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June 15, 1973
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Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 ument Denied State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001~3 f~ ~, Secret WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 15 June 1973 No. 0374/73 Cody N?_ 5 0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 The WEEKLY ~UMMAt~Y, issued- every F=riday morning by tl~e Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif- icant developments oaf the week thrrugh nasan on Thursday. !# frequently includes ma#erial eaorei'snated with or prepared by the Clffite of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and. the C3irectorate of c;,eience and Technology. Topics regcairtng mire ct~prehensive treaten# and there- fore published separately as apeciaE Reports are listed in the tan#ents. The WEEKLI'? Sl1MMAR`f :contains classified inf?rmation affiec#ing the hationat security of Ella United 5ta#es, within the meaning of Title I8, seetic~ns i'93 and 79~#, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its con- tents to or receipt by an unauthoriie~~ person is prohibited by law. i3fS5ERAINAfiiON C(71VTFt?LS CONTENTS (ISJunc1973) 1 3 4 5 FAR EAST 6 9 10 11 EUROPE 12 Brezhnev and the Summit Setback on the Kama International Oil: Sellers' Market OAS: Reorganization and Cuba Indochina Japan: What Does Moscow Want' Chirra: Dividing the Load Thailand: A Kra Canal USSR: The Charger in Paris 16 Spain: Righter Than Right 17 EC: The US Problem 17 Norway: A Government Survives 18 Italy: Invitation to the Left MIDDLE CAST AFRICA 19 Libya: Qadhafi's Warnings 20 Greece: Little Change 20 South Africa: Threat to a Boom WESTERN HEMISPHERE 21 Uruguay: Grumbling from Below 22 Panama: Off the Track 22 Argentina: Transition Phase 23 Chile: Troubles Mount Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 v~tri t~ i n d t h e 5 U M M 1 T ~~~ Leonid Ilich Brezhnev comes to Washington poli ically stronger and more confident than ever before in his nine years as Soviet party chief. In recent weeks, he has improved his position in the leadership through the change of personnel in the party's ruling Politburo. His power position has been publicly manifested in a cult around his name unmatched since Khrushchev was at his peak. Brezhnev's foreign. policy won sweeping approval at the Central Committee meeting in late April. Furthermore, the negotiating positions he brings to Washington have been approved by the Politburo, and this time Rolitburo approval carries the explicit approval of the minister of defense Page 1 and the head of KGB-both newly elected to the ruling body. A year ago, the outlook for Brezhnev was much less certain. His position, though undoubt- edly strong, rested on shakier foundations. His foreign policies, particularly the openings toward Bonn and Washington, were a matter of conten- tion within the leadership. His willingness to press on with the Moscow summit despite the bombing of North Vietnam was especially controversial within the Soviet leadership. The agreements signed at the summit were proclaimed by Brezh- nev as of great international importance; they SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 St(.:~it were regarded with some skepticism by segments of Soviet officialdom. His moves toward Germany were put in peril by they difficulties Chancellor Brandt faced at home. Brezhnev's concerns last year extended to the domestic front. His agricultural and livestock programs were threatened by a grain harvest that fell far short of needs, crE~ating an unprecedented dependency on Western arrd especially US sources of grain. The performancE~ of Soviet industry was 13rezhnev's concern that his visit not be disrupted by anti-Soviet demonstrations has led him. to insist on fle~cible scheduling. Lur- ing his visit to West Germany he shifted hzs schedule several tunes at the last minute, and Soviet officials in his entourage then said they hoped to follow the same procedure ir7 the US. unsatisfactory with industrial growth the lowest it has been since World War I I. This year, Brezhnev has reason to be guard- edly optimistic about thE; prospects for an im- proved performance in agriculture and industry. The outlook is for a fairly good grain harvest that should lessen Soviet needs for foreign supplies. Industrial growth during the first quarter of the year has improved somewhat over the below- average performance last year. He can therefore hope the Soviet economy is in at least a moderate upswing. In the foreign policy sphere, the re-elec- tion of Brandt by an unexpectedly large majority last November and progress at the European Security Conference preparatory talks have rein- forced Brezhnev's policy of seeking detente in Europe. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May went well. All of these "successes" will have an effect on Brezhnev's negotiating posture in Washington, as will his perception of US domestic develop- ments and their effect on US relations with its allies. It is clear from the way the Soviets have handled the Watergate affair that they hope it will not become an obstacle to further progress in US-Soviet relations. The occasional items on Watergate that have appeared in the Soviet press have been perfunctory and purely reportorial. The Soviets have expended considerable effort to portray the US, and the President in particular, as embarked on a new course in rela- tions with the USSR. They call the Moscow summit last year a turning point in relations and say the Brezhnev trip to Washington will add momentum to the cause of detente. Bilateral agreements on matters like transportation and oceanography are ready for signature, but it is doubtful that Brezhnev expects that his visit to Washington will result in major agreements on a wide range of issues to match those reached in Moscow. Brezhnev's main purpose will be to generate more public and political support for American dealings with the USSR. He will give special emphasis to economic relations and to influencing a favorable outcome of congressional legislation on most-favored-nation treatment for the USSR. He will promote the notion that the economies of the two countries are complementary and will stress the mutual advantage of economic coopera- tion. As he did in Bonn, he is likely to paint a glowing picture of the almost unlimited prospects for the exchange of Soviet natural resources for US technology and finished products. Brezhnev will convey Moscow's willingness to cooperate with the US in building a more stable international order. He will point to nego- tiations on strategic arms limitations, on Euro- pean security, and on force reductions as ex- amples of a new spirit of East-West reconciliation and of Moscow's commitment to burying the legacies of the Cold War. On the Middle East and Indochina, Brezhnev is likely to be reserved. He will probably confine himself to expressing Moscow's desire to help in the search for durable solutions, but it is doubtful he will come up with new proposals that would lead to meaningful change in either situation. SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Setbacl~ o~ the Karx~a ~~~ The first Western newsmen permitted to visit the Kama truck facility report that five of the six ~ plants of the complex acre still open steel struc- tures and that only the tool and repair plant is near completion. The complex originally was to be completed by 1974, but construction is at least two years behind schedule. As matters now stand, the plant is not likely to begin even limited production before 1976 transmission plant that will account for nearly half the complex's total equipment cost. Renault is also coordinating supplier contracts and provid- ing machine tools and paint lines. West Germany is furnishing equipment to make transmissions and forges, Italy is supplying conveyors, and Japan has received orders for stamping presses.'i ~' ~ (Until recently, the Soviets have maintained ~}- The complex, designed to produce 150,000 - good working relations with their Western sup- heavy diesel trucks a year, is being built with >> pliers, but strains are developing. Kama officials extensive foreign assistance. About three fourths ~ have complained that a US engineering firm has of the estimated $1 billion worth of equipment. delayed completion of the foundry by failing to required will come from the West. Orders valued deliver designs on time. The US firm's work, at about $500 million have already been placed with suppliers in the industrial West, mostly dur- ing the past 12 months.T ~%' rNearly two thirds of the equipment for the engine, gear, and transmission plant and the forge plant, and virtually all o~f the machinery for the stamping and pressing plant have been ordered from the West. The foundry will be designed and equipped exclusively by US firms: it was slated for operation early next year, but appears the furthest behind schedulE;. Most of the equipment for the small tool and repair plant and the assembly plant is being supplied by manufacturers in the USSR and Eastern Europe. More than half of the con- tracts for Western equiipment and engineering services were placed in Western Europe- mainly in West Germanny and France. Most of the rep>t were placed in the US. US firms have won contracts worth almost $200 million for foundry equip- ment, for machine tools and for pressing equipment. US firms also have submitted bids on con- veyors and a computer system. Renault of France is designing the engine, gear and however, has been hindered by frequent Soviet design changes and by Soviet failures to make final decisions on equipment. Renault has had fewer problems, but it too is being hampered by the Soviet refusal to provide sufficient informa- tion or to permit Renault personnel access to the plant site. As a result, Renault is operating largely in the dark. Many of these same difficulties plagued Western contractors during the construc- Equipment Costs for the Kama Truck Complex Plants Total Cost of Equipment ($ US million) Purchases from the West to date ($ US million) Foundry Engine, Gear, and Transmission 250 450 96 279 Forging 40 25 Pressing and Stamping 80 76 Assembly 150 34 Tooling and Repair 13 3 983 513 SE~;RET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 JCI,~KC I Int~rnat i~na I O i I Sellers' Marke~~ Producing countries are finding a ready mar- ket for the oil coming under their control. Saudi r Arabia and Abu Dhabi, which are receiving oil under the recently ratified participation agree- ment for the Persian Gulf Arab states, have al- ready sold all the oil coming to them in 1973 and much of that which they will receive through 1975. Iran has sold most of the oil it will receive through 1975. Iraq has committed the total out- put from the nationalized Kirkuk and North Rumaila fields through 1975. Even Libya has found markets, particularly in Communist coun- tries, for the "hot" oil from the expropriatecl Sarir field. The non-Communist governments are selling about 3 million barrels per day this year, about 9 percent of the oil being traded world- wide '~ ;The producing staters are receiving up to 55 percent more revenue per barrel for the oil they market themselves than they receive in the form of taxes and royalties on the oil produced by private companies. The companies are allowed to buy participation oil that producing states are entitled to, but choose not to market themselves. The "buy-back" price on this oil is considerably below the open market price ~ ~ jThe strong demand for government-con- ~? trolled oil has been generated primarily by the small independent companies-particularly in the US and Japan-and by the national oil companies of some developing countries seeking oil to sup- plement supplies from the large international oil com pan ies.~ ~ The ease with which the oil-producing coun- ' tries have been able to market their own oil has ~; long-term significance for the world market. The oil-producing states, unsure of market response, chose to take only the rriinimum of their share Page 4 through 1976, that is, 10 percent in 1973, climb- ing to 30 percent in 1976. The heady experience of the last five months will encourage them to claim a much larger part of their share under the participation agreement or, alternatively, to seek a much higher buy-back price from the oil com- panies for the years after 1976. It is even possible -that the producing states, noting the wide discrep- ancy between market and buy-back prices, may seek to renegotiate the terms of the earlier agree- SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 SECRET Reorganization and Cuba these will fall short of the extensive overhaul of the OAS that many desire ~a f Venezuela is eager to play a major role in the process and may again begin to press fora relaxa- tion in the sanctions against Cuba. In a surprise move in early June, Venezuelan diplomats at the OAS and in Latin American capitals began an offensive in support of a special session of the OAS Council to reconsider the Cuba issue. The proposal was dropped without a council meeting being convoked, however, after Caracas con- cluded that it would fall one or two votes short of a majority. 25X1 ~I ~tepresentatives of i:he 23 members of the Organization of American. States are scheduled to convene in Lima on 20 June to study proposals to restructure the world's oldest regional organiza- tion. Many of them-perhaps amajority-are in general agreement about ;their objectives: to chal- lenge US influence, decentralize the inter-Ameri- can system, and permit rr~ember nations to ignore OAS sanctions against Cuba if they wish. )] Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador, along with the seven countries that have already defied the OAS by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, desire reforms to achieve all these objec- tives. If this group is joined by at least two other countries, it will constitute a majority. It will be handicapped, however, by the requirement for a two-thirds vote on any substantive issue, by the shortage of time remaining before recommenda- tions must be forwarded to the OAS Council, and by failure so far to reach agreement on which of the several reorganization schemes that are being discussed should be favored. At the meeting, the reform wing-led by Peru-is likely to win at least some moral victories and pass some reforms, but I~ The flurry of diplomatic activity generated ,a, by the Venezuelans emphasizes once again how f! far attitudes have shifted on the Cuba issue. Even Guatemala-once one of the strongest advocates of a strict isolation of Cuba-is reappraising its stand. Foreign Minister Arenales told the US ambassador on 8 June that although he "opposes all that Castro stands for" he would instruct his OAS ambassador to abstain on the issue unless his vote was essential. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 SECRET !