WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010300010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
11 May 1973
No. 0369/73
Copy N? 50
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents,
CONTENTS (11 May 1973)
1 Middle East: Rising Tensions; Touchy
Situation
3 Indochina: China Moderation; Wet Months;
Cambodia; Laos
9 EC: End of a Wrangle
9 Netherlands: Government at Last
10 France: More Missiles
11 Iceland: A Key Resignation
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
11 Turkey: Back to the Barracks
12 India: Food Imports; Military Spending
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
18 Uruguay: Generals Pressure Congress
18 The World Energy Problem
SPECIAL
REPORTS
16 Chile: Another Tough Week
(Published Separately)
Libya: a a i, a igious evo u ionary
25X1
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summar
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' tzu {t I _qW
Middle East
RISING TENSIONS (A/g c'u'--es )
In the past several weeks, Egypt and other
Arab states have taken a number of measures that
could be interpreted as preparation for hostilities
against Israel. These actions could also be taken as
part of an effort to arouse international concern
and stimulate new pressures on the US to force
Israel to be more accommodating on a peace
settlement.
There is no conclusive evidence that Sadat
has made a decision to attack. Both Sadat and his
advisers are aware that their military prospects are
poor at best; a fresh disaster might well sweep
away Sadat and his regime. His military prepara-
tions are not, in any case, complete, and he has
not exhausted his political options. The UN ses-
sion on the Middle East, now set for late May,
and the US-USSR summit will be critical factors.
Military moves by other Arab governments
seem in harmony with Sadat's purpose. The major
gap in the Arab line-up-one to which the Arabs
are accustomed-is the refusal of the Jordanian
Government to place its forces at the disposal of
the "eastern front."
The Lebanese flare-up illustrates the danger
that military moves might develop a momentum
that Cairo would not be able to control. The
events of 1967 argue that most Arab governments
are not able to resist giving the situation a shove
once it has started rolling,. Sadat has said so often
that he is now dead serious that it will be pro-
gressively more difficult to find excuses for inac-
tion, particularly when other Arab leaders have
fulfilled their commitments to his cause.
Israel professes to see no serious threat of
war, although Tel Aviv may be less relaxed than it
has indicated. The Israelis are watching most par-
ticularly for any signs that the Egyptians or other
Arabs are developing a serious capability to dam-
age Israel itself. Such a development would lead
the Israelis to consider a pre-emptive strike.'
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Top to bottom: Cairo, Beirut, Moscow
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SLUKL I I
I After a week of fitful fighting with the
fedayeen, the Lebanese Army appears to have
gained the upper hand..1The Lebanese are cautiously
optimistic that the army's forceful tactics and the
broad popular support for President Franjiyah's
tough stand place them in a strong position vis-a-vis
the guerrillas\
1( \The air strikes and artillery fire against feda-
yeen positions in Beirut and the Arqub-Fatah-
'y land-in the southeast appear to have had a sobering
1 effect. The army's liberal use of its firepower has
inflicted heavy losses.)
iThere are still incidents of terrorism staged by
extremist fedayeen bent on shattering the truce.
Fedayeen-army joint committees have begun en-
1`?-'forcing the cease-fire in Beirut, but they will have
trouble reining in the extremists.,)
Communal differences have
not e~tac or in the conflict so far. 3
15 Beirut sees Damascus' limited involvement as
no more than might be expected in light of Syria's
generally hostile attitude toward Lebanon and pres-
sures from within the Syrian power elite for support
3 of the fedayeen:)~ince the fighting began, the Syri-
ans have allowed an estimated 1,000-2,000 fedayeen
to infiltrate into Lebanon, but have not committed
Syrian regulars.
fhe uproar in Lebanon is an embarrassment to
Egypt and the other Arabs because it distracts inter-
national attention from what they see as the broader
aspects of the Middle East conflict.
