WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009400070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
25 February 1972
No. 0358/72
Copy N2 46
17-
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 24 February 1972)
Hanoi and the Summits . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cold its Soviet, Last European Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5
FAR EAST
Indochina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Manila Weighs China Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Japan-Mongolia: Getting Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CHINA'S ROLE IN AFRICA
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0358/72A)
World Money: The Dollar Is Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
French Government Under Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Problems Face Geneva Arms Conferees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
UN Maritime Talks Resume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II
Hungary: Still the Conservatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Open Roads in Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
USSR Draws Close to Arab Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Egypt: Patience, Peace, Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Arab World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Greece-Cyprus: No Solution Yet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Bangladesh: Trials of a New Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Soviet Ships Leave Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Indian States Go to the Polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Congo: Ngouabi Still in Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
El Salvador: Disputed Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ecuador: Rodriguez Takes Hold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Uruguay: Opposing Bordaberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
US-Venezuela Relations Strained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Cuba: Looking at Guantanamo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Chile: Allende Strikes Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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Hanoi and the Summits
The North Vietnamese have yet to comment
officially on President Nixon's trip to China, but
the Hanoi press has made it clear that the North
Vietnamese are worried about the possibility of
big-power deals on Indochina, in Peking or in
Moscow. Privately, the Vietnamese Communists
have been even more fretful. During the recent
anti-war conference in Versailles, the Vietnamese
delegates complained that Hanoi was caught in a
squeeze. "Chou En-Iai is too interested," they
said, in the US to concern himself with Vietnam,
"except in speeches." They expressed fears that
the war would be settled in Peking. A number of
Page 1
other North Vietnamese leaders, including party
First Secretary "tee Duan, have betrayed similar
concern over the implications of the summits.
They are obviously worried that, in agreeing
to summit talks with the US, Hanoi's patrons in
Peking and Moscow, inadvertently or not, are
helping the US to distract attention from the
Vietnam issue. Indeed, in Hanoi's eyes the aura of
good will being emphasized by both Peking and
Washington in" coverage of the President's visit
undercuts the militant, hostile stand against the
US that Hanoi has been at such pains for so long
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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to encourage and tends to spotlight Hanoi as a
hold out against the new trend of reasonableness
in the Communist world. But beyond this the
Vietnamese seem genuinely concerned that China
or the Soviet Union might make a deal with the
US at their expense. Such a concern sows doubts
about the triangular relationship with Moscow
and Peking that forms the cornerstone of Hanoi's
foreign policy. A key goal of North Vietnamese
diplomacy has always been to ensure an adequate
flow of moral and material backing from China
and the Soviet Union without coming under the
thumb of either. Up to now Hanoi has been more
or less successful in playing Moscow and Peking
off against each other because each has been
ready to vie for influence in Indochina, and-
more important-because neither has been willing
to see the other become dominant in Hanoi.
Other factors, of course, have had a bearing
on Hanoi's relations with its two patrons. Over
the years the North Vietnamese have had to face
up to Moscow's dealings with their American ad-
versary. Hanoi evidently has learned to live with
this behavior-helped to do so, perhaps, by the
continuing flow of Soviet assistance to North
Vietnam. Up to now, however, the North Viet-
namese have not had to make similar allowances
for the Chinese. The establishment of contacts
between Peking and Washington has clearly re-
opened the question of Chinese motivation, and it
may be this, feeding on the old legacy of distrust,
that accounts for the shrillness of Hanoi's re-
action. The Chinese have worked hard to
persuade the Vietnamese that Peking's backing is
as strong as ever, and Hanoi may learn to tolerate
Peking's big-power waywardness as it has
Moscow's. Still, so long as the North Vietnamese
are determined to achieve their maximum poli-
tical objectives in Indochina, they will be tempted
to read the worst into Peking's motives and will
remain hypersensitive to any change in the poli-
tical environment which might limit their free-
dom of action or reduce their leverage on world
opinion.
These concerns are not, of themselves, likely
to lead to a basic shift in Hanoi's approach to the
Page 2
two big Communist powers. That might happen if
Moscow or Peking seemed about to give up com-
peting for influence in Indochina. The continuing
series of "supplemental" aid agreements being
signed with both parties suggests, in fact, that the
competition is very much still on. The recent
expressions of concern in the North Vietnamese
press may even be designed in part to prompt a
more positive response from both allies that
would confirm the value of Hanoi's traditional
balancing act.
But no matter how successful they are in
this effort, the North Vietnamese will probably
never be able to convince themselves that their
world is what it was prior to the first tentative
feelers between the US and China. In part, of
course, their changing perspectives are due to
international shifts which predate the announce-
ment of the US-China summitry. In addition,
after so many years of war, the North Vietnamese
may simply be taking more seriously the prospect
of a post-war environment in which regional con-
tacts will become a more important complement
to Hanoi's relations with the great powers.
Hanoi's recent tentative feelers toward such coun-
tries as Japan and India may be part of an effort
to hedge bets against the eventual outbreak of
peace in the area.
Without the extra incentive provided by the
changes in big-power relationships, however, it
seems unlikely that Hanoi would be pursuing the
new possibilities for international exchange and
cooperation as vigorously as it has been. I n pur-
suing new contacts abroad Hanoi cannot, of
course, hope for the kind of material aid it has
gotten from Moscow and Peking; nor can it realis-
tically expect such countries as Japan or India to
come out four-square behind North Vietnamese
objectives on the war. But it may well have de-
cided that an effort to expand its international
ties would be advisable and opportune, not only
as political and economic insurance for the future
but also as a way of reminding its two major allies
that they can no longer take their role in North
Vietnamese affairs for granted and had better
look to their basic long-term inter s in
Hanoi. 25X1
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Prime Minister Mintoff insists on more
money and has suggested a meeting with Prime
Minister Heath. In letters to Heath on 17 and 23
February, Mintoff renewed his demand for an
additional, one-time payment of $13 million. He
stuck to his position on how many Maltese the
British should employ and how much they should
be paid. He also raised the question of British aid
to improve the Malta drydocks as part of a settle-
ment. London had offered the previous govern-
ment $7.8 million to improve the drydocks, pay-
able in 1974 when the original defense and
financial arrangements were to have lapsed.
Heath has agreed to a meeting, but has asked
for a working-level session first to reduce the
number of issues requiring decisions by the princi-
pals. Heath reaffirmed the UK-NATO financial
offer, the allied position on foreign military use
of Malta, and the broad outlines of the British
position on the remaining bilateral issues. Mintoff
told the US ambassador on 22 February that the
British position was "unacceptable" and that he
believes only a high-level meeting can close the
gap. He claimed to have two alternatives-pre-
sumably Libya and the USSR-to a continued
British presence. He acknowledged, however, that
acceptance of either option might provoke violent
disturbances in Malta.
There is no reason to believe that Mintoff
has found a politically viable alternative to the
final UK-NATO offer of $36.4 million annually,
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Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
plus bilateral aid. Mintoff apparently wants an
agreement with the UK, but his inflated view of
Malta's worth, his increasing domestic strength,
and his strong belief that the Maltese have long
been exploited by the British leave him at present
temperamentally incapable of compromise.
On the domestic front, Mintoff, who has
capitialized on growing Maltese nationalism, is in
complete control. His sharp criticism of British
negotiating tactics and attitudes has helped to
consolidate his Labor Party support and has won
over many apolitical, but anti-British, Maltese.
Moreover, Mintoff's success in squeezing more
money out of the UK and NATO at almost every
stage of the talks so far has probably convinced
moderate Laborites to continue their support,
despite misgivings over his tactics.
For the present, Mintoff has neutralized the
opposition Nationalist Party and the politically
influential Catholic Church. The Nationalists
seem mesmerized. They are reluctant to criticize
Mintoff, believing that, if the talks fail, Mintoff
could accuse them of hampering the government's
efforts, and that, if the talks produce an accord,
the Nationalists could be portrayed as having
been willing to give in for less than Mintoff got.
The involvement of Archbishop Gonzi, the
island's conservative Catholic primate, in a futile
mediation effort last month and Mintoff's 25X1
subsequent calls on the religious leader have given
the outward appearance that Gonzi is fully
briefed and supports the government.
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Cold Hits Soviet, East European Crops
Severe cold and scanty snow cover threaten
winter crops in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Winter grains usually account for almost 50
percent of the USSR's bread-grain production. They
constitute roughly 90 percent of the total in Eastern
Europe.
Abnormally low temperatures hit the heart of
the Soviet winter grain belt in mid-January, and
there was little snow cover to protect the seedlings.
The Soviet press admitted damage to the grain in "a
number of areas" and that some reseeding would be
necessary. An unusual one-day conference of party
and government leaders called in Moscow last week
to discuss spring field work and the livestock sector
probably reflects the leadership's concern about
crop prospects this year.
Similar weather conditions prevailed in 1969
when about one third of the winter grains sown
failed to reach maturity. The Soviets have lost a
large portion of their winter grain about every
fourth year because of harsh weather. Losses have
risen as higher yielding but less hardy varieties have
been adopted.
The extent of the damage this year will depend
on the weather to come. That part of the crop not
yet affected is vulnerable because the lack of snow
cover continues and soil moisture is declining.
Losses of winter grains can be recouped in part by
reseeding with spring grains and by heavier ferti-
lizing of the surviving winter grains. Resowing re-
quires an additional expenditure of seed. Moreover,
yields of spring grains are generally less than those
of winter grains, and a severe winter often lowers
the yields of the winter grains actually harvested. If
the winterkill proves to be as extensive as in 1969,
the net loss would amount to about four percent of
the planned grain crop, or seven million tons-
almost as much as the USSR has arranged to import
this fiscal year. Last week, Soviet foreign trade bank
officials admitted that further imports may be
necessary.
Throughout Eastern Europe low levels of pre-
cipitation since last fall combined with a two-week
period of sub-zero temperatures in late January
probably caused ar above-normal amount of damage
to winter crops, particularly the less hardy barley
and rape crops. A recent warming trend may have
melted the already sparse snow cover, in which case
damage from a new freeze in the coming weeks
would be even more serious.
Although much of the damage to winter grain
can be alleviated through reseeding this spring,
normal or above-normal precipitation will be
required in the coming weeks to overcome the soil
moisture deficit. Lacking that, output of small
grains will be substantially down from the levels of
1971, and East European requirements for grain
imports-most from the USSR-would exceed the
current relatively high levels.
