WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009800020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 47
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
1.5 September 1972
No. 0387/72
Copy N! 47
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of Current Intellioenca,. re nits and analyzes signif-
WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morninn by
developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
aptly includes malaria' coordinated with or prepared
requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
of Economir Researcrh. the Office of Strategic"
arch? and the Directorate of Science and Tectenology,
published separately as Special Rar,orts are listeel in the
jr,,, WEEKLY SUMMARY contains rL csified information
i the national security of the United States within
ended. its transmission or revelation of its con-
or receipt by an unauthorized oe>rson is prohibited by
1. After Munich
5 Japan: The US Base Syndrome
6 Indochina
10 Japan Looks Outward: Korea: i-hsna
I I 1 -he Dragon Spreads Its Wings
12 Disarmament: Hopeful Atrnosphericc
12 Trade Control Talks Resume
13 UK: Unions Lean Leftward
1a Report on the Soviet Harvest
3 France: L_.inhtning on the Left
Yugoslavia- Tit,) Talks -Tn. -l
1.8 Sierra Leone: One-Party Rule
1.9 7amhia: Kaunda Flays Critics
19 Tanzania: Socialism Revisited
20 lJganda: Economic Decline
WEST[- RN
HEMISPHERE
1 nanarna: A Little Drama
22 Bahamas: Election Coming Lip
2-' Mexico: Violence Threatens
23 Chile: Allende's Headache
24 Argentina: A New Mood
SPECIAL
REPORTS
A The 27th UN General Asserrihly
s The Communist Economic Courtship
of Latin America
no of "'title 15 sections 793 and 794, of the US
CONTENTS (15 September 1972)
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6EUKt I -love
AFTER MUNICH
LIsrael's strikes at Arab terrorist bases three
days after the Munich killings are probably only
the beginning of an intensified Israeli effort to
eradicate the fedayeen as an effective threat. No
major ground action by Israeli forces into feda-
yeen sanctuaries has yet occurred, but this re-
mains a definite possibility, given the obvious
intention of the fedayeen to keep the pressure on
Israel and focus international attention on the
Palestinian cause. f
'In wide-ranging air attacks, one almost
reaching the Turkish border, Israeli aircraft on 8
September hit a total of 11 targets, three in
Lebanon and eight in Syria. Israeli officials said
the sites were all fedayeen installations-head-
quarters, guerrilla concentrations, training camps,
storage areas, and new fedayeen marine bases.
The extent of the damage and casualties is not
certain, but some 80 aircraft took part, and the
Israelis estimate they killed or wounded 100-200
persons. Some of the casualties were civilians,
which, the Israelis claim, is unavoidable because
the fedayeen place their installations inside or
near Palestinian refugee camps. Israeli aircraft
struck southern Syria later on 8 September, and
again the next day when they shot down three
SU-7s and damaged a fourth. The Syrians had
attacked the Golan Heights.
`'Tel Aviv, in effect, has declared open season
on the fedayeen. Minister of Transport Peres
spoke of not resting "until terrorism is eradi-
cated." Minister of Commerce and Industry Bar-
Lev said Israel should "crush them and annihilate
them." Chief of staff General Elazar spoke of
mounting a "continuous war,'not one "started
~lazar added that
today and finished tomorrow."
air attacks were not the only meansiof fighting
the saboteurs and that Israel will use "many and
various means" against them. Prime Minister Meir
vowed before the Knesset on 12 September that
Israel would strike at terrorism "everywhere our
hand can reach it," and the Knesset affirmed this
in a unanimous resolution.
In preparation for future action, the Israeli
Defense Force has moved eight of its 175-mm.
guns, with a range of about 20 miles, into the
Golan Heights. Israeli officials have laid all blame
and responsibility for the terrorism on the host
Arab states and those supporting and encouraging
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them, indicating that Arab government installa-
tions-especially in Syria-may come in for their
share of Israeli attention.
The determination of the Israelis to end the
threat of the fedayeen appears to be matched by
the commandos' resolve to continue terrorism
and sabotage. Spokesmen for the fedayeen have
voiced their elation over the events in Munich and
maintain that more attacks will occur sometime
within the next two weeks. These attacks will
probably be concentrated in the US and Europe.
