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May 18, 1973
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Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 I%W Secret WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed Secret 18 May 1973 No. 0370/73 Copy N?_ 47 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office rrf iurrent fntelligerscereports and analyzes signif- icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Off ice cif Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science- and Technology. Topics-,r equirinrg more comprehensive treatment and there- fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents. CONTENTS (18 May 1973) 1 USSR: Brezhnev; Grain Crop 4 Middle East: Lebanon 5 Indochina: Control Commission; Politics in Command; Cambodia 9 Korea: Limited Talks 10 China: Economic Problems 10 Japan: A Small Opening 11 Australia: Labor's Hold 12 Ireland: New Broom 13 Europe: Force Reduction Talks 13 Yugoslavia: An Old Soldier 15 Money and Gold MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 16 South Asia: Inching Backward 16 India: A Problem of Money 17 Bangladesh: Food Shortages Ease 18 Burundi: The Hutus Again 19 Third World: Arms Customers 20 Changes in Sudan WESTERN HEMISPHERE 21 Chile: No End in Sight 21 Peru: Mundane Concerns 22 Argentina: All Systems Go 23 Mexico: The Students Again Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 1%W INW Brezhnev Meets Honecker in East Berlin (L); with Young Admirer and Gierek in Warsaw (R) USSR ?, ,The past week saw action on several fronts in preparation for Brezhnev's arrival in West Ger- many on 18 May. Last weekend the Soviet party chief made 24-hour visits to Poland and East Germany. These were hand-holding sessions de- signed to reassure the two allies that he will not sacrifice their interests during his talks with the West Germans. As a further sop, Brezhnev heaped lavish personal praise on Gierek and Honecker and awarded each of them the Order of Lenin: 1 During the Warsaw stopover, which officials of both countries said "went well," Gierek asked Brezhnev to encourage Bonn to be more con- ciliatory on compensation for Nazi war crimes and economic matters, and less demanding on the resettlement of ethnic Germans. In East Berlin, where his hosts strained to get a huge turnout, Brezhnev stressed the gains that East Germany has made on the international scene, as if to remind his listeners that their past concessions were worthwhile. Brezhnev had an implicit warning, aimed possibly at both Ger- manies. He observed, "If we put our signature to a treaty, it means we are determined to imple- ment the letter and spirit strictly and fully.... We expect the same approach from our treaty part- ners. "r 14 fthe East Germans, like the Poles, were well aware that Brezhnev's visit was mainly window dressing. Despite the kind words and pledges from Moscow, Pankow no doubt fears that closer So- viet relations with West Germany will lead in the end to new pressures to speed up the inter- German negotiations.? (Meanwhile, the West Germans and Soviets were briskly trying to ensure that Brezhnev's visit will be marked by specific accomplishments. Bi- lateral agreements on cultural exchanges, eco- nomic cooperation, and civil aviation were ini- tialed in Moscow this week after compromises were reached on their Berlin clauses. Brezhnev granted a two-hour interview to Stern Sunday, his first formal meeting with reporters from a non- Communist Western publication. While the bulk of the media treatment on both sides has been optimistic, the West German press has been aroused by Soviet tactics at the USSR's recent trade fair in West Berlin. The Soviets used a variety of petty methods to strengthen their basic contention that West Berlin is a separate political entity. It thus appears inevitable that despite Brezhnev's desire to concentrate on the larger political and economic picture, the status of the West German Government's ties with West Berlin will come up at his meeting with Brandt. I SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET AN EARLY LOOK AT THE GRAIN CROP P ra c tic KCE5 Favorable weather for planting and a massive sowing campaign, backed by a special decree authorizing the transfer of men, materials, and machinery from other sectors of the economy to agriculture, have improved the outlook for the Soviet Union's grain harvest this year. It was very dry in the USSR's winter grain belt last year, and fall sowing fell 20 percent short of the plan. Thus, despite only a normal winter- kill, the surviving grain area is somewhat less than the 23.5 million hectares that made it through last year's very heavy winterkill and far less than the average of 31 million hectares harvested annually in the 1966-70 period. In response to the expected shortfall in the winter grain harvest, a record-breaking spring sowing campaign is being undertaken, especially in the Russian Republic. Aided by an early spring, the enormous amount of field work required in Area Sown to Spring Grain (million hectares) 1970-71 Actual 1972 Actual 1973 Plan USSR 88 99 1041/2 RSFSR 54 61 68'/2 Kazakhstan 21 22 23 Ukraine 8 11 7 this effort has so far gone smoothly. By 7 May 53 million hectares had been sown to spring grains, compared with 47 million sown at this time a year ago. If the Soviets are able to keep up the pace, the grand total for the year could exceed 125 million hectares-some 4 million above the average sown to grain for the last five years. The effort to increase the area sown to grain, however, is likely to exact a penalty in terms of lower Major Grain Growing Regions in the U.S.S.R. Bertic 2%_ Belorussia 2% Ukraine 20% L.1 Northwest Central 5% North\ Caucasus 10% Volga- Vyatka 3 %/ Volga 14% Caspian S- SECRET Ural 9% West Siberia 8% Kazakhstan 12% "7u Percentages show region's share of grain production 1966-70. ,. --- .,1,4 +^ o1?/ of total oroductlon. Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 123 May /3 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET Grain Production in the USSR (Million metric tons) Official Claims of Gross Production Estimate of Net Production b/ Average, 1961-65 1:30 106 Average, 1966-69 163 131 1970 187 150 1971 181 148 1972 168 134 1973: Plan 197 160 Preliminary forecast 190 154 .gj Including pulses. Jj Estimate of usable grain. Net usable grain is estimated as the officially claimed gross output minus excess moisture, unripe and damaged kernels, weed seeds and other extraneous materials, post- harvest losses incurred in loading and unloading grain between the grain harvesting combine and storage facilities, and suspected biases in the official reporting of grain production. average yields, since some of the area added will be of marginal worth. Despite this effort, the USSR still may not be able to cover domestic requirements of bread grains (wheat and rye). The Soviet strategy in response to an acreage shortfall in fall-sown bread grains is to plant more feed grains (barley and oats), which promise higher yields than spring wheat. The feed grains will be used in Brezhnev's livestock program. Taking into account the soil moisture and the area, we estimate that the winter grain crop will be about 37 million tons of usable grain- about 8 million tons more than the poor crop last year but still more than 12 million tons below the average for 1970-71. It is too early to project spring grain yields at other than their long-term trend values, but these would give a spring grain harvest of about 117 million tons-12 million tons above last year and 17 million tons above the average for 