WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009200030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200030001-9
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
5 November 1971
No. 0395/71
Copy
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 4 November 1971)
India-Pakistan: The Developing Crisis . . . . . . . . . y`. . . . . . . . . 1
Soviet Globetrotters: Another Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Communist China: Legacy of a Purge .,, 6
Finland: The Government Parties amble 17
Poland Emphasizes Brighter Aspe is of Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Yugoslavs Resist New Stabilize ' n Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Mexico-US: Talks Begm 19
Canada: Where to Tur . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Venezuela: An Issue r the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Guatemala: An Endo Emergency Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Tunisia: Split idens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Israel: Govefnment Takes Hard Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Mauritius: ,,Government Shaken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
NOTES:, Philippines, Peru, Turkey; Syria-Jordan
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India-Pakistan: The Developing Crisis
India and Pakistan traded artillery exchanges
and charges of border and airspace violations this
week. The exchanges have heightened tensions
and helped create an atmosphere in which either
country could trigger a war. At the same time,
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on her current for-
eign tour has sought-so far without great suc-
cess-to generate international support for her
position that Pakistan must be forced to negotiate
with the leaders of Bangla Desh for a real, as
opposed to a "cosmetic," solution to the crisis.
For its part, Islamabad may be having some suc-
cess in efforts to win international sympathy by
seeming to show greater flexibility and receptivity
to suggestions for resolving the crisis than has
New Delhi.
On 31 October, Indian Defense Minister
Ram said that war was "imminent" and asserted
that, if attacked, India would drive the Pakistanis
deep into their own territory. The following day,
Defense Secretary Krishnamurthi admitted that
regular Indian forces, as distinct from the para-
military Border Security Force, had been in a
24-hour battle against Pakistani gun positions
near the East Pakistan border. The defense secre-
tary did not deny that Indian troops had crossed
the border, stating only that they had been suc-
cessful in silencing the guns which, he said, had
been firing on the village of Kamalupur in the
eastern state of Tripura for 11 days. The Indians
may have publicized the encounter-probably the
most serious clash involving regular troops of the
two countries since the trouble began last March-
in order to put their version of the incident on
record in case a Pakistani counterattack was
provoked.
Mrs. Gandhi is adopting a firm and uncom-
promising position during her foreign tour.
Most Pakistani units are based fairly close to the
border even in peacetime, but some important
Indian units are hundreds of miles distant. Given
the tense situation, Mrs. Gandhi maintains that an
Indian withdrawal would put her troops at a great
disadvantage.
While Mrs. Gandhi continues to assert that
New Delhi will not initiate hostilities, the Indians
appear to be relying primarily on a show of force
to achieve their ends. The Soviets, in effect, are
cooperating in this effort by sending numerous
diplomatic and military representatives to New
Delhi for "consultations" under the terms of the
Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Soviets may
hope that their highly visible diplomatic activity
will help stabilize the situation by acting as a
warning to Pakistan and China, and as a domestic
boost for Mrs. Gandhi, who is increasingly vul-
nerable to criticism for "vacillation" in the face
of Pakistani provocations.
Though Moscow is still advising moderation,
it may be becoming more resigned to the pos-
sibility of war. T-He gigin New Dealt
has told--US asst'-o-fftcials that the Soviets-are
iq -tF a paces of pr?vtctirsg bst ntial arms de-
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Yahya this week claimed a somewhat similar
Chinese commitment to Pakistan. Chinese leaders,
however, attempting to avoid heightening ten-
sions, have played their support to Islamabad in
low key. Peking hopes to improve its relations
with India while maintaining its present high level
of influence in Islamabad.
The Pakistanis have reacted to Indian pres-
sure with diplomatic initiatives designed to cast
New Delhi in an unfavorable light and contrast its
attitude with Islamabad's conciliatory approach.
President Yahya has offered to consider troop
withdrawals, and he has made several appeals for
UN mediation. Islamabad has been suggesting for
some time that it may raise its problems with
India in the Security Council once Peking is
seated. Recently, the Pakistanis have again been
sounding out council members on the possibility
of such a meeting even though they recognized
that it would produce no more than bitter verbal
exchanges. On 30 October, Yahya made another
appeal for all refugees to return to their homes
and in contrast to India's negative position on the
subject, suggested posting UN observers on both
sides of the border.
Page 2
The
Indians may have decided that, in order to retain
their present level of control, they will have to
increase support and guidance for a more active
guerrilla program. During his visit to New Delhi
last week, Firyubin reportedly refrained from
advising the Indians to curtail support to the
guerrillas. Q ~.g .tQQ:-o.Yugoslav::char.ge, the
Sati s ,.recognized that India views the Mukti
B i as the . rfnci aI ''forcin- factor','.:to solve
iu di mma.
ecently, the Bangla Desh governmer25X1
announced that it had set up-with "expert advice
from some friendly countries"-a mechanism to
control a "liberation war" and to guide political
and economic activity in "liberated areas."
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of guerrilla op-
erations deep inside East Pakistan is growing.
Guerrilla activities have disrupted most land trans-
port and have made water transport dangerous
and expensive. Consequently, the jute and t25X1
industries are operating well below normal. Many
basic consumer goods are in short supply in the
cities and nonexistent in the countryside. /
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Soviet G o e ro ers: not er apter
The mome,um of Soviet Westpolitik last
week carried Party`'ecretary Leonid Brezhnev to
France. He probably r'agards the visit as successful
despite the fact that th M"Principles of Coopera-
tion" concluded between''\the two nations fell
short of the friendship treaty'e sought. Brezhnev
performed competently, if no ?vjpectacularly,
his first visit to the West as Si viet leadexR He
emphasized Moscow's current peacpro ism and
polished his new image as protagonis detente,
to counter that of author of tfle 4 rezhnev
Doctrine.
French President Geor s Pompidou succss-
fully enhanced the Franc=Soviet special relatio#,-
ship as a balance to thttention being given West\
German Ostpolitik. ompidou managed to sur-
round the visit h an atmosphere of good will
and accomplisl ent while giving no ground on
basic politic'issues. His statements and those of
Foreign Mfhister Debre carefully placed France
within tkhe Atlantic Alliance and indicated Paris'
willingfiess to moderate the pace of detente.
