WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
ument Denied
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001~3 f~ ~,
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
15 June 1973
No. 0374/73
Cody N?_ 5 0
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
The WEEKLY ~UMMAt~Y, issued- every F=riday morning by
tl~e Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments oaf the week thrrugh nasan on Thursday.
!# frequently includes ma#erial eaorei'snated with or prepared
by the Clffite of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and. the C3irectorate of c;,eience and Technology.
Topics regcairtng mire ct~prehensive treaten# and there-
fore published separately as apeciaE Reports are listed in the
tan#ents.
The WEEKLI'? Sl1MMAR`f :contains classified inf?rmation
affiec#ing the hationat security of Ella United 5ta#es, within
the meaning of Title I8, seetic~ns i'93 and 79~#, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its con-
tents to or receipt by an unauthoriie~~ person is prohibited by
law.
i3fS5ERAINAfiiON C(71VTFt?LS
CONTENTS (ISJunc1973)
1
3
4
5
FAR EAST
6
9
10
11
EUROPE
12
Brezhnev and the Summit
Setback on the Kama
International Oil: Sellers' Market
OAS: Reorganization and Cuba
Indochina
Japan: What Does Moscow Want'
Chirra: Dividing the Load
Thailand: A Kra Canal
USSR: The Charger in Paris
16
Spain: Righter Than Right
17
EC: The US Problem
17
Norway: A Government Survives
18
Italy: Invitation to the Left
MIDDLE CAST
AFRICA
19
Libya: Qadhafi's Warnings
20
Greece: Little Change
20
South Africa: Threat to a Boom
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
21
Uruguay: Grumbling from Below
22
Panama: Off the Track
22
Argentina: Transition Phase
23
Chile: Troubles Mount
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
v~tri t~ i
n
d
t
h
e
5
U
M
M
1
T
~~~
Leonid Ilich Brezhnev comes to Washington
poli ically stronger and more confident than ever
before in his nine years as Soviet party chief. In
recent weeks, he has improved his position in the
leadership through the change of personnel in the
party's ruling Politburo. His power position has
been publicly manifested in a cult around his
name unmatched since Khrushchev was at his
peak. Brezhnev's foreign. policy won sweeping
approval at the Central Committee meeting in late
April. Furthermore, the negotiating positions he
brings to Washington have been approved by the
Politburo, and this time Rolitburo approval carries
the explicit approval of the minister of defense
Page 1
and the head of KGB-both newly elected to the
ruling body.
A year ago, the outlook for Brezhnev was
much less certain. His position, though undoubt-
edly strong, rested on shakier foundations. His
foreign policies, particularly the openings toward
Bonn and Washington, were a matter of conten-
tion within the leadership. His willingness to press
on with the Moscow summit despite the bombing
of North Vietnam was especially controversial
within the Soviet leadership. The agreements
signed at the summit were proclaimed by Brezh-
nev as of great international importance; they
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
St(.:~it
were regarded with some skepticism by segments
of Soviet officialdom. His moves toward Germany
were put in peril by they difficulties Chancellor
Brandt faced at home.
Brezhnev's concerns last year extended to
the domestic front. His agricultural and livestock
programs were threatened by a grain harvest that
fell far short of needs, crE~ating an unprecedented
dependency on Western arrd especially US sources
of grain. The performancE~ of Soviet industry was
13rezhnev's concern that his visit not be
disrupted by anti-Soviet demonstrations has
led him. to insist on fle~cible scheduling. Lur-
ing his visit to West Germany he shifted hzs
schedule several tunes at the last minute, and
Soviet officials in his entourage then said they
hoped to follow the same procedure ir7 the
US.
unsatisfactory with industrial growth the lowest it
has been since World War I I.
This year, Brezhnev has reason to be guard-
edly optimistic about thE; prospects for an im-
proved performance in agriculture and industry.
The outlook is for a fairly good grain harvest that
should lessen Soviet needs for foreign supplies.
Industrial growth during the first quarter of the
year has improved somewhat over the below-
average performance last year. He can therefore
hope the Soviet economy is in at least a moderate
upswing. In the foreign policy sphere, the re-elec-
tion of Brandt by an unexpectedly large majority
last November and progress at the European
Security Conference preparatory talks have rein-
forced Brezhnev's policy of seeking detente in
Europe. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May went
well.
