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March 23, 1973
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State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 `-Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 23 March 1973 No. 0362/73 Copy N2 45 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by =.)f Current intelligence. reports and analyzes signif- iopments of the week through noon on Thursday. iv includes material coordinated with or prepared ice of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic and the Directorate of Science and Technology. f more comprehensive treatment and there- CONTENTS (_'3 March 1973) 1 Indochina 5 China: Economic Slowdown 6 Burma: In from the Cold? 6 The Koreas: At Loggerheads 7 Philippines: Refugee Problems 8 Indonesia: Just Fade Awav 9 Europe: Force Reduction Talks 10 East Germany: Summer Happening 12 Money: Markets; EC; Middle East MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 14 Egypt: Economic; Cabinet Change 15 Morocco: Incident in Interior 16 Somalia-Ethiopia: Border Tensions 17 Iran: Campuses Closed 17 Sudan: Mending Fences 18 Pakistan: No Better Off 18 Turkey: Full Circle for Sunay WESTERN HEMISPHERE 19 Panama: Back to Business 19 Argentina: Morning After 21 Colombia: A Mixed Bag Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summer , Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 NMWI SECRET inOTMDocr~inA a shaky ruse ), fhe cease-fire got a little shaky last week as the word spread that the Communists were con- tinuing to reinforce their troops in the South. Several sharp battles were fought north of Saigon and west of Hue-areas long used by the Com- munists to move troops from the border areas into South Vietnam. )Most of the recent military activity has cen- tered around government outposts in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong provinces. Communist main force units have isolated a Ranger camp at Tonle Cham, preventing even aerial resupply, and have hit government positions farther south at Rach Bap, Lai Khe, and Ben Cat. The ICCS has ordered an investigation of the fighting, but the Com- munist delegates on the Four-Power Joint Mili- tary Commission have so far thwarted attempts to arrange an on-site inspection)) At week's end, the South Vietnamese Government had begun moving to clear the trouble spots, conscious that this could lead to a major battle.) j1 = In the northern provinces, the most sig- nificant fighting developed in outlying areas as government forces patrolled near Communist infiltration routes. This happened west of Hue, where the Communists are trying to develop an access route to the coastal lowlands, and in the Que Son Valley, where Communist units have reportedly been reinforced with newly arrived armor and artillery. In Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnamese officials believe that the Com- munists are about to make a renewed attempt to capture the coastal village of Sa Huynh to use as a deepwater seaportI Who's Supervising j STwo months after the signing of the cease- fire agreement, the various supervisory agencies are talking in a variety of forums, but making only spotty progress on specific issues. Polariza- tion has hampered the International Commission for Control and Supervision. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission is due to expire with little to its credit beyond the exchange of prison- ers and its Two-Party successor may prove even less effective: !; h In the international commission, the Cana- dians and Indonesians have usually lined up on SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SLUHt one side and the Hungarians and Poles on the other. Only a few reports of cease-fire violations have been investigated. In those few cases, where a final report could be compiled, it died a quiet death in the Joint Military Commission. The international commission has also been hampered by personality clashes: in particular the Com- munist delegations resent Canadian efforts to give purpose and direction to the body.! !The Four-Party Commission scheduled to expire on 28 March, thus far has made little use of its authority to investigate truce violations, spending most of its energy handling Communist complaints over living conditions, freedom of movement, and harassment of their delegations:? Maneuvering is growing more intense over the South Vietnamese - Viet Cong Two-Party Joint Military Commission that is supposed to take over. A Hungarian member of the interna- tional commission recently told US officials that the Viet Cong delegates would insist on moving from their isolated compound at Ton Son Nhut Air Base to downtown Saigon or to a contested area once their North Vietnamese colleagues depart. 'The Viet Cong clearly are pushing for greater public exposure than Saigon is ready to concede. Viet Cong General Tra is expected to stay on as head of the Communist side of the two-party commission. Saigon has named a rather undistinguished general to head its contingent. Progress on this front is so questionable that there has been some press speculation the four-party body may be extended another 45 days.. Meanwhile, political talks between the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong formally opened in Paris on 19 March. The two parties have yet to agree on an agenda, and outside the meeting, the Communists have engaged in relatively low-key polemics. Laying the groundwork for elections in South Vietnam will be a major part of the discus- sions, but progress, if any, on this and other issues is likely to be slow in view of the deep suspicions and dramatically different objectives of the two sides.! Political Parties Stirring The approach of the deadline next week by which South Vietnamese political parties must meet the terms of the presidential decree trig- gered a flurry of last-minute activity. Several par- ties are trying to form an alliance to preserve their status, but the government's relatively new Democracy Party has been making headway at their expense. Some parties may be put out of business or forced to go underground. r 'Two of the better organized parties-the Farmer-Worker Party and the Progressive Nation- alist Movement-are now talking about joining forces with several smaller groups! Another new alliance, the Catholic-based Freedom Party, applied for provisional recognition several weeks ago. Both coalitions will have trouble meeting the requirement that they win 20 percent of the vote if the Senate elections are held as scheduled next August 1 ;One of the most prominent leaders of the Farmer-Worker Party, Lower House Chairman Nguyen Ba Can, says he is switching to the Demo- cracy Party and estimates that more than half of SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET his party officials have already done so. Can claims that Democracy Party leadership is weak and corrupt, but he considers it impossible for any independent party to operate effectively "in the middle" between the Communists and the administration. Can has cooperated with the gov- ernment in the past, but he is one of the first prominent political figures with some degree of independence to make a commitment to the Democracy Party. A number of other strongly anti-Communist figures may share his attitude and conclude that it