Although offering little change in basic posi-
tions, the "principles" provided Brezhnev with
the trappings of success, allowing him to return to
a'
number of sectors; the moderniza-
11
t in of Soviet light industry by
Frech companies is singled out for
par '"cular consideration. It seems
doubt ul that the new pact adds sig
nifican Jy to a comprehensive Franco-
Soviet epoperation agreement that has
been in ffect for five years; imple-
mentationtstill depends on particular
projects ag'r ed to by French firms
and Soviet ererprises.
The agreement whereby Renault
will supply $216 million worth of
machinery and engineering services for
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Moscow with a
advance the Fra
call for more
expansion
called
document purporting to
b-Soviet relationship. Clauses
ateral meetings and for further
exchanges on several levels. The
uniqug focused largely on Europe and
Conference on European Security.
No mention was made in either of the docu-
ents regarding the linkage of Bonn's ratification
of its treaties with Moscow and Warsaw with the
final signing of the Berlin accord. A Quai spokes-
man did state, however, that the two countries
had reached an agreement in principle to support
the simultaneous signing of the treaties and the
accord.
Both leaders extracted domestic political
gain from the visit. Soviet media gave extensive
coverage to the visit, and lauded the party secre-
tary personally. Pompidou advanced his own
domestic political objectives by rolling out the
ed carpet for Brezhnev. It will now be more
d ,ficult for the French Communists to criticize
go rnment policies effectively and to encourage
the arty's trade union arm to agitate for strikes
again the regime.
On result of the meetings was the signing of
a ten-yea .agreement that provides for each coun-
try to he build industrial plants in the other.
Prospects fc11cooperation are deemed favorable in
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the ma truck plant in the USSR
reporte ly was signed under pressure
from t e French Government. A
Renault s okesman has said that the
company h neither the men nor the
capacity to i,yolve itself heavily in the
project.
Franco-Sov N trade, which is
slated to double tween 1969 and
1974, nevertheless witremain a small
part of the over-all co nerce of both
countries. The primary factor restrict-
ing an appreciable incree in this
trade is the limited ability ! either
country to provide what tli other
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friendliness that appeared to characterize all
aspects of the five-day visit, it seems probable
that the talks between the two.,46aders did not
fully resolve long-standing dispe1eements relating,
for instance, to proper reydlutionary tactics in
Latin America or to Cubans' management of Soviet
economic assistance. hese matters have per-
sistently troubled ations between Moscow and
Havana, though , ey may be less pressing than
when relatiop were at a low point during Ko-
In what was probably a dual effi Xt to get a
better reading on the state of the int 'rGerman
talks and to assure the East Germans th. t they
had not been forgotten in his round of meetings
with Brandt, Tito, and Pompidou, Brezhnev
stopped in East Germany for two days on his w'@y
home. The Soviets have shown impatience witt
the slow progress of the inter-German negotia-
tions, and the Soviet leader certainly stressed
Moscow's desire for a prompt windup. East Ger-
man leader Honecker demonstrated Pankow's de-
fensiveness on this issue by stressing in a formal
toast to Brezhnev that East Germany was doi
"everything it can" to bring about a po ive
conclusion of the talks. Consistent with e ef-
forts of the junketing Soviet leadership sewhere,
the final communiques called for th arliest pos-
sible convening of a European curity confer-
ence.
The unusually I Vg joint Soviet-Cuban com-
muniqu> issued on 1 November described Ko-
sygin's visit to Cub from 26 to 30 October as an
unqualified success. Despite the warmth and
Page 4
sygin's visi -our years ago.
ere is reason to believe that the Kosygin
may, have been the product of last-minute
The communique di .indicate, however, that
an earlier invitation to Cato to visit the Soviet
Union had been reiterated by, Kosygin and was
"gratefully accepted. No hint' were given con-
cerning the timing of the visit, which would be
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Castro's third trip to thUSSR and his first since
The communique men ns "US-encouraged
hostile actions," including vi lations of airspace
.uaai.q"&gests that he is no closer to ob
such backing than he was before. It there
remains unlikely that Castro will provoke an in
cident by moving against the base or by attempt-
ing to intercept a reconnaissance aircraft.
I n addition, the c -nique pressed
sympathy with the " "ving of the Panamanian
people to exe QI lull sovereignty over the whole
off thy, ional territory." This statement may
and may reflect the work of Panama's Communist
Party, whose exiled leaders have been working
industriously to get Soviet and East European
Communists to focus on the canal treat is
sue.
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can military base at Guantana
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Communist China: Legacy ofaPurge
The impression that a struggle involving Lin
Piao and other top-ranked military leaders is be-
deviling the ruling politburo has been reinforced.
When Yang Cheng-wu was purged in 196
he was accused, among other things-.of plot ing
to oust several of China's major military, regional
commanders. The charge was also lh,At Yang
was acting on behalf of a still higher 15 thority,
whose identity has never been revealed:
it is possible
that/an effort to bring down Lin Piao by linking
him' with Yang Cheng-wu may have reached some
sort of climax in August or September, creating a
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crisis at the top of the military structure. The
prospect that the Yang Cheng-wu affair is an
important clue in the current leadership mystery
gains some support from the fact that two of the 25X1
ranking military figures whose political positions
have been in question in recent months-the com-
mander of the air force and the political com-
missar of the navy-worked closely with Yang
Cheng-wu during the radical phase of the Cultural
Revolution. The current chief of staff, Huang
Yung-sheng, has also been out of the public eye
for some; time now and his future is equally
China Pictorial Cover: A Distribution Problem
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questionable. He succeeded Yang Cheng-wu as 25X1
chief of staff. the orthtdox formula calling for unity
around the parfy central committee ''with Chair-
man Mao Ts0-tung as head and Vice Chairman Lin
If the long-simmering disputes within the Piao as ,,the deputy" has been amended by omit-
politburo indeed took a more serious turn lately, ting ,ire reference to Lin. There also have been no
they do not appear to be settled. An English- ref-0'rences to Lin's name in the Chinese press
language edition-but not the?,Chinese-language .since 8 October, and foreign governments, acting
version-of China Pictorial beating Lin Piao's under guidance from the Chinese, are no longer
picturE on the cover and containing pictures CAF citing Lin's name in messages of greetings or in
nearly all of the missing Chinese leaders-ba Aud- toasts to the health of Chinese leaders.
denly appeared in Hong Kong. Local Comp'fu,jists
appear to be calling attention to its avaijability.
