WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
1 June 1973
No. 0372/73
Copy N9 45
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
The WEEKLY SU-MMA RY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif
icant developments of the week rough, noon on Thursday.
It frerfuently it Ludes material coordi ated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Off ice of Strategic
Researc#i, and the Directorate ofScience and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (1 June 1973)
1 Vietnam: And Then There Were Three
3 International Money: Post-mortem
4 Argentina: Passing the Baton
6 Thailand: The Same Old Stand
6 Indochina: Cambodia; South Vietnam
9 Japan: Space Program Lags
10 The Germanies: Ostpolitik; Honecker
11 CEMA Tries to Expand
12 Iceland: Fire For Effect
13 USSR: Jewish Emigration
14 Europe: Closer to a Conference
14 Italy: Scramble for Power
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
16 Greece: All the King's Men
17 Jordan: In With the Old
17 Syria: Rare Election
18 India: "Indira Wave" Receding
19 OAU: Stormy Meeting
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Costa Rica: A Foreign Affair
21 Bolivia: Military Changes
22 Peru: An Overshadowing Problem
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
SECRET AREMOV
VIETNAM
Ottawa has announced that it will withdraw
from Ithe ICCS by the end of July. External
Affairs Minister Sharp expressed the hope that
the advance notice would give those interested
time to find a successor and that the withdrawal
would not have any significant impact on the
peace in Vietnam. The decision is "firm and defi-
nite," said Sharp, but the Canadians would be
willing to return to Vietnam to help supervise any
elections held under the Paris accord.
The Vietnamese Communists may not be at
all unhappy to see the Canadians go, particularly
Canadian chief, Michel Gauvin, who has been
vocal in his criticism of the obstructionist tactics
of the commission's Communist members. Al-
though Hanoi is almost certainly committed to
the commission's continuation, the North Viet-
namese will angle-for a less assertive replacement
for the Canadians
r fThe commission's effectiveness ultimately
depends more on the attitudes of the parties to
the Paris accord than on its own composition.
The Viet Cong - Saigon two-party commission (to
which the ICCS is supposed to report) has never
gotten off the ground, and it has been an uphill
battle for the peace-keeping machinery as a
whole. The Poles and Hungarians continue to
impede effective ICCS action, despite repeated
assurances from Warsaw and Budapest that the
commission can be made to work. The Canadian
replacement will step into a very difficult situa-
tion
Canada's withdrawal from the ICCS high-
lights the near-paralysis that has gripped the ICCS
since its inception. This paralysis is likely to con-
tinue unless some new understanding is reached
with the Communists to make the body work.
Explaining a "Victory"
/The Vietnamese Communists have been
sending out a variety of signals indicating that
they intend to de-emphasize the fighting over the
near term{
5 Some of this comes through in a broad
apologia for Hanoi's handling of the war and the
negotiations, published recently in the party's
theoretical journal. This candid article, which
appeared in March, amounts to a defense of First
Secretary Le Duan's policy of aggressive use of
main-force tactics. A prominent theme of the
article is that if Hanoi had not adopted these
tactics, North Vietnam would have been invaded.
Tracing the twists and turns of the early stages of
the war, the author claims that the revolution in
the late 1950s was "in danger of being repulsed."
Alluding to the conflict raging at the time be-
tween the advocates of lower level guerrilla war-
fare and supporters of Le Duan's argument for a
broad offensive, the article said "the problem was
whether to take the offensive or withdraw. Our
people chose to attack...." Explaining the ration-
ale for the Tet offensive in 1968 in terms reflect-
ing Le Duan's line, the article says Hanoi felt that
"major military efforts" could fprce the US to
"de-escalate, if not end, the war."
5 [The Communists also admit that President
Nixon's election and the "Americanization" of
the war posed new problems. The article attri-
butes final "victory" to the main-force offensive
ICCS Helicopter
Still on the ground
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
WNW -1
-101 A
VT WT-PSI
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
SECRET _VMW
that was launched in March 1972. The tone, how-
ever, is unusually defensive. The Paris agreement
is described as the "greatest victory we could win
considering the actial balance of forces between
us and the enemy."
3 fUp to now, Hanoi's propagandists have done
little but complain about the various political and
military pressures that brought Hanoi to the nego-
tiating table. The new apologia for the regime's
"correct" strategy over the years is overdue. So is
the official scaling down of Communist objec-
tives. The "victory" embodied in the Paris ac-
cords is now interpreted as the withdrawal of US
forces. With that "victory" in hand, the article
implies that Hanoi intends temporarily to lay
aside aggressive main force tactics in favor of
more peaceful competition.)
