WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009800040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
ARCHIVAL
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
Secret
29 September 1972
No. 0389/72
Copy N2 49
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10 Malaysian Mission to Moscow
10 EC: Norway Says No
1.2_ Italy: Problems for Andreotti
1.2 Moscow and Belgrade'Draw Closer
13 Netherlands: Muddling Along
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
14 Middle East: On It Goes
16 Uganda-Tanzania: Brief Respite
17 Sudan: Numayri Chooses Africa
18 Guinea: Toure's Threats
18 Standstill in South Asia
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
19 Colombia-Nicaragua: Dispute
20 Brazil: Censorship Mishandled
21 Argentina: Political Maneuvers
22 Ecuador: Student Unrest
22 Uruguay: Amnesty and Economics
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REPORT
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THE PHILIPPINES: MARCOS GOES FOR BROKE
'resident Marcos played a trump card in his
bid to keep power when he declared martial law
on 23 September. As part of the well organized
and executed maneuver, constabulary forces
closed all newspaper and broadcasting offices,
imposed travel restrictions, and arrested prom-
inent anti-Marcos critics-including newsmen,
politicians, students, and some elected officials. /lt seems likely that Marcos plans to use
'The President announced that the move was
1 necessary to prevent a Communist conspiracy
from overthrowing the government; as proof he
J- cited a recent rash of bombings and an abortive
assassination attempt last week on his defense
secretary. There is circumstantial evidence to sug-
Philippine ROTC cadets whitewash
anti-Marcos slogans.
gest that the assassination attempt and some of
the bombings were staged in order to justify the
subsequent martial law declaration. Moreover,
many of those arrested can not by any stretch of
the imagination be regarded as leftists or
sympath izers_~
martial law to rebuild his shattered public image
and increase his political support in the country
at large. The President apparently believes that
most of his political troubles are caused by bu-
reaucratic ineptitude and that firm personal con-
Ltrol and some showy reforms are necessary if he is
to regain public confidence. Marcos has directed
the constitutional convention to continue its
deliberations, which indicates that he still plans to
oversee the manufacture of a constitution that
will allow his election as prime minister within a
parliamentary system.)
In the meantime, Marcos is using his new
powers to decree legislation. He is streamlining
the bureaucracy and has announced a widespread
land reform program. It will take more than
administrative measures like this if he is really to
correct the fundamental social and economic
imbalances plaguing the Philippines. An all-out
attack would entail challenging the vital interests
of the nation's entrenched oligarchy, and might
,)-,provoke more opposition than Marcos and the
Philippines' small security forces could handle.
Thus far most Filipinos have acquiesced quietly
to the new situation, preferring to reserve judg-
ment until they see exactly what Marcos is up to
and whether he has the muscle to achieve it.
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THE GRAIN SCENE
US GRAIN WINDOW OPENS FOR PEKING
j2
yet seen in Communist propaganda. Denouncing
as "absurd" Dr. Kissinger's statement on 16 Sep-
tember that the US rejected any move that would
"impose a particular form of government" on
South Vietnam, Commentator claims that if the
US negotiates "seriously" the parties could "agree
on effective measures to discard" these American
fears. Such measures, Commentator asserts,
would be "aimed at ensuring that neither side is
allowed to dominate the political life in South
Vietnam.")
The Commentator article is notable for its
straightforward presentation of the North Viet-
namese negotiating position on the political as-
pects of a settlement. Terming the "question of
power" the key issue in the negotiations with the
US, Commentator sets forth the Vietnamese
Communist stand against the President's 8 May
proposal for a peace settlement. Hanoi cannot
accept the US terms, according to Commentator,
because they require that the Communist side
become "merely members" of the other "political
forces" who would be "allowed to nominate their
people to join an independent election organiza-
tion." All this would be done while the Saigon
government apparatus was still intact, he charges,
and the result would inevitably be to "legalize"
the Saigon government.>
Z./ ;An authoritative "Commentator" article in
the party daily of 25 September lays out the
North Vietnamese position in the clearest terms
a) The US cannot expect the Communists to
accept a settlement, says Commentator, which
seeks to achieve through diplomacy what the "US
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has failed to achieve with so many military strat-
egies through four presidential terms." He asserts
it would be much better for the US to acknowl-
edge the Communist position as now enunciated,
which states that two "armies and administra-
tions" exist in South Vietnam-i.e., that neither
side can force its position militarily on the other,
and then to agree to a three-sided coalition which
reflects the power "realities" in South Vietnam_ >
~_'Fighting subsided last week as South Viet-
namese troops wound up their operation to
secure Quang Tri City, and Communist forces
slowed the pace of their attacks in Quang Ngai
Province. Government forces in Quang Tri Prov-
ince apparently are planning to consolidate their
current hold and to conduct only limited further
operations to recapture territory elsewhere in the
province. President Thieu stated recently that
government forces would maintain defensive
positions around Quang Tri City and would begin
to tighten security between the city and Hue;fhe
Marine commander said recently that his troops
and Airborne units would periodically conduct
raids north of the city and would attempt to
recapture some fire support bases to the west. He
confirmed that large-scale operations north to the
DMZ are not in the cards'r
/After two weeks of heavy attacks by the
Communist 2nd Division, action in Quang Ngai
Province has tapered off to skirmishing by smaller
units. The Communists control parts of Route 1
along the coast from the Song Ve River south to
the district capital of Mo Duc as well as some
former government positions on a ridge around
Mo Duc itself. Two other district capitals-Ba To
and Duc Pho-have come under heavy ground and
artillery attack, but government troops have
maintained control of both towns;(Further action
can be expected in Quang Ngai Province, as the
Communist forces show no signs of leaving the
area, but appear to be regrouping and resup-
plying..',-
--Government troops in Military Region 3
have renewed operations to recapture the airfield
at Quan Loi north of An Loc, the Binh Long
provincial capital. Resistance by Communist 9th
Division units has slowed the advance and appar-
ently forced both sides to slacken the pace. By
the end of the week, government troops had
recaptured about half the airfield.->
l=ighting in the delta also quieted consider-
ably after a two-week period of intense action.
