WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT URUGUAY'S ELECTIONS TRADITION VS. THE LEFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009200040004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 12, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Uruguay's Elections- Tradition vs the Left
State Dept. review completed
Secret
12 November 1971
No. 0396/71B
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URUGUAY'S
ELECTIONS:
Tradition vs. the Left
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Political placidity and a practically uninterrupted tradition of democratic
practices have typified 20th century Uruguay. Today, however, the country finds
itself grappling with Latin America's most formidable terrorist movement and a
third-force political coalition, the Frente Amplio, that hopes to emulate Allende's
victory in Chile. The 28 November presidential election pits the incumbent Colorado
Party, headed by the hard-lining rightist President Pacheco, against its traditional
rivals, the Blancos, and the new leftist coalition. After more than 100 years of
Colorado and Blanco rule, the Frente is attempting what would literally be, in
Uruguayan terms, the upset of the century.
The government's stumbling record has given the left cause for optimism. The
administration has lost ground to the Tupamaro guerrillas, and the moderate
economic growth of the past two years has been bought at considerable political
cost. Further, Uruguay's political system has institutionalized factional politics, and
the strong-willed President has added to the disarray by seeking a constitutional
amendment that would permit him a second consecutive term. With the Blancos
fielding no odds-on favorite candidate, the specter is raised of a tight three-way race
of the type that allowed Chile's Allende to squeeze to victory. The Frente, sup-
ported by the terrorist Tupamaros, is hoping that, by offering an alternative to the
traditional parties, it will be able to take advantage of the general disgruntlement
with the country's lack of direction.
The Frente, is likely to fall considerably short in its first bid to overturn the
establishment. The complex electoral system heavily favors the two major parties,
and the Frente is not likely to woo voters from Blanco and Colorado strongholds in
the interior where party ties are strong. This should again allow the Colorados and
Blancos to dominate the national vote, with the incumbent Colorados being con-
ceded a slight edge over their traditional rivals. The Frente bid, which will be
stronger in the important contests in the capital, makes it apparent that the
country's long-term economic decline is edging toward a political crisis which must
be confronted with new attitudes and new policies. The Communist-backed Frente
should be able to establish itself as a viable third force that-like the terrorist
activities of the formidable Tupamaro guerrilla organization-will serve as a reminder
that reliance upon custom and tradition will no longer be sufficient to meet a
growing challenge.
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Uruguay, with a proud heritage of a prosper-
ous and thriving economy and a smoothly func-
tioning two-party political system, has fallen
upon hard times. The difficulties began to appear
during the 1950s, when the cost of a massive
public welfare system began to overburden an
essentially pastoral economy. Earnings began to
fall as meat and wool, the principal export com-
modities, suffered from fluctuating prices, dwin-
dling world markets, and an overvalued exchange
rate. Inefficient government enterprises and the
failure to increase productivity commensurate
with higher levels of spending contributed to the
pinch. Successive administrations found it more
expedient to pay heed to politics rather than
economics and opted for continued spending
rather than fiscal responsibility. Budget deficits, a
spiraling cost of living, and stagnating per capita
gross domestic product characterized the eco-
nomic picture in the 1960s. Inflation picked up
speed and prices rose 1,600 percent between
1963 and 1969, peaking at an annual rate of 165
percent in the first half of 1968.
The economic distress inevitably gave rise to
political unease. Many Uruguayans yearned for
the peace and prosperity of yesteryear. Dis-
satisfied youth began to question whether
progress would ever come via the creaking
Uruguayan machinery. The startling and dramatic
rise of the Tupamaros in the late 1960s gave
further urgency to re-examination of traditional
practices.
Early in this century, the father of Uru-
guay's modern political institutions and architect
of its social reforms, Jose Batlle y Ordonez, lob-
bied vigorously in favor of a system of shared
executive power via a plural presidency. From
1918 onward, the country experimented with
varieties of a curtailed executive system or "rule
by committee." In periods of calm and prosperity
the system functioned-tolerably if not effi-
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ciently-but it proved unable to cope with crises.
In the 1950s the foundering prompted a search
for new solutions. A nine-man Council of Govern-
ment system was adopted in 1951, but it pro-
vided little relief. In 1958 and again in 1962 the
voters turned from the Colorados, who had held
power for 93 consecutive years, to their tradi-
tional rivals, the Blancos. The Blancos fared no
better, and in 1966 the voters scrapped the coun-
cil and adopted a single presidential system,
returning the Colorados to power at the same
time.