~-' The Communists apparently are planning no major new military action following the an? nouncement of what the Communists Military action erupted early in the week in several long-time trouble areas. The South Viet- namese made small inroads in widely scattered regions, but were thwarted in other thrusts, in- cluding amajor effort to reopen Route 13 north of Saigon. The Communists showed muscle in some areas. They seized several villages in Kon- tum Province and were active in long-time sore spots of the delta-Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong provinces f )'~~ the Commu- nists expected that Saigon would sign the agree- ment, but they do not ex~~ect the South Vietnam- ese Government to abide by its conditions. Com- munist military units must be employed primarily in defense of the liberated areas against antici- ated South Vietnamese incursions. a re are to concentrate on propaganda, educa- tion, and troop proselytin!~, as well as on trying to convince the people that the new agreement represents a major political victory for the Com- munists. ,l~ Both sides stepped up the tempo of military action early this week prior to the anticipated strengthening of the cease-fire agreement. For the most part, South Vietnamese military units car- ried the battle to the enemy with incursions into Communist-held territory. The Communists played mainly a defensive role, and there were few solid indications that they were planning any major military campaign. Since they apparently consider last-minute timing as the key to success- Saigon Prepares for an Election The Saigon government has been going ahead with preparations for the election of half of ~ the South Vietnamese Senate in August. President i~fiThieu promulgated the law regulating the election this week, and candidates apparently must file by 17 June. A number of non-Communists of various ~~tripes are considering entering the race, but ~'Thieu's Democracy Party is clearly in a dominant position. Two slates of 15 candidates each will be elected. Each group putting up a slate must post a substantial deposit, which it must forfeit if it fails to win 10 percent of the vote ~Le Duan and Pham Van Dong do not appear to have achieved what they wanted in their week- long trip to China. The first secretary and the premier were given the usual round of banquets, rallies, and factory visits, and they had an audi- ence with Mao. They also concluded a ne.y~ eco- nomic and military aid agreement for 1974! ful land-grabbing operations, they could shift)`~~ tactics abruptly. S SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 ~~x-I Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 SECRET Both were absf:nt from some of the routine ceremonial visits, and they were together during the latter few days of the visit. The usual references to Sino -North Vietnamese solidarity were made in public, but they were outweighed by significant differences, notably on the two most important issues of all-implementation of the Paris agreement and CPrinese aid.l `The differences were laid out in speeches by Le Duan and Chinese politburo member Yeh '~ Chien-ying at amass rally on 7 June. Le Duan I~'~ blamed all cease-fire violations on US "neocoloni- alism" and admonished the Communists' op- ponents to improve their adherence. His harsh criticism of the US seems to stem in part from a continuing concern that Nino-American dealings might limit Hanoi's options. Yeh, by contrast, stated that "all parties" should respect the agree- ments. He mentioned the US only in passing, although he did level some criticism at Saigon:? :'_> Aid was clearly the subject of considerable disagreement. In asserting at the rally that the North Vietnamese "believe" Peking will come through with the sort of aid Hanoi thinks it deserves, Le Duan betrayed concern over the quantity and composition of future Chinese as- sistance. Yeh, on the other hand, blandly implied that Chinese aid to the North is meant for recon- struction and Chinese assistance to the South is for "building national concord." The language in the announcement of a final aid agreement indi- cates that Peking's assistance will be weighted on the civilian side, and the tepid statement in the final communique that both sides are "glad" the agreement was signed indicates that Hanoi re- mains unhappy. 1 ? tfhe communique contains further evidence of divergences over the implementation of the Paris agreement. Almost half the text-including all but one sentence of the paragraphs dealing with Vietnam-is cast in the form of unilateral statements by one party or the other. Peking's portions are full of language about the great vic- tory scored by the Vietnamese Communists, about the emphasis that allegedly will now be North Vietnamese Prerrrier Pham Van Dong (2nd frc-m left) and Le Duan greeted by Chou En-lai in Peking SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 J C 1,,,, t~(C I placed on reconstruction and consolidation, and about the importance of implementing the Paris accord. { ?, 1The North Vietnamese portions are shorter, narrower in scope, and more defensive: Hanoi is r, grateful for past Chinese aid; the Vietnamese `~ Communists have a "consistent stand" of "strictly implementing" the agreement; Saigon and the US are to blame for shortcomings.! ~ "~ Conspicuously missing from the Chinese sec- ;- tions is any condemnation of either Saigon or the ?