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March 1, 1974
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Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Weekly Summary State Dept. review completed ARCHIVAL RECORD PLEASE FtLTURN TO AGENCY ARCHIVES, Secret Secret 1 March 1974 No. 0009/74 Copy N'? Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 CONTENTS (March 1, 1974) i China: Confucius No Say 2 Latin America: The New Dialogue 3 International Money t ?i!srrenf #rst?:iiiraanCe recrt4 ~rnd anaiVz~~ si~nf- t i9,~. week tt~rotagh ;eot~n on i hur5clay. It ?eriai resordinatgc# with or o~!~ared by c~rttdc Research. 'the t~ffice of ?,tr~fen#c C?ireE_torate of Sa;#~r~ce and T~r~no#opy, >re cc~morehensive eatment and therefore 4 Israel: Political Frustrations 5 Ethiopia: The Times Are Changing 7 Islamic States: The Lahore Summit 8 Rhodesia: Insurgency Continues 9 EC-Arab Cooperation 10 Iraq: Truce With Kurds Expiring 11 Morocco: Restless on Throne Day MIDDLE EAST AFRICA ugoslavia: Third Constitution 17 East Germany: A Firmer Grip EAST ASIA PACIFIC 19 South Vietnam: Government Changes; Economy 21 Cambodia: More Government Gains 21 Laos: The Communists' Turn 22 Thailand: The Students, Again 22 The "4th Burma Rifles Government" ~JVESTE RN HEMISPHERE 23 Chile: At Home and Abroad 23 Argentina: Police Rebellion 25 Guatemala: Presidential Elections 2G Cuba: Raul Goes to East Europe Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Q Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 SECRET G'l~i~ra: L'oKfuc~us ,Na Say Chou En-lai recently became the first Chinese official to comment publicly on the anti- Confucius campaign. Chows remarks, made dur- ing a February 24 speech at a banquet for Zam- bian President Kaunda, should put to rest the frequent press speculation that the Premier is a target of the campaign. Although there has been no official statement on the objectives of the drive, Peking has moved forcefully to deny for- eign press reports that Chou is a target, that the campaign will prompt a change in foreign policy, or that it is a new Cultural Revolution': Criticism of Confucius began last August but did not become a full-fledged campaign until early February. The announcement on February 2 that this campaign was the first order of busi- ness was preceded by careful planning, including specific measures to keep the campaign under strict party control. Teng Hsiao-ping, known as a rigid disciplinarian, was added to the Politburo even as the propaganda was touting the virtues of maintaining party discipline'~~In January, the Central Committee issued a series of directives, including one that set clear limitations on the conduct of the campaign~~ The directive is obviously aimed at prevent- ing t e kind of turmoil that erupted during the Cultural Revolution. It reportedly prohibits travel around the country to "exchange experiences," a feature of the Cultural Revolution that resulted in nationwide disorder as unruly youths roamed the country at will. It also bans attacks by name on specific individuals." ~,, The latter stricture has not been well imple- ment d, however, and Peking has felt it necessary to restate its position. On February 20, an author- itative editorial in People's Daily warned that the campaign must'stay on the "correct course" and must not become "entangled" with "other prob- lems." For several months, young students have been attacking individual teachers for all manner of real or imagined wrong-doings; petty thieves were also being criticized~~and at least one factory manager came under at ac rAlthough the ac- cusers all claim that their cri icism is consistent with the anti-Confucius drive, it is clear that Peking is trying to put a stop to just such activity1 Ithough in some instances the campaign has become bogged down in local issues, the prov- inces for the most part are stir_king closely to the official line coming from Peking. The situation is under such controll[that some Chinese officials have already begun to speculate when the cam- paign will end. Chinese estimates range from three to six months before Peking calls a halt to the criticism of Confuciu"s~ Before that time, it is SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 SECRET Latin America: The Ne~v Dialogue ;Latin American and Caribbean foreign minis- ters have returned home from their meeting with Secretary Kissinger in Mexico City last week with .mixed feelings about what was accomplished. i here has been insufficient time for the partici- ,r3ating governments to have reached firm con- ~lusions about the meetings, and early com- mentaries by the area's public media have typi- cally run the gamut from cynical negativism to ~aroud satisfaction. More measured official re- actions will trickle in for weeks to come, but a preliminary reading suggests that most of the 24 I__atin and Caribbean governments that attended regard the conference as a promising starting point fora healthy new dialogue with the US. They generally look forward to resuming the dialogue in Atlanta in mid-P~pril just prior to the meeting ,there of the fourth OAS General Assembly. Although their comments to date about the meeting's concrete results have been under- standably guarded, most of the participants who have spoken up since the rr~eeting have been en- thusiastic about its style. They generally have e;:hoed the satisfaction shown by Mexican For- eign Minister Rabasa in his speech closing the conference when he mentioned the feeling that "here, for the first time in zi long while, we have met on a plane of absolute equality."