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Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 'rn+' Secret Weekly Summary State Dept. review completed Secret 15 February 1974 No. 0007/74 Copy M?_ 5 8 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 CONTENTS (February IS, 1974) 1 SALT Resumes 2 The Energy Conference 3 EUROPE The Middle East 5 USSR: US Technology; Mars 6 Eastern Europe -The Vatican: Accommod ti 8 omania: Middle East Tour Yugoslavia: Extremism Under Fire 9 Berlin: Back in the News EAST ASIA PACIFIC 11 Laos: Obstacles to a New Coalition 12 Cambodia: Shell Shocked 13 Philippines: Muslim Backlash 14 Australia: Whitlam Scores MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 15 Israel: A Narrow Coalition 16 Jordan: Husayn Restores Order 17 Iran-Iraq: Unneighborly Neighbors 18 Arab Funds Shift 18 Cyprus: After Grivas 19 North Yemen: Out With the Old ?_0 South Africa: Seeking a New Mandate 7.1 India: Violence and Votes WESTERN HEMISPHERE 22 American Foreign Ministers To Meet 23 Argentina: Peron and Youth 24 Colombia: Election and Beyond 25 Chile: Out in the Open SPECIAL REPORT (Published separately) Afghanistan: President Daoud's First Six Months Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 ~e.~= a9e,,, ~oo~ Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 SECRET SALT Resumes r,~ ~ QG~~ The US-Soviet negotiations on strategic arms expressed readiness limitations have entered a crucial phase. With the the systems to be talks set to resume on February 19, both sides have made public commitments to reach a perma- nent agreement on offensive weapons this year. If even a partial agreement is to be achieved by the time of President Nixon's planned trip to Moscow in early summer, the negotiators will be under considerable pressure to find areas of accom- modation at this session. The problem facing the negotiators is both technical and political. They must find a formula to deal with existing strategic asymmetries in a way that preserves the national security interests of both sides. At the same time, the agreement must also be so constructed as to enable both to deal effectively with potential domestic critics. Thus far, the two sides have taken sharply diver- gent approaches to achieving their common objec- tive. The US wants to renegotiate the terms of the existing five-year agreement, adding strategic bombers to the inventory of weapons to be limited and setting equal numerical limits on the central strategic systems for both sides. Washing- ton also wants to place limits on the throw-weight of ICBMs, constrain qualitative improvements- e.g., MIRVs-and begin a program of active reduc- tions in strategic weapons. The Soviets would like to retain the nu- merical and throw-weight advantages they have under the interim agreement, although they have to include heavy bombers in limited. They justify their present advantages by arguing that what was equitable for the near term is also equitable over the longer haul, particularly if the US is unwilling to count its own forward-based nuclear systems and those of its allies as strategic weapons. The negotiations have been further com- plicated by the vigorous pace of the Soviet arms buildup over the past year. The Soviets have begun testing new-generation ICBMs with greater accuracies and demonstrated MIRY capabilities. They have tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles to extended ranges and have continued to add to their submarine force. These and other less dramatic developments are consonant with the provisions of the interim agreement, but they have cast doubt on Soviet intentions at SALT nevertheless. Meanwhile, there is growing concern over the possibility that advances in weapons tech- nology may overtake efforts to impose political controls over weapons development. Whether or not the Soviets share the US concern on this score, they have continued, at least in public, to voice optimism about SALT's prospects. Writing in the latest issue of the journal USA, prominent Soviet military theoretician G. A. Trofimenko avowed that mutually satisfactory formulas could be found that would ensure the security of both sides, while taking into account existing asym- metries in the strategic relationship. SECRE-i" Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 SECF-ET The Energy Conference ~~ The outcome of the Washington energy con- ference clearly highlighted France's isolated posi- tion and suggests some shift in the power relation- ships within the EC~ Many of the proposed objectives of interna- tional cooperation that the conference endorsed were in the position paper approved by the EC Nine prior to the Washington meeting ar~d were accepted by the French. France reserved its posi- tions on financial measures, however, and refused to accept the establishment of a coordinating group of senior officials to carry out energy pro- grams within existin bodies a move endorsed by all other participants -- Although ostensibly a procedural matter, the French maintained that these points raised the broad question of Europe's future relations with the US. They chose to si:ick to the view