All of these "successes" will have an effect
on Brezhnev's negotiating posture in Washington,
as will his perception of US domestic develop-
ments and their effect on US relations with its
allies. It is clear from the way the Soviets have
handled the Watergate affair that they hope it will
not become an obstacle to further progress in
US-Soviet relations. The occasional items on
Watergate that have appeared in the Soviet press
have been perfunctory and purely reportorial.
The Soviets have expended considerable
effort to portray the US, and the President in
particular, as embarked on a new course in rela-
tions with the USSR. They call the Moscow
summit last year a turning point in relations and
say the Brezhnev trip to Washington will add
momentum to the cause of detente. Bilateral
agreements on matters like transportation and
oceanography are ready for signature, but it is
doubtful that Brezhnev expects that his visit to
Washington will result in major agreements on a
wide range of issues to match those reached in
Moscow.
Brezhnev's main purpose will be to generate
more public and political support for American
dealings with the USSR. He will give special
emphasis to economic relations and to influencing
a favorable outcome of congressional legislation
on most-favored-nation treatment for the USSR.
He will promote the notion that the economies of
the two countries are complementary and will
stress the mutual advantage of economic coopera-
tion. As he did in Bonn, he is likely to paint a
glowing picture of the almost unlimited prospects
for the exchange of Soviet natural resources for
US technology and finished products.
Brezhnev will convey Moscow's willingness
to cooperate with the US in building a more
stable international order. He will point to nego-
tiations on strategic arms limitations, on Euro-
pean security, and on force reductions as ex-
amples of a new spirit of East-West reconciliation
and of Moscow's commitment to burying the
legacies of the Cold War. On the Middle East and
Indochina, Brezhnev is likely to be reserved. He
will probably confine himself to expressing
Moscow's desire to help in the search for durable
solutions, but it is doubtful he will come up with
new proposals that would lead to meaningful
change in either situation.
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
Setbacl~ o~ the Karx~a
~~~ The first Western newsmen permitted to visit
the Kama truck facility report that five of the six
~ plants of the complex acre still open steel struc-
tures and that only the tool and repair plant is
near completion. The complex originally was to
be completed by 1974, but construction is at
least two years behind schedule. As matters now
stand, the plant is not likely to begin even limited
production before 1976
transmission plant that will account for nearly
half the complex's total equipment cost. Renault
is also coordinating supplier contracts and provid-
ing machine tools and paint lines. West Germany
is furnishing equipment to make transmissions
and forges, Italy is supplying conveyors, and
Japan has received orders for stamping presses.'i
~' ~ (Until recently, the Soviets have maintained
~}- The complex, designed to produce 150,000 - good working relations with their Western sup-
heavy diesel trucks a year, is being built with >> pliers, but strains are developing. Kama officials
extensive foreign assistance. About three fourths ~ have complained that a US engineering firm has
of the estimated $1 billion worth of equipment. delayed completion of the foundry by failing to
required will come from the West. Orders valued deliver designs on time. The US firm's work,
at about $500 million have already been placed
with suppliers in the industrial West, mostly dur-
ing the past 12 months.T
~%' rNearly two thirds of the equipment for the
engine, gear, and transmission plant and the forge
plant, and virtually all o~f the machinery for the
stamping and pressing plant have been ordered
from the West. The foundry will be designed and
equipped exclusively by US firms: it was slated
for operation early next year, but appears the
furthest behind schedulE;. Most
of the equipment for the small
tool and repair plant and the
assembly plant is being supplied
by manufacturers in the USSR
and Eastern Europe.
More than half of the con-
tracts for Western equiipment
and engineering services were
placed in Western Europe-
mainly in West Germanny and
France. Most of the rep>t were
placed in the US. US firms have
won contracts worth almost
$200 million for foundry equip-
ment, for machine tools and for
pressing equipment. US firms
also have submitted bids on con-
veyors and a computer system.