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Major winter grain area
Area threatened by cold
and lack of snow
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Indochina
SPRING CAMPAIGN SPUTTERS
Communist military activity picked up last
weekend, and small-scale harassing actions con-
tinued through the week. But, so far, no large
Communist main-force units have been involved.
Rocket and mortar attacks struck several allied air
bases and provincial capitals, as well as a number
of South Vietnamese field positions and outposts,
but ground assaults were confined primarily to
small outposts defending remote villages and
hamlets.
Some of the increased fighting was the result
of aggressive allied patrols and field operations
designed to disrupt enemy preparations for a new
offensive. Several stiff battles erupted in the
northern provinces, where a considerable number
of enemy troops were reportedly killed. South
Vietnamese forces were placed on full alert on 19
February and intensive artillery and air strikes are
under way to pre-empt enemy plans.
Thus far, the level of Communist attacks is
well below what enemy battle preparations would
have indicate.
e enemy ig comman may e allow
ing su ordinates greater flexibility in the timing
of attacks this dry season compared to some
previous years.
BACKING OFF IN CAMBODIA
Lon Nol has temporarily backed off from
replacing Chief of State Cheng Heng and assumin
the prerogatives of that office himself.
Lon Nol had been urging the Con-
stituent Assembly to approve a new constitution
by mid-February providing for the office of presi-
dent. There were even plans under way for
demonstrations in support of such a move.
If he had persisted, he could well have re-
vived political tensions in Phnom Penh, especially
among his many critics who would likely have
interpreted his haste as further evidence of an
increasingly authoritative and arbitrary manner.
When the assembly failed to act by his deadline,
the prime minister was prevailed upon to wait
until the constitution is formally completed, pos-
sibly by the end of February. To quiet specula-
tion that Cheng Heng would be replaced or that a
cabinet shuffle was under way, the prime minister
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authorized publication of an official denial that
any major government shakeup is imminent.
IRREGULARS LOSE MOMENTUM IN NORTH
LAOS
Stiffening Communist resistance has slowed
Vang Pao's jab south and east of the Plaine des
Jarres. In a clear effort to protect vital supply
lines, the North Vietnamese are launching sharp
probes and shelling attacks against the irregular
forces. One irregular task force moving against
suspected 130-mm. gun positions on the southern'
edge of the Plaine has been forced to retreat to
the area southeast of Phou Louang, while another
force has made little progress toward the high
ground at Phou Theung. The two other task
forces have encountered much less resistance, but
they have made only slow progress toward objec-
tives near Route 4.
The irregulars thus far have done little
damage to the Communists' logistic operation,
but their presence near the Plaine des Jarres has
relieved somewhat the Communist pressure
against Long Tieng and Sam Thong. The level of
enemy-initiated action near these bases has been
uncommonly light for the past two weeks.F_
With the
number of Communist troops diminished, ir-
regular units have been able to patrol more
aggressively, and small forces have moved down
the north slope of Skyline Ridge to probe enemy
positions.
The battle for Long Tieng, however, is not
over. Air observers report that the Communists
may have extended the new road from the south-
ern Plaine to within four miles of Long Tieng. If
the Communists can quickly disperse Vang Pao's
forces near the Plaine, they could use the road to
0 Government-held location
0 Communist-held location
redeploy additional troops toward Long Tieng
and more easily move supplies forward for an
assault before the rainy season begins in mid-May.
Souvanna Phouma took a generally concilia-
tory tone in his response to Souphanouvong's
recent message on talks. Souvanna indicated that
he is willing to receive the Communists' special
envoy in Vientiane to open a "constructive dia-
logue" as soon as possible and reiterated his
standard refusal to call for a bombing halt as a
precondition. Souk Vongsak, the Communist en-
voy, probably will return to Vientiane fairly soon.
Productive negotiations, however, seem as remote
as ever.
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Sr,VKJc1'
Manila Weighs China Ties
The Philippines may be preparing to broaden
contacts with China. Mrs. Marcos' younger
brother, Benjamin Romualdez, who has been used
as a presidential emissary in the past, recently
made a ten-day visit to Peking that has been
widely interpreted as laying the groundwork.
The Romualdez trip was a marked departure
from Manila's studied avoidance of the Chinese
and a major step in the slow weakening of the
Philippines' traditional aloofness from the Com-
munist world in general. Manila announced last
month that it would establish its first diplomatic
ties with Communist countries-Yugoslavia and
Romania. The mission to Peking coincided with
statements from Manila of an intention to seek
closer trade and political relations with Commu-
nist countries.
Romualdez probably did raise the question
of opening trade channels in his talks with Pre-
mier Chou En-lai. According to the Manila press,
sources close to Marcos claim the Chinese have
agreed that trade could develop even in the ab-
sence of diplomatic relations. Although early
diplomatic ties with Peking now seem unlikely,
Manila recognizes the need for eventual move-
ment in this direction given what it sees as a
declining US commitment in the western Pacific.
The Manila press is speculating on a possible
visit by Mrs. Marcos to China this year. There is
no other evidence that such a trip is under active
consideration, but the Marcoses may have decided
that it would help repair their damaged political
prestige after the poor showing of the Nacion-
alista Party in off-year elections last November. A
journey to China by Mrs. Marcos would, in any
case, clearly accelerate the move toward closer
cultural and economic ties and would pave the
way for additional steps in the future. r
JAPAN AND MONGOLIA: GETTING TOGETHER
Tokyo and Ulan Bator established diplo-
matic relations last week and intend to exchange
ambassadors within a few months. While Japan
gave de facto recognition to Ulan Bator in 1961
by supporting Mongolia's entry into the United
Nations, Tokyo had in recent years been reluctant
to move much ahead of the US on establishing
relations
the announcement, the Nationalist Chinese regis-
tered only a pro forma protest, reiterating their
claim to Mongolian territory.
The Soviets have been urging the
Japanese to recognize Ulan Bator for some time,
and Foreign Minister Gromyko probably pressed
the case during his recent visit to Tokyo.
Japan's decision to move at this time reflects
declining concern with Taipei's interests and a
belief that the action will not adversely affect the
improvement of relations with Peking. Following
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World Money: The Dollar is Firm French Government Under Attack
This week, the dollar has stabilized, at least
temporarily, in international currency markets,
and European central bank intervention has sub-
sided. The Reuters index of major currencies
shows an over-all dollar depreciation since the
Smithsonian currency realignment of 1.1 percent,
a level midway between the dollar's central rate
and the lower limit of its wider band. Two cur-
rencies, the Belgian franc and Dutch guilder, are
very near their ceilings. The German mark and
Japanese yen are about 1.6 and 1.8 percent, re-
spectively, above their central rates. Central banks
in these countries have intervened in moderate
support of the dollar over the past few weeks.
Although the German interventions have been the
largest, they were made chiefly to demonstrate a
willingness to defend the Smithsonian currency
alignment. Japanese dollar purchases have been
intermittent and primarily to smooth out daily
market fluctuations. On Thursday, however,
Tokyo reimposed some controls to stem the
inflow of dollars.
Several factors have contributed to the firm-
ness of the dollar, including the businesslike
Senate hearings on raising the price of gold, which
dampened speculation against the dollar. Perhaps
more important have been reports that Germany
may lower its bank rate and require German firms
to deposit a portion of their foreign borrowings in
interest-free domestic accounts, thereby in-
creasing the real cost of borrowing abroad.
The reported consideration by West Ger-
many-Europe's most ardent defender of free
capital movement-of implementing such restric-
tions reflects a growing belief in Europe that
controls on capital movement will be required to
defend the Smithsonian currency realignment.
Foreign central banks are willing to purchase
limited amounts of dollars, but if massive
speculative flows were to resume, they would
probably impose strict controls on movement
rather than absorb substantial quantities of dol-
lars.
Until recently, the largely divided opposition
parties in France had little political ammunition
to fire at the government. The economy is in
good shape and Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas
has kept students and labor pacified. The con-
troversy over alleged irregularities in Chaban-
Delmas' tax returns, however, and criticism of
Gaullists implicated in other scandals have given
the opposition new life.
The government, greatly embarrassed, fears
that such publicity will cut into the Gaullist
majority in the parliamentary elections this
spring. The government is in no immediate
danger, and President Pompidou does not wish to
dismiss Chaban-Delmas. Although the prime min-
ister has not regained the degree of public confi-
dence he enjoyed six weeks ago, he has had some
success in fending off criticism. Given this re-
maining support and the prime minister's cordial
links with the centrists, who lend tacit and some-
times open support to the government, Pompidou
has good reason for keeping Chaban-Delmas in
office-at least for the present.
Since defending himself on television last
week, Chaban-Delmas-with full support from
Pompidou-has continued to proclaim his per-
sonal integrity and to speak out for government
policies. By supporting the prime minister,
Pompidou hopes to minimize the electoral impact
of the tax affair and other scandals. Nine separate
cases involving fraud, abuse of public confidence,
influence peddling, extortion, and outright theft
surfaced in 1971. A common thread running
through all the scandals is a connection-
sometimes explicit and sometimes tenuous-
between those accused and the Gaullist party.
Only a few Gaullists are involved thus far, and, on
the basis of what has been uncovered to date,
critics cannot accuse the Pompidou government
of widespread corruption. There are persistent
rumors, however, that ranking Gaullists are
implicated in more serious abuses.
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Problems Face Geneva Arms Conferees
The 26-nation Geneva disarmament con-
ference resumes on 29 February, but prospects
for agreement on any of the likely issues do not
appear good. There is no indication as yet that
the Chinese plan to attend, although their admis-
sion to the conference received strong support at
the UN General Assembly last fall. If they decide
to show up, they will likely insist on ending the
US-USSR co-chairmanship, letting in third-world
countries sympathetic to their views, and con-
sidering such propagandistic proposals as "no first
use" of nuclear weapons. Should the Chinese take
part, the French will likely be asked again to sit
in, they have left their chair empty for ten years.
A prime question facing the conference this
year will be a ban on the development and stock-
piling of chemical weapons. The non-aligned, in
particular, want such a ban to follow up the
convention on biological weapons, which will be
opened for signature next month. The US has
gained some support for its argument that verifi-
cation measures are not yet sufficient to permit
an international accord on chemical weapons.
