WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
30
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 19, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 25, 1972
Content Type:
SUMMARY
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0.pdf | 3.91 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
V-' Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
25 August 1972
No. 0384/72
Copy No 50
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
CONTENTS (25 August 1972)
1 USSR-Egypt: Dirty Linen
2 Law of the Sea: Back on Course
3 Indochina
8 Philippines: Politics of Property
9 Singapore: To the Polls
25X6
10 Czechoslovak Trials End
11 USSR - Eastern Europe: Autos
12 Yugoslavia: Countering the Emigres
13 USSR: Stemming an Exodus
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
15 Morocco: I n the Eye of
the Storm
16 Persian Gulf: New Friends
16 Burundi: A Long Way To Go
17 Somalia: Siad Tightens Grip
18 Yemen (Aden): Ali vs. Ismail
19 Sri Lanka: Land Reform, Labor
Unrest
19 Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks
20 Oil Talks Progress
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Honduras: More Ferment
21 Argentina: Time of Trouble
22 Ecuador: First Half-Year
22 Costa Rica: Common Market
23 Chile: Economics Makes Politics
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
SECRET
USSR-EGYPT: DIRTY LINEN
p 1As the removal of Soviet military personnel
and equipment appears to be coming to an end,
so do the efforts in both Moscow and Cairo to
avoid public recriminations over the expulsions.
The effort in Cairo, never very strong, seems to
have cracked first with a series of articles in
leading publications which rather specifically
called Soviet good faith into question.I
C", 41
for "active negotiations" as signs that "some
people in the West and in Tel Aviv" feel Egypt
has weakened itself. Egypt is exhorted to turn
down these "old proposals for direct negotiations
and interim agreements." J
- [The New Times article was only the opening
shot. After Haykal and Al-Quddus again pub-
lished critical editorials on 18 and 19 August, a
Soviet Foreign Ministry official acknowledged in
Cairo's willingness to make its case public .d public that Moscow was particularly embittered
forced Moscow to react. And Soviet resentment 5 by Egypt's handling of the expulsion in the press.
over the expulsion, and especially over criticism He observed that this press treatment could only
of Soviet activities, boiled to the surface and will have the approval of the leadership in Cairo. J
likely become more open. The Soviets had sought
to avoid such exchanges which would harm their
he Soviets, in addition, are certain to react
fuel to world-wide speculation on their setback.] negatively if Sadat attempts to bypass Moscow in
t t ettle
e
ce s
d
longer term interests in the Middle East and add
rThe first direct rebuttal of Egyptian criti-
cism, which had been balanced to some degree by
appeals for continued Soviet-Arab friendship,
came in the current issue of the weekly magazine
New Times. It was apparently triggered by
Egyptian editorials of 11 and 12 August which
openly criticized Soviet behavior concerning
Egypt. One was by Al-Ahram chief editor Haykal
and the other by Akhbar al-Yawm chief editor
Al-Quddus. In Soviet eyes they probably bore an
official imprimatur. 3
LThe New Times article singles out Al-Quddus
and charges him with anti-Soviet propaganda. It
calls Egyptian claims of insufficient military aid
"provocative" and sticks to Moscow's contention
that Soviet military experts returned home with
a` the thanks of the Egyptian leadership after com-
pleting their jobs.
1 [The article also cites Golda Meir's appeal to
Q, Sadat to meet as equals and Secretary Rogers' call
a
campaign o promo e a p
his avowe
ment. New Times, for instance, encouraged the
Arabs to rely on "the friendly support of the
socialist commonwealth" in frustrating "in-
trigues like those by Meir and Rogers. Izvestiya
,~.aand Pravda on 21 and 23 August reflected par-
,)ticular concern about the Egyptian's turning to
the US. Izvestiya, not surprisingly, blamed the US
for most of the troubles in the Middle East over
the past 20 years. ravda underscored US support
for Israel, sayin showed "how illusory the
1 hopes of some Arab political leaders for 'mutual
understanding' with the United States are." It
warned that the Arab countries can achieve a fair
peace only by relying on the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries. _3
These critical items in the Moscow press had
been preceded by bitter comments made in pri-
vate by Soviet diplomats in the Middle East. The
US Embassy in Beirut states that Soviet Ambassa-
dor Azimov and other Soviet officials were mak-
ing remarks highly critical of the Egyptians. As
undiplomatic as these references may be, they are
probably honest expressions of Soviet vexation at
the Egyptians.
