WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009900030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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`Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
On file Department of Agriculture
release instructions apply.
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
17 November 1972
No. 0396/72
Copy N2
46
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelisrtence, reports and analyzes sign if.
rcarzt -developments of the ;week through noon on Thursday.
it fr ;'tuentiy includes mate6al coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology;
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there.
=ore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
oritwits.
CONTENTS (17November 1972)
1
2
3
4
6
6
7
8
Peron in Argentina
West Germany: To the Polls
SALT II: A Difficult Job
Indochina
The Philippines: No Waves
Japan: Bright Prospects for Tanaka
North Korea: Trade with Japan
The UN: Satellite TV; South-
West Africa
UNCC
TO--S-weden: Trouble for Palme
11
Europe: Something for Everybody
11
USSR-Yugoslavia: Walking Softly
12
Yugoslavia: Taking a Breather
13
Polish Trade Bid
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
14
Israel: Syria & Jordan
16
Tunisia: Call for Reform
17
India-USSR: No Naval Exercise
17
Pakistan: Leftward Ho
18
Sierra Leone: More Problems
19
Guinea: Toure Moves In
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20
Cuba: Some Are Not Welcome
21
Chile: Military at the Focal Point
22
Venezuela: Guarding the Flanks
23
Bolivia: Devaluation Blues
SPECIAL
REPORT
A
Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe: Overture
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SECRET NNO,
" LAn air of tense expectation hung over the
Argentine capital this week as both Peronists and
the military government prepared for the return
of Juan Domingo Peron. The 77-year-old former
dictator termed the trip a "journey for peace,"
but the government, trusting neither Peron nor
Peronist nor anti-Peronist, ordered elaborate se-
curity measures so strict that a Peronist spokes-
man suggested that Peron's plane might have to
be diverted to Uruguay.
/ .While the generals and the Peronist leaders
worried about possible provocations by ex-
tremists of the right or left, the rest of the nation
enjoyed a paid holiday as a national strike was
called to release workers to attend the home-
coming festivities. The government ordered all
public and business establishments closed down as
a security precaution. J
/ /Peron's stay in Argentina, expected to be
between three and seven days, carries with it
considerable risk. Moderate Peronists and top
military officers share a desire to move toward
some manner of national accord that will facili-
tate a return to elected government, and both
groups hope that Peron's visit will contribute to
,,such an accord. Peron's presence in Argentina,
however, will fan political passions, providing dis-
sidents on the right and terrorists on the left with
the best chance they are likely to get to sabotage
the election. Likewise, a failure of Peronist
leaders to control the activities of the old dicta-
tor's mass of followers or an overreaction by
security forces charged with crowd control could
set off a chain reaction of violence desired by
neither side.?
^. !It is unlikely that Peron would have agreed
to make the trip at this time if he did not believe
that President Lanusse could make good on his
guarantee of safety and if most of the work on a
political agreement had not already been com-
pleted. Neither Peron nor Lanusse was willing to
confirm publicly that they were even close to an
agreement. Peron told reporters in Rome earlier
in the week that he was "available for a draft" in
the presidential election scheduled for next
March. For his part, Lanusse denied that there
was an agreement and made arrangements to be
out of the capital viewing military maneu-
vers during at least part of Peron's stay.I
;[President Lanusse still hopes that when the
Argentines see the elderly Peron and his third
wife, Isabel, the memory of the young and
energetic Peron with beloved Evita at his side will
finally recede. Indeed, many observers, including
many Peronists, believe that Peron will turn down
the presidential nomination, signal his willingness
to cooperate in moving the nation toward
elections and then return to Spain. This, for all
practical purposes, would write finis to Peron's
long and active political career. It is a nagging fear
that Peron, caught up in his own mythology, will
not be willing to fade away that is worrying
Lanusse and a good many other Argentines
today.
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The election campaign will grind to an end
this Sunday when approximately 40 million Ger-
mans cast their ballots. Although recent polls
indicate that the governing coalition of Social
Democrats and Free Democrats holds a slim lead,
the outcome will be determined by which way
the large number of undecided voters end up
voting.
