WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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30
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December 21, 2016
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November 19, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
August 25, 1972
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 V-' Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 25 August 1972 No. 0384/72 Copy No 50 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 CONTENTS (25 August 1972) 1 USSR-Egypt: Dirty Linen 2 Law of the Sea: Back on Course 3 Indochina 8 Philippines: Politics of Property 9 Singapore: To the Polls 25X6 10 Czechoslovak Trials End 11 USSR - Eastern Europe: Autos 12 Yugoslavia: Countering the Emigres 13 USSR: Stemming an Exodus MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 15 Morocco: I n the Eye of the Storm 16 Persian Gulf: New Friends 16 Burundi: A Long Way To Go 17 Somalia: Siad Tightens Grip 18 Yemen (Aden): Ali vs. Ismail 19 Sri Lanka: Land Reform, Labor Unrest 19 Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks 20 Oil Talks Progress WESTERN HEMISPHERE 20 Honduras: More Ferment 21 Argentina: Time of Trouble 22 Ecuador: First Half-Year 22 Costa Rica: Common Market 23 Chile: Economics Makes Politics Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 SECRET USSR-EGYPT: DIRTY LINEN p 1As the removal of Soviet military personnel and equipment appears to be coming to an end, so do the efforts in both Moscow and Cairo to avoid public recriminations over the expulsions. The effort in Cairo, never very strong, seems to have cracked first with a series of articles in leading publications which rather specifically called Soviet good faith into question.I C", 41 for "active negotiations" as signs that "some people in the West and in Tel Aviv" feel Egypt has weakened itself. Egypt is exhorted to turn down these "old proposals for direct negotiations and interim agreements." J - [The New Times article was only the opening shot. After Haykal and Al-Quddus again pub- lished critical editorials on 18 and 19 August, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official acknowledged in Cairo's willingness to make its case public .d public that Moscow was particularly embittered forced Moscow to react. And Soviet resentment 5 by Egypt's handling of the expulsion in the press. over the expulsion, and especially over criticism He observed that this press treatment could only of Soviet activities, boiled to the surface and will have the approval of the leadership in Cairo. J likely become more open. The Soviets had sought to avoid such exchanges which would harm their he Soviets, in addition, are certain to react fuel to world-wide speculation on their setback.] negatively if Sadat attempts to bypass Moscow in t t ettle e ce s d longer term interests in the Middle East and add rThe first direct rebuttal of Egyptian criti- cism, which had been balanced to some degree by appeals for continued Soviet-Arab friendship, came in the current issue of the weekly magazine New Times. It was apparently triggered by Egyptian editorials of 11 and 12 August which openly criticized Soviet behavior concerning Egypt. One was by Al-Ahram chief editor Haykal and the other by Akhbar al-Yawm chief editor Al-Quddus. In Soviet eyes they probably bore an official imprimatur. 3 LThe New Times article singles out Al-Quddus and charges him with anti-Soviet propaganda. It calls Egyptian claims of insufficient military aid "provocative" and sticks to Moscow's contention that Soviet military experts returned home with a` the thanks of the Egyptian leadership after com- pleting their jobs. 1 [The article also cites Golda Meir's appeal to Q, Sadat to meet as equals and Secretary Rogers' call a campaign o promo e a p his avowe ment. New Times, for instance, encouraged the Arabs to rely on "the friendly support of the socialist commonwealth" in frustrating "in- trigues like those by Meir and Rogers. Izvestiya ,~.aand Pravda on 21 and 23 August reflected par- ,)ticular concern about the Egyptian's turning to the US. Izvestiya, not surprisingly, blamed the US for most of the troubles in the Middle East over the past 20 years. ravda underscored US support for Israel, sayin showed "how illusory the 1 hopes of some Arab political leaders for 'mutual understanding' with the United States are." It warned that the Arab countries can achieve a fair peace only by relying on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. _3 These critical items in the Moscow press had been preceded by bitter comments made in pri- vate by Soviet diplomats in the Middle East. The US Embassy in Beirut states that Soviet Ambassa- dor Azimov and other Soviet officials were mak- ing remarks highly critical of the Egyptians. As undiplomatic as these references may be, they are probably honest expressions of Soviet vexation at the Egyptians. SECRET Page 1 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Law of the Sea BACK ON COURSE SECRET Eventual convocation of the long-planned Law of the Sea Conference now seems assured. The UN Seabeds Committee removed the main obstacle to the meeting last week by adopting a list of topics to be discussed. Early hopes that producing a conference agenda would be a simple matter foundered as the drafting got under way, and agreement was reached only after months of debate. The emer- gence of an agreed list is thus something of an achievement. It does nothing, however, to solve the prob- lems with which the Law of the Sea Conference must deal. There is, for example, a gathering of support for a 12-mile limit to territorial seas, but 1 + a number of countries persist in making greater claims. If this basic problem is settled, the eco- nomic rights of coastal states beyond their territo- rial seas must be debated. The related question of