WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010600040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 7, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
7 December 1973
No. 0399/73
Copy N2 57
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Office of Current intelligence, reports and analyzessiignif
VEEKI..Y SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
nt develooments of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology:
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there
25X1 re piabltsh=*d separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents,
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
1 The Middle East
5 Korea: Action on the Northern
Limit Line
7 NATO: The Ministerial Meetings
8 USSR-China: The 1973 Harvest
10 EC Summit Meets Next Week
10 Denmark: Taxpayers' Revolt
12 USSR: Unmanned Soyuz in Orbit
12 Soviet Dissident Movement Declines
13 Eastern Europe: Weathering the Oil Crisis
14 Italy: Center-Left Showdown
15 Bonn: The High Price of Ostpolitik
16 Vietnam: A Couple of Hard Knocks
17 Cambodia: A Diplomatic Victory
18 Thailand: Bottling the Genie
18 Burma: The Counterinsurgency
CONTENTS (7December 1973)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
19 Greece: A Hard-Line Regime
20 Brezhnev Returns from India
21 Turkey: Still No Government
21 Pakistan-Bangladesh: Thawing
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
24 Honduras - El Salvador: Flash Point
25 Trinidad-Tobago: Williams Stays
25 Uruguay: Snuffing Out the Left
26 Monetary Developments
27 IJN: Nonaligned Solidarity
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summar
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THE MIDDLE EAST
Arab and Israeli military forces were on high
alert this week, and cease-fire violations increased
as Cairo and Tel Aviv engaged in fruitless indirect
negotiations for a resumption of their stalled dis-
engagement talks at Kilometer 101. A round of
diplomatic activity early in the week gave rise to
some optimism, but this later dissipated as Cairo
and Tel Aviv held to their bargaining positions,
presumably in hopes of realizing gains from Secre-
tary Kissinger's impending visit to the area. Mean-
while, Israel and the Arab states are preparing for
the peace conference, expected to convene later
this month in Geneva. Syria now appears willing
-to attend, but Jordan is still reluctant.
Military Moves
Israeli and Egyptian military forces were, if
anything, even more on edge this week, each
guarding against precipitate action by the other.
There were no firm indications that either side
intends to resume hostilities immediately, al-
though the Cairo press continues to stress Egypt's
ability and will to fight.
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the Egyptians are building an earthen cause-
way to supplement the three ponton bridges that
they constructed earlier this month across the
Suez Canal north of Ismailia.
Despite these increased preparations and the
touchiness of both sides, cease-fire violations on
the Egyptian front this week were fern and gen-
erally minor. Neither this limited military action
nor the stalled negotiations were sufficient to
disrupt the continued flow of supplies to Suez
city and the encircled Egyptian Third Army.
More serious cease-fire violations were re-
ported on the Syrian front. On 2 December,
Damascus claimed to have destroyed an Israeli
engineering unit, three tanks, a bulldozer, and an
ammunition dump during a three- to four-hour
battle. Syrian forces reportedly used small arms,
artillery, and tanks, as well as anti-tank missiles,
in their attempt to disrupt efforts by the Israelis
to solidify their positions in captured Syrian
territory. A similar attack was made the next day.
Terrorist activity increased in Israel this
week. On 4 December a hand grenade exploded in
the Arab section of Jerusalem, injuring about 20
persons. It was the most serious incident in the
Arab quarter in more than a year. The following
day, 15 people were injured in an explosion on a
bus northeast of Tel Aviv. Guerrilla activity in the
occupied West Bank area has also increased re-
cently. In mid-November, there were six violent
incidents in as many days, up from 17 for all of
1972.
Egypt and Israel this week talked all around
the question of resuming their disengagement
talks at Kilometer 101. The meetings were sus-
pended late last week by the Egyptians, who
decried Tel Aviv's stalling on the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from positions along the critically
important Cairo-Suez road. Cairo insisted at the
time the talks were broken off that it would not
agree to their resumption until Tel Aviv indicated
a willingness to change its "intransigent" position
on troop pullbacks.
Early this week, the Egyptians were exhibit-
ing cautious optimism. A Foreign Ministry
spokesman indicated that indirect diplomatic con-
tacts were under way between Egypt and Israel.
He added that results-presumably a reopening of
the talks at Kilometer 101-could be expected
"perhaps in the immediate future." The spokes-
man did not claim, however, that Egypt had se-
cured a promise from Israel to implement a troop
withdrawal.
A new round of diplomatic activity over the
weekend was responsible for at least part of the
Egyptian optimism. President Sadat on 1 Decem-
ber consulted with the US and Soviet ambas-
sadors.
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Posturing for the Peace Conference
Official Egyptian spokesmen as well as the
Cairo press repeated this week that the question
of Egypt's attendance at the coming peace con-
ference "was complicated" by the lack of prog-
ress at Kilometer 101. They have refrained from
directly tying the Egyptian presence to progress
on the disengagement issue, suggesting that their
implied threats to boycott the conference may be
part of a rhetorical war of nerves. As the week
ended, it appeared increasingly likely that Cairo
would delay any decision on either the talks at
Kilometer 101 or the peace conference in the
hope of reaping diplomatic benefits from Secre-
tary Kissinger's visit.
According to press accounts, Syria's Presi-
dent Asad bowed this week to pressure from his
Arab allies and agreed to attend the Geneva talks.
Damascus had threatened last weekend not to
attend, perhaps as a show of solidarity with Egypt
over the impasse at Kilometer 101. Syrian politi-
cal and military leaders apparently have serious
doubts about Israel's interest in peace, however,
and are pessimistic about the possibility of reach-
ing a settlement without further fighting.
In a speech last weekend, King Husayn left
open the question of Jordan's attendance at the
peace conference, but in private he is saying that
he sees no reason to participate. The King is
especially bitter about the failure of the inhabit-
ants of the West Bank and Gaza to protest the
Arab summit's recent decision to designate the
Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legit-
imate representative of the Palestinian people.
Despite the urging of other Arab leaders, Husayn
continues to turn aside feelers from high-level
fedayeen leaders for possible cooperation be-
tween the PLO and Jordan.
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Libyan President Qadhafi's opposition to the
cease-fire accord and to Arab participation in a
peace conference has triggered a bittE r contro-
versy and a diplomatic rift between Libya and
Egypt. The press feud that has been going on
between Tripoli and Cairo since the signing of the
cease-fire agreement escalated last week to the
point where a leading Egyptian commentator is-
sued a scathing and direct denunciation of Qa-
dhafi. In retaliation, Libya closed its "relations of-
fice" in Cairo and recalled all but three of its
diplomatic personnel. This falls well short of a
formal break in relations-and both sides seem
anxious to avoid an open rupture-but it marks a
low ebb in the special relationship between the
two states.
Preparations in Israel
This week, as expected, the central com-
mittee of the ruling Labor Party gave a strong
vote of confidence to Mrs. Meir. It endorsed the
modifications in the party's platform that were
worked out last week by party leaders i i prepara-
tion for the parliamentary elections set for 31
December. The platform, which Mrs. Meir hopes
will help give her a mandate to try for a peace
settlement, is clearly a compromise. It reflects
pressures from party doves for new flexibility
toward the Arabs, but holds fast to Israel's long-
standing demands for defensible borders and a
united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The
platform also reiterates Israeli opposition to any
independent Palestinian state on the West Bank of
the Jordan River.
Otherwise, government leaders are absorbed
in hammering out their negotiating position and
tactics for the peace conference, althouch they do
not intend to get into substantive issues until
after the elections. In efforts to clarify the extent
to which Israel can count on support from the
US, Prime Minister Meir and Foreign Minister
Eban held long talks with US Undersecretary
Rush when he was in Israel for the funeral of its
first prime minister, David Ben Guricn. In ad-
vance of Secretary Kissinger's visit, Defense Min-
ister Dayan and Finance Minister Sapir headed for
the US for bond rallies and talks wi-:h US of-
ficials.
Press reports indicate that Israel's initial
tactic at the conference will be to press the Arabs
for some show of "good faith"-for example, an
indication of their willingness to recognize Israel
and sign a binding peace treaty. Israeli officials
are saying that the "nature of the peace" the
Arabs are willing to undertake will affect the
flexibility of Israel's response to the key Arab
demand-Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories.
