WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009200060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 26, 1971
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A009200060001-6
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
26 November 1971
No. 0398/71
Copy
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i
CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 24 November 1971)
India-Pakistan: Fighting in the East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Egypt: More Talk of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Indochina: Cambodia; South Vietnam; Laos; North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thailand: Tying Up Loose Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
South Korea Charts a New Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Communist China: Shipping Expands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Communist China's Educational Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Meetings in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Portugal: Terrorist Bombings Trouble Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Warsaw Pact Ministers Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Yugoslavia: Unrealistic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Problems Mount for International Labor . 16
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Burundi: More Loose Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Political Stirrings in Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
20
Honduras: Cruz' Problems Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NOTES: Japan; Iceland; Cuba
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India-Pakistan: Fighting in the East
The largest and most costly military clashes
in the eight-month-old Indo-Pakistani conflict
erupted inside East Pakistan on 21 November.
Mukti Bahini guerrillas, apparently supported by
Indian air and ground forces including armor,
fought Pakistani troops in a region between the
West Bengal/East Pakistan border and Jessore
town, some 20 miles inside East Pakistan. Con-
firmation of widespread Indian military involve-
men-: at Jessore is not available, but it is likely
that Indian regulars, perhaps up to two 3,000-
man brigades, participated in the operation, and
that they penetrated some eight miles into East
Pakistan.
Indian officials at first maintained that the
offensive was solely the action of Bengali insur-
gents, but on 24 November, an Indian govern-
ment spokesman admitted that Indian tanks had
crossed the border three days earlier in what he
described as a defensive action in which 13 Paki-
stani tanks were destroyed. Also on 24 Novem-
ber, !'rime Minister Gandhi told Parliament that
Indian troops were instructed not to cross the
borders "except in self-defense."
Indian Army
EASTERN COMMAND
Page 1
The fighting was heaviest in the Jessore area,
but incursions were also reported into the dis-
tricts of Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong, as well
as in the Chittagong Hills. Pakistan claims Indian
troops were fighting in five places on East Paki-
stani territory.
In the first report of aerial losses, the Indians
claim to have downed three Pakistani F-86s over
Indian territory and to have captured two Paki-
stani pilots. The Pakistanis admit losing two air-
craft and claim they downed two Indian fighter
jets.
The View from Islamabad
Shortly after the fighting broke out, Islama-
bad accused India of instigating an "all-out offen-
sive" and later threatened to request an emer-
gency meeting of the UN Security Council to
consider the alleged Indian incursion. On 23
November, President Yahya Khan declared a state
of emergency, citing the "threat of external ag-
gression" as the cause. The next day he called up
the Pakistani reserves. These moves were taken
primarily to dramatize the situation at home and
abroad. In fact, Pakistan has been under martial
law since March 1969, and the country has almost
no reserve system.
The Jessore clash followed closely on the
heels of several conciliatory gestures by the Paki-
stani President. In his message marking the
Muslim holiday last weekend, Yahya offered a
"hand of friendship" to India, his most con-
ciliatory language in recent months. The message
followed a cordial meeting between Yahya and
the newly designated Indian high commissioner to
Pakistan, J. K. Atal.
There have also been indications that Yahya
is becoming somewhat more receptive to the pos-
sibility of negotiating with the disaffected
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B H U T A N
E of
P 9 $stani F- b Jessor
r p )r edit' s low ,
C1-,(7 T
_,G
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Bengalis, as it becomes more apparent that a
move in this direction may be the price he will
have to pay for preserving the nation. Yahya
appears to be trying to gain enough time to trans-
fer power to a civilian government, which accord-
ing to his plans will be established in early
January.
Indira Gandhi's negative response to Yahya's
holiday message and the escalating border clashes
Indian Army
4TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION
providE, little hope for an early political settle-
ment of the crisis. Mrs. Gandhi publicly stated
that if Yahya is sincere, he must release Bengali
leader Mujibur Rahman, forgo the "farce" of
by-elections in East Pakistan next month, and
negotiate a political accommodation with the
East Bengalis. Moreover, New Delhi still shuns
international initiatives which it considers would
only delay progress toward establishing virtual
independence in East Pakistan. Thus, India ap-
pears increasingly willing to risk a major war with
Pakistan in order to force Islamabad toward a
political settlement that would enable a sub-
stantial number of the 10 million Pakistani
refugees to return home.
In addition, India is adding substantially to
its support of the Mukti Bahini and broadening its
press coverage of guerrilla successes.
The Mukti Bahini- Growing Audacity
The guerrillas are estimated to be in control
of almost a third of rural East Pakistan, and the
Pakistani Army and volunteer militia apparently
provide little more than a facade of law and order
in the remainder of the province. In Dacca, the
army's search operation for Mukti Bahini ele-
ments last week resulted in some 500 arrests and
netted leaflets and a small number of weapons.
The continuing wave of incidents in the capital
demonstrates that insurgent activity has not been
effectively reduced.
There is also evidence that the guerrillas have
decided that UN relief efforts will no longer be
exempted from sabotage operations. On 23
November, two UN-marked coastal vessels
berthed at Narayanganj-about 20 miles from
Dacca-were mined. In addition, several UN
trucks were reportedly commandeered by the
Pakistani Army. The guerrillas have long held that
UN operations support the Pakistani military.
Fear for the safety of UN personnel led to the
evacuation to Bangkok of about 40 nonessential
staff and dependents on Tuesday. The accom-
panying recall of UN workers from outlying posts
to Dacca and Chittagong brings the 85-man relief
operation to a virtual halt, at least temporar-
ily.