~' US or any expression of across-the-board support ,, ;j for Hanoi. Equally conspicuous is Hanoi's failure to mention its own attitude on the question of implementing the agreement ~ ~ ,These divergences are not surprising. It has been apparent for some weeks that Hanoi has been unhappy with Peking, and the significance of the visit may lie in the fact that it confirms the changes that have occurred over the past couple of years in the Sino -North Vietnamese relation- ship. Le Duan and Pham Van Dong probably were trying at the highest level ito secure a modification of Chinese policies that ~Nere galling Hanoi. The communique indicates that they failed in most important respects. They may not be deterred from trying again, but under present circum- stances they probably believe the odds are against them CAMBODIA: POLITICAL PARALYSIS jA month has passed since the new cabinet headed by Prime Minister In Tam was installed. In that time, neither the cabinet nor the ruling High Political Council has made any significant effort to meet the country's priority military and eco- nomic problems. Much of the inertia results from Lon Nol's efforts to reassert his supremacy over the three other council members-including In Tam---and over governmental affairs in general There have been indications that Lon Nol is try- ing to bypass the counciil. Thus far, the other council members have been unable to work to- gether and make the president hew to the arrange- ment for sharing author{'i:y that was the key to the council's formation. ! ~ ~ Lon Nol's activities have been particularly unsettling to In Tam. The prime minister has become discouraged by the President's ability to keep In Tam from the center of power. In Tam has also found it hard to forge good relations with senior military officers who hold him in low esteem.~~Some of these officers probably are sup- porting Lon Nol's maneuvers in order to block military reforms-including the replacement of incompetent and corrupt commanders. Although In Tam evidently is willing to stay in office despite these difficulties, the chances that he or the council will be able to provide a semblance of effective government remain poor. ;;-, `The Phnom Penh area was the focal point of military activity again this week as the Khmer Communists pressed attacks west and south of the city. The heaviest fighting took place along Route 4. Despite determined efforts by heavily reinforced government troops to clear the road, the Communists at mid-week were still in control of a short segment some 15 miles from the capi- tal. Communist forces also retained control over most of Route 26 south of Thnal Totung on Route 4, and government attempts to clear that road also made little progress.! SECRET Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 SECE~ET JAPAN: WHAT DOES MOSCOW WANT? )-?L Japanese-Soviet relations, which were ~; war~ing, hit a snag in the past few weeks. Mos- ~ cow has informed Prime Minister Tanaka that his proposed mid-August visit would be "incon- venient." Prior to this rebuff the Russians had requested the postponement of a Japanese mission that was to discuss details of the Tyumen oil project. The Soviets underlined the deliberate- ness of the snub to Tanaka by making another announcement welcoming a Japanese parlia- mentary mission that is to go to Moscow in late August.] ~-~ The Communists also kept up pressure on`'- government forces along I~outes 2 and 3 south of Phnom Penh. Several government defensive posi- tions along both highways were abandoned during the week. Communist resistance forced govern- ment tro ps to suspend sweep operations west of Route 3.~ ~ ~ pThe Communists shelled Phnom Penh's air?? port on 10 and 11 June, but caused only minor M t d a e resulted from am ~ An an- nouncement by Tanaka on 9 June that he would visit the USSR sometime after 20 September has prompted Japanese press speculation that he intends to visit Moscow en route to or from Europe. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets have yet given their assent to this timing.` ~~There are several possible explanations for Moscow's action, none of which can be very encouraging to Tokyo: Moscow may be chary of hosting a state visitor whose political future is cloudy; the Soviets may want to wait until Brezh- nev completes his visit to the US and they have had a chance to weigh the benefits of possible US and West European participation in the develop- ment of Soviet resources; and finally Moscow may just be stringing Tokyo along in hopes of driving hard bargains with a politically weakened Japanese leader. g damage. ore ex ensive Communist rocket and mortar fire in the north- i ~-~The Soviets have been trying to stimulate west against the Cambodian Air Force mainte- US, West German, and Japanese interest in de- nance and training center at Battambang on 10 ~2veloping Soviet resources by suggesting to each of and 12 June. Three fighter aircraft and a number ?