Renault of France is designing
the engine, gear and
however, has been hindered by frequent Soviet
design changes and by Soviet failures to make
final decisions on equipment. Renault has had
fewer problems, but it too is being hampered by
the Soviet refusal to provide sufficient informa-
tion or to permit Renault personnel access to the
plant site. As a result, Renault is operating largely
in the dark. Many of these same difficulties
plagued Western contractors during the construc-
Equipment Costs for the Kama Truck Complex
Plants
Total Cost
of Equipment
($ US million)
Purchases from
the West to date
($ US million)
Foundry
Engine, Gear,
and Transmission
250
450
96
279
Forging
40
25
Pressing and Stamping
80
76
Assembly
150
34
Tooling and Repair
13
3
983
513
SE~;RET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
JCI,~KC I
Int~rnat i~na I O i I
Sellers' Marke~~
Producing countries are finding a ready mar-
ket for the oil coming under their control. Saudi
r Arabia and Abu Dhabi, which are receiving oil
under the recently ratified participation agree-
ment for the Persian Gulf Arab states, have al-
ready sold all the oil coming to them in 1973 and
much of that which they will receive through
1975. Iran has sold most of the oil it will receive
through 1975. Iraq has committed the total out-
put from the nationalized Kirkuk and North
Rumaila fields through 1975. Even Libya has
found markets, particularly in Communist coun-
tries, for the "hot" oil from the expropriatecl
Sarir field. The non-Communist governments are
selling about 3 million barrels per day this year,
about 9 percent of the oil being traded world-
wide
'~ ;The producing staters are receiving up to 55
percent more revenue per barrel for the oil they
market themselves than they receive in the form
of taxes and royalties on the oil produced by
private companies. The companies are allowed to
buy participation oil that producing states are
entitled to, but choose not to market themselves.
The "buy-back" price on this oil is considerably
below the open market price ~
~ jThe strong demand for government-con-
~? trolled oil has been generated primarily by the
small independent companies-particularly in the
US and Japan-and by the national oil companies
of some developing countries seeking oil to sup-
plement supplies from the large international oil
com pan ies.~
~ The ease with which the oil-producing coun-
' tries have been able to market their own oil has
~; long-term significance for the world market. The
oil-producing states, unsure of market response,
chose to take only the rriinimum of their share
Page 4
through 1976, that is, 10 percent in 1973, climb-
ing to 30 percent in 1976. The heady experience
of the last five months will encourage them to
claim a much larger part of their share under the
participation agreement or, alternatively, to seek
a much higher buy-back price from the oil com-
panies for the years after 1976. It is even possible
-that the producing states, noting the wide discrep-
ancy between market and buy-back prices, may
seek to renegotiate the terms of the earlier agree-
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
SECRET
Reorganization
and Cuba
these will fall short of the extensive overhaul of
the OAS that many desire
~a
f Venezuela is eager to play a major role in the
process and may again begin to press fora relaxa-
tion in the sanctions against Cuba. In a surprise
move in early June, Venezuelan diplomats at the
OAS and in Latin American capitals began an
offensive in support of a special session of the
OAS Council to reconsider the Cuba issue. The
proposal was dropped without a council meeting
being convoked, however, after Caracas con-
cluded that it would fall one or two votes short of
a majority.
25X1
~I ~tepresentatives of i:he 23 members of the
Organization of American. States are scheduled to
convene in Lima on 20 June to study proposals to
restructure the world's oldest regional organiza-
tion. Many of them-perhaps amajority-are in
general agreement about ;their objectives: to chal-
lenge US influence, decentralize the inter-Ameri-
can system, and permit rr~ember nations to ignore
OAS sanctions against Cuba if they wish.
)] Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador, along with
the seven countries that have already defied the
OAS by re-establishing diplomatic relations with
Cuba, desire reforms to achieve all these objec-
tives. If this group is joined by at least two other
countries, it will constitute a majority. It will be
handicapped, however, by the requirement for a
two-thirds vote on any substantive issue, by the
shortage of time remaining before recommenda-
tions must be forwarded to the OAS Council, and
by failure so far to reach agreement on which of
the several reorganization schemes that are being
discussed should be favored. At the meeting, the
reform wing-led by Peru-is likely to win at least
some moral victories and pass some reforms, but
I~ The flurry of diplomatic activity generated
,a, by the Venezuelans emphasizes once again how
f! far attitudes have shifted on the Cuba issue. Even
Guatemala-once one of the strongest advocates
of a strict isolation of Cuba-is reappraising its
stand. Foreign Minister Arenales told the US
ambassador on 8 June that although he "opposes
all that Castro stands for" he would instruct his
OAS ambassador to abstain on the issue unless his
vote was essential.