.With less than two weeks to go before the
election, the coalition parties grabbed the head-
lines and diverted public attention from domestic
issues-particularly inflation-by effectively ex-
ploiting the general political treaty with East Ger-
many initialed on 8 November. Chancellor Brandt
and other government spokesmen strongly em-
phasized the practical improvements promised by
the treaty and its ancillary agreements. It was all
front-page material-the announcement that nego-
tiations had been completed, the cabinet decision
to accept the draft, the initialing of the pact and,
finally, the text in full- Even though some news-
papers, particularly those of the anti-government
Springer press, criticized the treaty, the net result
was that the coalition basked in the limelight.j
f. The opposition's guarded reaction to the
'treaty did little to further its campaign. After
being taken to task by the Springer press for his
failure to adopt a clear position, Christian Demo-
cratic leader Barzel attacked the treaty in some
detail on 11 November. He appealed to coalition
leaders not to sign the accord unless East German
guards stop shooting at refugees attempting to
cross the border and ridiculed government allega-
tions that Bonn had obtained as favorable terms
as possible. It is doubtful that Barzel's criticisms
will have much effect on an electorate that has
generally supported Brandt's Ostpolitik.j
[fhe opposition prefers domestic issues and
moved in the past week to refocus public atten-
tion on inflation. Barzel met twice with Karl
Schiller, the former economics and finance min
ister in Brandt's cabinet, who represents eco-
nomic stability to many German voters. Schiller
reportedly agreed to support a Christian Demo-
cratic government in combating inflation, but his
precise role has yet to be announced. The amount
of support Schiller brings to the opposition has
been widely debated in West German media, but
the opposition was at least able to gain much-
needed publicity in the final campaign week.
[As the campaign drew to a close, some de-
spondent opposition leaders were predicting that
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SLC:HL
the governing coalition would emerge with a
20-seat majority in parliament. The election,
which is likely to be close, is in the hands of the
16 percent of the voters who have still not
expressed their preference.
The second phase of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks will begin in Geneva on 21 No-
vember. The opening round of SALT 11 will try to
set the guidelines for future discussions of a
treaty to limit strategic offensive weapons
systems. SALT I, which ended in May, produced
an ABM treaty and an interim agreement limiting
offensive arms.
The opening round will also seek to establish
the Standing Consultative Commission called for
in the ABM treaty. This commission is intended
to handle questions and problems concerning
compliance with and implementation of the May
agreements.
The Soviets have said very little about what
they will seek to accomplish at SALT II. A num-
ber of unresolved problems are left over from
SALT I. Among these is the Soviet insistence that
US forward-based military systems be included in
some manner in limitations on strategic offensive
systems. Achieving agreement on aggregate levels
of offensive arms also promises to be a long and
arduous task. There have been some hints in the
Soviet press of interest in considering qualitative
limitations on arms at SALT II, but these have
been tenuous and inconclusive.
The consensus in the Soviet leadership that
led to the agreements reached at SALT I appears
to be holding. Speakers defending the SALT I
agreements before the USSR Supreme Soviet on
29 September included President Podgorny,
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, senior party
theoretician Suslov, and Defense Minister
Grechko. Speaking for the Soviet leadership on 6
November, First Deputy Prime Minister Mazurov
praised the accomplishments of the US-Soviet
summit meeting last May, when the SALT agree-
ments were signed. He did not mention the agree-
ments as such, but noted that "tangible, practi-
cal" solutions were possible for "even the most
complex international problems."
Placards lauding SALT and disarmament
were in evidence during the military parade in
Red Square on 7 November. Grechko used that
occasion to endorse the search for detente with
the West and to express satisfaction with meas-
ures being taken to strengthen Soviet defenses.
The defense minister's public support for
detente and SALT policies doubtless strengthens
the hand of SALT supporters against any in the
hierarchy who remain skeptical of arms limitation
agreements with the US. That such skepticism
still exists was suggested by Podgorny's defensive
comment before the Supreme Soviet that only a
"blatantly biased politician" would assert that the
international situation had become worse since
the achievement of the accords.
Soviet press reaction to President Nixon's
re-election indicates a strong desire to continue
the present course in US-Soviet relations, of
which SALT is an integral part. TASS quickly
publicized the President's stated determination to
move ahead in SALT II, and Brezhnev pledged
the Soviets to continue the improvement in rela-
tions on 13 November. Soviet criticism of the US
congressional amendment calling for equal levels
of offensive weapons in any future treaty has died
down, although occasional rumbles are still heard.
Most recently, a public lecturer in Moscow, after
citing the Soviet numerical advantage in inter-
continental ballistic missiles and in submarine-
launched ballistic missiles in the interim agree-
ment, claimed that such an amendment would
hinder future talks and put a brake on US-Soviet
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Jtl:t-(t I
The Communists are telling their supporters
in South Vietnam to press for a cease-fire and,
once attained, to use it to prepare for a rapid
take-ov r of the countr once the US has with-
drawn. the
Communist high command in the south, N,
has told lower level cadre that the US is stalling
on a cease-fire agreement\lin order to ship in more
war material and improve its bargaining position.
COSVN claims that it is essential for the Com-
munists to apply "maximum pressure" on the US
to force the signing of the agreement in the near
future and to effect the complete withdrawal of
US forces. )
"COSVN also assures its followers that Com-
munist objectives and policies remain unchanged..