1970-71. Taken together this would produce a record combined harvest of 154 million tons of usable grain. At this stage in the develop- ment of the 1973 crop, there is still a wide range of uncertainty around such a projection. Even if the Soviets were able to bring in a bumper harvest, Moscow would still need to im- port large amounts of grain to meet domestic and export requirements in the 1974 crop year. So far in 1973 the Soviets have contracted for or are rumored to have purchased about 9 million tons, much of which is elivery by this fall. SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Middle East I IThe heavy fighting that broke out on 2 May between the Lebanese Army and the fedayeen tapered off this week, and a cease-fire appears to have taken hold. The question now is the extent of the controls that will be put upon the feda- yeen, and talks on this nagging problem are get- ting under way) 15- At present, President Franjiyah is trying to enlist broad support for his tough bargaining `7 stance with the guerrillas in the negotiations that began on 15 May. At a minimum, he wants all but light weapons removed from Palestinian refugee camps, he wants army access to the camps for inspection and control, and he wants fedayeen movement outside the camps to be closely regulated.] I.S IFranjiyah's desire to curb the Palestinians has the support of the Christian community and the army. An important segment of the Muslim community is sympathetic to the Palestinians, however, and Franjiyah has not had much luck in bringing Muslim political and religious leaders around to his point of view. If the pressure on the fedayeen increases, the confessional split in Lebanon could worsen and lead to civil strife.) 1;-) ,In view of various pressures on him, Fran- ,- jiyah will probably be forced to accept fewer 7 restrictions than he would like. The important business community is eager for a resumption of normal commercial activity. The army performed effectively against the fedayeen, but it wants to avoid an all-out confrontation. The 14,000-man army is not adequate to sustain a prolonged, country-wide campaign which would be necessary to crush the estimated 6,000 guerrillas supple- mented by 10,000 lightly armed militia from the refugee camps.] I'S ~he fedayeen are on the defensive. They are aware that they cannot regain the considerable freedom of action which they had before the fighting. They will probably work toward a for- mula which allows them some freedom of move- ment in the countryside and leaves them in con- trol of the refugee camps. In any case, their loss of the Jordan base in 1970 severely narrowed their operating options against Israel, and they are now intent on preserving a measure of operational capability in Lebanon. If Franjiyah can impose more rigorous controls on them, they may be forced to rely even more on foreign terrorism.] is Other Arab states, particularly Egypt, played a useful role in arranging the cease-fire and dis- suading Syria from open interference. The Arab states are likely to argue against the imposition of tighter controls. Syria has permitted a modest number of fedayeen to infiltrate into Lebanon, but might open the gates if a harsh settlement were imposed. The Syrians, fearing Israeli retalia- tion, would even in this case probably stop short of sending in regular troops. Left to Right: Mediation Meeting in Lebanon Egyptian Envoy Al Khuli, Saiqah Leader Muhsin, Yasir Arafat, Socialist Leader Jumblatt, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam SECRET 25X1 25X1 Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 _WP11 -,mope INDOCHI NA The Control Commission Canada has promised an announcement on whether it will remain on the International Com- mission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam by the end of the month. It could come sooner. The arguments are running heavily for a pullout, and, barring a drastic change in the current point of view, Ottawa will decide to withdraw its con- tingent by the end of June.' ,'From the outset, Canadians of all political colorations have been uneasy about the Canadian role in Vietnam. When the minority Trudeau gov- ernment agreed on 27 March to remain on the commission, it did so chiefly in response to pres- sure from Washington. Since then, parliamentary, press, and public opposition to Canadian involve- ment has grown considerably.' - " The public considers the commission in- effective and fears for the safety of the Canadian members. In addition, there is concern over the level of military activity in Indochina, including US bombing. `Even if the commission were op- erating efficiently, Ottawa would probably stick to its belief that the commission is an unnecessary adjunct to the Paris agreement. Canadians doubt that the commission is contributing to a lasting peace in Vietnami The press has begun to suggest that the Watergate affair will have an effect on the Cana- dian decision and that a pullout now would not unduly harm bilateral relations with the US. One influential columnist who may be reflecting of- ficial thinking contends that the Watergate dis- closures have struck a severe blow to the adminis- tration's influence on Congress. He reasons that, as a result, the administration's trade legislation will fall victim to a protectionist Congress, leaving President Nixon little leeway in his dealings with Ottawa on the economic matters so important to the Canadians. With the administration thus af- fected, Ottawa no longer has any reason to be apprehensive about the consequences of with- drawal because the Congress would have already set a harsh tone for future Canadian-US economic relations. J THE VIEW FROM JAKARTA 1,With Canadian withdrawal from the com- mission an increasing possibility, Indonesia's will- ingness to stay on is of growing importance. Jakarta shares much of Ottawa's concern over the performance and effectiveness of the commission, but the Indonesians are reluctant to end their participation. Indonesia views its role on the com- mission as serving several important foreign policy interests that, for the time being at least, out- weigh the frustrations and costs of membership. 7a; `,A number of factors will have a bearing on Ottawa's decision. A positive Communist re- sponse to Washington's efforts to secure adher- ence to the Paris accord would be very important. Less obstructionism from the Hungarian and Polish members of the commission would go a long way toward placating domestic critics. The fast-approaching rainy season in Indochina, which should contribute to a slower military tempo in Vietnam, will help. Beyond its oft-stated desire to help ensure peace and stability in South Vietnam, Jakarta sees its membership as an important step toward es- tablishing Indonesia's credentials as the future leader of Southeast Asia. The Indonesians see their role as that of spokesman for regional inter- ests in an otherwise non-Asian body. The role of a disinterested regional spokes- man has proved a frustrating one for the Indone- sians. During his tenure as commission chairman, SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET 1WW the Indonesian represenl:ative acted in typical Javanese fashion-stressing areas of agreement while postponing discussion on divisive issues. The Indonesians believe that their efforts to serve as an unbiased mediator were constantly misinter- preted by both the Canadians and the Communist delegations. The Indonesians strongly object to being lumped with the Canadians as the "West- ern" or pro-US faction on the commission. The Indonesian members have