is a practical necessity to identify with the government in its political strug- gle with the Viet Conga IThe Democracy Party now has chapters in 38 of the country's 56 provinces and autonomous cities and is planning a national convention in the near future. The first test of its strength may come when village council elections are held later this spring. The government seems certain to make a strong effort to elect Democracy Party members to the councils. The .decision to resume the elections, suspended during the Communist offensive last May, reflects the government's desire to show its own constitutional legitimacy at the local level in light of.the political negotia- tions with the Viet Cong:11 President Thieu has indicated that the elections will be held in rela- tively secure government-controlled areas. This would rule out any overt Communist participa- tion unless the two sides have reached agreement in their Paris talks.! jC? The day before the deadline (24 March) for the formation of a new coalition government-as set by the peace accord signed last month-a government spokesman announced that more time will be needed to reach an agreement. The Communists have been deliberately stalling all week, and their ranking delegates left Vientiane on 22 March for consultations at Sam Neua.j 1-j The major impediment to progress is the continued absence of the chief Communist nego- tiator, Phoumi Vongvichit. Until he returns to Vientiane, high-level discussions on the composi- tion of the future cabinet cannot begin, and the official negotiating sessions will remain pro forma exercises Despite the failure to form a new govern- ment, the major provisions of last month's settle- ment remain in force. One effect of the delay, however, is to set back the deadline for the with- drawal of North Vietnamese troops. Under the terms of the agreement signed last month the withdrawal of foreign forces must be completed 60 days after the formation of the new gov- ernment. All Quiet on the Fronts (There is a good chance that the cease-fire will continue to hold. There are no signs of any impending increase in military activityjThrough- out the week field commanders reported only minor skirmishing near Khong Sedone and Pak- song in the south and between Thakhek and Dong Hene in the central panhandle. In the north, Com- munist units reacted to a move by Vang Pao to establish a presence along Route 4 southeast of the Plaine des Jarresjj but elsewhere Communist and government units are honoring informal local cease-fire arrangements.? Lao students demonstrate support for cease-fire. SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET CAMBODIA: UNHAPPY ANNIVERSARY the 18th of March 1970 is an important date on Lon Nol's calendar. It marked the end of Sihanouk's rule and the beginning of his own. Any plans the President may have had to com- memorate the date this year literally went up in smoke on 17 March. A disaffected Cambodian Air Force,pilot bombed the presidential residence, and although Lon Nol escaped injury, 43 of his coun- trymen were killed. The bombing was not the only violence in the capital on the 17th. A few hours before the bombing incident, two people were killed and several injured when Cambodian Army troops threw grenades into a crowd of striking teachers who had gathered to decide whether to continue their month-old protests against the government's economic policies. The soldiers, in civilian dress reportedly were under orders from Lon Nol's younger brother, Brigadier General Lon Non, to enforce the regime's ban on such assemblies. Considerable confusion has surrounded the two incidents. The regime was quick to allege that the events, as well as the continuing anti-govern- merit protests by teachers and students, were part of a coordinated plot against the republic. A state of emergency was immediately proclaimed, and the government began to move against various opposition elements and members of the royal family including Republican Party Chief Sirik Matak. A government spokesman on 22 March attempted to dispel reports that Matak is under house arrest, but in effect confirmed that he is being held incommunicado. The move against Matak probably stems from recent rumors that he has been involved in royalist plotting against the government, allega- tions probably circulated by Matak's long-time foe, Brigadier General Lon Non, who is deter- mined to block Matak's appointment to the vice- presidency. The government's action against Matak will intensify political tensions in Phnom Penh and make important figures in the govern- ment apprehensive about their own positions. Army Chief of Staff General Fernandez, another of Lon Non's political enemies, will be especially SECRET D a 1AJ P V1 V cl 1MFAARV 2-~ Mar 7-~ Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 pproved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001 CHINA: ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN ( I In contrast to its sparkling performance in foreign affairs, China suffered an economic set- back last year. Gross national product barely kept pace with the relentless 2-percent annual increase in population. Agricultural production may have declined by as much as 5 percent, and the growth in industrial output probably fell to around 8 percent. China's news media provided ample documentation that agriculture, still the founda- tion of China's industrializing economy, had an off year. Some slippage had been anticipated in the rate of economic growth, because most of the slack in the non-agricultural sectors caused by the Cultural Revolution had been taken up over the previous two years. The slowdown, however, was greater than expected; agricultural produc- tion was hit by adverse weather, shortages of raw materials slowed industrial expansion, transporta- tion was hampered by bottlenecks, and key con- struction projects were not finished. Local authorities commonly misused the decision- making authority they inherited after the Cultural Revolution. Production gains were reported in steel, petroleum, and a few other industrial goods, but in every case the rate of increase was below those registered in 1971. Chinese Agriculture Less reason for smiles Peking's reaction thus far has been one of cautious concern rather than panic. Some adjust- ments have been made in national economic plans. The government cut the 1973 ration of cotton cloth, strengthened measures to conserve food, increased emphasis on the mining of raw materials, and acted to curb unsanctioned eco- nomic activities by local authorities. Peking has shown a greater willingness to increase imports to support agriculture and maintain living standards. Grain and cotton imports have been stepped up, and China has purchased these commodities from the US for the first time in more than two decades. Moreover, Peking is again accepting cred- its and has recently contracted to buy six Western plants, worth almost $150 million, to expand production of fertilizer and synthetic fibers. Agriculture is, as always, the crucial element in China's economic future. Peking gives every indication that it will take measures to restore momentum in this key sector, and with rea- sonably good weather, may succeed. The con- tinuation of pragmatic economic policies is crucial to China's being