Smooth-stemmed Sago
Page 2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
JGL F1 L I
?9?w *"
INTERNATIONAL MONEY: POST-MORTEM
-I- fhe international monetary system is being
helped through its latest storm by the predomi-
nance of floating exchange rates. Only minor ceri-
?? .21tral bank interventions have been needed to mairi-
dollar borrowing, increased currency velocity
could in the future contribute to large variations
in exchange rates. J
tain the joint European float, and the massive 12! [Confidence in the dollar has not yet been
central bank dollar-support operations seen earlier restored. During the past week, the dollar's per-
proved unnecessary. West European officials formance has been mixed, and the price of gold
report that international trade has been less afJhas reached about $115 an ounce on foreign-
fected by adjustments in the floating currencies exchange markets. Although the dollar strength-
than had been anticipated.( ened last week following the announcement of a
)11, Although the system has performed well,
there is one new element that could intensify
,,future currency pressures. It appears that in the
absence of central bank intervention, the velocity
of currency turnover in the foreign-exchange mar-
tions with only a small increase in currency hold- 41 tary Fund to draft a reform package, met again
ings. There has been little movement in the Euro-? % `_last week, but there is no sign that they made any
dollar interest rates, indicating that banks have
had adequate funds to meet trader demand for
dollars to buy gold or other currencies. By con-
trast, when the dollar came under heavy pressure
substantial progress toward agreement. The far
from impressive performance of the committee so
far and the relative stability of currency markets
with the advent of widespread floating of cur-
earlier
funds
in the year, speculative demand for bank rencies stron
temporarily pushed the one-month Euro- early world
gly suggest that
monetary reform
prospects
program
for
are
an
re-
dollar
rate from about 6.25 percent to 10.5 per- ceding.
25X1
cent.
By holding down the cost of speculative
25X1
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
dramatic improvement in the US trade balance in
April and the subsequent rally on the New York
Stock Exchange, the dollar later fell to new low
points relative to the joint float currencies in light
trading.
kets has increased substantially. The result was a I . `Deputies of the Committee of Twenty, the
large increase in the volume of currency transact- sub-group established by the International Mone-
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
SLUKL I MAW
ARGENTINA
is' (While police clashed with Peronist youth,
,, Hector Campora received the presidential sash
and baton from outgoing president Lanusse. The
I transfer officially marked Argentina's return to
civilian rule after nearly seven years of relatively
ineffectual government by the armed forces.
Campora's inauguration speech set a nationalistic
but basically moderate tone for the new Peronist
government. Most of his cabinet members were
drawn from the moderate wing of the Peronist
Page 4
movement, although his first official acts were
designed to please the more radical youth wing.,
/S he activities of high-level foreign guests
drew almost as much attention as did those of
President Campora. The inauguration afforded
Secretary of State Rogers the opportunity to
meet with Chilean President Allende and such
other Latin American dignitaries as Foreign Minis-
ter Tack of Panama. Allende, who paid his re-
spects to the outgoing government of General
Lanusse as well as to the incoming Peronists, was
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
*RAW SECRET
cheered by throngs of Argentines whenever he
appeared. Cuban President Dorticos was accorded
an even more enthusiastic reception. He visited
two major provincial cities before leaving Argen-
tina. Dorticos spoke at a ceremony commemo-
rating the massive 1969 riots in Cordoba and, to
the delight of the crowd, praised the memory of
that Argentine-turned-Cuban, Che Guevara.
~gainst this background of high-powered
foreign visitors, Campora set out to put his cam-
paign promise of an "independent" foreign policy
(1 into action. At his inauguration, he pledged his
solidarity with "anti-imperialist struggles" around
the world. Immediately after taking office, he
re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba,
took steps to establish relations with East Ger-
many, and announced that relations with North
Korea would follow soon./
ICampora's first official action on the do-
mestic front was to grant presidential pardon to
large numbers of "political prisoners." He was
pushed into hasty action in part by the threat of
mob attacks on the prisons and may come to
regret the all-inclusiveness of his amnesty. As
imprisoned labor leaders and convicted terrorists
alike walked out of the prison gates, many of the
freed Trotskyist guerrillas promised to continue
the struggle. The special courts set up by the
military to deal with subversion were abolished in
a further move to break down the "repressive"
structure set up by the armed forces. The law
making t e Communist Party illegal was also
abrogated
;' )With these actions as a sop to the radical
w ing of Peronism, Campora installed a cabinet
representative of the moderate and the labor wing
of the movement. The new economic team,
headed by Minister of Treasury and Finance
Gelbard, promises little in the way of radical
change, and most of the other appointees fall into
the same category. The cabinet is totally Peronist,
with other parties represented in second-level
jobs. The politically important post of minister of
social welfare was given to Juan Peron's private
secretary, Jose Lopez Rega. Lopez Rega will
probably serve as the conduit between Peron and
Campora, and he is likely to emerge as the
strongest member of the new government.]