In another fedayeen attack in Europe, an
Israeli Embassy official in Brussels was enti gipped
on :0 ',eptember by an Arab assailant and seri-
ously wounded. Along the Arab-Israeli cease-fire
lines, fedayeen continued to engage in sporadic
attacks on the Israelis in the Golan Heights and
the West Bank. The fedayeen made exaggerated
claims on the results, but their attacks have not
yet resulted in significant damage or in any casu-
alties. a
Jordan's Kinq I-Iusayn unequivocally con-
demned the terrorists' acts in Munich last ciec'k,
thus isolating himself once again from the rr ain-
stream of Arab opinion. While other Aral) leaders
remained silent or justified the terrorist actions,
Husayn in harsh terms denounced the killioq of
the Israeli hostages as the work of "sick minds''
and expressed condolences to the families of the
victims, r bold gesture for an Arab head of state.
Moreover, the Jordanians apparently sought to
avoid embroilment in the subsequent military
clashres.\There are no indications that ,iords.,ian
military units increased their state of readiness in
reaction to retaliatory Israeli air strikes in `.~yria
and Lebanon or to the engagements of Syrian and
Israeli fighter aircraft.
idost Arab comment, both from, oftic:al
sources and the media, avoided condemnation of
the cuerrilla tactics. Arab news media to:ocd
squarely against the US for its veto of the Sr=t_?.;-
rity Council resolution that called for an end to
violence in the Middle East. The Cairo press ac.
cused the US of applying a double standard that
deplored the deaths of members of the Israeli
Olympic team while at the same time ignoring the
victims of Israeli air strikes in Syria and L_-charrn.
< I he Egyptians, anxious not to be associated
with the "traitor Husayrr," excused the guerrillas;
responsible for the Munich episode and placed the
onus for the loss of life on the West German
Government. Perhaps a hit on the defensive, a::
Egyptian spokesman reacted with considerable
sensitivity to West German charges that Cairo 'lid
not fully respond to Bonn's appeals for coop- a--
tion dr,rinn the Munich incident. Ritter we: t=-
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have been exchanged, but Egypt, anxious for gen-
eral West European support now that the Soviets
have left, is trying to cut its losses.
/Arab League foreign ministers, meeting in
Cairo this week, voiced a theme dominant in
almost all Arab reaction. The ministers insisted on
blaming the deaths of the Israelis at the Olympic
Games on Israel's "criminal" occupation of the
Palestinian homeland.
The Lebanese Government while expressing
"deep regret" over Munich, viewed the tragedy as
an outgrowth of the Palestinians' despair and
their wish to prod the international community
to redress their grievances. The grim events in
Munich severely shocked Saudi leaders, who
allowed scant
coverage in the local me ia/ n Algeria, early
misgivings about the wisdom of the fedayeen
operation gave way to gratification that the
Palestinians have the capability to strike boldly
and throw fear into the enemy. ,>
(the five guerrillas slain in Munich received a
final tribute at a funeral on 12 September in
Libya. Although the Libyan Government was not
publicly involved, officials assisted the private
citizens who ostensibly sponsored the funeral
services. In view of Qadhafi's strong vocal and
financial support of the fedayeen movement, the
guerrillas no doubt consider internment in Libya
as appropriate. l
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS
:The fedayeen action at Munich underscored
Moscow's limited room for maneuver on Middle
East matters. The tragedy came at a time when
Soviet support was being seriously questioned by
many Arabs. On the one hand, Moscow could not
afford to treat the killings in a way that would
suggest its support for the Palestine liberation
movement was diminishing. On the other hand,
the oft-repeated Soviet warning to Palestinian
leaders that terrorist tactics are counter-
productive was again ignored by the guerrillas,
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driving home to Moscow its lack of control over
most events affecting the Middle East.'\
Soviet media restricted their coverage of the
attack to sparse, straightforward accounts. The
tone was one of disapproval, but official Soviet
expressions of regret have been limited to brief
statements by sports representatives. Moscow's
East European allies were more outspoken, and
their first reaction was to condemn the attack
sharply. Most bloc media, however, made an ef-
fort to dissociate the Arab governments from the
acts of a "few fanatics."
