WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009500040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A009500040001-5
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
14 April 1972
No. 0365/72
Copy
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday
morning by the Office of Current intelligence, reports
and analyzes significant developments of the week
through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes
material coordinated with or prepared by the office
of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Re-
search, and the Directorate of Science and Technol-
ogy. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment
and therefore published separately as Special Reports
are listed in the contents pages.
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CONTENTS, (14 April 1972)
25X1
7 Japan: Sato and the Economy 25X1
8 Korea: Toward Private Talks
9 Canton Fair to Host US Traders
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
USSR-Finland: More Cooperation
Honecker Departs Moscow
Grechko Gratifies Yugoslavs
Italy: The Economy and Elections
Malta: Mintoff's China Success
USSR: Tighter Ties with Iraq
Palestinian Pow-wow
Libya: The Rulers and the Ruled
Lebanon: Parliamentary Elections
India-Pakis,t,an: Bhutto's Burdens
Zanzibar: After the Fall
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
24 Niaragua: The New Or er
25 gentina: More Politica Violence
26 azil: No Time for Polite s
27 ,chile: More Politics `I
28 'Colombia: Challenge to Oli~archy
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Hanoi's spring offensive still had plenty of
momentum this week. Although the drive in the
northern part of South Vietnam slowed and the
anticipated push in the central highlands failed to
materialize, Communist forces struck hard across
the Cambodian border north of Saigon and
stepped up attacks in the Mekong Delta. The
deployment of Communist troops indicates that
heavy attacks are in store in each of the major
sectors.
Their positioning is similar to that observed
in the early stages of the 1968 Tet offensive. As
in 1968, the biggest concentrations are in the
north. The North Vietnamese 304th and 308th
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divisions are still threatening Quang Tri city, de-
spite considerable losses, and the 324B Division is
near Hue. Opposing them are the weakened South
Vietnamese 3rd Division in Quang Tri, now rein-
forced by Vietnamese Rangers and Marines, and
the elite 1st Division and Ranger units around
Hue. South Vietnamese commanders have
claimed a number of battlefield successes and are
expressing confidence that they can contain the
enemy assaults if US air support continues.
In the central highlands, the North Vietnam-
ese have now moved strong forces well into Kon-
tum Province. The South Vietnamese 22nd Divi-
sion in Kontum has been reinforced with two
Airborne brigades from the general reserve, and
parts of another infantry division, the 23rd, could
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be moved to the province from farther south in
the highlands.
The three South Vietnamese divisions as-
signed to Military Region 3 have not been able to
contain the enemy there and are being reinforced
with an Airborne brigade and the 21st Division
from the Mekong Delta.
10@ -flems 60
tnr" in '"h `@`"` . By late in the week,
the Communists controlled most of the northern
half of '7 1province and have been blocking rein-
forcements heading toward An Loc, the provin-
cial capital. In the delta, recently the most secure
part of the country, the balance of opposing
forces has shifted significantly with the departure
of the South Vietnamese 21st Division and the
arrival of several enemy main-force regiments
from Cambodia.
With these moves, both the North Vietnam-
ese and the South Vietnamese have now moved
most of their available reserves onto the battle-
field. The opposing armies are still a long way
from being fought out. Both are regrouping for
more action and have many units that have not
been seriously damaged or even involved to any
great extent in the fighting.
South Vietnamese Remain Calm
The populace outside the fighting areas has
generally remained calm. There have been some
signs of heightened concern in Saigon, including a
rise in some prices, but business continues as
usual. To the north, in Quang Tri and Thua Thien
provinces, popular morale appears to have risen in
recent days as South Vietnamese forces have
checked the enemy advance. Local officials and
community leaders are engaging in defense and
refugee relief efforts, and representatives of all
the area's major political elements have set up a
new anti-Communist front group in Hue.
Many political groups have denounced the
offensive. Some of these denunciations appar-
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ently have been instigated by the government, but
others seem to have been spontaneous. Some
opposition groups appear to be muting their criti-
cism. Even the An Quang Buddhists and militant
students are cooperating in refugee relief efforts.
They are acting more out of concern over the
situation and because of their hostility toward the
Communists than out of any greater commitment
to President Thieu, and it seems unlikely that the
offensive will cause them to soften their opposi-
tion to Thieu over the long term.
The North Vietnamese on 11 April called on
allies and friends abroad to do more to help their
fight against "US imperialism." The appeal was
issued as a government communique addressed to
the "governments and peoples of the fraternal
socialist countries" and to Hanoi's supporters
around the world. In it, the North Vietnamese
urged their backers to "take timely actions to
check the US aggressors" and "to extend even
stronger assistance" to the struggle in all three
parts of Indochina.