able to feed and clothe its huge population and still make progress in de- veloping a modern industrial and technical SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET ;The Burmese, upon gaining independence 25 years ago, adopted an isolationist foreign policy that is still pursued today. Although xenophobia has helped Burma avoid a number of international pitfalls, it has done little to improve thorny prob- lems at home like a stagnant, ill-managed econ- omy and widespread, foreign-assisted insurgency. Recently, Rangoon has been cautiously emerging from its self-imposed shell to explore the chang- ing diplomatic waters in Southeast Asia.' ,This past January, in a marked departure from its policy of avoiding regional forums, Rangoon announced its willingness to participate in a ten-nation conference on ,regional develop- ment after the Indochina war; the only proviso attached was that the North Vietnamese must be invited. In recent weeks the Burmese have been receptive to Thailand's overtures for improved relations. Last week the Burmese foreign minister visited Bangkokj(fhe Burmese have also softened their attitude toward UN involvement in a limited narcotics suppression program and are co- operating in a field survey. Rangoon probably judges that the end of the Indochina war and shifting power relationships will ease the way for Burmese participation in regional affairs without violating Burma's neutralist credentials. ,Rangoon may also have decided that its iso- lationism provided little immunity from Chinese- inspired subversion and that the problem might he eased if outside opinion could be focused on it. In recent weeks, government officials have actively sought international assistance in curbing Chinese support to the insurgents. Burma's small size and proximity to China sharply limit what Rangoon can do to counter Chinese subversion. There is no sign that Rangoon intends to take any step that would inflame its relations with Peking, such as asking for sig- nificant Soviet military aid to counter the-insur- gency. 1 During three days of negotiations in Pyong- yang last week the North-South Coordinating Committee found little to agree on, and no com- munique was issued. The lack of progress appears to have resulted from a tougher North Korean negotiating position. Although the details of the actual discussions are not yet available, North Korean Vice Premier Pak Song-chol gave a press conference his version of what went on. He indi- cated that the North Koreans had demanded a mutual reduction in arms and military manpower, a withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea, and a peace treaty as prerequisites for progress.; -Although these demands have been part of North Korean propaganda for some time, they had not been raised before as conditions in the negotiations. Their introduction in this way now underscores the importance Pyongyang attaches to the withdrawal of US and UN forces from the South. Pyongyang would also like to halt the modernization of the South Korean military, since the North is having difficulty sustaining heavy military investment in the face of the grow- ing demands of an expanding economy.] =The North Koreans may believe that these tough tactics now will pay dividends. A similar approach worked late last year when Pyongyang launched a harsh propaganda campaign, and Seoul responded by coming to terms on the organiza- tion and functions of the coordinating commit- tee. Pyongyang may have perpetrated the shoot- ing incident in the DMZ earlier in the month to underscore the fragile nature of the detente.; ;Although the South Koreans were prepared to discuss substantive economic and cultural ques- tions in the meetings last week, they flatly re- jected the new North Korean demands. Pyong- yang does not anticipate that its tough tactics will effect an immediate change in Seoul's position; but the North will keep the pressure on, tensions may be escalated, and pauses between sessions lengthened. SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 14W StUKt I THE PHILIPPINES: REFUGEE PROBLEMS , '1After several weeks in the headlines, the pable of routing the well-armed dissidents from Muslim uprising in the south is back on the inside their fortified strongholds in the interior of Min- pages. The atmosphere in the southern islands danao and on scattered islands in the Sulu Archi- remains tense, however, and thousands of Chris- pelago'.) fThe fighting has already driven thousands of amilies out of their homes. Most Muslims have fled to Sabah and its offshore islands where they iyU,UUU sand =.0UU,000 retugees. I he figures may snot be%p urgte, since it is difficult for the govern- ment:;:to,. count the refugees. Their numbers are, nevertheless, significant, and Manila will be hard pissed t 3 pr vid equate relief. The problem can ortly grow .unttiil ccurity improves so that the Initially, s surprise attacks caught government forces c& pletely off guard in many areas. Novo; the govern- refugees cart b erf'tg ack home. SECRET On 16 March, he flew to Zamboanga td-i2ei t with local civilian officials in an effort, tq; ip$i a ment pressure the Muslim population without relax ing_govern searching for new ways to isolate the rebbls r`orno( tians and Muslims have fled their homes, creating a sizable refugee probleni President Marcos claims that government forces are firmly in con-!l trol. He is playing down the military threat and is of the amnesty period1(during wh`ich_ dissid5'r.t5 have relatives and friends. Their plight adds fuel may surrender without penalty, and\h? will pr'ofi- to an international Muslim campaign about Ma- ably establish some sort of blue ribbon gmmit#ee nila's treatment of its Muslim minority. Christian to consult with Muslim leaders. Such 1)Iliativ refugees have flocked to the government-con- seem unlikely to be more successful th lm~I--f trolled urban areas -where they compete for lim- efforts in the past, since Muslim confidence in th Ited;, food stocks.)IThe Philippine Government ment seems to have regained the initiative at least in some places.JThe armed forcessst'ill seem inca- Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET -: ' he Indonesian armed forces in the mid- 1960s potentially were one of the strongest in the Far East. Massive Soviet and Eastern European aid had provided Jakarta with one of the most impressive arsenals in the region. After the failure of the Communist coup attempt in 1965, how- ever, the government formed by Suharto decided that the economy could no longer afford the free-spending defense policies of former president Sukarno.' ';Since then, the Soviet weapons held by the I n d o n e s i a n armed forces have deteriorated rapidly. The Indonesian Government has been unable to obtain sufficient spare parts and tech- nical assistance, and, today, almost all of this Soviet equipment is inoperable. Although Suharto has been able to get some replacements from the West, Indonesia's air, naval, and ground combat capabilities have gradually weakened: of the jet bombers has flown for several years. In an effort to restore some combat capability to the air force, Australia recently delivered 16 F-86 jet fighters to Indonesia, and Jakarta is looking to the US for additional assistance.l \The Indonesian Navy received an impressive