1 I The Israelis are keeping a close watch on their
border with Lebanon. The prime question for Tel
Aviv is how far Syria will go in support of the
fedayeen in Lebanon) Israeli Defense Minister Dayan
on 9 May indicated that Israel had no intention of
acting as a "policeman in an inter-Arab quarrel." At
the same time, he issued a public warning to Damas-
cus that Israel would take action if Syrian regular
Israel's borders.
forces entered Lebanon and took up positions on
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"'btu l-{t I NuOr
Indochina
!Chinese diplomats have indicated privately
for months that Peking favors an end to the
fighting in Indochina for several reasons. Prolon-
gation of the conflict would, in China's view, only
serve to inhibit improvement in relations with the
US while cessation of hostilities would enhance
China's prospects for reaching its own political
goals in Southeast Asia. Toward this end, the
Chinese have urged their allies to the south to
tively strong Communist positions in Laos and
Cambodia, while reducing chances for US rein-
volvement. On Laos, Peking may have urged
Hanoi to move ahead with a new government. On
Cambodia, Peking clearly hopes that Sihanouk
will gain a major share of political power in a
postwar government in Phnom Penh. Peking ap-
parently believes, however, that a more flexible
bargaining position might be more attractive to
Washington.
avoid actions that might provoke US reinvolve-
ment. Some officials have suggested Peking is ,People's Daily on 25 April used a different
prepared, if necessary, to press Hanoi harder on formulation than heretofore in outlining Peking's
this score; one even hinted that China might go so terms for a settlement. The paper called only for
far as to end its military assistance. _22an end to US military interference in Cambodia.
A
b
2-`, )The Chinese apparently have taken another
look at the situation in the wake of recent devel-
,,Y,opments which heightened concern that Indo-
china after all might not be removed as a major
issue in big power politics. Following discussions
in Peking with Communist leaders from Indo-
china, the Chinese put out a series of authorita-
tive statements which suggest that Peking has
indeed interceded again and called for greater
tactical restraint
.Z 1 Running through the statements has been a
clear implication that it is time for the Commu-
nist side in Indochina to show a greater effort at
compliance with the cease-fire agreement. An
editorial and commentary in People's Daily and a
message signed by Chou En-lai treated the provi-
sions of the cease-fire agreements dealing with
"foreign" forces in a manner suggesting Peking
had Hanoi in mind as well as the allied side. By
contrast, the Chinese in the past have been ex-
plicit that the US and South Vietnamese were at
25X1 fault.
-- r The Chinese in private may have told the
Indochinese that a more flexible Communist
stance would turn to better advantage the rela-
out a month ago, Chou publicly insisted on an
end to all US involvement, political and economic
as well as military. A year ago, the North Viet-
namese, in a show of flexibility, uncoupled their
demand for a US military disengagement from
Vietnam from their demand for an end to US
political and economic involvement in Saigon?
[The possibility that the Communists might
use their newly infiltrated men and materiel in a
major offensive this spring is rapidly diminishing.
Earlier than normal rains have already begun to
slow movement on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and will
soon impede the Communists' ability to receive
vital combat support from back-country bases.
Drier weather prevails along the northern coast
during the summer, however, so major combat
would be more likely to occur there than else-
where.7
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Mr" %WL_'-, I t" I
7
(preparations for a big
campaign are almost totally lacking at present.
The Communists' major military effort during the
wet summer months, therefore, seems likely to go
into rebuilding, realigning, and consolidating their
main forces, their logistic system, and their spe-
cialized sapper and artillery units.)
L"c \The Communists probably assume that
emphasis on rebuilding their forces and on tactics
like artillery harassment and small-scale raids will
give them a capability to defend most of what
they now control and a much improved military
position by next fall's dry season.