While the voters experimented with specific
mechanisms for governing the country, the
unique system designed to ensure the dominance
of the Colorado and Blanco parties continued to
function. The system recognizes the legal and
separate existence of factions within a party and
allows them to field candidates and gain repre-
sentation while remaining officially under the
party banner. The presidential election combines
both a primary and general contest in which the
most-voted candidate of the most-voted party
wins. In 1966 the victorious Gestido-Pacheco
ticket was one of several slates of differing ideo-
logical persuasions fielded by the Colorados.
Jorge Pacheco Areco succeeded to the presi-
dency in 1967 on the death of retired General
Oscar Gestido.
e approac a is in eri a pos
with determination and dedication. As President
he moved forcefully in both the economic and
political spheres, and recorded several midterm
successes.
By the use of restrictive controls his admin-
istration slowed the near-ruinous inflation that
raged during much of the period from 1955
through 1967. Efforts in 1968 to trim wage
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Uruguay= Cost of Living
Real GDP Per Capita
50
1965 '66 '67 '68 '69
'70 1965 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70
increases and a subsequent devaluation were fol-
lowed by more stringent wage and price freezes
distasteful to both labor unions and the general
public. The cost-of-living index was held down to
a 14-percent rise in 1969 and to 20 percent in
1970, but Pacheco got little mileage out of it. He
failed 1:o publicize the positive aspects of the
program or to consult with other political leaders
so as to emphasize the national, bipartisan aspects
of the administration's policies.
This has been a continuing weakness during
Pacheco's tenure. His term has been a one-man
show. Political compromise has been an all but
alien art. The cabinet has had no continuity;
ministe'ial changes have averaged at least two a
month and totaled more than 60 since 1967. The
administration is identifiable not by a coherent
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program, but by the personal policies of its
President.
Relations with the legislature, which has
opposed many of these policies, have been
stormy. The congress, accustomed to deference
and a position almost coequal with the president,
reacted defensively to Pacheco's rough tactics.
Matters nearly reached the breaking point on sev-
eral occasions although the legislature usually
backed off at the implied threat that Pacheco,
supported by the military, might close the con-
gress and rule by decree. The ill-feeling gave rise
to an abortive congressional attempt this year to
impeach the President for allegedly overstepping
his constitutional authority in ignoring legislative
wishes and imposing emergency security meas-
ures.
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The President's obstinacy, as defined by his
critics, or his determination, according to his sup-
porters, has been put to its severest test over his
public-order policies. In this area, Pacheco has
suffered his most serious setbacks, yet he has
made and staked a political reputation on the
issue of law and order.
The government's reaction to unrest, and
specifically to the terrorism of the Tupamaros,
has been vigorous but woefully inadequate to the
task. Bypassing the legislature, Pacheco has made
liberal use of emergency security measures that
suspend certain constitutional provisions. When
the wave of spectacular Tupamaro kidnapings
began in 1968, Pacheco became the first Latin
American leader to refuse to negotiate. He has
not budged from this public stance. The govern-
ment, however, has failed to wrest the initiative
from the guerrillas and has suffered frequent pub-
lic embarrassment at their hands. Most recently,
in September, the terrorists staged a mass jail-
break of 106 of their fellows, including all of the
top leaders imprisoned by the government over
the last three years. As an additional insult, the
guerrillas freed their hostage of eight months,
British Ambassador Jackson, saying there were
"no longer any prisoners whose safety his deten-
tion had guaranteed." The Tupamaros still hold
four Uruguayan captives, including a close adviser
to the President whom they have sentenced to
"life imprisonment."
The President's reaction to the September
debacle was characteristic of his hard line.
Pledging his own life in the battle, Pacheco trans-
ferred responsibility for dealing with the terrorists
from the police to the army, but the measures
adopted have not yet had encouraging results.
Nonetheless, Pacheco's unyielding deter-
mination in the face of adversity has won him a
degree of respect from the electorate and a meas-
ure of popular support. Most of the blame for the
reverses suffered by the administration in its
counterterrorism campaign have been attributed
to the inefficiency and corruption of the govern-
ment machine rather than to him personally.
Special Report - 5 -
If necessary at the cost of nay own life, I will lift this
t try out of the `situation i i co e try facing.
prom now o more than ever, t1 dministrat on,
the, d eision ,making and the r sponsibility far the
sate wil e nd mine alone v _
tcc, 11 Sept. 1971,
o lowin T armaro rnass~jatl break.