The Soviets are continuing to stress the need
for an Israeli pullback to the positions held on 22
October. Top Soviet leaders told visiting British
Foreign Secretary Home this week that Israeli
intransigence on this issue might prevent convoca-
tion of the peace conference. Pravda on 30 No-
vember played on this theme, accusing Tel Aviv
of placing every possible obstacle in the way of a
peace settlement.
The Soviets are backing Cairo's position, but
it seems unlikely that Moscow will in fact demand
an Israeli pullback as a pre-condition to a confer-
ence. A peace conference would again place the
USSR in the center of Middle East diplomacy,
and the Soviets indicated to Home that they
definitely see themselves as permanent guarantors
of any peace settlement.
The visit of candidate politburo member
Ponomarev to Baghdad late last week appears to
have stemmed in part from Iraq's opposition to a
Middle East settlement. The joint Soviet-Iraqi
communique, however, made no mention of the
peace conference, suggesting that any Soviet at-
tempt to move the Iraqis to a more conciliatory
policy was not successful.
Moscow also sent a middle-level party dele-
gation to Cairo in late November with the evident
purpose of putting a positive face on Soviet-Egyp-
tian ties. The visit also gave the Egyptians the
opportunity to show their appreciation for Soviet
support and to soothe Moscow's nerves about
Egypt's improved relations with Washing-
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KOREA
A Jfter several weeks of provocative patrols
,.south of the Northern Limit Line-the unofficial
western extension of the Demilitarized Zone-
Pyongyang began to justify some of this activity
at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commis-
sion on 1 December. The North Korean delegate
served notice that Pyongyang was claiming the
water around the five South Korean - occupied
island groups lying south of the line because it is
within Pyongyang's proclaimed 12-mile limit.
South Korean naval vessels were accused of re-
peatedly violating North Korean sovereignty by
entering its waters, and Seoul was warned to
obtain permission from now on before sending
any vessel to the islandsT South Korea has subse-
quently sent a ferry to one of the islands without
incident, and it was scheduled to proceed to other
islands on 6 December,
Pyongyang's Intentions
fi (Pyongyang's objectives in pursuing this line,
with its attendant risk of military incidents, are
several. At a minimum, the North probably wants
to assert its rights to the disputed waters and to
help assure unimpeded access to its own develop-
ing commercial port at nearby Haeju. The North's
moves could also be calculated to make the South
and its US ally more cautious in penetrating the
area by ship or plane. The North's complaint on 5
December of an SR-71 overflight of its airspace
would tend to reinforce this view.,
C. Political considerations, however, are prob-
ably of greatest importance in explaining the
North Korean actions. By raising the threat of
military confrontation in conjunction with the
settlement of complex legal questions, Pyongyang
may have found an effective wedge to force rene-
gotiation of territorial and other military/political
questions-something the South has resisted for
over two years in its talks with the North. Pyong-
. yang may even wish to assert a claim to the
Page 5
C..
islands themselves, if only to press for removal of
the South Korean security forces and electronic
surveillance installations on three of them. In all
this, Pyongyang appears to be proceeding under
the assumption that the future of the United
Nations Command, which technically controls the
five island groups under the 1953 armistice terms,
should be reopened for discussion,
A Pyongyang could have even broader consid-
erations in mind. In a major speech on 29 Octo-
ber-only a few days after the crossings of the
Northern Limit Line began-Kim II-sung sharply
criticized East-West detente, stressing the need for
unrelenting pressure on Seoul. The North may be
reminding its allies in Peking and Moscow that,
despite their improved ties with the US, Korea
remains an area of conflict involving the Great
Powers. Neither Moscow nor Peking has as yet
commented on North Korea's recent naval ac-
tivity or its territorial claims
The Response from Seoul
A [Pyongyang's challenge comes at a time of
domestic uncertainty in South Korea. Seoul's re-
j sponse has been measured, however, as the South
Koreans are reluctant to see the removal of the
UN Command's interest in the territorial situa-
tion. They prefer that any challenge to the 1953
arrangements be negotiated through the Military
Armistice Commission-in effect, keeping the
powers, particularly the US and China, involved -1
A rAt this point, neither side appears to want to
precipitate an incident, although the chances of
one occurring remain high. Propaganda on both
sides has been relatively muted in recent days,
and the North-South coordinating meeting at Pan-
,munjom on 5 December went off in a businesslike
manner; it was positive in tone. Indeed, Pyong-
yang complimented Seoul for removing CIA
Director Yi Yu-rak from his post as chief delegate
for the Southern side and implied that this could
mean resumption of the dialogue-1
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' Faced with persistent political dissent at
home and a tense territorial dispute with North
Korea, President Pak this week took his first
serious steps to ease the domestic situation. By
firing the chief of the South Korezn CIA and
reshuffling the cabinet, Pak made some conces-
sions to students and intellectuals, but his moves
fell short of any basic change in the regime's
authoritarian policies. Although he may have
eased the immediate situation, Pzk has not
quelled demands for basic political refarml
appointments, particularly CIA Director Sin, are
regarded as his close associates.
Justice Minister Sin Chik-su, a close associate of
Pak and a former vice director of the agency,
replaced Yi. Sin's appointment will not be popu-
lar with the students as he is responsible for
prosecuting student dissenters and investigating
the Kim Tae-Chung case. Sin is almost certain to
be less controversial than his predecessor, particu-
larly if-as seems likely-he lowers the agency's
profile. CIA press censorship has already been
rescinded/
I The rest of the Cabinet appointments will
not appease the opposition. Most of the changes
have been rumored for some time and bring no
new faces into the government; all have records of
long-standing loyalty to the President. There is
already some criticism that Pak failed to remove
the ministers of information and education, who
have been in charge of much of the recent dis-
ciplinary action against students(.
I The political balance among Pak s chief lieu-
tenants has also been changed by Yi's ouster.
Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil-Yi's principal ri-
val-has retained his post, and his position has
been strengthened because several of the new
)Pak seems confident that the military and
security forces, which are firmly under his con-
trol, will be responsive to his direction in contain-
ing any further anti-government demonstrations.
Moreover, he continues to believe that most Kore-
ans prefer the stability of his strong leadership to
the uncertainty that would accompany any major
weakening of his power. Pak recently reminded
the nation that it needed firm leadership to meet
the economic problems brought on by the current
oil crisis. He has also drawn national attention to
the increased tension in relations with the North./
~Pak's troubles are likely to continue, never-
theless. Campus demonstrations still occur despite
the closing of the schools. Christian groups and
elements of the press are also pressing publicly for
basic political reforms. Thus, unrest may well
persist over the next few months and could take
on greater vigor in the spring when the schools
reopen-particularly if the government does not
come through with some genuine efforts to mod-
erate its control of the political process.-
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NATO: THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
The meetings of the NATO defense and for-
eign ministers beginning this week are expected to
provide a major test of the cohesion of the North
Atlantic Alliance. The representatives are meeting
at a time when the bonds of mutual interest
uniting the US and Western Europe are somewhat
frayed and the Alliance is facing internal prob-
lems as well as discord over attitudes toward the
Middle East. The ministerial sessions-the defense
ministers on 7 December and the foreign minis-
ters on 10-11 December-will also take place
against a background of the Europeans' intensi-
fied interest in defense cooperation on their side
of the Atlantic. Among the topics the ministers
will discusss:
Burden Sharing The US desires a firm commit-
ment that the allies will relieve the balance-of-
payments deficit incurred by stationing US troops
in Europe. The allies are not likely to make ex-
plicit pledges, but several NATO members have
indicated they are prepared to offer aid. Some
agree that the US share of portions of the NATO
budget should be reduced, while others intend to
make additional purchases of military equipment
in the US. The British and West Germans, how-
ever, remain opposed to multilateral burden-
sharing efforts, and several other states have re-
fused to make any commitments.
West Germany plays the pivotal role. Bonn
continues to argue that its major contribution to
burden-sharing is its bilateral offset agreement
with the US, but the West Germans have offered
less than half of what the US desires for offset in
1973-74. If Bonn maintains this position, the
other NATO states will be hard-pressed to make
up the difference required by the Jackson-Nunn
amendment for a full offset of costs, and prob-
ably will be very reluctant even to try. Should
Bonn substantially increase its offer, on the other
hand, the others will be encouraged to make
additional contributions.
