negotiated promptly.
The Maltese leader agreed to lift restrictions
placed on British forces on the island and to
restore the previous arrangements, which gave
London a veto over third-country military use of
Malta's airfields and harbors. Mintoff made clear,
however, that his dependence on the West would
not be as complete as that of the former govern-
ment. He told Heath that regular visits by the US
Sixth Fleet would be acceptable, but with the
clear understanding that "very occasional"
courtesy visits by Soviet naval forces would be
The effect of the new regions on over-all
administrative efficiency seems likely to depend
largely on the quality of the various regional
governments. The Communists have been notably
thorough in setting up their bureaucratic ma-
chinery and are utilizing the best Communist
administrative talent of their reaions.F-
required to maintain Malta's neutrality. Further,
Mintoff implied that he would agree to the
establishment of a Soviet Embassy on Malta.
NATO approved the Heath-Mintoff agree-
ment on 21 September and has instructed its
military budget committee to meet as soon as
possible to work out financial details. The British
are contributing a little over half of the $24
million annual package, most of which is in the
form of a direct cash payment, and have promised
to pay a portion of the total by 30 September.
The US, Germany, and Italy are the other major
contributors, with smaller amounts expected
from Belgium, Canada, and Iceland.
Mintoff is already turning his attention to
striking the best bargain possible in bilateral aid
negotiations. In talks with Chancellor Brandt
following his London visit, Mintoff tried without
success to get Brandt to "quantify" Bonn's bi-
lateral aid intentions. He also failed to get a
German commitment to expand its previous offer
of approximately $7.3 million in technical assist-
ance plus equipment.
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Mintoff probably will not entirely abandon probably impelled toward a settlement by his
his tough bargaining techniques as he negotiates concern over the possible quid pro quo that Libya
bilateral aid pacts and the final details of the or the USSR might ask in return for substantial
agreement with London. He apparently did con- aid, and by his realization that the Maltese remain
clude that his "brinksmanship" tactics would not basically pro-Western. i
result in a bigger Western offer. He also was
Denmark: Election Results Produce no Majority
To no one's surprise, Denmark's quadrennial
parliamentary election on 21 September gave
neither the incumbent center-right coalition nor
the chief opposition party a majority in the next
parliament.
Jens Otto Krag, head of Denmark's largest
party, the Social Democrats, called on Prime
Minister Baunsgaard to resign and clear the way
for Krag to form a minority government. A
former prime minister himself, Krag had said be-
fore the election that he would form a minority
government, with the tacit parliamentary support
of the left-wing Socialist People's Party, if his
party regained the seven seats it lost in the 1968
election and if the incumbent coalition lost its
majority. As it turned out, the Social Democrats
gained eight seats, for a total of 70 of the 179,
while the coalition lost its majority, dropping
from 98 to 88 seats. Krag would have the support
of two and possibly three of the four representa-
tives from Greenland and the Faeroe Islands,
although this will not be confirmed until 5 Octo-
ber. With the tacit support of the Socialist
People's Party, which jumped from 11 to 17
seats, Krag would have the backing of 89 or 90 of
the 179 deputies.
Baunsgaard, whose Radical Liberals were the
only one of the three coalition parties to emerge
unscathed, has refused to resign pending a re-
count, but it should not improve his situation.
Baunsgaard has not been willing to reconstitute
his coalition as a minority government.
If Krag forms a minority government, he
may well find broad support for his domestic
program, which has not differed markedly from
the coalition's. On foreign policy, however, he
may drift somewhat to the left in areas where
there is some identity of views with the Socialist
People's Party while seeking to avoid contentious
issues on which the two parties differ. The gov-
ernment could pursue a cut in defense spending
and a retrenchment in the defense establishment,
and it may extend diplomatic recognition to
North Vietnam. But it could decline any initia-
tives on the divisive issue of Danish entry into the
European Communities, which will in any event
be decided next year by popular referendum.