T -le peculiar treatment accorded the dis-
tribution of the magazine probably does not
indicate that the missing lders-including Lin-
have been exonerated, bud`rather appears to signal
25X1 that there may be several political cross-currents
still flowing in Peki"fig. Furthermore, the possi-
bility That Lin's alth was a precipitating factor
in the present uation is still open.\
While the political maneuvering seems to go
on backstage, the position of Premier Chou En-lai
has -been stable as have the policies associated
with hiri.
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Indochina
FAR EAST
South Vietnam: The Viet Cong Takes Stock
The Corirnunists have made a realistic assess-
ment of their failure once again to manipulate or
even significantly~,influence the elections in South
Vietnam. A seriespf reports suggest that they are
thinking seriously A put new ways to rekindle an
effective opposition ow that the elections are
over and President l`t ieu appears to be in a
stronger position than before. The first hint that
the Communists recognizld the need for a new
political approach came fegm a provincial level
briefing of Communist cadre in South Vietnam
in early October.
the brieting tool< pessimistic tone
on the postelection situation, ack1 pwledging poor
Communist performance in the elections for both
the Lower House and the presidency. It warned
dent T1 lieu from consolidating his pos-ttion. Tye
Viet Cong hierarchy was even considering Ahe
creation of a new political front as one pVs 1bil-
ity, according to this source.
authoritative article in the party jour-\
nal from Hanoi have taken a si tlar line. The
article analyzed the current tion as one in
which diplomacy and politics ould contribute
significantly to Communistijectives in South
Vietnam and appeared to c for new and more
imaginative political initiat'. es. It talked at length
about the need to take vantage of dissension
within "enemy ranks" a borrowed heavily from
the prescriptions of p ty leader Le Duan to re-
mind cadres that the, must not "wait passively
for contradictions t?+?'develop."
a[ I o the reports
point to rene e efforts by the Communists to
ally themselves with important non-Communist
opposition forces in South Vietnam. The possibil-
ity that the Communists are thinking about creat-
ing a new front organization cannot be ruled out.
The Viet Cong are great believers in the value of
reorganization, even if the reshuffling really does
not result in more effective strategy, and postelec-
tion tactics could take this route. The past
failures of the Liberation Front and the National
Alliance to generate any effective or widespread
political opposit; n to the Saigon government,
however, mightwell discourage the Communists
from trying ~Ifis approach again. In spite of talk
about noVC sanding idle and waiting for oppor-
tunities, ommunist leadership probably rec-
ognizes Tat without some radical change in the
over-all/political or military situation in South
Vietn,m, a new "front" has little chance of mak-
ing ny more mileage than its predecessors. The
thane that runs consistently through all the re-
rts is Communist recognition that the recent
-selections constitute a watershed-a real setback to
declining Communist political fortunes. The Com-
munist response appears to be renewed deter-
mination to come up with new ways to make
their presence felt politically in South Vietnam.
President Thieu's inauguration last weekend
went off smoothly despite the threats of some
radical opposition groups to try to disrupt the
ceremony. The radicals apparently were discour-
Vged by heavy government security precautions.
T ese precautions probably also were responsible
inart for the failure of the Communists to try to
harks either the inauguration or the National Day
cerernies the following day.
With Thieu beginning his second term, South
Vietnamhe politicians are speculating about a
possible g6tyernment reorganization and changes
in policy. Rumors continue to circulate about
high-level shifts in the government and military,
and a cabinet reshuffle may be in the offing. But
no one knows with certainty when Thieu will act
or precisely what appointments will be made.
Leaders of several political parties are reas-
sessing their positions vis-a-vis the government,
and most would be receptive to an overture from
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Thieu. Some of these politicians were alienated
bi .Thieu's election tactics, but in recognition of
Thieu's.. relatively strong postele
they are",Willing to commit t
President, hod+g they can p
in the new gove
realize they have Ii
opposition. The
the political f
Saigon pol
peace
y speculation in
the repa+~ off an~ar nt+tr rewires #haL an-.
Other effects of the flood a been largely
brought under control. By October the coun-
try's main rail arteries re back in service but
there was still consi able damage to secondary
road systems. Mo industrial operations probably
were resume ell before the end of September,
although ew plants were idle due to transporta-
tion tlenecks. The regime appears to have
act quickly and effectively to stem hazards t
-the-out-break of epidemics..
North Vietnam: Flood Damage Assessed
The effects of the floods may hamper agri-
cultural output for the next year and increase
Hanoi's dependence on food imports. It is now
clear that the regime views agricultural prospects
with much less optimism than was the case a
month ago. To make up for rice losses, the minis-
ter of domestic trade has announced the planting
of a "winter crop" in addition to the spring and
autumn crops. The winter crop will consist largely
of secondary crops that can be harvested in 50 to
80 days. Success will depend in part on the extent
to which the regime can use miracle rice strains,
which can be planted some two months later than
traditional rice strains, for the regular spring crop.
side e e ort wi a 'red--to , -
store the irrigation system. A large nq.mbijr of
pumping stations appear to h a e-~b-edn damaged,
and aerial photography boW'extensive breaching
and silting of irri ri canals. Reconstruction of
irrigation facilities may take up to a year, in
whiehase both the fifth- and tenth-month rice
crow, .. &7-otifd be affected. - keg .+rger}cy of
Cambodia: Tug of War on Route 6
The fighting along Route 6, north of Skoun,
has entered the second week with the Com-
munists maintaining pressure against a number of
Cambodian positions scattered along the highway.
Although they have taken some heavy casualties
and have been plagued by supply problems, most
government units have stood up well in the face
of the attacks.
Most of the action has centered on the sec-
tion of Route 6 between the villages of Prakham
and Rumlong where, in the first days of the
fighting, the Communists isolated eight Cam-
bodian battalions and gained control of a four-
mile stretch of the highway. Intense ground fire
and poor weather complicated initial attempts to
resupply these units, particularly those in the
vicinity of Rumlong. In addition to their attacks
and ground probes, the Communists staged their
first gas attack of the war, which temporarily
incapacitated 100 men in one Cambodian bat-
talion.