SECRET
Page 1
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Law of the Sea
BACK ON COURSE
SECRET
Eventual convocation of the long-planned
Law of the Sea Conference now seems assured.
The UN Seabeds Committee removed the main
obstacle to the meeting last week by adopting a
list of topics to be discussed.
Early hopes that producing a conference
agenda would be a simple matter foundered as the
drafting got under way, and agreement was
reached only after months of debate. The emer-
gence of an agreed list is thus something of an
achievement.
It does nothing, however, to solve the prob-
lems with which the Law of the Sea Conference
must deal. There is, for example, a gathering of
support for a 12-mile limit to territorial seas, but
1 + a number of countries persist in making greater
claims. If this basic problem is settled, the eco-
nomic rights of coastal states beyond their territo-
rial seas must be debated. The related question of
control over passage through straits falling within
a 12-mile territorial sea would certainly become
the subject of prolonged wrangling. There are also
sharp differences over the type of international
machinery that would be established to supervise
the application of any agreements. The split on
these issues is generally between developed and
developing countries, but there is no unanimity in
either group. Ultimately, each country will take a
hard look at how its own economic and security
interests would be affected.
Despite these problems, there is some
cautious optimism. The Seabeds Committee meet-
ing was the most productive one so far, and there
is a growing realization among the participants
that accommodations must be made on a number
of specific issues. Nevertheless, the tactics
employed by the developing countries could
cause difficulties if used at the Law of the Sea
Conterence. They caucused in the so-called
"Group of 56" and faced the developed countries
with unified, rigid positions on several issues.
Many observers believe that this procedure was
designed primarily for negotiations on the agenda
items and will not be used again.
The Chinese delivered statements in the Sea-
beds Committee meetings designed to place them
on the side of the developing countries, but they
did not seem able either to assume leadership of
the developing countries or to exert any special
influence on them. Part of the difficulty may be
that Peking is still feeling its way on complex UN
issues, such as law of the sea. Soviet repre-
sentatives took pains to counter Chinese charges
of superpower collaboration. Early in the session,
Moscow's chief delegate told his US counterpart
that he would have to reduce public signs of
cooperation with Washington. The Soviets sub-
sequently raised the colonialism issue for the first
time in the Law of the Sea context and also
demanded East German participation in the Law
of the Sea Conference. The Soviets also offered a
new straits proposal without consulting the US,
thus backing off from a previous informal US-
Soviet understanding to insist on the right of free
passage through international straits. Moscow,
nevertheless, says it remains interested in private
cooperation with the US on these matters.
The UN General Assembly, which convenes
on 19 September, must approve the agenda and
set the date for the conference itself. Preparatory
work probably will not begin before late 1973,
with consideration of substantive issues set back
to early in 1974. In the meantime, the Seabeds
Committee will continue to wrestle with the
issues and to try its hand at draftin agreements
on them.
Page 2
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
SECRE I
NEW FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1 5 The Communists opened another battlefront
this past week by capturing the strategic Que Son
Valley in the coastal lowlands of Military Region J
1. Units of the North Vietnamese 711th Division
orced government troops out of Fire Support
i3 Base Ross and the district capital of Que Son) the
I S loss of these two positions appears to have been
due as much to poor local leadership as to any
overwhelming Communist military superiority
i~ LThe South Vietnamese have launched counter-
attacks to recapture the two positions, but so far
13 the operation is moving slowly. I
) 2 Farther north, the Communists are strongly
resisting South Vietnamese efforts to retake the
13 Quang Tri City area. The action is largely a slug-
fest between heavy artillery; casualties are high,
but little territory has changed hands Prisoners
assert that North Vietnamese units in the area
t S have no intention of abandoning Quang TO City
in the near future. The heavy artillery and mortar
barrages by the Communists during the past
week-over 4,500 rounds on one day-also indi-
cate that they have been able to keep supply lines
13
open to the Quang Tri City area.