The Middle East The alleged failure of the US to
consult with its allies concerning US diplomatic
and military moves related to the Middle East war
shook the Alliance. The allies undoubtedly will
press the US to consult more fully and on a more
timely basis in the future, and might request a
briefing concerning US tactics for the scheduled
peace talks in Geneva. The defense ministers will
also examine what implications the Middle East
conflict has for the Alliance.
The Atlantic Relationship In response to Secre-
tary Kissinger's call, the allies have been discus-
sing a declaration of Atlantic principles. The
drafting process has been protracted, but a
French paper has now been accepted as a working
document. Several states, including the US, still
would like changes, however, so that a final ver-
sion will not be ready for the ministers to ap-
prove. In fact, the Europeans will wish to discuss
this subject fully and may request further US
comments.
...THE BONDS OF MUTUAL INTEREST
UNITING THE US AND WESTERN EU-
ROPE ARE SOMEWHAT FRAYED, THE
ALLIANCE IS FACING INTERNAL
PROBLEMS...
Other topics that will be discussed include
the force reduction talks in Vienna and the
Geneva Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. Although they have some differences,
the allies have generally maintained a united front
in these negotiations and should have little diffi-
culty reaching a consensus. The allies may ask the
US to play a more active role in Geneva.
Some of the NATO states-Norway and the
Netherlands, in particular-wish to raise the issue
of democracy in Greece. This potentially divisive
issue will probably be handled as before, however,
in restricted meetings and with no countries being
named. Although not an agenda item, the subject
of European defense cooperation might be raised,
at least informally. Recent signs that the French
are more interested in cooperation have piqued
the interest of the other West Europeans, espe-
cially the West Germans.
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USSR and China
THE 1973 HARVEST
)
ment lagged early in the year and kept meat
production down. Production is now increasing,
however, and for the year as a whole may ap-
proach last year's revel.
Soviet agricultural production reached re-
cord levels this year after a dismal performance in
1972. -Although favorable weather during the
growing season was the most important reason,
the improved showing was also the result of an
expansion in sown area, increased inputs of ferti-
lizer, and special campaign tactics used during
planting and harvesting.
Grain Official claims put the crop at more than
215 million metric tons, equivalent to about 165
million tons of usable grain. This is 15 million
tons greater than the previous record set in 1970.
Potatoes Production surpassed the previous re-
cord crop by about five percent. Besides making
more potatoes available in city stores, the bumper
harvest means a more ample supply of seed pota-
toes for next year's crop and more for livestock
feed-especially in the economy's private sector.
Industrial Crops Sugar beet production is the
highest since 1968. The domestic crop-which
should yield almost 10 million tons of sugar-plus
expected imports of sugar from Cuba should ex-
ceed domestic requirements by about 1 million
tons, permitting resumption of normal exports or
stock replenishment.. Production of sunflower
seed, the main source of vegetable oil, is up al-
most 30 percent over last year. Cottonseed oil
supplies, another source of vegetable oil, will be
bolstered by a record cotton crop.
Livestock The shortage of feed supplies following
last year's disappointing harvest did not lead to
distress slaughtering of animals as it has in the
past. Indeed, at mid-year, herds in the socialized
economy were larger than the year before. Al-
though large imports of grain last year allowed
herds to be expanded, state livestock procure-
This year's outstanding agricultural per-
formance will be felt throughout the economy.
Growth will approximate 7 percent this year com-
pared with less than 2 percent in 1972. The major
impact on industrial production will not be felt
until next year; some industries that depend on
agricultural products have turned in weak per-
formances thus far because of the small 1972
harvest.
Consumers can look forward to better fare
in the months ahead. Butter and vegetable oil
supplies are improving, and fresh fruits and vege-
tables are more abundant. Although the supply
and quality of meat has failed to show a marked
improvement to date, availability of meat should
improve as production increases in the coming
months.
Moscow is now able to export or rebuild its
stocks of sugar and to resume normal exports of
vegetable oil. Grain imports have fallen sharply,
and in FY 1974 are likely to reach only half the
level of the previous year-to date, Moscow has
contracted for about 12 million tons. Even so,
there should be enough grain to rebuild stocks
and to export some to non-Communist countries.
China's grain harvest this year should be
somewhat better than last, when the crop re-
portedly declined to 236 million tons. It is not
likely to reach the record 246 million tons of
1971, however, predicted earlier by Peking. Since
then, crops have been set back by typhoons in
south China and by heavy rains in the Yangtze
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law
and Yellow river valleys, offsetting the positive
effects of increased supplies of chemical ferti-
lizers, pesticides, and water pumps.
Improved harvests of coarse grains-corn,
millet, and kaoliang-should more than com-
pensate for less wheat and rice than expected.
Peking tacitly admitted that the summer grain
harvest, mostly wheat, was not as good as in 1972
despite a substantial increase in acreage. Other
crops-cotton, oilseeds, and soybeans-fared even
worse because of acreage cuts and poor growing
conditions.
Peking's claims of a "good harvest of early
rice" were not borne out by reports from the
major producing provinces. Growing conditions
for the intermediate and late rice crops-which
together account for about 60 percent of the
harvest-have been generally favorable in the east-
ern Yangtze Valley, but only fair in south China
and in Szechwan Province. 25X1
Peking is continuing to import grain at a
record pace. Planned Chinese imports in 1974
already total 8.4 million tons-a new record-and
could reach 10 million tons.
almost all Chinese grain imports were
used to feed urban areas in north China. Peking
apparently has already contracted for sufficient
grain to satisfy these needs-except for small pur-
chases to round out deliveries in the fourth quar-
ter of 1974.
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EC SUMMIT MEETS NEXT EE
-D ~
ominatin the discussions of the leaders of
the nine EC countries when they meet in Copen-
hagen next week will be the energy crisis and
Europe's role in the Middle East. The fact that
the meeting will occur in the midst of nego-
tiations with the US over the Atlantic declara-
tions will heighten an impression that the Nine
are "defending" their common interests-an
impression that will be emphasized by the pub-
lication at the summit of a paper defining a
"European identity." Moreover, the complex
question of European defense-now under intense
public and private debate-may for the first time
be discussed by all the Nine at the highest levels.
Perhaps as important as these external con-
siderations will be the give-and-take over how this
and future summit meetings should be conducted,
which may have important implications for the
slowly evolving organization of Europe. Although
the gains and losses for the "community system"
remain to be calculated, France has already made
some grudging concessions to allay the concerns
of the other eight, who remain wary Df possible
French intentions to impose a political direc-
torate over existing EC institutions.
Although the summit provides further evi-
dence of the persistence of the idea of the need
for a greater degree of European unity, it is also
likely to demonstrate that progress will be slow
and halting. In reviewing accomplishments since
the summit last year, the leaders will have to
concede that much of the program agreed to then
has been only partially fulfilled. Social and in-
dustrial policies and plans for economic and
monetary union remain largely on the EC Com-
mission's drawing-board. Measured against the dif-
ficulty of overcoming resistance to any encroach-
ment on national prerogatives, even such half-
steps as new requirements for coordination of
economic policies are gains. But the success of
this summit is likely to hinge on the extent of
agreement or disagreement over energy policy-
and the prospects for a consensus are highly
dubious.
In general, the restricted attendance at the
summit-only the foreign ministers will accom-
pany the prime ministers or heads of state-
should encourage frankness and realistic apprais-
als of the community's accomplishments and
problems, including relations with the US. The
principal danger to US-EC relations that might
arise at the summit would be the belief-en-
couraged perhaps by open US-European dif-
ferences expected at the NATO ministerial that
almost immediately precedes the Copenhagen
meeting-that "Europe" is under siege. P~ 25X1
DENMARK: TAXPAYER 'REVOLT
In a massive protest against taxes, inflation,
and radical Socialism, Danish voters dealt
whopping losses to the country's five incumbent
political parties in off-year elections on 4 Decem-
ber. Four new and untried parties of the right and
center were the spoilers, picking up a total of 54
seats in the 179-seat parliament. Danish Commu-
nists, who have not been in parliament since
1960, won six seats.
