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Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Weekly Summary State Dept. review completed Secret Secret 14 September 1973 No. 0387/73 Copy N? 4 3 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 7??:_ b'vRi.~LY St1trMARY, issued every Frittay mcrr-~ng by tf?e t3ftic? of Lurrertt Ir-teliitlenee, regx~rts and anafyze=_ irtrnif- ic.~ni ~~ieu?loprrents of the week thrc,ugh noo='r o?ibvrrr4t#a?v- tt frequently includes rr+aterial coorcinated with ~r txepared b.,~ the Gif+ce crf EL;~nU+rr+! Research, the Off:ce pp ;ttat~r+ Re~.Parch, and the Directorate of Science aril T~:t+r+o#ogv. T~,pies requiring more camprehensi~e treatment ~ya~~i there- 'rsre pUbsi,hed separately as Special Reports are Isst_;9 in the cc~f,tena. The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classifi~ad irrf~r~tatic)n affecting She nations! recur+ty at t}:e Ursiteo State. within the mear3ing tat Tftie lEl. sections !93 and J94;-~~# `tte US Code, as amended. Its Eransmission or reveiatian of its c+Gn- tents to or receipt by an unauthorized person :s prt3hit2ited by law. 14 Fedayeen: A Tale of Three Cities 16 Ira4: Kurdistan Smolders 17 Sudan: After the Storm 18 Arab Harmony 19 Arab Apprehensions 20 Uruguay: A Meeting of Minds 21 Bolivia: No Time for Change '>PECIRL .SPORT (Published separately) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Crunch Gommants and gUanes on tha contents of this pub4lcatian ar~a waloama. That' may ba directed to !ha editor or iha Weekly Saemmary,~ CQNTEI'~IT'S (14 September 1973) BAST ASIA PACIFIC I Chile 2 The Nonaligned Chorus 4 Mr. Bhutto Comes to Washington 5 Indochina 8 Japan: A Big Spender Less Jamming France: Trouble with Immigrants Norway: Losers All Around UK: Toss-up MIDDLE EAST AFRICA WESTERN IfEMFSPHERE 25X6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 JCI~KC I Chile THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE CI~J cT s eu. ec~ The military junta that overturned the - lende government gives every evidence of being efficient and determined, but faces many diffi- culties in getting the country on its feet again. Moving in tkie early hours of 11 Septerber, the armed farces took swift control of cornmu- nications, media, the judiciary, public adminis- tration, transportation, and most government enterprises. A nearly nonstop series of public announcements revealed careful planning, but as resistance dragged out in Santiago, the forces shifted from reassurance to retaliation. Troops needed for the job of re-establishing economic order, particularly the distribution of s::arce supplies, were instead brought into Santiago to reinforce the military effort to root out resisters. Allende's defiant stand until his death in the burning presidential palace and the resistan~.:e of heavily armed leftists holed up in government buildings and industrial areas of the capital caused many casualties. The bloodshed will slow the work of reconciliation in a nation that was bit- terly divided over the Allende administration,. The junta is highlighting, however, the key role of leftist extremists and Cubans in the armed hold- outs and the Soviet origin of the heavy weapons in their hands. The junta is composed of the heads of the three military services and the national police. All are experienced and respected senior officers who only recently took command. The new President, army General Augusto Pinochet, is a nationalist like most of his colleagues, but he has had good relations with US representatives. All but two of the 15 cabinet members named on 12 September are military officers, a choice recommended by the junta's civilian advisers. Many of the new ministers are trained administrators, probably chosen more to reorganize the chaotic and cor- rupt bureaucracy than to provide expertise in their fields of responsibility. The military government is keeping its dis- tance from the major opposition parties, and those civilian advisers identified with it thus far are conservative business and professional leaders. Congress, where Allende's opponents had a ma- jority, has been "dissolved" indefinitely. While the Christian Democrats have announced they wil! not accept government posts, they and the more conservative National Party leaders have come out in support of the new government. Preliminary reports of the junta's plans for po- litical reform include a new constitution and con- gre~>sional elections. These reforms may not be realized for a long time since the restoration of puk~lic and economic order will be given top priority. International reaction to the coup has been vehement and widespread. Most governments that opk~osed Allende are silent. Several countries, including West Germany, Sweden, and Denmark have expressed regret over the ouster of an elected government. Venezuela and Mexico, and perhaps others, are joining Cuba in three days of official mourning. Leftist groups staged protest demonstrations in a number of capitals and, like Per~an in Argentina, most of them accused the US of complicity in Allende's downfall. The Soviet Central Committee issued a sharply worded state- ment denouncing "reactionary forces," and other Communist governments followed suit. SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Sep 73 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Algerian Foreign Minister lioutel7ika .addresses ~yreliminaru mectino ~3dat alld ~oi2JnedlenC Castro during sess~ian Qadhafi departs meeting hall Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 ~' ~t(.;F~t 1 The Nonaligned Chorus ~/u ~he Fourth Summit Conference of Non- aligned Nations broke up this week in a cloud of cliches. As before, it served largely as a forum for airing the resentments and grievances of thE: poor and weak countries against the rich and strong. The final resolutions were largely a repeat of those issuing from earlier gatherings; US p~~licies in the Middle East and Indochina were roundly condemned, along with colonialism and apartheid Lj, ~fhe US nevertheless came off reasonably well; most speakers attacked a nameless im~~erial- ism and colonialism. The Soviets lost some ground; most speakers lumped the USSR with the US as a rich, powerful, and menacing state. A heavy-handed effort by Moscow on the eve of the conference to avert that association backfired. The letter from E3rezhnev did not win friends>, and Fidel Castro's espousal of the Soviet position was badly overdone. The Chinese remained quiet and unobtrusive, while their views on big-power aJC" hegemony gained ground. Libyan President Qadhafi directed a broad appeal to the partici- pants to break relations with Israel and pr-orrrised Libyan assistance for any country that did so. He did, however, manage to introduce a rare note of candor into the proceedingsr ,?i ~Nith representatives of more than 70 coun- tries in attendance, including 52 heads of state or government, the Algiers meeting was the largest of the four summits held since 1961. Prince Sihanouk's delegation and one from the Provi- sional Revolutionary Government of South Viet- nam were seated as full members? jj~~, The Middle East resolution was somewhat watered dawn from the extreme language advo- cated by Borne Arab delegates. It nevertheless demanded immediate, unconditional Israeli with- drawal from the occupied Arab territories, con- demned the US-and unnamed other powers--for giving support to Israel, and called on the non- aligned states to work on measures for a full boycott of Israel. Only Cuba, trying to recoup, actually did anything: Havana broke relations with Tel Aviv. '~ Cln addition, the assembled leaders: ? supported the peaceful reunification of Korea before its admission to the UN and the ~Nithdrawal of all foreign troops; ? backed independence for Puerto Rico ably will continue for at least another month. The government seems to be using a "carrot-and- stick" approach to the Kurds. While trying to intimidate them through various types of harass- ment, the government is also offering the Kurds a place in the national front government, an offer SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Sep 73 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 apparent reference to dissident exiles-and other scapegoats. He failed to address himself to any of the key problems facing the country and his regime. These include: ? inflation and shortage of consumer goods-issues that were exploited by his enemies during the disturbances; ? labor unrest and how to deal with strikes; ? student grievances against the educa- 25X1 tional system. (~'~ President Sadat's latest go at summitry-his four h in three weeks-brought Jordan`s King Page t8 Husayn and Syria's President Asad to Cairo this week. Billed as an effort to reconcile Jordan's long-standing differences with its sister "con- ~~frontation" states~he meeting resulted in the normalization of Egypt's relations with Jordan and the prospect of an early restoration of Syrian- Jordanian ties. (p ? The communique issued at the summit's conclusion indicates by its terse wording that all ~' differences have not been resolved7~Major prob- (~ lems remain, centering an the restoration of the fedayeen to Jordan and the re-establishment of the so-called "eastern front" against Israel. +~.~ Husayn is not willing to agree to mare than a token commitment to either proposition, and Sadat-whose experience with the Libyan merger project has reinforced his caution-wilt probably not press the point (,pCf ~adat is taking other steps to expand Egypt's international support and to forge a greater de- gree of inter-Arab cooperation. Iran's foreign min- ister was in Cairo early this week, and the Arab League is meeting there now. Discussion will center on Arab strategy at the UN General As- sembly, which opens next week? fe,Cs Also scheduled for next week, or soon thereafter, is the final adoption of Sadat's new policy paper, which has been under debate in Egypt for the past several weeks. The paper calls for: ? disengagement from superpower in- terests ? expanded diplomatic and economic ties to establish a better balance in Egypt's rela- tions between East and West ? greater inter-Arab collaboration, par- ticularly on economic matters, to strengthen Egypt's and the Arabs' position against Is- ~E'~Rt~T Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 ARAB APPREHENSIONS The Arabs are playing up accounts cif US desert warfare exercises, linking them to Washing- ton's .current concern over its energy supplies. As the Arabs are handling the story, it has so stirred existing suspicions that some Arab leaders are openly expressing uneasiness about the possibility of US military intervention in the Middle East 4~' Feature articles about "the largest US desert battlefield maneuvers