that acceptance of a coordinating group composed of r,:onference participants amounted to another European capitulation to tNashington's "doming-~ lion"-a charge to which many Europeans or. occasion are sympathetic. In this instance, thE~ i=rench were unable to carry the other EC mem- bers with them, due in part to the Europeans' lack of confidence in their ability to cope with the energy crisis without US cooperation. '~ The conference outcome also made clear that, with the EC's enlarclement, Paris cannot in every instance call the tune. The Germans, who are in a strong position because they hold the presidency of the EC Council, would not go along with the French, particularly since Britain and the other EC members were not prepared to allo~N Paris to frustrate the goals of the conference ~3 ~Initial press reaction in Europe stressed con- cern over the effect that the evident disarray of the EC Nine would have on European unity. A representative story in the Italian press criticizE~d t=rench intransigence and noted that, one by one, the EC countries were aligning themselves with the Germans. One conservative paper commented that the European countries were torn between their desire to preserve European solidarity and the allure-which was simultaneously athreat-of tt~e US invitation for cooperation. The prestigious F rankfurtcr Allgemeerze commented that the meeting showed that the EC is "deeply ruptured" end that "France was prepared to allow unifica- tion of the Nine only on its own terms, the price of which would be a ermanent conflict between E=urope and America.' ;,~ ~A spokesman for the Organization of Petro- leum Exporting Countries picked up the French theme. He accused the US of attempting "to r~e-establish hegemony over Europe," adding that this was precisely why France objected to the US-initiated move:l )~ ~--~ ~fhe immediate problems the community now faces are difficult. The EC governments have postponed two foreign ministers' meetings: ? One, scheduled for February I5, was to discuss the European-US declaration of princi- ples; the governments had also planned to an- nounce after the meeting awide-ranging offer of cooperation with the Arab states; ? The second, scheduled for February 1$, The French team Emphatic views SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 The Middle East Algiers Meeting 3 ~fhe leaders of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria met in Algiers this week to discuss ~i Syrian-Israeli disengagement and to consider ac- tion on the oil embargo against the US. The ruler of Kuwait, who was invited but did not attend, indicated he would support the conference's de- cisions. The meeting was apparently promoted jointly by the Egyptians and the Saudis Cairo press accounts noted that the con- 'bl t' n of ra io h e posse e sepa f+3rees would discuss t Syrian and Israeli forces, as well as "a unified formula for a plan of Arab activity in the coming stage." These vague formulations may, in fact, have covered a determination to persuade Syria's President Asad to begin disengagement negotia- tions with Israel. Asad's reluctance to open talks is not due to his own hesitation, however, but to opposition within the Syrian Army and Baath party. The other heads of state apparently hoped that pressing Asad directly and en masse would reinforce his own inclinations and strengthen his hand in dealing with doubters at home rEach of the participants has urgent reasons for wanting movement on the Syrian front. Egypt's President Sadat, to prove that he is not negotiating a unilateral settlement with Israel, has publicly pledged that he will not move further until Syria also has a disengagement agreement. The longer Syria delays, the greater the danger that Sadat will be faced with discontent at home over lack of further progress: (~~ ~Sadat has also been urging that the oil em- bargo against the US be lifted, and Saudi Arabia and Algeria-for political reasons in the first case, economic in the other-would like to oblige. For the same reasons that hold Sadat back on further negotiations, however, neither King Faysal nor President Boumediene can afford to ease oil re- strictions until those restrictions have produced the same benefits for Syria that they appear to have yielded for Egypt" 3 Disengagement on the Egyptian front, mean- while, is proceeding smoothly. On February 12, Israeli forces completed stage three of their four- stage withdrawal from the west bank of the Suez Canal. They now retain only the northern third of their west bank salient and are scheduled to with- draw from that portion by February 21. Disen- gagement is to be completed by March 5~ '3 CAlong the Syrian front, by contrast, tension remained high throughout the week. Beginning on February 10, Syrian artillery shelled Israeli posi- tions for three consecutive days. The Israeli press claims that the three-hour Syrian barrage along the entire front on February 11 was the heaviest since the October war and that for the first time it included Israeli civilian settlements. Two civil- ians reportedly were killed.) J rThe February 11 attacks, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, violated