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Z!ir,l..11C.L" I
Egypt: More Talk of War
President Sadat capped the bellicose rhetoric
coming out of Cairo recently with two tough
speeches last weekend. Speaking to military units,
the Egyptian leader 'declared that "the time for
battle has come" because there was no longer any
hope for a peaceful solution. He claimed the US
does not want serious N-peace negotiations and
charged that Washington' S procrastination was
designed to give Israel whatjt could not obtain by
fighting in 1967. Sadat said the negotiations Israel
had been seeking in the cotjtext of Secretary
Roger's initiative would have one on endlessly,
allowing Tel Aviv's occupationCof the Sinai to
become a fait accompli.
Sadat's remarks may have been ntended
convey the impression that he had r the
"decision" promised before the end o
A decision to resume fighting, however,
likely not been made. "The order t
Sadat's words, "is still to come nd mu
preceded by strenuous and fier training.
any case, Sadat implied fur er political
neuvering was possible if I el would respon
positively to UN envoy Ja ng's initiative of last
February and commit elf to complete with-
drawal from territories ccupied during the June
Sadat dou3tless also hoped his remarks
would bring a _ increase in international pressure
on Israel. Neweek, Egypt is expected to seek a
resolution i the UN General Assembly calling on
Israel to rypond positively to Jarring's initiative.
Cairo is y fso likely to test the atmosphere in New
York toward sanctions and an arms embargo
against Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, public apprehension is growing
in Israel, and governmpnt officials have accused
Sadat of heightening Aar hysteria and of boxing
himself in. Foreigl Minister Eban called upon
Sadaf o "stop the public bombast" and to nego-
tiate a ttlement. Declaring that Israel would not
yield to ilitary intimidation or political pres-
sure, Eban- aid that Tel Aviv must take Sadat's
remarks Seri ysly. On Tuesday, military officials
conducted the- first nationwide air raid warning
test in six month',
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Indochina
Cambodia: To the Rescue Again
The South Vietnamese have responded to
Cambodian requests for help with a new dry-
season campaign against Communist main-force
units, in eastern Kompong Cham Province. Ele-
ments of a large South Vietnamese task force
crossed the border on 22 November and have
moved virtually unopposed along Route 7 in the
initial phase of the operation.
I-amiodi-ans obviously were reluctant to
.be. South Vietnamese troops return, especially
in view of their past-reco'rd of misconduct. Con-
cer,r7.:-_over the Communist offerisjXe around
Porn Penh and in the Route 6 area, apparently
,Ln ,d 1 L,_;possi_bility of rekindling anti-Vietnam-
ese sentiment worth the risk. It seems doubtful
that the movement of South Vietnamese units
into eastern Kompong Cham Province will by
itself relieve the pressure around the Cambodian
capital, since the Communist units there are not
responsible for defending the plantations in Kom-
pong Cham. It is possible that the South Vietnam-
ese drive will force the Communists to pull their
9th Division regiments away from operations
against Cambodian troops in the Chenla II area
along Route 6.
The So V -l ve--i feel-
ings about incursions into Cambodia. ey would
like to see Cambodian forces do the fighting
on the Cambodian side of the b `rder, but Saigon
recognizes that the Cambo _'ar ns are no match for
Communist main forces d that the continued
presence of large eny units just over the border
constitutes a threat: The South Vietnamese see it
as in their owpj ffi terest to carry out limited cross-
border oper1ions, but they will ensure that such
forays,,d6 not cut into defenses at home. This
cautious approach stems from earlier dry-season
campaigns and is likely to be the basis for South
V %thisyear.
The proximity--(if the Communists -..Q-,- the
capital, following hard on last month's con-
troversial political changes, has made some resi-
dents apprehensive about the depth of the govern-
ment's concern for them arfd about the army's
ability to defend Ptntm Penh.
No major attacks have been mounted
ie g,nmur ists-dur'rrV'Tfl f st'few days, and
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Pehe`rTtriri"ie bias not been liit by rockets'
siV nce ? ;, ,,.GI.eve7 fiber.
A government task force, twice reorganized,
recaptured the village of Tuol Leap unopposed,
but it has made little progress in driving the
Communists from this area. Major elements of the
enemy's Phuoc Long Front remain within striking
distance of the capital. Several additional bat-
talions from the Chenla II area have been airlifted
to Phnom Penh by South Vietnamese helicopters
and are scheduled to join renewed clearing opera-
tions at week's end
South Vietnam: The-Opposition Lies Low ._,
The- strtvtt?"- ?o fftic~`f-pdsition of .the Thieu
government is attributable in part to the weakness
and division of the opposition. Radical student
and veterans groups, which were in the forefront
of anti-government demonstrations q&ring the
presidential election campaign, have Aden quiet in
recent weeks. Their leaders are cplaining pri-
vately that they have been una a to get much
support for agitation either fry~ their own fol-
lowers or from other anti-government leaders.
One veterans' faction is evp said to be looking
for ways to cooperate witn'1resident Thieu.
ill
Other influentialppposition groups also have
indicated that they will keep a low profile for the
time being. The .ter Quang Buddhists, the one
group capable of osing a serious threat to gov-
ernment stability ,apparently will stick to a mod-
erate policy o seeking to improve their position
by working within the system. Tri Quang, the
leading poljic:al voice among the Buddhists, be-
lieves tha'An Quang should accept the fact that
they cantot force Thieu out of office. Tri Quang
was a rti otivating force behind An Quang's partici-
pation" in the recent legislative elections, and he
apparently intends to rely heavily on representa-
tives in the National Assembly to advance Bud-
dhist"interes"'f's. He' has-no-strong challengers for
power--=within-.the An Quang move.merA_4, his
views probably will predominate. Some other fn-
Quang leaders favor a more active 4nti-govern-
ment policy, however, and they will continue to
look for opportunities to promote' their views.