The difficulties facing a minority gov-
ernment are likely to be so great, however, that
Krag may call for new elections during 1972. He
would probably wait until after the referendum
on the EC so as to keep this question out of the
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
India: Mrs. Gandhi Tightens the Reins
Prime Minister Gandhi's dominance over her
Ruling Congress Party is becoming more ap-
parent. In the six months since she led her party
to an overwhelming victory in national elections,
she has made several bold moves that highlight
her growing political power.
Last July, she forced the resignation of
Mohan Lai Sukhadia, chief minister of the pre-
dominantly Hindu northern state of Rajasthan.
Sukhadia had held the state's top political office
for 17 years and, until Mrs Gandhi's low-key but
relentless attack against him began, his position
seemed inviolate because he appeared to possess
an independent political base. Sukhadia was re-
placed by Barkatullah Khan, a Muslim who owes
his new job to no one but Mrs. Gandhi. Earlier
this month, Mrs. Gandhi moved against Brahman-
anda Reddi, chief minister of the southern state
of Andhra Pradesh, whose domination of local
politics had made him one of the most powerful
figures in the Ruling Congress Party. Reddi's suc-
cessor has yet to be named, but Mrs. Gandhi has
made it clear that she will do the choosing.
With Reddi's fall, pundits in New Delhi are
openly speculating about the prospects of
Maharashtra State's chief minister, V. P. Naik, a
member of Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan's inner
circle. Chavan was Maharashtra's chief minister
until he left some years ago to accept a position
in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet. The prime minister
probably sees Chavan as her greatest potential
rival for power, and has long been interested in
eroding his support.
Although all four men declared their al-
legiance to Mrs. Gandhi when the Congress Party
split in 1969, they were all ranged against her in
various degrees before the split and mutual trust
has never been high. With the two dismissals, Mrs.
Gandhi will gain a free hand to ensure that candi-
dates of her choice are nominated by the local
Ruling Congress to represent the party in state
electoral contests, scheduled to take place by
March 1972.
The two high-level dismissals, together with
other local Ruling Congress purges, have stimu-
lated rumors in New Delhi of imminent cabinet
changes. Mrs. Gandhi last manipulated her cabinet
in March, when younger people were brought in
to fill subcabinet offices, but little new blood was
infused into the ministerial ranks. Mrs. Gandhi
doubtless wishes to upgrade the "progressive"
image of her government and make it more re-
sponsive to her dictates. Her recent actions indi-
cate that she may now feel strong enough to
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Pakistan: Bleak Prospects for Reconciliation
President Yahya Khan continues to take
steps ostensibly aimed at improving the domestic
political situation but probably designed pri-
marily to assuage international criticism of his
government. His recent efforts are unlikely to
improve relations between Pakistan's two wings.
In East Pakistan, a civilian cabinet was ap-
pointed on 17 September by A. M. Malik, the
civilian provincial governor named earlier this
month to replace an unpopular West Pakistani
general. Malik and his cabinet ministers all are
East Pakistanis, but he shares his authority with a
West Pakistani general who holds the post of
Adding to
Malik's-and Yahya's-problem is the suspicion
with which army leaders in the East regard any
move toward civilian government.
Islamabad has also announced that by-elec-
tions will be held in East Pakistan in December to
President Yahya Khan
fill seats that became vacant last month when the
government disqualified a majority of Awami
Leaguers who had been elected to the national
and provincial assemblies. The large number of
disqualifications, together with the likelihood
that many of the "acceptable" legislators prob-
ably will decline to take their seats, will dilute
whatever legitimacy these assemblies might have
had in the eyes of the East Pakistanis. Addition-
ally, there is considerable doubt that government
forces will be able to remove the threat of guer-
rilla actions before the poll.
In a measure aimed at increasing civilian
participation on the national level, Yahya has
agreed that the new constitution to be drawn up
by his government will be submitted to the na-
tional assembly for its consideration before being
proclaimed by the executive branch. The assem-
bly will have 90 days to suggest revisions; Yahya
retains the power to veto any recommended
changes.
dealings with the Bengalis.