a tacit Syrian- Israeli understanding that the Israelis would re- frain from retaliatory air strikes so long as the Syrians limited their attacks to military targets`7' Despite this alleged violation, the Israelis are, for the present, inclined to avoid heavy retaliation that could upset current diplomatic efforts to launch Israeli-Syrian negotiations. According to Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, Tel Aviv feels that the Syrian attacks reflect Damascus' political frustrations rather than a desire for renewed hostilities) 3 rlsraeli forces did step up their shelling of southern Lebanon early this week in retaliation for two recent cross-border attacks by the feda- yeen. One Israeli soldier and one civilian were k i Iled in the attacks. Lebanese Government spokesmen have been unusually candid in acknowledging that fedayeen initiatives have Cv prompted the Israeli shellings, but the Lebanese Army has only a limited ability to control feda- yeen activities in the border area. 25X1 Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMAF2Y Feb 15, 74 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 `"'' SECRET (~co ~cxx ~c ~,S Moscow's interest in Western, e cially US, ~ technology has flourished over the past five years or so. In pursuing trade deals, cooperation agree- ments, and bilateral technological contacts, the USSR has been more aggressive than at any time since the 1920s. Soviet leaders recognize that rapid economic growth can be achieved once again only by accelerating technological progress. The USSR has been relatively inefficient in devel- oping and applying new technology, however, forcing Moscow to turn increasingly to the West for assistance. The revival of Soviet interest in US products and technology is partly political, but it is also in line with the traditional policy of acquiring the most advanced technology available. In some areas, such as oil field equipment for Arctic ex- ploration, US firms are the only source in the eyes of the Soviets. US companies also are the preferred sources of automotive equipment, com- puter hardware and software, and civilian aircraft technology. If contracts cannot be reached with US companies, however, the Soviets recognize that other countries often can provide technology that is as good or almost so. The USSR has, for example, bought computer hardware and some kinds of automotive equipment and machine tools from Western Europe and Japan. Soviets have included the acquisition of technical data, contacts with Western firms and scientists, and formal arrangements for joint research and exchange of scientific and technical information. None of these has lived up to Soviet expectations, however. Western equipment frequently is not as productive under Soviet conditions, and attempts to exploit foreign technical data or to copy for- eign machinery have had mixed success. Because machinery imports-especially "turn-key" plants-are expensive, the Soviet lead- ership is trying to hold down the cost of acquiring foreign technology in this manner. The most prominent innovation is a push for cooperative economic ventures that provide for the export to the USSR of equipment and technology on long- term credits, which are repaid by deliveries of the goods produced by the venture. As an alternative means of acquiring technol- ogy, the USSR is also pressing strongly for in- creased cooperative research with private firms. More than 20 such agreements have already been concluded with US firms. Most ho-d out the promise of tangible technological gains for the USSR, while Western companies hope to enhance their sales prospects in the USSR. The onset of detente has lowered some of the traditional obstacles to Soviet acquisition of US technology. The extension of medium- and long-term credits by the US after May 1972 re- sulted in a large increase in Soviet imports of US equipment and technology. Relaxation of US ex- port controls has also contributed to the rise in imports, although controls continue to limit ac- cess to very specialized and sophisticated tech- nology. The major means of acquiring technology from abroad is the outright purchase of machin- ery and equipment. Other channels used by the There is little prospect that transferring tech- nology from the US to the USSR will have a substantial influence on Soviet economic devel- opment. Although machinery imports and the acquisition of technical data from the West will continue, they are likely to be too small in scale to have a substantial impact on Soviet economic and technical development. The sum total of technology acquired from the industrial west will be more impressive, but the influence of such transfers depends above all on how rapidly they can be assimilated and duplicated. Ultimately, the USSR must depend on its own applied research and development sector to close the technological gap with the West and to boost its own economic growth. 