The other prominent topic is the perennial
one of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The
Soviets continue to reject on-site inspection. Sev-
eral NATO allies and Secretary General Waldheim
now appear inclined to accept the Soviet position,
with international exchanges of seismic data as a
possible back-up to national means of verifica-
tion. Moreover, many non-nuclear states seem to
regard a comprehensive ban as logical at this time.
However, no significant progress will be possible
until the long-standing US-USSR impasse over
verification is broken.
The Geneva conferees have managed one
significant agreement in three of the last four
years, and pressures will be strong to keep up the
pace. Progress at Geneva this year would undercut
support for convening the unwieldy all-member
UN Disarmament Commission or holding a world
disarmament conference, as proposed at the
General Assembly last fall. Further progress
toward putting into effect the safeguards required
by the Non-Proliferation Treaty would also
improve the international climate on disarmament
matters. The third round of negotiations between
the IAEA and EURATOM on these safeguards
was held in Vienna this week. The outcome of
these negotiations will have an important bearing
on whether the five EURATOM non-nuclear
states-as well as Japan-will eventually ratify the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
UN MARITIME TALKS RESUME
The General Assembly's seabeds committee reconvenes in New York on 28 February to
prepare for the 1973 Law of the Sea conference. The Chinese Communists will participate in
committee work for the first time. Peking does not appear to have a fully developed policy on the
complex maritime subjects as yet, but its statements to date suggest that it will support coastal state
claims to extensive territorial waters and the seabeds below. This week, for example, Peking
officially recognized Argentina's 200-mile territorial waters claim.
Conferees at the New York session must agree on a list of issues for the 1973 meeting.
Spain-which wants more control over passage through the Straits of Gibraltar-has joined the
South American states to prevent progress in hopes of obtaining more support for their positions.
Other participants, however, are now more inclined to draw up an agenda for 1973. With regard to
territorial waters, a consensus may be developing for agreement on a 12-mile limit, with coastal
states having some control over resources and pollution problems in a broader zone.
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Hungary: Still the Conservatives
Party leader Kadar is trying to fight off
conservative attacks on his moderate reforms. Al-
though the conservatives have some support from
Moscow, Kadar is threatening to act against those
who get out of step. He has flown to Moscow to
remind the Soviets that, by backing the conserva-
tive faction, they invite instability in Hungary,
where the population is volatile and potentially
anti-Soviet.
The conservatives have seized on balance-of-
payments and investment problems as ammuni-
tion to attack further economic and political
reforms. some of the
attacks are coming rom wit in t e central com-
mittee. Zoltan Komocsin, an opportunist polit-
buro member, allegedly wants to abandon the
reforms and hew more closely to the Soviet
model. On 3 February, the Soviets lent support to
the conservatives with an article in Pravda warn-
ing about Hungarian susceptibility to nationalist
and Zionist deviations. Pravda also pointedly
reminded Budapest of past problems with
younger, overly liberal party members who were
promoted over "veteran Communists."
On 10 February, Kadar personally stepped
into the quarrel. At a Budapest party meeting, he
emphasized that he was in control and seconded
demands for action made by one of his loyal
proteges, Karoly Nemeth. Nemeth had said that
officials at all levels who ignore or distort the
party line should be demoted. He also warned
against using Soviet-style anti-Zionism-Nemeth
candidly called it "anti-Semitism"-to attack
Jewish liberals, some of whom are close to Kadar.
On 11 February, Kadar began three days of
talks with Brezhnev in Moscow. Kadar probably
told the Soviets that his domestic policies are
"the only possible way" to build a stable Com-
munist system in Hungary. This argument has
succeeded in the past and still carries weight.
Although Kadar won
Soviet support and alt oug t e communique
after the talks alleged a "complete identity of
views," it is doubtful that Kadar overcame either
Kadar: To Be Persuasive
Soviet misgivings about his reforms or the Krem-
lin's affinity for the Hungarian right.
Moscow reportedly is unhappy with Buda-
pest's increased indebtedness to the West and
with its occasional failure to deliver contracted
goods to the USSR. There are more practical
ways for the Soviets to register these complaints
than by direct interference in Hungarian internal
affairs. A Soviet delegation will discuss long-range
economic cooperation later this year and the pres-
sure inherent in such talks should help keep the
Hungarians in line. In fact, the current difficulties
will be read in Budapest as a go-slow sign on
innovations.
There are long-range stakes in the conserva-
tive challenge to Kadar. If he permits any ques-
tioning of his basic policies now, chances for a
smooth succession would all but disappear.
Kadar's decision to turn to Nemeth for support at
this time indicates that Nemeth is a prime con-
tender to succeed the 60-year-old party
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Open Roads in Eastern Europe
Poles, East Germans, and Czechoslovaks in
large numbers are taking advantage of new agree-
ments that minimize passport and customs for-
malities. They poured across the borders in record
numbers last month. All that the Poles and East
Germans now need to cross into each other's
territory for three-month periods are their per-
sonal identity documents. Since 1 January their
governments have dramatically relaxed currency
restrictions and have virtually abolished reciprocal
customs duties and declarations.
A similar agreement between East Germany
and Czechoslovakia went into effect on 15 Janu-
ary; a third such arrangement between Poland and
Czechoslovakia will be completed in April. During
the first three weeks of the Polish - East German
agreement, over a half-million East Germans
visited Poland, and 350,000 Poles went to East
Germany. These exchanges far surpassed total
tourist traffic between the two countries for all of
1971.
The new travel arrangements are designed to
popularize the East German and Polishparty lead-
erships and to relieve people's frustrations. Some
East German disappointment over the failure of
the Berlin agreement to provide for greater travel
to the West, for example, may be softened by
easier travel to the East. A Polish survey reports
Tourists in Poland
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that 83 percent of the Polish population has an
urge to travel abroad. Poles have been told that
the new travel arrangements will satisfy this urge,
and the Polish consumer is being told that access
to East German commodities will be a vast im-
provement over the drab selection at home.
Indeed, Polish women are being encouraged to
shop in Berlin, which for many Poles is far closer
than Warsaw.
The regimes may indeed be substituting lib-
eral border-crossing regulations for what they
know they cannot offer in the near term. Thus, in
the absence of any real freedom of expression or
any hope of a solution to the chronic housing
shortage, the new travel arrangements are billed as
a significant manifestation of individual freedom
that "widens one's living space."
Forecasts in the Polish press that all the
European socialist countries, except Albania, will
conclude open-border agreements in 1972 seem
overly optimistic. The practical problems as-
sociated with a flood of tourists-accommoda-
tions, transportation, and food-are already cre-
ating difficulties. Last week, Prague banned the
export of certain foodstuffs and consumer goods
by tourists because of short supplies.
In addition, many authorities doubtless have
serious political reservations about the experi-
ment in Eastern Europe's northern tier. For them,
the massive response in mid-winter probably has
added to misgivings about what summer would
bring. Hungary already has announced a wait-
and-see attitude and has voiced apprehensions
over uncontrolled tourism. Indeed, control is the
key factor; Eastern Europe's leaders have not yet
resolved the problem of how to relax certain
restraints without fostering demands for addi-
tional liberties. 25X1
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USSR Draws Close to Arab Clients
The Soviet Union is devoting an unusual
amount of attention to its position in the Middle
East, particularly in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which
receive more than half of all Soviet military as-
sistance to the third world. Moscow's relations
with these states, often troubled, have been dis-
turbed lately by Arab distrust generated by Mos-
cow's alleged support for the Communist coup in
the Sudan last summer, its support for India in
the defeat of Muslim Pakistan, and its lukewarm
support for Sadat's ambitious aims. Moscow is
moving to overcome these obstacles.
The USSR had been particularly cautious in
developing ties with Iraq and Syria because of
misgivings about the stability of those regimes.
The Kremlin apparently believes at this juncture
that Baghdad and Damascus have their internal
affairs in the kind of order that would permit the
USSR to benefit from more visible signs of sup-
port. Iraq and Syria, for their part, are edging
away from their traditional isolation within the
Arab world and are interested in better ties with
the USSR.
The Soviets signed large military and eco-
nomic aid agreements with Baghdad in the past
year. Last week's visit to Moscow by Saddam
Tikriti, the current strong man in the Iraqi Gov-
ernment, strengthened these ties. The Baghdad
press has announced that a treaty of friendship
and cooperation will be signed in April when an
impressive Soviet delegation is due to visit Iraq to
dedicate the North Rumaila oil field, a Soviet aid
project.
The communique winding up Tikriti's visit
was marked by some Iraqi movement toward the
Soviet position favoring a "democratic solution of
the Kurdish problem." The Soviets have long
urged the Iraqis to at least pay lip service to
greater political participation for the Kurds and
the Communists. The communique did not en-
dorse a political settlement in the Middle East,
however, and the Iraqis apparently did not yield
to the Soviets on this point.
This week, the Soviets sent Kiril Mazurov,
politburo member and deputy chairman of the
Council of Ministers, to Syria at the head of a
delegation of high-ranking military and economic
officials. On 22 February, the two sides signed
the first cooperation agreement between the
Syrian Baathist and Soviet Communist parties.
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko returned to
the USSR on 21 February from four-day visits to
Egypt and Somalia, where the armed forces de-
pend on Moscow for nearly all of their military
assistance. Neither visit yielded any announce-
ment of new aid commitments, but in both places
Grechko reaffirmed Moscow's support for con-
tinued military cooperation. The presence of
several high-level Soviet military officials with
Grechko in Egypt suggests that his visit there was
not a routine affair. The Soviets may have under-
taken a comprehensive review of Cairo's military
needs, as well as those of Moscow's own forces
operating in the Middle East.
The announcement that Libyan Deputy Pre-
mier Jallud would arrive in Moscow on 23 Feb-
ruary suggests that Tripoli may receive more
Soviet military equipment. President Qadhafi has
criticized the Soviets at every opportunity and
has worked hard to limit the Soviet presence in
the Mediterranean. But like other Arab leaders, he
realizes that the Western states do not deliver
arms as willingly or as cheaply as the USSR.
Jallud has taken part in Soviet-Libyan arms talks
before.
Military assistance remains the common
denominator in all of these Soviet-Arab contacts.
Arms aid has built Moscow a position of influence
in the Middle East at the expense of the West and
has given the Soviets access to ports, airfields, and
other facilities for their expanded military
presence.