~ ;Some of those who attended have also spoken proudly of the fact -that the Latins them- selves were able for the first time in such a meeting with the US to attain and preserve a high degree of unity on the subjects discussed. Latin solidarity was in fact impressive, but it did show strains when issues like Cuba, the revision of the inter-American system, and the wording of the final communique arose for discussion inside and outside the formal sessions. It was only with considerable pulling and hauling that the dele- gates were able to agree on one Latin spokesman to respond in the name of alt to Secretary Kis- singer's comments on each agenda item. Some delegates privately bridled at what they regarded as the high-handed way that Mexico, the host government, ran the meetings. Mexico itself ap- peared very pleased, both with the conduct of the conference itself and with the "Declaration of Tlatelolco" concluding the conference:? The two issues that produced the deepest cleavage between some of the Latin American and Caribbean delegates on the one hand and the US on the other were the US suggestion that a new "hemispheric community" be formed and the Cuban question, which cropped up informally. Some of the area's more nationalistic govern- ments vehemently rejected the "community" idea because they saw it as a possible new vehicle for what they regard as US domination. A few dele- gates-notably those of Jamaica, Guyana, and Peru-sought to force the group to discuss the exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American sys- tem, but they received little support. Neither problem loomed so large as to dominate the Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 JCVI-tC I conference, although Cuban and Soviet press commentary trumpeted both issues and made it appear that way." >C"? Cuba has yet to react directly to the discus- sions at Tlatelolco. Prensa Latina, the Cuban wire service, sent considerable caustic commentary from Mexico to Havana during the course of the meetings. The main theme of this reportage was perhaps best conveyed in the comment, attri- buted to a Central American delegate, that the US had "offered us, under new titles, the same old State Department cliches." Tass also played up the same alleged remark and was generally only slightly less critical than the Cuban wire service. International Money ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ,The dollar dropped further against most mayor currencies in hectic trading during the past week. Daily changes in value sometimes exceeded 2 percent as energy-triggered uncertainties con- tinued to dominate currency markets. Central banks did not intervene substantially to limit daily fluctuations in exchange rates or to halt the dollar's general decline. Since February 1, the dollar has depreciated nearly 4 percent against the mark, 2 percent against the pound, and 4 percent against the yen. The price of gold surged to a new high of $175 per ounce on February 26, up nearly 50 percent so far this year; it eased slightly on February 28 after some profit-taking. The dollar's weakness reflects a growing realization that the Europeans and Japanese will be able to finance much of the rise in their oil import bills by borrowing; thus, they will be under less pressure than anticipated to depreciate their currencies or draw on foreign reserves. Rome is planning to float a new $1.5-billion foreign loan. It also will be able to draw on a recently negotiated $1.2-billion standby credit from the International Monetary Fund and to utilize new arrangements for increased short-term currency swaps with the US. In France, some state agencies will apparently follow the lead of the treasury and Electricite de France in seeking foreign capital. The treasury and the electrical agency have already obtained loans totaling $2 billion. The Danes announced plans for a loan in marks equivalent to $37 million, and substantial further borrowing by the Scandinavians is likely. The dramatic rise in the price of gold is attributable mainly to increased speculative de- mand brought on by uncertainties about the fate of major currencies. Reduced gold sales by South Africa and renewed expectations that the EC will raise its official price for gold sharply have also SECRET L rWith the Mexico meeting now over, Latin American and Caribbean governments will begin focusing on how best to refine their arguments and seek further US actions in their favor at the April meetings in Atlanta, where most of the issues raised in Mexico will again come up. In the interim, they will speak loudly, mostly for home consumption, about the need for Washington to do more for them. But privately, most will remain guardedly hopeful that the new impetus they see in US -Latin American relations can be nurtured and sustai ed. Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 ISRAEL: POLITICAL FRUSTI~ATIONS ;~; ;Prime Minister Meir spent a trying week at- tempting to broaden her minority coalition, while seeking to forestall its early collapse. Continuing difficulty with both tasks led President Katzir to give her another week to form a cabinet. Last week, he gave an informal extension of seven days to name a cabinet after she refused to request a formal three-week extension of her original man- date, which expired on February 20. Mrs. Nleir now plans to present her new cabinet to the Knesset for a vote of confidence on March 5. `: ~ The Prime Minister clearly wants the addi- tiona~ time to coax the National Religious Party and recalcitrant Labor Alignment ministers into the cabinet. More moderate leaders of the Na- tional Religious Party apparently are still hesi- tating to go against the wishes of the party's ultra-orthodox youth faction. As a result, the party has continued to reject all overtures. Labor leaders are now concerned that the National Re- ligious Party may act in concert with the rightist Fikud to block legislation in N:nesset committees) ~rying to hold her own Alignment factions ~to~jet er, Mrs. Meir addressed several personal appeals to Defense Minister Dayan and Trans- portation Minister Peres to remain in the govern- ment; she reportedly even offered Dayan the post of foreign minister. Her hopes were given a boost when the Rafi faction, of which both are leading members, endorsed Mrs. Meir's move tv form a minority cabinet and urged both men to join. ~~Peres, who would like to remain in the cabi- net and even called on Dayan to stay, will follow Dayan's lead. The Defense Minister, for his part, appears to be holding out for stronger support from all Alignment factions before making his final decision. the Alignment factions have estab- lished a "reconciliation committee" to formulate proposals on overcoming the intra-party crisis, but the committee, at best, is likely only to gloss over party differences. =; Meanwhile, the Independent Liberal Party, the' Alignment's junior coalition partner, is maneuvering for more representation in the cabi- net. Mrs. Meir has agreed to give it one more cabinet seat in addition to that held by Minister of -(ourism Moshe Kola ~~ ` I n contrast to the lack of movement on the do estic political scene, a major breakthrough was made on the Syrian disengagement issue when Damascus presented Tel Aviv, through Sec- retary Kissinger, with a list of the 65 Israeli POWs it holds and said Red Cross officials could begin visiting them on March 1. Mrs. Meir announced that Israel was now prepared to conduct negotia- tions with Damascus on a separation of forces agreement Ilsraeli political observers are playing down 'Elie possibility that Mrs. Meir's minority cabinet would have difficulty beginning disengagement talks, arguing that the principles held by such a cabinet are shared by a majority of Knesset mem- bers. SECRE7- 1='aae 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 JCl.ir'1C I ~~' i "l spreading military revolt has forced Em- ~ peror l-laile Selassie to appoint a new government appointees named so far are likely to be more ~~ The revolt began on February 26 when army reform-minded than their discredited predeces- and air force enlisted men and some junior offi- sors, and their selection represents a determined ~- cers in Asmara, Ethiopia's second largest city, effort by the Emperor to reach some accommoda-?~~, went on strike and placed their senior officers tion with the dissident troops, whose demands are ~ under restraint. The situation worsened on Febru- focused mainly on economic issues. The situation, ~ ~ ary 27 when some elements close to Addis Ababa however, will probably remain unsettled for some joined in and the dissident troops in Asmara time. The new government will have to act placed under house arrest most of the senior quickly if it is to restore public confidence. It is not clear how much authority Haile Selassie will grant the new prime minister, Endalkatchew Makonnen, or even if the new appointees will be acceptable to the dissidents. The new cabinet at a minimum will have to make concessions to the troops' economic demands exceed the immediate economic issues. Enlisted men and NCOs have been the most visible partici- pants in the revolt, but many junior- and