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F n position
selves to the
an important role
the same time, they
eal leverage with Thieu
ng alliances with the
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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bt UKJ'1*
Kompong Thom
spond=
ing to the situation. A Khmer Kronelief force
accompanied by armored personf carriers had
moved from Skoun through P ham and Tang
Kouk to within a few miles P:Rumlong. At that
point, however, its advae was halted by an
enemy ambush. A se O d Khmer Krom relief
column from Kom ng Thmar ran into even
stiffer enemy opp. ition as it tried to push down
Route 6. Inveral days of sharp fighting on
Rumlong's r rthern outskirts, these forces had 30
killed and 200 wounded-extremely high casual-
ties fo>Kthe Cambodian war. Communist losses
repe atso `high.
The government's ability to move reinforce-
ments and supplies overland from Phnom Penh to
the Route 6 front is being severely hampered by
an extensively damaged bridge on the highway,
some 12 miles south of Skoun. Cambodian en-
gineers have estimated that it will take a month to
put the bridge back into operation. I n the mean-
time, a makeshift ferry of limited capacity is
being used as a substitute.
The current round of attacks along Route 6
probably is motivated in part by the Communist
desire to re-establish control over the highway to
facilitate the movement of supplies to forces west
of the road now that better weather is ap-
proaching. They probably would like to under-
mine Phnom Penh's morale by inflicting sharp
setbacks to what has been the Cambodians' best-
organized military operation. It is possible, more-
over, that the Communists are seeking to pre-
empt any government operations in the direction
of important enemy bases and supply points east
of Route 6 or into the nearby Communist-con-
CAMBODIA: Route 6 Area
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EUROPE
Moscow Adjusts to Peking at the UN
The USSR is wasting no time in preparing for
the arrival of the Communist Chinese delegation to
the UN and its affiliated organizations. Remarks
made by Soviet officials in New York and Geneva
indicate that Moscow is supporting full Chinese
participation in UN-sponsored activities, hoping
thereby tc prevent an extension of the Sino-Soviet
dispute to the halls of the world forum. Whatever its
private views on the desirability and consequences
of Peking's entry into the UN, Moscow's public
posture is that the vote of the General Assembly on
25 October marked a victory for common sense and
a defeat for the US.
The Soviet deputy permanent representative to
the UN observed on 28 October that Peking's entry
created a "new situation for all of us." He suggested
that meetings of the Security Council and the Four-
Power talks on the Middle East should be delayed
until the arrival of the Chinese. He explained that
the Soviets did not want to prevent meetings over
any long period of time, but since neither the Se-
curity Council nor the Four Powers were dealing
with urgent matters at this time, the Chinese should
be given the courtesy of a chance to participate. In
this way, the Soviets hope to delay reactivation of
the talks, from which Moscow expects little, as well
as to make a gesture toward Peking.
TJ;
the-US aic S-R-as co-chairmen of the.conferencc.
Moscow apparently does not want:e~cert-fissure
on Peking to join t,.-? ,,,,,tJ~as~arr? ament forum but is
prepared to room for the Chinese to share the
,.participate. Soviet
Permanent Representative Roshchin mentioned that
the Chinese would have to be consulted regarding
the Soviet proposal for a World Disarmament Con-
ference.
Soviet news media have welcomed the seating
of China as a "step toward realism." Although the
Soviets voted for the Albanian resolution, they did
no active lobbying to line up supporters. During the
debate, Malik spoke in favor of seating Peking, but
he acknowledged that Soviet-Chinese relations have
assumed at times a "sharply ideological and political
character."
Indeed, Soviet support for Peking's entry has
been rather phlegmatic over the past several years
L The Soviets are probably concerned
that Peking will attempt to engage in polemics with
Moscow at the world forum and undercut Moscow's
relations with the Third World nations there. When
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko learned of the UN
vote, he commented that "it had to happen, but
from now on we won't have an easy time" in the
General Assembly and the Security Council
to procedtres~j;kie-T1 erence of the Committee
neva -panic-uI-ar#y the roles of
on Pt~ar
e
PHILIPPINES: President Marcos' Nacionalista Party
is expected to score a landslide victory in the 8
November senatorial and gubernatorial elections. If
the landslide becomes an avalanche, it will stimulate
charges of fraud and increase public disaffect-to
with the regime.
The opposition Liberal Party's campaign has
been severely handicapped by a lack of funds and, in
many local elections, the party has not even been
able to field candidates. Primary interest centers on
the eight senate seats up this year. There are rumors
that Marcos may try to engineer a Nacionalista
sweep since he would like an overwhelming victory
.in order to strengthen prospects for extending his
own tenure. The combination of Marcos' increased
attempts to accumulate power and the Liberals'
despair ` over their inability to compete through
established pttht.ical channels may prompt them to
seek an accommodati.Qn with the radical left. The
result could be greater ~ol'tical turbulence.
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5E( yRET
Finland: The Government Parties Gamble
On.-_29 October, President Kekkonen appointed
Finland's--fourth government since the March 1970
elections, a government of experts to run the coun-
try until early elections can be held on 2-3 January.
Its predecessor, a four-party center-left coalition,
fell when the two principal members refused to
compromise on next year's. agricultural price sup-
ports. More to the point, both parties-the Center
and the Social Democrats-concluded that the time
was opportune to increase their strength at the polls.
Although eight parties are repres ted in the
Finnish parliament, governments normal have to
be formed around the Center and Social De cratic
parties. Parties of the right are unacceptablet'dqhe
USSR, which is still granted a veto by the Finns, a
the Communist Party is so divided that it is unable
to impose discipline on its members for key"parlia-
mentary votes.
The Communists were members of the govern-
ment coalition from July 1970 until March 1971.
They dropped out when the- party's liberal leader-
ship, under attack from a..st'rong conservative minor-
ity, decided that it could no longer accept co-re-
sponsibility for the government's economic deci-
sions. A nominal Communist is in the new caretaker
government, however, and the Center and the Social
Democrats-as well as President Kekkonen-
probably=would like the party to join the next
government. Finland's economic stabilization pro-
gram must be renegotiated early next year, and the
Social Democrats, who are also currently battling
the Communists for control of Finland's largest
trade union, would particularly like their rivals on
the left to share the onus for whatever is decided.