There are indications that the Progressive
Nationalist Movenr nt-one of the country's
strongest politip& parties-may abandon its pos-
ture of mo4ate opposition and join the govern-
ment mp. Some of the party's leaders have been
ne rating with presidential aides, but they pri-
ville y acknowledge that other elements of the
party favor a- continued opposition TS000P .
Reaction to the economic reform package
announced by the government last week has been
surprisingly mild thus far. Some critics of the
government have attacked the reforms, but their
protests have looked pro forma. Many people
have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and if prices
continue to rise as a result of the measures, the
protests are certain to increase in intensity.
For its part, the government is strengthening
its position in the newly elected Lower House,
and it now appears to have a majority of the
deputies firmly in its camp. At the urging of
presidential aides, pro-government deputies are
taking a tough line and are refusing to com-
promise with the opposition. Although these
tactics will help assure majority support for the
government, they could alienate some inde-
pendent and moderate opposition deputies whose
backing may be needed in the future. In the past,
the government has been able to secure passage of
high-priority legislation by mustering a two-thirds
majority in the Lower House to override less
desirable Upper House versions. It now is ques-
tionable whether the government's tactics will
deliver a consistent two-thirds vote in the new
house.
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? Government-held location
0 Communist-held location
was airlifted into an area north of Ban Phone, a
North Vietnamese logistic center northeast of the
Bolovens Plateau. The irregulars captured the vil-
lage without a fight on 21 November. Three other
irregular battalions are moving overland from
Saravane to strike at transportation routes at
Thateng. Neither of the operations has yet en-
countered significant enemy resistance, but the
Communists presumably will react strongly to
these threats to their supply network. The North
Vietnamese are known to have six battalions in
the northern Bolovens area, most of which have
been concentrating on rice collection rather than
military operations for the past few weeks.
In the central panhandle, the Communists
may be ready for dry season action. After several
weeks of relative inactivity, North Vietnamese
units attacked government forces near Muong
Phalane and drove them back more than 12
miles.
The pace of military activity is increasing as
both sides prepare for the North Vietnamese
dry-season offensive.
Premier Pham Van Dong arrived in Peking
on 20 November for an official visit that has been
marked by effusive protestations of Sino - North
Vietnamese solidarit .
In southern Laos, the government has
launched operations to keep Communist forces
off balance and to disrupt supply and troop con-
centrations. A four-battalion irregular task force
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JAPAN: The Liberal Democratic Party clea ed a
major hurdle on 24 November when the Lower
House ratified the controvers;j T Okinaya Rever-
sion Agreement. Passed 285=73, the loor vote
was boycotted by the Communists and Socialists.
The Democratic Socialist- and Komeito represent-
atives voted against rification but were per-
suaded to take part )in the proceedings after the
ruling party agreed to support a resolution calling
for a nuclear-freekinawa and a reduction of US
bases on the isl~hds. The treaty now goes to the
Upper House where approval is a procedural
formality. .
ShortlyIafter the vote, radical student vio-
lence in T yo erupted and large-scale labor ral-
lies drew veral hundred thousand demonstrators
through t the nation. The protests will continue
as the to government attempts to push through
seven elated packages of implementing legisla-
tion. here is considerable doubt that these meas-
ures ill reach a floor vote before the Diet re-
ces s on 24 December, and debate may extend
w ll into the new year.
Thailand: Tying Up Loose Ends
It was scarcely a revolution or even a coup,
but the military leaders who were quick to apply
those labels to the abrogation of the constitution
last week have had to make changes in the admin-
istrative machinery that rules Thailand. Although
not significant in themselves, the changes have
given rise to some maneuvering among second and
third echelons in the military establishment and
have provided some indications about the future
fortunes of some of the principal military leaders.
A new 16-man National Executive Council,
with Field Marshal Thanom as chairman, will ex-
ercise authority for an interim period of three or
four months until a new cabinet is set up under a
provisional constitution. The day-to-day conduct
of affairs will be under the jurisdiction of military
and civilian "divisions." The military division is
headed by General Praphat, and the civilian by
General Prasert. This could be a step up for
Labor Demonstration in Tokyo on the 18th
Prasert, but it seems likely that Thanom and
Praphat will keep him on a short leash. Q-t g finer _,
in the new setup is General Krit who, in addition
to being deputy commander of therrrr forces,
now acts as secretary gene al of 15e -ruling revolu-
tionary party. Thereis`some speculation in Bang-
kok that Krit riow is the number-three man in the
rulirig, hierarchy.
The--pr+ne-ipal -losers in the shuffle appear to
be Thanom's brother, Sanga Kittika xn, whose
assertiveness annoyed-.-.the -other leaders, and
Sawaeng_..Senanorong, the only top leader who
opposed the scuttling of parliament. Former for-
eign minister Thanat has still not been given a
position in the new administrative machinery, but
the fact that he was selected to represent Thai-
land at the ASEAN meeting suggests that he still
has a future.
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Thanom has publicly promised a return to con-
stitutional rule, but this is probably for foreign
consumption. The ease with which the military lead-
ers have made the change-over is reflected in the
commentary in the Bangkok press, which has
blamed the "irresponsible" parliament for the de-
mise of Thailand's two-year experiment with govern-
ment. Now, however, with no parliament to blame
for Thailand's difficulties, the burden will fall
Sout)i, Korea Charts a New Course
Sout orea's leaders have set the country on a
more flexible nurse in foreign affairs in an effort to
avoid becoming lated by changing power relation-
ships in east Asia. The government is making a
serious effort to shak off its rigid anti-Communist
image and an equally a est attempt to compete
with North Korea for intern Tonal acceptance.
