Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 16, 2007
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 20, 1973
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5.pdf2.07 MB
Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 %0101 w4w Secret Weekly Summary Secret 20 July 1973 No. 0379/73 Copy N2 48 State Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 CONTENTS (20July 1973) 1 Argentina: Peron'sLast Chance 2 Rhodesia: Guerrillas Settle In 4 Libya: Qadhafi's Crusade 5 Cambodia: All Fight, No Talks Indochina 7 Australia: Good Show 7 Japan: The Soybean Crunch 3 Iceland: Smoother Sailing ') USSR: Gas; Grain 10 Yugoslavia: Talks With Tito I Eastern Europe: More Debts 11 Bulgaria: The Changing Mood 12 The Germanies: Pankow Backs Down; Fesiival France: Pompidou Beset 14 EC-Africa: Association Questions 15 Portugal: Atrocity Charges 16 Greece: Getting Out the Vote 17 Egypt-USSR: Strained Relations 18 India: Nuclear Setback 18 Nepal: After the Fire 19 Iraq: A Regime in Ferment 20 India: The Arms Trade 21 Afghanistan: Now a Republic 22 Chile: No Improvement 23 Cuba: Holiday Atmosphere 24 The Americas: Changing the OAS 24 Guyana: Elections Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 MIDDLE EAST AFRICA WESTERN HEMISPHERE Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Argentina PERON'S LAST CHANCE 9' he resignation of the Campora governnnent has paved the way for populist leader Juan Peron to resume direct rule of Argentina. Campos has been succeeded by Raul Lastiri--the son-in-law of a close Peron aide-who will serve as provisional president until elections are held, possibly within 45 days. Such an election, which he will win handily, will do little more than give formal sanc- tionto his decision to return to powers RAr?l I rThe newly installed provisional president said elections would take place in accord with the old practice rather than under the revised laws decreed by the military government. However, some believe that the laws will be amended to allow for a direct election on the basis of a popular vote. The presidential term, if it follows the old system, would be six year,. but some uncertainty also remains on this point. 1 ?Speculation centers on who will be Peron's vice president-a key spot since the incumbent would be next in line to succeed the aging P=aron, whose health is deteriorating. Peron's choice appears to be Radical Party leader Ricardo Balbin, who ran against Campora last March. The Radical Party, split over Balbin's possible can- didacy, will meet. in a national convention, pos- sibly at the end of July, to settle the issue crr an alliance with the Peronists. There are also objec- tions to Balbin within the Peronist movemeril. A Peron-Balbin ticket would pool the support of most of the nation's voters? JIn announcing his availability for the op y post following Campora's resignation, Peron emphasized his respect for constitutionality, probably to alleviate military fears that lie /vas ~r preparing to take over in a patently illegal rnan- ner. Army chief General Carcagno told Pero,a he could expect full support for any governmental changes as long as they were made within the law, The army high command reportedly believes that there is only slight opposition within the military to Peron's take-over. Peron has been curr,ving favor with armed forces leaders since he retur,ied, SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jul 73 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927AO10400030001-5 :)c~,rAr- 1 rleferrinq to their wishes on several occasions and ,howine an intent to forge stronger ties v,i'.h th e military establishment from which he has lun a been estranged.? fn policy matters, Perori appears tU, be bo - rowing heavily from former president .__nusse s econernir- and ~r,Iitic1 sistin(j that Peron undertake a tull-scale frontal Grand National Accord. Pr)ron secros tr :varit an alliance of the nation's major political 'vices- lienated leftist groups may yet join forces Peronists, Radicals, and the mil tarv. F'laris t) with Marxist terrorists in a campaign of violent ,r-hieve stability through "national orrcih~ opposition to the government. These elements f on'' are eliciting support from soiri tanner could well run up against the combined weight of enemies, but Peron has a long way to go :,iir>rr7 he the S its 3Z prospects JDuring the conference, Whitlarn em- -Sq/ VIhile lining up new suppliers, Tokyo will phasized is government's cordial yet independ- press Washington to fulfil existing contracts for ent stance toward the US. He criticized both the J" the shipment of grain and soybeans. The Japanese hostility of leftists in his party toward the had contracted for delivery during the third quar- ANZUS alliance and the tendency of the prey ous '1 ter of this year of 660,000 tons of soybeans, government to see every issue as falling within the about two months' consumption; this amount has ANZUS framework.1 been cut in half as a result of the US export 3S" normal cabinet approval of a long-starding decision to withdraw Australian ground troops from Singapore, 'which had been announced the week before, forestalled leftist-inspired debaic on the stationing of Australian troops overseas. 