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In sum, Pacheco's inflexibility has been both
strength and weakness. Persistent efforts in the
economic sphere brought Uruguay back from the
brink of economic chaos in 1968, but no early
end is predicted for the financial squeeze. The
stabilization program has been a political mill-
stone. The respect occasioned by Pacheco's tough
stand on terrorism is balanced off by the absence
of sorely needed national political leadership.
Pacheco's close-to-the-vest style and his re-
luctance to consider or consult others have gov-
erned his relations with his own party as well. For
example, only in the closing months of the cur-
rent campaign did he reveal his decision to seek
re-election. That decision and his choice of a
running mate were made without party consulta-
tions.
The re-election effort, via a constitutional
amendment permitting a second consecutive
term, is sponsored by the Unity and Reform
faction, probably the strongest single group in the
Colorado Party. The theme of its campaign,
"Pacheco or Chaos," accurately reflects Pacheco's
presidential philosophy. To take account of the
possibility that the amendment may fail, Pacheco
has named a stand-in candidate, Agriculture Min-
ister Eordaberry. A citizen will vote yes or no on
a constitutional amendment, mark one ballot that
will include Pacheco, and a second slate that will
list Bordaberry instead. The second will be valid if
the amendment fails.
The President's last-minute unilateral
decision to tap Bordaberry for the alternate slot
triggered several high-level defections, including
Vice President Abdala and several cabinet offi-
cials. Those in opposition to Bordaberry cited his
forme- membership in the Blanco Party and his
lack of real Colorado credentials. Here again, the
President's brusque style cost him an opportunity
to capitalize fully on both his and an alternate's
strength.
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The turncoats are likely to take the bulk of
their supporters into other Colorado groups
rather than to the Blancos or Frente. The Colora-
dos will be fielding four other candidates. Jorge
Batlle, head of the long-prominent Batlle political
clan and a well-known newspaper publisher of
moderate political persuasion, is Pacheco's prin-
cipal Colorado rival. He has a strong base of
support in his powerful List-15 faction and is
running with another widely respected Colorado
politician in the vice-presidential slot. Previously,
his presidential aspirations have been foiled by an
inability to expand his appeal beyond this solid
base. In the final weeks of the campaign, Batlle's
strategy will be to attempt to convince Colorados
who name Pacheco on their primary ballot to
choose him rather than the officially anointed
Bordaberry as a second choice.
The Vasconcellos' "third-front" ticket can-
not compete with the Batlle or Pacheco machines.
The Vasconcellos' slate opposes the Pacheco
administration policies across the board and,
therefore, furnishes an important escape valve for
liberal Colorado votes that might otherwise be
lost to Blanco and Frente appeals. The final
Colorado candidate, retired General Juan Ribas,
has made a big publicity splash but is unlikely to
score heavily with the voters. He is competing
with better known names for the law and order
vote.
The New Left Frente Amplio
With the Colorados staked out on the right
of the political spectrum in this election, the
Frente Amplio (Broad Front) has emerged as a
counterforce on the left. Opposing Pacheco at
every turn, the Frente contends that the blame
for the country's ills rests with the sterile, cor-
rupt, and inefficient system that has given the
voters only a choice between do-nothing look
alikes, the tweedledum Colorados and the
tweedledee Blancos.
The left, principally the Communists,
recognized the growing manifestations of
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uneasiness-the search for new governing mechan-
isms, the turn to the Blancos in 1958, and the
dramatic rise of the Tupamaro organization since
1968. Especially in its earlier years, that terrorist
organization skillfully parlayed vague disgruntle-
ment into popular sympathy in the battle against
what was portrayed as government corruption.
The fledgling Frente effort hopes to harness that
same frustration and disenchantment.
Efforts by the left to effect election coali-
tions date back to the 1950s but have gained only
minimal.-`.success. In 1966 the Communist Leftist
Liberation Front (FIDEL) attracted only six per-
cent of the vote. The Communists failed to
expand their role beyond a limited ideological
following, and "front" ploys were generally rec-
ognized as tactical smoke screens. Respectable
groups on the left, such as the Christian Demo-
crats, shied away from such alliances, fearful of
Communist contamination and domination.