With the exception of the delta, action in
the rest of the country was fairly light. Some
fighting took place in Binh Dinh Province where
government troops are trying to recapture the
northern three districts. The movement of the
Communist 2nd Division from the highlands to
the Quang Ngai - Binh Dinh province border,
probably to reinforce the 3rd Division, suggests
that the Communists may soon offer stiffer re-
sistance to the government's operation. 3
The delta continues to be the scene of the
biggest battles in the southern half of the coun-
try. Units and supplies continue to infiltrate from
Cambodia into Base Area 470 in northwestern
Dinh Tuong Province, and government efforts to
stop this movement have produced numerous
sharp engagements. Casualties to both sides have
12~ been high, but prisoners indicate the Communists
will make a strong bid to gain and hold more
territory in this area. Some sources claim that the
Communists will try to cut Route 4, the main
highway linking the delta and Saigon. If the road
were cut for a long period of time, Saigon's major
source of food would be disrupted and the
psychological effects on the capital's population
would be severe. -7
12 (In the southern delta, there are fresh indica-
a tions that combat units from the Phuoc Long
0,3 Front will again attempt to infiltrate across the
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
A
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
The struggle goes on in Quang In City-Communist troops (above) and South Vietnamese Marines (below).
7-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
SECRET
border, probably into their base camp in the U
Minh Forest. (With government forces tied up in
the fighting farther north, the Communists prob-
ably see the time as ripe for action in the delta
that would further disrupt pacification and chal-
lenge government control.
Bitter Words from Hanoi
In the last week or so, Hanoi's propaganda
has been caustic about Moscow and Peking. With-
l out mentioning the Soviets or the Chinese by
name, the North Vietnamese have made it clear
that they are deeply disturbed by the current
attitudes of their big allies.
Hanoi's worry seems to center on the theme
of "compromise." The burden of the propaganda
is that through "unprincipled compromise" with
the US, Moscow and Peking are betraying both
the socialist revolution in general and the Viet-
namese revolution in particular. Moreover,
Hanoi's comments make it fairly clear that the
North Vietnamese themselves have been under a
good deal of pressure from their patrons to be less
rigid on the question of a settlement4{ln Hanoi's
convoluted language, the Vietnamese ommunists
have been "pushing back terrible pressure...of all
kinds of none-too-agreeable actions in one way or
another exerted by tendencies of compromise
from the outside."
The propaganda takes a somewhat schizo-
phrenic line when it discusses how Hanoi intends
to react to this pressure. Some passages show a
determination to persevere. "Our posture is very
firm and can be reversed by nobody," asserts the
party daily, adding, "We are ready to cope with
all trials and will only advance, never retreat."
But another section in the same editorial raises
the specter of "times of regression" in the revolu-
tion. "A revolutionary movement rarely or never
develops along a straight path," it notes. The
army newspaper, moreover, praises the Commu-
nists' history of "flexibility" in their "revolu-
tionary strategies. "'[The theme that the revolution
is bound to have its ups and downs has not been
emphasized since late 1968 and early 1969, when
the Vietnamese Communists were preparing to
alter their tactics in South Vietnam. ,
Chou En-lai greets Le Duc Tho:
Hanoi's editorials were less friendly.
IINorth Vietnamese propagandists make no
attempt to resolve this apparent conflict. The
rhetoric is clearly designed to convince Hanoi's
audiences at home and abroad that the Vietnam-
ese Communists remain capable, materially and
morally, of carrying on the struggle, and of stand-
ing up to their allies' pressure in the process-if
they so choose.,;
No Major Floods Yet
LThe rainy season is now well along in North
Vietnam, and the country has so far escaped
extensive flooding.
the flooding noted in
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
25X1
25X1
SECRET
lowland areas north of Hai Duong in late July has
spread to new areas along a 15-mile stretch of the
Cao River. There has also been some flooding
west of Hanoi in lowland areas between the
primary dikes, but no significant damage is appar-
ent. On the whole, the dikes themselves appear to
be under little pressure. None of the flooding can
be attributed to bomb damage..1
the rivers are no higher
an normal or this time of year. Probably as a
result of both the diminished flood threat and the
regime's success in strengthening the dike system,
Hanoi's news media have cut back their propa-
ganda on the flood danger.