control over passage through straits falling within a 12-mile territorial sea would certainly become the subject of prolonged wrangling. There are also sharp differences over the type of international machinery that would be established to supervise the application of any agreements. The split on these issues is generally between developed and developing countries, but there is no unanimity in either group. Ultimately, each country will take a hard look at how its own economic and security interests would be affected. Despite these problems, there is some cautious optimism. The Seabeds Committee meet- ing was the most productive one so far, and there is a growing realization among the participants that accommodations must be made on a number of specific issues. Nevertheless, the tactics employed by the developing countries could cause difficulties if used at the Law of the Sea Conterence. They caucused in the so-called "Group of 56" and faced the developed countries with unified, rigid positions on several issues. Many observers believe that this procedure was designed primarily for negotiations on the agenda items and will not be used again. The Chinese delivered statements in the Sea- beds Committee meetings designed to place them on the side of the developing countries, but they did not seem able either to assume leadership of the developing countries or to exert any special influence on them. Part of the difficulty may be that Peking is still feeling its way on complex UN issues, such as law of the sea. Soviet repre- sentatives took pains to counter Chinese charges of superpower collaboration. Early in the session, Moscow's chief delegate told his US counterpart that he would have to reduce public signs of cooperation with Washington. The Soviets sub- sequently raised the colonialism issue for the first time in the Law of the Sea context and also demanded East German participation in the Law of the Sea Conference. The Soviets also offered a new straits proposal without consulting the US, thus backing off from a previous informal US- Soviet understanding to insist on the right of free passage through international straits. Moscow, nevertheless, says it remains interested in private cooperation with the US on these matters. The UN General Assembly, which convenes on 19 September, must approve the agenda and set the date for the conference itself. Preparatory work probably will not begin before late 1973, with consideration of substantive issues set back to early in 1974. In the meantime, the Seabeds Committee will continue to wrestle with the issues and to try its hand at draftin agreements on them. Page 2 SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 SECRE I NEW FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1 5 The Communists opened another battlefront this past week by capturing the strategic Que Son Valley in the coastal lowlands of Military Region J 1. Units of the North Vietnamese 711th Division orced government troops out of Fire Support i3 Base Ross and the district capital of Que Son) the I S loss of these two positions appears to have been due as much to poor local leadership as to any overwhelming Communist military superiority i~ LThe South Vietnamese have launched counter- attacks to recapture the two positions, but so far 13 the operation is moving slowly. I ) 2 Farther north, the Communists are strongly resisting South Vietnamese efforts to retake the 13 Quang Tri City area. The action is largely a slug- fest between heavy artillery; casualties are high, but little territory has changed hands Prisoners assert that North Vietnamese units in the area t S have no intention of abandoning Quang TO City in the near future. The heavy artillery and mortar barrages by the Communists during the past week-over 4,500 rounds on one day-also indi- cate that they have been able to keep supply lines 13 open to the Quang Tri City area. With the exception of the delta, action in the rest of the country was fairly light. Some fighting took place in Binh Dinh Province where government troops are trying to recapture the northern three districts. The movement of the Communist 2nd Division from the highlands to the Quang Ngai - Binh Dinh province border, probably to reinforce the 3rd Division, suggests that the Communists may soon offer stiffer re- sistance to the government's operation. 3 The delta continues to be the scene of the biggest battles in the southern half of the coun- try. Units and supplies continue to infiltrate from Cambodia into Base Area 470 in northwestern Dinh Tuong Province, and government efforts to stop this movement have produced numerous sharp engagements. Casualties to both sides have 12~ been high, but prisoners indicate the Communists will make a strong bid to gain and hold more territory in this area. Some sources claim that the Communists will try to cut Route 4, the main highway linking the delta and Saigon. If the road were cut for a long period of time, Saigon's major source of food would be disrupted and the psychological effects on the capital's population would be severe. -7 12 (In the southern delta, there are fresh indica- a tions that combat units from the Phuoc Long 0,3 Front will again attempt to infiltrate across the SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 A Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 The struggle goes on in Quang In City-Communist troops (above) and South Vietnamese Marines (below). 