This apprehension was eased by the victory
of Allende's united front in Chile. The Commu-
nist Party of Uruguay held out the prospect of a
coalition including "Marxists and non-Marxists
alike," and an independent group of intellectuals
took the lead in calling for unity late last year.
The Christian Democrats were also outspoken
advocates of the need for a coalition. Thus, the
Frente Amplio came into being in February. The
coalition includes the Communists, Christian
Democrats, Socialists, Independents, the Revolu-
tionary Movement of Uruguay, and several rene-
gade factions from the Blancos and Colorados.
Some dissidents left the major parties more
because of opportunism than any other factor.
Ex-Colorado Senator Michelini joined the Frente
as his weight within Colorado Party councils was
diminishing, partly as a result of the drop in his
vote between the 1962 and 1966 elections. He
envisions a role for himself as the foremost leader
of the non-Communist elements of the Frente,
but when he bolted he suffered defections from
his group. Others shed their party labels more
from ideological conviction and distress at
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Pacheco's brand of leadership. They, too, did not
pull major segments from the traditional parties.
Even the Christian Democrats were not able to
lure all of their adherents into the Frente fold,
and their offshoot Radical Christian Union is
fielding its own presidential candidate. The
Frente, however, is counting on a huge protest
vote to swell its following.
The Communists, although maintaining a
low public profile, are supplying the money,
drive, and organization for the Frente. Although
the former independent groups and major party
dissidents optimistically claim that the election
results will allow the democratic forces in the
Frente to emerge as the controlling force, their
confidence is contradicted by such examples as
the formation of the Frente's central and coor-
dinating committees earlier this year which
showed that only the Communist Party was capa-
ble of stocking all of the committees with per-
sonnel. The party's large organization-about
40,000 members in one of South America's small-
est nations-its financial resources, and its na-
tional political network make its domination of
leftist groupings very likely.
The various factions of the Frente are run-
ning separate slates for the Senate and the Cham-
ber of Deputies, and the squabbling over potential
political spoils, added to the differences natural in
such a mixed ideological bag, have put a strain on
unity. Nothing however, currently threatens the
breakup of the Frente. To foster the unity image,
the Frente is putting up a single presidential can-
didate, the left-leaning, retired General Liber
Seregni. Seregni was a capable soldier, sometimes
described as brilliant, whose rumored "pro-Com-
munist" political beliefs and political aspirations
led to his retirement from the military. He filled
the Frente need for a non-Communist com-
promise candidate.
Seregni has handled himself well in public,
and the Frente has concentrated on attacking
Pacheco's policies. It contends that it can halt the
terrorist violence and emphasizes that the country
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is ready for change. It urges amnesty for all politi-
cal prisoners, selected nationalizations, and resto-
ration of relations with Cuba. Its spokesmen have
in the past engaged in more radical rhetoric, but
its official platform drew back from some of the
earlier allusions to widespread nationalizations,
free-swinging attacks on the OAS and foreign
companies, and hints of a new political and elec-
toral system. Having staked out the left of the
political stage as its own, the Frente is now avoid-
ing ultraradical stances that would alienate
prospective voters. The Frente has gained the
unsolicited public support of the Tupamaros-the
Communist Party would prefer to keep what it
considers "misguided revolutionaries" at arms
length. At the same time, the Frente has publicly
rejected terrorism as a way to solve the country's
problems.
The Blancos, as much by necessity as choice,
occupy the middle ground. They hope that mod-
erates will shy away from the extremes presented
by Pacheco and the Frente and will vote for a
Blanco candidate rather than one of the other
Colorados.
The leading Blanco hopeful, Senator Ferreira
Aldunate, hammered together a party coalition
early this year and has run a well-organized cam-
paign. His official platform, which includes calls
for selected nationalizations and land reform, is a
nationalistic and generally realistic effort to stem
the loss of votes to the Frente. Although the
articulate Ferreira has drawn well throughout the
campaign, the lack of a second strong Blanco
candidacy to swell the party's over-all vote
seemed an insurmountable handicap. The failure
of the other announced Blanco presidential
aspirant, retired General Mario Aguerrondo, to
attract early support led to rumors of a third
candidacy.
In September and October, however, Aguer-
rondo's campaign began to attract some solid
support, especially in the interior. Although
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Aguerrondo remained a somewhat colorless per-
former, one of the respected party elders agreed
to run on his slate and public interest picked up.