Troubled But Trying
~q ,Some of President Thieu's political oppo-
nents are becoming more active, but they do not
pose much of a threat to the government. Last
week Big Minh, still Thieu's most prominent op
ponent, issued his second recent statement criti-
cizing both Saigon and the Viet Cong for their
"meager" attempts to implement the cease-fire
agreement. Minh is clearly pointing to his availa-
bility to play a role in a peace settlement as a
"third force" leader. His statement received some
publicity in the Saigon press. It drew a rebuttal
from the government that it contained nothing
"new, concrete, or reasonable" and that a "so-
called third segment" does not exist in South
Vietnam.]
Page 4
5 \The An Quang Buddhists, the most impor-
tant opposition group, are still divided, in part
over political tactics, but they continue to resist
?' pressure to move closer to either the government
,or the Communists.
More Problems in Agriculture
anoi is beginning to focus more intently on
persistent production problems in agriculture.
The North Vietnamese leadership has complained
in a series of recent editorials that the people are
paying too much attention to private production
and not enough to the collective economy-a
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complaint and a problem as old as the regime
itself. The recommended remedy is also a familiar
one-to increase material incentives, a prescrip-
tion long associated with party leader Le Duan.
This time around the leadership is trying to entice
the peasant-away from his private plot by making
work for the collective more attractive. The arti-
cles recommend better pay for better work and
increases in peasant income in general.
Concern with lagging agricultural production
'-
has increased considerably since the cease-fire,
and Hanoi planners are obviously anxious to get
back on the road to self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction as quickly as possible. The prospects in
the near term are not promising. The current
spring crop is having problems, according to pub-
lic pronouncements which put the blame as much
on the weather as on inadequate collective man-
agement. Unusually warm weather has indeed
brought on insects and disease, drought has af-
fected several areas, and the peasants are having
special difficulty with the high-yield strains that
make up roughly two thirds of the crop. f
CAMBODIA: POLITICAL PITFALLS
w
JThe selection of a ne
prime minister in
Cambodia is rarely an easy undertaking and the
several policy issues. The council and party repre-
sentatives have agreed on the need for new elec-
tions, but they preferred to avoid additional dis-
pute on this delicate subject and deferred decision
on the type and timing. On the military side, they
agreed to place the armed forces under civilian
control, presumably through the prime minister's
office. This move appears to be designed to
reduce President Lon Nol's overinvolvement in
military affairs-something that the three other
council members are determined to achieve.?
The Military Situatign
2
,Meanwhile, t`/ Fhe fighting continues along
familiar lines. Heavy air strikes have not dislodged
Communist troops from their well-entrenched
positions along sections of the Mekong. A re-
supply convoy en route to the capital from South
Vietnam was attacked on 6 May, and two of the
convoy's nine ships were badly damaged. The
Communists also maintained a grip on stretches
of most of the principal highways leading to
Phnom Penh~j
new ruling body in Phnom Penh-the four-man 3cl ~lf Phoumi Vongvichit brought back
High Political Council-is finding this out. Since negotiating cards when he returned from
its installation late last month, the council has Neua two weeks ago, he is holding them very
met frequently with representatives of two of the close to the vestajln meetings with Prime Minister
country's three political parties to try to decide"kj Souvanna Phouma and Souvanna's personal
on a new prime minister. Negotiations bogged envoy, Pheng Phongsavan, Phoumi has merely
down early in the week when Republican Party repeated the demands that have stalled lower level
leader and council member Sirik Matak unex-)(,, talks j(Consequently, government officials believe
pectedly nominated a political nonentity from that Hanoi will not allow the Lao Communists to
the pro-government Socio-Republican Party as his
choice for prime minister. Matak's move appeared
to be a Byzantine bid to enhance his own political
position. Whatever the case, council members In
Tam and Cheng Heng reportedly are strongly op-
posed to Matak's candidate. If a compromise is
not reached soon, the council itself could
founder.