also become resentful of what they consider the tendency of the Cana- dians to treat them as "younger brothers" with- out the right to an independent view. Still, Jakarta is unlikely to pull out. Barring a total collapse of the supervisory effort in South Vietnam-which might occur if Canada is not replaced or if there is a major breakdown in the Vietnam cease-fire-Jakarta's own commitment to the commission will probably endure.) Opposition Wins A Round [The President's supporters in the Lower House last week tried to restore provisions in the Senate election bill that give the President's F-Democracy Party a big edge in August elections. The Thieu backers failed to muster the necessary two-thirds vote to override Senate amendments eliminating the party's special privileges. The Pres- ident's only recourse now is to make amendments of his own which he must do before the end of next week. )Some legislators expect Thieu to go back to the original version of the bill. They think he will SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 I SECRET get his way since the Assembly has rarely rejected presidential amendments. If so, it seems likely that only the Democracy Party will be able to run senatorial candidates) (Some opposition figures are also becoming more outspoken about the government's position in the peace talks. A 30-member anti-government bloc in the Lower House issued a statement last week. indicating that they preferred some,/ pro- visions of thelatest Viet Cong proposal to Saigon's plan. The statement also disputed recent govern- ment assertions that there is no "third segment" in South Vietnam. The anti-government bloc represents a small minority in the 159-member Lower House, but it does include members of the An Quang Buddhists and supporters of Big Minhj fter lengthy bargaining and bickering, the J A P ruling High Political Council has finally formed a new government. Late last week, the impasse over the selection of a prime minister was broken SECRET Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET when council member In Tam was tapped for the The Military Situation post. The council subsequently approved his slate of cabinet appointees, and on 16 May the cabinet rKhmer Communist military activity was at was officially installed generally reduced levels for the second week in a row, suggesting that the Communists may be rest- ing and refitting after several months of fighting. 3/ /Thirteen of the ministers are holdovers from The Communists kept up their pressure in the the previous cabinet; ten are newcomers, but Phnom Penh area, however, with a series of at- f most o them have had some type of ministerial tacks on government positions south of experience. The able Long Boret remains as for- eign minister, and Major General U Say, currently ambassador to Laos, has been named minister of PRIME MINISTER IN TAM HAS DE- CLARED THAT THE PRIMARY TASK OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS TO RE- VITALIZE AND REFORM THE ARMY. defense. About half the cabinet positions went to members of Lon Nol's Socio-Republican Party, the remainder were divided) up by the republican and democratic parties and political independ- ents.J t JPrime Minister In Tam has declared that the primary task of the new government is to revi- talize and reform the army. Much of the respon- sibility for that enterprise apparently will fall to a commander in chief of the armed forces. The commander in chief will be outranked militarily only by Lon Nol, who will retain his title of "supreme commander." On the problem of ending the war, In Tam reiterated Cambodia's demand that all foreign troops be withdrawn and ruled out any negotiations directly involving Sihanouk. The new prime minister, however, re- portedly hopes to set up contacts with Com- munist leaders in various iregions of Cambodia, apparently to induce them to stop fighting. He may also try to enlist the services of Son Sann- who served as a prime minister in the Sihanouk era-to woo some of Sihanouk's camp followers in Paris.I ital along Route 3. ciearing operations a ong sections of Routes 1 and 5 registered little or no progress. On the government side, Cambodian Troops SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 5tuKt 1 KOREA: LIMITED TALKS(( ll Jrhe unification talks between Seoul and Pyongyang are entering their second year with little progress to show. The opening of a dialogue between the two adversaries has been important, if only because it gives each a more realistic appreciation of its limited ability to influence the other's policy and political processes. The dia- logue has also contributed significantly to the general reduction of tension on the peninsula. The talks have probably been more advanta- geous to Pyongyang, boosting North Korea's legit- imacy and moving it into the international diplo- matic arena. More than a dozen countries have recognized North Korea since the talks began, and Pyongyang now has a chance to secure observer status in the UN this year or certainly in 1974. Pyongyang is working to exploit its im- proved status to develop additional international backing for a mutual reduction of forces in Korea and the withdrawal of all US troops. Although the North Koreans have little hope at present of forcing a US withdrawal, they may believe they can complicate US - South Korean relations over the troop issue; a major propaganda campaign is being directed toward this end. Pyongyang's objective is to weaken the mili- tary and political underpinnings of the South Korean Government, but this does not mean that the North Koreans plan renewed military aggres- sion against the South. There are indications that Pyongyang believes a reduction in Seoul's armed strength would allow the North to reduce its own military spending and devote more of its re- sources to the development of heavy industry. For its part, South Korea has derived benefit from the talks, but at the expense of its former position as the sole representative of Korea in the free world. Seoul's goal was to develop a relation- ship with Pyongyang that would preclude a North Korean attack. The South was motivated, at least initially, by uncertainty over what the Nixon doc- trine meant for US forces in Korea. There was also a domestic factor. President Pak Chong-hui used the talks to justify his re- shaping of South Korean life along more authori- tarian lines. He told the people that it would be necessary to tighten national discipline in prepara- tion for political contacts with the Communist North. These domestic objectives are largely accomplished; he is more confident about the presence of US forces and thus less fearful of new North Korean military action. His interest in the talks has therefore diminished. Despite their differences, both Seoul and Pyongyang recognize that the big powers want detente on the peninsula and are capable of ap- plying military and economic constraints to pre- vent backsliding. For this reason alone the talks are likely to continue, though the pace may be slowed. They may yet produce some lowering of barriers to non-political contacts and cooperation, but lar achievements are unlikely in the near future. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14 CHINA: ECONOMIC PROBEMS (:51) /China's task this year is to restore momen- tum to an economy that has been plagued by declining growth rates since the Fourth Five Year Plan was launched in 1971. Although weather has been favorable thus far this year, lagging agricul- tural production is still at the forefront of China's economic problems. In the face of an inadequate harvest last year, China has contracted this year for imports of grain, cotton, and vegetable oil, worth a record $900 million. Increasing the volume of farm imports is a short-term palliative. China's leaders apparently have concluded that low-grade fertilizer and other semi-modern products of small rural factories cannot raise agricultural production fast enough to meet China's growing needs. In recent months, Peking has been curtailing the construction of these small ventures and has signed contracts worth $300 million with western firms for four huge chemical fertilizer plants and four man-made fiber facilities. Industrial production appears to be in- creasing moderately. Peking claims that produc- tion of mining equipment, agricultural machinery, and light industrial products made from non- agricultural raw materials increased in the first quarter of the year. Peking has not released any claims for nationwide output of major industrial commodities like steel, coal, petroleum, or elec- tric power. Official media have carried only a handful of first-quarter claims for provinces and major cities. Although the expansion of basic industries seems to have a lower priority than the expansion of agriculture, Peking is also looking to imports for industrial growth. Firms in West Germany and CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Japan are competing to sell China a $300-million steel complex, which would add 3 to 4 million tons of finished steel to China's current annual output of about 17 million tons. In the electric power field, the Chinese have been negotiating with several countries for conventional and nu- clear generating equipment that might be worth as much as $500 million. Peking also is seeking to improve its transportation and communications systems. Most of the recently purchased industrial facilities, however, will not become operational until the late 1970s and thus will not accelerate economic growth during the remainder of the current five-year plan. JAPAN: A SMALL OPENING [The foreign investment liberalization pro- gram, which became effective on 1 May, is the broadest yet, but it is unlikely to generate large amounts of investment from abroad. Although foreign investment will increase significantly in some industries where 100-percent foreign owner- ship is being permitted for the first time, invest- ment will be restricted in many firms that would be most attractive to the potential investor. These include the firms dealing in computers, food processing, and large retail sales operations. 1 3`? }The liberalization program increases from 228 to about 800 the number of industrial branches where 100-percent foreign ownership of new firms is permitted. Most of the 22 industries remaining under restriction are scheduled for liberalization within the next three years? SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRE I Foreigners also are being permitted for the first r even to t , o time to own more than 25 percen buy out completely, existing Japanese firms. Such actions, however, will require the approval of the Japanese firm, and obtaining such approval could be a complex and difficult matter( Vin' )Tokyo's attitude and interpretation of the new regulations will determine the level of foreign r investment the new regulations will attract. In the past, the Japanese Government has used tactics such as delays in processing applications, exces- sive requirements for reports, and guidelines on production and sales set by Japanese industry associations. Foreign firms ignoring such guide- lines have in many cases been unable to use the most efficient marketing channels or to obtain credit locally. Such market sharing arrangements are technically illegal, but the government has chosen to ignore the law and allow industry as- sociations to operate in such a manner.? 31y l lthough the industries scheduled for grad- ual liberalization over the next few years hold } attractive possibilities for investment, these indus- tries already are girding to resist foreign encroach- ment. The Japanese computer manufacturing industry, for example, is-with the government's blessing-working out plans to standardize the production of peripheral equipment and the development of software. Other industries are likely to take similar actions o e for new foreign investment. AUSTRALIA: LABOR'S HOLD 43- 'After only six months in office, Prime Min- ister Whitlam's government is considering new national elections in the hopes of putting Labor in a commanding political position for years to come. A developing parliamentary stalemate over trade union legislation could provide the opening. The government has introduced bills that will reduce union liability in strike actions and de- emphasize arbitration in favor of collective bar- gaining. The opposition Liberals see these bills as confirmation of their fears that the Labor govern- ment will cater excessively to union interests. The government's proposals have passed the Labor- controlled House of Representatives, but appear headed for almost certain defeat or unacceptable amendment in the opposition-controlled Senate.) 141 IPrime Minister Whitlam looks on these bills as a test of his ambitious domestic legislative program and has implied that he will dissolve both houses and call elections if the bills are blocked. Under Australian law, legislation must fail on two separate occasions before Parliament can be dissolved in this manner. This is a time- consuming process so Whitlam will probably not be making a final decision until late this year or possibly early 1974.1 u;Z, (The opportunities new elections offer the Labor government make the gamble attractive. Although a recent Gallup Poll showed a slight slippage in the government's public following, it did not indicate a corresponding jump in the standing of the divided and colorless opposition. Labor has a majority of nine in the House that it is unlikely to lose in an election in the near term. In the Senate the government has 26 seats, the opposition coalition 31, and independents 3. Labor would need only a moderate increase in its vote to gain control of the Senate. If that were achieved, Whitlam's domestic program would be ensured. The government would also be in posi- tion to reapportion electoral constituencies and amend other procedures which now favor the opposition. These steps would dramatically change the Australian political landscape.; Whitlam's decision will be influenced by the outcome of the Victoria State elections on 19 May. The national elections last December pro- duced a 6.2-percent swing to Labor in Victoria. Although Labor is unlikely to pick up enough seats to form the next state government, many observers believe that the trend toward Labor in Victoria will continue and that the party will cut deeply into the Liberal majority. If this proves to be the case, Prime Minister Whitlam will be encouraged move for national elections later this ear. SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET ' 5 ~ few weeks after Garret Fitzgerald took 25X1 over Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs SU First he summoned all 19 Irish ambassadors and the senior officials in the department to a four-day policy conference. Such a meeting was a y~ novelty in Dublin, and it must have been a taxing experience for the ambassadors. Prime Minister 4 Cosgrave, in his opening remarks to the diplo- mats, stressed his desire to make an Irish contri- bution, "necessarily small, but never negligible, to peace and progress in the world." He told the diplomats that their primary task was to promote vital economic and trade relations with other countries. Although he did not put it in so many words, Cosgrave's long-term goal is a lessening ofS Ireland's economic ties with Britain.