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Egypt: Patience, Peace, Palestine
Over the past ten days, Egyptian officials
have been stressing the need for patience in the
present trying period while attempting to lay the
blame for some of the country's problems on
"outside elements."
President Sadat and other high Egyptian of-
ficials focused on meetings of the national party
congress. He again pointed up the dangers of
impatience to the congress, declared the Arabs
have other equally effective weapons beside the
threat to use Arab oil as a weapon against the US
and Israel, and acknowledged that relations be-
tween Egypt and the Soviet Union might be sub-
ject to differences. Sadat characterized these as
minor and maintained that there were no strings
attached to Soviet aid.
The President directed another warning at
Egypt's students, stating that he would not allow
study time to be devoted to anything but study.
The repeated warnings, which he has demon-
strated will be backed by the use of force when
necessary, along with measures designed to under-
cut student grievances apparently have had the
desired effect for the moment. Cairo's universities
reopened last weekend with no incidents re-
ported.
Egyptian officials have sought to deflect
criticism from the regrme by blaming foreign spies
and saboteurs for some of Egypt's problems. The
arrest of three alleged Israeli agents, accused of
distributing anti-government leaflets to incite
student demonstrators last month, was an-
nounced this week. The discovery of another
group of anti-government intellectual activists was
also publicized, their goal allegedly being the
overthrow of the Egyptian and other Arab gov-
ernments.
The hearings of the four Palestinians accused
of assassinating Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tal also
gained widespread attention in Cairo during the
week. The four defendants publicly admitted the
killing, but claimed it was a legal commando
action to do away with an "Arab traitor." If, as
indicated, the trial turns into a public indictment
of King Husayn and his policies toward the
fedayeen, Egyptian-Jordanian relations, already
cool, will be further damaged.
Meanwhile, UN envoy Gunnar Jarring ar-
rived in Tel Aviv on 25 February on his tour of
Middle East capitals. He spent three days in Cairo
last weekend before proceeding to Nicosia and
Amman. In addition to discussing the general
state of diplomatic play, the Egyptians probably
used the visit to sound him out on his interest in
playing a role in the US-proposed "proximity
talks" with Israel on an interim Suez arrange-
ment. Jarring, for his part, probably would be
interested.
Amman, on the other hand, would prefer
that Jarring focus more attention on Jordanian
interests in the Arab-Israeli problem. The Jor-
danians have chafed at his concentration for over
a year on the Egyptian-Israeli negotiating impasse.
They probably pressed Jarring to ask Tel Aviv to
set forth its terms for a settlement on the Jor-
danian aspects of the dispute.
Israel is unlikely to be forthcoming on either
of these schemes. In recent months, Tel Aviv's
dissatisfaction with Jarring has been evident, and
the Israelis would be reluctant to spell out their
terms vis-a-vis the Jordanians.
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The Arab World
The seizure on 21 February of a Lufthansa
Boeing 747 by the fedayeen was the latest inci-
dent in the Palestinian terrorists' campaign against
Western economic interests. Although the feda-
yeen who commandeered the aircraft identified
themselves as members of "the Organization of
Victims of the Zionist Occupation," they are
probably members of either Fatah, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or the
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, all of which have been involved in hi-
jackings. The latter two organizations have long
had close ties with the Yemen (Aden) govern-
ment, where the plane was forced to land. The
perpetrators allowed the plane and its crew to
continue their flight on the 23rd despite an earlier
demand that a number of Palestinians allegedly
arrested by West German police be released first.
Press reports from Beirut claim a $3 million
ransom had been paid by Lufthansa. If the re-
ports are true, the fedayeen will be emboldened
to carry out still further hijackings.
Sheik Ahmad ibn Ali al-Thani, frequently an
absentee ruler, was deposed on 22 February by
his cousin, Sheik Khalifa ibn Hamad al-Thani, the
heir apparent and prime minister.
The ouster took place while the former ruler
was in Iran on a hunting trip. Shortly after the
change of leadership was announced, Sheik
Khalifa increased the salaries of security force
personnel and other civil servants and canceled
debts due the government from low-income pur-
chasers of public housing. He has also announced
that the former ruler's income, which allegedly
amounted to 25 percent of the state's revenues,
will be transferred to the general budget. There
has been no opposition to the turnover.
The two cousins were at odds during the
mid-1960s, but their relations seemed to have
settled down in recent years. Sheik Khalifa had
responsibility for running Qatar on a day-to-day
basis, while the ousted ruler spent much of his
time abroad. The ruling family is large-num-
bering perhaps 500 male members-and well
armed. Some members have a reputation for
undisciplined behavior, so the new ruler will have
to make certain he has the support of the various
branches of the family.
The 3,000-man public security force, divided
between military and police components, is made
up largely of Saudi and Yemeni mercenaries. It is
commanded by Muhammad Mahdi-born Ronald
Cochrane-a former British officer converted to
Islam. The public security force has shown no
sign of becoming involved in domestic affairs.
This is the second move within a month
against rulers of the nine Persian Gulf sheikdoms.
In late January, the ruler of Sharjah was killed
during an abortive coup led by a former ruler.
Although family rivalry was involved in both
V EN 'YEMEN
na) _(Aden)
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'~i-- 5alalah.
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incidents, there is good reason to believe that
other Arab states were implicated in the coup
attempt in Sharjah. The Qatar coup was solely
internal and appears free of ideological signifi-
cance.
A conference of Islamic foreign ministers
will begin in Saudi Arabia on 29 February. About
30 states are expected to be represented at this,
the third conference since 1970. The five-day
meeting is being held under the aegis of the
Islamic Secretariat, a creation of King Faysal
designed to promote Muslim solidarity, rally
international Islamic support for the Arab posi-
tion, and-not incidentally-enhance the Saudi
monarch's prestige.
Previous conferences have produced acrimo-
nious debate cloaked by final communiques bland
enough to satisfy the diverse interests of those
represented. Little in the way of substantive
achievements have come out of them. The prosaic
formal agenda of this conference includes the
establishment of an Islamic development bank
and a news agency. It is likely that the Indo-
Pakistani conflict and the Iranian occupation of
the Persian Gulf islands will be discussed, along
with such perennial topics as Palestine and the
"liberation" of Africa.
After months of procrastination, interrupted
by intermittent consultations with the political
opposition, King Hassan has at last moved toward
sharing some of his powers with the government
and parliament. In the process, the King has
thrown his opponents off balance and increased
confusion in their ranks.
Late last week, Hassan announced that a
nationwide referendum, now scheduled for 1
March, would be held to approve certain constitu-
tional amendments. He said these would involve
the direct election of two thirds of parliament,
the indirect election of the other third, and pro-
vide increased but balanced powers for the "exec-
utive" and legislative branches of government.
The King reserved for himself all the prerogatives
of a chief of state, including appointment of the
government, dissolution of parliament, and
amending-subject to referendum-the constitu-
tion. Once again, he claimed the mandate of the
people.
While these proposals on the surface appear
to give significant authority to the government
and parliament, they fall far short of meeting the
basic demands of the opposition National Front
coalition, which seeks a constitutional monarchy
with circumscribed powers. Carefully avoiding
outright rejection, the front registered "astonish-
ment" at the King's announcement. The front
declared that the King's new constitution, "re-
gardless of the positive elements it might present,
does not respond to the demands of the situation
or constitute a valid solution." Five days later, it
announced it would "abstain" during the referen-
The King's behavior over recent weeks may
in the long run help create new difficulties for
him. His power base has been narrowing for the
past decade. Both students and labor are restive-
the former have boycotted their classes almost
continuously since early this year and the latter
seized on the relaxation of economic controls last
fall to engage in prolonged and repeated strikes to
gain more benefits.
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Greece-Cyprus: No Solution Yet
The Greek Government and President
Makarios are retreating cautiously from the edge
of violence. The recent events on Cyprus have
surfaced some very basic disagreements between
the Archbishop and Athens, however, and it will
take intensive care to mend this rift. Meanwhile, a
trivial incident on the island could lead to rash
action.
The Greek regime, since the take-over in
1967, has failed to convince Makarios that
Athens, being the center of Hellenism, has a right
to advise him on Cypriot matters. In Makarios'
view, this is interference in Cypriot internal af-
fairs. The Archbishop's major concern has been to
protect his position as the political and religious
leader of the Greek Cypriots in the face of in-
creasing political pressure from Athens. Other
factors contributing to the ill-will between
Makarios and Athens include the Greek-Turkish
rapprochement over the past three years, Athens'
and Ankara's renewed efforts to find a solution to
Cypriot intercommunal problems, and the clan-
destine return of General Grivas to the island last
September. All of these events raised Makarios'
fears of a Greek or a combined Greek-Turkish
attempt to force him to accept an imposed solu-
tion to Cyprus' problem.
The Athens government, until recently,
made every effort to obscure these growing dif-
ferences with the Archbishop. The number-one
priority in Athens, however, has been to work for
good relations with Ankara. The Turks have be-
lieved all along that Makarios is the real obstacle
to permanent peace in Cyprus. The Czech arms
issue provided Greece with a reason to accept the
Turkish position, further improve Athens-Ankara
relations, and put an end to Makarios' stubborn
refusal to accept Greek primacy.
Nothing has yet come of Athens' threat last
week of military action against Makarios. It is
difficult to believe that Athens really accepted
Panayotakos' claim that in a showdown the Greek
Cypriots would support Greece over Makarios,
but given the apparent high regard for Panayo-
takos in Athens, it is one possibility. On the other
hand, both the Turkish charge in Cyprus, Inhan,
and the head of the Greek Cypriot House of
Representatives, Clerides, say that the Greeks
have spent a long time in preparing for the con-
frontation with Makarios, and they both believe
the crisis has not passed.
In any event, now that the immediate threat
has faded, the focus has returned to the Czech
arms issue. Makarios has not responded to Greek
demands that he turn over the arms to the UN.
Turkish concern for its community on Cyprus is
likely to persist as long as this demand is not met,
and Ankara may eventually insist upon a compen-
satory arms buildup for the Turkish Cypriots.
Although the record of Greek-Cypriot relations
favors some kind of negotiated settlement, as long
as the arms issue remains unresolved, the situation
on the island will remain explosive.
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Bangladesh: Trials of a New Nation
Transport problems, raw material and food
shortages, and labor difficulties are hampering
economic recovery. The two major ports, Chit-
tagong and Chalna, cannot handle the relief and
rehabilitation imports that Bangladesh requires.