Another action taken by Yahya earlier this
month-the announcement of an amnesty for
most East Pakistani insurgents-does not appear
to have made much of an impression so far on the
Bengalis; the latest measures will not do much
either to lessen their hostility toward Islamabad.
Bengali leaders have indicated that as long as
Awami League chief Mujibur Rahman remains
imprisoned, they will not respond favorably to
Yahya's political moves. Mujib is currently being
tried in secret for treason before a military tribu-
nal, and is expected to be found guilty and pos-
sibly sentenced to death. The sentence has to be
reviewed by Yahya, whose decision to uphold or
commute it could indicate whether he intends to
pursue a hard or a conciliatory line in future
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Egypt-Israel: All Quiet on the Canal
There have been no further incidents along
the Suez Canal following the Israeli air strikes on
18 September. The sequence of events that led to
the Israeli action began on 11 September when
the Israelis shot down an Egyptian SU-7 conduct-
ing low-level reconnaissance of Israeli positions
along the canal.
The Egyptians retaliated for the loss of the
SU-7 on 17 September when they used missiles to
shoot down an Israeli C-97 which, according to
the Israelis, was flying "well on the east side of
the canal." Seven of the eight Israeli crewmen
were killed. Because the plane was over Israeli
territory and unarmed, an Israeli response was
almost guaranteed. The following day, the Israelis
responded with air strikes at Egyptian SAM sites
along the canal. Israeli aircraft first flew along the
canal to induce radar emissions from seven pre-
selected sites between Ismailia and Suez City.
Then eight Israeli Phantoms launched a total of
12 Shrike missiles at the targets from the Israeli
side of the canal. None of the Shrikes hit the
targets, however, and all seven sites were still
operational when the Israeli planes left the area.
The Egyptians launched missiles at the Israeli
planes during the attack, but the Israelis were out
of range and no missile came close.
The Israelis probably regard their action,
even though not a success, as a sufficient warning
to the Egyptians of Israel's intention to respond
forcefully to future Egyptian acts against Israeli
forces. The Egyptians have claimed that they suf-
fered no losses as a result of the Israeli action,
indicating that they are probably willing to regard
the events of last week as a closed chapter.
Neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis appear
to desire an escalation of the fighting in the near
future. The recent events, however, have illus-
trated the basic fragility of the present cease-fire
and the way in which military action by either
side is likely to provoke reactions.
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Egypt: Sadat Speaks Out
President Sadat's words and actions during
the past week reflect his determination to focus
international attention on the Middle East and to
put his personal stamp on the restructuring of the
Egyptian state.
In a nationwide address on 16 September,
Sadat took the US to task for its "failure" to
define its own position on a settlement of the
Middle East dispute. Although he claimed that
the Americans had given up their role as "mail-
man" between Egypt and Israel and that they had
even misrepresented the positions of the dis-
putants, Sadat stopped short of denouncing US
mediation efforts. Instead, he called for a UN
Security Council session at some unspecified time
so that the international community could
"shoulder its responsibility" toward the Middle
East. By using these tactics, Sadat seemed intent
both on goading the US into wringing concessions
from the Israelis and on refocusing international
attention on the continued deadlock in the talks.
He no doubt views the shootdown of the Egyp-
tian SU-11 and the Israeli C-97 in the past two
weeks as having the merit of reminding Washing-
ton of the fragility of the cease-fire and the
dangers inherent in the protracted diplomatic im-
passe.
Although foreign policy overshadowed the
domestic aspects of Sadat's speech, he did outline
plans for a broad reorganization of the state ap-
Page 19
paratus and the economy. The central theme of
this portion of his address was that the reforms
were not ends in themselves but were instead
necessary in order to build a new domestic foun-
dation for the "battle."
Among the significant specifics of his action
program, Sadat has directed the simplification of
the cumbersome bureaucratic processes that have
hampered expansion of industrial production.
New legislation will provide for tighter guarantees
to foreign investors and for the creation of indus-
trial "free zones" where customary trade restric-
tions will be waived to facilitate the formation of
new export industries.