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
SECRET
!~-' The Communists apparently are planning no
major new military action following the an?
nouncement of what the Communists
Military action erupted early in the week in
several long-time trouble areas. The South Viet-
namese made small inroads in widely scattered
regions, but were thwarted in other thrusts, in-
cluding amajor effort to reopen Route 13 north
of Saigon. The Communists showed muscle in
some areas. They seized several villages in Kon-
tum Province and were active in long-time sore
spots of the delta-Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong
provinces f
)'~~ the Commu-
nists expected that Saigon would sign the agree-
ment, but they do not ex~~ect the South Vietnam-
ese Government to abide by its conditions. Com-
munist military units must be employed primarily
in defense of the liberated areas against antici-
ated South Vietnamese incursions.
a re
are to concentrate on propaganda, educa-
tion, and troop proselytin!~, as well as on trying to
convince the people that the new agreement
represents a major political victory for the Com-
munists.
,l~ Both sides stepped up the tempo of military
action early this week prior to the anticipated
strengthening of the cease-fire agreement. For the
most part, South Vietnamese military units car-
ried the battle to the enemy with incursions into
Communist-held territory. The Communists
played mainly a defensive role, and there were
few solid indications that they were planning any
major military campaign. Since they apparently
consider last-minute timing as the key to success-
Saigon Prepares for an Election
The Saigon government has been going
ahead with preparations for the election of half of
~ the South Vietnamese Senate in August. President
i~fiThieu promulgated the law regulating the election
this week, and candidates apparently must file by
17 June. A number of non-Communists of various
~~tripes are considering entering the race, but
~'Thieu's Democracy Party is clearly in a dominant
position. Two slates of 15 candidates each will be
elected. Each group putting up a slate must post a
substantial deposit, which it must forfeit if it fails
to win 10 percent of the vote
~Le Duan and Pham Van Dong do not appear
to have achieved what they wanted in their week-
long trip to China. The first secretary and the
premier were given the usual round of banquets,
rallies, and factory visits, and they had an audi-
ence with Mao. They also concluded a ne.y~ eco-
nomic and military aid agreement for 1974!
ful land-grabbing operations, they could shift)`~~
tactics abruptly. S
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
~~x-I
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
SECRET
Both were absf:nt from some of the
routine ceremonial visits, and they were together
during the latter few days of the visit. The usual
references to Sino -North Vietnamese solidarity
were made in public, but they were outweighed
by significant differences, notably on the two
most important issues of all-implementation of
the Paris agreement and CPrinese aid.l
`The differences were laid out in speeches by
Le Duan and Chinese politburo member Yeh
'~ Chien-ying at amass rally on 7 June. Le Duan
I~'~ blamed all cease-fire violations on US "neocoloni-
alism" and admonished the Communists' op-
ponents to improve their adherence. His harsh
criticism of the US seems to stem in part from a
continuing concern that Nino-American dealings
might limit Hanoi's options. Yeh, by contrast,
stated that "all parties" should respect the agree-
ments. He mentioned the US only in passing,
although he did level some criticism at Saigon:?
:'_> Aid was clearly the subject of considerable
disagreement. In asserting at the rally that the
North Vietnamese "believe" Peking will come
through with the sort of aid Hanoi thinks it
deserves, Le Duan betrayed concern over the
quantity and composition of future Chinese as-
sistance. Yeh, on the other hand, blandly implied
that Chinese aid to the North is meant for recon-
struction and Chinese assistance to the South is
for "building national concord." The language in
the announcement of a final aid agreement indi-
cates that Peking's assistance will be weighted on
the civilian side, and the tepid statement in the
final communique that both sides are "glad" the
agreement was signed indicates that Hanoi re-
mains unhappy.
1 ? tfhe communique contains further evidence
of divergences over the implementation of the
Paris agreement. Almost half the text-including
all but one sentence of the paragraphs dealing
with Vietnam-is cast in the form of unilateral
statements by one party or the other. Peking's
portions are full of language about the great vic-
tory scored by the Vietnamese Communists,
about the emphasis that allegedly will now be
North Vietnamese Prerrrier Pham Van Dong (2nd frc-m left) and Le Duan greeted by Chou En-lai in Peking
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
J C 1,,,, t~(C I
placed on reconstruction and consolidation, and
about the importance of implementing the Paris
accord.
{ ?, 1The North Vietnamese portions are shorter,
narrower in scope, and more defensive: Hanoi is
r, grateful for past Chinese aid; the Vietnamese
`~ Communists have a "consistent stand" of
"strictly implementing" the agreement; Saigon
and the US are to blame for shortcomings.!