'Initial US contacts with East European gov-
ernments have reflected a certain sympathy for
Secretary Rogers' proposal for international meas-
ures against terrorism, buts' with the possible
exception of Yugoslavia and Romania, these
states will wait for Moscow before making a
definitive response: An authoritative Yugoslav
press article has called for "the world to seek
quick and effective steps to combat modern ter-
rorism," and the Romanian security service has
approached the US Embassy for an exchange of
intelligence on Arab terrorist movements and
Largely because of the fedayeen, the Olym-
pics produced a political setback for the Brandt
government instead of the hoped-for boon. Con-
troversy about the handling of the incident with
the fedayeen is intense, and the question of
internal security may turn out to be a major issue
in the national election late this fall.
The Israeli deaths, the disputes in a number
of athletic contests, and East Germany's high
accomplishments at the games largely eliminated
favorable publicity for Chancellor Brandt- Bonn
has been able to recoup some ground, at least on
the diplomatic side. For example, Brandt has
made good use of messages of support from world
leaders, especially the telegram of gratitude from
Golda Meir. ;
Relations with Arab states, particularly
Egypt, remain strained. In an effort to ease ten-
~sions, Bonn has retracted its accusation that Arab
governments were involved in the Munich events
and sent the bodies of the five terrorists to
Libya. The Arabs had requested both measures.
The fate of the three surviving terrorists is a
contentious issue,,-tut Bonn is unlikely to release
them, as the Arabs demand.;
Despite continued accusations in the Arab
press, the Germans will probably try to limit
damage to bilateral relations. Foreign Minister
Scheel has affirmed publicly that Bonn will en-
deavor to build upon the recently restored rela-
tions with Arab states. Although the visit of the
new Egyptian foreign minister to Bonn this
month has been postponed, Bonn's new ambassa-
dor to Cairo is still scheduled to present his
credentials on 17 September.
Brandt, facing elections in less than three
months, must now try to limit the loss of public
support. He has promised a thorough investi-
gation, ordered tightened security at airports
and
;
increased protection of oil lines throughout the
country. The belated character of the measures,
however, underscores the government's failure in
the public eye to anticipate or prevent the
tragedy at Munich. The Christian Democrats, who
have been gaining ire the polls, intend to con-
centrate on the law-and-order theme. The fly in
their soup is that the Bavarian authorities-Franz
Josef Strauss' Social Christians-must bear some
blame for the Munich events, and this will restrict
the opposition's ability to ranitalize on the is-
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"US tanks may soon roll out of repair depots
in Japan, but anti-military sentiment is stirring
other controversies. A shipment of M-48 tanks
destined for Vietnam has been held up since 6
August by Socialist-initiated demonstrations at
the Sagami repair depot and by the claims of
Yokohama's Socialist mayor that the tank con-
voys would violate local road ordinances.:-
,Late last month, Socialist Party representa-
tives began secret discussions with ruling party
and government officials to develop a way to end
the confrontation and save face all around. Nego-
tiations were completed on 8 September. The
Socialists agreed to withdraw their demonstrators
this week. On 12 September, a cabinet spokesman
announced that the government would study the
possibilities of reducing tank repair activities at
Sagami and of discouraging the shipment of over-
hauled tanks to Vietnam. The issuance of road
permits by Sagamihara and Yokohama authorities
is now awaiting US Army confirmation that the
convoys will operate in accordance with city road
regulations.;/
1969, and this contributed to severe electoral
setbacks in December of that year. `s
<
unions put left
in the General
voted to suspend 32 unions for registering under Council. One leading moderate lost his bid for
the Industrial Relations Act in defiance of con- cJ re-election to the council. As a result, the moder-
gress policy. These unions represent 500,000
members out of some 10 million in the congress.
This unprecedented purge dramatically demon-
strates the determination of British unions to
defy the act. If the suspended unions do not
remove themselves from the register, the congress
may expel them next yea>
,5S The suspension of these
~,*,Ttes are bitter and some are even contemplating
leaving the Trades Union Congress. If the moder-
ates do withdraw, the government's prospects for
S dbringing labor peace will be even bleake In a few
instances, the moderates prevailed. For example,
they defeated a resolution to suspend unions
which, when cited for violations of the Industrial
Relations Act, defend themselves in the National
Industrial Relations Court..