The ruling Social Democrats sustained the
worst setback in their 100-year history, losing 24
of 70 seats. The Socialist People's Party, which
had cooperated with the minority Social Demo-
cratic government for the past two years, re-
turned only 11 of its 17 representatives to parlia-
ment. Prime Minister Jorgensen and his cabinet
resigned on 5 December, but will stay on in a
caretaker capacity until a new government can be
formed.
Danes have long been disenchanted with the
spiraling tax rates required to support one of the
most pervasive social security and welfare systems
in the world. Some 55 percent of Denmark's GNP
is paid out in taxes. As a result, a recent
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government proposal to abolish deductions for
mortgage and other loan interest was most un-
popular. The re-introduction this fall of the con-
troversial Economic Democracy bill, aimed at
creating a huge government investment fund from
payroll deductions, also was regarded by many as
yet another scheme to take money from the
people.
The unorthodox policies of the iconoclastic
Mogens Glistrup, founder of the anti-tax and anti-
bureaucratic Progress Party, struck a responsive
chord with many voters. Glistrup, who captured
28 seats, advocates tax exemption for all incomes
below $10,000, and an eventual abolition of the
income tax. He would reduce government spend-
ing by cutting 4,500 civil servants a month until
only a handful remained and thus free the nation
from what he calls "paper-fiddling bureaucrats."
On the question of defense, Glistrup suggested
that the Defense Ministry be replaced with a
telephone recording in Russian saying simply,
"We surrender." Despite Glistrup's impressive
showing, a coalition including the Progress Party
and other right and center parties seems unlikely.
The Center Democratic Party, founded last
month by former Social Democrat Erhard
Jakobsen, was also a victor. Jakobsen's resigna-
tion from the Social Democratic Party on 8 No-
Social Democratic
Socialist Peoples
Communist
vember caused the collapse of the present govern-
ment. Many prominent Social Democrats, as well
as members of the three bourgeois parties, joined
Jakobsen. The new party provided a haven for
moderate Social Democrats who were dissatisfied
with Jorgensen's radical policies but were not
willing to gamble on parties advocating extreme
solutions. The Center Democrats, with 14 seats,
could flesh-out either a center-right or center-left
coalition. Represented in parliament for the first
time with seven seats, the Christian People's
Party, running on an anti-pornography, anti-abor-
tion platform, reflects a modest backlash to the
flourishing traffic in pornography that has given
Copenhagen a notoriety disturbing to many
Danes. The Justice Party, advocating a single tax,
also won representation for the first time with
five seats.
The election has so fragmented Danish pol-
itics that it may be impossible to put together a
coalition of parties with the 90 seats needed to
form a majority government. The three non-
socialist parties lost a total of 30 seats; although
they still include some of Denmark's most capa-
ble leaders, they could contribute only 56 seats to
a coalition government. The next government,
therefore, will probably be weak and new elec-
tions may be necessary in 1974.
SECRET
Conservative
Christian Peoples
Faeroes/Greenland
(Elections undecided)
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Soyuz spacecraft
USSR: UNMANNED SOYUZ IN ORBIT
The Soviets launched another unmanned
Soyuz spacecraft on 30 November, possibly to
test design changes in preparation for tl-e joint US
Apollo-Soviet Soyuz mission scheduled for
1975. This is the fourth Soyuz orbited since the
ill-fated Soyuz 11 mission in June 1971, when
three cosmonauts died while re-entering the
earth's atmosphere after having spent 23 days
aboard a Salyut space station. Only one of the
four missions conducted since has been manned-
Soyuz 12, launched last September, carried two
cosmonauts and ? remained in orbit only two
25X1 days.
1- ) Moscow's crackdown on active dissidents is
having considerable success. Signs of disarray and
discouragement among many former champions
of the movement are numerous. Many dissident
spokesmen have emigrated or are thinking of join-
ing those already in exile. Some who had been
arrested have publicly recanted or have collab-
orated with the authorities. The remainder are
under intense pressure to conform.,'
Physicist Andrey Sakharov, one of the pillars
of the opposition, told Western journalists on 28
November that he was seeking exit visas for
himself and his family. Among the factors that
probably persuaded Sakharov to take this step
were hints by the KGB that his wife, an activist in
her own right, might be tried on criminal charges
or be put in a mental hospital. Threats of this sort
were given added force on 26 November when
Yury Shikhanovich, a Moscow dissident, was
ordered into a mental hospital by a Moscow
court.'
Sakharov's departure from the Soviet Union
would add to the present malaise in the dissident
movement, which has suffered a series of setbacks
in recent months. The example of Pyotr Yakir
and Viktor Krasin, two former spokesmen of the
Democratic Movement who collaborated in a
staged trial late last summer, has now been fol-
lowed by at least two other well-known dissi-
dents. Irina Belgorodskaya, a Moscow activist,
reportedly gave evidence against her former
associates. Ivan Dzyuba, a Ukrainian nationalist
and author of Internationalism or Russification,
publicly repudiated his past views. Both were
rewarded with their freedom in mid-November;
1' I `The regime continues to observe some
constraints, particularly those imposed by public
opinion abroad. At least one dissident who is not
known to have recanted, Andrey Amalryk-
author of Will the USSR Survive Ti111984?-had
his three-year prison term reduced to a period of
exile after an appeal. Amalryk's release followed a
117-day hunger strike, and official leniency may
have been influenced by concern for the criticism
that probably would have attended the death of
this relatively well-known dissident. In another
show of restraint, on 5 December the authorities
did not harass a silent demonstration marking
Soviet Constitution Day. It has been an annual
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Eastern Europe
WEATHERING THE OIL CRISIS,
Eastern Europe is b'ginning to feel the pinch
of Arab oil restrictions, but the impact is ex-
pected to be far less than in Western countries. In
an effort to overcome shortages, conservation
measures have been introduced and attempts are
being made to import more oil from the Middle
East and the USSR.
Yugoslavia and Poland have been hit by cut-
backs in shipments of petroleum products from
West European suppliers, while Bulgaria has been
hurt by the interruption of Iraqi crude oil de-
liveries during the war. East Germany, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia also need new sources of oil
because Soviet shipments are not adequate to
meet rising demands.
Romania-the only net exporter of oil in
Eastern Europe-will feel the impact of the
closing of the Israeli pipeline, which supplies half
of its imported crude oil. Ceausescu, however, has
seized upon the oil shortage and favorable world
market prices to boost hard-currency earnings; he
has adopted an extensive oil rationing program to
divert as much petroleum as possible to exports.
All of the East European countries are trying
to limit consumption of oil products, mainly
through gasoline rationing and lower speed limits,
but also by reducing the use of heating oil in
homes and offices.
Yugoslavia raised gasoline prices by 40 percent
and limited purchases to 10 liters.
Romania imposed gasoline rationing, lowered
speed limits, restricted lighting and room temper-
atures, and reduced industrial use of electricity
and heating oil.
Bulgaria called for a 10-percent reduction in elec-
tric power consumption to save liquid fuels, and
later announced gasoline rationing for public and
private automobiles, higher gasoline prices,
reduced speed limits, and a 15-percent decrease in
the use of heating oil in government and business
offices.
Poland introduced rationing on gasoline used by
official government vehicles and those belonging
to collectives and cooperatives, a ban on their use
on Sundays and holidays, and a lower speed limit.
Czechoslovakia ordered ministries to cut down on
electricity and gas consumption.
Hungary reportedly is considering price increases
for gasoline and heating oil.
East Germany has drawn up but not implemented
an energy rationing program.
Eastern Europe was not totally unprepared
for energy rationing. Winter shortages are com-
mon, especially in East Germany and Czechoslo-
vakia, and Bulgaria had already called for con-
servation of liquid fuels as early as 25 July. More-
over, Moscow has been telling Eastern Europe
since at least 1970 to look elsewhere for increased
supplies of petroleum. Because the USSR has
little, if any, uncommitted oil, attempts to obtain
more from the Soviets apparently have only
resulted in small emergency shipments. Eastern
Europe, except Romania, is trying to capitalize
on its pro-Arab policy to boost oil imports; Yugo-
slavia is having the most success thus far.
The oil shortage-and higher import prices-
will put further strains on Eastern Europe's hard-
currency balances. Transportation facilities also
will be squeezed by the need to switch, where
possible, to solid fuels. Poland, for example, is
already short of freight cars to handle industrial
goods because of the increased need to move coal
and agricultural products. Economic priorities
undoubtedly will shift more of the burden onto
the consumer if shorts es ersist.