number of warships from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They included a Sverdlov-class light cruiser, eight Skoryy-class destroyers, eight Riga-class destroyer escorts, 12 W-class attack submarines, and 12 Komar- and 16 Kronstadt- class patrol boats. Almost none of these ships are operational, and most are being scrapped. The navy has been reduced to a coastal patrol force, although it still can move a limited number of troops to outlying islands for counterinsurgency and security duty. Although attempts are being made to obtain patrol craft from Australia and the US is providing a destroyer escort, the navy's role will be limited in the future.I ''The army has suffered less from the dete- rioration of Soviet equipment because less than 20 percent of the items in its inventory are So- viet-made. Nevertheless, much of the army's mixed arsenal of Communist and Western weap- ons is not in working order, and the army could not repel a major attack on the country. The number of troops has been gradually reduced over the past few years, and a further reduction of some 50,000 from the present level of 225,000 is planned. The idea is to create a more mobile force capable of coping with insurgency threats and undertaking related civic action programs. ;Nearly 80 percent of the aircraft in Indo- nesia's air force in the mid-1960s came from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These included 26 TU-16 jet medium bombers, 28 IL-28 jet light bombers, and nearly 100 MIG-21, MIG-19, and MIG-17 jet fighters. The air force also received equipment for three SA-2 missile sites, several IL-24 and AN-12 transports, and MI-4 and MI-6 helicopters. Almost all of this equipment has been put in storage.1 fhe air force now is essentially a transport service, and it relies on a few vintage US aircraft to fill this role. Indonesia would be virtually de- fenseless against air intrusions, and the air force could provide little tactical ground support. None Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET EUROPE: FORCE REDUCTION TALKS After another two weeks of consultations, NAYO and the Warsaw Pact delegates have failed to resolve the Hungarian participation issue that has held up the initial talks on force reductions since late January. An end to the deadlock is not in sight. The Soviets have reacted coolly to the most recent allied proposal-that the status of Hungary be left in abeyance for the time being so that the initial talks might move on to other matters. Moscow continues to find unacceptable any pro- posal that singles out Hungary. Thus, it maintains that if Hungary is to participate in the talks, so should Italy, and that if Hungary's status is left in abeyance, Italy's should be also. Some of the NATO allies oppose such a linkage. The Soviets have not, however, formally re- jected the Western proposal. In informal conversa- tions, they have floated the idea of including Hungary in a constraints area even if it were not a direct participant in the negotiations, provided that similar constraints were applied to Italy. This would have some appeal to the Belgians and Dutch, who originally made their participation conditional on Hungary's being included and who see constraints as an end in themselves. The Hungarians, strongly supported by the Soviets, have proposed that countries not directly involved initially should later be able to petition the participants to be included. In this regard, the Soviets have emphasized that it is important to leave open a way for France to join the talks. In fact, the Soviets have lately begun to stress the theme of France's eventual participation It will be difficult to find a way out of the Hungarian quagmire. Any compromise solution is certain to get a hard look in the North Atlantic Council, where the European allies remain con- vinced that the whole force reduction exercise raises basic security issues and that concessions to the Soviets at this early stage would set a bad precedent. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET Festival to be held in East Berlin beginning 28 July. East Germany wants the nine-day affair to be a major international event and is seeking wide foreign participation. The festival's preparatory committee, dominated by the Soviets, chose East Berlin as the site to boost East Germany's pres- tige, but the possibility that the youth will again prove unmanageable is bothering festival spon- sors. 1 47 The festival theme will be, "the common stfuggle against world imperialism." The prelimi- nary schedule calls for heavy emphasis on the US role in Vietnam, Israeli "aggression," and "neo- colonialism." Angela Davis has been asked to take a leading role in demonstrations against "racial imperialism." As many as 50,000 delegates are expected to attend. The figure includes 20,000 East Germans, and the regime is doing all it can to whip up interest among the young.I "f n fhe festivals, beginning in Prague in 1947, have been designed as Communist propaganda spectaculars. They have not always produced pro- paganda coups for their Communist sponsors, generating instead disruptions and subsequent em- barrassment. The most recent festival, held in Sofia in 1968, was marred by violence and dis- putes over the participation of Czechoslovak "lib- erals" and the anti-Soviet antics of New Left agitators. The squabbles that marked the Sofia gathering raised considerable doubt whether the Communists would stage any more of these spec- taculars. The Soviets, however, apparently ecided in 1971 to have another go, presumably because Moscow judged that the international climate, at that time heavily influenced by Vietnam, offered overriding propaganda benefits for the bloc.'` ore recently, the Soviets have shown some 'cone rn that the customary provocative nature of these festivals conflicts with their support for East-West detente. In talks with US diplomats this month, Soviet youth officials appeared uneasy over this inconsistency. The reluctance of some Western youth groups to attend the festival with- For over a year Pankow has been working out guarantees of free debate, plus the dwindling hard on preparations for the tenth World Youth US presence in Indochina, could cause the SECRET Paae 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET Communists to tone down the affair this year. Indeed, some Western observers believe that these factors could present non-Communist representa- tives with a chance to take the initiative on such topics as human rights and. international coop- SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET MARKETS OPEN AGAIN %r~ -, 4 4) Only limited interventions by central banks has taken place since foreign exchange markets reopened Monday for the first time since 2 March. The dollar fluctuated slightly as official trading resumed. Japan sold some $50 million on Monday to keep the dollar's value from rising too fast, as seasonal trade factors produced an in- creased demand for dollars. The mark was the weakest currency in the European float, and the Bundesbank sold $10-15 million in Belgian francs and a smaller amount of Swedish and Danish crowns to keep the band intact. During the recent crisis, the mark appreciated more than any Euro- pean currency, except for the Swiss franc, and the weakness this week reflects