The Center Party aving just staunchly de-
fended the interests, its agricultural constituency,
is optimistic aboixt'a new election that will focus on
economic issue's. Politicians predict that Finland's
desire for.,arh arrangement with the European Com-
munitioS,fa sensitive item in Helsinki's all-important
relations with Moscow, will also be a major issue.
The government parties' election hopes may be
ill-founded. The electorate moved dramatically to
the
right in 1970 in protest against the policies of
arties, but it ended up with a government of
the sa
since the
dustrial strik'
recently took f
the streets in the belief that they
are being made
economic stabilizatio
victims of the government's
rogram. The Communists,
approaching a party cori
fractious than ever and u
ss in the spring, are more
jkely to profit at the
polls. The electorate may,
votes to the parties of the rig
refore, give added
Finland's limited political o tions, reap only more
political instability.
Poland Emphasizes Briqhter Aspects of Economy
Premier Jaroszewicz last week was optimistic
about Polish economic developments in a speech to
parliament. He apparently was hoping to demon-
strate prior to the December party congress that the
Gierek regime has begun to replace promises of a
better fLture with concrete achievements. The
speech did contain a frank admission of continuing
shortfalls and thereby acknowledged it would take a
long time to narrow the gap between the expecta-
tions of the populace and the economy's ability to
satisfy them.
Page 17
Jaroszewicz stressed particularly improvements
in the lot of the consumer, claiming achievement of
above-plan increases for national income, real wages,
and consumption. He also cited improvements in
market supply and the achievement of price stabil-
ity. The premier admitted, however, that supplies
and assortment of consumer goods and particularly
of meat have failed to match consumer demand,
that butter remains in short supply, and that prog-
ress in housing construction is marred by inadequate
quality and rising costs.
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parties. Domestic tensions have increased
the country has suffered its largest in-
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Progress in agriculture, a sector crucial to the
Polish regime's future, has been uneven. Jaroszewicz
claimed a record grain harvest, but Warsaw still will
have to import 3 million tons of grain next year.
This is due partly to the regime's need to com-
pensate for a sharp decline in output of potato and
forage crops, and partly to the increased require-
ment for feed to support record numbers of hogs. If
adequate feed supplies are not available, farmers will
prematurely slaughter meat animals, thereby nul-
lifying measures introduced in the past year to boost
long-term as well as current meat production. Mar-
ket supplies of meat were up on the strength of
record imports in the first nine months of 1971, and
incentives to increase domestic production should
have a favorable impact on supplies, particularly
pork, in coming months.
Yugoslavs Resist New Stabilization Measures
Belgrade's current attempts to strengthen its
attack on liquidity problems-the inability of indus-
tries and banks to meet current obligations-are run-
ning into difficulties. Some of the republics, which
gained increased budgetary authority in last sum-
mer's decentralization, appear determined to amend,
if not kill, the new federal stabilization proposals.
This will be the first test of Belgrade's ability to
promulgate a unified program under the decen-
tralized system. Ultimately the collective presidency
may be called in as a court of last resort to resolve
the clash of interests.
The latest in the series of stabilization measures
was presented to the Federal Assembly this week.
The draft legislation focuses on the continuing prob-
lem of illiquidity by providing for forced settlement
of outstanding debts. The problem also will be
tackled by requiring enterprises and government or-
ganizations to maintain reserve funds and by increas-
ing the reserve requirement of banks.
Remaining measures are concerned with al-
leviating inflationary pressures. Attempts to reduce
demand, which in turn should ease import require-
Jaroszewicz seemed to contradict his assertions
about full employment by disclosing that in certain
regions women are having a difficult time finding
work. In addition, his assertion that the nation's
long-term indebtedness has not increased does not
seem accurate in view of the known increases in
imports of consumer goods and grains. Nevertheless,
the regime is predicting a positive trade balance this
year.
The leadership has been quick to take much of
the credit for positive developments in the Polish
economy, although giving the usual nod to the
USSR for helping Poland to meet its economic
requirements. The government is well aware that the
population expects further improvement, and
probably will step up efforts to upgrade working
and living conditions rather than risk the consumers'
25X1
ments, include additional restrictions on credit and a
reduction in the growth of the money supply. Price
controls, slated to expire on 29 October, have been
extended "until further notice."
Longer term economic measures to be incor-
porated in the new five year plan are being prepared
by special working groups of the Federal Executive
Council. This legislation will include revisions of the
price system, modifications of taxes, and new for-
eign trade and exchange regulations. Proposed ac-
tions must be coordinated with republic authorities.
Coordination will be difficult to achieve, how-
ever, because the various republics differ on the
central issues of exchange rates and retention of
foreign exchange earnings. The two wealthiest re-
publics, Croatia and Slovenia, already have taken
public exceptions to the federal program. In addi-
tion, the Federal Executive Council and the Federal
Assembly are squabbling over control of the stabili-
zation drive. Trade unions also have some reserva-
tions about the recent stabilization measures. The
trade union leadership is trying to exert pressure on
the government to give more consideration to the
plight of the worker.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Mexico-US: Talks Begin
Mexican and US negotiators are once again
tackling the major outstanding issue between the
two governments, the salinity of the Colorado
River water being delivered to Mexico. Long a
difficult, technically complex, and politically
sensitive issue, the matter has been complicated
by a lack of coordination among Mexican officials
and by Foreign Secretary Rabasa's apparent de-
sire for a personal triumph in wresting dramatic
concessions from the US. Meetings, begin on 8
November to seek a new, practical solution to
replace the one that expires this month`..
In 1961, largely because of a new drainage
system in the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation?region
of Arizona, water released into the Col' rado
downstream became so salty that Mexico
San Diego
Colorado
River
ARIZONA
:Mohawk
.Wellton
71
tested that it was unacceptable under the 1944
Water Treaty and contaminated under interna-
tional law. Mineral concentrations in the river
increase as the water ,moves downstream through
salt-permeated soils, This natural concentration,
along with the increase in salinity resulting from
the addition of s1fine groundwater washing back
after irrigation,poses a serious water quality
threat to all Colorado River water users. The US
in 1961 tooKmeasures to reduce salinity and by
1965 concluded the agreement with Mexico
which last 'year was extended to 15 November
1971.
