WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010000010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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V Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Department review completed
22 December 1972
No. 0401/72
Copy N2 44
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t by an uoauthorizrd p-erson is prohibited by
CONTENTS (22 December 1972)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
6 Indochina
10 USSR-China: Bitter as Ever
14
15
16
17
18
19
19
USSR: The SST Story
Yugoslavia: A Purge Rolls On
Romania: More Recycling
European Security: Off the Blocks
Austria-Yugoslavia: Signs of Strife
France: A Slow Start
Iceland: Gambit Declined
20 Uganda: Time! for the British
21 Angola-Zaire: Insurgents, Unite
22 Greece: The Economy Soars
22 Malagasy Republic: Tribal Unrest
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
24 Ecuador: Toward the Brink
24 Peru: Tuna and Arms
25 Uruguay: Halt, Who Goes Where?
26 Argentina: Peronist Problems
27 Chile: Prats' Expanding Role
'We t. gal the week tt rouaan noon o Thursday.
GARY, issued every Freday adorning by
udss material roor'xin-nted with or prepared
Economic Research,tr.e Office of Strategic
rectorate of micic-nce and technology.
y n .it = compretaer:oive treat=twat and there-
SUMMARY corttains s. iassified information
Al Title 18, sections 93 and 794 of the US
d. > t.o transmission or reveiation of its con-
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The political elite from across the Soviet
Union gathered in Moscow for a week of business
and celebration of the nation's 50th anniversary.
They quickly got a dash of cold water when it
was revealed that, because of poor economic per-
formance this year, the goals for next year had to
be trimmed with the Soviet consumer taking the
worst of it. Although it was not revealed publicly,
military spending will, however, creep up again
next year. Several shifts in leadership posts were
announced, and Brezhnev displayed his continued
primacy by holding the limelight during the week.
The Central Committee and the Supreme
Soviet, meeting on Monday and Tuesday, ap-
proved major plan goals for 1973. The goals had
to be scaled down because of the poor economic
performance this year. The Soviets failed to reach
their industrial goal and suffered a large decline in
agricultural output. Preliminary data indicate that
Gross National Product in 1972 may grow at the
smallest rate since World War 11.
In late September Premier Kosygin had pub-
licly warned of the serious effects of a construc-
tion lag on industrial production. Baibakov also
attributed this year's industrial slowdown to the
failure to introduce new production capacity,
adding that the poor harvest had a "negative
effect" on several branches of industry. Baibakov
went on to say that the "lag in the commissioning
of production capacities, especially in ferrous
metallurgy, chemicals, oil, gas, and light indus-
tries, as well as a shortage of a number of agricul-
tural raw materials" forced general reductions in
the targets for 1973, the third year of the five-
year plan. Goals for the light and processed food
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industries were cut back relatively more than
those for heavy industry. Thus the leadership has
been diverted at least temporarily from a policy
begun in the late 1960s of faster growth in the
consumer goods industries than in industrial
materials and machinery.
Although investment data for 1973 are
meager, the farm sector apparently will maintain
its high priority. The 1973 plan calls for agricul-
tural production to increase 'by almost 13 percent
to a level in keeping with the five-year plan goals.
Soviet leaders apparently view the 1972 failure
primarily as an aberration because of the weather
and are still committed to Brezhnev's ambitious
agricultural program.
The major loser in 1973 will be the con-
sumer. Enough foreign grain has been purchased
to assure the Soviet consumer of a basic supply of
daily calories, but shortages of other farm
products and a reduced livestock inventory will
SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH*
Annual percentage rates of growth, rounded to nearest half percent
1966-70
Actual
1971-75
Plan
1971
Actual
1972
Preliminary
Gross national product
5.5
6
3.5
1.5
Industrial output
7
8
5
4.5
Agricultural output
4
3.5
-0.5
-8
* Western measures
1973 ECONOMIC PLANS REVISED*
Percentage rates of growth
Original Goal Revis
ed Goal
National income
7.2
6.0
Gross industrial output
7.8
5.8
Group A (mainly producers' goods)
7.6
6.3
Group B (mainly consumers' goods)
8.1
4.5
Retail trade
7.6
5.0
Average monthly earnings:
of wage & salary workers
4.5
2.7
of collective farmers
7.6
4.4
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slow down the improvement in the quality of the
daily diet. Baibakov tried to reassure the populace
that consumer supplies would be adequate "in the
main." A sizable cut in the retail trade plan for
1973, however, clearly signals shortfalls to come.