( J )Fitzgerald followed up the conference with a peech on 9 May outlining the foreign policy of the new coalition government. He reiterated the government's moderate approach to the unifica- tion of Ireland, took note of the "openness" of British views on the problem of a divided Ireland, and reaffirmed support for London's white paper on Ulster's future H (> )Fitzgerald emphasized Dublin's new role as a member of the EC. He believes that the way for Ireland to get maximum economic benefits from its membership is to put great stress on maintain- ing the common agricultural policy. Fitzgerald acknowledged Ireland's continuing need for large-scale_US investments, but he served notice that Dublin would oppose any efforts to modify the common agricultural policy in a way that would undermine its value to Irish farmers. Fitz- gerald also wants the EC to adopt a strong re- gional development program-of which Ireland would be a prime beneficiary. tf )The new look in Dublin can be directly traced to Fitzgerald, a dynamic and innovative foreign minister. His energy is likely to make him the most visible man in the Cosgrave govern- ment-a situation that at times will create friction between him and the more conservative prime minister. Fitzgerald's political views appear to fol- low the main trends of European social democ- racy. This makes him somewhat of a radical in SECRET Page 18 May 73 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRE I EUROPE: FORCE REDUCTION TALKS >.~ [After 100 days of informal negotiations, the participants in the preliminary talks on force reductions in Europe have gotten around the knotty problem of Hungary, the issue that oc- cupied the diplomats almost since they assembled in Vienna on 31 January. That country has been placed, at least temporarily, in the "observer" category just as the Soviets desired. NATO retains the right to reopen the question during the actual negotiations, but a precedent has been established that will be difficult to overcome:? . \The delegates resolved other procedural matters with relative ease, although a number of issues remain that will require informal talks be- tween now and the anticipated starting date for the substantive talks in October. One of the issues still unsettled is the agenda for the later talks.'] '1 , The plenary sessions this week gave the del- egates an opportunity to comment generally on force reduction. Representatives of the Warsaw Pact states praised detente generally and charac- terized the force reduction talks-for which they took credit-as an important contribution to the further relaxation of tension. The speakers gave nothing away on the future pact position on substantive aspects, though they did stress that Participants in Force Reduction Talks "Full" or "Direct" Participants Belgium Canada Czechoslovakia East Germany West Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Poland USSR UK US "Special" Participants (observers) Bulgaria Denmark Greece Hungary Italy Norway Romania Turkey reductions should not endanger any country's se- curity. The pact speakers also left open the possi- bility of inviting additional European countries- meaning France and the neutrals-to take part in the formal talks and raised the prospect of similar talks later on other European regions) 5-). IThe hassle over Hungary led to some prob- lems among the Western allies, and the strain on allied unity may well reappear. The British, in particular, felt that the West was too quick to give in to the Soviets.? liZ The preliminary talks could conclude this month. The Soviets, however, will have no trou- ble finding ways to drag them out if they so desire. In this regard, there is at least an implicit connection between the force reduction talks and a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviets are not likely to agree to set a date for force reduction talk until one has been set for a security conference. YUGOSLAVIA: AN OLD SOLDIER 571Y )The ravages of time, fatigue, and possibly ill health seem to be catching up with Tito, and party secretary Stane Dolanc is taking over some of the functions of the aging leader.) 7 !After the conference, Dolanc announced that Tito will no longer perform "unnecessary protocol duties" because of his advanced age. SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 IAW SECRET Dolanc said that other leaders will help Tito so that he can carry on as party chief and president of the country for "as long as possible."? This announcement will advance Dolanc's claim as heir apparent even further. Dolanc dominated the conference and gained some of the nationwide attention he will need to establish himself as the rightful successor. Four years ago, Tito plucked Dolanc from an obscure post in Slovenia and he has come a long way since. At 47, his style closely resembles that of the younger Tito. Like Tito, Dolanc is a straight-talking, no- nonsense man of the people, totally dedicated to preserving Yugoslavia's federal system.j G, )His self-assured performance at the confer- ence set the tone for future appearances. Dolanc = k predictably gave unstinting support to Tito's drive for tougher party discipline, but he also spoke of the need for "creative Marxism," presumably to reassure Yugoslavia's dispirited liberals that he can be pragmatic. Dolanc focused on economic problems and courted the workers by demanding an end to the recent decline in their standard of living. He did not say how this is to be done, but urged party and government leaders to correct the situation.( `-i Y )As Tito had arranged in advance with the republic party bosses, Dolanc was re-elected unanimously as secretary of the Executive Bureau at a presidium meeting after the conference. This puts him in an ideal position to influence the party congress due next spring and gives him a chance to show whether he can deal with the manifold problems facing Yugoslavia. SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 ,r,W J [_ L t % I uropean money markets have come under The weakening of the dollar in Europe abruptly halted the Bank of Japan's heavy dollar selling in the Tokyo market. Foreign exchange banks and other private sources have replaced the central bank as dollar sellers in the Tokyo market. Continued strong demand for dollars to finance imports and foreign investment has resulted in the dollar losing only moderately against the yen. their first severe speculative pressures since the joint float began on 19 March. The dollar was under strong attack for the first time in more than two months, and although it firmed on 16-17 May it remains substantially below its early May levels. The Bank of England is the only European central bank reported to have provided dollar support. If the run on the dollar were to resume, the European participants in the joint float may well attempt, through limited interven- tion, to prevent too rapid an appreciation of their currencies against the dollar in order to minimize the impact on their foreign trade. Many traders attribute the dollar's problems primarily to the Watergate issue, but Watergate has only added to an already pervasive uncer- tainty about the dollar in the wake of two deval- uations. The New York Stock Exchange's poor performance, worries about the US balance of payments, and inflationary pressures in the US are other contributing factors. The free market price of gold soared to a