7-7 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 SECRET border, probably into their base camp in the U Minh Forest. (With government forces tied up in the fighting farther north, the Communists prob- ably see the time as ripe for action in the delta that would further disrupt pacification and chal- lenge government control. Bitter Words from Hanoi In the last week or so, Hanoi's propaganda has been caustic about Moscow and Peking. With- l out mentioning the Soviets or the Chinese by name, the North Vietnamese have made it clear that they are deeply disturbed by the current attitudes of their big allies. Hanoi's worry seems to center on the theme of "compromise." The burden of the propaganda is that through "unprincipled compromise" with the US, Moscow and Peking are betraying both the socialist revolution in general and the Viet- namese revolution in particular. Moreover, Hanoi's comments make it fairly clear that the North Vietnamese themselves have been under a good deal of pressure from their patrons to be less rigid on the question of a settlement4{ln Hanoi's convoluted language, the Vietnamese ommunists have been "pushing back terrible pressure...of all kinds of none-too-agreeable actions in one way or another exerted by tendencies of compromise from the outside." The propaganda takes a somewhat schizo- phrenic line when it discusses how Hanoi intends to react to this pressure. Some passages show a determination to persevere. "Our posture is very firm and can be reversed by nobody," asserts the party daily, adding, "We are ready to cope with all trials and will only advance, never retreat." But another section in the same editorial raises the specter of "times of regression" in the revolu- tion. "A revolutionary movement rarely or never develops along a straight path," it notes. The army newspaper, moreover, praises the Commu- nists' history of "flexibility" in their "revolu- tionary strategies. "'[The theme that the revolution is bound to have its ups and downs has not been emphasized since late 1968 and early 1969, when the Vietnamese Communists were preparing to alter their tactics in South Vietnam. , Chou En-lai greets Le Duc Tho: Hanoi's editorials were less friendly. IINorth Vietnamese propagandists make no attempt to resolve this apparent conflict. The rhetoric is clearly designed to convince Hanoi's audiences at home and abroad that the Vietnam- ese Communists remain capable, materially and morally, of carrying on the struggle, and of stand- ing up to their allies' pressure in the process-if they so choose.,; No Major Floods Yet LThe rainy season is now well along in North Vietnam, and the country has so far escaped extensive flooding. the flooding noted in SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 25X1 25X1 SECRET lowland areas north of Hai Duong in late July has spread to new areas along a 15-mile stretch of the Cao River. There has also been some flooding west of Hanoi in lowland areas between the primary dikes, but no significant damage is appar- ent. On the whole, the dikes themselves appear to be under little pressure. None of the flooding can be attributed to bomb damage..1 the rivers are no higher an normal or this time of year. Probably as a result of both the diminished flood threat and the regime's success in strengthening the dike system, Hanoi's news media have cut back their propa- ganda on the flood danger. Minesweepers at Haiphong Haiphong harbor reveals the presence of four vessels appar- ently equipped for minesweeping. At least three of the ships entered the harbor in late July, but the presence of the others before mid-August cannot be confirmed. The largest ship is the only known unit of the 136-foot long Chinese Woo-sung class of minesweeper. The three smaller craft-about 93 feet long-are of a type not previously identified in the Chinese or Soviet naval inventories, al- though they bear a superficial resemblance to a Soviet diving tender. The mooring of these ships adjacent to Chinese merchantmen suggests that China has supplied all of them. the Woo-sung weep moored contact, acous ic, and possibly magnetic mines, but it is not a modern or advanced minesweeper. The effectiveness of these four ships against so- phisticated types of acoustic and magnetic mines is almost certainly limited. Saigon Publishers Protest Press Decree f .Some elements of the Saigon press are pro- testing the government's new press decree, but they have been unable to get the measure changed, and it seems unlikely that they will be able to keep the issue alive for long. A group of publishers staged a two-day strike this week, but not all of Saigon's papers joined the actiony land the publishers reportedly have decided to aban- don their efforts soon if they cannot get results. Some of the larger papers may actually benefit from the decree~Its provision requiring publishers Lto put up large deposits by early next month to cover future fines is expected to force many of the smaller and poorer papers out of business. IThe government does not regard the protests as n Uch of a threat, and President Thieu has indicated he has no intention of compromising. Thieu has said that he does not want to see "responsible" opposition papers go out of business and that he has offered government- sponsored loans to publishers of two independent journals to enable them to raise the money needed for the deposit. I Military action during the week was focused on government efforts to break the Communists' hold on several key highways. In the southeast, Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces op- erating along Route 1 finally managed to link up with the five government battalions that had been pinned down on the outskirts of Kompong Trabek since they were driven out of that town on 6 August. These combined forces apparently will now try to recapture Kompong Trabek. SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY is equipped to Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 o r- rt l 1 N., - - bang Province. The Communist offensive along Route 5 could not have come at a worse time. The government was already concerned about rice supplies for the capital for the balance of the year. The minister of commerce has reported that rice supplies in Battambang, intended for ship- ment to the capital, are sufficient for two months only and that the capital faces a rice shortage in mid-October. The government is now seeking increased rice imports from the US, Japan, and Thailand.] 