I f`exico's position on salinity has continually
hardlned under the Echeverria administration, at
leaf as that position has been presented by the
f9feign secretary. Rabasa has insisted that Eche-
erria's political requirements in the important
agricultural area southwest of Arizona demand a
better deal than that offered to Diaz Ordaz, and
,,,that the juridical aspects of the issue are funda-
hental to an acceptable solution. He has in effect
maintained a threat of international litigation if
theS balks at demands for further concessions.
His c nterproposal last month was reasonable on
the su t ce but was designed to damage the US
legal pos ion.
p~.
It is ber-.oming evident, however, that Rabasa
is not above`,misrepresenting Echeverria's view.
Perhaps eggedn by rumors of Echeverria's dis-
pleasure with
his foreign minis r, Rabasa has been trying to
squeeze an extra measure from the US on the
salinity issue as a display of his diplomatic skill.
He has not even kept the minister of hydraulic
resources informed orr, the coming talks. More-
over, last week President Echeverria told Ambas-
sador McBride that technical rather than legal
problems were paramount on the salinity issue.
The President reportedly seemed relaxed about
the matter, and was confident that this one major
bilateral difficulty can be solved amicably with-
out resort to third-party juridical proceed-
ings.
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Canada: Where to Turn?
Ottawa is irritated with Washington over a
considerable list..of issues, the most important of
which stem from-the, new US economic policy.
The government has instituted a review of its
relations with its southern neighbor but it is not
likely to find an easy alternative.`
The catalog of Canadian complaints `is fairly
extensive. Canada has failed to obtain relief fro.L1
the surtax. It is concerned that US congressional
approval of the Domestic International Sales Cor-
poration and of the "buy American" provisions
of the investment tax credit will "export" jobs
from Canada to the US. It fears that Canada will
as a result be turned into merely a supplier of raw
materials for US industry.
Ottawa is op-
posed to the Amchitka nu~lr test.
A white paper'Iast year stated that if Canada
were to thrive,as an independent state, it must
exercise "judicious" control over its economic
relations with the US and expand its contacts
with other nations. Under Prime Minister Tru-
PERU: The government has taken two major
steps in recent`-weeks to further its policy of
seeking a leading rOle-in the third world. On 2
November, it established'?-di~lomatic relations
with Communist China, with whith--i had opened
trade relations. Peking reportedly will to
200,000 tons of fishmeal, a commodity that Pe
has had difficulty marketing recently. In addition,
Peru has sold 105,000 tons of fishmeal to Cuba
and sponsored Cuban membership in the "Group
deau, Ottawa has displayed this independent ap-
proach mostly in the realm of foreign affairs. It
has been constrained on the economic front by
the advantages of its special relationship with the
US and by resistance in -some provinces to
stronger national policies.
Now, the Trude-ad government is moving to
reduce Canada's 6pendence on the US. In a
policy review Lander way, Canada can be expected
`tQ seek to diversify its export markets and find
nd ou c-Ts of technology and capital. It is likely
to fi that alternatives are severely limited and
tlt atte is to reorient the economy are costly
'm terms o rowth and development. External
thirds of Canadian exports.
Affairs Ministe Sharp and Industry, Trade, and
Commerce Minis Pepin have already indicated25X6
that it is unlikely ada can in any significan
way replace the US m et, which absorbs two
The prime minister has an eye on the ex-
pec ed federal elections in 1972, and will doubt-
less wish to be seen as an effective protector of
Canadian interests.
of 77," now meeting in Lima to prepare for the
UN Conference on Trade and Development sched-
uled for Chile next year. At this meeting, the
Peruvians have cast themselves in the role of
spokesmen for the developing countries vis-a-vis
the developed world. Peru can be expected to
continue this policy, charting a course inde-
nt of major powers while attempting to
keep co relations with as many countries as
possible.
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Venezuela: An Issue for the Opposition
The Caldera administration has opened itself
to heavy criticism by issuing an arrest order for
Senator Miguel Angel Capriles, owner of Vene-
zuela's largest (and most sensationalist) chain of
newspapers and magazines. Though the order was
obviously provoked by Capriles, it has brought
the government under attack for violating the
principles of press freedom, congressional im-
munity, and political asylum.
The administration's patience with the un-
scrupulous senator, whose papers have repeatedly
cost it embarrassment, ended a month ago with
the reprint in Capriles' afternoon daily, El
Mundo, of the text of a secret Ministry of De-
fense memorandum purporting to describe
Colombian war preparations against Venezuela.
Compounding the insult to the military, the paper
claimed that the document was leaked to the
press by insurgent penetrations of the armed
forces. The government charged Capriles with of-
fenses against national security so that the case
would be tried before a military court.
Senator Miguel Angel Capriles
Page 21
Both civilian and military officials are con-
cerned with Capriles' irresponsibility. His vicious
anti-Colombian propaganda brought Colombia
and Venezuela dangerously close to war this sum-
mer, and his stories that Venezuela planned to
annex Curacao nearly torpedoed Caldera's trip to
that island in September.
Active support of Caldera during the 1968
presidential campaign earned Capriles a senate
seat, but he has since been on the outs with the
government, particularly after cabinet changes
last spring again failed to include any of his men.
Capriles has long felt that his service in the close
presidential race deserved higher recognition. Pur-
suit of his political ambitions recently took
Capriles to Spain, where he offered ex-dictator
General Marcos Perez Jimenez support for the
next presidential elections in December 1973.
Despite the length of time before elections,
maneuvering by announced and potential can-
didates is already in progress. Many are eyeing a
deal with the old dictator, who polled 11 percent
of the congressional vote in 1968 and whose
popularity is rising. Although Perez Jimenez has
as yet struck no deal, the Capriles news chain has
given him favorable copy while intensifying its
anti-Caldera line. Capriles has seemed determined
to provoke government action against himself so
that he, like Perez Jimenez, might be depicted as
a "victim of suppression"
Caldera has taken on a formidable enemy in
Capriles. His papers are widely read by the lower
classes, and his ability to influence popular opin-
ion is considerable. Capriles has taken asylum in
the Nicaraguan Embassy
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vLV1~L i
Guatemala: An End to Emergency Measures
The government of President Arana, having
squeezed.,all possible political mileage out of its
"get tough'with the terrorists" campaign and con-
cerned with its -deteriorating international image,
is making plans to:,lift the year-old state of siege.