Minesweepers at Haiphong
Haiphong
harbor reveals the presence of four vessels appar-
ently equipped for minesweeping. At least three
of the ships entered the harbor in late July, but
the presence of the others before mid-August
cannot be confirmed.
The largest ship is the only known unit of
the 136-foot long Chinese Woo-sung class of
minesweeper. The three smaller craft-about 93
feet long-are of a type not previously identified
in the Chinese or Soviet naval inventories, al-
though they bear a superficial resemblance to a
Soviet diving tender. The mooring of these ships
adjacent to Chinese merchantmen suggests that
China has supplied all of them.
the Woo-sung
weep moored
contact, acous ic, and possibly magnetic mines,
but it is not a modern or advanced minesweeper.
The effectiveness of these four ships against so-
phisticated types of acoustic and magnetic mines
is almost certainly limited.
Saigon Publishers Protest Press Decree
f .Some elements of the Saigon press are pro-
testing the government's new press decree, but
they have been unable to get the measure
changed, and it seems unlikely that they will be
able to keep the issue alive for long. A group of
publishers staged a two-day strike this week, but
not all of Saigon's papers joined the actiony land
the publishers reportedly have decided to aban-
don their efforts soon if they cannot get results.
Some of the larger papers may actually benefit
from the decree~Its provision requiring publishers
Lto put up large deposits by early next month to
cover future fines is expected to force many of
the smaller and poorer papers out of business.
IThe government does not regard the protests
as n Uch of a threat, and President Thieu has
indicated he has no intention of compromising.
Thieu has said that he does not want to see
"responsible" opposition papers go out of
business and that he has offered government-
sponsored loans to publishers of two independent
journals to enable them to raise the money
needed for the deposit.
I Military action during the week was focused
on government efforts to break the Communists'
hold on several key highways. In the southeast,
Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces op-
erating along Route 1 finally managed to link up
with the five government battalions that had been
pinned down on the outskirts of Kompong
Trabek since they were driven out of that town
on 6 August. These combined forces apparently
will now try to recapture Kompong Trabek.
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
is equipped to
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
o r- rt l 1 N.,
- - bang Province. The Communist offensive along
Route 5 could not have come at a worse time.
The government was already concerned about rice
supplies for the capital for the balance of the
year. The minister of commerce has reported that
rice supplies in Battambang, intended for ship-
ment to the capital, are sufficient for two months
only and that the capital faces a rice shortage in
mid-October. The government is now seeking
increased rice imports from the US, Japan, and
Thailand.]
2 The supply and price of rice are sensitive
political issues in Phnom Penh, and government
officials have long been aware that the city's
stocks would not last until the next harvest is
gathered late this year. The government may have
delayed on this potentially serious problem to
forestall the hoarding and price increases that
accompany public awareness of shortages. ),
1 The improved situation along Route 1 may
be more than offset by what is shaping up as the
first sustained Communist offensive against Route
5 in the northwest. Heavy attacks by predomi-
nantly Khmer Communist troops have closed a
14-mile stretch of that vital road near the border
of Pursat and Kompong Chhnang provinces. A
government relief column from the town of
Pursat retook one Cambodian outpost that had
fallen on 18 August. Other reinforcements from
Kompong Chhnang City were stalled by sharp
resistance, however, shortly after they began
moving up Route 5 to try to regain control of
two other positions. The Communists reportedly
are also receiving reinforcements-indicating that
more fighting is in prospect.