Aside from the prime ministerial hassle,
some progress has been made in dealing with
conclude a final peace agreement until cease-fire
problems in South Vietnam are resolved and until
there is some movement toward a solution in
Cambodia. This could well be the case. Still,
Souvanna is now in personal charge of the nego-
tiations, and agreement might be reached quickly
once the Communists are ready. When Hanoi gave
the Lao Communists the green light in February,
the two sides surmounted considerable obstacles
in a matter of days
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EC: END OF A WRANGLE
The EC Council on 1 May reached agree- ? The smallness of the increase in the grain
ment on farm prices, but only after one of the support price is good news for US exporters. In
EC's most difficult, confused, and bitter meet-;:.T addition, the EC apparently refused to discuss a
ings. The enlargement of the community this year French proposal to include soybeans-a major US
to include the UK, Ireland, and Denmark con- agricultural export to Western Europe-in the
tributed to the acrimony, particularIX because EC's protectionist farm support system. A new
Britain is opposed to higher farm prices. margarine tax, which the US opposes, also failed
to materialize, despite considerable European
interest in such a tax as a way of tackling the
;!Concern that a deadlock would paralyze not butter surplus.`
only the common agricultural policy, but other
EC activities as well, pushed the Nine into a The EC now can prepare for a thorough
compromise. It includes a big price rise for meat, review of farm policy this fall. Proposals probably
especially beef-which is in short supply-and will include increased direct national payments
small increases for grain and beet sugar. The com- for poor farmers to supplement income earned in
promise calls for incentives to farmers to en- the market. The present system, based almost
courage them to switch from milk production to entirely on price supports, has become harder to
beef and veal; manage because of monetary instability. More-
over, German and British resistance to financing
the family farm in France and Italy under the
present system is now so strong that it adds force
to talk of reform.-
[The extraordinary difficulties of the recent
meeting have led to harder thinking about the
inefficiency of EC decision-making in general.
Danish Economic Minister Norgaard, who takes
over as council president for a six-month term in
July, told American representatives in Brussels
that he had been disgusted at spending 100
chaotic hours negotiating a compromise "which
should have taken 10 hours at most." Norgaard is
aware of the usual argument that such marathon
sessions are the only way to achieve critical EC
decisions. He is also well aware of the resistance
he will meet if he moves to rationalize council
procedures. He has, however, talked with the
British who also find council methods annoying
and expects their strong support.
The Netherlands
A GOVERNMENT AT LAST
l coalition cabinet is finally taking form
more than five months after the parliamentary
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elections; it is an unhappy compromise that is not
likely to endure. For as long as it does last, the
new center-left government will have to proceed
cautiously. J
JAfter the inconclusive elections in Novem-
ber, the excessive number of Dutch parliamentary
parties and the intransigence of their leaders
hampered efforts to form a new government. The
150 seats in the Second Chamber are divided
among ten parties. Some of these are aligned in
two general political groupings. The socialist
"Progressives," composed of the Labor, Demo-
crats '66, and Radical parties, hold 56 seats. The
moderate-right "Confessionals," composed of the
Catholic People's, Protestant Anti-Revolutionary,
and Protestant Christian Historical Union, hold
48 seats. Neither grouping could muster a
majority without the other. After months of
haggling, the progressives were able to break up
the confessional group and convince elements of
the group to join a new coalition.;
iThe coalition cabinet, with Labor floor
leader Joop den Uyl as prime minister, will con-
sist of ten ministers from the progressive and six
from two of the confessional parties. The
Christian Historical Union stubbornly refused to
take part. Last week, the cabinet-to-be agreed to a
program that will satisfy about 80 percent of the
pre-election program of the confessional group
while moderating part of the progressive program.