They still are partially blocked, and clearing
operations get more difficult as sunken ships set-
tle farther into the mud. Undiscovered mines re-
main a hazard; on 12 February, an Esso oil tanker
exploded and sank in Chittagong harbor. Accord-
ing to the UN, Chittagong port is handling only
about one third of its normal 200,000-ton
monthly capacity. The UN relief operation has
chartered vessels and tugs to try to speed port
clearances. There are 350,000 tons of inbound
cargo alone clogging the docks.
Exports of jute and jute manufactures, the
major foreign-exchange earners, are far below
normal. Last fall's jute crop is estimated by the
chairman of the Bangladesh Jute Board at only
4-4.5 million bales-more than 40-percent below
normal. But transport bottlenecks preclude ship-
ment of even this amount. About 70,000 tons of
jute manufactures and 145,000 tons of raw jute
reportedly are awaiting shipment at the two
ports, and more is stocked elsewhere. Dock
workers are causing further delays by refusing to
load jute until each bale is relabeled "Product of
Bangladesh." Large quantities of jute are being
smuggled into India where the price is almost 20
percent higher.
The lack of skilled, technical, and managerial
personnel is retarding industrial recovery, while
urban unemployment is rising as unskilled
workers flock to cities. In the jute industry, many
skilled Bengali workers were killed during the civil
war, and their Bihari counterparts are afraid of
reprisals if they return to work. The large
Adamjee Jute Mill, which normally employs
30,000 workers, is running at 15-20 percent of
capacity with only 8,000 workers.
With the economy unable to provide suf-
ficient employment, discontent among the Mukti
Bahini guerrillas-who greatly outnumber the gov-
ernment security forces and in many cases are still
armed-is likely to grow unless Dacca manages to
find enough places for them in the government
bureaucracy, the new national militia, the army
and police forces, or the country's educational
institutions. For the most part, the guerrilla's
have not seriously disrupted law and order in the
two months since independence. Last week, how-
ever, two clashes, with gunfire and casualties,
broke out between government forces and ex-
guerrillas who felt they were being denied their
rights and prerogatives as former freedom
fighters. Additionally, reports of looting and
extortion, both by genuine ex-guerrillas and by
hooligans masquerading as Mukti Bahini, are be-
coming more frequent.
Raw material shortages are hindering in-
dustrial recovery. For example, only five of the
17 tobacco processing factories in Bangladesh,
which employed over 34,000 workers, are operat-
ing. The rest are closed for lack of tobacco, which
previously was imported from West Pakistan. The
five will have to close by mid-March when their
supplies run out.
The Bangladesh Government is helping the
refugees returning from India-over 8 million are
back in Bangladesh-and the estimated 20 million
displaced persons within the country. Although
Dacca has allocated $22 million for reconstruc-
tion of the rural economy and $41 million for
immediate relief and rehabilitation, only $7 mil-
lion has been distributed so far. It is far from
enough.
The UN estimates that Bangladesh will re-
quire 200,000 tons of imported foodgrains a
month until the harvest next winter. The major
winter rice crop, just harvested, was better than
expected but still far smaller than in previous
years. The spring crop is likely to be relatively
poor because not enough fertilizer and farm
equipment will be available. India has pledged
500,000 tons of foodgrains to be delivered by 1
June, primarily by overland and barge transport
because of the port congestion. Two trains carry-
ing 57,000 tons have already reached destinations
in Bangladesh, and at least three more trains with
foodgrains are en route from Calcutta.
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SOVIET SHIPS LEAVE INDIAN OCEAN
The Soviets have begun withdrawing part of the naval force sent to the Indian Ocean following
the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. Early this week, a guided-missile cruiser
and a nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine left the Indian Ocean, apparently returning to their
Pacific Fleet bases. Two other surface ships and a submarine may soon be headed for the Malacca
Straits en route to home waters.
Until the Indo-Pakistani war, the usual Soviet force in the Indian Ocean consisted of three
surface combatants and a submarine. In response to the fighting on the subcontinent and the
presence of a US naval task force in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets increased their force during
December by eight combatants and nine support ships. Although the Soviets demonstrated readi-
ness to augment their naval forces, the logistic requirements almost certainly strained their support
system. As the tensions between India and Pakistan relax, the Soviets will probably continue to
Indian States Go to the Polls
Elections will take place in 16 of India's 21
states and in two of its six union territories begin-
ning on 5 March and stretching over a seven-day
period. Of these, eight are under the political
control of the Ruling Congress Party, seven are
under administrative control of the central gov-
ernment, and three have other than Ruling Con-
gress governments. Prime Minister Gandhi's Rul-
ing Congress Party is expected to win majorities
in most states. Even in those areas where the
going may prove difficult, Ruling Congress strate-
gists expect enough votes to give the party a
dominant position in a coalition government.
The Ruling Congress Party is fielding candi-
dates in all the states and territories, and in-every
case Mrs. Gandhi has personally approved the
slate. Only her candidates received "electoral
tickets." This nomination process has shaken the
party organization; many old-line leaders,
dropped by Mrs. Gandhi, are running as inde-
pendents. Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi's promise of
a new and "progressive" era has strong appeal and
the bulk of local Ruling Congress Party leaders
will be loath to buck the tide. Mrs. Gandhi ex-
pects that the 1972 state elections will consoli-
date her control of the party organization at the
local level in the same way that the 1971 national
election consolidated her control of the central
government.
For the most part, the opposition to Mrs.
Gandhi is demoralized and fragmented. The op-
position parties are concentrating their efforts in
those states where they believe they have some
chance of success and are not fighting the Ruling
Congress on a nationwide basis. Still, their
prospects appear bleak. The Organization Con-
gress, which broke with Mrs. Gandhi in 1969, is
plagued by infighting and has not succeeded in
shedding its unpopular conservative image. The
Socialist Party is unable to create a viable con-
stituency from among those who find the Com-
munist parties too extreme and the Ruling Con-
gress too moderate. Hindu-nationalist parties such
as the Jana Sangh have failed to compete ef-
fectively, especially in light of the government's
recent victory over Pakistan. Conservative groups
like the Swantantra Party continue to disintegrate
in a nation avowedly "socialist," and regional
parties are being pushed hard by Ruling Congress
Party workers attempting to capitalize on the
national euphoria induced by India's military suc-
cess.
Nevertheless, all will not be smooth sailing
for the Ruling Congress. In states such as
violence-prone West Bengal, politically frag-
mented Bihar, and the Punjab-long ruled by the
Sikh religious sect-the Ruling Congress has
elected to hedge its bets by entering agreements
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with like-minded parties not to contest against
each other in specified constituencies. In the ma-
jority of cases, the Congress has found it most
convenient to team with the pro-Moscow Com-
munist Party of India. By aligning with this
"moderate" Communist group, Mrs. Gandhi suc-
ceeds in dealing a blow to their common enemy,
the radical Communist Party of India/Marxist.
The pro-Moscow Communists hold only 24
seats in the 521-member lower house of Parlia-
ment to 258 for the Ruling Congress, and Mrs.
Gandhi does not consider them a threat. She has
undertaken to share power with them in West
Bengal, but elsewhere she has been reluctant to
tie the Ruling Congress to any coalition agree-
ments. Although Congress strategists probably are
considering the possibility of post-election coali-
tion governments in some problem states, for the
most part the party is going it alone. The prog-
nosis for this strategy is good-as many as 30
Congress Party leaders in seven states have already
been declared elected unopposed.
25X1
Congo: Ngouabi Still in Charge
President Ngouabi's extremist partners in his
military-based coalition appear to be shattered in
the wake of the confused events in Brazzaville on
22 February. An extensive purge and reorganiza-
tion of the regime is expected.
Broadcasts over Radio Congo on the morn-
ing of 22 February accused army chief of staff
Yhomby-Opango of trying to seize power in
Brazzaville while President Ngouabi was in the
coastal city of Pointe Noire. The radio then went
off the air for several hours. It returned with a
statement from Yhomby-Opango asserting his
loyalty to Ngouabi and announcing that "in
communication with" the President he had
crushed a military plot by "ambitious" army ele-
ments under the leadership of extremist political
bureau member, Ange Diawara. Ngouabi then re-
turned to the capital and gave a radio speech. He
repeated Yhomby-Opango's charges and stated
that many arrests were being made.
The actual course of events during the da
remains murky.
In any event, it is clear that Ngouabi is exploiting
the situation to move decisively against the left
wing of his regime. Virtually all of the country's
prominent leftist extremists are reportedly under
arrest or being hunted down. As of 23 February,
Diawara evidently was still at large. Another
important political bureau member, Ambroise
Noumazalaye, and the popular militia commander
are among the detainees.
Ngouabi has already made some changes in
the army, and other moves to solidify his position
are sure to follow. Meanwhile, Ngouabi has re-
sponded warmly to a congratulatory message
from President Mobutu, which could presage a
period of warmer relations with neighborin
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President Ngouabi
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,t _ J_.(rJ 1
El Salvador: Disputed Election
The presidential election on 20 February
was almost a draw between the two leading con-
testants. In the absence of official returns, the
only certainties are that none of the four candi-
dates won a majority and that, unless the military
intervenes directly, the legislature will elect El
Salvador's next president.
The left-of-center opposition is crying fraud;
its allegations are based mainly on the tally in the
Department of San Salvador, the area of its great-
est strength. Leaders of the opposition coalition
say the departmental count showed their candi-
date, Napoleon Duarte, running about two-to-one
ahead of the governing party's Colonel Molina.
Early figures released by the Central Electoral
Council indicate a narrower margin-enough to
give Molina, strong in rural areas, an over-all
plurality. The council's delay in announcinq offi-
cial results is taken by the coalition as "proof"
that figures are being juggled to deny Duarte a
victory.
The legislature is expected to decide early
next week whether Duarte or Molina has won.
There is no legal requirement that the decision be
in favor of the person designated by the council
as having received the larger number of votes. The
Legislative Assembly is dominated by Molina's
party (34 of the 52 seats), and it would normally
be expected to elect Molina.