Officials close to Preside Pak, including
Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil an Central Intelli-
gence Agency Director Yi Hu-rak, h 3v led the de-
velopment of this new policy. Spurre by uncer-
tainty about the long-term implication of the
Nixon doctrine for Korean security, the\ have
25X1 sought to develop relations with Eastern Euro
nd
p
to arrange contacts with the Soviet Union an
The most 1 por-
ant development, however, has been the opening of
a dialogue with North Korea on the reucation of
divided families. This move, more thart- any other,
has reflected the South Korean leadglship's sense of
confidence that the country had advanced to the
point where it is more than a ri tch for the North.
Seoul, sparked by Pe.('et`ng's entry into the UN,
has also undertaken a _l se review of its standing
with that internationa Jrganization. Acknowledging
that support for it,ithe UN vis-a-vis North Korea
had slipped somivhat, South Korea was prepared
this year to accept some form of UN recognition of
the two Koreat While the issue has not come up for
debate in the current General Assembly session,
Seoul is anticipating pressure from Peking in the
1972 session for an end of UN support for South
Korea and is taking a fresh look at its approach to
the whole problem.
squarely on Thanom and Praphat to deal effectively
with the country's economic problems, its growing
insurgency, and the security menace near its bor-
ders. The government's threats to bear down hard
on any show of defiance should prevent public dis-
plays of disaffection, but Thanom will run into
difficulty within the ruling group if his policies
prove ineffective or his leadership irreso-
China's emergence in the UIJ'and in interna-
tional affairs generally has, also 4 ompted Seoul to
lessen its traditional hostility. Toward Peking. The
South Koreans do not anticipate that their attempts
to open a dialogue wills ceive a positive response
over the short term, bO, they feel it useful to dem-
onstrate their reasQf ableness to the Chinese who,
over the longer pull, might be influenced to restrain
Pyongyang.
W~ire China looms large in South Korea's fu-
ture,..Seoul's close ties with Japan are a major ele-
mrit in current foreign policy decisions. Japan's
economic involvement in recent years has been an
"important factor in South Korea's growth, but this
has not eliminated the deep resentment and distrust
of Japan stemming from the Japanese occupation.
though this suspicion militates strongly against
an significant Japanese political or military role in
the untry, Seoul realizes that Japan's economic
predo ' ance may perforce bring a greater Japanese
security r e in the region-a role the South Koreans
would like see balanced by US involvement in
some Asian setirity arrangement.
In their eager
rents in east Asia,
e South Korean leaders recog-
nize that their room
hostile northern neighb
maneuver is limited by a
, and they accordingly in-
their policies on their
alliance with the US. Neve? heless, because in their
view the role of the US in Aa is diminishing while
China and Japan are becomir g more important, the
South Koreans will attempt to broaden the range of
their policy o tions.
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Communist China's Educational Policies
Several key elements in Mao Tse-Tung's
radical reform of higher education may be modi-
fied as China's universities open for their second
year of operation since the Cultural Revolution.
The treatment given higher education in domestic
propaganda suggests that a number of problems
remain, but a major article in Red Flag, the
authoritative party journal, earlier this fall does
indicate that a more moderate approach is likely
to prevail in many places.
The article reviewed the difficulties in-
volved in "revolutionizing" scientific and tech-
nical training at Tsinghua University, China's fore-
most engineering school. When Tsinghua resumed
full-time classes last fall, it introduced several
Maoist innovations, but they sparked considerable
debate, precipitated serious conflicts over enroll-
ment policy and the curriculum, and damaged
teacher morale and student discipline. Red Flag's
candid description of the problems encountered
at Tsinghua probably reflects guidelines formu-
lated at a lengthy national education conference
concluded in September in Peking-guidelines
which are still apparently being debated at other
colleges and universities.
The lengthy delay in developing a program
for higher education in China clearly is the result
of the inherent difficulties involved in
maintaining academic quality while responding to
Mao's call in July 1968 to break the intellectuals'
stranglehold on the education system. Mao or-
dered that university schooling be shortened and
that curricula be oriented away from theoretical
studies toward political and vocational training.
Students were to be drawn primarily from among
workers, peasants, and soldiers. Former faculty
members were to undergo rigorous political re-
education, and universities were to be placed
under the control of worker-soldier propaganda
teams which were to carry some of the instruc-
tional load.
While the Red Flag article reaffirms these
prescriptions, it stresses their negative impact and
suggests they should be modified substantially in
practice. It argues, for example, that time-con-
suming political re-education and labor require-
ments have curbed the enthusiasm of many
faculty members and disrupted their "personal
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1ourtn joint stock company sched-
,tablished with Ceylon in January
China's intr rational fleet makes up about a
quarter of its t( ii merchant fleet, which ranks
20th in the wor As its seaborne foreign trade
increases, China robably intends to expand this
freer principally -rom domestic resources, thus
t olcinq down h. :i-currency outlays for the our-
chase and chartei )f foreign ships.