fears that mark hold- ers will switch to other currencies. Several West European nations have in- stituted new controls to discourage capital in- flows. The Benelux countries, following the example of West Germany and Switzerland, imposed interest charges on non-resident com- mercial bank deposits. France stopped payment of interest on non-resident deposits. It also pro- hibited commercial banks from increasing their net foreign exchange liabilities to non-residents and from permitting such accounts to be used for the purchase of French securities. Finally, Stock- holm imposed new controls on foreign exchange holdings and operations of Swedish commercial banks. The government claims the new controls have already eased upward pressures on the kroner. The generally light trading activity in the reopened exchange markets indicates that most traders are taking a wait-and-see attitude. Those traders who speculated in marks and other strong currencies may well hold off repurchasing sub- stantial quantities of dollars until they get a clearer picture of trends. Preliminary analysis of balance-of-payments prospects in Japan and West- ern Europe suggests that pressures will build for further appreciation of the yen and mark and a depreciation of sterling. The International Monetary Fund and the Committee of Twenty, the fund's offspring that was given the job of developing a reform package, have had their roles in international monetary affairs diminished. Monetary reform is in fact being introduced as a result of exchange market pressures. The introduction of the European float, for example, has overtaken discussions about more flexible exchange rates. Moreover, the parities of the US dollar and the mark are being quoted in terms of Special Drawing Rights, in- stead of gold. Committee of Twenty meetings this week and next will make a fresh attempt to deal with the new situation." IMPACT ON THE EC }The EC emerged from the latest monetary crisis neither significantly strengthened nor weak- ened, but possibly with a better appreciation of the problems facing economic and monetary union. The narrow exchange-rate margins of EC currencies vis-a-vis each other have been retained in the joint float of six of the community SECRET Pane 12 WFFKI Y SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET currencies. This float, with the problem cur- rencies left out, may give the community breath- ing space to reach agreement on the nature and purpose of a community-wide intervention fund. The economic policy harmonization necessary for the long-run success of a monetary union still seems distant. Agreement on the partial float nevertheless showed a desire, especially on the part of Paris and Bonn, to act together. Political considerations were apparently as important as such economic considerations as preserving the common agricul- tural policy. The Europeans generally accepted London's decision not to take part as logical; with the UK in, a common float would have been jeopardized from the start. Rome's abstention, however, has given rise to charges, even from the Italian Communists, that the government has hurt the prospects for European unity. However much the monetary trouble took on the overtones of a confrontation between the EC and the US in which the community's unity was put to the test, the Europeans continued, in their search for a solution, to bid for US support for their efforts. The importance of the com- munity's trading ties to other European countries, meanwhile, has been highlighted by the participa- tion of Sweden, Norway, and Austria in the con- trolled EC float. Despite any political benefits from the com- munity's togetherness, economic integration suffered some setbacks. The new French and Benelux measures to deter inflows of foreign capital have further divided the EC's capital markets. Moreover, the exclusion of the UK, Italy, and Ireland from the fixed exchange rates inside the community will make it harder for the EC to determine its 1973-74 farm prices. The EC Council is still scheduled to begin this debate next month, but decisions may not come until next fall.? MIDDLE EAST: DOLLARS AND THE CRISES Although mbney f om the Middle East is widely rumored to have been a major factor in precipitating the recent exchange crises, there is no hard evidence that a massive intervention from the Middle East actually occurred. Of the esti- mated $13 billion exchanged during the recent crises, Middle East sales of dollars for gold and foreign exchange totaled no more than $1.5 bil- lion through early March, and probably were sub- stantially less. Saudi Arabian dollar holdings, about $2.5 billion, may have increased somewhat in recent months. Libya, with almost $3 billion in gold and foreign exchange, like Saudi Arabia, took substantial losses as a result of the dollar's devaluation. Kuwait also probably suffered some devaluation losses. There is little reason to suppose that any Middle East nation was intentionally seeking to weaken the dollar. Middle East money managers, like other portfolio managers, attempt to protect the value of their assets in a period of currency uncertainty. Indeed, they have been less willing than multinational corporations, including the large oil companies, to desert the dollar. Con- sequently, their losses have been relatively greater. Reported dollar sales on behalf of Middle East interests were distributed over a relatively long time and among different countries, belying the contention that these sales were motivated by a desire to weaken the dollar or precipitate a monetary crisis. There are, however, indications that official and private Middle East dollar holders are pre- paring to pursue a more aggressive portfolio management policy that could cause problems for the dollar in the future. This, is a result, rather than a cause, of the dollar devaluation in Feb- ruary and the dollar's continued weakness. US and European banks are aggressively soliciting Middle East business, arguing that they can more effectively manage and protect Middle East for- eign exchange assets. Some Middle East interests already have hired Western specialists to this end. SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET Egypt's economic troubles are likely to con- tinue for the foreseeable future even if Cairo's problems with Israel are resolved. The country's beleaguered economy is riddled with fundamental weaknesses. A largely peasant population, dou- bling every generation, has only meager land and water resources. Uneven economic development has left Egypt dependent on imports to feed its population and operate its industry. Government control over the economy has been handicapped by bureaucratic inertia and extravagance. Assist- ance from the West has been steadily reduced. 