Aguerrondo, as another law-and-order candidate,
probably also benefited from the Tupamaros'
massive September prison break. Some conserva-
tives, who favor Pacheco's policies but are dis-
satisfied with his performance, could turn to
Aguerrondo.
With the emergence of two contenders
whose strengths appear to complement one an-
other-Aguerrondo appealing more to the interior
and Ferreira more to the capital-the Blancos for
the first time began to see a real chance to win
the presidential race.
President Pacheco has firmly staked out his
position on the law-and-order question, which is
regarded as the overriding campaign issue and his
principal strength. He is having trouble in turning
his efforts in the economic sphere to any political
advantage. The austerity program could benefit
the populace only in the long run, and in the
meantime the voters, especially in the capital,
regarded the restrictions as onerous. In recogni-
tion of his weakness on this issue, Pacheco began
to move away from strict austerity in the latter
half of the year. Despite a constitutional prohibi-
tion against wage increases in the civil service in
the year preceding elections, Pacheco decreed a
monthly "loan" beginning in August and con-
tinuing through February, it being understood
that repayment would be forgotten. In September
the government raised the minumum wage and
announced that all private sector wages would be
increased 27.2 percent, with selected industries
receiving even more. The increases are in excess
even of the demands of the powerful Communist
trade union federation and will again fuel infla-
tion. But they will partly offset the political
deficits incurred by past policies and the setback
occasioned by the Tupamaro escape in Septem-
ber. Along with recent very flexible enforcement
of the restrictions on trade union activities, the
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wage hikes went a long way toward ensuring labor
peace through the elections.
Pacheco's propaganda has hammered away
at the theme that the Frente is a Communist
disguise and represents an alien tradition wedded
to violence. Pro-Pacheco campaign posters juxta-
pose the Frente with quotes from Fidel Castro.
Blancos trade on the negative aspects of
both the Frente and Pacheco, contending that the
Frente has no real chance to win and that a
protesi vote against Colorado policies will have
impact only if entered in the Blanco column.
The Frente strategy, pursued quite success-
fully through the early months, has been to pic-
ture itself as riding a popular groundswell. Its
quick starting and free spending campaign, ini-
tiated while its opponents were still preoccupied
with intraparty politicking, enhanced the image.
Not unexpectedly, the individual candidates have
depended more upon party labels, personal ap-
peal, and recognized ideological leanings than on
any specific campaign promises of solutions for
Uruguay's problems. The standard campaign fare
includes attacks on the unpopular banking indus-
try, criticism of President Pacheco that ranges
from mild to malevolent, and calls for progress
for the economic sphere.
The relatively straightforward issues are
balanced by a bewildering barrage of candidates.
There are nine presidential candidates, and each
of the various party subfactions has nominated
hopefuls for senator, deputy, and municipal of-
fices. The average Uruguayan is literate, inti-
mately involved with the political process, and
quite experienced in picking his way through a
welter of candidates. In the elections of 1966,
besides various constitutional reform proposals
the electoral lists contained 17 presidential can-
didacies and more than 200,000 office seekers.
The figure, although it includes duplications and
substitutes, does illustrate the sophistication of
the voter and the extent of participation in the
political process in a nation of less than three
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million people. The political parties are permitted
to print their own ballots under central super-
vision, so that many voters arrive at the polls with
ballots distributed by their local political club
ready to be stuffed into the box.
The Frente is hoping that an especially large,
youthful vote in this contest will swing the elec-
tion its way. Voter interest should push the par-
ticipation level well beyond the 75 percent of the
registered voters who have turned out in the last
two elections. Registration drives have swelled the
rolls to about 1.8 million eligible voters. This will
be the first election conducted under a new con-
gressional bill which has put teeth, by way of
penalties, in a long-standing but unenforced con-
stitutional stipulation making voting obligatory
for citizens over 18 years of age.
The voter increase and the new laws are at
best a mixed blessing for the Frente. Those who
have chosen not to vote in previous elections
seem as likely to be sedentary conservatives as
activist radicals ready to mark a protest ballot.
Penalties may also draw out more housewives and
their vote is likely to be entered in traditional
columns.
The population of the country is not nearly
as youthful as are most others in Latin America.