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ITALY: CENTER-LEFT SHOWDOWN
' ` JThe government's cohesion will face a severe
test next week when leaders of the four parties of
: the center left coalition-Christian Democrats,
!''Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans-
meet to thrash out their long-standing d fferences
over social and economic reforms.!
;Prime Minister Rumor called the meeting in
the hope of resolving disputes that were papered
over or set aside last July in order to bring the
Socialist Party back into the government with a
minimum of friction. Since then, however, the
government has operated mainly with stop-gap
measures, such as a comprehensive price freeze to
ease the country's soaring inflation and, more
recently, harsh emergency steps to conserve
energy, 9The Socialists-backed by organ zed labor
r' and the powerful Communist Party--are now
forcing a showdown on their demand that the
government implement long-promised reforms)
\The coalition is split along familiar lines. The
Republican Party holds that reforms must be put
off until inflation is licked and the country is
firmly on the road to economic recovery. Ugo La
that would combine the austerity measures de-
manded by the Republicans with sufficient pro-
gress on reforms to mollify the Socialists. They
appear to have at least narrowed differences to
the question of the means to achieve common
goals. As usual, the Christian Democrats' strong-
est card is the fact that there is still no viable
alternative to the center-left coalition./
,2)- frhe communist Party and organized labor
have indicated that they will abandon the "soft"
opposition policy they have followed since July,
if the government does not adopt the reforms
advocated by the Socialists. Since Rumor took
office, the Communists have encouraged labor to
hold off on major strike activity and demands for
large-scale wage increases. This policy has been
largely responsible for the government's consider-
able progress against inflation, and the Commu-
nist Party's leaders have used it to remind the
government that major problems cannot be solved
without their assistance. The Communist hierar-
chy and labor leaders have come under increasing
pressure from the rank-and-file, however, who
want social and economic reforms to compensate
for not demanding steep wage hikes. The specific
measures being urged on the government are im-
proved public transportation, the creation of new
jobs, better welfare services and, bove all, raising
the standard of living in the south(
L IAnother factor that should encourage the
coalition parties to iron out their differences is
the increasing attention being given in public to
the availability of the Communist Party for a
national government role. Communist boss Enrico
Berlinguer recently argued that the way to break
the country's political impasse is through a "great
historic compromise" among the three largest
parties-Christian Democrats, Communists, and
Socialists. Berlinguer knows that such a deal is
unlikely in the immediate future, but he is using
the current deadlock to play on a familiar
theme-that the Communists' demonstrated abil-
ity to aid the government in the resolution of key
problems means that, in a de facto sense, they
participate in the governing of the country as
much as the parties comprising the coalition.
Therefore, according to Berlinguer, it is only
reasonable to move toward a more open form of
Malfall Republican leader and treasury minister, is
threatening to resign if he does not get his way-a
step he has taken in the past to bring down
former center-left coalitions!
.The dominant Christian Democrats are
having some success with a compromise solution
Rumor (1) and Socialist cabinet member
cooperation.
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BONN: THE HIGH PRICE OF OSTPOLITIK
-~~- fin a sudden about-face, Bonn has agreed to
sign the "reconciliation" treaty, and to establish
,Zr /diplomatic relations with Prague, prior to nego-
tiating the Federal Republic's claim to represent
West Berlin's legal interests. Chancellor Brandt
and Foreign Minister Scheel are expected in
Prague for the ceremonies on 11-12 December.
Although this will get Brandt's stalled Ostpolitik
under way again, the price may be high in terms
of the future problems Bonn is likely to face. I
J TThe reversal apparently was prompted by
Bon 's desire to counter the public's growing
disenchantment with Ostpolitik, as well as a need
to respond to reported Soviet concern over West
Germany's preoccupation with its ties to the
West. Brandt is not likely to win kudos from the
German public for going ahead with the treaty at
the price of weakening Bonn's claim to a special
relationship with West Berlin.
The Prague-Bonn dialogue had broken down
in early November over last-minute Czechoslovak
objections to a compromise that would have
permitted West Berlin-as well as West German-
courts to deal directly with their East European
counterparts. Resolution of the legal assistance
problem will now have to wait until Brandt visits
Moscow early next yeari
Even i onn is willing to compromise, the East
Germans appear in no mood to give any ground
on West Berlin. Having gained most of their objec-
tives-international recognition and UN member-
ship-the East Germans are prepared to take their
time in order to wring the most they can from
Bonn. 1
1-Over the short run, Brandt has opened the
door to establishing relations with Hungary and
Bulgaria. Both countries had stalled until the West
German - Czechoslovak impasse was overcome.
Bonn now appears confident that formal ties will
be established with Sofia and Budapest soon, pos-
sibly by the end of the year.
As for "the Berlin issue," Brandt may be
gambling that a temporary loss of popularity at
home will be more than offset if he can nail down
the Federal Republic's special relationship to
West Berlin when he meets with Soviet party boss
Brezhnev next spring. Brandt apparently reasons
that, having demonstrated his flexibility, he is
now in a position to press Brezhnev for conces-
sions on West Berlin's legal status-perhaps
making the package more attractive by offering
low-interest credits, which the Soviets are known
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=v The Communists went on the attack last
week'. They fired a barrage of rockets into the
country's largest oil tank farm, south of Saigon,
j 1 and used artillery, tanks, and infantry to overrun
the Kien Duc District capital in Quang Duc Prov-
ince4
The assault in Quang Duc is a severe setback
for Saigon. Government forces had been com-
pleting preparations for a campaign of their own
to retake several border camps captured by the
Communists in early NovembeeA one-day delay
in the government's offensive, caused by the late
arrival of reinforcements, apparently t3nabled the
North Vietnamese to beat the government to the
draw.
IF THE COMMUNISTS HOLD THEIR
GAINS IN QUANG DUC, THE REMAINING
LINK IN THE NORTH-SOUTH SUPPLY
CORRIDOR WILL BE SECURED.
The loss of Kien Duc, the first district town
to be captured by the Communists sir:ce the start
of the cease-fire, is a psychological blow to gov-
ernment units in the highlands. The Communists
may press on with their campaign in hopes of
capturing the provincial capital at Gia Nghia, 12
miles away. The South Vietnamese have the
equivalent of one full division in Quang Duc, and
observers in the field believe that once these units
have recovered from the initial setbacks, they will
rally and regain the initiative, at least to the
extent of retaking Kien Duc. Their chances of
retaking the three border camps lost in early
November are minimal at the moment.`I?
if the Communists hold their gains in Quang
Duc, they will have secured the remaining link in
their north-south supply corridor to bases north
and west of Saigon. They also will have served
notice of their readiness to respond strongly to
any further government attempts to attack so-
called "liberated areas." Although there are no
indications that they intend to extend the current
stepped-up fighting to other areas, additional
Communist moves could be triggered by gov-
ernment retaliatory actions elsewhere or by con-
tinued Communist successes in the high-
-r4 Over-Un Airfiel
Hy Rlt/A
Bu
Bong
Bu Prang At. BB
nt. 14
Main attack I
ten uC~' Rt. 344, GIA NGHIA
tNhon Co
PHUOC
LONG
SECRET
Battle for Quang Duc
Province
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CAMBODIA: A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY
The Lon Nol government will continue to
represent Cambodia in the UN-at least for an-
other year. The UN General Assembly voted late
on 5 December to defer action until next fall on
an Algerian resolution to seat Prince Sihanouk's
representatives. Despite the slim three-vote mar-
gin of victory, the postponement is an important
victory for Phnom Penh and its Southeast Asian
supporters.
The Sihanouk challenge had been endorsed
by the Algiers nonaligned conference, and had
strong support in the assembly from China and
the nonaligned states. Although several African
states joined the vote for deferment, Latin Ameri-
can members were the primary defectors from the
nonaligned leadership's stand against postpone-
ment. Parliamentary maneuvering, which permit-
ted the motion for deferment to take priority
over the substantive resolution, was vital to
Phnom Penh's success; the Algerian resolution
might well have carried had it taken precedent.