I 5 fro demonstrate his determination to control
the military, Campora selected the most junior of
Argentina's major generals, Jorge Raul Carcagno,
17 to be the new army commander. If custom is
followed, his elevation will force into retirement
the nine major generals senior to Carcagno and
thus remove many of the strongest anti-Peronists
in the armed forces. General Carcagno has built a
reputation as a populist, but he is a thoroughly
military man well-respected by his fellow officers.
Although he will be more amenable to working
with the Peronists than most of his colleagues, he
will also be an effective spokesman for the mili-
tary. He has already served notice that he will
tolerate no efforts by the Peronists to politicize
the army or to operate outside the chain of com-
Peronist Crowds on Inauguration Day
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
NEW SECRET VAW
p [The lack of any constitutional framework
for an orderly transfer of power has vexed succes-
sive governments in Bangkok, and the present one
has again side-stepped the troublesome succession
issue by extending for another year the military
duties of both Prime Minister Thanom and army
commander Praphat. Thanom's third extension in
the largely ceremonial post of supreme com-
mander of the armed forces has a direct bearing
on control of the Thai Army-the key to political
power in Bangkok. Thanom had announced last
January that he would stay on as prime minister
but would step down as supreme commander in
August. He probably changed his mind at the
urging of General Praphat. Had Thanom stepped
down, Praphat would have come under strong
pressure from the military to move upstairs as
supreme commander and turn over command of
the army to his deputy and rival, General Krit
Sivara
n~ [Now, the chances for Krit and other younger
officers to move up the ladder have been stymied.
The apparent beneficiary is the ambitious Colonel
Narong, who is Thanom's son and Praphat's Bon-
in-law. It is possible that Tiianom and Praphat
decided to hang on because they could not agree
on an immediate successor and wanted to give
Narong more time to expand his power base.
~Z 3 IThis Thai version of the Alfonse and Gaston
act means a continuation of the present conserva-
tive approach to foreign and domestic policies.
The most serious problem facing the government
is the Communist-led insurgency. While the insur-
gency has thus far been contained, its course over
the long run will largely depend on Bangkok's
ability to come to grips with fundamental eco-
nomic problems such as the growing disparity in
income between urban and rural areas. A signifi-
cant weakness of the Thanom-Praphat leadership,
however, is its apparent lack of interest in de-
veloping and implementing the long-range eco-
V-- 1 [The Khmer Communists are keeping up mn.
tary activity in the Phnom Penh area, even though
the rainy season is now under way. Last week,
they started a new operation along the Mekong
corridor near the government base at Neak
Luong. Their effort to "liberate" Neak Luong has
yet to gain much momentum, and the over-all
level of military activity subsided during the
week)
(2.c1 IShellings and minor probes continue against
government positions on both sides of the Me-
kong near Neak Luong and around Prey Veng
City to the northeast, but heavy air strikes have
enabled the government troops to hold their
ground and have complicated the Communists'
logistics and manpower problems. Even if the
nomic policies that could undercut the insurgents.
The two leaders may believe, moreover, that the
budding Thai relationship with Peking will solve
this troublesome problem for them.
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
SECRET NNW
Khmer Communists
Planning for action
Communists do not overrun Neak Luong, they
will still be able to harass resupply convoys on the
Mekong
IThe only bright spot for the government
during the week was on Route 5, where Cam-
bodian units broke the Communists' two-month-
long hold over a section of that vital highway
some 50 miles north of Phnom Penh. Several
bridges along the road have been destroyed and
must be repaired before Route 5 can be reopened
to traffic,?
i he Khmer Communists' nominal com-
mander in chief, Prince Sihanouk, continues to
take a hard line on the prospects for negotiations.
Sihanouk, winding up a tour of a number of
African countries, said again on 29 May that he
would never negotiate with Lon Nol. He will
discuss a peace settlement with the US and is
prepared to establish diplomatic relations with
Washington as soon as the US abandons "the
traitors of Phnom Penh." Sihanouk protested that
Cambodia is "not a satellite" of North Vietnam
and insisted that the Cambodian problem be
solved by Cambodians only
16 (In some parts of South Vietnam there are
continuing signs that the Communists are deter-
mined to use their military muscle to expand
their holdings. Chuong Thien Province in the
delta is one of these trouble spots. Although it
has relatively few people, it is adjacent to im-
portant Communist sanctuaries and supply routes
from Cambodia. Since the start of the cease-fire,
Chuong Thien has consistently borne the brunt of
Communist military action in the delta#Govern-
ment officials view the current level of action as a
prelude to a Communist campaign to capture the
whole province, but some US officials believe that
the Communists will stick to their nibbling
operations]
' % )Chuong Thien has some of the heaviest con-
centrations of Communist combat units in the
southern delta. These forces include three in-
fantry regiments, elements of an artillery reg-
iment and a sapper group, along with the senior
command of the Communist forces in the south-
ern delta./
r7 bn the government side, the South Vietna-
mese 21st Division has the responsibility for
Chuong Thien Province. Two regiments of the
division, supported by two Ranger battalions,
have been given the job of disrupting the infil-
tration of Communist personnel and supplies into
and through the province.'/
1\t present, government control is restricted
to the areas immediately surrounding the district
and province capitals. Much of the rest of the
province has been in effect ceded to the
CiCommunists.1tommunist attacks, consisting for
the most part of mortar and rocket fire are
keeping the South Vietnamese defenders close to
their bases and outposts.