Hanoi has been concerned that none of the
statements volunteered by the Soviets and the
Chinese during the current offensive has come
close to the fervor of their propaganda support
during Operation Lam Son 719 last year or the
Cambodian crisis in 1970. More than usually sen-
sitive to such nuances, the North Vietnamese
apparently believed that some special prompting
was necessary to secure more enthusiastic public
backing. Presumably, the North Vietnamese were
pressing for the most ringing statement possible
from both partners and made sure of a response
by asking for special interviews at the highest
possible levels in both capitals. Both Brezhnev
and Chou En-lai responded, but both responses
probably fell far short of Hanoi's hopes.
Chou En-lai's remarks in his interview with
the North Vietnamese charge were measured, cor-
rect, and not belligerent. He appeared to be trying
to avoid giving real offense to Hanoi without
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going much beyond the minimum called for by
the circumstances. He pledged all-out support and
assistance to the Vietnamese in carrying the war
"through to the end," but this formulation has
long been standard in the Chinese lexicon; it
commits Peking to no particular course of action
and continues to place the burden-and the
responsibility-for prosecuting the war on Hanoi.
For the first time, Chou indicated that the Chi-
nese were "closely following" the development of
the current situation, but even this formulation
does not rank especially high on the Chinese scale
of rhetoric.
Moscow has so far failed to mention the
statement explicitly. The atmospherics of the
meeting between Brezhnev and the North Viet-
namese ambassador were described as those of
"fraternal friendship and solidarity," and Brezh-
nev went beyond previous Soviet comment
condemning the bombing by demanding its im-
mediate cessation. He made the first promise of
continued Soviet "assistance and support" to the
Vietnamese since the offensive began. Brezhnev,
however, avoided, belligerent language. This So-
viet posture of restraint appears to be dictated by
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sensitivity to the forthcoming meeting with the
President.
Hanoi has acknowledged that the party cen-
tral committee recently held its "20th plenary
session" to review over-all regime policies.
According to initial press accounts, a strong en-
dorsement by the plenum of Hanoi's current
military strategy was coupled with a decision to
stand fast on the negotiating front.
The regime's official account of the session
suggests that the leaders may in fact have decided
on a tougher negotiating line than they have yet
made public. Nowhere in the report is there any
reference to vague hints by the Viet Cong last
February that the Communists might be willing
to deal with the present Saigon administration
once President Thieu is out of the way. Instead,
the full burden for a political settlement is placed
on the US. Washington is not only exhorted in
customary terms to cease its military involvement
in Indochina, but it is also called upon to "sup-
press" the "coercive and oppressive machinery"
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of the Saigon government. This is the first time in
recent months that Hanoi has said that Washing-
ton, rather than the South Vietnamese, should
change Saigon's political apparatus as a prelude to
a deal with the Communists. In pressing this line,
Hanoi may be signaling its determination to keep
the political and military aspects of a settlement
closely linked.
The plenum report is not the only recent
indication that the Communists may be shedding
some of their pretense of negotiating flexibility.
Premier Pham Van Dong assured North Vietnam's
National Assembly a week ago that Hanoi was
determined to achieve its maximum political de-
mands, and Foreign Minister Trinh, in an address
to the same body, studiously ignored the notion
that the Communists might come to terms with
any of Thieu's present colleagues.
This apparent stiffening of the Communist
negotiating position can only raise questions
about the present validity of the Viet Cong's
February "elaboration" with its ambiguous treat-
ment of the problems of a political solution. The
Communists may never have intended the elabo-
ration as anything more than a propaganda
riposte to the US disclosure of secret negotiations
between Hanoi and Washington. Hanoi probably
also believes that, whatever its recent negotiating
stand, it makes sense to stake out a maximum
position now that Communist forces in South
Vietnam are on the offensive.
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In Laos, despite the diversion of US air
strikes to South Vietnam, the Communists have
not yet kicked off what is expected to be a
concerted and, perhaps for this year, final drive to
take Long Tieng. They have limited themselves to
intermittent shelling attacks against irregulars on
Skyline Ridge and at artillery sites in the valley
below. Vang Pao's troops have taken advantage of
the lull in enemy ground activity to recapture
some positions on Skyline, and all but one of the
major positions on the ridge are now either in
friendly hands or unoccupied.
The Communists show no signs of abandon-
ing their stalled campaign. Elements of seven
North Vietnamese infantry regiments, accom-
panied by artillery, anti-aircraft, and armored
r1Qr mimic arrp rnal