Hekinq is c.
show the f!aq. r
tries Newer and
tioriai routes, w
orr(.uasta;
merchant ships
cuercy at third
American ports
flag visits contrv"
t;-)reign polu;y.
nq its small merchant fleet to
!rticularly in developinq coun-
3rger ships are used on interna-
ie older ships are relegated to
ade. Chinese Communist - flag
re calling with increasing fre-
iorld ports, landing at South
r the first time this year. Such
ite to Peking's current activist
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n ;;t China: Shipping L pands
rr; to handle over 90 percer- of its
:jr;r- Chinese merchant ships in n:erna-
ro produce ocean-going
Fier t . nas t;rst 20,000-ton dry-ca co ship.
icr runt fleet, first established ir 1961.
phi be in service soon. Pekin-'s inter-
03 69 ships totaling nearly x,00.000
-:nee.=Iinr_ Irns.
t= using ships flying the Chinese
anew by 26 percent last y-~ar_ The
t t tapered oft this yr=n:3r. but..
Purchase new and used ton-
ships- China currentiy parr,cipates
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SECRET
ease of mind." It recommends they be given more
say in determining course content and more time
to prepare lectures and engage in professional
research, including the "discriminating" study of
foreign scientific and technical journals.
The pragmatism of Red Flag was also under-
scored by its proposals for sharp limitations on
student power, at its zenith during the Red Guard
phase of the Cultural Revolution. According to
Red Flag, activist students should no longer be
allowed to interrupt lectures when they spot po-
litical errors, and propaganda teams are to refrain
from differing with the teacher's professional
judgment. Although these concessions hardly
presage complete academic freedom, they attest
not only to the renewed concern for the quality
of higher education, but also to the tenacious
resistance of teachers to the Maoist anti-intel-
lectual bias. Indeed, many have refused to return
to teaching because of persistent political
intimidation.
Red Flag had some critical comments on the
program for recruiting worker-peasant-soldier stu-
dents into the university. Recruits from this
group caused serious difficulties when they were
thrust into classes alongside more qualified
former students who returned to school last year
after performing manual labor on farms and in
factories since 1968. Red Flag admits that at-
tempts to treat all students in the prescribed
Maoist egalitarian fashion proved so demoralizing
that the worker-peasant-soldier students ulti-
mately had to be given "supplemental" academic
work.
The Tsinghua solution suggests that Peking is
attempting to return to a more demanding educa-
tional curriculum-a proposal that has been cas-
tigated by radicals as an attempt to "dish out a
capitalist double-track system." If widely copied,
it would mean that programs not currently availa-
ble on a broad scale would be offered to capable
students in an effort to remedy the serious short-
comings caused by the cessation of higher educa-
tion during the Cultural Revolution.
The moderate thrust of Red Flag has been
echoed in other articles in recent weeks. These,
include a frank admission by the directors of one
engineering college that they had been remiss in
neglecting basic theoretical course work. The
admission stands in sharp contrast with a number
of articles by other university authorities stressing
only practical course content. Sentiment for a
change is not only limited to course content,
however; controversies also exist over other as-
pects of the Maoist reforms-the university-spon-
sored factory system, the attenuated period of
schooling at both lower and higher levels, and the
banning of a wide range of sociological and tech-
nical books formerly used in the schools.
The present debate by no means signals a
complete departure from the broader Maoist goal
of providing university students a mix of basic
formal training and practical labor. Peking, in
fact, remains committed to the retention of
propaganda teams as permanent ideological
watchdogs in the colleges, and to linking ad-
vanced theoretical research to the solution of
practical agricultural and industrial problems.
Nevertheless, the general trend appears to be
toward providing a differentiated education for
qualified students, particularly those with an
aptitude for high-priority technical fields such as
science, engineering, medicine, and foreign lan-
guages.
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Meetings in Moscow
The Soviet party central committee met for
two days this week in Moscow to review the
five-year plan before its final formal adoption by
the Supreme Soviet. In addition, the central com-
mittee heard a report by General Secretary
Brezhnev on the conduct of foreign policy since
the 24th Party Congress and made some changes
in the composition of the party's ruling bodies.
The plenum went only part way in this regard,
however, leaving a number of loose ends hanging.
Most importantly, Gennady Voronov re-
tained his seat on the politburo, where he has
been a lame duck since July when he lost his job
as premier of the Russian Republic and was re-
assigned to a relatively insignificant post. Mikhail
Solomentsev, who replaced Voronov as the Rus-
sian premier, was elevated by the plenum only to
candidate membership, probably because the
plenum failed to remove Voronov. Solomentsev
was also released from the party secretariat, but
no one was named to assume his responsibilities
for heavy industry on that body.
Voronov may owe his reprieve partly to the
efforts of his politburo colleagues to prevent
Brezhnev from completely dominating the deci-
sion-making process. Over the years, Brezhnev has
been able to place a number of supporters in the
politburo and secretariat, and has suc-
ceeded in maneuvering such critics as Voronov
and Shelepin into positions of lesser power.
Despite obvious gains in Brezhnev's authority,
however, there have been no departures from the
politburo since the retirements of Mikoyan and
Shvernik in 1966. On outward appearance,
Brezhnev dominated the plenum. Not only did he
speak on foreign policy, but he summed up the
"debate" on the economic plan and budget. The
foreign policy address has not been published, but
the plenum issued a communique approving it.
At the Supreme Soviet, which convened on
24 November, Kosygin took the spotlight by de-
livering the report on the five-year plan instead of
planning chief Baybakov. The Supreme Soviet,
which may last through the 27th, is also expected
to adopt the annual plan and budget for
1972.
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SEG1U T
Portugal: Terrorist Bombings Trouble Regime
Prime Minister Caetano has received Na-
tional Assembly approval of special powers to
combat subversion following recent terrorist
bombings in the Lisbon area. The police have so
far failed to apprehend those responsible, and the
government believes special powers are needed
because of the difficulty of monitoring and
rounding up suspected terrorists.