Some nonaligned states that were willing to sup-?
port deferment would have felt compelled to
stand with the caucus of developing states in a
clear substantive vote. Concern over the prece-
dent of seating a non-resident government may
also have contributed to Phnom Penh's success.
Nevertheless, the inscription of the Algerian reso-
lution on next year's assembly agenda and the
closeness of the vote this week seem to ensure a
renewal of the Sihanouk challenge next fall.
The Shooting War
[Khmer Communist propagandists are indulg-
ing in an orgy of self-congratulation following the
fall on 30 November of Vihear Suor, a small
provincial capital on the east side of the Mekong
ten miles from Phnom Penh. The Communists
apparently captured more than half of the town's
500-man military garrison, 1,500 civilians, and
significant quantities of military equipment. De-
spite heavy seasonal flooding of the marshy area
-+ (South of Phnom Penh, the Communists
edged closer to the larger provincial capital of
Takeo. They also maintained firm control over
stretches of key overland routes to the capital.
The Mekong River remains open to shipping,
however, and a large convoy arrived in Phnom
Penh early in the week. At mid-week, government
militia forces foiled an attempted Communist sap-
per raid on the Route 1 bridge linkin the capital
to the east bank of the Bassac River.
Page 17
around the town, elements of two Communist
regiments had kept steady pressure on it since
mid-August.
[The loss of the provincial capital poses no
direct threat to Phnom Penh, but it does give the
Communists a base from which to operate against
other government positions on the Mekong's east
bank upstream from the capital. The government
still holds some ground a few miles south of
Vihear Suor and is preparing to make a stand
there.!
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THAILAND: BOTTLING THE GENIE
I Jfhe overthrow of the Thanom-Praphat re-
gime last October is now history, but the fledgling
civilian government still has not fully succeeded
in putting the genie of popular unrest safely back
into the bottle. An unprecedented level of strikes
and labor unrest, protesting inflation and govern-
ment inefficiency, has led to violence and vandal-
ism uncharacteristic of Thailand's normally docile
and well-disciplined society7jOn the student front,
demonstrations continue against corrupt provin-
cial and district officials. The growing influence
of activists within the once-conservative student
movement suggests that student agitation will re-
main a feature of Thai politics for the foreseeable
future.
;The reaction of the military, unaccustomed
to it's new position on the sidelines, will be cru-
cial.
L-rl For his part, the King probably would sanc-
tion a limited move by the military if he were
convinced that it was essential to bolster the
current government. The King's concern over the
possibility of renewed turmoil may have been a
factor in his sudden decision to be out of Bang-
+ kok during the traditional festivities for his birth-
day on 5 December.
i
25X1
LThe current unrest does not at the moment
constitute a major threat to public order, but
there is a danger that the new and inexperienced
government will over-react to minor provocations.
Last week, for example, Prime Minister Sanya
warned workers that he would resort t "drastic"
measures if they did not stop their :strikes and
negotiate their differences with em Dloyers. LA
joint appeal from all unions for a ten-day mora-
torium on strikes has quieted the situation, but
the atmosphere remains edgy]
BURMA: THE COUNTERINSURGENCY
;Rangoon's counterinsurgency campaign in
the northeast, now more than two months old, is
running into new difficulties. Heavy rains are
complicating supply efforts and have grounded
the air force. The Communists have inched to
within eight miles of the regional administrative
center of Kengtung, and panicked civilians are
fleeing the area. It is not clear that the Commu-
nists intend to take the town, but they do hope
to cut its already tenuous road link to the rest of
Burma. Government forces around Kengtung out-
number the Communists two to one, but the
insurgents have the advantage of greater familiar-
ity with the terrain, and some army commanders
feel the Communists are better armed than gov-
ernment forces.
Despite the gloomy picture at Kengtung, the
Burmese military feel the situation can be stabi-
lized eventually. Army morale was buoyed by a
successful offensive last month against Commu-
25X1
nist
troo
forces in northern Shan State, and fresh
s are being moved in from lower Bur-
ma.
25X1
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GREECE: A HARD-LINE REGIME
i-}Lj )As the military-backed government con-
tinues to consolidate its hold through new ap-
pointments and a controlled purge of unfriendly
elements, it is revealing more of its strategy and
character
J.f.Z{ [With most ministerial posts now filled, it is
evident that Brigadier General loannidis intends
to play the role of eminence grise and that the
civilian cabinet will serve as a facade to deflect
political and popular pressures.
censorship had been lifted. Vradyni, whose pub-
lisher has long advocated the return to power of
self-exiled former prime minister Karamanlis, ap-
parently offended by engaging in mild editorial
criticism of Prime Minister Androutsopoulos'
recent policy speech. The paper had also pub-
lished a statement by retired Colonel Stamatelo-
poulos, who participated with both loannidis and
Papadopoulos in the 1967 "revolution," that
called for the restoration of constitutional order
as soon as possible
yL~ fin a display of confidence, the government
redpened the universities on 3 December-about a
loannidis' week ahead of Papadopoulos' schedule. The word
retention o his position as mi nary police chief qgwas passed, however, that any new student
will aid him in maintaining his power base within demonstrations would not be countenanced.
L)%- the military, from which any real threat to the Several days of such activity last month was the
new junta would probably come.] 4ycatalyst for loannidis' coup.[
S- `Restoration of discipline in the army is an
urgent concern of the junta. Some of the younger
officers are even more eager than loannidis to
root out Papadopoulos' supporters and senior of-
ficers involved in corruption. There are also signs
that some of those who opposed Papadopoulos
are not enthusiastic about the new leadership.
They could prove to be troublesome for loan-
nidis, especially if he continues his tendency to-
ward excessive centralization of power, which
many resented in Papadopoulos]
i~ _~ The new rulers are likely to be more harshly
a- auth ritarian than was Papadopoulos' govern-
ment. On 1 December, they abruptly shut down
the conservative newspaper, Vradyni, one of
Athens' major dailies. It was the first such action
y against a newspaper since 1967 and came only
days after an announcement that formal press
,)L1 the new leaders seem determined to focus
on the pressing economic problems of the coun-
try. An outline of the national budget for 1974,
announced on 1 December, emphasizes austerity
and anti-inflationary measures, especially in the
public investment sector; these steps had also
been promised by the previous government. The
new government's capacity for dealing with these
problems is questionable]
50 (The widespread euphoria initially evoked by
the fall of Papadopoulos appears to be dissipating
rapidly as recognition grows that loannidis and
` 7 General Gizikis, who is now president, do not
plan to introduce a more liberal regime any time
soon. The continued detention of many students
arrested last month, the Prime Minister's state-
ment that the government would rule by decree
indefinitely, and the action against Vradyni have
displeased many Greeks, especially among the
civilian elite. Prominent figures from the pre-
Papadopoulos parliamentary era are openly crit-
ical, and younger politicians have been slow to
offer their services. Meanwhile, popular opposi-
tion to the new junta has already surfaced; ex-
plosions occurred on 3 December at two banks,
one of them the Piraeus branch of the Bank of
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j Moscow and New Delhi have reason to be
satisfied with Brezhnev's visit to India last week,
although neither got all that it hoped for.'
'Soviet gains were primarily political. India
endorsed Moscow's policy of detente znd lauded
Brezhnev's personal contribution to it. India also
reaffirmed the value of its friendship treaty with
the USSR. Moscow will use these expressions of
support to help undercut criticism from other
nonaligned countries of super-power diplomacy.
The two countries also signed a 15-year economic
agreement, a planning accord, and a consular con-
vention that the Russians can portray as a further
strengthening of their position in India. Brezhnev
apparently had some success in persuading New
Delhi that its interests will not be neglected as the
USSR pursues detente further
On the debit side, New Delhi failed to en-
dorse Brezhnev's Asian collective security idea
despite his strong pitch for it in a speech to
India's Parliament. Throughout the visit, Mrs.