This also weighs against the Frente. The average
age is over 32, with more than 400,000 of the
potential 1.8 million voters already on retirement
rolls. The average Uruguayan voter, while possibly
disappointed with the Colorado government's per-
formance and perhaps disenchanted that the
downhill economic slide has pinched his pocket-
book, is probably not yet ready for the radical
change associated with the Frente. Especially in
the interior, where slightly more than half the
population lives, conservativism is likely to block
the Frente aspirations. The conservative factions
from the Colorados and the Blancos have his-
torically run well outside the capital, and there is
little sign of change this year. In the outlying
areas, neighborhood political clubs the func-
tioning nuts-and-bolts mechanism for delivering
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votes-tend to a tightly knit cohesion which ap-
proaches that of a social group.
The Frente should make a much stronger
showing in Montevideo. The factions of the
Frente that participated separately in the 1966
elections attracted only eight percent of the in-
terior vote but 22 percent of the vote in Monte-
video. If they were to better that record substan-
tially, they would pose a serious challenge in light
of the normally close division of the votes be-
tween the Blancos and Colorados. Although both
Blancos and Colorados are fielding candidates for
mayor who appear somewhat more attractive
than the Frente nominee, the prohibition against
splitting votes between national and local choices
makes the party label rather than personal attrac-
tiveness the critical factor.
The Frente has shown well in the polls in the
capital, close on the heels of the Colorados and
with a substantial lead over the Blancos, and the
expected closing rush by all three parties will be
of critical importance.
A majority vote for the re-election amend-
ment seems highly unlikely. Too many in Pa-
checo's own party oppose it, and the President
lacks the personal following to carry off such a
vote of confidence. The most voted candidate of
the most voted party carries the day, and the
Colorados, with or most probably without Pa-
checo, seem likely to retain the presidency, the
Blancos finishing a strong second. The Blanco
candidate Ferreira Aldunate could conceivably
emerge as the most popular eligible candidate
fielded by either party, but the Blanco total will
probably not match the Colorados. Either Battle,
somewhat to the left of center, or the somewhat
more conservative Bordaberry thus seems the
most likely choice to succeed Pacheco. With voter
samples showing 25 percent of the vote still un-
decided, neither is an odds-on favorite and the
Blancos retain an outside chance.
The Frente does not yet appear to have the
political muscle for a major national bid. Simply
on the basis of the number of parties and factions
now running under its banner, however, it will
almost surely increase the left's congressional
representation. With FIDEL members and recent
congressional converts from the major parties, the
Frente now has 11 of the 99 seats in the Chamber
of Deputies and four of the 30 in the Senate.
Gains are likely, but probably not enough to give
it a congressional balance of power. Given the
factionalization of Uruguayan parties, presidents
are accustomed to operating with minority sup-
port and negotiating for other votes. A substantial
Frente representation in the congress may make
interparty negotiations somewhat more difficult,
but not impossible.
Just as a strong congressional representation
would increase its political leverage, the capture
of the capital race would amount to a major
psychological boost and would deal a blow to the
future of the two-party system. A close race be-
tween the Colorados and the Frente and a large
undecided vote continue to be reflected in the
latest polls, and in a contest as tight as this one
still looks, last-minute miscalculations or a final
party push could have a dramatic impact. As the
size of the uncertain vote has dwindled in the last
months, however, the two traditional parties have
benefited more from the shift than has the
Frente. The present trend seems likely to con-
tinue and should allow the Colorados to score an
uneasy triumph over the upstart Frente.
Extraconstitutional Factors:
The Military and the Tupamaros
Extraconstitutional solutions are not un-
precedented in the country's history. In both
1933 and 1942 presidents illegally extended their
terms with military acquiescence and instituted
measures that strengthened the executive. Presi-
dent Pacheco too has lamented the weakness of
his office and has used the implied threat of
military backing to cow his opponents. With
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public security forces often frustrated by the ter-
rorists' ingenuity, rumors of coup plotting have
occasionally arisen. At this point, however, they
amount to little more than talk about con-
tingency plans to support the President if he
attempts to extend his term. Even this is not
widespread and is based on the slim possibility
that the Frente might win the elections and that
Pacheco would take the initiative. In that even-
tuality, the President could probably count on
the military standing squarely behind him.
The President involved the military establish-
ment more fully in the antisubversion battle by
transferring responsibility for controlling terror-
ism from the police to the armed forces in Sep-
tember. The military is busy trying to sort out the
mechanics of its new responsibilities. In addition,
public security forces are apparently under wraps
until after the elections to avoid the possibility
that new initiatives against the terrorists might
result in a political scandal. Thus far the public
security forces have shown that, operating with
their present methods and under existing handi-
caps, they cannot eliminate, and indeed are hard
pressed to contain, the Tupamaros. The judicial
system leans to an extreme for Latin America in
the direction of protecting the rights of individ-
uals and metes out light sentences. This is not
likely to change in the near term. After the elec-
tions, the counterterrorist campaign will therefore
have to become far more efficient, or brutal, if it
is to cope with the threat.