Under a new amendment to the constitu-
tion, Caetano could have assumed special powers
without recourse to the as?embly, but he wants to
bolster the moderate imagge of his regime. By
moving quickly Caetano will undercut right-wing
criticism of police failu1p to prevent the
bombings.
In communiques to the fo
illegal revolutionary groups hav
credit for one of the three recent
ign press, t
each cl;i1ned
s fsspected
Armed Revolutionary Action, whit
of links with the Portuguese Com
took responsibility for the explosion
ber at the new headquarters of the NA
Atlantic Command. This self-pro , ime
anti dictatorship rganiz
anti-colonialist
,
been involved in several bombjf g incide
the past year. The targets a
chosen to symbolize its op
pear to hav
st Party,
27 Octo-
radical,
on has
s over
ties with the US and NAftO, the governm
effort to put down the revolts in Portugu
been
al's
is
Africa, and the tactics~of the Portuguese Secr
ICELAND: Rey 4,avik's negotiat
earlier this mo . when attempti
and West Geran agreement to
Iceland's ter torial waters from
Bonn and London did agree to
servation easures, and Reykjavi
rs got nowhere
g to win British
2 to 50 miles.
consider con-
's inability to
enforce s will would seem to erf ourage com-
promis 'In fact, however, the centr-left govern-
ment as little flexibility in its position, which is
the major plank of its foreign pol'cy program.
Moreover, the fisheries minister, a member of the
Communist-dominated labor alliance, remains
Police. Although the secret ,police arrested 29
suspected ARA members:Ist September, the
bombing of NATO headquarters a month later
showed that the group's leaders are still at large.
Although most political observers have con-
cluded that there is a strong link between the
ARA and the orthodox Portuguese Communist
Party, their relationship to the revolutionary
brigades is difficult to determine. There are dif-
ferences and similarities in the rhetoric of the
ARA and brigade communiques, but their bomb-
ing techniques are identical. Thus, the possibility
exists that the orthodox Communists have
sponsored the brigades to divert police attention
from the ARA. The obvious expertise and su-
perior organization of ARA and the brigades are a
striking contrast to the crude efforts of several
minor terrorist groups that the police have
uncovered and suppressed in the
year.
e UK and West
Int
cy doesn't carry
ate Iceland's agreements with
rmany by 1 March if diplo-
e day, and to ignore the
pstice if, as seems likely,
it is
uled f
jurisdict
is to mov
Reykjavik in Jan
ound of talks is sched-
ry, and the longer the
n fight drags on,
otiating a phase
pledges-n
SECRET
e less likely Iceland
f its foreign policy
25X1
Force.
past
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Warsaw Pact Ministers Meet
A meeting of the pact foreign ministers or
their deputies is expected to take place in Warsaw
on X10 November.
The possibility of the imminent conclusion
of the inter-German negotiations on Berlin makes
such a gathering timely. The-Era GermaaaJ yq.
acknowledged -privately. that they are under -con-
si.derable -pressure to wind up the talks, and
Pravda on 18 November went so far as to mis-
quote East German party chief Honecker to the
effect that the German talks "can and must be
successfully concluded in November." Pravda
further argued that it is necessary to begin prep-
arations in the "very nearest future" for a Confer-
ence on European Security and Cooperation. The
Yugoslavia: Unrealistic Planning
Belgrade's development plan for 1971-75 is
designed to promote long-run stability, but attain-
ment of several of its targets is in doubt. The plan
envisions a reduction in the growth rate (7.5
percent in real output) and less rapid price and
wage increases than in recent years. The republics
and the trade unions will inevitably resist slower
growth because personal incomes and consump-
tion Will be affected, while the proposal to limit
price increases to five percent seems optimistic in
light of the 14-percent increase so far in 1971.
Further efforts to retard an increase in the rate of
domestic consumption will be handicapped not
only by the indecision of the federal government
but also by the new governmental structure that
gives :he republics more independence.
USSR will probably try to use the expected pact
meeting to issue a fresh appeal for such prepara-
tions, in the hope of influencing the NATO minis-
terial scheduled for 9-10 December.
The pact foreign ministers may also take up
the question of mutual force reductions, but Mos-
cow has thus far attributed little urgency to this
question. There is no sign that the Soviets and
their allies have done much work to develop a
common position. The specter of Romania-hangs
over any attempt to come to a common bloc
position. Bucharest has frequently been a thorn in
the side of its allies at pact conclaves and Ceau-
sescu's views on mutual force reductions are
known to be at variance with those of his more
orthodox colleagues.
Planners hope to reduce the balance-of-pay-
ments deficit by stimulating the growth of both
exports and invisible earnings-particularly from
tourism and workers' remittances-while restrain-
ing growth in imports. Although the planned in-
crease in exports of 11 to 13 percent is not
unreasonable, much of this increase will probably
be with CEMA countries, which will not redress
the large imbalance with hard-currency countries.
The expected increase in imports of 9 to 11
percent is far below increments of the past several
years, except for the recessionary period of
1966-67. Meanwhile, continued growth in invisi-
ble earnings is dependent upon a prosperous West-
ern Europe inasmuch as an economic downturn
there would reduce the flow of worker remit-
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25X1
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OL Li1[ L, 1
Problems Mount for International Labor
he coming enlargement of the European
Commllties along with movement toward East-
West detent and international economic develop-
ments are c .sing considerable ferment in the
European and 'nternational trade union move-
ments. European affiliates of the International
Confederation of F"r e Trade Unions met in Oslo
on 5-6 November an set up a working party to
suggest approaches to t ese problems. The work-
ing party will concentra on how labor should
deal with an enlarged E and the growth of
multinational corporations i promoting labor's
goals of full employment and constantly rising
standard of living. Working pa proposals, if
adopted, would be put into force \y 1 January
The Oslo meeting reflects a growing'ware-
ness on the part of European trade unions
their response to the development of the E
so far been grossly inadequate. While t
unions have long had offices in Bru s, their
influence on EC policies has been. mited and
coordinated collective bargaini on a com-
munity-wide basis is a long way- f.