in 40 years" appeared in US newspapers in August. The stories, along with comments from Arab correspondents in WasFring- ton, were picked up and embellished in a v~rriety of Middle Eastern periodicals, which are now talking of US readiness to ensure its oil require- ments by force. Several articles claim that un- identified US Marines had directly linked the intensification of their desert training to the .situa- tion in the Middle East Libyan environment. Others predicted US and British collusion in a plan for using airborne troops to seize oil fields:) (,~Z? ~rab officials, who see themselves reacting in a war of nerves started by the US, have lent thE~mselves to the campaign. President Boume- diene, in his address to the nonaligned confer- ence, declared that "overt and covert military threats" by the US are dangerous tools to gain domination over important economic and stra- tegic areas. He specifically referred to the possi- bility of an "imminent invasion" of the Gulf stales. President Sadat told the conference, "What the American press writes about, what it calls the desert war, is intended- to usurp the wealth of other states." ~ Some Middle East observers believe all this tal4c about "desert " h war as created a sense of '~' urgency in the Arabs' search for common ground (`fhe Beirut Daily Star, a moderate English-~~{ on such sensitive issues as oil pricing and produc- la~guage newspaper, noted that the maneuvers tiorl limitation. The search, however, still con- came on the heels of reports that "the US, in fronts the same serious political and economic order to guarantee its oil supplies, may intervene differences that have so far prevented a united directly or through. surrogates such as Israel and Arab oil policy. Nevertheless, if mistrust of US Iran." As usual, more inflammatory rendi-lions intE~ntions grows, Arab oil negotiations will be appeared in the Libyan press; for example, one ~Sthat much more difficult in the months paper claimed last week that the exercises were ahead. carried out under conditions which simulated the THE DAILY STAR ~sx; The Leading English Langt.~age Newspaper in the Middle East BOUT WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1973 1 o Pages No. 781,6 PL 25 But Deny Mideast Link U.S. Marines Train for Desert War ey EDMOND GHAREEB "The Daily Star" Correspondent WASHINGTON, Aug, 21 -- Energy requirements, Middles East tension and geo-political considerations may have been the motivating factors behind the largest desert battlefield maneuvers in 40 years held recently by the U.S. Marines in the Mojave desert, '"'te maneu~`?rs, which involved several thousand reser~~e yes, ?~ old ' des hF ~ hP? ?ing ~' v "I hs.ve been in the marines for 12 years and I have never been called upon to tight in the desert before. I lust hope it is agother 12 years before the marines decidetheyhave to be ready attain, "The;~e musk be some reason for the longest desert exercise in 40 years, You can hardly say it took us 40 years to think of it. The airline hijackings, the skirmishes, the controversy in this country over the Jews and the Arabs, the Russian influence in ' Ara'- ~rld that migh' ve had ~ ethln~ ~ do w' i ,. .. ~~ Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 . Jtt~I~C 1 URUGUAY: A MEETING OF MIfUDS ~'~ (President Bordaberry's position vis-a-vis his military associates was strengthened by his per- y formance at a recent meeting, which was called to G~ seek ways to restore vigor to the economy and confidence in the administration. The President, who set the tone for the meeting by rolling up his sleeves and getting down to business, emerged with increased prestige among the officers present? wring the week-long meeting, the President, his t p civilian advisers, and high military officials decided to encourage foreign investment; spend Ga 61 considerable sums on roads, bridges, and port facilities; and support the development of key industries. The administration hopes to rally flagging public enthusiasm by publicizing this example of civilian-military cooperation and the actual measures adopted to cure the country's ills. It was also decided, but not made public, that the Brazilian-style mini-devaluation of the nation's currency in relation to the dollar would continue. (,,~. ~ne man who loomed large at the con- ~rence was General Gregorio Alvarez, chief of the joint general staff and secretary of the na- G~ tional security council. Alvarez, who is considered the leading military intellectual, reportedly initiated the conference. During the meeting, he cemented relations with Bordaberry, while Gen- eral Esteban Cnsti, commander of the important First Army Division, aright-winger and a man of action, took a back seat. The prominence of General Alvarez could signal the emergence of a strong military faction more interested in ideas and plans than in force. Although Bordaberry has enjoyed a good relationship with Cristi, he could benefit from an equally close link with Alvarez, who could be a balancing farce to Cristi and his followers. The President must exercise care, how- ever, not to show partiality to either since this could fester a disruptive rivalry' ~~ (Bordaberry has gained a broader base of support among the military by indicating his readiness to innovate. He has secured from the officers a renewed public commitment to act on the national problems, a commitment they used months ago to justify their assumption of a larger role in government. Action must be quick and specific, however, if the government is to keep alive the optimism created by the meeting. SECRET page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 '~ StC;HET BOLIVIA: NO TIME FOR CHANGE ?