In an attempt to maintain some balance between
supply and demand, all personal income goals for
1973 are being held substantially below the
original five-year plan targets. Per capita real
income rose by only 3.7 percent in 1972, by far
the smallest annual increase under the current
leadership.
The reduction in economic targets is a bitter
pill for the leadership to swallow and must have
involved some very tough decisions. In particular,
the acceptance of lower targets for processed
food and light industries and the reduction in
goals for family incomes compromise the con-
sumer program that Brezhnev emphasized at the
24th Party Congress. That program was con-
troversial, and Politburo member Shelest, for
example, spoke against making promises-talking
"about a horn of plenty"-which he implied
would be hard to fulfill.
Brezhnev, however, has succeeded in under-
cutting the position of some critics such as
Shelest. V. P. Mzhavanadze's departure from the
Politburo, presaged by his retirement as Georgian
party chief in September, also serves Brezhnev's
purposes. The emphasis on raising living standards
continues, suggesting that Brezhnev, despite the
difficulties, will try to maintain the existing line
on economic policies.
Finance Minister Garbuzov told the assem-
bled dignitaries that the 1973 appropriation for
defense will be 17.9 billion rubles-identical to
the announced figure for the three previous years.
The revelation of yet another unchanged defense
budget presumably was designed to project an
image of moderation and detente consistent with
the spirit of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Agreement.
This official figure, however, does not in-
clude a number of allocations normally associated
with defense. The largest and most significant of
these is military research and development. Mili-
tary research and development programs appear
to be funded principally out of science appropria-
tions. The plan for science outlays was reported
by Minister Garbuzov to be 7.2 percent larger
than was spent last year. As always, the portion
of the science budget allocated to military pur-
poses was not identified.
The newly released defense and science
budgets are consistent with observed Soviet force
structures and defense programs. Intelligence
analysis projects a slight rise for 1973 in Soviet
spending on deployed forces. As in past years,
military research and development expenditures
are expected to rise more rapidly. When the intel-
ligence estimates for military research and de-
velopment are added to those for the deployed
forces, total outlays will reach an estimated level
of slightly over 22 billion rubles-the equivalent
of nearly $70 billion valued at 1970 US costs.
This will be the greatest amount ever spent for
defense in the Soviet Union, and represents an
over-all increase of about 2.5 percent over our
estimate for 1972.
The Central Committee added Vladimir I.
Dolgikh to the party secretariat while dropping
Mzhavanadze as a candidate member of the
Politburo.
Dolgikh probably will assume the responsi-
bility for heavy industry that Mikhail Soloment-
sev exercised before he became premier of the
Russian Republic in July 1971. To his new post
Dolgikh, 48, brings a background as an industrial
manager and a reputation for energetic promotion
of Siberian development. He was director of the
Norilsk Mining-Metallurgical Combine from 1962
to 1969, when he became party chief of the
Krasnoyarsk Kray in eastern Siberia.
In that position Dolgikh has forcefully
argued to many listeners-including the 24th
Party Congress and Western newsmen-the
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economic rationale of developing industry in
Krasnoyarsk and the necessity for building cor-
responding housing and social facilities there at an
accelerated rate. At the congress, he emphasized
the cheapness of Krasnoyarsk coal and thus
seemed to be vying with the Ukrainian coal in-
dustry, whose interests Politburo member Shelest
complained had been slighted. Dolgikh appears to
have no close ties to any senior leaders in Mos-
cow, but in June 1971 Brezhnev cited the com-
prehensive plan to develop Krasnoyarsk by 1980
as a model for other eastern regions. F
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0r-utiC I
CUBA: NEGOTIATIONS SI, DETENTE NO
Fearful that Havana's hijacking negotiations
with the US might discredit his anti-imperialist
credentials, Fidel Castro has publicly rejected any
general reconciliation. Speaking at a rally for
Chile's President Allende in Havana last week,
Castro warned against interpreting Cuba's desire
to reach an agreement with the US on hijacking as
a sign that Havana is seeking a broad rapproche-
ment. He did not entirely rule out discussions
aimed at improving relations, but he did set such
stringent conditions that their acceptance by the
US would be considered a major victory for his
regime and a humiliating reverse for the US.