The situation has become far from normal,
however, and the final decision will probably be
dictated by the military, the number one source
of political power in the country. A coup is a
possibility, but a solution within the constitu-
tional framework would entail fewer risks. De-
spite the military's distrust of the parties of the
left and its anger over some of the coalition's
campaign charges, the officer corps could support
Duarte's succession under certain conditions if it
becomes convinced that he actually won. Duarte
would undoubtedly have to agree to complete
disassociation from the Communists and a gradual
approach to controversial subjects such as agrar-
ian reform and unionization of rural work-
ers.
Ecuador: Rodriguez Takes Hold
President Rodriguez has dealt successfully
with the first major controversy within his admin-
istration. The dispute, which surfaced in his first
week in office, was touched off when it became
apparent he planned to act on his own, consulting
only army colleagues, rather than through a gov-
ernment council made up of the commanders of
the army, navy, and air force. The navy and air
force commanders protested bitterly and re-
signed.
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Replacements have been named, and the
council has been reorganized-at Rodriguez' di-
rection-to remove another point of friction, this
time between council members and Minister of
Defense Aulestia. Aulestia took the position that
he could not report to a government council
made up of the three commanders while he was in
theory their military superior. To solve this sticky
question of protocol, each service chief now will
designate a representative to serve on the council.
A third problem, the discrimination against
the navy and air force in the allocation of cabinet
posts, could cause continued resentment. The
new commanders of the air force and navy prob-
ably will be somewhat stronger than their prede-
cessors, but the army will continue to dominate
the government. The new navy chief has been
responsible for enforcing Ecuadorean policy
against US tuna boats, but he reportedly has been
helpful to US officials within the constraints
imposed by that policy. The new air force chief
reportedly is a political moderate who is friendly
to the US.
The fact that Rodriguez won this initial
showdown will increase his power in the short
run; in any event, he can stay in office as long as
he retains the support of important army units.
At the same time, lack of military unity will
hamper the execution of his policies. If, in the
long run, the navy and air force become too
obstructive, army officers who want to set Ecua-
dor on a progressive course may replace Rod-
riguez with someone who can command wider
support.
Uruguay: Opposing Bordaberry
The electoral court has officially proclaimed
Juan Maria Bordaberry president-elect of Uruguay
after two and a half months of vote counting.
Bordaberry does not begin his five-year term until
1 March, but his administration already appears
headed for trouble with the Congress and hostile
labor unions.
On the first day
of its session, the new
Chamber of Deputies
chose a member of the
Blanco opposition to
be its leader. Although
the new congressional
alignment gives the
Colorados a slim lead
over the Blancos in
both houses, members
of the leftist Frente
Amplio coalition re-
portedly supported the
President-Elect Bordaberry:
Headed for Trouble
Blanco candidate. Voting in the Uruguayan legis-
lature traditionally has been split among the nu-
merous political factions rather than along major
party lines, and efforts to obtain a majority prob-
ably will have to be renewed on each specific
issue.
While congressional confusion has long char-
acterized Uruguayan politics, Bordaberry's prob-
lems may be compounded by the animosity of his
defeated Blanco opponent, Wilson Ferreira. Fer-
reira, who probably will head the largest Senate
coalition, has denounced the election results as
fraudulent. Bordaberry, however, is attempting to
improve inter-party relations and has invited
Ferreira and the other Blanco leaders to join his
administration "in any form they find accept-
able." The president-elect specifically requested
Blanco collaboration on the major issues of public
safety, education, and regulation of the leftist
press.
In addition to these political difficulties, the
Communist-dominated labor confederation has
attacked the new president in its report on the
labor movement, adopted late last month. Al-
though this latest diatribe contains nothing new,
it establishes the foundation for a continuation of
the policy of repeated labor-government prob-
lems. A general work stoppage is scheduled for 14
March, at which time labor leaders will present
their demands to Congress.
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Bordaberry and his running mate, Jorge
Sapelli, were both strong supporters of President
Pacheco and can be expected to follow the gen-
eral lines of his conservative policies. Although
Bordaberry has yet to establish a clear national
image, he has maintained closer ties than his
predecessor with other Colorado leaders, in-
cluding Jorge Battle, the head of the powerful
Colorado List 15 group. One of Battle's chief
lieutenants appears certain to get the Economic
Ministry.
US-Venezuela Relations Strained
Compulsive politicking by the Christian
Democratic administration is making it difficult
to halt the deterioration of US-Venezuelan rela-
tions. Even though some leaders, notably busi-
nessmen, are unhappy with the trend, the Caldera
government is working on the assumption that
legislative and rhetorical assaults on the foreign
oil companies are a fail-safe method of pleasing
the general public. Caldera further seems to be-
lieve that the US, being inured to anti-American
invective and in need of Venezuelan oil, has a
high tolerance for this sort of surging nationalism.
Several anti-US incidents have occurred over
the past two weeks for which the Caldera gov-
ernment has expressed regret, but largely for US
consumption. The Christian Democrats, for
example, officially deplored the burning of an
American flag, though their youth organization is
known to have been responsible and though a
party leader gave a highly inflammatory anti-
American speech at the burning. Also, the min-
ister of mines has again charged that declining oil
production is a result of a conspiracy by the
foreign firms, and the education minister linked
recent student violence to interference by the oil
companies. This latter charge was retracted fully
only in Caracas' English-language daily.
Caldera's own view was illuminated in an
interview with a US journalist last week. Caldera
judges that US energy requirements demand a
secure source of fuel and that since Venezuela can
fill this need, the US will continue to buy from
Venezuela at least at the current volume. Given
this necessary relationship, Caldera sees no reason
why Venezuela cannot enjoy a guaranteed stable
market for its oil "at prices comparable to those
for petroleum produced in the US."
President Caldera also continues to tell the
public that he plans no retreat from the nation-
alist position he has taken in defense of Vene-
zuelan resources. This approach and the repeated
denunciations of alleged pressure tactics by the
oil companies do little to ease the strains in
US-Venezuelan relations and may point to further
trouble ahead. The next clue to the progression of
bilateral relations is likely to surface in Caldera's
state of the union message next week.
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Cuba: Looking at Guantanamo
Since last November, Castro's government
has been showing unusual interest in the subject
of the US naval presence at Guantanamo. The
communique issued at the end of Kosygin's visit
to Cuba on 1 November mentioned "US-encour-
aged hostile actions," and referred to the "unlaw-
ful presence of the North American military base
at Guantanamo." Soon thereafter, the Cuban
military magazine, Verde Olivo, made similar
charges, and Havana television carried a special
documentary along the same general lines.
In an apparent effort to drum up interna-
tional support for the ouster of US forces from
Havana*
carrying members of Cuba's Union of Communist
Youth on a ceremonial round-island tour and
accompanied by a small gunboat intended to put
in at Caimanera. There was good reason to
suspect that such a plan, which would necessitate
sailing through waters of the US naval base, had
been engineered to dramatize Cuba's Guantanamo
claim by provoking US authorities into denying
transit to the Cuban gunboat. According to treaty
arrangements governing the base, Cuban military
vessels may not enter the US base. In any event,
the merchant vessels bypassed the base and went
on to Baracoa, and the gunboat turned back
before reaching the entrance to Guantanamo Bay.
the naval facility, Castro told Chilean reporters in
early December that he viewed the US presence in
Guantanamo as a "dagger stuck in the heart."
"There are many accounts to be settled and some
day we will have to demand payment," he added.
The only solution, he said, was for the US to pull
out, since the "base served no purpose from a
military point of view." Castro said, "We will let
them stay in Guantanamo until they get bored."
At a press conference in Guayaquil on 4 Decem-
ber, Castro commented that Cuba "is saddled
with a United States naval base" and that the
same situation occurs in Panama with the case of
the canal.
Cuban vessels bypassing
Caimanera arrive 22 Feb
Caimanera+
Guantanamo
Naval Base
Cuba continually monitors the activities of the
base, and, because of increased security pre-
cautions by US forces, Castro may have elected
not to create an incident at this time.
Although Havana is reiterating that Cuba
intends to gain "rightful" control over Guan-
tanamo at "the proper time" through legal and
peaceful means, it is highly unlikely that Castro
will undertake hostile actions against the base.
But he may see psychological advantage in
stepping up propaganda pressure and "other25X1
harassment" to build up a "legal case" for pos-
sible submission of the issue to the UN or some
The most recent focus on Guantanamo came
with reports that three Cuban merchant ships
other international forum.
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Chile: Allende Strikes Back
President Allende will invoke his broad con-
stitutional powers to fight the opposition's latest
move to curb the nationalization of private indus-
try. He will veto important sections of a constitu-
tional amendment passed on 19 February that
requires legislative approval of each nationaliza-
tion. He insists that a two-thirds congressional
majority is necessary to override his veto. The
opposition claims that only a simple majority is
required and that the President's only recourse
thereafter would be a plebiscite on the issue
which he would lose. Allende has declared that
instead of a plebiscite his recourse would be to
the constitutional tribunal. The recently estab-
lished tribunal's decisions have most often ac-
cepted Allende's position, in part because Chilean
constitutional law is vague, flexible, and favorable
to presidential prerogatives.
Allende's crack
legal adviser, former
political conservative
Eduardo Novoa, is a
constitutional expert.
He has dug up for-
gotten decrees issued
by a short-lived So-
cialist government in
the 1930s to facilitate
some of the already ef-
fected nationali-
zations. He is the ar-
chitect of Chile's legal
position on nationali-
zation of US copper interests and the justification
for lack of compensation.
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Secret
Secret
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`', Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
China's Role in Africa
Secret
NO 47
25 February 1972
No. 0358/72A .
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 r 1 F \ 1 1 1 1 1^\ 1 1 1 11 1 1 \ I I 11 I
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~JL11J~~L;1~ iLHi
~1 LJ ~ Lr,1 l~J LI LI ~ ~ ~ LI Ll ~ LI
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SECRET Amp~
After marking time for nearly five years, Communist China again is expanding its
presence in Africa. Since October 1970, five African governments have established diplo-
matic relations with Peking. When the two others now in the process do so, the Chinese
Communists will be ahead of the rival Chinese Nationalist regime in the contest for
recognition. When the UN General Assembly voted to admit the People's Republic of China
to the world body, Peking received most of the African ballots. Along with these diplomatic
gains, there has been a considerable increase in Chinese economic aid to African nations.
Transforming such short-range political profit into long-term influence will depend on
a number of factors: the effectiveness and continued generosity of Peking's economic aid,
the ability of the Chinese to allay African fears of subversion, conditions and events within
Africa, and Peking's ability to find issues on which China and the African regimes can unite.