The government has been relatively pleased with
the success of its anti-i`t-surgency program and has
little to lose from such a'move. It will probably
announce the step before thd-and of the year.
General Arana, who made his reputation as a
ruthless guerrilla fighter, ran for the pf_sidency in
1970 on a campaign that stressed law iid order.
He promised to write the final chapter a de-
cade of political violence that has cost thous nds
of lives. Nevertheless, he began his administratsn
on a conciliatory note, attempting to project thy`,
image of a moderate and focusing on socioeco-
nomic reform. The new Arana was a shocking
disappointment to both left and right. The forme
saw little profit in allowing the government
play at reform and resumed terrorist activity ' 'an
effort to provoke repressive action in the pope it
would be so excessive and so poorly foc $d as to
hasten the polarization of Guatemal society.
The right, for its part, was itching f a no-holds-
barred counterterror campaign tqAt might com-
pletely destroy the Communist paratus. On 13
November 1970, Arana finall/ yielded to these
pressures and imposed a state f siege.
Government efforts over the past year to
combat insurgency II9ve met with mixed results.
The scatter-fire tacres adopted by security forces
and right-wing vigilante groups have caused a
number of Unj*. stified killings. On the positive
side, however., the two major insurgent groups-
the Cuba-orl'ented Rebel Armed Forces and the
action arr of the Communist Party-have been
severely ,-hurt and their tactical losses already
exceed any strategic gains they might have hoped
to make.. Nevertheless, the government has not
dealt a death blow to the insurgent movement,
and it retains a significant operational capacity.
Political violence has, ecome so much a part
of life in Guatemala that-Ahe increased level since
the state of siege wa imposed had not, until
recently, penetrated, opular apathy and indif-
ference. Indeed, thigh the state of siege restricts
political activitie -, nd suspends certain constitu-
tional guarante , it impinges little if at all on the
average Guato., alan. There is, for example, no
curfew. Re "ntly, however, restiveness has been
growing a ng students, professors, Catholic and
Protesta church officials, the bar association,
and political opposition. Even some of
Aran -s own supporters have begun to suggest
tha as change in policy might be useful.
In September, Arana indicated that he
ould not restore constitutional guarantees until
tMe pacification program was completely success-
ful. j The President, nevertheless, is sensitive to
critic" in the foreign press and, having estab-
lished hl self as a "forceful leader," may now
agree that ntinuation of the state of siege is of
more valuerthe left as a symbol of repression
than it is to thgovernment in dealing with the
Communists. Th .re are already indications that
Arana is beginnin to discourage the extralegal
use of force by his sporters and some evidence
that he will end the s> to of siege and perhaps
even amnesty political pi' oners as soon as he can
do so without appearing\}:to yield to his op-
Once this is done, the presNre will shift to
the insurgents. If they do not demonstrate their
strength by mounting a spectacular, operation,
they lose face and Arana can declare his pacifica-
tion efforts a success. If they mount the opera-
tion, however, Arana will have demonstrated to
his critics the need for a continued and a ssive
antiterrorist program.
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Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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bhUXEY
Tunisia: Split Widens
President Bourguiba's ec!sion o ignore e
grounds`Ovell for liberalization of the party and the
administrattion has caused considerable polariza-
tion of the two principal party factions.
has stirred fern -ent within the normal l , pofrtrcal
military and polie@ forces. Th i "now lining
up behind either th lib' b?rals;who desire to infuse
more democrat .-1narty and state institutions,
or the c e1Vatives, tra itionalists who support
horttar-ian.ru e.-
The liberals are led by former interior minis-
ter Ahmed Mestiri. They clearly ominated)he
unexpectedly free and d
l:L.
a:___ _
e
er
month's congress of the ruling Destour
_N
ist Party. They won a majority of theseats
party central committee. Mestiri then presse
_ .
election by the congress of the`_'
political bureau
the party's executive body, and came out strongly
for a constitutional amendment providing for the
national election of a, president in case a vacancy
occurs before Bourguiba's term expires in 1974.
Ignorarg the developing consensus and argu-
ing once" 'again that the Tunisian people are still
too immature politically to be trusted with de-
Page 24
MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
mocracy, tiourgui a announce e w Id
name the political bureau and stated that Prime
Minister Hedi Nouira, in whom he has often ex-
pressed confidence, should succeed to the presi-
dency. W-hen--Po ttrT p6Ze freely -to-the foreign.
press, Bourguiba syyt~s ended him from rty 6';25X1
ties. The Prsient appar t as persuaded,
however, t ( cal e bitter domestic press
campa
Bourguiba also
,presented a slate of 20 party stalwarts to the
central committee from which it selected the
14-member political bureau.
Although Prime Minister Nouira had hoped
to avoid a governmental crisis, the liberals were
able to force one by resigning en masse. This
complicated the task of Nouira who sought to
rm a broadly representative government. A new
a inistration council of ministers was invested
late I S-1. It is composed largely of long-time
supporte of Bourguiba, and includes two ex-
ponents of a liberal point of view as well as
both leaders of conservatives.
Fir tFTd'fi s me, mi-fia} 't5fficers have be~
gun openly ,.to discuss?pctd,:ticajalornents.
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Senior officer are general) Ding themselves
with the conserva unior officers support
the liberals. Noui d i defense minister
can be expe to watch closely or any signs of
politic ctivism within the military. Already,
po e officials known to be close to or sym-
T13Th Y: Military pressure on the Justice Party
has caus'd-fit to "postpone" a decision to with-
draw five of`'itt..,members from Prime Minister
Erim's cabinet. The`arynouncement early in Octo-
ber by Justice Party leader, Demirel that he was
pulling out these cabinet m ers was followed
by Erim's offer to resign-reject y President
Sunay-and the threat of renewed mi1T'taQ inter
General Tagmac, chief of the General Staff,
in a speech on the 29 October- Republic Day
celebrations commented pointedly that the armed
forces would not allow,,.-the present dangerous
situat'on to continue,afid that they supported the
government "with all their strength." Two days
earlier, top .military officers are said to have
SYRIA-JORDAN: Syria has eased sombwhat its
rest ric:tions=on 4111 border with Jordan, which was
closed last July as a g aeR rian support for
the fedayeen. Jordanians with vaii in ea-
also ensuring that the fedayeen do nt4"tart
trouble on the border. Last montfD-, a'`Jordanian
commercial delegation and the foreign minister
visited Syria. Both were assured that the border
closure would soon be lifted. On 28 October, a
newspaper in Amman reported that the Syrian
foreign minister had asserted that matters pending
between Syria and Jordan would soon be settled.