C Phnom Penh can ill-afford any prolonged
closure of Route 5 because most of the capital's
rice supply moves over this highway from Battam-
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
0 Government-held location
Communist-held location
Irregular task force
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
%NW StUKt I NW-W
LAOS: TOWARD THE PLAINE
tAs Vang Pao's offensive to recapture the
Plaine des Jarres entered its second week, his
irregular forces were still poised on three sides of
the Plaine, but had made little progress on the
Plaine itself. One three-battalion irregular task
force that landed near Than Heup on 14 August is
now patroling on the western edge of the Plaine,
but a second force moving from the southeast is
awaiting better weather and air support before
trying to dislodge Communist troops dug in on a
ridge at the Plaine's edge. 3
,QA
the aftermath o a Philippine Supreme Court
ruling last weekhe court decided that the rights
to land and bu ess interests acquired by Ameri-
1-can citizens and corporations under a 1946
amendment to the Philippine constitution will
expire along with the amendment on 3 July 1974.
Although the legal niceties of the decision are still
being sorted out, local politicians are delighted to
have new fuel to stoke the fires of nationalism, an
always useful political issue.)
The court decision is so vaguely worded that
3t is uncertain how much of the total American
investment of over $1 billion will be affected.
Some $53 million in private land holdings and
about $276 million in other investments are
clearly included and, depending on how the gov-
ernment ultimately chooses to interpret the
ruling, a good part of the remainder may also be
involved. Prior to the decision, many US business-
men had hoped that most rights acquired under
the amendment could be retained and that its
expiration would preclude only future acquisi-
tions.]
The Supreme Court did not address itself to
'yyihe particulars of the timing and procedures for
the dissolution of American rights. The majority
floor leader of the Philippine Senate believes that
congress should decide, and he is introducing a
bill which calls for the reversion of the affected
property to the Philippine Government. Since
Manila is in the process of drafting a new con-
stitution, however, the whole issue of the future
of US rights will probably be resolved by the
constitutional convention.)
3 [President Marcos controls the convention
-and can pretty much dictate its final decisions. He
is currently engaged in a campaign to retain
power beyond the expiration of his present term
and he, like others, has found that talking tough
to the Americans is very popular with his con-
Vang Pao, meanwhile, has sent additional
troops to the north. Three irregular battalions
were airlifted on 21 August to a landing zone near
Phou Keng, a hill overlooking the Plaine on the
northwest. On 22 August another task force be-
gan moving south from Bouam Long, an isolated
government outpost north of Communist supply
routes. These new pressure points-like those
established to the west and south of the Plaine-
presumably are intended to force the North Viet-
namese to divert units from southwest of the
Plaine.
Wang Pao now has committed more than
6,000 indigenous tribesmen to this offensive. In
addition, elements of the 4,000-man irregular task
force that has been operating east of Sam Thong
since May are advancing toward Communist de-
fensive positions in the hills southwest of the
Plaine. 1
Changing of the Guard in South Laos
The initial phase of the government's rainy
season offensive in south Laos ended on 15
August. The eight irregular battalions that had
spearheaded the recapture of Khong Sedone and
its surrounding villages have been withdrawn to
Sav i f r r t and retrain-
ing.
PHILIPPINES: THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY
Y3 tUS business interests in the Philippines are
more than ever hostage to Philippine politics in
Page 8
stituents. He can be expected to use the now-
precarious position of American business interests
as a bargaining lever for more favorable treatment
in the renegotiation of trade and economic agree-
ments with the US.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
,.. SEUKE I
3
SINGAPORE: TO THE POLLS
[Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew should have
no trouble gaining a thumping majority in parlia-
ment when his disciplined constituents vote next
month. Taking advantage of the generally quiet
situation he faces at home and abroad, Lee has
decided to call elections some six months before
the legal deadline.
US-Australia in case the Labor Party wins and
withdraws Canberra from the Five-Power Defense
Arrangement on Singapore/Malaysia, and the US
for fear that election politics force hasty changes
in established Asian economic or military arrange-
ments. He also wants to be able to come to terms
with China quickly, if he must.
of members to parliament.
ever, that these diverse elements will be able to
cooperate sufficiently to elect more than a couple
Domestically, Lee has less cause for concern.