2 The supply and price of rice are sensitive political issues in Phnom Penh, and government officials have long been aware that the city's stocks would not last until the next harvest is gathered late this year. The government may have delayed on this potentially serious problem to forestall the hoarding and price increases that accompany public awareness of shortages. ), 1 The improved situation along Route 1 may be more than offset by what is shaping up as the first sustained Communist offensive against Route 5 in the northwest. Heavy attacks by predomi- nantly Khmer Communist troops have closed a 14-mile stretch of that vital road near the border of Pursat and Kompong Chhnang provinces. A government relief column from the town of Pursat retook one Cambodian outpost that had fallen on 18 August. Other reinforcements from Kompong Chhnang City were stalled by sharp resistance, however, shortly after they began moving up Route 5 to try to regain control of two other positions. The Communists reportedly are also receiving reinforcements-indicating that more fighting is in prospect. C Phnom Penh can ill-afford any prolonged closure of Route 5 because most of the capital's rice supply moves over this highway from Battam- SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 0 Government-held location Communist-held location Irregular task force 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 %NW StUKt I NW-W LAOS: TOWARD THE PLAINE tAs Vang Pao's offensive to recapture the Plaine des Jarres entered its second week, his irregular forces were still poised on three sides of the Plaine, but had made little progress on the Plaine itself. One three-battalion irregular task force that landed near Than Heup on 14 August is now patroling on the western edge of the Plaine, but a second force moving from the southeast is awaiting better weather and air support before trying to dislodge Communist troops dug in on a ridge at the Plaine's edge. 3 ,QA the aftermath o a Philippine Supreme Court ruling last weekhe court decided that the rights to land and bu ess interests acquired by Ameri- 1-can citizens and corporations under a 1946 amendment to the Philippine constitution will expire along with the amendment on 3 July 1974. Although the legal niceties of the decision are still being sorted out, local politicians are delighted to have new fuel to stoke the fires of nationalism, an always useful political issue.) The court decision is so vaguely worded that 3t is uncertain how much of the total American investment of over $1 billion will be affected. Some $53 million in private land holdings and about $276 million in other investments are clearly included and, depending on how the gov- ernment ultimately chooses to interpret the ruling, a good part of the remainder may also be involved. Prior to the decision, many US business- men had hoped that most rights acquired under the amendment could be retained and that its expiration would preclude only future acquisi- tions.] The Supreme Court did not address itself to 'yyihe particulars of the timing and procedures for the dissolution of American rights. The majority floor leader of the Philippine Senate believes that congress should decide, and he is introducing a bill which calls for the reversion of the affected property to the Philippine Government. Since Manila is in the process of drafting a new con- stitution, however, the whole issue of the future of US rights will probably be resolved by the constitutional convention.) 3 [President Marcos controls the convention -and can pretty much dictate its final decisions. He is currently engaged in a campaign to retain power beyond the expiration of his present term and he, like others, has found that talking tough to the Americans is very popular with his con- Vang Pao, meanwhile, has sent additional troops to the north. Three irregular battalions were airlifted on 21 August to a landing zone near Phou Keng, a hill overlooking the Plaine on the northwest. On 22 August another task force be- gan moving south from Bouam Long, an isolated government outpost north of Communist supply routes. These new pressure points-like those established to the west and south of the Plaine- presumably are intended to force the North Viet- namese to divert units from southwest of the Plaine. Wang Pao now has committed more than 6,000 indigenous tribesmen to this offensive. In addition, elements of the 4,000-man irregular task force that has been operating east of Sam Thong since May are advancing toward Communist de- fensive positions in the hills southwest of the Plaine. 1 Changing of the Guard in South Laos The initial phase of the government's rainy season offensive in south Laos ended on 15 August. The eight irregular battalions that had spearheaded the recapture of Khong Sedone and its surrounding villages have been withdrawn to Sav i f r r t and retrain- ing. PHILIPPINES: THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY Y3 tUS business interests in the Philippines are more than ever hostage to Philippine politics in Page 8 stituents. He can be expected to use the now- precarious position of American business interests as a bargaining lever for more favorable treatment in the renegotiation of trade and economic agree- ments with the US. SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 ,.. SEUKE I 3 SINGAPORE: TO THE POLLS [Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew should have no trouble gaining a thumping majority in parlia- ment when his disciplined constituents vote next month. Taking advantage of the generally quiet situation he faces at home and abroad, Lee has decided to call elections some six