1' The June 1967 war with Israel multiplied long-standing economic difficulties by cutting for- eign exchange earnings from two key sources-the Suez Canal and tourism. These and other losses were largely offset by an annual subsidy of $250 million from Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; another $200 million a year was available for balance of payment purposes from Libya. From 1967 through 1972, over $2 billion in grants poured in from Q,ther Arab states to keep Egypt's economy afloat. --' \Sadat has sought to lessen his dependence on his Arab neighbors by seeking private foreign cap- ital investment and by encouraging the repatria- tion of funds banked by Egyptians abroad. The Arab International Bank was created and a large number of investment guarantees have been of- fered. Thus far, however, only a small number of investment projects have been approved. Invest- ment from abroad may continue to increase slowly, mainly because revitalizing the private sector runs counter to deep socialist currents and poses difficult political questions. [In 1973, Sadat has been beset by additional economic difficulties. Libyan President Qadhafi has suspended the $200 million in aid that helps offset Egypt's chronic balance of payments def- icit. Higher wheat prices and lower oil output threaten to increase the payments deficit to over $250 million, and no alternative financing is in sight. A more aggressive military posture toward Israel or a seemingly large deficit in Egypt's de- fense budget might cause Qadhafi to relent and perhaps attract assistance from the Persian Gulf states. On the other hand, increased tension be- tween Egypt and Israel would complicate the task of attracting private capital and increase Egypt's dependence on foreign aid.! /A settlement with Israel would not solve Sadat's economic problems. Over the long run, peace would benefit the economy by making in- vestment more attractive to foreigners and by releasing Egyptian energies to economic develop- ment. The immediate results of a settlement would be less promising, partly because the in- come-earning potential of the Suez Canal and assets in the Sinai have been reduced over the years. In addition, a settlement almost certainly would cause Qadhafi to cut off the $59 million annual subsidy paid since the Six-Day War.) A settlement would provide a net gain of about $100 million annually as against a prospec- tive annual payments deficit of at least $200 million. Other Arab states are committed to as- sisting Egypt only until Israel withdraws from the occupied territories. If they were to end their aid after a settlement, Egypt's annual payments def- icit could mount to $400 million even if the present low level of investment and rigid austerity measures were maintained.) )President Sadat has reportedly requested the resignation of Prime Minister Sidqi and charged presidential adviser Hafiz Ismail with the forma- tion of a new cabinet. Rumors of an impending government reshuffle have been circulating in Cairo during the past week. The new cabinet may be unveiled early next week, possibly during a meeting Sadat has scheduled with representatives from Egypt's legislature and partyf jSidgi is disliked by many Egyptians and in January 1972 was criticized by student demon- strators as a poor choice to lead the nation's war effort. Sadat may hope that Sidqi's removal will help heal some of the divisions troubling the government. Sidqi's failure to deal effectively with Egypt's largely intractable economic prob- lems probably weighed in the President's decision. SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 -` SECRET _7l' rThe combined military, gendarmerie, police, and civilian sweep for subversives has expanded beyond the Middle and High Atlas regions of central Morocco. The Algerian press late last wee enie "tendentious" news item, appar- ently filed by the AP in Rabat, that Algeria had arrested some 400 Moroccans Meanwhile, Moroc- can opposition figures complain of police harass- ment and several more prominent ones, identified by arrested subversives as contact points, have been arrested. In addition, Sadat may have feared that the am- bitious Sidqi represented a potential threat.( 3 Hafiz Ismail is a trusted lieutenant of Sadat and 'a logical choice to succeed Sidqi. Ismail has been heavily involved in Egypt's recent diplo- matic offensive, and his appointment to the pre- miership would appear to confirm Sadat's con- tinued interest in political efforts to resolve the dispute with Israel. Nevertheless, the new govern- ment might be cast in terms of a "war cabinet" in an attempt to underscore Sadat's commitment to MOROCCO: INCIDENT IN THE INTERIOR Ii lKing Hassan, the target of two assassination attempts in the past two years, is very nervous about the security situation following attacks by armed bands on two widely separated police posts in the rugged Middle and High Atlas regions. One was hit on 3 March, the other on the 8th.) SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET Somalia's recent calls for diplomatic media- tion of its long-standing claims to the Ogaden, a largely Somali-inhabited part of Ethiopia, appear to mark a retreat from its earlier demand for bilateral negotiations with Addis Ababa. Mogadi- scio, however, is keeping its guard up. Somalia reportedly has countered an Ethiopian military buildup on the border by moving troops to the area. Moreover, Mogadiscio gives no sign of re- laxing its territorial claims in the Ogaden or of ending its close ties to Moscow and its receipt of sizable deliveries of Soviet military equipment, all of which have generated considerable Ethiopian concern. In a recent speech Siad acknowledged that efforts to resolve the dispute have foundered through bilateral channels and he called upon other African countries to mediate. Siad's offer to take the problem to mediation was foreshadowed by Somalia's announcement last month that the conflict will be settled peacefully.'I According to the Ethiopians, Somalia has already approached several African countries-Sudan, Uganda, Tan- zania, Morocco, and Mauritania-to act as media- tors, and Siad probably will raise the issue at the OAU summit in May? 'Siad clearly hopes the involvement of other African countries will help to limit or halt the Ethiopian military buildup on the border.!'The Ethiopians now appear to be in a good position to counter a conventional attack, and they are im- proving their capability to contain a Somali- backed insurgency on Ethiopian soil! ;This week, Somalia reportedly moved an estimated 2,000 troops to the border. The mutual troop buildup could lead to incidents and perhaps a wider outbreak of hostilities. Somalia, however, could not sustain a conventional offensive with- out more modern Soviet tanks and better logis- tics, neither of which appear forthcoming. Never- theless, the Somalis are capable of supporting a renewal of insurgent activity in the Ogaden and of encouraging Eritrean insurgents. SECRET ?Siad probably hoped his moves would con- vince his many domestic opponents that he is working actively to unify all ethnic Somalis.] Siad's failure to make any progress on this emo- tional issue and to take a more aggressive stand against Ethiopia has contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with his regime.] . !,Chances for a successful diplomatic resolu- tion of the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict are slim; recent bilateral negotiations indicated there is lit- tle room for compromise. Ethiopia has not com- mented officially on Siad's proposalj\ but in a conversation with a US Embassy official, a For- eign Ministry officer rejected it out of hands .Moreover, OAU members, many of which have 'their own border problems, are reluctant to discuss territorial issues. Although many African countries are unhappy with borders left over from the colonial era, they apparently prefer them to the chaos they believe would result from wholesale revisions. SUDAN Red Sea ,OMAN N hartoum fE REA ~ -~EME 'Asmara - ~ *Sana Jg~ti~ /_` *Ad b of Ad?e lpiitiouti Addis Ahab F T H 10 P I A UGANDA) Kampala / K ? N Y A d TANZANIA Nairobi \ ,. ~Chisimaio OGADEN// ,, 0 49 Indian Ocean Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 4waw SECRET IRAN: CAMPUSES CLOSED 2C FRecent anti-regime demonstrations by stu- down almost the entire system of higher educa- dents throughout Iran have induced the govern- tion. The Shah may decide to keep the schools ment to close nearly all of the country's universi- closed until next term in an effort to postpone ties. Publicity about arms purchases from the US dealing with student discontent. 