25X1 SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Feb 15, 74 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 SECF~ET improved relations with Eastern Europe. In each instance, the Vatican's actions also appear in- tended to signal amore pragmatic approach to church-state relations in the communist-governed countries 2-~ With apparent approval from Moscow, the East European regimes with large Roman Catholic populations are responding in kind. The Soviets probably feel that in an era of detente, with East-West contacts increasing, it is well to neutral- ize apotential source of internal discord"? Y~; The 81-year-old Mindszenty, all but offi- f h US E t d h d t e m- epar ure rom r_ially retire since is bassy in Budapest in late 1971, has continued to be a symbol of resistance to the Hungarian Com- munist regime rAlthough his removal opens the gary, any real amelioration in the church's plight v~~ill come slowly~rln conjunction with Mind- REACH RE=D P~ NET ?~ `kzenty's dismissal, the Vatican was able to fill an ~~ , ; t~,~ 1j archbishopric that has been vacant for two years wo of four S let 'space probes launched and to appoint a temporary administrator for surface on February 10 but 1=ailed to orbit Mars as planned due to a malfunction. Mars 5 went into orbit around the planet two days later. last simmer have arrived in the vicinity of Mars. Esztergom, the archbishopric that includes Buda- According to a Tass announcement, Mars 4 passed pest. A permanent successor to both of Mind- within about 1,200 nautical miles of the planet's`LSrszent~'s positions will probably not be selected The other space probes-Mars 6 and 7-are still en route to the planet. They should arrive in early March and are expected to release small instrument packages in an effort to obtain data and pictures from the planet's surface. The So- viets landed a capsule from Mars 3 on the planet in December 1971, Eastern Europe -The Vatican GESTURES TOWARD ACCOMMODATION In the long run, Wyszynski may not be a le to prevent an accord but, for the '~ ~ ~T'he enforced retiremeint of Jozsef Cardinal ~~" time being, Casaroli and his official hosts could Mindszenty as primate of Hungary and Arch ?on-y agree to discuss the specific issue of diplo- ?,_~, bishop of Esztergom, together with the visit of ~ matic relations in Rome at some future date. Vatican "foreign minister" Casaroli to Poland last They did, however, com liment each other on ,,-week, demonstrate the \/atican's interest in their devotion to detente. SECRET until the Cardinal dies _j ~ ~he removal of Mindszenty on February 5 followed by one day Casaroli's arrival in Warsaw. The coincidence of the two events may have been intended to remind Poland's primate, the con- servative Cardinal Wyszynski, that he also may eventually have to show more flexibility toward the state in order to permit formal Vatican-Polish ties 25X1 25X1 Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY Feb 15, 74 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700050001-0 V L. V I lL t ROMANIA: MIDDLE EAST TOUR 1~~'~President Ceausescu's current swing through four Arab capitals marks a high point in his drive to justify Romania's neutraliist Middle East policy and to head off Arab plans to boycott Romanian exports. Ceausescu will also use the tour to nur- ture the impression at home and abroad that Romanian diplomacy is facilitating the Arab- Israeli peace negotiations~rCeausescu's delegation ~~pent February 12-13 in Tripoli, will be in Beirut until February 17, and wil'! visit Damascus and Baghdad before returning to Bucharest on Feb- ruary 21.~ excluded from playing a role in the Middle East. Bucharest will also find ways to drive home this message in Moscow and Belgrade, which bitterly YUGOSLAVIA: EXTREMISM UNDER FIRE ~,~ ~ugoslav party leaders are stepping up prep- rati ns for republic and federal party congresses ~ this spring to include a drive against extremists. i nese errorts to achieve ideological "purification" ~fhe Romanian press buildup for the tripe have increasingly shifted away from attacks n o suggests that Ceausescu will offer limited political ~ liberals and nationalists, however, to focus on the and economic concessions, .but will not bow to threat posed by "neo-Stalinists.' Arab demands that Romania break diplomatic relations with Israel. The Syrian and Iraqi visits ~~ The most striking example of this shift oc- could prove especially trying as the Romanians ~ca~rred during a meeting last week of the Croat will face Arab leaders who have been particularly 'y~~party central committee, during which veteran ~.~Gociferous advocates of a boycott of Romanian ~ party leader Vladimir Bakaric leveled a blast at goods. A preliminary recommendation for eco- ~ lwhat he called a "centralist faction." He charged nomic sanctions against Ronnania already awaits ~ that this faction is vigorously pressing for large- action by the Arab League. The Romanian Presi-y lscale personnel changes, for a radical restructuring dent's personal efforts to avert a boycott will of the party along Soviet lines, and for the total probably feature attractive offers of Romanian ~~7domination of society by the party. He also oil-extraction equipment and technology as well charged that the group is undermining Yugo- as selective political support: for Arab goals n sl