The first step in government reorganization
was taken on 19 September when Sadat ap-
pointed a new, modified cabinet. Although the
key members were retained, several ministries
were abolished and two new ones-war produc-
tion and maritime transport-were created.
Sadat has portrayed Egypt's new constitu-
tion, which came into force on 11 September, as
his administration's blueprint for the building of a
modern industrial society. Since dismissing those
who shared power with him last May, Sadat has
given high priority to the reshaping of govern-
mental, political, and economic institutions.
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Yemen (Sana) : A New Cabinet
Muhsin al-Ayni, 39-year-old diplomat and
politician, accepted the premiership and ap-
pointed a cabinet late last week. The cabinet,
with its many old faces, is composed of both
right- and left-wingers. The naming of military
officers as deputy premier and as ministers of
interior and communications reflects the army's
key role in national politics.
In addition to the post of premier, al-Ayni
has also assumed direction of foreign affairs. The
previous holder of the portfolio was an Adeni
whose appointment had been interpreted as sig-
naling stepped-up assistance for Adeni dissidents
operating out of Yemen with Saudi Arabian back-
ing. Although al-Ayni is known to oppose the
radical government in Southern Yemen, his in-
Malagasy Republic: Tsiranana Rides High
President Tsiranana's pre-eminence was reaf-
firmed at the conference of the ruling Social
Democratic Party earlier this month. In a care-
fully manipulated vote, Tsiranana was designated,
without opposition, as the party's presidential
candidate for the national election scheduled for
early 1972. He also solidified his control over the
party's executive body, renamed the political
bureau, and apparently became party chief for
life. Moreover, the President downgraded the post
of party secretary general, last held by discredited
former vice president Resampa. Resampa, before
his downfall, was Tsiranana's heir apparent and a
potential rival. According to a new party statute,
Tsiranana will appoint the secretary general an-
nually from among the members of the political
bureau, who are also appointed by the President.
tentions toward it. have not yet been spelled out.
In the past, he has supported the idea of a
"Greater Yemen,"but it is likely that he will be
less intransigent toward the Aden regime than his
predecessor, who favored a military solution. Al-
Ayni has re-established a Ministry for Unity Af-
fairs, which may indicate that he intends to
launch a propaganda campaign in favor of uniting
the two Yemens.
In an interview, al-Ayni declared that posi-
tive neutrality and nonalignment would charac-
terize Sana's foreign policy. Although this may be
rhetoric, it could also signify hesitancy about
resumption of relations with the US.
Tsiranana's Tsiranana's renomination means his almost
certain re-election to the presidency. The gov-
ernment's prestige was badly damaged by a
bloody uprising last year in the southern part of
the island and by the detention of Resampa for
alleged coup plotting. Tsiranana, however, has
recently made an effort to soften the effects of
these events with a series of country-wide per-
sonal appearances. His opposition in the election
will be modest at best; the main opposing party,
which won only three of the 107 seats at stake in
the last legislative election, has so far failed to
nominate a presidential candidate.
Tsiranana may have more in mind than just
another seven-year term. According to rumors
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circulating in Tananarive, he may be planning to
become president for life. Tsiranana was ap-
parently impressed by the election of President
Banda of Malawi to a life-long term last July. It
has also been rumored that Tsiranana may call for
immediate elections, instead of waiting until 1972
as scheduled. Such a move would be uncon-
stitutional, but this factor would probably not
dissuade the mercurial Tsiranana, who advanced
the date of the 1965 presidential elections.
The party conference also endorsed Tsir-
anana's policy of developing closer ties to South
Africa. Relations between the two countries were
put on a more formal footing last month with the
establishment of a joint commission that will ex-
amine, among other things, customs problems,
trade, and technical assistance. The party's en-
dorsement increases chances that Tananarive may
establish diplomatic relations with South Africa, a
move the Malagasy Government has recently
hinted it is considering.
Ethiopia-Japan: Growing Economic Ties
Ethiopian economic relations with Japan
have grown substantially. Tokyo has found an
enthusiastic trade partner in Addis Ababa and
Ethiopia has been host to numbers of Japanese
missions searching for export markets, investment
opportunities, and sources of raw materials.