There is a small, though steadily increasing, cur-
rent of dissent, largely among workers who are
annoyed that the government holds down wages
in a time of prosperity and who believe that the
English-educated ruling elite does not speak for
the Chinese-educated poor. There is disaffection
in intdllectual circles with Lee's autocratic rule,
despite general approval of Singapore's progress
under his regime. There seems little chance, how- 25X1
Singapore's numerous but sickly opposition
parties sensed that he might do this and have been
trying to coordinate their assault on the govern-
ment's parliamentary monopoly. Thus far, how-
ever, only four of the 14 registered parties have
managed to decide on candidates or agree on
which party will contest which seat. Although
Lee himself has forecast that his opponents might
win as much as 30 percent of the vote, he is
determined that they win no parliamentary seats.
Lee's major reason for calling elections now
i based on international developments. He wants
to reinforce his hand at home in case he must
take decisive action in the foreign policy field.
Lee, for example, is keeping a wary eye on up-
coming general elections in both Australia and the
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
SECRET
~lThe subversion trials which ran from 17 July
to 1 August have ended, and legal proceedings
against dissidents still in jail have evidently been
suspended. The end was signaled on 16 August
when the party daily, Rude Pravo, ran summaries
of the cases of the 46 persons who received
punishment ranging from one year suspended
sentences to six and one-half years imprisonment.
President Svoboda also waived prosecution of a
group of ten young Czechoslovoks accused of
helping the last major defendant. 3
Many of those convicted were well known
inte ectuals or former party officials, and all had
been supporters of Alexander Dubcek. They had
refused to stop political activity even after warn-
ings from the security police, and the regime
finally decided to move against them even at the
cost of adverse publicity. i
LThe convicted were accused of "attacks
against the basic principles of our state and social
system." Czechoslovak laws on subversion, like
those of other Eastern European countries and
the Soviet Union, are particularly open to wide
interpretation and application. The specific
"crimes" involved were preparing a small action
program, gathering in "conspiratorial meetings,"
distributing illegal printed matter, and keeping in
.,touch with those who fled when the Russians
came. Unfavorable Western publicity proved quite
embarrassing, and Prague dwelt at great length on
the legality of the trials, even to the extent of
calling upon Soviet and East European propa-
ganda media for support.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO09700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
SECRE I
USSR - Eastern Europe
AUTO PRODUCTION ROLLS ALONG
The rapid development of the USSR's auto-
motive industry stems not only from the expan-
sion and modernization of its own production
capacity, but also from the use of plants in East-
ern Europe as specialized suppliers of parts and
subassemblies. The Eastern European countries
are cooperating among themselves to a growing
degree in the exchange of parts and finished
vehicles. The CEMA Bank for Economic Coopera-
tion is offering credits to member countries to
finance new or expanded manufacturing capacity
geared toward greater specialization. Planners in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are striving
to achieve self-sufficiency for the bloc in the
manufacture of cars, trucks, and buses.
The USSR began large-scale importing of
automotive parts from Eastern Europe in 1970
when Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and Yugoslavia started shipping parts and com-
ponents to the Volga Automobile Plant at
Tolyatti for the Fiat passenger car. Moscow also
began to import East European technology and
components for trucks and buses, while paying
the supplying countries in finished automobiles.
The scope of cooperative automotive pro-
duction arrangements between the USSR and
Eastern Europe will be expanded substantially
when the Soviet Union's Kama truck plant be-
comes operational. The complex, which will be
the world's largest when completed in 1975, will
Fiat-designed auto being built at Tolyatti, USSR.
rely extensively on plants in Eastern Europe for
parts and components to be used in the assembly
of heavy diesel trucks. Hungary, for example,
may manufacture more than a dozen parts and
subassemblies. A plant to build larger trucks,
which is proposed for construction in the late
1970s, also will rely heavily on Eastern Europe
for parts. This plant would be a cooperative ef-
fort, with 40 percent of output going to Eastern
Europe.
"Plans to increase cooperation in automotive
production are designed to afford East European
plants the benefits of economies of scale in pro-
duction while enabling Soviet industry toecon-
omize on labor and investment in plant and
technology. Partly because of this larger scale of
production, both Eastern Europe and the USSR
will be increasingly dependent on the West for
expertise in engineerin and in production process
and equipment.
Soviet artist's concept of Volga Automobile Plant.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Aug 72
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A009700070001-0
SEUKE I www
YUGOSLAVIA: COUNTERING THE EMIGRES
q
4))