4 A sharp country-wide drop in Communist
military action has in the past often preceded the
initiation of heavier fighting.
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IE7;NA ' , -. 'gyp DEMILITARIZED ZONE U Lu
h'Rt1
Quang NO
N ...-Song Ve River
O Interdicted
.Mo Duc
Eta Tom, ,Duc Pho
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Thieu's Opponents Win Senate Vote
Opposition forces in the Senate passed a
resolution last weekend declaring the provisions
of the Emergency Powers Law enacted last June
to be null and void. The measure passed easily
because a number of the pro-government sena-
tors, who constitute about half of the Upper
[-louse, were absent. The vote followed a stormy
session during which President Thieu's press
decree came under sharp attacks
',The Senate resolution has no legal effect,
since both houses of the National Assembly must
approve such a measure, and Thieu has a firm
majority in the Lower House. The vote represents
the first successful ploy by the opposition in
many months, however, and indicates the diffi-
culties Thieu still faces in gaining majority sup-
port in the Senate. This could be important after
his emergency decree powers lapse in December;
the President has stated he will not seek an exten-
sion of the measure.'
The ICC Dispute
-The Indian delegation to the International
Control Commission is departing South Vietnam
for Hanoi this week following the refusal of the
South Vietnamese to renew its visas. Saigon has
been annoyed with India since New Delhi up-
graded its relations with North Vietnam last Jan-
uary and maintains that India can no longer serve
as ICC chairman because it is not neutral. The
Indians plan to set up the ICC headquarters in
Hanoi, while the Canadian and Polish delegations
remain in Saigon.)
CAMBODIA: KHMER COMMUNISTS IMPROVE
'One of the more significant military develop-
ments in Cambodia during the present rainy
season has been the improved combat capability
displayed by Khmer Communist units. Previously,
Khmer Communist troops had largely been used
to support tactical operations of the Vietnamese
Communist main force units. Following the com-
mitment of many of the main force units to the
current Communist offensive in South Vietnam,
however, the Khmer Communists have had to
handle more of the fighting against the Cam-
bodian Army, and their performance in the field
indicates they have come a long way militarily
since March 1970,,)
-',In the past two months, they have exerted
effective pressure against several key roads. They
succeeded in keeping Route 5 closed to through
traffic for almost four weeks, thereby contrib-
uting to Phnom Penh's recent rice supply prob-
?I lerns. Khmer Communist harassing attacks also
resulted in the closure of Route 2 for 11 days in
late August and early September. Late last week,
they again went on the attack along that same
highway, cutting several other stretches between
Phnom Penh and Takeo)

3-; The Communists had ended the last round
of discussions on 3 September when their special
representative left Vientiane for the Communist
headquarters at Sam Neua protesting the govern-
ment's current offensive in the north. That of-
fensive has failed to shake Communist control of
the Plaine, however, and the Communists ev-
31 (Preliminary discussions on peace talks idently see some merit in resuming the talks
apparently will resume soon in Vientiane. Lao ?about talks)ghe Communists have offered few
Communist leader Souphanouvong on 27 Sep- hints on what tack they will take now, but in his
tember appointed Soth Phetrasy, the Pathet Lao letter proposing the resumption Souphanouvong
permanent representative in Vientiane, to "hold took a tough line strongly condemning "US
discussions and exchange views." Prime Minister intervention and aggression in Laos."