Enemy forces are to continue trying to expand
areas under their control and to work at breaking
down the government's administrative machinery,
When the cease-fire comes, the Communists must
be ready at a moment's notice to launch all-out
attacks to seize land and control people. The)
Communists were assured that the party has com-
pleted "all" military plans so that, after about
two months when US forces have been pulled out
in toto, the Communists will be prepared to over-
throw the Thieu government:)
These latest instructions seem to go beyond
earlier reported COSVN directives, which talked
of the cease-fire period as a time of intense "polit-
ical struggle," although the ultimate goal-Thieu's
ouster-remains the same)) In these instructions, as
in most Communist directives, there is a good
measure of rhetoric, and one of COSVN's aims
doubtless is to keep its forces ready for anything
in the uncertain period ahead, even including a
Communist-triggered breakdown in the cease-fire
arrangements.
J the Communists do not think they have
much chance of winning the struggle for control
unless they use military force. At the same time,
however, they seem to have doubts about their
chances in many areas of South Vietnam even if
they use all the military force available to them.
Saigon Sticks to Tough Line
The Saigon government is maintaining its
firm stand, at least in public, against the an-
nounced peace terms. A government-controlled
newspaper, quoting a "highly placed source" in
the administration, has claimed that the rumor
that a peace settlement will be signed in the near
future "is completely groundless." In a speech
this week, Foreign Minister Lam stated that some
of the peace terms "appear insufficiently clear."
He asserted that "no agreement will be valid with-
out our signature." Despite some earlier indica-
tions of flexibility on Saigon's part, the govern-
ment is still publicly insisting that all North Viet-
namese troops must withdraw from the South
and reiterating its standard objections to any coa-
lition government.)
j /The pro-government press is taking the line
that President Nixon's re-election puts the US in a
-J_ronger negotiating position so that concessions
to the Communists are not necessary. The press
also claims that General Haig's visit to Saigon
immediately after the election showed that the
US was paying more attention to South Viet-
nam's views on a peace agreement. I
Rail Repair in the North
Jhe North Vietnamese have taken advantage
of the restrictions on bombing to repair rail lines
:forth of the 20th parallel. The Hanoi-Haiphong
rail line has undergone rapid repair and is now
serviceable. Except for the Paul Doumer bridge at
Hanoi, the vital northeast rail line to the China
border station of Pinghsiang is open. Two bridges
on the rail line south of Hanoi have been recon-
structed, and two others are under repair.
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)) [Forward movement was discernible this
week in the peace talks in Vientiane. For the first
time since the talks got under way five weeks ago,
government spokesman Pheng Phongsavan ad-
dressed himself to the Lao Communist five-point
-,, peace proposals] EAmple ground for agreement
appears to exist on the points dealing with foreign
intervention, Lao neutrality and foreign policy,
and the resettlement of refugees.)
LIMajor stumbling blocks between the two
sides remain. One of them concerns the mechan-
ics of an internal political settlement. Pheng re-
jected the Communist contention that the Sou-
vanna government has outlived its legitimacy, but
he did advance ideas on how a new government
might be created within the existing constitu-
tional framework. J
he government's presentation is an invita-
tion To the Communists to move the talks beyond
polemics and to start working out the specifics of
a settlement. In another apparent effort to make
progress, Prime Minister Souvanna has called for a
meeting with Souphanouvong in Luang Prabang,
the royal capital, presumably to work out details
of a settlement as they did in 1962. The Com-
munists have not yet reacted to these recent gov-
ernment initiatives. Following his first private
meeting with Souvanna late last week, Phoumi
Vongvichit, the high-ranking Lao Communist
"special adviser" to the negotiating team, left for
consultations with Souphanouvong in Sam Neua.J
_3 [Meanwhile, in an obvious attempt to remind
Vientiane that military pressure can still be in-
creased, the Communists staged surprise attacks
during the week on two widely separated fronts;
Communist gunners on 11 November fired a num-
ber of rockets at Luang Prabang airfield, destroy-
ing one aircraft and damaging nine others. The
following day, the Communists attacked
Thakhek, a provincial capital on the Mekong
about 60 miles north of Savannakhet, breaking a
long period of quiet in the area. A small Pathet
Luang Prabong
Tha Tam Plame des
THAILAND 7 Long Tieng pho Dong
91 Government-held location
? Communist-held location
Lao force entered the town, but made no effort
to hold it.)
i r, [The Communists also kept up their attacks
against irregulars operating near the Plaine des
Jarres in north Laos. North Vietnamese ground
attacks and shell fire on 13 and 14 November
caused two of Vang Pao's task forces to give
ground. The task force north of the Plaine was
pushed out of its positions along Route 71, while
another, near Khang Kho, had to fall back toward
Pha DongJ
)The government's efforts to retake territory
in south Laos met with mixed results. After sev-
eral days of sharp fighting, irregular troops on 11
November drove the Communists out of Dong
Hene in the central panhandle. While the town is
of little military significance, its reoccupation
capped the successful government counteroffen-
sive that began with the recapture of the nearby
town of Keng Kok early in the month. Farther
south, however, government units on 15 Novem-
ber gave up Saravane in the face of Communist
artillery and ground attacks. Irregular units re-
main close to the airstrip near the provincial cap-
ital, but Communist artillery is checking any gov-
ernment move to retake the town.