The delegates expressed firm opposition to
any kind of statutory wage restraint policy, but,
for the first time under the Heath government,
used the term "incomes policy" in an official
pronouncement and even indicated some willing-
(7 ness to negotiate voluntary restraints in the round
of talks beginning 14 September. The unions cur-
rent terms are so extreme, however, that agree-
ment from business and government representa-
tives seems unlikely. As a result, Heath can expect
a continuation of the labor problems he has faced
for over a year.
/-,The congress statement on EC entry por-
7,ends trouble for Harold Wilson's Labor Party at
its annual conference next month. The delegates
confirmed existing policy by approving entry on
terms "consistent with British interests" and ad-
vocating that efforts be made to negotiate "more
favorable terms." Left-wing anti-marketeers, how-
ever, pushed through an additional resolution call-
ing for opposition "in principle" to EC entry.
Some anti-market members of the Labor Party
now threaten to propose a resolution at the Octo-
ber meeting calling for withdrawal from the EC
when the Labor Party comes to power.
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REPORT ON THE SOVIET HARVEST
"Grain yields reported by the USSR for areas
where the harvest has been completed confirm
that poor weather severely damaged the crop in
the major grain-growing areas of European Russia.
According to data given for the Ukraine, Belo-
`russia, and North Caucasus, gross production in
these areas will be 16 million tons below last year.
Reports from other regions in European Russia,
which account for over one third of total sown
area, indicate additional shortfalls that will only
be partially offset by a good harvest in the New
Lands.
The Soviets now are concentrating all their
efforts on bringing in a good harvest in the New
Lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan, which ac-
counts for 40 percent of all grain acreage. As of
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the first week in September, however, only 45
percent of the sown area in the New in thndssh had
been cut, compared with 83 in this area nor-
mally country. Although the grain
mally ripens later than in European Russia, it is
almost two weeks later than
and usual rbenause of cool
during the
rainy weather. Early frost
harvest period could result in above-normal har-
vest losses. Press reports indicate thatcmoren men
and machinery from rarrns all- the final ver-
rest of the country have been sent to the east than uncertainty surrounding
recent year. Party chairman Brezhnev dicta on the Soviet harvest apparently has tempo
than in any morale-boosting
has just returned from a ten-ay d rt "in a rather rarity halted negotiations for additional grain im-
trip to the area. He was reportedly ports. An international grain trader recently in
bouyant spirit," believing that a successful out- Moscow was invited to return in November when
come could help offset losses elsewhere. Soviet plans "would be firm." Soviet purchases of
grain for delivery by mid-1973 already top 27
tons,
including 19 illiloli n tons tons from
u{ si
ar also affected million
c
for one
ntract
r he poor weather this ye
co
other and the latest reports continue to US. brings total Soviet purchases to about $1.8
ops,
otcr tiers.
stress problems. Blight attacked the potato crop beans bout 15 percent of billion from all Western su
in Belorussia-which raises a
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15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Sep 72
the country's potatoes. The blight also hit the
northwest RSFSR. Drought in the central Eu-
ropean RSFSR has almost halted potato develop-
ment and slowed the growth of other vgetablei s.
The hot, dry summer burned up
some areas, requiring emergency imports from
other areas and the transport of livestock to
greener pastures. Also, harvests of sugar beets and
the most important oil seed, sunflowers, are
down.
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-RANCE. I IGHTNING ON THE I FFT
Sorial[st Party First Secretary Mitterrand s
strong critic isms
Soc: of Soviet policies have strained
the ialisf-Cormunist electoral alliance
France- Last week, after receiving an abi,isiv
letter from soviet Ambassador Abrasimov, Mpttpr
rand canceled a visit to Moscow that be had
planned for this November. The letter, publisher:
in the French Communist daily, Ilutnanite, at
tacked Mitterrand's recent criticisms of Soviet
Policies on Czechoslovakia and Jewish emigration
'Torn the t 1S SR Abr
and's asimov suggested that Mitter
acl_vitiPs had put the trip in question
1 he imhroglio has put the 1 Tench Corn...
monist Party in a box. While the party deplored
both the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1.968 and the trials in Czechoslovakia this year,
the censure was mild and considered inadequate
by non-Comrriunistc. Soviet emigration policy
presents a similar problem to the French Com-
munists ?heir endorsement of Moscow's pro-
cedures would alienate many in France, while
criticism would raise Soviet hackleslko the par ty
equivocates A !politburo communique on 6 Sep-
tember c )nfiennpd reactionary propaganda
against socialist states, but reserved the party's
right to critic 170 those states. The controversy was
,thus an-een,barrassinq reminder that the F renc!r
Communist Party. which presumably still rec:eiva_~s
funds from Moscow, has long been the most sun
servient of iho I ;,ropean parties!