Neither group will be satisfied with the com-
promise program, which will not be formally
announced until next month, but both sides will
have to proceed with it in a businesslike manner if
they want their coalition to get anything
d on
FRANCE: MORE MISSILES
rf
!Armed Forces Minister Galley confirmed
late fast week that France intends to build a third
group of nine IRBM silos at the St. Christol
complex. The French for many years have
planned to have a force of at least 27 I RBMs; the
first group of nine became operational in 1971,
the second in 19727
The announcement presumably means that
construction on the third group will now be
resumed. Work on this group was halted in 1969,
when former Defense Minister Debre announced
that completion would await the development of
an improved missile with a thermonuclear war-
head.
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ICELAND: A KEY RESIGNATION
The sudden resignation last week of Han-
nibal Valdimarsson from his two cabinet posts
was a sharp blow to the Icelandic Government. If
Valdimarsson's party, the Organization of Liber-
als and Leftists, does not appoint someone to fill
the vacated cabinet positions, the government
could fall,
this may have been Valdimarsson's objec-
tive. He still has his parliamentary seat and his
post as party chairman.
Valdimarsson used the issue of bringing the
fishing dispute with the UK before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice as an excuse for leaving
the cabinet. The opposition parties have held that
Reykjavik can present a valid case to the court
that Iceland's economic survival is dependent
upon wider fishing zones, and Valdimarsson
members of Valdimarsson's party oppose present-
ing the dispute to the court.;
T'-1 )Progressive Party leaders, particularly Prime
Minister Johannesson and Foreign Minister
Agustsson, are in political trouble because they
have made no headway in resolving the fishing
dispute.ln waters off Iceland, the dispute has led
to collisions and gunplay in the last two weeks.
The latest round of negotiations with the British
--was broken off on 4 May The British foreign
secretary has threatened to `"send in the navy" if
further serious incidents occur.
I Iln the event of a collapse of the present
government, its likely successor would be a cen-
ter-right coalition of the Independence Party, the
Social Democrats, and Valdimarsson's party. Such
a mix would be less antagonistic to the US on the
base issue. Prior to Valdimarsson's resignation,
Agustsson had threatened to bring up the base
issue formally in NATO. He subsequently prom- 25X1
ised, however, not to move on the matter until
agreed. The Communist People's Alliance and the after the Nixon-Pompidou meeting in Reykjavik
Progressive Party, the primary members of the on 31 May - 1 June.
present three-party coalition, as well as some
TURKEY: BACK TO THE BARRACKS
' The course and outcome of the three-week-
long presidential race this spring signaled a shift in
the balance of power in Ankara from the military
commanders back to parliament. Military officers
have long been a potent force in Turkish politics
and their role became more pronounced after
forcing the re s. nation of Prime Minister Demirel
in March 1971.
"q IThe presidential race was not a straight con-
test between the politicians and generals, al-
though it had that appearance in its initial stages.
Had the military been united behind former Gen-
eral Staff Chief Faruk Gurler, touted as the mili-
tary's choice, he would very likely be occupying
the presidential palace today. In fact, the bold-
ness of the political leaders in rejecting Gurler was
in large measure due to Justice Party leader
Demirel. He perceived, quite correctly, that
Gurler was not especially popular with his fellow
officers and that differences existed in the mili-
tary over its proper role in national political life.
Demirel judged that these factors would inhibit
the armed forces from moving against parliament
if Gurler's candidacy were rejected. Demirel
reasoned that the situation gave parliament the
opportunity to assert civilian supremacy, to pay
back some old scores with the military, and to
jettison the practice that the president is chosen
from the ranks of active officers.]
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7y( !Come August, when the annual military pro-
motion and assignment lists are published, it is
likely that those general officers identified with
Gurler or with anti-parliamentary activity will not
get another star or will be sent down to isolated
or nonstrategic ports.\
The officer who will benefit most from the
election will probably be General Faik Turun,
commander of the First Army in Istanbul; it is
possible that he will become commander of the
ground forces. Turun was lukewarm to Gurler's
candidacy
11The military remains one of Turkey's most
powerful pressure groups, but the presidential
election spotlighted its weaknesses. Its new com-
manders have apparently withdrawn from inter-
25X1 ventionist politics and clearly do not want to be
involved in the messy business of day-to-day gov-
ernment. Civilian government has won another
chance to show what it can do.