SECRET
Page
7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
I%W SECRET
Japanese launch scientific satellite, September 1971.
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
-ftw SECRET "Of
JAPAN: SPACE PROGRAM LAGS
'Controversy has arisen over the slow prog-
ress and limited capabilities of Japan's space pro-
gram. Critics in both government and industry see
t3 Tokyo's reliance on domestic efforts to develop a
three-stage space launch vehicle as the major
problem. Although the Japanese are acquiring US
technical assistance, including a Thor-Delta first
stage, for the development of a booster, the
Japanese vehicle will be able to put only a
250-pound payload into synchronous orbit. This
capability would not be sufficient to launch corn-
munications satellites to meet Japan's domestic
requirements}
'Critics of the space program, especially in
the Japanese Ministry of Communications, argue
that a 650-pound communications satellite is
needed by 1976 to meet these requirements. The
critics claim that Tokyo should end its efforts to
develop a Japanese space launcher and purchase
one from the US. For this purpose, the ministry
has asked for a greatly increased space budget
over the next several years}
The government's space activities commit-
tee, 'which oversees the program, is reluctant to
reduce Japanese efforts to develop an indepen-
dent space program. Instead, it has undertaken an
extensive review of the program. It has approved
a space budget for 1973 of 36,679 million yen
(about $140 million), roughly a 50-percent in-
crease over 1972. This increase still does not
reach the level considered necessary by critics of
the program.'
The results of the review are to be an-
nounced later this year,. The committee is likely
to recommend some additional increases in for-
eign technical assistance, while encouraging the
continued development of a domestic space capa-
bility. Tokyo may eventually be forced, however,
to take the alternative course-greatly increased
reliance on the US or other foreign countries.
Japanese officials are already thinking of asking
the US to launch a 550-pound weather satellite
for international use that will be ready in
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
SECRET
Assuming that the treaty's ratification would be
completed by early June, the two German
states-in conjunction with the US, USSR, UK,
and France-had planned to apply for UN
membership in July. Now the Brandt government
will have to decide whether to adhere to its long-
argued position that a ratified inter-German
treaty must precede UN membership. Court re-
view will also rekindle suspicions in East Berlin
and perhaps Moscow about the ability of the
Brandt government to deliver on detente.)
Sg hancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik got mixed re-
viewtthis week. On the plus side, West German
and Czechoslovak negotiators finally announced
completion of a draft treaty normalizing rela-
tions. This long-awaited good news paled in the
face of a challenge to the inter-German basic
treaty on constitutional grounds.(
> The Czechoslovak treaty was the final hurdle
in Brandt's campaign of reconciliation with Ger-
many's World War II enemies to the east. The
treaty opens the way for diplomatic relations
with Hungary and Bulgaria. The absence of any
great historical problems obviates the need for
3r1 special treaties with these countries, but there is
some question, at least in Bonn, whether Moscow
may ask Budapest and Sofia to hold back until
Bonn ratifies its pacts with Prague and Pankow.?
.f (Soviet caution would be understandable,
given the surprise decision of the conservative
Bavarian government to seek a court ruling on the
East German treaty. The court decided on 29
May to hear the case. It will begin deliberations
on 19 June, and is expected to hand down its
ruling on 31 July. At the same time, the court
rejected another Bavarian challenge questioning
the objectivity of one of the justices, and put off
until 4 June a ruling on the Bavarian request that
)+d [After two years at the top, First Secretary
Erich Honecker is in firm control of the ruling
Socialist Unity Party of East Germany. He has
'ff made no sudden personnel changes, but has care-
fully placed his supporters in key government and
party positions. At this time, there appears to be
no one on the East German scene who can chal-
lenge his primacy. Under the unblinking Soviet
eye, however, Honecker-like his predecessor,
Walter Ulbricht-must walk a thin line when
engaged in foreign policy matters. Like Ulbricht
again, Honecker has had but limited success in
winning support from a skeptical populace)
W IHonecker, in his early career, was co-founder
and leader of the party's youth organization; he
l
t
b
Ulbri
ht'
h
t
h
t
i
ti
a
er
ecame
c
s
c
e
man
n ous
ng
a
party dissidents and was then entrusted to head
the Politburo's important cadre and security com-
missions. In this role, he supervised the building
of the Berlin Wall. Throughout his career,
Honecker has demonstrated that he is strong on
organization and administration and, more impor-
tant, that he has an instinct for making friends in
Moscow and for being on the winning side in
important debates at home. Often referred to as
"second secretary" by party functionaries in the
1960s, Honecker actually ran the party's day-to-
day business. Thus, it came as no surprise that he
succeeded Ulbricht as party boss in May 19711
President Heinemann be enjoined from signing Lll/
the treaty ratification legislation. This last step is
a effort to take some of the heat off the court by
putting it on Heinemann:]
3'? There is guarded optimism in Bonn that the
court will find the treaty constitutional. The first
chamber of the court, dominated by opposition-
appointed justices, will debate the constitutional
issue. It cannot be assumed, however, that opposi-
tion-inclined justices will necessarily vote against
the government, for a sizable element of the
Christian Democratic Union no longer opposes
the treaty. Several Christian Democrat state gov-
ernments, for example, did not support Bavaria in
its unsuccessful attempt last week to block the
treaty in the upper house of parliamentll
37 Even the decision to hear the case, however,
is a setback and an embarrassment for Brandt.