1 he Fi-nc i Communists doubtless rrecognrr_e
that Mitterrand who is already looking ahead t.
the '1976 presidential race, will gain from th
controversy AhrasirnOV's reaction effectively
refutes the charges that Mi
tt
errand became a dupe:
of the Com
Communist a afros when he signed the Socialist
!.Tart earlier this year. Moreover,
highlights Mitterr.ad's argument that the pact di it
(
not indicate total )greernent. In this first nma)or
lest, each par
-01nmon ty emit its own interests ahead of the
cause of a united left,
The alliance it indeed very much a marriage
of convenience: it will face rnany more trials
before the legislative elections next spring,>Hard -
l-ne Communists for instance: convinred fh,,t
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party leaders conceded more than the Socialists,
are concerned that basic positions have been com-
promised. They insist the real stand of the French
Communist Party be made absolutely clearly
The Gaullists are beyond a doubt pleased by
the dissension on the left which makes the leftists
less of a threat to the Gaullist majority in the
legislature. Nevertheless, the Gaullists have not
reacted publicly to the Abrasimov affair, in part
because of the value they attach to their "special
relationship" with the Soviets. For some months
before Abrasimov's intervention, however, Gaul-
list spokesmen had criticized the Communists and
Socialists for relative indifference to events in
Czechoslovakia. This provoked from both vigor-
ous efforts to clarify their positions as well as
pledges to respect democratic norms if brought to
power.
YUGOSLAVIA: TITO TALKS TOUGH
('resident Tito has set the stage for personnel
shifts in the party at or before the third national
' party conference in November. In hard-hitting
speeches delivered between 4 and 10 September,
Tito lashed out at Yugoslavia's real and imaginary
t enemies, both at home and abroad. He identified
the main culprits as nationalists, corrupt enter- Appealing for worker support, Tito put en-
prise officials, and lax party functionaries.; Y/terprise officials on notice that they would no
longer be allowed to amass wealth on the labor of
displaying the vitality of earlier days, octo- others. He warned those government and party
genarian Tito hammered away at the old partisan officials responsible for
youth affairs not to let
theme of "brotherhood and unity." He called for'; i Yugoslav youth develop in "anti-socialist" direc-
rooting out the class enemy hiding behind re-tions. Youth problems will be the main topic at
gional chauvinism. Tito told the party to clean up -, , the party conference; ,>
-its ranks and warned nationalists to leave or be
1 1 purged. Emotionally aroused by the guerrilla at-
tack in Bosnia-Hercegovina last July, as well as by
the Munich tragedy, Tito denounced all terrorist
activity. He claimed that he knows where the
anti-Tito terrorists get their financial aid, but
would not say because it is "unpleasant." While
most Yugoslavs would normally take that to
mean the Soviet Union, in this case it refers to the
ITito's tough talk is clearly intended to ward
off a repetition of last year, when Croatian
nationalism got out of hand and threw prep-
arations for the second party conference into
disarray. He also intends to avoid the criticism
that he spends too much time on foreign affairs
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SLUR[- I
SIERRA LEONE: ONE PARTY RULE
.=The government has moved a step closer
toward its goal of creating a one-party political
system by successfully intimidating the sole oppo-
sition party..
'A new wave of intimidation began early this
month when the ruling All People's Congress used
party thugs to ensure the unopposed election of
its candidates to three vacant parliamentary seats
in the area in the south that normally votes with
the opposition. The opposition Sierra Leone
People's Party is based in the southern part of the
country. The party was physically prevented from
filing its candidates' names as prescribed by law.