record last week. The price on the London market, which had stabilized at about $90 an ounce between late March and early May, reached $112 on 15 May before dropping back somewhat. The attack on the dollar clearly contributed to the rise in the price of gold. Tight exchange controls on the continent, which have made it more difficult and expensive for money managers to shift funds among currencies have added to the attraction of gold. Other factors are: reduced South African sales, reflecting reduced output; rumors that President Nixon will discuss new gold price arrangements with Soviet party chief Brezh- Middle East. London Gold Price 1973 January February March SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 - JCIi~-5.C I SOUTH ASIA: INCHING BACKWARD )April saw some slight progress toward a South Asia settlement, but the movement has been in the opposite direction this month )India and Bangladesh offered Pakistan a package deal in April; it called for the return of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (except 195 to be tried for war crimes), the release of about 150,000 Bengalees from Pakistan, and the trans- fer to Pakistan of some 260,000 Biharis from Bangladesh. Islamabad rejected the offer, but did suggest discussions with India on mutual prob- lems..; )On 5 May, several hundred senior Bengalee civil servants resident in Pakistan were rounded up by the authorities. The move-ostensibly in preparation for their repatriation-was designed to convey two messages from Islamabad to Dacca: that Pakistan had senior Bengalees it could try for treason if Bangladesh went through with the war crimes trials, and that the delay in send- ing the prisoners-of-war home was worsening the situation of the Bengalees in Pakistan~1Reaction in both India and Bangladesh was adverse, and it appears to have made concessions by New Delhi and Dacca less likely-1 W ilndia rejected on 8 May Pakistan's offer to talk. Two days later, Islamabad reiterated its rejection of the India-Bangladesh package and announced it was taking its case to the Interna- tional Court of Justice to prevent India from transferring the prisoners to Bangladesh for war crimes trials.! 1Despite the May events, both India and Pakistan want a settlement. President Bhutto is expected to make a formal reply to the Indian message of 8 May, and in so doing he could make further proposals. New Delhi still appears anxious to settle its differences with Pakistan, but remains unwilling to act without Dacca's concurrence. The Indians have not yet been able to shake Dacca's insistence that Pakistan accept the Biharis and that r crimes trials be held. and PL-480 agricultural sales to India that were repayable in rupees, rather than hard currency. Another $5 billion in rupees will be added over the next 35 to 40 years as outstanding principal and interest on other loans by the US to the Indian Government become due. 7 position of the large sum in rupees held by the US in India. Some $900 million in rupees have piled up over the past 20 years as a result of US loans INDIA: A PROBLEM OF MONEY - Negotiations are slated to begin on the dis- { New Delhi became quite concerned with the US balance since PL-480 aid repayable in rupees was all but halted. Until 1968, India enjoyed a surplus from the arrangement. After 1968, how- ever, US rupee expenditures from the fund exceeded India's local earnings from sales of SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 ''W SECRET PL-480 commodities and New Delhi became con- cerned that the funds might give the US influence over India's economic policies. The concern is exaggerated since aid agreements stipulate that most uses of these funds by the US must be approved by the Indian Government.f US-owned rupees have been spent in India for a variety of purposes. Some $450 million have been used to finance the expenses of US govern- ment agencies in the country; almost $2 billion went into development loans to India; $150 mil- lion were made available as loans for US business- men; and $75 million bought Indian goods as aid for Nepal until New Delhi halted the practice last year./ New Delhi most likely will try to write off as 'muc as possible of tha rijr p halanrn and d k+ will probably allow the continued use of rupees to operate the US Embassy during this period. New Delhi may agree to use the rupees to help finance the country's development budget. Pro- tracted negotiations may be necessary before an agreement can be reached. Future use of US rupees in any event will continue to restricted. BANGLADESH: FOOD SHORTAGESS~ ASE (Deliveries of food grain to Ban desh from 9 abroad since January have filled more than half the projected food deficit for 1973 of 2.7 million tons. The spring rice harvest now under way is expected to yield a record 2.3 million tons. This crop accounts for about 20 percent of annual rice production. Food graiins have been distributed more efficiently this year than last because many bridges have been repaired and more river vessels are in service. As a result, no serious food short- ages have been reported. SECRET Dacca has purchased 1.1 million tons of food grains on the world market since January and has received aid pledges for another 800,000 tons-mainly from Canada, the US, the European Community, Japan, and Australia. Deliveries have been running slightly ahead of domestic dis- tribution, resulting in an increase in government food grain stocks from 200,000 tons in January to 500,000 in early May. This is approximately a two-month supply. To fill the remaining gap of 800,000 tons for the last quarter of 1973, Dacca has requested 400,000 tons of food grains from the US under PL-480 and has approached other donors for the rest. In addition, Dacca has asked the US for another 450,000 tons of food grains for the first half of next year./ Bazaar Day in Bangladesh Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET (-?1-' 79) The distribution of food is gradually being taken over by the government. The UN mission is beginning a phased withdrawal and plans to end its operations by December. The government maintains ration shops throughout the country; these sell food grains at low fixed prices and provide one third of the country's population with a minimal 15 ounces per day. The remainder of the population relies on its own crops or the free market. Despite the large food grain imports, free market prices on rice have risen more than 60 percent since December and 80 percent since April 1972. Normally, rice prices are stable during the first half of the year and increase moderately before the major rice harvest in December. Ben- galees normally eat rice, but wheat has been the primary import because rice on the world market is higher priced and in shorter supply. Since al- most all wheat is imported and sold in ration shops, the price has remained stable and low. The 25X1 spring rice harvest probably will reduce rice prices temporarily; but a sustained price decline is un- likely- t until next December. BURUNDI: THE HUTUS AGAIN `] ` J ) Hutu rebels in the remote southern border region appear to be ready for another attempt to overthrow the Tutsi government. The Hutus may be better organized than last year when tribal hatreds led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands. T$ JIn the early morning hours of 11 May a rebel force of perhaps 100 men attacked a number of villages and army installations in southwestern Burundi near the border with Tanzania The reb- els had some automatic weapons and 'their at- tacks were well coordinated. The army's key gar- rison at Nyanza