7' lNew Delhi is using stopgap measures to meet
the country's serious food shortages and is still
hoping to collect sufficient grain at home to avoid
heavy spending for grain imports. There are indi-
cations that India will soon try to buy 2 to 3
million tons of food grain abroad. More may be
needed. If larger amounts must be imported,
Indian officials indicate they will seek long-term
credit, perhaps from the U'S under the PL-480
program.'
?Food supplies are tight throughout India.
The situation in hard-hit Maharashtra, where riots
broke out in mid-April, improved somewhat in
the past few days after the arrival of special
"wheat trains" from north India and more ships
with imported grain. Four states have had food
riots or demonstrations in the past ten days and
more are expected. There well may be famine in
various areas, and New Delhi is trying to avoid
publicity by limiting movement of foreign news-
men in serious drought areas of central and west-
ern India.':
Only about half of the 1.65 million tons of
grain India purchased abroad-mainly in Decem-
ber and January-has arrived. Congestion in US
ports, winter closure of Canadian ports, and the
high cost of ship chartering have delayed loadings.
Moreover, normal distribution channels were dis-
rupted when the wholesale grain trade was na-
tionalized on 1 April. In some drought areas, no
free-market grain supplies are available. In areas
where grain is available, it costs two or three
times the price in government-subsidized ration
shops. 1
;Government collections from the wheat
harvest now under way are going badly. The crop
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is estimated to be at least as large as the 26.5
million tons produced last year, but by early May
the government had obtained only about 600,000
tons of a planned 8 million tons. Some merchants
and farmers reportedly are encouraging and even
financing the retention of grain on the farms.
They are protesting the take-over and the low
government purchase price. Farmers in some
grain-surplus areas are threatening to feed their
wheat to cattle and sell instead their coarse grain.
Prices for the latter are higher because they are
not government-controlled;,
price be raised to encourage deliveries. If New
Delhi agrees, it would have to increase either the
ration shop price which would be incompatible;,"
with Mrs. Gandhi's program to help the poor, or
its grain subsidies. It is likely that even a modest
increase in the purchase price would sharply
improve deliveries to government purchasing
agents and still permit the government to get
domestic wheat more cheaply than imported
wheat. I
military materiel have increased by 75 percent in
the past three years, while domestic military
production has increased by 55 percent. The
budget for the current fiscal year (April 1973
through March 1974) calls for $526 million in
military imports. Two thirds of this is allocated
for finished materiel; raw materials, components,
and license fees for domestic military production
make up the remainder. A part of these imports,
particularly weapons, is financed by medium- and
long-term credits. I
Yw- [The amount of grain that India will import is YS ipomestic military procurement now con-
J, still unsettled. On 1 May, New Delhi press re- -` stitu es about 70 percent of total military pur-
ports, apparently based on leaks from the Indian -- chases. Non-government enterprises are expected
1.3 cabinet, stated that India planned to import 6-7 to supply about 60 percent of domestic defense
million tons "in the next several months." This needs in 1973/74, including petroleum products
million tons of wheat purchased abroad, India
must set aside about $125 million. Sorghum and
corn would be about 25 percent cheaper, but
Indian consumers view these as poor substitutes.
India's foreign exchange reserves amounted to
$1.1 billion at the end of March, or the equivalent
of about six months' imports. The ambassador-
designate to the US, T. N. Kaul, has raised the
possibility of getting credit for grain purchases in
the US.
MILITARY SPENDING UP
Although severely strained by shortages of
[New Delhi is studying its options. State food ;,.food and fuel, the Indian economy is supporting
officials are urging that the wheat procurement S' ;continued heavy military spending. Imports of
leak no doubt was intended to relax tensions
among consumers and discourage domestic hoard-'!
ing and speculative buying. Mrs. Gandhi quicklyl
denied the press stories.