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!The first two months of martial law have
passed almost without incident. Despite occa-
sional grumbling, anti-Marcos elements have been
unable to organize an effective challenge to the
President, who is pressing forward with his pro-
gram and apparently plans to call a national refer-
endum early next year on the new constitution he
is writing.
Government fears that urban students and
rural Maoist guerrillas would mount a concerted
attack against martial law have so far not materi-
'alized.; ISome leftist students have made token
protests-chanting slogans, painting posters, distri-
buting pamphlets-but these have been unco-
ordinated and short-lived:' iDpposition politicians
-'have remained conspicuously silent, except for a
few who have publicly praised the reformist goals
of martial law. Selected media have been allowed
to reopen but under strict censorship; they may
not print editorials or embroider in any way on
government press releases. '
The only serious violence since the im-
position of martial law has been in Mindanao,
where Muslim insurgents have ambushed govern-
ment patrols and overrun a police headquartersN
;Tension in Muslim areas has increased as a result
of government efforts to collect private stocks of
firearms. Many Muslims are convinced that the
Christian-dominated armed forces would exter-
minate them once they were disarmed. Marcos
has sent personal emissaries to reassure Muslim
leaders, but the situation remains explosive.
'Apparently satisfied that his program is pro-
ceeding apace,i President Marcos has accelerated
his timetable for instituting a new parliamentary
system of government that will get around the
present constitutional limitations on his tenure. A
draft of the new constitution, prepared at Marcos'
dictation, was presented to constitutional con-
vention delegates in late October-along with in-
structions to complete action on it by December,
The new document provides for an interim
government in which Marcos will exercise the
combined powers of the president under the pres-
ent constitution and the prime minister under the
new one. According to the terms of the draft,
Marcos will decide when and how to introduce
the parliamentary system-which means he may,
-_~ if he chooses) !retain supreme authority indefi-
nitely. Marcos evidently believes he must move
quickly to get public ratification of the new gov-
ernment before disillusion with his martial law
regime_can set in.
IThe Liberal Democratic Party should retain
a comfortable Diet majority in the general elec-
tions on 10 December. The last Diet was dissolved
earlier this week, and more than 800 candidates
for the new one are blanketing the country with
intensive media and mailing campaigns. Japanese
law restricts the campaign to three weeks.?
Prime Minister Tanaka's immense personal
popu arity has dimmed the opposition's hopes of
recouping the losses suffered in the last election
three years ago. Moreover, broad support for his
self-assurance in dealing with the US and for his
normalization of relations with Peking has robbed
his critics of much ammunition. Lacking other
issues, the opposition parties are being forced to
focus on charges that the defense build-up plan
and the Mutual Security Treaty with the US con-
tradict trends toward a relaxation of world
tensions. The opposition will attempt to exploit
friction related to US bases in Japan.'
Although the Liberal Democrats might lose
up to 15 of their 297 seats in the 491-member
House of Representatives, there will be no sig-
nificant shift in the balance of party power. The
Socialists, Japan's second largest party, have
largely suppressed their ideological feuds and
overcome their earlier identification with the
excesses of student radicals, which caused their
severe electoral setback in 1969. A shortage of
funds, however, will limit their ability to increase
their Diet seats at Tanaka's expense. The small,
but well-organized Communist Party may pick up
a few seats, but the Komeito and Democratic
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NORTH KOREA: TRADE WITH JAPAN
1 JA North Korean economic mission has com-
pleted the first tour of Japanese industrial facili-
ties in recent years, but the tour is not ikely to
have much impact on bilateral economic ties in
' the near future. The trade mission's claim that
92Pyongyang is prepared to import 20 whole plants
for the production of iron and steel, chemicals,
and automobiles is doubtless exaggerated, but
some deals were very likel discussed with-arkLate
Japanese investors.
The delegation failed
to meet with Japanese officials, however, in-
dicating that the thornier questions of Japanese
trade credits and relaxation of trade controls re-
main unresolved.)
,2 \ )Although still small, Japanese - North
'Korean trade has grown in recent years. The total
value increased from $28 million in 1966 to al-
most $60 million in 1971 It may reach $100
1111111VII L1113 yCdl . I V1 L11C IIIVJL yal L, JdF1d11CJC
exports-consisting largely of specialized steel