25X1 appears to nave been a factor in the unrest; the students are complaining about high tuition costs and calling for government subsidies. 7 ,Authorities dealt swiftly and sometimes harshly with the demonstrators. At least three students were killed and more than 200 injured at Tabriz University. There have been no reports of fatalities elsewhere, but many of the arrested students remain in custody. Although the gov- ernment has not allowed news of the disturbances to appear in the press, word has spread among,he students along with rumors of police brutality. SUDAN: MENDING FENCES 7C% [The Arabs were spared the embarrassment of more fraternal infighting this week after media- tion efforts by the Iraqi Government and repre- sentatives of the Arab League. The Sudanese Government and the fedayeen agreed to halt their propaganda assaults on each other. The Sudanese ac t d f d cep e e ayeen denials of complicity in the o ,The current phase of student dissidence was Khartoum murders1(and gave the Palestinian Lib- set off in late January when several hundred eration Organization permission to reopen its Tehran University students, skeptical of the local office. President Numayri may also have Shah's claims of success for his White Revolution agreed not to execute the eight Black September reforms, rioted. No one was injured and the., , terrorists he holds;jfto uphold his end of the authorities quickly regained control and closed'. charade, Yasir Arafat promised to investigate the the university. Then, three weeks ago, demon- affair.l strations-sometimes violent-broke out at vir- tually every major college, university, and tech- nical training school in the country.' 61 1 [Numayri's anger was still present in an inter- view) on 16 March. He said that one of the main objectives of the terrorists was to put a stop to +Anti-regime sentiment is probably greatest the "Arab-US dialogue." Although he did not among intellectuals, but until recently there had mention Libya by name, it was clear that been relatively few instances of student activism Numayri believes that Qadhafi planned the opera- in Iran. During the 1950s and early 1960s, dis- tion to embarrass Sudan. Numayri said he had turbances were frequent. In the last decade the called for a special meeting of the Arab League's Shah's security forces have kept down manifesta defense committee to air the whole matte f LNow tions of opposition to the government. They wereI / that Sudan and the fedayeen are smoothing things helped by the Shah's reform and economic pro- over, his request will probably be conveniently grams, which pre-empted many of the issues forgotten:"] around which vocal opposition might have rallied. C/ - Khartoum announced that a date will be set The widespread nature of the recent demon- for he terrorists' trial before Numayri leaves for strations attests to the depth of anti-regime feel- London early next week) LThe eight commandos i h ) ng on t e campuses. While most students were ' are expected to be quickly tried, convicted, and previously content to secure a place in the estab- condemned to death. Whether Numayri will carry lishment rather than fight it, many now are more out the executions is still uncertain, although willing to take risks in a show of opposition. most of the diplomatic corps in Khartoum be- SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET )President Bhutto's campaign against the op- position so far has neither achieved its objectives nor brought the violent reaction some observers feared. By discrediting, intimidating, and disorga- nizing his opponents, Bhutto had sought to lessen their criticism of his proposed constitution and to replace the two provincial governments they con- trolled. ;On 15 February Bhutto dismissed the gov- ernment and the governor of Baluchistan and imposed a month of rule from Islamabad on the province. He also dismissed the governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, and the provincial government then resigned in protest. Bhutto's actions followed charges by his sup- porters that the party that dominated the coali- tions in both provinces was plotting the breakup of Pakistan and was the intended recipient of the arms discovered at the Iraqi Embassy in Islama- bad on 10 February. At the same time, other opposition groups-including dissidents within Bhutto's own party-came under attack and some were jailed,' jin Baluchistan, Bhutto has won away some of the supporters of the former ruling coalition, but it still has 11 or 12 of the 21 provincial assemblymen. Central rule has been extended for another month. There is still room for com- promise and political deals, but Bhutto may have to settle for less than he expected.1 the provincial govern- approved by committee on 21 March}l It could ment. With considerable ICI run into problems in the Senate. Two small par- difficulty, a pro-Bhutto ties have announced their opposition. A constitu- )In the frontier province, local objections !(It (The proposed amendment should have torced Bhutto to abandon his first choice to head smooth sailing in the lower house, where it was majority has been formed, but the forma- tion of a government is being delayed by dis- agreement over the divi- sion of the spoils.) stitution is now being debated, neither side seems willing to compromise. The opposition, uncowed by Bhutto's campaign, is doing its best to dis- credit the constitution and prevent its passage. The government, however, has an overwhelming majority, controlling 90 votes to 25 for the oppo- TURKEY: FULL CIRCLE FOR SUNAY Stymied for more than a week in its effort to elect a president, parliament is considering a proposal to amend the constitution and extend the term of incumbent President Cevdet Sunay. This effort to break the presidential deadlock began to unfold on 19 March when the majority Justice Party decided-probably under pressure from the generals-to introduce the amendment enabling the 72-year-old Sunay to serve two years beyond the expiration on 28 March of his regular seven-year term. The military candidate, Faruk Gurler, and the Justice Party candidate, Tekin Ariburun, subsequently withdrew from the con- test. Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Republican Peo- ples Party, and at least half its members in parlia- ment are on record in favor of extending Sunay's term.