IG [Nor is it surprising that Honecker has acted
circumspectly since then. To maintain an air of
stability and continuity, he has avoided abrupt
departures from the ways of the old regime. He
has moved slowly to broaden his political base by
placing loyal supporters in key positions.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
'"M 5tUKt I %
(separation from West Germany) and regards with
skepticism most of the regime's other policies.
Popularity, however, is not a prerequisite for re-
maining in power. Unless Honecker makes some
move that arouses Soviet ire, he will remain the
boss for some time to come.
1?~.~- (The European Communist countries, in an
effort to strengthen economic relations, are en-
`T couraging certain non-Communist countries to
establish ties with the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance. In mid-May, Finland became
the first non-Communist country to sign a co-
operation agreement with CEMA, and Iraq is talk-
ing about it.1
Honecker has dealt with possible contenders not
by ousting them but by assigning them new
responsibilities that take up their time and
energies. He has permiitted considerable intra-
party give and take in policy formulation, but he
has carefully kept final decision-making in his
own hands. The 61-year-old Honecker made good
use of his long apprenticeship in sensitive posi-
tions, and he and the party-government apparatus
have adapted easily to each other.
t- Honecker does have problems. East German
and Soviet interests do not always coincide, par-
ticularly on West Germany. He has not resisted
Moscow as often or as stubbornly as Ulbricht, but
the Soviets have been able to extract only reluc-
tant agreement from him to be more accom-
modating to Bonn. Honecker knows that he needs
Moscow's approval to remain in power, and so he
tries to mimimize frictions in representing East
German interests. His method has worked. Two
weeks ago, Brezhnev lavished high praise on
Honecker and gave him the Order of Lenin
(fir, Honecker has had no more success than his
predecessor in winning real support. The East
German populace particularly resents Abgrenzung,
Page 11
,14 )These developments follow a decision last
month to establish a $1.3-billion fund to provide
economic and technical aid for the developing
countries. The fund, which will go into operation
next January, will provide 15-year untied credits
in transferable rubles and hard currencies. This is
in addition to $900 million in credits now made
available annually to developing countries by
individual CEMA members; these are tied to pur-
chases in the donor country.]
i4b (CEMA was set up in 1949 at Moscow's
behest to increase economic specialization and to
coordinate the economic policies of the members.
In addition to the Warsaw Pact countries, Mon-
golia and Cuba are full members, and Yugoslavia,
North Korea, and North Vietnam are observers.
Moscow's attempts to widen the organization
probably reflect the need to expand sources of
energy supplies, particularly for the East Euro-
peans. These countries may also be anxious to
obtain raw materials, consumer goods, and labor./
l ~ [Iraq has marketed some oil in the USSR and
Eastern Europe and may have hoped to sell more.
Demand for Iraqi oil has been rising in the West
following the settlement with the Western-owned
Iraqi Petroleum Company. As a result, Iraqi co
operation with CEMA may now offer less than
when Baghdad first sought observer status in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
ICELAND
SECRET
?-~ f fhe reaction in Iceland to the introduction
of British warships into the "cod war" has been
severe. On 24 May, an angry crowd broke win-
dows in the British Embassy, and two days later,
an Icelandic patrol boat turned its deck gun on a
British trawler. There were no injuries in either
incident:]
fteland was trying to build up special pres-
sures on the US and NATO to force the British to
withdraw before the French-US summit meeting
in Reykjavik. The effort failed, but the damage to
US-Icelandic relations, particularly Reykjavik's at-
titude toward retention of the NATO base at
Keflavik, has been considerable. Icelandic leaders
of all parties now risk political oblivion by sup-
porting retention of the base, and the original
price, which was expected to consist of only
slight modifications to the base agreement, has
probably gone up. One government spokesman
mentioned a rental fee of $80 million annually,
but the prime minister said he would not permit a
"Malta-like" arrangement for Iceland.]