There are, nevertl Tess, tentative signs that
some labor unions rye ognize the problems posed
by such developrnerts as the multinational cor-
poration. The auto-producing sector of the Inter-
national eta workers' Federation, in which the
American W participates, some months ago
singled ox the Ford Motor Company for com-
mon action in extracting benefits on a world-wide
scale. ?he aim is to press for labor contracts that
all t rminate at the same time so as to enable
unions to try to force coordinated collective bar-
gaining with Ford as a whole instead of wi hif its
separate enterprises. This procedure, if suc ssful,
may serve as a model for dealing w) other
multinational corporations.
The development of a r Are effective Euro-
pean labor organization w. P obviously be a long
and arduous process, no ly because of the dif-
ficulties posed by the ntinued Communist dom-
rade unions in France and
ina/e
Italowever, may in the future be
moontacts with the Communist
unimeeting, Nordic delegations
prent in this direction and, sub-
seqands union reversed 40 years
offs that it now favors increased
ntacts with the Communists. Meanwhile, in
Italy the negotiations toward a merger of Com-
munist and non-Communist unions drag on to-
ward a still elusive accord.
The movement of European unions both
oward greater unity on a regional basis and to-
d a relaxation of their traditional anti-Com-
st stance will further weaken the over-all
struc ? re of ICFTU. Non-European affiliates have
steppe p their attacks on the European dom-
inance o ICFTU leadership positions and have
called for re equal representation. The possi-
bility of coo eration with the Communists will
likely doom a' possible reconciliation between
the ICFTU and -e powerful AFL-CIO. The lat-
ter's withdrawal frd'- the ICFTU in 1969 was in
part caused by this ist~e. Thus, as European Iabor25X1
addresses its most pressing problems, the status of
ICFTU as a global organisation will suffer further
decline.
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SJ (iKr;t
Burundi: More Loose Ends
President Micombero has survived a power
play designed to tie his hands and on 28 Novem-
ber celebrates his fifth anniversary in power. The
President may use the occasion to make some
changes in his government.
Late last month, Micombero established a
Supreme Council composed of himself and 27
army officers in order to meet a challenge from a
radical faction in the government, which was in-
tent on isolating him and assuming power. The
radicals, led by Foreign Minister Simbananiyeand
Justice Minister Shibura, managed to discredit
their moderate opponents, charging them with
plotting against the government and bringing
them to trial. The radicals' influence crested in
mid-October when Simbananiye brought about a
resumption of diplomatic relations with Peking,
which had been suspended for six years.
Since the establishment of the Supreme
Council, the radicals have been lying low. Led by
the army commander and chaired by the Presi-
dent, the council is a throwback to the revolu-
tionary council that supported Micombero when
he seized power from Burundi's failing monarchy
in 1966. The new council has authority over a
broad range of political and administrative mat-
ters, includin the selection of senior government
officials
Thus far, Micombero has not moved against
the radical leaders themselves. Moreover, the trial
of moderate officials is still going on, although
the prosecution has failed to come up with per-
suasive evidence against them and the army is
skeptical of the charge. Micombero may take the
opportunity of the celebration of his accession to
power to announce a cabinet shuffle and perhaps
even reinstate the moderates.
Micombero may also announce plans, -
ed~~ araJ weeksr, to
draw up a new constitution to replace the one
scrapped when he took power and to prepare for
national elections. For these tasks, Micombero
will probably rely mainly on the Supreme Council
rather than on civilian officials, who are badly
factionalized and incorrigibly addicted to political
intrigue.
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LIBERIA: The Tolbert administration is review- eral years, foreigners have repatriated about $50
ing concession agreements with foreign investors, million annually in investment income.
beginning with the largest iron mining firm in the
country, the Liberian-American-Swedish Mining
Company. The company has $275 million in-
vested in Liberia and appears willing to accede to
most of the government's demands. It challenges,
however, the government's charge that the com-
pany has understated profits to avoid taxation.
Like the other three firms in the industry, the
company pays one half of its net profit in taxes.
Nevertheless, government revenue from iron
mining profits is only 16 percent of total revenue
even though iron ore accounts for 70 percent of
export earnings.
Since taking office, President Tolbert has
carefully stated that his predecessor's open door
investment policy would continue but that
investors would have to provide more jobs for
Liberians, and Liberia must receive a greater share
of protits. Employment opportunities for Libe-
rians have stagnated, and the need for more jobs
may be a major motive for Tolbert. He also
recognizes that there is considerable scope for
increasing government revenue. For the past sev-
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S;EUX ; l
Political Stirrings in Panama
Now that celebrations marking the third an-
niversary of the coup which put General Torrijos
in power and the 68th anniversary of Panamanian
independence are out of The way, the rhetoric and
patriotic posturing of October and early Novem-
ber is giving way to a period of reassessment. The
focus of government attention remains on the
canal negotiations, but the regime is also begin-
ning to work out the mechanics of next year's
assembly elections. Various pre'sure groups are
attempting to ascertain the thrusf?pf government
policy so as to formulate their in positions.
Aside from the Communist Party, h-cwever, most
groups have scant expectation that they will bene-
fit from any relaxation in the current D
on political activity.