Page 25
pathetic with Mestiri are being tran~red out of
national, 4pcurity headquarter.,5,-to" outlying areas.
Inasmuch as??t e y have ite'to convoke a party
disciplinary co_ e, Bourguiba and Nouira
may be bac aw from further action to
denigrate mart rize~ tiri
agreed that the politicians sho be given an-
other chance to make pa i entary government
work and that mi ry intervention could be
avoided only by (fiving Erim full backing.
Meanwhile, Erim has sharply attacked
Demirel, accusing him of showing financial fav-
oritism toward his brothers when he was prime
minister. This tactic appears designed to split the
m ity Justice Party by strengthening the fac-
tion o ed to Demirel's leadership. The way
party cabinet wit stice Party members of his
own choice, as he had nded, and try to push
his reforms through a arliament still dominated
by the Justice Party.
Syria has tied a reopening of the border to
an accommodattven Jordan and the feda-
yeen. TICtr 'ices for such an agreement still are
n have reached a common position regarding
Jordaniations with the fedayeen, the Pal-
estinians remain-as. as ever. Yasir Arafat
and other moderates softened their stand,
sensing that they must acc Amman's terms if
the fedayeen movement in Jor is to survive.
The radical groups, on the other nd, have de-
nounced an negotiations with Jorda as a defeat-
ist course.
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sraeI:. Government Takes Hard Line
Israeli, concern over relations with the US
was made 6yident in a major policy speech by
Prime Ministr Golda Meir to the Knesset last
week.
In her speech;wMrs. Meir recalled her state-
ment on 9 Februaryt at Israel was ready to hold
discussions on openinthe canal, and she noted
that on 19 April Israel .,:ad presented to the US
detailed proposals on an %terim agreement. She
quoted US spokesmen as saying that Israel's view-
point could serve as a basis r continuing talks
and said that Secretary Roger? dispatch of As-
sistant Secretary Sisco to Cairo apr his May visit
to Israel indicated that Rogers di 1 not find the
Israeli proposals unreasonable per se.
Mrs. Meir said that since March titre have.
been "disturbing changes" in the US appri ch td3
several aspects of the canal settlement. The rUn,
and of a symbolic crossing of the Suez Canal b'
Egyptian forces, even mentioning number Secre-
tary Rogers had said that an interirp` S ez Canal
agreement would be only a step/to `ard imple-
mentation of Security Council Res, ution 242 of
November 1967. Secretary Rors, Mrs. Meir
. 94
added, had also spoken of Ise'li withdrawal to
the international boundary. y departing from
the limits of good offices.'`' i id offering proposals
of its own, Mrs. Meir sa the US risks bringing
about a stalemate and 'arming the chances for
negotiations.
On the ques on of the supply by the US of
Phantom aircra to Israel, Mrs. Meir said, "We
cannot the fact that in recent months,
there has b n an interruption in the supply of
planes to "rael. This upsets the balance of arms...
and it courages the Egyptian rulers in their
preparations to violate the cease-fire and com-
menc 'military operations against Israel if it does
not," ey their dictates."
"intensified discussion" of t
opening the canal,
liminary discussions
statements by other
the US supply of P
ment. In a radio
Prime Ministe
wish to co
not agree
two subjects, Israel would
Israel's Position on an Interim Agreement
Egypt must clear, open, and operate the canal for
the ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel,
within six months of the effective date of the agree-
ient;
he cease-fire must be unlimited;
e Israel Defense Forces will withdraw to adis-
tance; east of the canal to be determined in the
agree nt;
Egyp.;'an civilian technicians will be allowed on the
east bank f the canal;
no Egy 'an armed forces, regular or irregular, will
cross the ca I
Egypt will Vin out its forces west of the canal as
specified in th; rout
ways and mea of control will be agreed upon;
the line to w h Israel withdraws will not be
regarded as final; an
the interim agreemit will not prevent the parties
from continuing negoti ons under Jarring.
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
e engaging in an
e arrangement for
would require pre-
the SUS. Subsequent
ocials have linked
ntom /o Israeli willingness
tiatior 'on an interim settle-
nterviv on 30 October, Deputy
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 Approved For Release 2008/05/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200030001-9
Mauritius: Government Shaken
Tie settlement of a recent labor dispute on
terms favorable to the leftist opposition party,
Mauritian Militant Movement, is having serious
repercussions for the coalition government and
especially for Prime Minister Ramgoolam himself.
After a series of strikes that began two
months ago, the Movement won its key demand
that its dockworkers union be recognized instead
of a government-backed organization. By con-
centrating on economic issues and the present
government's ineffectiveness, the Movement had
already won a series of electoral victories over the
past two years, and its leader, Paul Berenger, now
Paul Berenger
Leader of Leftist opposition
has a stranglehold on the island's sugar-based
economy.
The government was further discredited by
the inept way it handled the strikes. Formed in
1969, the coalition has held in check the island's
internecine communal strife, but has made almost
no progress toward solving pressing problems of
poverty, unemployment, and overpopulation.
Ramgoolam has apparently decided that
negotiation is the best way to deal with Berenger.
Meetings between the two have led to speculation
that Ramgoolam might consider a deal whereby
he would resign in favor of a more popular leader
from his own Labor Party who would then call
general elections.
Ramgoolam's receptiveness to the Mauritian
Militant Movement is not shared by most Labor
Prime Minister Ramgoolam
Party members. His overtures to Berenger-who
himself is not keen about joining forces with
Ramgoolam-are therefore likely to intensify the
efforts of Labor Party dissidents to force the
prime minister's early retirement.Fii
Page 27
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Nov 71
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 Approved For Release 2008/05/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09200030001-9
Secret
Secret
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