Under its terms renegotiation must begin within
six months; if no agreement is reached, either
party can give notice of intent to terminate the
agreement within twelve months. Agustsson's
move may provide time for Icelandic emotions
over the fishing issue to cool before base negotia-
tions must be concluded./
[The situation on the fishing banks is a stale-
ate. r The British trawler fleet continues to oper-
ate inside the 50-mile limit. The ships are divided
into two "packs," each guarded by a Royal Navy
frigate and two support ships. Trawlers that stray
from the packs are subject to fine by the British
trawlermen's association. The four Icelandic
patrol craft continue to watch for unprotected
trawlers to capture and arrest.?
:O, NATO proposed on 29 May that the British
withdraw the warships in return for a guarantee
that Iceland cease harassing the trawlers. Secre-
tary General Luns offered the plan to bring both
parties back to the negotiating table. Such a
scheme would permit the British to continue to
fish, and the Icelanders are in no mood to com-
promise on that score.fReykjavik has rejected any
Foreign Minister Agustsson announced that') j sort of mediation by third parties, but has not yet
his government would invoke Article VII of the
base treaty on 14 June at the NATO ministerial
meeting in Copenhagen. This will start the clock
provided for in the treaty's termination clause.
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
responded to Luns' proposal, which concerns
only the use of naval forces, not the details of a
compromise agreement.
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
SECRET
USSR: JEWISH EMIGRATION
fSoviet Jews are leaving for Israel this year at
a rate of nearly 2,600 per month, a pace closely
%matching that of 1972. The suspension of the
education tax last March has had no effect on the
over-all rate, but there has been an increase in the
proportion of better educated emigrants. Emigra-
tion from Moscow and Leningrad--cities with rel-
atively well-educated Jewish populations-is cur-
rently more than triple the pre-suspension rate/
t,
Non-financial obstacles still bar Jewish erw-
gration, however, and there is no sign that the
Soviets are prepared to relax these internal con-
week that those who hoped to use the summit to
extract concessions from the USSR on the emi-
gration issue would be sorely mistaken. Jewish
activists have been complaining to the US Em-
bassy in Moscow of increased repressive measures
and exit refusals.]
Jewish Emigration from the USSR, 1972-73
January
2,275
2,731
February
2,025
2,407
March
2,777
2,555
April
2,110
2,689
May
2,669
June
3,332
July
2,065
August
2,197
September
2,059
October
3,545
November
3,546
December
2,813
lThe Soviets are, of course, sensitive to the
connection between Jewish emigration and US-
Soviet relations. They have held open the possi-
bility that, through no fault of theirs, the rate of
emigration may decline later in the year. Early
last month in a meeting with New York Mayor
Lindsay, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs
Shumilin claimed that the number of new appli-
cants for emigration to Israel had declined during
the past two months.,
_;2f fAs an earnest of improved relations with
~S,Washington, Moscow may be preparing to grant
exit permission to several score Soviets, many of
them Jewish, who have for some time been trying
unsuccessfully to emigrate to the US. In the past,
only about 20 percent of those on US lists of
Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate have received
permission to leave. Last week, however, a Soviet
official confided that "appropriate circles" had
made a decision "in principle" to grant exit per-
mission to "most" people on the new US list. He
said that final decisions on individual cases would
be taken in early June. Such a gesture, if it is
made, would be timed to improve the atmosphere
for Brezhnev's visit.
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
%MW 5L(.;KI I
(o/ he preparatory talks for the Conference on
Secu ity and Cooperation in Europe, which began
last November, have cleared the way for the open-
~Ping of the first stage of the conference itself. This
will take the form of a foreign ministers' meeting
in Helsinki in late June or early July-7
frhe principal business in recent weeks has
been to draft negotiating "mandates" for the four
main agenda topics: security, economic coopera-
tion, human contacts, and follow-up machinery.
These mandates, if approved by the foreign minis-
ters, would guide the commissions that would
eventually prepare the agreements the conference
would approve at a later date.
V) ~oviet flexibility opened the way for prog-
ress on the human contacts mandate, to which
the West attaches importance. The Soviets had
been holding out for a reference to "non-interfere
ence in internal affairs," and such a formulation
would have made it difficult to come up with
meaningful measures to increase East-West con-
tacts. The negotiators have now decided not to
list specific principles in the human contacts man-
date, but to refer instead to the principles listed
in the security mandate]
60 [Most of the problems that had surrounded
these security principles have been settled. The
doctrine of the "inviolability of frontiers"--
perhaps the most important topic to the So-
viets-is listed separately, as they have demanded.
The principle of "non-use of force" is listed first,
however, to satisfy the West Germans that "in-
violability of frontiers" would not necessarily pre-
vent the reunification of Germany by negotiated
agreement at some future time,
(" C, Although the economic cooperation man-
date is incomplete, the unfinished parts probably
will not be troublesome. Discussion of follow-up
machinery has only begun, but the debate should
not take long. The Soviets had insisted on lan-
guage that would permit discussion of separate
and permanent machinery, but they have recently
seemed willing to settle for less.j
e I there is one substantive issue-involving the
security mandate-that could still cause problems.