There can be little doubt that Castro genu-
inely wants to halt the flow of criminals and
lunatics who enter Cuba as air pirates. Despite his
claim that "aircraft hijacking was invented by
Yankee imperialism against our country," it was
his own rebel group that introduced the tactic as
a political weapon by commandeering a Cuban
domestic flight in October 1958 during the revo-
lution. The subsequent propaganda lauding this
action prompted Castro adherents in Miami to
attempt a similar venture less than two weeks
later. This time, however, the plane crashed in
eastern Cuba with great loss of life; the disaster
gave the rebels a black eye. Castro wants to avoid
a repetition of that damaging incident, and the
particularly vicious nature of the hijackings in
October and November may have moved him to
negotiate.
Until now, Havana's main efforts to dis-
courage air piracy have consisted of punitive
measures. Hijackers not accepted by Havana as
true revolutionaries are frequently jailed or placed
in a mental institution. Even some of those not
confined have found life in Cuba so depressing
that they have chosen to return to the US to face
prosecution. Several have attempted suicide, and
at least one was successful. Harsh treatment has
not served as a sufficient deterrent, however, and
after the last two incidents Castro felt the time
had come to take broader measures.
His willingness to negotiate on this specific
point-occurring as it did in an era of change in
US foreign policy-aroused widespread specula-
tion that talks might be expanded to cover other
topics and might eventually develop into a Cuban-
US reconciliation. Castro felt it necessary to spike
this line of reasoning and dispel any hint that he
might be compromising his principles for selfish
national interests. He reasserted his long-standing
conditions for discussions with the US. Before
any such talks begin, he emphasized, the US must
halt its "economic blockade." There is no reason
to assume that Castro has waived his other long-
standing demands that the US relinquish the
Guantanamo naval base and act to prevent any
further exile hostilities against Cuba, but by
stressing the blockade issue Castro could be laying
a groundwork for demanding that the US pay
reparations for damages to the Cuban economy
caused by the US economic denial campaign. He
realizes that his package of demands is unac-
ceptable to the US, and he has offered it in that
spirit. Hostility to the US is woven too deeply
into the fabric of Castro's Cuba for him to work
seriously for an improvement in relations at this
time. 25X1
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.~tUHE I
The North Vietnamese reacted to the re-
newed bombing in predictable fashion: immediate
condemnation in low-level commentaries,
followed by a Foreign Ministry statement on 19
December and a government statement on the
21st. As of noon on 21 December, however, there
was still no authoritative commentary on the
impasse in the negotiations.
The commentaries on the bombing were
straightforward and devoid of surprises. The
themes were the alleged duplicity of the US, the
perseverance of the Vietnamese people, and the
need for pressure from world opinion to force the
US to sign the draft accord. There was no hint
that the bombing posed an immediate threat to
the Paris talks.
preparing their propaganda accordingly. North
Vietnam apparently saw a need for high-level con-
sultations with its Communist allies. Truong
Chinh, the number-two man in they Politburo,
left Hanoi on 16 December for Moscow at the
head of a delegation to the anniversary ceremo-
nies there. He is accompanied by Hoang Van
Hoan, another Politburo figure. Chinh's presence
in Moscow is unusual; he has concerned himself
largely with domestic affairs and has conducted
no official business abroad in recent years. More-
over, relations with the Soviets have always been
the special concern of party First Secretary Le
Duan. The North Vietnamese may have decided
Le Duan was needed at home in the present
sensitive period and that in his absence only
Truong Chinh carried the necessary prestige and
authority to represent North Vietnam.
The most recent substantive Vietnamese
Communist commentary on the negotiations was
keyed to President Thieu's speech of 12 Sep-
tember. The Hanoi press has criticized Thieu for
attacking the "basic principles" of the draft agree-
ment by calling for North Vietnamese troop with-
drawals from the South and for the creation of a
"permanent political" boundary at the Demilita-
rized Zone. Hanoi's main point seems to be that it
is the US which wants to alter the principles
behind the "approved" peace agreement and that
Thieu's proposals were made at US instigation.