China undoubtedly will continue to give priority to its relationships with the US, the USSR,
Japan, and Europe, but in Peking's effort to alter power relationships in the world, Africa
has a definite, if limited, part to play.
The Early Years
Africa first attracted the attention of the
Chinese Communists in the mid-1950s, when the
European powers came under increasing pressure
to grant independence to their colonies. Taking
advantage of the surge in African nationalist senti-
ment, Peking stressed its opposition to imperial-
ism, offering moral and, on occasion, material
support to African national liberation move-
ments. In May 1956, Egypt's President Nasir,
sensing a potential source of support in his devel-
oping dispute with Britain and France over the
status of the Suez Canal, became the first ruler on
the African continent to recognize Mao's regime.
Peking's aid to the nationalist rebels in Algeria
paid off in 1962 when the newly independent
government established diplomatic relations with
China.
Peking's efforts to assert itself as a revolu-
tionary model for African independence move-
ments and to forge diplomatic, economic, and
political ties with the more radical of the newly
independent African states set the stage for
increased competition with the USSR, and, as
Sino-Soviet differences widened during the 1960s,
rivalry for influence in Africa increased. Peking's
attempt to preserve its ideological purity and out-
bid Moscow in revolutionary appeal, however,
soon adversely affected Chinese diplomacy. Once
in power, most African nationalists, who wel-
comed Chinese political and material aid during
their struggle for independence, gave a chilly
response to the Chinese cries for continued social
revolution that Peking felt compelled to sound as
part of its contest with Moscow for ideological
leadership of the Communist movement.
Nevertheless, as an increasing number of
African colonies gained independence during the
early 1960s, China stepped up its efforts to gain
influence, mainly to match Soviet moves. The
Chinese were also trying to counter the rival over-
tures of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and
reduce US influence on the continent. As Chinese
diplomatic missions on the continent grew in
number, a modest foreign aid program was in-
augurated to woo African governments and
enhance Peking's prestige. High-ranking Chinese
leaders, such as Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign
Minister Chen I, made personal tours in Africa.
African delegations were encouraged to visit Pe-
king, and promising African revolutionaries were
cultivated and occasionally given training in
Special Report
-2- 25 February 1972
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;V bt C.:KL 1 Iffi.:
China. By 1965, 15 African countries had diplo-
matic relations with Communist China.
Starting in 1965, China's steady, if modest,
progress in Africa began to slow down. African
leaders resented Chinese efforts to use them as
political weapons in the widening quarrel between
Peking and Moscow. A major reason for the can-
cellation of the Afro-Asian conference planned
for Algiers in 1965 was the desire of many Afri-
can leaders to avoid association with any Chinese
effort to turn the meeting against the USSR.
Peking's doctrinaire support of revolutionary
action cast suspicion on its motives. In some
cases, such as their backing of the radical Lu-
mumba and Mulele uprisings in the Congo (now
Zaire), the Chinese appear to have overestimated
the revolutionary potential of the situation.
Revelations-some of them concocted-of Chinese
complicity in subversion aimed at overthrowing
independent regimes, as in Burundi, alarmed
many African leaders. Close Chinese ties with
such national leaders as Ghana's Nkrumah meant
that when those leaders were ousted, Chinese
influence suffered.
Peking also discovered that diplomatic ties,
modest Chinese economic aid, and ideological
rhetoric were no match for the larger amounts of
economic and military assistance available to Afri-
can governments from Moscow and the West. In
Algeria, for example, Peking was unable to com-
pete with the large Soviet military and economic
aid commitment. Nor was the prospect of Chinese
political support on international issues attractive
enough to win over more African regimes. Peking
lacked the superpower status and political punch
of the US or USSR.
African uneasiness over Peking's policies in-
creased with the unfolding of the Cultural Revo-
lution. The Chinese at that time appeared almost
completely engrossed with domestic concerns and
presented an image of internal instability. All of
China's ambassadors, with the exception of the
one in Cairo, were called home. In only one
instance, however, was there a break in
diplomatic relations between an African nation
and Peking during the most tumultuous stage of
Special Report
the Cultural Revolution. In 1967, after Tunisian
complaints about Chinese propaganda activities
and Chinese accusations that Tunsia wished to
wreck relations, Peking closed its embassy. Peking
was otherwise generally able to isolate its basic
interests in Africa from the effects of the up-
heaval, "although Chinese prestige and influence
undoubtedly suffered. The major effect of the
Cultural Revolution in Africa was to curtail the
extension of new Chinese economic aid and to
put a moratorium on further expansion of Pe-
king's diplomatic relations. After Mauritania
recognized Communist China in July 1965, no
other African government entered into diplomatic
relations with Peking for over five years.
In 1969, the restoration of order at home
and the adoption of a more pragmatic and flexi-
ble approach to foreign policy laid the ground-
work for a renewal of China's campaign to
increase its presence and influence in Africa.
Chinese ambassadors began returning to their
posts. Peking's economic effort on the continent
was given new impetus; in 1970, China extended
$452.8 million in new economic aid to African
regimes, far exceeding its previous aid to Africa.
The commitment to finance and build the Tan-
zania-Zambia railway accounted for most of this
total ($401.2 million), but Guinea ($10 million)
and Sudan ($41.6 million) were given a slice of
the pie. Continuing its version of dollar diplo-
macy into 1971, China extended new economic
aid to Somalia ($109 million), Ethiopia ($84 mil-
lion), Sudan ($40 million), Algeria ($40 million)
and Mauritania ($20.5 million). In Mali, Peking
indicated its interest in financing and constructing
the $100 million Manantalli dam project.
A New Approach to Revolution
Since 1969, Peking's answer to the problem
of differences between the demands of its African
policy conducted in a world of nation states and
the demands of its revolutionary ideology has
been to downplay the ideological factor and to
operate on a more pragmatic basis. In effect, the
goal of social revolution has been retained but put
off into the indefinite future. Chinese policy now
emphasizes the cultivation of good state-to-state
-3- 25 February 1972
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African Countries Recognizing People's Republic of China
PORT. aNEAj
NIGERIA
f
wAwis anv ,'j.: (Intern at. 9 BOTSWANA
Terr.)
~urvoi y
TANZANIA
HODESIA
(U. K.)
REPUBLIC ~''~
OF. {~ sg4HO
MALAGASY
REPUBLIC
Full recognition including diplomatic
relations
? Recognizes Peking, but'does not
maintain diplomatic relations
Special Report
25 February 1972
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relations with any government willing to recog-
nize Mao's regime as the sole legitimate govern-
ment of China. No ideological strings are
attached, and Peking does not demand that other
governments support its position vis-a-vis the
USSR. Communist China's leadership apparently
accepts the fact that non-Communist, nationalist
regimes are in power throughout Africa and are
likely to remain indefinitely. Naturally, the Chi-
nese are pleased when an African regime adopts a
radical position, as in Guinea or Congo (Brazza-
ville). Nevertheless, while publicly applauding
such measures as the nationalization of various
sectors of the African economy, Peking has
demonstrated considerable private caution. Chi-
nese officials have warned various African regimes
of the dangers of going too far, too fast in
remaking their economies. Chinese spokesmen
also have reminded African leaders hungry for
economic aid that China's capacity to help them
is limited, implying that they should not cut
themselves off from other sources of assistance.
China's adoption of a flexible, pragmatic
policy emphasizing good state relations has paid
off in wider acceptance of Mao's regime by Afri-
can states. In turn, diplomatic recognition by
African governments helps buttress the interna-
tional legitimacy of the Peking government and
undermine that of its rival on Taiwan. African
regimes are encouraged to believe that they can
do business with Peking without fear of Chinese-
sponsored subversion. In the long run, the Chi-
nese obviously hope that increased international
prestige and acceptance will be translated into
support for Peking's moves directed at altering its
power relationships with the US and the Soviet
Union.
Peking loses no opportunity to establish the
image of China as a champion of third-world-
hence, African-interests against those of the two
superpowers. Chinese propaganda hits hard on the
theme that Washington and Moscow are "con-
tending and colluding" in order to divide the
world between them, that Soviet and US eco-
nomic and military aid are given with ulterior
motives, and that Afro-Asian (and Latin Ameri-
can) countries should "get united" to oppose the
Special Report
schemes of the two superpowers to block the
attainment of complete political and economic
independence. Peking, which repeatedly pledges
never to behave as a superpower, looks for con-
crete issues of importance to Africans on which
China can take the lead. For example, China
supports African anti-colonial moves in the UN,
approved the Security Council decision to hold a
session on African problems in Addis Ababa, and
keeps up a drumf ire of criticism against the white
governments in Rhodesia and South Africa. If
possible, Peking attempts to select issues that
involve the interests of as wide a range of third-
world countries as possible. Thus, Chinese sup-
port of the claim of several African countries to a
200-nautical-mile limit for territorial waters, a
matter of even greater concern to most South
American states, was included in the communique
of July 1971 summarizing the visit of a govern-
ment delegation from Sierra Leone. Later the
same month, the communique marking the end of
the visit of the Algerian foreign minister called for
a "Mediterranean for the Mediterranean states,"
obliquely criticizing the presence of both the US
and Soviet fleets in the area.
Current Chinese pronouncements stress the
African states' struggle to protect their sover-
eignty and interests in the face of "imperialism,
neo-colonialism, and racism." Peking is fully
aware of the damage done to its position in Africa
by its past association with subversive move-
ments. The Chinese quickly, and probably truth-
fully, denied charges made in the summer of 1971
by Uganda's President Amin that they were aiding
exiled President Obote in his plans to return to
power.
There is no good current evi- 25X1
dente t at Reking is offering material or propa-
ganda support to any movements aimed at over-
throwing blackor Arab regimes in Africa. Indeed,
as demonstrated by Chinese criticism of the
Soviet Union's alleged meddling in the internal
affairs of the Sudan, Peking is attempting to turn
the tables on those who continue to label it
subversive.
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China maintains the revolutionary basis of
its African policy by supporting liberation move-
ments directed against white rule in Portuguese
Africa, Rhodesia, and the Republic of South
Africa. Peking furnishes arms and training to the
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) based
in Tanzania, and a small amount of arms have
been given to the rebels in Portuguese Guinea.