( tional amendment requires a two-thirds Ironically, supporters of Sunay in the mili- tary tried without success early this year to per- suade political leaders that an extension of Su- I In the National As- nay's term would be the best solution to the sembly, where the con- presidential problem SECRET n--- 18 %A11 17C71/1 v ci INAKAARV 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12: CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 ir > ,Now that the United Nations Security Coun- cil meeting is over, Panamanian leaders will be trying to measure its impact on US attitudes toward a canal settlement. At the same time, they will be seeking ways to convert the abstract ex- pressions of support they received into bargaining chips.) )Panama got broad support from Communist and Third World delegations at the meeting, and as a result insisted on a stronger resolution on the Panama Canal than could be accepted by Wash- ington. The support received at the meeting will encourage Panamanian moves toward the estab- lishment of relations with a number of these countries. Relations with Algeria, Libya, Bulgaria, Guyana, and Guinea were announced recently, and formal ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, and East Germany are under considera- tion. Final decisions are likely to wait until after a full evaluation of the impact of the Security Council meeting and a re-examination of the bid- ding in the canal talks.) )It will quickly be apparent to Panamanians of all persuasions that they cannot shift to a non-aligned international position without jeop- ardizing US aid, a major source of funds for the public expenditures that have come to charac- terize the economy since Torrijos took overjfFor- eign Minister Tack denounced the motives behind US economic assistance but there apparently has been little thought about the possible conse- quences of a cutback in that aid. The search for alternate sources of aid may come to dominate Panama's budding relationships.) /Although the Security Council meeting was not all that he hoped, Torrijos is still a believer in pressure tactics against the US. Torrijos has pub- licly promised to obey last October's National Assembly resolution recommending that he refuse to accept the canal annuity, though the payment in February went through. He could also use the resolution to open a legal assault on the 1903 treaty in the World Court)i'Foreign Ministry of-~ ficials have been checking with the World Court- to which Panamanians are unusually partial because one of their most distinguished jurists once served on it-and have been advised not to renounce the treaty unilaterally. Appeals to other international bodies such as the OAS or theUN General Assembly would also serve to keep the ARGENTINA: THE MORNING AFTER The Peronists' efforts to heal old political wou ds following the election last week have been well received by all but their most impla- ,,,cable political enemies. The armed forces are seeking ways to work with President-elect 1Campora, although they also seek to intensify inherent differences within the Peronist camp. Most Argentines are taking the Peronist triumph more or less in stride, but the Brazilians are quite concerned over what it means for them./ SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET Colombia: Guerrilla Operational Areas SECRET National Liberation Army (ELN) People's Liberation Army (EPL) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) VENEZUELA Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Mar 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 SECRET While Argentines appear to be taking the Peronist victory with relative equanimity, their neighbors to the north are openly worried. The Peronists have warned that they will not accept the agreement made with Brazil by the Lanusse government giving up Argentina's demand for prior consultation on proposed hydroelectric projects on rivers that flow out of Brazil to Ar- gentina. The Brazilians intend to go ahead any- way, but foresee nothing but problems from the Campora government on this matter.: The Peronist victory in Argentina has also added to Brazilian fears that the Spanish-speaking nations of South America will cooperate more closely in an effort to isolate Brazil. Peronist campaign statements give some substance to Brazilian fears, and cooler relations are probable once Campora is inaugurated. If the Campora government tries to play the role of a Latin Amer-; ican leader, however, Argentina's other neighbors, including Chile and Peru, will immediately be- come as suspicious of Argentina's intentions as the now are of Brazil's. the field are suffering as a result. The guerrillas /// [The National Liberation Army's urban sup- port network has been decimated by the security forces, and the group's 250 to 300 guerrillas in have managed to build up their depleted treasury by kidnaping wealthy ranchers and holding them for ransom. The guerrillas have been less success- ful in acquiring supplies from isolated police and army posts. The reduced circumstances of the insurgents have caused them to take risks that have led to the death or capture of several promi- nent leaders. Morale is likely to suffer further as captured guerrillas are brought to trial to foster the government's law-and-order image before the presidential election in April 1974.' /:/- LAs the fortunes of the National Liberation Army have waned, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia appears to have abandoned the lengthy "training phase" imposed by the legal Communist Party, nominally its parent organiza- tion. The pro-Soviet guerrillas not only show a willingness to fill the vacuum left by their Castro- ite counterparts, but they also show an interest in overcoming long-standing ideological differences by working closely-and in a few cases joining ,;_forces-with militants of other groups. In this and other aspects of its renewed activity, the Revolu- tionary Armed Forces is in a strong position. It is supported by a legal political party, and many small rural areas used as base camps are nearly devoid of central government influence. These guerrillas, numbering up to 400, are well equipped and organized fThe security forces are not likely to take on the Revolutionary Armed Forces as a whole al- though individual members or small groups may suffer if they venture into the cities or misjudge their ability to raid a security forces installation. i Alj Guerrilla groups are showing remarkable re- (,1 frhe pro-Peking People's Liberation Army siliency despite strong government counter- has far less potential than the pro-Moscow group insurgency measures. While the military and po- but both have taken advantage of the govern- lice forces have been concentrating since mid- ment's preoccupation with the National Libera- summer on the pro-Havana National Liberation 03tion Army. The pro-Peking group has some 50 to Army, the pro-Moscow Revolutionary Armed 75 active guerrillas, but they are disorganized and Forces of Colombia has emerged from years of poorly armed and would be a relatively easy tar- inactivity. Even the minuscule, poorly organized' yget if the government decides to seek additional pro-Peking People's Liberation Army has been victories over the guerrillas during the election active recently.) campaign. SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9 Secrt c Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A010200010001-9