Page
Some of the Western allies are insisting on "confi-
dence-building measures" that would allow ob-
servers at, and require advance notice of, "major
military movements." While the Soviets do not
oppose confidence-building measures across the
board, they are adamantly opposed to so wide an
application of therm
1v'bther than that, the main question mark
confronting both the security conference and the
force reduction talks is the linkage the Soviets are
trying to impose on the two. They have stated
that formal force reduction talks should not start
until at least a month after all stages of the
security conference have been completed. The
West wants to hold Moscow to its previous agree-
ment that force reduction talks would begin no
later than the end of October, without reference
to the security conference. Should the Soviets be
difficult on this matter, the allies could retaliate
by blocking the start of the first stage of the
security conference, which the Soviets want very
much. The allies would prefer not to have to do
this. Many of them still attach some importance
to a security conference as a vehicle for East-West
detente and foresee some positive results for the
West in the human contacts it may foster-
ITALY: SCRAMBLE FOR POWER
7)- 1The Christian Democratic Party congress
next week will go far to determine the future
shape of the governing coalition. At issue are the
fate of Prime Minister Andreotti's year-old cen-
trist coalition and the possible revival of the
Christian Democratic - Socialist collaboration that
produced the center-left coalitions of 1963-1972]
'7 )-'/Andreotti's fragile coalition of Christian
Democrats, Social Democrats, and Liberals has
run into serious trouble. The government's critics
have been noisier, and Andreotti has sustained a
record number of parliamentary defeats on sub-
stantive issues. This week, the Republican Party-
whose parliamentary support provides the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
"_ SECRET _Nwe
Major CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC the Republican rebuff pushed the Andreotti gov- 25X1
1969
Party Factions
Delegates
(Approximate percentage)
ernment out onto very thin ice. Republican and
coalition leaders have indicated a willingness to
wait until after the congress.
Cl
/)L (The divided state of the Christian Democrats
does not portend a clear resolution of the party's
problems. The strength of the party's organized
factions has remained relatively stable since the
3congress in 1969 with no single faction gaining a
clear majority. As usual, the outcome of the con-
gress will depend on deals worked out behind
closed doors j
1So far, interior Minister Mariano Rumor has
gained control of about a third of the delegates.
His principal competitor is Fanfani, who is trying
i,'-~Ito augment his faction with groups drawn mainly
from the party left. Andreotti has not yet allied
his faction with either of them. If neither Rumor
nor Fanfani is successful in rallying a majority
a
,
'71 broad grouping, excluding only the party's right
4
554396 6-73
coalition's slender margin of survival-declared
that it would no longer support the government
in a confidence vote. The declaration followed
Andreotti's refusal to acquiesce in Republican
demands for the dismissal of a cabinet minister
whose handling of television policy had irritated
party leaders.
and left extremes, could emerge./
~I' / [With the exception of Andreotti and others
on the party right, most Christian Democratic
leaders, including Rumor and Fanfani, are
jib leaning toward renewed collaboration with the
Socialist Party. Whether this apparent trend
emerges as formal party policy depends on the
resolution of both personal and ideological ri-
`/2valries. A clear condition for such a shift is a
Socialist guarantee that it will keep its distance
Ufrom the Communists. Continued Socialist al-
liance with the Communists in local governments
has been an obstacle, but recent Socialist policy
it .j statements take a moderate line and open the
.. fiAlthough chamber rules precluded a con- [door to a rapprochement with the Christian Dem-
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
M SECRET
d' u ~he planned naval mutiny last week, at first
portrayed by the government as a clumsy affair
with comic opera overtones, appears to have been
the first move in a plot aimed at toppling the
Papadopoulos regime and bringing back King
Constantine. The Greek Navy is traditionally
royalist. The extent of the plotting became
clearer on 25 May when the commander of the
Greek destroyer Velos detached his ship from
NATO exercises and sought asylum in Italy, along
with 3Q officers and crewmen. The list of naval
officers under arrest or suspicion in the plot has
grown.l
rv \Security forces had no trouble foiling the
mutiny attempt on the night of 22-23 May and
rounding up some 35 suspects. Their action did
not, however, prevent the subsequent defection
of the men on the Velos, which was at sea when
the government moved against the plotters. The
Velos affair deeply embarrassed the government,
since it demonstrated that the conspiracy was
more widespread than the regime had at first
thought.
levertheless, it is from the army and not the
navy that Papadopoulos draws his support. Al-
though many army officers have been unhappy
with Papadopoulos' performance for some time,
and a few may have been in league with the navy
plotters, there is no sign that key army leaders
were involved in the plot. US officials report
some special security precautions, but say that in
general the regime is functioning on a business-as-
usual basis
?)" jPapadopoulos may actually be able to im-
prove his position if he can tap anti-monarchist
sentiment to unite the more important army
leaders behind him. A number of officers whose
backing is essential to Papadopoulos are strongly
opposed to the King's return because they fear it
would only lead to a reduction in their own
power and prestige
[There are conflicting reports on the King's
role in the affair, but so far no hard evidence that
he was involved at all. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment has concluded that the King was linked to
the plotters, and it may yet try to use the inci-
dent to discredit the King and perhaps further
Papadopoulos' plan to eliminate the monarchy.