Gandhi stressed that Soviet-Indian relations were
not aimed at any third party (read China) and
that India would not mortgage its independence
to anyone. The Soviets apparently failed to con-
vince India of the need for closer military collab-
oration. On the eve of the visit, the Indian Gov-
ernment held a press backgrounder designed to
put to rest the notion that the Soviet Navy would
be granted exclusive bunkering privileges{
n ev
endorsed the Indian stand on Pakistan
and Bangladesh, and he also agreed to work "with
other countries on an equal basis" toward having
the Indian Ocean declared a zone of peace. In the
past, Moscow has been distinctly cool to the idea;
just last month, the USSR abstained on a UN vote
designed to implement the nonaligned resolution
aimed at keeping Great Power competition out of
the Indian Ocean./
}On economic matters, Moscow apparently
did go at least part way toward meeting India's
requests, though few binding agreements were
signed. The Soviets, for example, agreed to in-
"crease exports to India of some scarce commodi-
ties, including newsprint, crude oil, and possibly
food grains. Moscow apparently also promised to
provide some debt relief as well as new assistance
in several fields, most notably to help India de-
velop its energy potential. It is not yet clear,
however, whether the Soviets agreed to enough
non-project assistance to have an immediate im-
pact on the Indian economy. If New Delhi's
hopes for a substantial revision in the kinds and
amounts of goods provided are not realized, the
newly improved atmosphere in Soviet-Indian re-
lations could be short-livedi
)Military aid problems were dealt with pri-
marily by the military representatives during the
visit, and there are no hints yet about what Mos-
cow may have agreed to supply. India reportedly
was interested in several types of aircraft, modern
naval ships, and some of the surface-to-air missiles
that proved so effective during the recent Middle
Exchanging documents
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IMP- 6EURET
TURKEY: STILL NO GOVERNMENT
--' `The indecisive parliamentary election on 14
October has left Turkey with a leadership vacuum
for the second time this year. Last spring, 25 days
and 15 ballots were needed to elect a candidate to
the largely ceremonial office of president. More
serious now, however, is the failure to form a new
government after nearly seven weeks of trying:)
Leaders of the two largest groups in the
450-seat National Assembly, Bulent Ecevit of the
Republican People's Party and Suleyman Demirel
of the Justice Party, have both failed in successive
attempts to form coalition governments that ex-
cluded the other group. Each has also refused to
participate in a coalition headed by the other.
Although a minority government might yet be
tried, President Koruturk is not in favor of this
solution \lnstead, he has suggested a national
coalition representing all
parties. The alternative=
course of holding new elections, Koruturk said 4
was a question for parliament to decide. Even the
- national government he advocated, however,
L could bring an early election, as such a coalition
might soon receive the three "no confidence"
votes that would force its dissolution./
[Another election may not produce a more
decisive outcome. Local elections, to be held on 9
December, could indicate some changes in party
strengths that would affect voting patterns in a
new general election. The events since 14 October
have not gone unnoticed by the Turkish military.
The politicians know that the army will not toler-
ate endless political chaos, and Koruturk's sugges-
tion of a "national coalition" indicates that the
politicians may be close to exhausting their
options. The army may not yet have made up its
mind that it is time to intervene, but it is certain
that the possibility of "aiding" the politicians to
solve their problem is being discussed.
PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH: THAWING
(t . i jBengalee Prime Minister Mujib is apparently
no longer insisting that 195 Pakistani prisoners
held by India be tried for war crimes. This shift
may have improved
prospects for resolving
the problems left over
from the violent divi-
sion of Pakistan in
19717
IThe Bengalees
have told UN Secre-
tary General Waldheim
that they want to be-
gin talks with Pakistan
on the fate of the pris-
oners, but that the
talks would have to be
Mujib
on the basis of "sovereign equality." The Bangla-
desh high commissioner in London has indicated
that the number of prisoners to be tried might be
reduced in such negotiations. Dacca has demon-
strated a less vengeful attitude recently by
granting amnesty to about 30,000 residents of
Bangladesh accugd of collaborating with the
Pakistanis in 1971(
(The US ambassador in Islamabad believes
that formal talks between the two countries are
unlikely unless Dacca has also softened its re-
quirement for prior recognition by Pakistan.
Islamabad has so far refused to grant recognition
until the 195 Pakistani prisoners are released. The
Pakistanis suggest the impasse could be resolved
through secret talks in which officials of the two
countries would work out a formula for simulta-
neous recognition and renunciation of trials. At
present, there is no indication Dacca is willing to
go that far, although some precedents exist for
quiet meetings on neutral ground".7
G- In any event, public opinion in both coun-
tries will limit diplomatic flexibility. Addition-
ally, deep mutual suspicions at the highest levels
of the
two governments will make any progress
l
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StIrKC I
VENEZUELA: DOWN TO THE WIRE
!Approximately 4.6 million Venezuelans will
go to the polls on 9 December to elect a presi-
dent, congress, state legislatures, and municipal
7 councils. Indications are that the longest, costli-
est, and most intense campaign in Venezuelan
history will remain relatively free of violence./
Belt-estimated conservatively at 70-100 billion
barrels-the Venezuelans will demand unlimited
access to US markets, not only for oil but also for
certain other exports such as iron ore./
;. f< [The first few days after the election will be
J the critical period. Both parties fear that if there
`. The outcome of the presidential race, domi- r 7 is a close victory margin-say 50,000 votes-the
nated by Democratic Action's Carlos Andres loser will cry fraud. This would encourage serious
Perez and the governing Social Christian Party's disturbances by party militants, who are building
candidate, Lorenzo Fernandez, is still in doubt. themselves up to a pre-election frenzy with rallies 25X1
Only two percentage points separate the two in and parades. Party leaders on both sides are con-
recent polls and almost a fifth of the voters re- tinuing to lobby with the military to ensure that
main undecided. Running a strong third is Jose it will remain impartial. e
Vicente Rangel, an independent socialist sup-
ported by the new marxist Movement to Social- arme forces generally are expected to ensure
inner assumes office in early March. 25X1
t th
h
e w
a
ism. Although Rangel has no chance of becoming t
are too weak and disorgan-
ti
i
ons
za
president, the Movement is expected to gain a Terrorist organ
large number of seats in the new congress] This ized to disrupt the election to any si nificant
d
egree.
will add to the problems of the president-elect,
who as head of a minority government will find
a- his effectiveness dependent primarily on his skill
L7 in creating and maintaining a working coalition
]1 Whoever wins the election, the new adminis-
)rvtion will be even more nationalistic than Presi-
dent Caldera's and will probably try to adopt
more "progressive" domestic policies aimed at
private industry and foreign investment in Vene-
zuela. In particular, the hard nationalist stance on
petroleum will continue. Flushed with ever in-
creasing revenues from the sale of petroleum,
Venezuelans will be in no rush to negotiate a
long-term energy agreement with the US. They
believe the increasing scarcity of petroleum gives
them a strong hand in dealing with oil-consuming
countries.?
(,(, (Fernandez and many of his followers have
strong feelings on the petroleum issue and are
likely to be less restrained than Perez in using oil
as a political weapon. Party leaders have already
indicated that any agreement to explore and ex-
ploit oil reserves in eastern Venezuela would re-
quire concessions from the US. In exchange for
b, favorable operating conditions and guaranteed
access to oil reserves in the Orinoco Petroleum
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JtC:Kt I _.~,
HONDURAS-EL SALVADOR: FLASH POINT
?Far from displaying enthusiasm for the re-
sumption of peace talks that were interrupted in
late November, El Salvador and Honduras are
once again eyeing each other angrily across their
disputed border. Since long-standing differences
flared into open war in 1969, various Central
American leaders have repeatedly failed to per-
suade their colleagues that settlement is vital for
the political and economic well being of all.
Neither side really wants a settlement, in fact,
even though both pay lip service to reasonable-
ness.
~'- fhe real obstacle to agreement has always
been the division of two small border tracts. On
several occasions, negotiators have agreed on such
important and thorny problems as trade, trans-
portation, migration, and treatment of one
another's nationals, only to fall short cf a general
treaty because of the border issue. Realizing that
Honduras has a stronger legal case, El Salvador
refuses to submit to arbitration. Honduras, on the
other hand, fears domestic reaction if it "gives
away" territory except as a result of an arbitral
award.!
;After the present round of talks bogged
down over the border question, each country has
blamed the other for the impasse, and both have
)7 taken steps that make successful negotiations all
k but impossible. Their armed forces are on partial
_~alert, and El Salvador, to underscore its rejection
of arbitration, has renounced the Bogota Pact,
1zwhich established procedures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes. Each government views
the other as essentially non-democratic and on
shaky ground with its own people. Suspicions are
compounded by a lack of good intelligence about
,,Reach other,
k' l rfhe deep-seated animosity has been allowed
to grow to the point where the media characteris-
ticall refer to the other county as "the enemy."