A number of Japanese-financed factories
have opened during the past year and imports
from Japan increased by more than 50 percent in
1970 to $25 million. Japan's climb to second
place as supplier of imports has been at the ex-
pense chiefly of the US, UK, and France, all of
whom suffered an absolute decline in exports to
Ethiopia last year.
Exports to Japan-primarily coffee-are in-
creasing rapidly but are still overshadowed by
imports, which last year were almost four times
the value of sales. While Addis Ababa has sought
out Japanese industrial projects that reduce its
needs for imports, these have frequently led to
high-cost production. The cost of products from
recently inaugurated factories producing garments
and steel pipe, for example, will be higher than
previous imports. Furthermore, Ethiopia is pro-
curing only one Japanese factory-a meat-process-
ing plant-that is designed to spur exports.
Earlier this year, Japan attended for the first
time the meeting of the international consortium
providing aid for Ethiopia. Ethiopia may hope
that Japan will provide sufficient aid to coun-
terbalance any reduction from the US, currently
the chief donor. Addis Ababa is trying to step up
implementation of an already much-delayed de-
velopment program. The current budget places
heavy emphasis on development expenditures,
with more than half the capital outlays ex ected
to come from foreign borrowin .
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Breakup of East African Community Seems Possible
The four-year-old East African Community
is threatened by the political tensions that have
arisen between Tanzania and Uganda since the
coup in Kampala last January. Despite some bene-
ficial developments, the community has not fos-
tered the hoped-for regional unity and its breakup
would not be deeply felt, especially since most
present common services could probably be sal-
vaged.
The community's operations-common eco-
nomic and communications services for these two
countries and Kenya-are stymied by Tanzania's
refusal to recognize the new Uganda Government.
This blocks any meeting of the community's
governing authority, consisting of the three heads
of state, which must approve major decisions. At
present, only routine business is conducted, and
continuity is maintained through informal con-
tact by lesser officials. A number of important
fiscal and administrative matters need to be unre-
solved, however.
Since its inception, the hoped-for regional
unity of the grouping has been impaired by ret-
rogressive measures and petty jealousies: the
demise of a single east African currency, the
creation of competing industries, the imposition
of exchange controls, and the restriction of
worker movement. Furthermore, economically
advanced Kenya is restive over being "held back"
in favor of the others, while Uganda and Tanzania
feel that Kenya's industrial economy has grown
largely because of its unrestricted access to their
markets.
Nevertheless, the community has been mutu-
ally beneficial in some aspects. East African trade
with the world, conducted largely under a com-
mon external tariff, has expanded rapidly in re-
cent years. With a market of about 35 million
people having an income of about $3 billion an-
nually-relatively high by African standards-the
community provides one of the most attractive
markets in Africa to foreign investors and credi-
tors. In practice, however, most of the industry
has gone to Kenya, by far the most receptive to
foreign capital.
Some worth-while features of the commu-
nity probably could be salvaged should it
break up. The free trade area and the four present
East African corporations-originally established
by the UK to handle railways, harbors, telecom-
munications, and postal services-probably would
be maintained. Moreover, the close economic rela-
tionship between Kenya and Uganda would prob-
ably survive because Kampala is dependent on
overland transport routes via Kenya for its ex-
ports and imports. Tanzania, because of its lim-
ited resource base, would suffer most, offering
further openings for the Chinese Commu-
nists.
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Sk CK1 1
Brazilian Extremists Dealt New Blows
During the past two weeks, radical oppo-
nents of the Medici government have lost a top
terrorist leader and have seen several priests sen-
tenced to prison on charges of aiding subversives.
On 17 September, military and civilian secu-
rity forces located and killed renegade army Cap-
tain Carlos Lamarca and a companion, culminat-
ing an extensive manhunt in the northeastern
state of Bahia. The 33-year-old Larnarca had
become the central figure in the terrorist move-
ment since his desertion from the army in early
1969. Under his leadership, the Popular Revolu-
tionary Vanguard carried out extensive operations
in urban centers, including bombings, bank rob-
beries, and three of the four kidnapings of foreign
diplomats. Unrelenting pursuit by security forces
beginning in late 1969 cut deeply into his
strength, however, resulting in dissension within
the group that apparently caused Lamarca to
leave it in March 1971.