~ "~ Conspicuously missing from the Chinese sec-
;-
tions is any condemnation of either Saigon or the
?~' US or any expression of across-the-board support
,, ;j for Hanoi. Equally conspicuous is Hanoi's failure
to mention its own attitude on the question of
implementing the agreement
~ ~ ,These divergences are not surprising. It has
been apparent for some weeks that Hanoi has
been unhappy with Peking, and the significance
of the visit may lie in the fact that it confirms the
changes that have occurred over the past couple
of years in the Sino -North Vietnamese relation-
ship. Le Duan and Pham Van Dong probably were
trying at the highest level ito secure a modification
of Chinese policies that ~Nere galling Hanoi. The
communique indicates that they failed in most
important respects. They may not be deterred
from trying again, but under present circum-
stances they probably believe the odds are against
them
CAMBODIA: POLITICAL PARALYSIS
jA month has passed since the new cabinet
headed by Prime Minister In Tam was installed. In
that time, neither the cabinet nor the ruling High
Political Council has made any significant effort
to meet the country's priority military and eco-
nomic problems. Much of the inertia results from
Lon Nol's efforts to reassert his supremacy over
the three other council members-including In
Tam---and over governmental affairs in general
There have been indications that Lon Nol is try-
ing to bypass the counciil. Thus far, the other
council members have been unable to work to-
gether and make the president hew to the arrange-
ment for sharing author{'i:y that was the key to
the council's formation. !
~ ~ Lon Nol's activities have been particularly
unsettling to In Tam. The prime minister has
become discouraged by the President's ability to
keep In Tam from the center of power. In Tam
has also found it hard to forge good relations with
senior military officers who hold him in low
esteem.~~Some of these officers probably are sup-
porting Lon Nol's maneuvers in order to block
military reforms-including the replacement of
incompetent and corrupt commanders. Although
In Tam evidently is willing to stay in office
despite these difficulties, the chances that he or
the council will be able to provide a semblance of
effective government remain poor.
;;-, `The Phnom Penh area was the focal point of
military activity again this week as the Khmer
Communists pressed attacks west and south of
the city. The heaviest fighting took place along
Route 4. Despite determined efforts by heavily
reinforced government troops to clear the road,
the Communists at mid-week were still in control
of a short segment some 15 miles from the capi-
tal. Communist forces also retained control over
most of Route 26 south of Thnal Totung on
Route 4, and government attempts to clear that
road also made little progress.!
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
SECE~ET
JAPAN: WHAT DOES MOSCOW WANT?
)-?L Japanese-Soviet relations, which were
~; war~ing, hit a snag in the past few weeks. Mos-
~ cow has informed Prime Minister Tanaka that his
proposed mid-August visit would be "incon-
venient." Prior to this rebuff the Russians had
requested the postponement of a Japanese
mission that was to discuss details of the Tyumen
oil project. The Soviets underlined the deliberate-
ness of the snub to Tanaka by making another
announcement welcoming a Japanese parlia-
mentary mission that is to go to Moscow in late
August.]
~-~ The Communists also kept up pressure on`'-
government forces along I~outes 2 and 3 south of
Phnom Penh. Several government defensive posi-
tions along both highways were abandoned during
the week. Communist resistance forced govern-
ment tro ps to suspend sweep operations west of
Route 3.~
~ ~ pThe Communists shelled Phnom Penh's air??
port on 10 and 11 June, but caused only minor
M t d a e resulted from
am
~ An an-
nouncement by Tanaka on 9 June that he would
visit the USSR sometime after 20 September has
prompted Japanese press speculation that he
intends to visit Moscow en route to or from
Europe. There is no evidence, however, that the
Soviets have yet given their assent to this timing.`
~~There are several possible explanations for
Moscow's action, none of which can be very
encouraging to Tokyo: Moscow may be chary of
hosting a state visitor whose political future is
cloudy; the Soviets may want to wait until Brezh-
nev completes his visit to the US and they have
had a chance to weigh the benefits of possible US
and West European participation in the develop-
ment of Soviet resources; and finally Moscow
may just be stringing Tokyo along in hopes of
driving hard bargains with a politically weakened
Japanese leader.
g
damage. ore ex ensive
Communist rocket and mortar fire in the north- i ~-~The Soviets have been trying to stimulate
west against the Cambodian Air Force mainte- US, West German, and Japanese interest in de-
nance and training center at Battambang on 10 ~2veloping Soviet resources by suggesting to each of
and 12 June. Three fighter aircraft and a number ?~.>:~the parties the possibility of losing out to the
of other military and civilian aircraft were dam- others. Moscow may now believe that it has more
aged in the attack on 1C~ June, and another air- to gain by cultivating the West, particularly West
craft and a munitions depot were destroyed on
the 12th. The actions at Battambang were the
first since the war began.