Lac on Lake Tanganyika was easily overrun.'] Two days later the Burundi radio announced that government forces had crushed the dissi- dentsJlalthough the US Embassy reported that the 74 rebels faded away before army reinforcements Page 18 arrived. The Burundi Government is accusing Rwanda and "trade union circles" in Belgium of supporting the rebellion, but so far has refrained from implicating Tanzania:j \In a separate action on 12 May, about 1,000 Burundi refugees living in a camp in Rwanda responded to reports of the attacks and launched forays of their own into northern Burundi. Scat- tered fighting was still taking place three days later, but the south is the greater problem area for the government. )Southern Burundi long has been a target for kutu dissidents intent on overthrowing the op- pressive Tutsi regime, which represents only about 15 percent of the 3.7 million population. Just over a year ago in the same area, a rebel attempt to spark a general Hutu uprising was quickly put down by the government. The rebel- lion led to a summer-long campaign of reprisals against the Hutus in which perhaps as many as 200,000 were killed and another 100,000 forced to flee into Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire.? 1 [This year, the Hutu rebels seem to be organ- izing for an extended insurgency, and this would severely test Burundi's weak 3,000-man SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SLUM= I ._ THIRD WORLD: CUSTOMERS FOR AR1YS (: ;) )Arms shipments to Third World countries have averaged about $3 billion annually in the past three years. Since 1966, the US has ac- counted for approximately half of the arms reaching this market each year. In the previous ten years the US accounted for more than 60 percent of the total. About one third of the current flow comes from Communist countries, mainly the USSR; the re- mainder comes from West- ern Europe. The demand for arms has been generated by con- tinuing regional animosities and a felt need to improve military inventories. The main recipients have been the countries directly in- volved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Israel, Egypt, andl Syria), India and Pakistan? and the contenders for dominance in the Persian Gulf (Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia). Almost all types of arms, except nuclear weap- ons and strategic missiles, have been provided. During the last three years, more complex weapons systems have been supplied, includd- ing advanced surface-to-air missile systems, supersonic jet fighters, guided-missile patrol boats, radar-con- trolled antiaircraft guns, and sophisticated tanks. This equipment not only has a high initial cost, but also requires extensive and continuing technical sup- port. Agreements concluded in the past few years be- tween suppliers and Third World customers assure a substantial growth in deliveries over the next several years. The types of arms will become even more sophisticated, raising questions about the ability of the recipients (with the notable excep- tion of Israel) maintain and use the equipment, effectively. Arms Exports to Third World Countries Total trade Million US $ 34,140 Million US $ 3,500 r- -A I I I l o 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 The ten major arms recipients are Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey. suthe US data do not include some $15.7 billion of arms prodesigned under pport Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program, to foreign forces engaged in combat in Indochina or some $700 million in naval equipment made available under the Ship Load and Lease Program. SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 CHANGES IN SUDAN d ~ )President Numayri last week signed Sudan's first "permanent constitution" which incorpo- rates the terms of the peace accord reached last year ending the 17-year-old southern rebellion. At the same time, Numayri named a new cabinet, released a number of political prisoners, and an- nounced several reforms designed to improve gov- ernmental efficiency. He is still struggling with the problem of the Arab terrorists who killed three diplomats in Khartoum last March-1 ' I lThe cabinet has fewer faces but virtually no r. new ones. Significantly, Arab sympathizers and f leftists lost their last prominent spokesmen in the shuffle. Several former army officers were ap- pointed to key provincial posts with the rank of deputy minister. Otherwise, the changes simply increased the power of men already close to the President.( I jNumayri reportedly tried to inject some new blood into the government; somewhat sur- prisingly he was unable to do so. Although the President is personally popular, many Sudanese intellectuals and businessmen apparently remain opposed to the authoritarian nature of his rule.? ~f Among the most important detainees re- leasdd was former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the banned Umma party, and the Ansar Muslim sect. Because of his large following, Sadiq represents a potential source of serious opposition to the regime. Numayri may have extracted some quid pro quo from the Umma party learipr return for his free President Numayri SECRET' Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET CHILE: NO END IN SIGH s the newly elected` congress prepares to convene on 21 May, government and opposition forces are hardening their positions. Internal divi- sions still nag both camps, particularly the efforts of extremists to promote violence. The reduction of the opposition majority in congressional elections in March has strengthened Allende's resolve to override obstructions raised by the congress, the judiciary, and the comptrol- ler general to a broader implementation of his program. A showdown seems imminent on the expropriation of over 100 businesses, on wage readjustments, and on the division of power between the executive and congress. The predilec- tion by some on both sides to postpone, side-step, or accommodate is not in evidence at this time. reinforce the officers' nearly obsessive fear of civil war, a fear that is a major factor in the reluctance of even the most adamant of Allende's military opponents to move against him. Moderates within the government are again attempting to curb the ultra-leftists, whose taste for violence has set off numerous recent disturb- ances. Even a word of caution from visiting Cuban Vice Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rod- riguez did not deflect the revolutionaries. In their latest outing, the ultra-leftists invaded the meet- ing of the leftist Latin American Students' Organ- ization in Santiago to protest their exclusion from the administration-controlled gathering. The Christian Democrats, although they have not yet decided to join the conservative National Party in an effort to impeach the entire PERU: MUNDANE CONCERNS cabinet, have elected a new directorate that repre- sents the least compromising wing of the party. `i fhe country has been shaken by labor unrest The shift does not seem to have alienated the for much of the past month, and opposition more leftist Christian Democrats, possibly be- .,i groups, emboldened by strikes, by President cause outright opposition is proving politically Velasco's illness, and by the apparent absence of a popular-and effective-even among workers who,/, strong hand at the helm, are taking advantage of have in the past supported Allende. the situation? The sudden widespread police raids on the ultra-rightist Fatherland and Freedom group brought it little sympathy, particularly since one of its leaders was calling