Lamarca and several followers went to the
hinterlands of Bahia in late July to prepare for
rural guerrilla activities, but the authorities
learned of his presence before he was able to gain
significant support among the populace. His en-
trapment demonstrates anew the hazards that
face Brazilian terrorists who attempt to shift their
operations from a known urban environment to
an unfamiliar rural one. Lamarca was the last
active figure in the circle of terrorist leaders who
once headed the several groups that advocate vio-
lence against the government; his loss will be a
severe psychological blow to the subversives. It
may force them to adopt less visible, and there-
fore less vulnerable, methods of operation. These
would also be less effective.
25X1
Another setback to the extremists was the
conviction on 14 September in a Sao Paulo mil-
itary court of four priests charged with violating
national security laws by collaborating with the
National Liberating Action group of Carlos
Marighella, Lamarca's predecessor as principal
terrorist leader.
Although their prolonged
detention without trial has been the subject of
frequent protests, church officials apparently
were satisfied with the four-year sentences meted
out to the three defendants who faced the most
serious charges; a fourth defendant received a
six-month term, while eleven others were ac-
quitted.
The hierarchy's restrained reaction to the convic-
tions may warn the small number of radical
clerics that they can expect little assistance from
ranking church leaders if they become involved
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Argentina: Election Date Set
President Lanusse's announcement that na-
tional elections will be held on 25 March 1973
may have been prompted by the rising level of
civil unrest and the notable increase in rumors of
military plotting. The announcement of elec-
tions-the first for president since 1963 and the
first for congress since 1965-was made nearly a
month earlier than originally planned with the
apparent intention of sidetracking or pacifying
Lanusse's critics.
The rumors of military plotting against
Lanusse that have circulated widely in Buenos
Aires are to some extent a reflection of dissatis-
faction with the President's policy of accom-
modation with the Peronists and his failure to
deal with the nation's serious economic problems.
The unrest at this time, however, may be more
directly attributed to the confusion and appre-
hension over army promotions and assignments,
which reportedly are being made early this year.
Lanusse reportedly is in the process of moving his
most loyal military supporters into key troop
commands to frustrate any coup plotting, and
many officers are angered over the favoritism
being shown presidential "cronies."
Business and labor groups are agitated over
the President's failure to deal effectively with the
sagging economy and spiraling inflation. Lanusse
must have the support of the large and well-
HONDURAS: Tottering President Cruz has
gained a temporary respite from the disorders
threatening his "unity" government. Bombings
have tapered off over the past two weeks, and bad
weather has apparently dampened student enthu-
siasm for demonstrations. The last significant
bombing occurred on 14 September when ex-
organized Peronist labor movement if he is to be
successful in returning Argentina to elected gov-
ernment. Moderate labor leaders are generally
satisfied with the President's performance so far,
but pressure from more radical groups has forced
the moderates to make a show of opposition to
the government's economic policies. The national
leadership was able to outmaneuver the radicals,
who were calling or a series of active nationwide
general strikes, but only by calling for a "passive"
general strike on 29 September. Any overreaction
by security forces during the strike would cost
Lanusse heavily in political terms, but, in any
case, it is becoming obvious that he must soon
show some success on the economic front or risk
losing all the political gains he has made since
coming to power six months ago.
With the announcement of an election date,
President Lanusse retains the political initiative
and demonstrates the political astuteness that has
served him well thus far. The announcement has
been generally well received by the public and
should reduce the threat of a military coup,
which now would be interpreted as a move
against the expression of the popular will at the
polls. Similarly, it should temporarily quiet the
President's civilian critics and give the government
more time to devise a new economic ro
gram.
tensive damage was done to the United Fruit
Company office in Comayaguela across the river
from Tegucigalpa. Two other bombs were found
unexploded later in the week. General Lopez,
chief of the Armed Forces, says the reduction in
violence may be a result of increased police pa-
trolling, especially at night.