The Viet Cong have laid out Communist
complaints in more detail. The US is charged with
making new demands on three basic issues: the
"withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops," the
"restoration of the DMZ," and South Vietnam's
"right to self-determination." The tone is tough
but while the Viet Cong "fllatly reject" the first
point, they are slightly less categorical in the
second, saying only that they "unquestionably
opposed" it, and the third is merely criticized
without stating the Communist position ex-
plicitly.
Whatever the specifics, it seems clear that
even before Dr. Kissinger's press conference the
Vietnamese Communists recognized that a sticky
period in the negotiations was at hand and were
Soviet party leader Brezhnev's speech at the
50th anniversary celebrations in Moscow on 21
December included a strong statement of support
for the Vietnamese, and, for the first time since
Premier Kosygin's election speech in June 1971,
an explicit threat that progress in US-Soviet re-
lations could be affected by developments in
Indochina. Brezhnev promised that "no new
crimes" of the United States would shake the
determination of Vietnam's friends to provide
all-round support to its liberation struggle, and he
called attention to Moscow's "active assistance"
to help the Vietnamese gain a "just, peaceful
settlement."
Brezhnev's remarks were undoubtedly dic-
tated in part by his audience, which included
senior North and South Vietnamese Communists
and representatives from most other foreign Com-
munist parties. Brezhnev made clear, moreover,
that the USSR still has hope for better Soviet-US
relations. He said that if the two countries can
follow the course charted during last May's sum-
mit meeting, then substantial new steps for the
benefit of Soviet-US relations and for mankind
.'may become possible through further contacts."
On 20 December, the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry delivered to the US Embassy a brief pro
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On the Ground in South Vietnam: South Vietnamese (above), Viet Cong (below)
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forma protest note which charged that the Soviet
merchant ship Michurin was damaged on 18 De-
cember during US air raids on Haiphong. The
note was apparently designed to make the inci-
dent a matter of record. The US Embassy reports
that contacts with Soviet officials remain cordial.
A film show on President Nixon's visit to the
USSR was hosted by the Foreign Ministry on 19
December, and the atmosphere was unaffected by
developments in Vietnam.
Peking Keeps a Low Posture
Peking's initial authoritative reaction to re-
newed US bombing of North Vietnam and the
impasse at Paris-a Foreign Ministry statement
issued on 20 December-is a mild restatement of
long-standing Chinese positions and views. Taken
as a whole, it appears to represent little more than
the minimum that Peking can safely say at high
levels given the circumstances. Nowhere in the
statement does Peking register alarm about
prospects for an eventual agreement or hint that
the turn of events has wider implications for
Chinese policy. Nor does Peking express explicit
backing of Vietnamese Communist terms for an
agreement or pledge stepped-up Chinese political
and military support for Hanoi, even though a
North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry statement
issued on 19 December specifically asked for this.
Lower level statements out of Peking-a New
China News Agency commentary and NCNA
pick-ups of American press comment-strike a
slightly tougher tone, but this almost certainly is
meant by Peking to pacify the North Vietnamese.
It seems plain from their public stance so far that
the Chinese do not view recent events as a reason
to change their own course with respect to the
war and post-war relationships.
In Quang Tri, enemy gunners have combined
heavy artillery and rocket fire with stiff ground
resistance to thwart South Vietnamese operations
north and west of the provincial capital.
A Party Is Born
With well-staged pageantry, President
Thieu's Democracy Party was officially and
publicly introduced last weekend in Quang Nam
Province. Similar introductory ceremonies are
scheduled during the coming weeks in other prov-
inces, culminating in a national convention in
Saigon next February.
For more than a year, recruiters have been
active throughout the country signing up mem-
bers. Although they have had considerable success
in terms of numbers, chiefly among civilian of-
ficials and military officers, the depth of com-
mitment of some of the recruits is doubtful.
Many have joined to avoid harassment or to ad-
vance their careers. While several high-level mili-
tary officers have joined, some senior com-
manders have refused on the grounds that the
military should not be oriented toward any party.
Among those refusing was the commander for
Military Region 1, General Truong, who is
generally rated as the country's best officer.
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