The Tupamaros, for their part, have similarly
scaled down their pre-election activities. Although
they had previously disowned all political effort,
recent communiques have reflected their interest
in the elections and their "positive attitude" to-
ward the Frente. Not all elements in the
Tupamaro organization share this view however.
Policy disputes have arisen over the proper
emphasis to be given to the violent versus the
political tactic. One of the factions of the Frente,
the 26 March Movement, is receiving Tupamaro
backing and could emerge as a political arm of the
terrorist group. Even if the disagreements give rise
Special Report
to some fragmentation, however, the Tupamaros
will retain a substantial capacity for terrorist
activity as a hard core has been nurtured on, and
presumably is committed to, a violent strategy.
Movement toward resolution of the internal
dispute will await, in part, the election results. In
the meantime, even the violence prone seem un-
likely to attempt to force cancellation of the
election. Such a tactic would require an all-out
effort by a majority of the Tupamaros, and would
risk all of their resources in a long-shot gamble. A
more likely tactic for the pragmatic Tupamaros
would be an effort to stage another embarrassing
spectacular designed for political impact just
before the election.
The Frente's political star is tied to external
factors. It is still a tenuous coalition of political
convenience. As a protest movement, it reflects
primarily a negative reaction to the inability of
the government to solve economic problems and
calm the country. A continued lack of success in
these areas will boost its stock.
Its realistic near-term goal remains to make a
showing in this election impressive enough to
establish itself as a viable third force that could be
a serious threat in 1976. An impressive showing
would be in the neighborhood of 20 percent of
the vote. If the Frente wins the mayor's seat in
Montevideo, the resulting patronage and prestige
would help bind the coalition together, but its
political muscle, while significant, would have
definite limitations. The Blancos and Colorados
would presumably maintain a majority on the
Montevideo Departmental Council, which has
considerable power over the mayor's office.
Police forces are under national rather than local
jurisdiction, and the mayoralty is partly de-
pendent upon the purse strings controlled at the
national level.
Whatever the exact percentage of the vote
tallied by the left's coalition, the fact of the
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Colorado Party
Frente's existence is itself a clear indication of
disenchantment. The next administration will
have to bend greater efforts toward achieving a
sense of national unity and fashioning bipartisan
support for its programs or face a continuation of
present trends.
Whatever the exact shape of the new admin-
istration, a number of problems are likely to
deepen rather than disperse. Many of the financial
difficulties are rooted in the basic economic struc-
ture and there are no short-term solutions. The
terrorist violence seems likely to become worse,
especially as compared to the pre-election period.
If the Frente loses the elections, as is expected,
some radicals will view it as a reaffirmation of the
hard line. Some of those who have backed the
Frente political bid may in frustration and disap-
pointment embrace the violent alternative posed
by the Tupamaros. No government, not even a
Frente administration, is likely to be able to fol-
low policies that would satisfy incessant
Tupamaro demands. In addition, the Tupamaros,
whose style has been copied by other revolution-
ary groups in Latin America, are breeding imita-
tors within the country as well. Other small bands
will be seeking to utilize the Tupamaros' success-
ful tactics for personal gain and political advan-
tage. With the military now more firmly com-
mitted to the struggle and the Tupamaros
strengthened by their several jailbreaks over the
past year, many of the ingredients seem present
for a wider struggle.
Jorge Pacheco
Areco
Blanco Party
Wilson Ferreira
Aldunate
Frente Amplio
L Iber .Seregni
Radical Christian Union
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12 November 1971
Jorge Battle Ibanez
Juan
Pedro Ribas
Uruguay: Presidential Candidates
(Major candidates in red.)
1966 Election Results
PARTIES
Votes
%
Colorado
607,633
49.3
National
496,910
40.3
Christan Democrat
37,219
3.0
Fidel Communist)
69,750
5.7
Socialist
11,559
0.9
Other
8,691
0.7
Total
Total eligible
voters 1,658,368
Senate Deputy
Seats Seats
16
13
-
1
50
41
3
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