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O _r _. ' I
Peru:
Strike Increases Influence of Communists
The recent nationwide teachers' strike has
increased the influence of the pro-Moscow Com-
munist labor federation (CGTP) at the expense of
the more moderate APRA labor leaders and of
the extreme leftists in the labor movement.
The military government in recent months
has displayed an ambivalent attitude toward the
CGTP. Since coming to power in 1968, it has
looked on the confederation as a means of de-
stroying the labor federation controlled by
APRA, with which the army has been at odds
since the 1930s. For a while last month, the
administration seemed to be moving toward an
open crackdown on the CGTP's sponsorship of
labor stoppages, especially those at government-
controlled installations. The government de-
nounced agitators of both the extreme right and
the extreme left, and President Velasco, while
blaming rightists for the government's problems,
said that the Communists had become unwitting
tools of the right.
The CGTP, having gained influence in the
labor movement by associating itself from the
URUGUAY: The campaign for the November
presidential elections is proceeding apace, with all
three parties able to point to some recent prog-
ress. In the incumbent Colorado Party, Jorge
Battle has emerged from internal party elections
as a likely-and strong-contender for the presi-
dency, along with the several other Colorado
candidates allowed to run under Uruguay's com-
plicated electoral system. If the Colorados are
able to attract the law-and-order vote via Presi-
dent Pacheco's renomination and field several
other attractive candidates as well, they will be
favored to retain the presidency. The campaign of
the principal Blanco candidate, Ferreira Aldunate,
beginning of the strike with the teachers and their
legitimate grievances, began working behind the
scenes for acceptance of the government's com-
promise offer. As a result, the government
charged APRA and the "ultraleft," but not the
CGTP, with attempting to manipulate the strike
for "partisan and counterrevolutionary" pur-
poses. The APRA federation jumped on the
teachers' bandwagon only after the strike was
under way, but it was Apristas and members of
extremist splinter groups who were arrested on 13
September for counterrevolutionary activities.
The government apparently hopes to break
the back of APRA, which has had strong labor
support, then turn its attention to the Commu-
nists if necessary. The willingness of the leaders of
the CGTP to cooperate with the Velasco regime
will encourage this attitude. New troubles could
develop, however, if the government goes through
with its plan to impose a new law removing the
trade union movement from politics. Such a law
could bring a direct confrontation with the
CGTP, with possibly serious consequences for the
already fragile economy.
continues to attract good turnouts in the capital,
and his proposed reformist program of govern-
ment is designed to enable the traditionally con-
servative Blancos to draw on the dissent vote that
the leftist Frente Amplio is attempting to monop-
olize.
The Frente recently received a modest boost
when the Uruguayan Bishops' Council publicly
affirmed that Catholics could in good conscience
vote for any of the three parties, thereby some-
what undercutting the two traditional parties in
their attempt to picture the Frente as a Commu
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VLt/1tL 1
UN Developments
F Security Council Takes up Jerusalem
As of noon on 23 September, the Security
Council had yet to resume last week's two-day
debate on Israeli actions in Jerusalem. Continuing
intra-Arab disagreement over the terms of a draft
resolution has held up reconvening of the council.
The Arab discord that has surfaced in New
York reflects the long-standing dissatisfaction of
some of the more radical states, led by Syria, with
Jordan's desire to work out a resolution that
would be palatable to the US. Syria took a tough
stance against Amman's position at the meeting
on 11-12 September of Arab League foreign min-
isters and wanted an indefinite postponement of
any council debate. Jordan pushed ahead, how-
ever, because it hoped that its scenario fora quick
vote in the council could still be achieved. Am-
man also could hardly have afforded to back
down on a matter it regarded as vital and on
which so much diplomatic capital had been
expended during the summer months.