'n- controls announced on 2 July. Japan will require a resumption of normal US soybean shipments sometime in late September or early October if serious shortages are to be avoided, berra has not, however, withdrawn from the 1 ive 1/( IrTo secure supplies, Japan already has altered Power Defense Arrangement covering Singa ore its agricultural buying practices. In the past, and Malaysia and maintains its air squadrer; in Tokyo purchased wheat in small amounts-for Malaysia 2shipment within 30 to 60 days and kept stocks at a minimum level. Recently, Japan has been sign- 3Y ton domestic matters, the party leaders nip won endorsement of a resolution for exclusive central government control over the exploitation of minerals and fuels, an issue that figures promi- nently in the sensitive relations between Canberra and the states. State party leaders lobbied ag,;i nst the proposal, which could lead to a considerc.ble paring down of the extensive rights the states now hold under the loose federal system. ing larger contracts for shipment within six months and apparently plans to increase markedly its stockpiles of wheat. In June, Tokyo received a commitment from Australia for deliv- eries of 730,000 tons in 1974-about half the normal amount that Japan imports from Australia in a year. Japanese traders reportedly also began negotiating with US commodity dealers for much 25X1 years. larger than normal amounts of corn and soybeans from the 1973-74, and even the 1974-75 crop SECRET Page / WELKLY SUMMARY 20 Jul 73 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 1)L_' T j r,re ign IV,r, ister Ac ;istss(rn ) i, l i et- ned his goverriment'5 c,:rer ing p,)rsi' r ill ti r Forthcoming necotia' offs river the rrtr,r US-manned NA I Cr nase H Krrflnvii I n - ~; ti rI--isonahle ~,t.7temen' Oil that sut)I, r i t,J rI d.Hanc c official it nearly two rnr nth, i he r eg,r- rtions remain linked in Icel,nrl c ml try tl rnresorved fishing disprrt-, hrit orc,sp- t: f~, r amino thr. ha,,c in .-, n~,di~i?rrf to r, (-n, if i- rreved.f fAqustsson proposed that soirri < f tf,.: ~,_,r_r -r~s n- the defr:nse force no idctTI ant ,p t- ,r . h i n d r , f the r , i ( ; t a r y nersnnrit, ( ) v - nd,~ tf nerrotiaofe. and the miiifaty r,r-rS r 1"1,31 r, r, tr , rri-nteri by Anern:an anrf Icr 1-1-1 c ,sci.:ai it , the Foreign Min ote' - (-rer. - i - t.; ,'IL; in The novernrr.ent to riciud,t thei h,' Ice end;, nenntiatinc t~~anr fl, st Jlugur,t, the For'tigo %i r is ter grrrrrjght NATO) interventi,in ruain>t tr , Hritostart in September, an(] Acustsson, wishing to get t ,rr , th,, nrec?tinq ()i NA, TO 'on~i,tn r:ist,-rs if srrrnr- of the spadework out of the way, has asked iar,rl-June, thrrutcninn t invoke tf,e ,n;ratir rrS7 'r r r;formal talks next month. 'base (r'-'vrticle Kill ref its deter amre1,~ ;,-nt rRET Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 OCUric I "'' The Soviets have come forward with various proposals for expanding Iranian deliveries, in- cluding the construction of a pipeline parallel to the existing 687-mile line to Astara or another line from the giant Sarakhs field in northeast Iran. Construction of a new gas pipeline will take a long time, and Tehran probably will insist on better payment terms prior to undertaking any major expansion in gas output for the USSR. Tehran is in a strong bargaining position as it has a number of prospective buyers reportedly willing to pay 30 cents per 1,000 cubic feet for gas as compared with the USSR's 19 cents. The two countries have been discussing the matter for some time, and there is speculation that an agree- meit setting higher prices will be signed during Prime Minister Hoveyda's visit to Moscow on 19 July. rThe USSR faces the prospect of paying more for its natural gas imports; both Iran and Afghan- istan are pressing for higher prices in current negotiations. Moscow relies on Iran and, ?o a lesser extent, Afghanistan for all of its natural gas imports, which last year totaled 388 billion cubic feet, valued at $79 million. Deliveries from Iran and Afghanistan, in repayment for Soviet credits, have helped overcome regional shortages in the USSR and offset Soviet exports of gas to Western Europe. Last year the Soviets earned about; $23 million in hard currency from exports to Austria alone. This year, the Soviets need to import more because they plan to export