;~, I .Since 1969 they have been involved in an
arms race, albeit at tortoise pace because of budg-
etary limitations and US pressure on potential
ellers. Both, of course, stress the defensive nature
of their purchases, but in the prevailing atmos-
phere of mutual distrust a pre-emptive offense
can seem the best defense. There are some indica-
tions that troops are being edged closer to the
disputed areas.
k 2,[It is possible that the two antagonists will
once again resume serious negotiations, perhaps
"encouraged" by some arm twisting by other
Central American leaders. A peaceful settlement,
however, appears unlikely in the near future and,
in the present highly charged atmosphere, hos-
tilities could erupt at the slightest provoca-
tion.
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JCunC I 1#41W
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: WILLIAMS STAYS
'Eric Williams, in an eleventh-hour reversal,
has decided to continue as prime minister of
Trinidad and Tobago and to remain as political
leader of the ruling People's National Movement
until general elections are held.'
[Williams' change of
mind evidently resulted
in part from his intense
dislike for former attor-
ney general Karl Hud-
son-Phillips, who had
emerged as his most
probable successor. In
addition, he appeared
genuinely concerned
that a change in leader-
ship would generate a
sharp racial division be-
tween the blacks and
East Indians in the party
and possibly result in its
disintegration)
\The Prime Minister's behavior probably em-
,- bittered a large segment of the party, but defec-
tions are unlikely unless he takes punitive meas-
ures against the Hudson-Phillips faction. On the
other hand, the long-term viability of the party
could be threatened if Williams continues to op-
pose development of a new generation of party
leaders.
'y The party's internal developments have
aroused little interest among the population,
which is more concerned with the country's seri-
ous socio-economic problems. Rising prices and
the declining quality of public services are being
aggravated by dislocations in the petroleum-re-
fining industry caused by a reduction in Arab oil
deliveries. The powerful labor unions are be-
coming increasingly militant and are agitating for
drastic solutions. Meanwhile, the trend among
opposition parties toward revitalization and pos-
sible coalition may present Williams with a strong
challenge in the next election.]
)Elections must be held by 1976, but will
'probably be called sooner. A constitutional com-
?`}-mission is expected to present its proposals within
a month, and the new constitution will be imple- 25X1
mented after several months of discussion and
refinement. Williams has promised that elections
will be held shortly thereafter.
URUGUAY: SNUFFING QUT THE LEFT
t is continuing to press
1g o v e r men its
~The S'7'
hard line against Marxism by outlawing the Uru-
guayan Communist Party and various other left-
ist-oriented political and student groups.
The move caused some surprise, coming as it
did at a time when the Communists and their
supporters appeared to be trying to avoid any
action that would give the government a pretext
to ban the party. The government's concern over
Marxist influence in the country-particularly in
labor and education-has grown since the over-
throw of President Allende in Chile.
The decision to move against the left at this
time apparently stems from a belief that the Com-
munists are gaining strength among the workers
and could hand the government a setback in elec-
tions that will be held soon to reorganize labor
unions. The unions were disbanded last June
when the Communist-dominated labor confedera-
tion was outlawed.
Thus far, there has been no mass arrest of
Communist Party cadre, although military leaders
reportedly are considering such a move. An at-
tempt to pick up some party leaders was unsuc-
cessful, and the party leadership is said to have
already moved underground. For the time being,
at least, it is unlikely to offer serious resistance to
the anti-leftist campaign.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
JThe dollar experienced a r pid, almost unin-
terrupted appreciation in November and is now at
its highest level since May.
Among European currencies, the mark,
guilder, and Belgian franc showed the largest
drop. The first two currencies replaced the Nor-
wegian crown at the bottom of the European
joint float band. The guilder's decline reflected
the Arab embargo on oil shipments to the Nether-
lands. Deterioration in the value of the mark and
franc resulted primarily from heavy German and
Belgian dependence on oil supplied through Rot-
terdam; the mark continued to decline in spite of
another record trade surplus in October.
The Bank of Japan allowed the yi?n to depre-
ciate from 270 to 280 per dollar in November.
Pressures on the yen were generated by predic-
tions of continuing balance-of-payments deficits
and fears of economic disruption caused by re-
duced oil supplies. Dollar sales of about $2.2
billion by central banks limited depreciation.
6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 31 6 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 4
AP
R MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
?ReI.tN. to 16 r a.jor ourrencles.
SECRET
These sales required the Bank of Japan to cash in
a sizable part of its holdings of US Treasury bills
and to withdraw special government deposits in
commercial banks.
Further dollar appreciation is likely to be
limited. A major reason is the widespread belief
among traders that the "Big Five" agreed in late
November to maintain the dollar at the rate pre-
vailing after last February's devaluation, which
should lessen speculation.
The gold market was quiet in the first half of
the month. On 14 November, the two-tier system
was ended, permitting central banks to sell gold
on the free market for the first time in five years.
The price of gold quickly dropped more than $10
an ounce to $90. When central bank sales failed
to materialize, however, buyers returned to the
market, pushing the price of old u to its earlier
level.
PERCENT CHANGE SINCE 2 JANUARY 1973
IN THE VALUE OF THE U3 DOLLAR
RELATIVE TO SELECTED FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Change in the Trade-Weighted Average
Value of the Dollar*
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"` SECRET NOW,
UN: NONALIGNED SOLIDA ITY
Each session of the UN neral Assembly in
rece t years, and especially the current session,
has seen a trend toward greater unity among the
developing or "nonaligned" states, particularly
the Arab-African bloc. On most issues, the major-
ity of the developing states of Asia and Latin
America can be counted upon to support the
Arab-African coalition. The growing unity of ac-
tion among these states reflects in some measure
their sense of greater economic strength,
stemming from control of key natural resources
in the face of growing world demand. The in-
creasing parliamentary sophistication of the devel-
oping nations has been another factor contrib-
uting to their power to dominate the General
Assembly and many other UN bodies when they
act together.
The effectiveness of the Arab-African bloc
was shown recently by the major role it took in
establishing and staffing the UN Expeditionary
Force to the Middle East, but it was also evident
in other issues such as the protection of diplo-
mats, Law of the Sea, Korean and Cambodian
representation, and various disarmament resolu-
tions.
The US UN mission believes that the great
danger in this increasing influence lies in the
ability of the developing states to challenge the
authority of the Advisory Committee on Admin-
istrative and Budgetary Questions. This commit-
tee, which considers UN expenditures and assess-
ments, is controlled by the ten member states
that contribute 77 percent of the UN budget. The
General Assembly can override the committee's
recommendations, however, and such assembly
decisions are binding on all UN members. Thus
far, the developing states have successfully chal-
lenged decisions involving only minor amounts,
but if this were done frequently, it would result
in the major contributing states losing control of
their assessments.
The US has found itself increasingly in the
minority on issues involving the Arab-African
bloc. The USSR has generally been able to sup-
port the Africans and the Arabs, but it is not
assured of indefinitely benefiting from Arab-
African cohesion. Recently, for example, pressure
from the developing states has forced Moscow to
modify its proposal for a world disarmament
conference. On issues such as the Convention for
the Protection of Diplomats, the Soviets may find
themselves in a minority along with the US.
China, which many developing states view as
sharing a similar past of exploitation by the West,
appears to have gained the most from the in-
creased unity among the nonaligned. Neverthe-
less, Peking must at times tailor its UN policy to
ensure nonaligned support. After refusing to have
anything to do with the Soviet-sponsored resolu-
tion for a world disarmament conference, the
Chinese reluctantly agreed to consider a revised
nonaligned proposal because it had the over-
whelming support of the developing states.
Despite awareness of their strength in unity,
the nonaligned are not always immune to frag-
mentation. Even on strictly African political
issues, fissures have appeared. During a recent
vote on the Portuguese territories, for example,
an open fight developed between supporters of a
moderate stand, designed to attract international
support, and those favoring a hard line calling for
use of force. This year's General Assembly session
has not considered issues involving significant
divergent national interests of the developing
states, but a test of their solidarity is likely in
such forums as the Law of the Sea conference,
which will tackle substantive issues involving
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Secret
Secret
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