~.>:~the parties the possibility of losing out to the of other military and civilian aircraft were dam- others. Moscow may now believe that it has more aged in the attack on 1C~ June, and another air- to gain by cultivating the West, particularly West craft and a munitions depot were destroyed on the 12th. The actions at Battambang were the first since the war began. SECRET Page 9 WEEK~..Y SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 SECRET CHINA: DIVIDING THIS LOAD r~~~China's political apparatus is being slowly .~~ Actually, the party-rebuilding process goes reorganized at provincial levels and below. The: ~, back to 1969, and it has encountered serious aim is apparently to restore the system in usf~ obstacles. Last month, provincial work con- before the Cultural Revolution when there were-~~ ferences in Anhwei and Kirin emphasized the parallel party and government structures with sep- arate personnel and distiinct responsibilities. Since the Cultural Revolution, party and government functions have been consolidated in so-called rev- olutionary committees. In the new reorganization scheme, these committees are to be phased out. Some of their functions will be returned to the party committees; other functions will be taken over by newly formed governmental organiza- tions. Progress in effecting the reorganization ins being slowed by the reluctance of some revolu- tionary committees to relinquish their authority and by wrangling over vvho should be named to the new party committees.l ins ruc ions issue in mi - 2 called upon t e revolutionary committees to assist in forming party branches. Political power was to be gradu- ally transferred from the revolutionary to the party committees, and administrative power was to be turned over to professional managers. Where these transfers were complete, the revolutionary committees would be abolished.; (revolutionary committee sign-~ boards have been removed but that most commit- tees remain intact because no replacement organi- zations have been activated. There are other re- ports that some revolutiionary committees have been abolished or are operating at a reduced level after relinquishing some of their cowers to arty committees.~1 the slowness to the unwillingness of revolutionary committees to give up tl~eir power. Progress has been faster in nearby Fukien. The provincial party committee recently regained such functions as the supervision of propaganda and the recruit- ment and training of cadre. Elsewhere, progress has been uneven. need to bring in new cadre, if the party is to be built up; this concept has met a good deal of resistance. The Kirin conference report attacked those who "still cannot fully understand the im- portance of training and promoting new cadre." The chief opponents are officials rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution; these officials are now vying with the newcomers for posts in the rebuilt party apparatus. So far, many more veter- ans than newcomers are winning party jobs at the provincial level, and the pattern may be repeated at lower levels. This trend is sure to arouse the antipathy of those who want more new blood in the party. ~~ Personnel problems like these will intensify as revolutionary committees disband. In areas where party and revolutionary committees have coexisted for several years, revolutionary com- mittee leaders have usually doubled as party bosses and will probably retain their party posts. The same does not hold true for ordinary mem- bers of the revolutionary committees, whether rehabilitated veteran or newcomer. Both could find themselves without work when the revolu- tionary committees close down, and both will be competing for positions in the new government organizations. -~ ~ There has been speculation that on the gov- ernment side the revolutionary committees will be replaced by "people's councils," which were the local administrative organizations before the Cultural Revolution. Some kind of government apparatus will have to emerge after the revolu- tionary committees are dissolved. Details are probably still under discussion, but the relation- ship between the party committees and the new administrative units is likely to be more clearly defined than has been the relationship between party and revolutionary committees. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3 SECRET THAILAND: A KRA CANAL a~j ~fhe Thai Government has under way several feasibility studies concerning a canal across the Malay Peninsula. Such a canal has been consid- ered at various times since the late 18th century but the canal has never been built. The high cost 33 of present proposals and a strong likelihood that such a canal might not attract enough business to cover operating costs suggest that a canal will not prove an economic venture at this time either., l ~fwo sites are under consideration. One runs fromlSurat Thani on the Gulf of Thailand south- ~'west to the Indian Ocean. It is being surveyed for ,.3 the Thai National Energy Authori#y. A second