gas to West Germany and Italy, and supply shortages are developing within the USSR. Depletion of the USSR's major gas fields at Stavropol, Krasnodar, and the Ukraine has left the European USSR badly in need of additional gas supplies. The Afghans, who are in a weaker bargaining position, began negotiating with the Soviets for Major Natural Gas Pipelines in the USSR, Iran, and Afghanistan -? Pipeline - -? Pipeline under construction Gasfield SECRET Page 9 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 higher prices on 14 July - Last dear, Karbui re- ceived only 16 cents per 1,000 cubic `ccet for i s natural gas. In June 1973, President Podgorny reportedly offered to rase prices to 19 cents, brit this apparently did not satisfy Afghan star. t ehran gets a price increase, Moscow probably will have to adjust Afghan prices too, regardless of the coup in Kabul. 43 11 it, 's talks with Romanian President Ceau- sescu on 15-16 July demonstrated anew the wide Srange of common interests between the two lead- ers. This, their seventh meeting since the Soviet irivas on of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, was held at Tito's Brioni Island retreat, where the Yugoslav leader has been resting,) 3 jtvloscow can take little consolation from the H:gher prices and larger deliver tr, would eet ng. The final communique stresses the arise the USSR's natural gas import b ll to well J, equality of all states, regardless of size, and ap- over last year's $79 million. Most o~ the impor.s a,plauds nonalignment as a struggle between the probabiy will not involve cash outla?;s by tt el USSR, and Moscow undoubtedly will try to pass part of the price increase on to its West Luropean customers. Gas sales to Western Luropc this year could be affected by the USSR's proti sins with natural gas output and with the --onsti u, ti(in r,t export pipelines) "haves' and "have nots" the Soviet Union, of course, being one of the "haves." The communi- que's treatment of the talks on European detente is designed to counter Soviet claims to hegemony in Eastern Europe and to ensure Romanian and Yugoslav participation as independent and equal in future talks.I j din bilateral issues, Tito and Ceausescu SOVIET HARVEST PROGRESS pled6ed even more frequent party and govern- *tni t' siilet~ nient meetings, and economic cooperation was E ,. 16 July the Soviets h3b cut 14.5 million stressed? hectares of grain, 11 percent of the arcs., sown to grains this year. Only 8 million hectares of the cut area had been threshed. It has rot bci,ri oossib e 64 [in contrast, Tito's session earlier in the week to thresh the remainder of the (train dirr:ctly b - , with Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar was cause of wet weather. Heavy rains and winds more pleasing to the Soviets. It was the first lodged grain in large parts of the Ukraine, Belo- (pcmeeting of the two leaders since 1967, and put russia, Moldavia, and the North Caucasus, causing relations between the two parties considerable delay in threshing, compared with last year. Accordina to a 13 July ra ti.) report from the Ukraine, 2.5 million hectares we e lodged: this is one third of the rapubl c. s winter grain area and could amount tea r'nn,rc than 6 million tons of grain. Lodged grain ~s difficult to harvest without loss and retains much rioistur,, reducing its milling quality. [his week the weather cleared over most of the Ukmine an d North Caucasus and harvestinq picking 25X1 up. keel. Tito suggested that the two leaders might resume the frequent meetings that had earlier marked their relations. I COY budging from the communique, the two de- voted special attention to economic cooperation, an area where ties had already been improving. SHungary and Yugoslavia have much in common in their shared spirit of economic tism SECRET P:rgr i!~ WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jul 73 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A010400030001-5 SECRET EASTERN EUROPE: MORE DEBTS BULGARIA: THE CHANGING MOOD astern Europe's debt to th ndustrial \Ni!st C,h,Concern in official circles over the possible rose about one fourth last year and reacth~d k nega-:ive consequences of detente may be well nearly $5 billion by year's end. Most of the -i-~~ founded. The US Embassy reports a distinct un- crease resulted from a surge in purchases of n a- dercurrent of feeling that change is in the wind chinery and equipment by Poland and Roman 3.411` and that new openings to the West lie ahead. This The outlook is for more of the same. With IE(_ ,02 impression is strongest among those Bulgarians possible exceptions of Romania and Bulgar a, who have kept up with Brezhnev's visit to the US.7 none of the East European countries has a seri,>,is debt servicing problem. The United States is pic