for civil war from safe- haven in Buenos Aires. Indeed, the group's antics provided convenient support for the government's charges that the real aim of its opponents is civil war. The armed forces are still involved in many day-to-day government activities. Allende's opponents contend that officers in economic posts, such as the chief of the national distribu- tion secretariat, are being used to impose contro- versial socialist policies. The imposition of states of emergency in two provinces gave the military greater powers to ensure public order, a primary concern of senior officers. The government's exaggerated accusations of opposition plotting `'jf) JPart of the trouble stems from a policy that gives the Labor and Interior ministries and Sinamos, the "social mobilization" apparatus, overlapping responsibilities. These entities have been working at cross purposes, hampering the effort to entice unions into a government-con- trolled labor confederation where they can be better controlled.! J') [The current round of labor trouble began earlier this year when militant miners' unions broke away from a Communist-controlled central labor organization. The Communists have been struggling to salvage what is left of their favored status with the government and have been under heavy pressure from the regime SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 made regular mine employees-was taken up by extreme leftist groups that oppose both the gov- ernment and the Communists, was added to a number of local grievances, and was fanned into a wider read strike in key areas of the volatile south illy - (Further issues were provided when the gov- ernment promulgated an unpopular retirement law and announced a nationalization of the fish- meal industry that threatened to cost many workers their jobs. When students and teachers joined in to press their demands, the regime found itself faced with the most serious manifes- tation of discontent it has encountered in five and one-half years in power. `"Jib he government responded by announcing that implementation of the retirement law will be delayed and by compromising on other issues in the south. These steps helped ease the strike situa- tion this week, but it may turn out to have been only a lull in the storm.( U 2 JThe American Popular Revolutionary Alli- ance, the military's archenemy which has been semi-dormant since 1968, is stirring. The party is attempting to organize a one-day nationwide gen- eral strike to take place today. The party sees many potential gains from such a venture, partic- ularly a show of strength that it hopes might Campora and Peron secure it a role in the choice of Peru's next again after 18 years on the sidelines, Campora is president taking a conciliatory line toward his political i 2-opponents and appears to be seeking a broad -1{ JThe party may even believe that the moment "national accord." Even the anti-Peronists in the of government weakness it has been waiting for is military seem prepared to accept the turnover of approaching. The strikes may, however, have power to the Peronists on 25 May( given Peru's military hierarchy a refresher course in the need for armed forces unity that could help resolve the continuing struggle over a successor to C,'% 25X1 have issued invitations to a wide variety of Latin American personalities. In addition to Secretary of State Rogers and the foreign ministers of many W estern Hemisphere nations, Cuban President ARGENTINA: ALL SYSTEMS GO Dorticos will attend and Chilean President r1t tt Allende may come. Such other notables as former /J fPreparations are under way for the inaugura-r t Colombian dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and tion next week of president-elect Hector Cam- former Bolivian president Juan Jose Torres will pora. As the Peronists prepare to take power also be there. Current Bolivian President Hugo SECRET SECRET promises to be an interesting affair. The Peronists Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 SECRET Banzer, who ousted Torres, is also scheduled to attend-1 With the countdown entering its final days, Campora still has not indicated who will fill cabi- net posts and other executive offices. He has continued to sound as if he wants to include representatives of the opposition Radical Party in his government. His call on all "political and civil forces" to join in a five-point program of "na- tional reconstruction" can be interpreted as an effort to soothe his opponents and attract the Radicals who have demonstrated an interest in joining the government. The first few months of the new administration will be difficult as it seeks to push through some of its more controversial programs, such as amnesty for political prisoners, and the broader the cooperation the better Cam- pora's chances of preventing things from getting out of hand-] he armed forces in ~ particular are going to take some lumps, but they now seem to have given up whatever hope they once had of stop- ping the process. Even the most obstinate uncom- promising anti-Peronists in the military have seen their support dwindle and have given up hope of finding a pretext that would generate enouah MEXICO: THE STUDENTS AGAIN 1' )Students in Puebla and Mexico City have quieted down after a week of agitation, but they have a unifying cause, the government demon- strates little give, and further clashes could occur.i The Puebla rcaen was manifestation of dis- content that has been simmering-and occasion- ally surfacing-in Mexico's universities during the past year or so. Tensions at Puebla University h,. been running high since the assassination last year of two leftist professors, apparently by a right- (!'-wing terrorist group. The culprits have not yet been caught. In addition to this issue, leftist agita- tors have for some months been in conflict with rightist authorities over university and local questions. P he situation in Puebla became explosive when on 11 May student agitators and the con- servative business community attempted to hold simultaneous demonstrations. State officials inter- vened to avert a confrontation. Business leaders, angry that student "hoodlums" were able to force the resignation of the rightist state governor, appear to be following deliberately inflammatory policies. Student and university groups, elated at bringing down the governor, are now levying demands on his successor? .-. S lEcheverria has for the most part stood back from the Puebla mess, confining himself to a doubt sincere in wanting a "dialogue" with stu- dents, but knows this is impossible without the true democratization of the political system he has promised them. J `i? [He is convinced that leftist rabble-rousers must be stopped lest they touch off more blood- shed. Echererria wants no repetition of the vio- lent student-government clashes of 1968 and 1971. He is known to shudder at the mere men- tion of the word "halcones," government-trained toughs used to disrupt student demonstrations in 1971. Yet these right-wing terrorist bands are still active, either because Echeverria is not strong enough to challenge those in the government and the universities who control these groups or be- cause he does not want to. The Puebla deaths provided a ready-made cause for unified student protest. Whether this will lead to a new cohesive- ness and increase the possibility of large-scale student-government clashes will depend in great part on how Echeverria handles the situa- tion. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 May 73 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300020001-7