~j fter raising public expectations by calling fort e resignation of his cabinet on 7 Septerraber, d' President Banzer proceeded to reappoint nearly ~? the same people and to maintain the same polit- ical balance as before. This lack of meaningful change suggests that Banzer was convinced that it is unwise to upset his coalition until after his visit to the US in October ~~ The right-wing Bolivian Socialist Falange, eaded by Foreign Minister Mario Gutierrez, has been too obstreperous for Banzer's taste, o~~enly attacking its partner in the coalition, the Nation- alist Revolutionary Movement. Banzer seems to favor the Falange, but it has only minimal public support. He needs the Movement, which Naas a measure of support, to avoid isolating himself. Banzer took a poll of military officers in the garrisons, and they seemed willing to abandon the "corrupt" politicians and rule with an all-military cabinet. The advice was not taken. Banzer prob- ably preferred not to install an all-military cabinet at this time since the action would open him to charges of being a military dictator-a charge that has plagued him during visits to other countriesr 7g' ~As a result, the new cabinet is basically the old one; a few cosmetic changes have been made, but the new cabinet will not be any better prepared than the old to find solutions to old and futcare problems. President Banzer still has hard decisions to make about the long-range or- gar~ization of his government. 25X1 25X1 Presidential Palace on Independence Day SE:~RET Page 21 WEEI~:LY SUMM,gRY 14 Sep 73 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 } StC;f-{t I IIUTERNATIC}NAL MIQNEY Money Market Developments b 3~t~C QS~ The dollar was mixed on European money markets last week. In Tokyo, it remained essen- tially unchanged as the Bank of Japan continued to sell dollars in moderate amounts to prevent the yen from .depreciating. Sterling continued under strong pressure and since mid-August has declined almost five percent relative to the currencies participating in the joint European float. Contributing factors in the de- cline were the belief that the E3ritish would pursue expansionary policies at the expense of increased inflation, lack of labor support for the govern- ment's incomes policy, and a growing trade def- icit. International Monetary Reform Agreement on an acceptable draft outline for monetary reform now seems unlikely in time for the Nairobi International Monetary Fund ~'~~~~~ WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Sep 73 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 meetings. The recent meeting of the C-20 Dep- uties-the body established by the International Monetary Funct last year to develop proposals for monetary reform-ended in deadlock. Thty Euro- peans took a less conciliatory position than at the July meetings ;end spoke of a hardened US posi- tion. The same basic issues remain in contention: the nature of the balance-of-payments adjustment process and the extent of currency convertibility. l-he US proposal that changes in the level of international reserves be relied on to indicate the need for balance-of-payments adjustment-an idea tl~at seemed to gain ground earlier this year-was s~:verely criticized in this negotiating session, especially by the French. The Europeans are opposed to subordinating their economic policies 25X1 25X1 Percent Change Since 2 January 1973 in the Value of the US Dollar Relative to Selected Foreign Currencies 1 ,? ^ _5~r^ ~~i^^^~~~~~~ RDITICN nnn.~n ~~~~~~~?? 19 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 2'2 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 31 7 12 MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT 554602 9-73 SECRET Page 23 WEE::KLY SUMPJIARY 14 Sep 73 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 ~++' r Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 ument Denied Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Secret Weekly Summary Special Report Conference on Security crz2d Coo~deration in Europe: The Crunch Secret N?- 4 2 14 September 1973 No. 0387/73A Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 ~7Cl~r~l~ i Summary After six months of preparatory discussions and a brief opening stage last July, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe gets down to brass tacks on 18 September in Geneva. This stage of the conference is to produce the agreements that are to be approved by ministers-or at the summit level-in the final stage. The conference has moved forward thus far by postponing or skirting contentious issues. Vigorous East-West clashes are likely to precede any agreements of importance; the East wants assurances about the "inviolability of frontiers"; the West would like to see "freer movement"' of people and ideas across national boundaries. The willingness of the Soviets to make concessions on "freer movement" and of the West to sweeten the bargain with offers, for instance, of increased economic cooperation, will say a .great deal about the direction of detente in the 1970x. The conference could produce only