Souvanna, who is obviously anxious to get the
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MALAYSIAN MISSION TO MOSCOW
3 ,~
In the pre-parliamentary maneuvering,
Andreotti has seemed determined to short-circuit
leftist criticism that could lead to defections from
his government. The government, for example,
terminated the controversial dual experimenta-
tion with the French SECAM and German PAL
color TV systems after the Olympic games and
before the originally scheduled 60 days of testing
were up. It was announced that the date for the
introduction of color TV would be determined
"in relation to the economic plan." The decision
seemed designed to mollify critics on the left who
regard color TV as economically frivolous and
suspect that the experiments with SECAM were
part of a bargainYAndreotti struck with Pompidou, 5'lemics that followed the occupation of Czecho-
in July. slovakia During the last year the two countrieas
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Although Andreotti has in this way managed
to steer clear of confrontations, he must now deal
with at least three contentious issues. The one
with the most immediate explosive potential is
the renewal of labor contracts involving 4.5 mil-
lion workers. The last renewal led to the "hot
autumn" of 1969. The rapid settlement of the rail
`:strike on 12 September, however, lends support
to other evidence that ilabor, management, and
government, faced with a severe and lingering
recession, are showing more restraint than at
times in the past. A second test for Andreotti will
be administrative elections involving 3.2 million
voters scheduled for 26 November. As in the past,
these elections will he a gauge of public reaction
to the government in power. Finally, although the
referendum on the repeal of the bill permitting
divorce has been rescheduled for May 1973, it is
ossible that this issue could explode before then_
ponsors of the referendum, who now have a
majority in both houses, may attempt to change
,,the divorce law in Parliament.
Although any of these issues could furn .h
the fuel for an early outburst, the Socialist and
Christian Democratic congresses hold the key to
the longer term shape of the government. 1 he
Socialists, scheduled to meet on 9 November, are
united in rejecting participation in a coalition
with the Liberals, but divided on the advisabili-v
of reviving the center-left formula. The Christian
Democrats, planning to meet in January 1973,
have not yet set the conditions under which they
would agree to the re-entry of the Socialist Party
into the government.
7 'Yugoslav-Soviet relations have improved siq-
nificantly since Brezhnev visited Belgrade a year
ago. His trip signaled an end to the bitter
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have exchanged ten high-level party and govern-
ment delegations and numerous lesser visits]

In any event, the Netherlands appears to be
entering an era of political instability as the cen-
ter-right governments of the past 14 years give
way to an as yet uncertain successor. Should a
center-left government eventually emerge, Dutch
foreign policy probably would not change much.
A center-left government would, however, be
more inclined to support such causes of the Euro-
pean left as aid to African insurgents. Also, de-
fense expenditures would almost certainly de-
A destroyer and destroyer escort from the
Soviet Mediterranean squadron, accompanied by
three amphibious ships, apparently entered the
Syrian harbor at Tartus on 27 September. An
amphibious exercise may take place in the near
future.
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79-r Soviet airlift to Syria probably involves
the ivery of air defense equipment ordered by
Damascus under agreements concluded with the
USSR in early 1971 and May 1972, and possibly
come new equipment outside these agreements.
J.)' .There is no hard evidence yet that additional
Soviet technicians or advisers have accompanied
the airlifted equipment, although the US Embassy
in Beirut has received a report that 100 Soviet
technicians were due in Damascus on 26 Septem-
ber. There were an estimated 800 Soviet advisers
in Syria at the beginning of this year}
~,~ J he airlift and the arrival of the Soviet com-
batants at Tartus provide highly visible demon-
strations of Moscow's support for the Arab cause.
According to an Italian Foreign Ministry official,
four or five of the military transports landed at
Damascus International Airport. This unusual use
of a civilian airport by military aircraft was prob-
ably intended by both sides to increase the visi-
bility of Soviet assistance.>
b 9
3
Although Bucharest's interest in the Euro-
pean Communities and the International Mone-
tary Fund does not please Moscow, the Roma-
nians apparently continue to believe that these
many-sided foreign policy initiatives best serve
their interests. Indeed, their preoccupation with
the establishment of a permanent secretariat
during the early phases of a Conference on Euro-
pean Security reflects their search both for insti-
tutional security and legitimacy. There is, how-
ever, a real and immediate reason for the Roma-
nian opening to the West. They need Western
knowledge and Western money. Indeed, in recent
months the Romanians have sometimes seemed
almost feverish in their search for more Western
credits. Although they are quite capable of crying
wolf, they have displayed increasingly serious and
genuine concern about the need for expanded
Western credits.>
29 September 19/2
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Special Report
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29 September 1972
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Visiting in Moscow, 1967: Kosygin, Brezhnev, Maurer,
Ceausescu