Iq [Foreign exchange considerations will weigh
heavily in any decision on food imports. For each
Domestic
570
604
842
882
918
Domestic Input
474
494
718
714
741
Foreign Input
96
110
124
168
177
Financed by Military Aid
-90
-92
-191
-130
NA
Military Debt Repayments
100
113
120
150
NA
Total Estimated Foreign
Exchange Outflow
304
345
361
535
NA
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and foodstuffs. Ordnance factories and enter-
prises under the Ministry of Defense Production
will provide the balance, including jet fighters and
other aircraft, naval craft, tanks, artillery, mis-
siles, radar, transport vehicles, ammunition, spare
parts, and clothing. Output under the ministry in
1972/73 is estimated to have been $508 million,
with 78 percent going to the Indian military, 19
percent to the civilian economy, and the balance
for export:[
India has relied on foreign collaboration to
build its defense industries, and most military
equipment is still produced under foreign license
agreements. The UK and several West European
countries supply most of this assistance. The So-
viet role in domestic production has increased,
but remains comparatively small. In contrast, the
1\IUSSR and Eastern Europe are the principal sup-
pliers of finished military equipment to India,
New Delhi plans to limit foreign participa-
tion in the manufacture of military equipment.
On 25 April, the government reaffirmed its policy
of not entering into new foreign license agree-
ments for production of military commodities.
Indian-Built HF-24 Fighter
New Delhi will endeavor to design and produce
military equipment domestically but will still
depend somewhat on foreign technology. India is
attempting to develop a surface-to-air missile and
an armored personnel carrier along these lines.
Existing licensing agreements will not be renewed
automatically, and all defense plants have been
instructed to develop indigenous versions of
equipment now produced under license within a
fixed period of time. These measures probably
will have little impact immediately on foreign
exchange outlays. They do, however, add to the
cost of India's military program and delay new
weapons systems.
r ' The government further plans to improve
India's capability to produce its own raw materi-
als for the defense industries. It is negotiating
with several foreign firms, including Westing-
house, to purchase machinery and technology for
a special metals and super alloys plant. This
$64-million facility and a proposed $67-million
special steel plant are expected to provide the
defense industries with the ability to produce a
wide range of metal products now bein im orted
for defense production.
Indian Helicopter Production Line
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CHILE: ANOTHER TOUGH WEEK
Historically disdainful of political turmoil in
the rest of Latin America, Chileans have in recent
months come to accept tension and confrontation
as the norm in their own country. The imposition
of a state of siege in Santiago on 5 May evoked
only minor reaction, and this was nearly lost in
the shrill public charges and countercharges of
conspiracy and treason]
[Military officers are now quite concerned
over growing public disorder, but they still appear
uncertain whether or how to put effective pres-
sure on President Allende. They do not even
know whom to trust among themselves. Although
another round of land seizures, contend that this
is further proof of their claim that farm owners
are ready to massacre peasants.
Allende now
believes the extreme a is s are growing stronger
and less controllable. He may, in fact, see them as
posing as great a threat to him as the ultra-right-
ists. This concern is behind his cautious campaign
to wean his own Socialist Party from its radical
leadership. At the same time, he does not want
extremist Secretary General Carlos Altamirano to
make an open break with him
With Altamirano in the USSR for a month's
medical treatment, Foreign Minister Clodomiro
Almeyda will soon leave the cabinet to devote full
time to his new role as party undersecretary for
government relations. Almeyda is the sole survi-
vor of Allende's original cabinet. He is highly
regarded, even by his enemies, for his handling of
Chile's foreign affairs. Along with two other for-
mer Socialist cabinet ministers, who have appeal
to the radical left, Almeyda appears to be the
nucleus of an effort to make the party more
responsive to Allende's leadership. 1,
recent roadblocks of major Santiago arteries by