pious rubbish or it could take a small but meaningful step toward reduced tensions and more stable relations between East and Wesi. Background The idea of a security conference in Europe was first broached by the Soviets in 1954, at the height of the cold war. Behind the initiative was a Soviet desire to secure international approval of European borders as they stood after World War II and thus give Soviet territorial gains legitimacy; equally important, the conference would ratify the division of Germany. The Soviets had in mind a grandiose diplomatic gathering, something like the Congress of Vienna, that would define the structure of European security for decades to come. This rather grand design was in the beginning staunchly opposed by the West. i3y last year, however, a number of factors--including Brandt's Ostpolitik and the Berlin and inter-German agree- ments-had made the idea of a conference more acceptable. Although the basic Soviet aim was the same, the West Europeans recognized that a cer- tain legitimacy had already been given to the division of Germany in the other agreements. They also began to think that a conference might offer real opportunities for the West. It could perhaps encaurage the countries of Eastern Special Report Eurape to move toward a greater degree of in- dependence in their relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Communist regimes might be induced to relax their domestic policies which would lead to greater freedom for the people of Eastern Eurape. Some economic benefits might else be derived from the conference. To the srna{ler nations of Western Europe, a conference began to seem a way of participating in detente. Of their larger neigh bars, Bann now viewed the conference as a tagicaf extension of its Ostpolitik, while France saw it as an opportunity for exer- cising independent diplomacy. The EC as a whale perceived in a conference a chance to concert its policies toward the East. Rreparatory Talks, November-June Preparations for a conference got under way in Helsinki in late November 1972 and, with interruptions between the four preparatory rounds, lasted until early June 1973. Despite de- bate that at times plumbed the depths of obscu- rity, there were several useful results. First, pas- sible agenda topics were grouped into four "'baskets,"' ar general categories. Agreement was made possible when the Soviets reluctantly ac- ceded to the West's desire to put "freer 14 September 1973 SEC6~ET Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 Approved For Release 2008/08/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010400110001-6 StC,:Kt I movement" items into a separate basket. With the agenda items organized in their "baskets," the delegates decidc;d to produce draft "mandates" for each of the "baskets" to serve as terms of reference for the committees in the stage of the conference that is about to begin. These ?'man- dates" were haggled over for months, and the Soviet willingness to discuss substantive issues at such length in the preparatory talks was another major concession. Moscow had hoped the prepa- rations would be general and brief; they ended up being detailed and lengthy. The Soviet concessions, however, were for the most part a r~natter of tactics. The main Soviet goal in the preparatory stage was, of course, the convening of the conference itself. A willingness to give in on procedural points and even to dis- play some flexibility on matters of substance seemed to Moscow a cheap enough price to pay for the conference. The Soviets doubtless hope to turn these concessions to their later advantage. They may, for example, argue that, since the preparations reached such a level of detail and went on for so long before, the second stage of the conference -need not go over the same tired arguments and can be relatively brief. Finally, the Soviets may have been pushed a bit by the surprising unity of the non-bloc coun- tries. This was due in part to the consultations in Helsinki among rnembers of the EC. The prEo-para- tory phases were perhaps the first major success of the EC at political consultation. Even the French-expected to be the Western prima donna-played a useful role. The emergence of reasonable EC positions on a number of issues attracted support from other Western countries and from several nonaligned states as well. ~iTAGE I, JULY The preparatory talks ended in a spirit of optimism, with rrrany observers feeling that agree- ment on the "mandates" might indicate that the resolution of some problems would be easier than had previously been thought. The conference it- self was formally held in Helsinki on 3 to 7 July; this stage showed clearly that no one was really willing to concede basic positions without a good deal of intensive bargaining. Special Report Foreign Minister Gromyko made the first s~~eech. He took nearly three times his allotted 20 minutes and left no doubt that the main Soviet goal was, as it had always been, the preservation of the territorial status quo in Europe. Europe's e~:isting borders, he said, are an incontestable political reality. He also opposed the West's aspi- rations for the freer movement of people and ideas, arguing that there could be no changes in political systems or ideological views. Any in- cr~~ased contacts would have to develop, he in- si~,ted, in accordance with the laws, customs, and tr