months before the legal deadline. US-Australia in case the Labor Party wins and withdraws Canberra from the Five-Power Defense Arrangement on Singapore/Malaysia, and the US for fear that election politics force hasty changes in established Asian economic or military arrange- ments. He also wants to be able to come to terms with China quickly, if he must. of members to parliament. ever, that these diverse elements will be able to cooperate sufficiently to elect more than a couple Domestically, Lee has less cause for concern. There is a small, though steadily increasing, cur- rent of dissent, largely among workers who are annoyed that the government holds down wages in a time of prosperity and who believe that the English-educated ruling elite does not speak for the Chinese-educated poor. There is disaffection in intdllectual circles with Lee's autocratic rule, despite general approval of Singapore's progress under his regime. There seems little chance, how- 25X1 Singapore's numerous but sickly opposition parties sensed that he might do this and have been trying to coordinate their assault on the govern- ment's parliamentary monopoly. Thus far, how- ever, only four of the 14 registered parties have managed to decide on candidates or agree on which party will contest which seat. Although Lee himself has forecast that his opponents might win as much as 30 percent of the vote, he is determined that they win no parliamentary seats. Lee's major reason for calling elections now i based on international developments. He wants to reinforce his hand at home in case he must take decisive action in the foreign policy field. Lee, for example, is keeping a wary eye on up- coming general elections in both Australia and the SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 SECRET ~lThe subversion trials which ran from 17 July to 1 August have ended, and legal proceedings against dissidents still in jail have evidently been suspended. The end was signaled on 16 August when the party daily, Rude Pravo, ran summaries of the cases of the 46 persons who received punishment ranging from one year suspended sentences to six and one-half years imprisonment. President Svoboda also waived prosecution of a group of ten young Czechoslovoks accused of helping the last major defendant. 3 Many of those convicted were well known inte ectuals or former party officials, and all had been supporters of Alexander Dubcek. They had refused to stop political activity even after warn- ings from the security police, and the regime finally decided to move against them even at the cost of adverse publicity. i LThe convicted were accused of "attacks against the basic principles of our state and social system." Czechoslovak laws on subversion, like those of other Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, are particularly open to wide interpretation and application. The specific "crimes" involved were preparing a small action program, gathering in "conspiratorial meetings," distributing illegal printed matter, and keeping in .,touch with those who fled when the Russians came. Unfavorable Western publicity proved quite embarrassing, and Prague dwelt at great length on the legality of the trials, even to the extent of calling upon Soviet and East European propa- ganda media for support. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 SECRE I USSR - Eastern Europe AUTO PRODUCTION ROLLS ALONG The rapid development of the USSR's auto- motive industry stems not only from the expan- sion and modernization of its own production capacity, but also from the use of plants in East- ern Europe as specialized suppliers of parts and subassemblies. The Eastern European countries are cooperating among themselves to a growing degree in the exchange of parts and finished vehicles. The CEMA Bank for Economic Coopera- tion is offering credits to member countries to finance new or expanded manufacturing capacity geared toward greater specialization. Planners in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are striving to achieve self-sufficiency for the bloc in the manufacture of cars, trucks, and buses. The USSR began large-scale importing of automotive parts from Eastern Europe in 1970 when Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia started shipping parts and com- ponents to the Volga Automobile Plant at Tolyatti for the Fiat passenger car. Moscow also began to import East European technology and components for trucks and buses, while paying the supplying countries in finished automobiles. The scope of cooperative automotive pro- duction arrangements between the USSR and Eastern Europe will be expanded substantially when the Soviet Union's Kama truck plant be- comes operational. The complex, which will be the world's largest when completed in 1975, will Fiat-designed auto being built at Tolyatti, USSR. rely extensively on plants in Eastern Europe for parts and components to be used in the assembly of heavy diesel trucks. Hungary, for example, may manufacture more than a dozen parts and subassemblies. A plant to build larger trucks, which is proposed for construction in the late 1970s, also will rely heavily on Eastern Europe for parts. This plant would be a cooperative ef- fort, with 40 percent of output going to Eastern Europe. "Plans to increase cooperation in automotive production are designed to afford East European plants the benefits of economies of scale in pro- duction while enabling Soviet industry toecon- omize on labor and investment in plant and technology. Partly because of this larger scale of production, both Eastern Europe and the USSR will be increasingly dependent on the West for expertise in engineerin and in production process and equipment. Soviet artist's concept of Volga Automobile Plant. SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0 SEUKE I www YUGOSLAVIA: COUNTERING THE EMIGRES q 4))