SECRET
Page 9 WEEK~..Y SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
SECRET
CHINA: DIVIDING THIS LOAD
r~~~China's political apparatus is being slowly .~~ Actually, the party-rebuilding process goes
reorganized at provincial levels and below. The: ~, back to 1969, and it has encountered serious
aim is apparently to restore the system in usf~ obstacles. Last month, provincial work con-
before the Cultural Revolution when there were-~~ ferences in Anhwei and Kirin emphasized the
parallel party and government structures with sep-
arate personnel and distiinct responsibilities. Since
the Cultural Revolution, party and government
functions have been consolidated in so-called rev-
olutionary committees. In the new reorganization
scheme, these committees are to be phased out.
Some of their functions will be returned to the
party committees; other functions will be taken
over by newly formed governmental organiza-
tions. Progress in effecting the reorganization ins
being slowed by the reluctance of some revolu-
tionary committees to relinquish their authority
and by wrangling over vvho should be named to
the new party committees.l
ins ruc ions issue in mi - 2 called upon
t e revolutionary committees to assist in forming
party branches. Political power was to be gradu-
ally transferred from the revolutionary to the
party committees, and administrative power was
to be turned over to professional managers. Where
these transfers were complete, the revolutionary
committees would
be abolished.;
(revolutionary committee sign-~
boards have been removed but that most commit-
tees remain intact because no replacement organi-
zations have been activated. There are other re-
ports that some revolutiionary committees have
been abolished or are operating at a reduced level
after relinquishing some of their cowers to arty
committees.~1 the
slowness to the unwillingness of revolutionary
committees to give up tl~eir power. Progress has
been faster in nearby Fukien. The provincial
party committee recently regained such functions
as the supervision of propaganda and the recruit-
ment and training of cadre. Elsewhere, progress
has been uneven.
need to bring in new cadre, if the party is to be
built up; this concept has met a good deal of
resistance. The Kirin conference report attacked
those who "still cannot fully understand the im-
portance of training and promoting new cadre."
The chief opponents are officials rehabilitated
after the Cultural Revolution; these officials are
now vying with the newcomers for posts in the
rebuilt party apparatus. So far, many more veter-
ans than newcomers are winning party jobs at the
provincial level, and the pattern may be repeated
at lower levels. This trend is sure to arouse the
antipathy of those who want more new blood in
the party.
~~ Personnel problems like these will intensify
as revolutionary committees disband. In areas
where party and revolutionary committees have
coexisted for several years, revolutionary com-
mittee leaders have usually doubled as party
bosses and will probably retain their party posts.
The same does not hold true for ordinary mem-
bers of the revolutionary committees, whether
rehabilitated veteran or newcomer. Both could
find themselves without work when the revolu-
tionary committees close down, and both will be
competing for positions in the new government
organizations.
-~ ~ There has been speculation that on the gov-
ernment side the revolutionary committees will
be replaced by "people's councils," which were
the local administrative organizations before the
Cultural Revolution. Some kind of government
apparatus will have to emerge after the revolu-
tionary committees are dissolved. Details are
probably still under discussion, but the relation-
ship between the party committees and the new
administrative units is likely to be more clearly
defined than has been the relationship between
party and revolutionary committees.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Jun 73
Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010300060001-3
SECRET
THAILAND: A KRA CANAL
a~j ~fhe Thai Government has under way several
feasibility studies concerning a canal across the
Malay Peninsula. Such a canal has been consid-
ered at various times since the late 18th century
but the canal has never been built. The high cost
33 of present proposals and a strong likelihood that
such a canal might not attract enough business to
cover operating costs suggest that a canal will not
prove an economic venture at this time either.,
l ~fwo sites are under consideration. One runs
fromlSurat Thani on the Gulf of Thailand south-
~'west to the Indian Ocean. It is being surveyed for
,.3 the Thai National Energy Authori#y. A second