Although Panamanian negotiators in Wth;,
ington last week publicly expressed optimism t
work on a new treaty could be completed b
end of the year, at home the government seoFns to
be hedging its bets, utilizing the media tqy- dimin-
ish public expectations that agreeme can be
won quickly or painlessly. The goviment has
not begun to stir up anti-US sentim t or prepare
the people for the possibility of monstrations.
But in a press interview, which s not circulated
in Panama, Torrijos warned t t force might be-
come necessary to recover th Canal Zone.
Panama is makinliplomatic efforts to gain
support for its negoyating position on the canal,
and its election toAhe UN Security Council will
facilitate these ef?Ybrts. Thus far, the Panamanians
have obtained Xrong public backing from Costa
Rica and a promise of support from El Salvador,
but efforts%o gain dramatic public statements of
support t(om Spain and Mexico have been less
successful. News services in Communist countries
have begun to focus on the canal issue and are
encouraging Panama to be firm.
On the domest;t front, the government once
again appears to be experiencing a shortage of
funds. Efforts t9 advance the "revolution" will
accordingly reLf; at least in the short run, on
bureaucratic reforms rather than bold new spend-
ing program': The regime, for example, is getting
ready to{.Sromulgate a new labor code. It will
extend overnment support for collective bargain-
ing anprovide for compulsory union dues check-
off.oth labor and business are watching very
carefully to see whether the new code will include
fday raise provisions. The business community
`strongly opposes provisions for payment of an
extra day's salary each week. Its inclusion would
signal Torrijos' readiness to move ahead with
rather sweeping social reforms. Its exclusion
would indicate a continued interest in wooing the
usiness community.
kfter three years with virtually no political
activit; a good deal of interest is being given to
the government's promise of legislative elections
next year>; Traditional political groups, however,
probably wijl find themselves frozen out of the
process. The`,- oting districts are expected to be
heavily weighfed in favor of small rural constitu-
encies easily cort`'lolled by the government, which
will probably organize an official party or elec-
toral front. The Communist Party, the only polit-
ical organization thAt Torrijos has allowed to
function, probably hopes that it can parley its
informal relationship with the government into a
more open and structured relationship in the new
legislature.
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SJ XJKET
Honduras: Cruz'Problems Grow
The stability of the lackluster Cruz admin-
istration is deteriorating because of a lack of
leadership and the strain of competing political
ambitions. A deepening fiscal crisis may be the
final straw, and the government could be toppled,
perhaps in a matter of weeks.
Since Cruz took office last June, practically
nothing has been done toward implementing even
the "minimum plan of government" recom-
mended by business and labor to stimulate invest-
ment and foreign commerce and to improve the
planning process. Businessmen gave the first ma-
jor public indication of dissatisfaction by sending
a large delegation to Cruz on 11 November to
protest his inaction on Honduras' many pressing
problems. Cruz, however, claims that he inherited
an almost empty treasury and that heavy spend-
ing by the outgoing government left him only 30
percent of the budgeted funds to cover seven
months of the fiscal year. The deficit in 1971 is
expected to reach some $18 million. The Presi-
dent has asked congress to approve moderate tax
increases, but the measure is likely to be watered
down.
In addition to the fiscal and economic prob-
lems, Cruz, who spent his first six months in
office refereeing a scramble for political jobs, now
proposes to rock his administrative boat by dis-
missing three cabinet ministers. One is the min-
ister of labor, and the fairly strong trade union
movement is threatening strikes if he goes. Also
rumored to be on the way out are the ministers of
finance and economy, both initially forced on
Cruz by the party machinery. Cruz may decide to
follow through on these dismissals as a means of
testing his own strength. He is sure to emerge the
loser, as he has no power base apart from a
waning national commitment to the "unity pact"
that placed him in office. His government has also
been weakened by the machinations of several
would-be successors, notably General Oswaldo
Lopez the chief of the armed forces and a former
president, and Minister of Government Ricardo
Zuniga.
If the Cruz government is not brought down
by these domestic problems, it is only a matter of
time before the President's intransigence on for-
eign policy will necessitate his removal. Honduras'
most urgent foreign policy need is a settlement
with El Salvador, and Cruz has curtly rebuffed
several Salvadoran overtures for negotiation. He
believes that Honduras has the stronger claim to
the disputed territory and has stated categorically
that adjudication by the World Court is the only
acceptable avenue for settlement.
25X1
The most obvious successor to Cruz is Gen-
eral Lopez, whose eight years of inaction in office
look good only by comparison with Cruz. ~
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SECRET
CUBA: The touring Fidel Cas-
tro has been successfully dem-
onstrating Cuba's solidarity
with Chile and improving his
international image.
Although he has been re-
ceived cautiously by a number
of Chileans, particularly the
Communists, the Cuban prime
minister continues to speak at
mass meetings, chat with uni-
versity students, and meet
with local workers. He has
been circumspect in his re-
marks, however, lest he be ac-
cused of meddling in Chilean
domestic affairs. Castro has re-
peatedly stressed the impor-
tance of unity between Latin
American countries and the
strengthening of brotherhood
and friendship between Cuba
and Chile. He was even less
bitter than usual about the US
base at Guantanamo, saying
only that Cuba "one day"
would recover it without a
shot being fired.
Castro has been so
pleased with his sojourn in
Chile that he reportedly plans
to extend his visit for a few
days. His heavy schedule has
thus far allowed little time for
him to confer with Allende
other than on the two-day
cruise to Punta Arenas last
week. Castro may wish to talk
at length with Allende before
returning to Cuba, possibly
with stops in Peru and Ecua-
dor.
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