The FRELIMO leader, Samora Moises Machel,
visited Peking in late summer 1971, and further
Chinese aid probably was discussed. The Chinese
have given limited amounts of aid to two smaller
groups, the Mozambique Revolutionary Com-
mittee and the Partisan Liberation Union of
Mozambique, in an effort to maintain wide con-
tacts within the anti-Portuguese liberation move-
ments.
The chairman of the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola made his pilgrimage to
Peking in July 1971, and he may have secured
promises of Chinese support in the form of sup-
plies and training by Chinese instructors in Tan-
zania. The Chinese also have given token amounts
of aid to the National Union for Total Inde-
pendence of Angola. Peking furnishes funds and
military training in Tanzania to the Zimbabwe
African National Union, an organization seeking
the overthrow of the present regime in Rhodesia.
Ideological and organizational splits have
undermined the political and military impact of
the various liberation movements, particularly
those in Rhodesia, and Peking probably discounts
their ability to overthrow colonial or white rule in
the foreseeable future. After seeing their aid to
various African revolutionaries frittered away in
the early and mid-1960s, the Chinese apparently
have decided to give only relatively modest
amounts of aid to such groups, at least until these
organizations prove to have created effective,
well-disciplined movements with a chance of
eventual success.
Chinese influence among the African libera-
tion movements faces several limiting factors.
Many of the movements, such as in Portuguese
Guinea, receive aid from the USSR which their
leaders are loath to jeopardize. The thought of
Mao Tse-tung may inspire some African leaders
intellectually and emotionally and interest them
as a general guide to military and political action
in a "people's war," but none of these leaders is
an out-and-out Maoist, and all are ardent national-
ists. None of them appears susceptible to firm
Chinese control, even if Peking should attempt to
exert it. Finally, Chinese efforts to influence the
liberation movements are restricted by the atti-
tudes of the African states that play host to the
rebels. For example, in view of Peking's efforts to
court the Nyerere regime, it is highly unlikely
that the Chinese would go against his wishes in
dealing with FRELIMO.
Given these limitations, which are aggravated
by China's remoteness from the scene of action,
the Chinese are contenting themselves with being
more of an inspirational force to the movements.
Chinese propaganda stresses the necessity for each
movement to be self-reliant, to build a base of
local popular support, and to adopt its tactics to
the local social and political environment.
The Chinese have no qualms about reducing
or even abandoning their propaganda or material
support of an African liberation movement, if
such an action helps cement good relations with
an African government. Peking ceased propa-
gandizing for the Eritrean Liberation Front sev-
eral months before China began recognition talks
with Ethiopia, and, since the establishment of
diplomatic relations, Peking has severely cut back
and probably ended support for the Eritrean
rebels. Suspension of aid, never very great in
absolute terms, was one of the main conditions
set by Ethiopia as the price of recognition, and
the Chinese apparently paid the price with alac-
rity in order to gain a presence in an important
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African state. During Emperor Haile Selassie's
visit to Peking in October 1971, the Chinese lead-
ership emphatically reassured their guest that
their aid to the Eritrean Liberation Front had
ended.
Peking's decision to accept the necessity of
dealing with the existing African nationalist
regimes is paralleled by a decision to write off as a
potential source of support the few existing-and
in almost every case illegal-African Communist
parties. Most of the parties have generally been
ineffectual and have lined up behind Moscow in
the Sino-Soviet ideological split, making it easier
for the Chinese to write them off as revisionists.
Peking's utter indifference to African Communist
parties is illustrated by its reaction to the fate of
the Sudanese Communists. China did not join the
Soviet and East European chorus protesting Presi-
dent Numayri's violent suppression of the Sudan-
ese party.
IThe Chinese
ambassador waste irst foreign representative
received by him after his restoration to power.
Peking has nearly doubled its economic assistance
to his regime and has signed a military protocol
with Khartoum. Chinese national interest in gain-
ing influence at the expense of the USSR in a
major African state clearly overrode ideological
considerations.
If Peking has written off the existing Com-
munist parties, there is still the question of why
the Chinese have made no great effort to en-
courage the formation of pro-Peking Communist
movements in Africa. One deterrent to such a
move is the bias toward "European Communism"
in the African movement. Particularly in French-
speaking Africa, most of the recruits to Com-
munist or other ultraradical views have undergone
ideological conversion under European influence.
During the colonial era, the embryonic African
Communist parties were in a sense an extension
overseas of the Communist movements in the
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metropole. An equally strong factor is Peking's
view of the prospects of African Communism.
The Chinese very likely do not regard the situa-
tion as ripe for the launching of African Com-
munist parties, which in their view cannot be
organized from outside but must evolve according
to the circumstances in each state. Rather than
engage in futile efforts to encourage chimerical
Communist movements, Peking has chosen to
support selected radical African leaders or nation-
alist movements and to await developments more
favorable to the organization of pro-Chinese par-
ties.
Since the renewed expansion of Chinese
activity in Africa in 1970, most of China's new
economic aid has gone to regimes that already
have recognized the People's Republic. In part,
this generosity is meant to impress African leaders
who do not recognize China with the tangible
benefits to be gained by good relations. Ethiopia 25X1
and Equatorial Guinea concluded economic aid
agreements with China within a year after reco -
nizing Peking.
Peking
uses its foreign aia as more than just a lure for
recognition. Provision of aid helps project an
image of a dynamic, expanding, and modern
Chinese economy that will serve both as an in-
spiration and source of help for underdeveloped
nations.
The Chinese are well-suited by experience
and the level of their technology to build basic
projects-roads, railroads, dams, ports, light in-
dustry, and agricultural and medical facilities--so
badly needed by many African nations. The tech-
nologically more sophisticated Western donors
often will not match Peking's financial terms,
which include mainly no interest credits with
repayment over a long term following a
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substantial grace period. Chinese aid has been well
received by most of its African recipients. The
Chinese have a reputation for hard work, fru-
gality, and living within the local economy. The
scarcity of African complaints about Chinese
ideological proselytizing in connection with the
aid programs suggests that Peking is treading with
circumspection. Moreover, the Chinese are willing
to undertake economically dubious projects if
they believe that the political gains will justify the
burden.
China's economic competition with the West
or the USSR is limited by its own economic
deficiencies. In Africa, Chinese economic aid has
surpassed that given by the Soviet Union in onl
seven countries.
image by recalling past Chinese association with
subversion and, on occasion, by meeting the
Chinese in head-on competition, as in Somalia,
where the recent Soviet agreement to finance a
large agricultural development project obviously
is meant to offset increased Chinese economic
aid.
Moscow's competition probably will not
deter an increasing number of African regimes
from seeking Chinese economic assistance in the
future. Almost all African regimes profess to fol-
low a nonaligned foreign policy, and acceptance
of Chinese aid helps reinforce this image. Al-
though there probably are few African leaders
who have any illusions about China's ability to
replace the West or the USSR as an economic
patron, Peking's assistance is welcome, not only
in its own right but also as a device to counter-
balance any Western or Soviet presence, and as a
bargaining tool with which to negotiate elsewhere
for more aid on better terms. The Malian regime,
for example, appears to be trying to play off
China, France, and the USSR in an effort to
secure greater economic aid.
Military Aid
Most African states also retain important eco-
nomic ties with their former colonial rulers; there
is still considerable French economic interest in
west and central Africa, and the United Kingdom
is an important trade partner for its former Afri-
can possessions, including Tanzania and Zambia.
Chinese aid activities, particularly in Ethiopia and
Somalia, have succeeded in arousing Soviet
apprehension. Moscow's representatives have
attempted to blacken Peking's new pragmatic
of their new military equipment.
Peking's use of military aid as a supplement
to its larger economic effort is more sparing.
Tanzania and possibly Sierra Leone are now the
only African states dependent on China for most
zanian Navy at Dar es Salaamand a major airfield.
Chinese instructors provide military training in
Tanzania, and Tanzanian naval and air force per-
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Apart from Tanzania, no African govern-
ment has received large amounts of military aid
from Peking since 1960. The agreement con-
cluded in July 1971 between China and Guinea
calls for Peking to supply only several small patrol
boats and an undetermined amount of arms and
ammunition. Despite the signing of a military aid
agreement with Congo (Brazzaville) in September
1971-which will bring in Chinese tanks and
"heavy equipment," and send some military
personnel to China for training-the Congolese
receive most of their military equipment from the
USSR. The Chinese have been well received, how-
ever, garnering considerable prestige from a
modest amount of aid.
Prospectus
Locked in a competition with the US and
the USSR in the changing world power balance,
Peking is likely to continue to take advantage of
Africa's underdeveloped economies and endemic
political instability to expand its influence and
secure African political support. How well the
Chinese do will depend on a number of factors.
Fifteen years of expanding involvement in Africa
have given Peking certain intangible assets-
experience in the area, contacts with several
important African leaders, such as Nyerere and
Kaunda, and a greater understanding of the
region's complex social and political structure.
These assets have not always been well used-
witness the setbacks dealt the Chinese during the
mid-1960s-but Peking's increasing experience in
Africa suggests that its policies and activities there
are likely to become more sophisticated in the
years ahead. The turn toward a pragmatic policy
after 1969 has paid off in an expanding Chinese
presence, yet Peking, by backing selected national
Special Report
liberation groups, has managed to retain its revo-
lutionary aura.
Transforming these assets into long-term
political gains is a more uncertain process. The
Chinese must continue to make good on their
promises of economic aid and to show African
leaders that China's support is valuable in attain-
ing their sometimes competing national objec-
tives. A major factor shaping the future of China
in Africa is, of course, the unpredictability of
events on the continent itself. The fall of
Nkrumah, which wiped out the political gains
Peking had made in Ghana, and the failure last
year of the attempted coup in the Sudan, which
opened up a new opportunity for expandinr25X1
Chinese influence, are cases in point.
So far, China's ability to influence develop-
ments in Africa has been very limited. No African
regime or liberation movement appears about to
adopt the Maoist model of society in toto, and,
given the intensity of the African desire for
independence, it is unlikely that any African
regime will allow itself to become completely
dependent on Peking. African leaders are more
likely to become increasingly skillful in balancing
the competing pressures from the West, the
USSR, and China.
But as long as Peking supports important
African objectives, avoids a repetition of med-
dling in subversive activities within black and
Arab African nations, and offers cheap economic
and military aid, it probably will continue to
make modest aains.
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