Two pro-government newspapers have com-
mented that Constantine's chances of returning
are now bleak.
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
,no, SECRET %W
JORDAN: IN WITH THE OLD
King Husayn's choice last week of Zaid
Rifai as prime minister is designed in part to
assuage public unhappiness with the Lawzi
government's feckless handling of the Jordan
economy. Rifai, a long-time confidant and
adviser, has a reputation for decisiveness and
should give the government at least the out-
ward appearance of dynamism it has lacked.
He is unlikely, however, to make any head-
way against the country's economic problems.
The King also believed that his views on for-
eign policy matters were not being effectively
communicated to other Arab leaders. Rifai,
who will also serve as foreign minister, will be
expected to correct this deficiency. Other-
wise, the new cabinet-which contains a
mixed bag of politicians, bureaucrats, and
academics-differs little from its predeces-
SYRIA: RARE ELECTION
Syria's National Progressive Front, a loose
association of parties dominated by the socialist
Baath Party but including the Communist Party,
won an overwhelming victory in balloting on 27
May for the new 186-member People's Council.
The nationwide elections-the first in Syria since
the Baathist military coup ten years ago-were
orderly, but apparently less than half of the elec-
torate went to the polls. The only hint of con-
troversy came from the northeastern city of
Aleppo near the Turkish border where some
"invalid voting" was reported; there has been no
further explanation.]
The elections are an outgrowth of the adop-
tion last March of a new constitution and are
intended, like the popular referendum held on the
constitution, to provide Syria a framework of
legality and a semblance of democracy. President
Asad remains in firm control, however, and will
continue to be the chief architect of government
policy. The new council will function largely as a
rubber stamp. Asad probably will name Prime
Minister Ayyubi to head a new cabinet, although
it is possible that Ayyubi will be chosen instead
to preside over the council. In that event, Deputy
Prime Minister Haydar is likely to become prime
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
INDIA: "INDIRA WAVE" RECEDING
xt'
Prime Minister Gandhi's personal prestige is
fading. The so-called Indira Wave brought her
Ruling Congress Party solid majorities in most of
the state legislatures in the most recent elections
in March 1972, and, until this year, her name
alone seemed sufficient to swing the voters to her
cause. Within the party, ambitious politicians
hewed closely to the line she set and took care to
present the unified political front she demanded.
Now, many of these same politicians, al-
though they have no immediate intention of
deserting her party, are beginning to express ideas
of their own and to build independent political
identities. Having noted that Congress Party
standard-bearers fared poorly in recent state and
municipal by-elections, they are questioning the
wisdom of pinning their political futures entirely
on that of the prime minister.
Mrs. Gandhi's sagging prestige can be traced
largely to her inability to come up with solutions
to India's all but intractable economic problems,
made worse this year by a serious drought. Her
government's failure to provide sufficient food
stocks to meet shortages has been especially dam-
aging. The lack of progress in forcing powerful
landowners in the state assemblies, who provide
the backbone of Congress Party financial support,
to implement land reform legislation enacted in
New Delhi is also coming in for increased
criticism from peasants. At the same time urban
workers' complaints about high prices for food
and other necessities are rising.
Businessmen find fault with the prime min-
ister's stringent controls as well as her favoritism
of public over private enterprises. The recent gov-
ernment take-over of the vvholesale wheat trade,
which has deprived traders of their livelihood but
failed to add the promised amounts of grain to
government stores, fuels their discontent. More-
over, as economic conditions deteriorate, voices
are being raised against Mrs. Gandhi on such non-
economic issues as her recent packing of the
supreme court and her abortive attempts to con-
trol the press by limiting the size of newspapers.
Although there is no immediate threat to
Mrs. Gandhi's hold on the national government,
her prospects for re-creating the enormous popu-
lar enthusiasm that built the Indira Wave are not
bright. The arrival of imported food grains, the
harvesting of the spring crop, and the onset of a
good summer monsoon could bring her some re-
lief, but her basic problems, for which she has no
magic solutions, will go on. Restiveness, of which
the recent police revolt in her home state is just
one example, will persist. As the prime minister's
reputation for omniscience diminishes, faction-
alism within her Congress Party will increase, and
fewer politicians will want blindly to follow her
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010300040001-5
VVW SECRET
OAU: STORMY MEETING