Opposition leaders and supporters tried to go to
Freetown to protest, but were forced to run a
roadblock of bully boys. In the ensuing melee,
one Congress supporter was killed. President
Stevens publicly claimed his supporter was killed
in an unprovoked attack; he arrested at least six
members of the opposition, including its principal
leaders, and charged them with murder.
Last week, Stevens called for by-elections in
two other southern districts, suspending in these
areas the state of emergency under which he has
ruled for nearly two years. A declaration signed
by the imprisoned opposition leaders, presumably
before their arrest, announced that their party
would not contest the several remaining by-elec-
tions in view of the violence that already has
occurred.'sadly disorganized and dispirited, the
opposition obviously is not willing to try to deal
with Stevens' strong-arm tactics, even in the
south.
,'The opposition's withdrawal from the by-
elections could foreshadow a deal with the gov-
ernment on a one-party state. Stevens says he will
not impose a one-party system without the con-
sent of the people. His supporters contend that an
overwhelming vote for one party in the general
elections, due next year, would constitute such
consent. Imprisonment of the opposition leaders
and withdrawal of their party from the by-elec-
tions opens the way for the required landslide.,
President Stevens presides over a badly frag-
merrted society. There were three coups in the
country between March 196/ and April i)6=`
Stevens took power following the third and sur-
vived an unsuccessful coup attempt in vla_,rc r
1971. Long-standing enmity between the Lou-
try's two major tribes-the Temne in the rwits
and the Mende in the south--lies benind nmmucH _.?!
the political trouble. Stevens' policies since h
was recalled from exile in Guinea to r .irr ti ='
country have deepened the old divisions and have
created serious new ones, some within his ow-
party. '
Pier>rdent Stevens" move toward more a.
thoritarianism at home has been coupled with
leftward swing in foreign policy. Last month di
the conference of nonaligned nations in Georg--
town, Guyana, Stevens' foreign minister ersthr -
siasticall,,y embraced the policies of the so-called
"progressive" third-world countries- During a sun
sequent visit to Cuba, the foreign minister, a.
cording to his government's press, told Lubeir
newsmen that Cuba's and Sierra Leone's encrntc'H
' were the same."
ZAMBIA: KAUNDA FLAYS CRITICS
-President Kaunda has begun to lash out
his opponents for tailing to support his poficie'
and cooperate with his plans for turning Iamb a
,into a one-party state.c_Early this month, Kaur,. a
directed a severe tongue-lashing at a group =wt
senior csvii servants for Irving to sabotage Lite
governments policies and those of his donlinanc
United National Independence Party. He insist, rf
that the civil service exists to serve the party ;r;
power and that any who disagree should resicfrr.
He warned that those who continue to oppo-s
him will be treated as enemies of the country.
Kaunda's campaign to press his critics into
tacit support was kicked off late last month when
a ban on unauthorized derrronstrations by pOr,-
,,econdary students was announced I he Dc",
which also was couched in harsh language,
followed eltorts by the student union president
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and groups from various schools to join in a
protest against the government-owned paper that
criticized a small and apparently minor demon-
stration at one of the colleges. Kaunda stepped in
to prevent a full-blown confrontation similar to
one a year ago when a large demonstration against
party interference in student affairs ended only
after Kaunda ordered troops to close Zambia's
university and send the students home>
% /Kaunda has rebuked the media for paying
TANZANIA: SOCIALISM REVISITED
0 The government is now pushing hard to
move peasants near Lake Tanganyika into ujamaa
(communal) villages, the backbone of President
Nyerere's efforts to build a socialist society. The
drive this year follows one last summejdn which
,'almost 100,000 nomadic Wagogo tribesmen in
drought-stricken central Tanzania were persuaded
to set up such villages with government assistance
and promises of water.
too much attention to national problems and
criticizing the government. At a press seminar last ~. Since Nyerere outlined his rural program in
month, he warned that freedom of the press does late 1967, it has had only limited success.
not mean the press can disseminate what it According to government figures, over 4,000
wishes. If it wishes to avoid government censor- ujamaa villages have been established, but officials
ship, he cautioned, the press should report only( admit that few of these yet operate as Nyerere
what the public should know.;. intends. Many exist in name only, and most still
allow individual enterprisV