Debate speeches have covered the usual
gamut of charges and countercharges. The ten
Arab statements have all played on the theme
that Israel is "bent on Judaizing Jerusalem" and is
thus violating the UN Charter and numerous
resolutions. Israeli replies have focused on the
alleged Jordanian trampling on the rights of Jews
in Jerusalem during the 1948-67 period and have
accused Amman of using the Jerusalem issue to
divert attention from its problems with the other
Arab states.
Soon after the council convened last week,
the Syrians offered to the Arab group an alterna-
tive text that would have sent a council mission
to Jerusalem and have required it to report back
within 15 days. The draft also cited the possible
need for UN sanctions against Israel. The Soviets
favor such language, largely because they want
any mission to be under the auspices of the coun-
cil rather than the secretariat.
Reacting to the Syrian move, the Jordanians
have consulted intensively within the Arab group
on alterations of the text agreed to between Am-
man and Washington. Jordan now maintains that
Syrian UN delegate Tomeh has given "his word"
to support an amended draft that would not refer
to UN sanctions or use the formula for a Security
Council mission. Should the original Jordanian-
US text be presented, Syria probably will offer a
number of amendments.
The upshot of these developments, com-
bined with the presence in New York of many
foreign ministers from the states concerned, is to
upgrade the significance of any council vote that
may F.
Africans Gird for Major Initiatives
The Africans have obtained a special high-
level meeting of the Security Council for next
week to consider South Africa's continuing asser-
tion of hegemony over South-West Africa. The
session should be the high point of African efforts
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at the UN this fall, which will also focus on the
Portuguese territories and the Middle East situa-
tion. The activism of the Africans contrasts
sharply with their relative stand-down at the UN
last year and denotes their increasing frustration
on anticolonial issues, something that OAU Chair-
man Quid Daddah is certain to stress next week.
Impetus for the council meeting on South-
West Africa was provided by the International
Court of Justice in June, when it issued an ad-
visory opinion upholding the action of the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1966 terminating Pretoria's
mandate over the territory. Ould Daddah will
make the principal speech before the council, and
five OAU foreign ministers are also scheduled to
make statements. The council's ad hoc committee
on South-West Africa is drafting a report for
council consideration, and the Africans appear
inclined to push for a text that would call for UN
sanctions against South Africa should it-as is
certain-fail to withdraw from the territory.
Another reference unpalatable to the West would
provide a controversial interpretation of the
council's arms embargo against Pretoria.
The Africans have been angling for years to
have the General Assembly designate delegates of
the national liberation movements for the un-
represented Portuguese territories in the Addis
Ababa - based UN Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA). The assembly is slated to vote this
fall on the issue, as all Western attempts so far to
defer the matter have failed. The Africans may
well have the votes needed to secure the designa-
tions to the ECA. If successful, this could spark
similar moves on behalf of dissident groups
elsewhere.
Rhodesia has been a focal point of African
concern for years, but the Africans have not
indicated that they have any new moves in mind
regarding Salisbury.
The OAU is sending a special committee of
self-designated "wise men" to Cairo and Tel Aviv
in early November to look into prospects for a
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Last fall,
African support greatly aided the Arabs in rolling
up a 57-16 majority in the assembly for a con-
tentious resolution strongly opposed by the US
and Israel. The Arabs have indicated they are
willing to await the conclusion of the OAU mis-
sion before commencing this year's assembly
debate on the Middle East. The Israelis hope to
persuade the OAU mission to favor a more bal-
anced text.
The meeting of the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs of the UN Economic and Social Council,
which opens next week, could eventually lead to
a considerable stiffening of international legisla-
tion to deal with drug traffic. The US hopes to
use the session to obtain more support for amend-
ing the 1961 convention to provide mandatory
powers for the International Narcotics Control
Board, which presently can only call for volun-
tary compliance with the convention. The en-
forcement amendments, about which many coun-
tries have reservations, are to be considered
formally at a high-level diplomatic conference
next year. The UN Drug Commission meeting is
also likely to produce greater adherence to the
recently completed convention on psychotropic
(mind-bending) substances, which permits cov-
erage of the LSD problem for the first
time.
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