middle- level officers are showing increased political awareness. There is growing evidence that they are in touch with each other and with discon- tented civilians. These groups are now likely to exert stronger pressure for implementation of long-postponed reforms, and their efforts are likely to call into question the Emperor's virtually unlimited authority. The officers and enlisted men, and probably most of the civilians, remain loyal to Haile Selassie, but they would prefer that the daily administration of the government be placed in the hands of officials chosen more for their competence than for their royal favor and service to Haile Selassie. ~ ~: ~Endalkatchew is probably not the strongest choice Haile Selassie could have made, but he is a change for the better. Although considered a con- servative in Ethiopian terms, he is considerably younger and probably more politically sensitive than former prime minister Aklilu and is more aware of the need for significant change. Lt. Gen- eral Abiye, the new defense minister, is a progres- sive who has urged swifter implementation of reform. Although loyal to Haile Selassie, he has in the past reportedly tried to impress the Emperor with the need to prepare Ethiopia for a less per- sonal form of government: officers-including the armed forces chief of staff-who had been sent to negotiate with them.. On February 28, Fourth Division troops in Addis Ababa for the first time proclaimed their support for the dissidents in Asmara, but continued to assert their loyalty to the Emperor: ,~ ~ I The military and civilian unrest of the past I`~ (The revolt so far has been almost totally free ~f. few weeks holds political implications that far ~-rof violence or bloodshed. The US consul in SECREI~ Page 5 ~NEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 J C l.l~ C I SUDAN .*Kharloum ER(.TR.E~G 'Asmara YEMEN TySana -Aden F.T. A.I. s,DjibouYi ~~" AAdis Ababa E T H I O P I A Asmara reports that the dissidents are well disci- plined and tha their leaders appear to be ex- tremely capable ~~ Dissatisfaction in the military has been grow- ing ~r some time. In addition to grievances over low pay and benefits, morale has suffered because of poor living conditions and extended periods of duty against insurgents in Eritrea and along the tense Somali border. The enlisted men are also resentful of the privileges and much higher pay of senior officers ~~ ~ The military revolt followed by a few days violent demonstrations in Addis Ababa by strik- ing students, teachers, and workers protesting the government's inability to deal effectively with sharply rising inflation. Haile Selassie eased the situation by announcing strict enforcement of price controls, a reduction in gasoline prices, and a small increase in military salaries. These meas- ures, however, were too little and too late to halt the discontent, and the revolt continued to spread in the face of the inability of Aklilu's government to cope with the situation. +'~ge 6 ~.NEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 7~+ Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 ISLAMIC STATES: THE LAHORE SUMMIT ;~ The official decisions of the Islamic leaders been moving in the direction of recognition for who met in Lahore from February 22-24 were about two years, but the efforts of Sadat and overshadowed by other developments that others who wanted Bangladesh, the second most emerged from the conference. Probably the most populous Muslim nation, to be represented at important result was the enhancement of the per- Lahore apparently added enough extra pressure sonal standing of Egyptian President Sadat. At on Pakistan to bring a favorable decisionl least tacit acceptance of his position on the Arab- Israeli dispute was reflected both in the relatively Z3 The official Declaration of Lahore tended to moderate speeches of most delegates and in the _~, confirm areas of agreement and avoid possible lack of the more radical Arab positions in the areas of conflict. The declaration included calls joint declaration. This development may also 1.7 for: benefit Syrian President Asad, who has been at- tempting to overcome domestic opposition to Damascus' participation in the Geneva peace ? Arab control of Jerusalem; talks., ? pport for E ! Muslim su gypt, Syria, Jor- 1 ~ dan, and the Palestinians in recovering "all ,~ 'The meetings also helped bring about Paki- their occupied lands by all means"; stan's reco nition of B I d g h ang a es . Islamabad had ~- _a Mujib and Bhutto Recognized by the host ? confirmed the Palestine Liberation Or- ganization as the sole representative of the Palestinians and called for the restoration of their "full national rights." The wording of the declaration may have been left intentionally vague and ambiguous in some places. It does not deal explicitly with some im- portant issues, notably whether there should be negotiations with Israel. Economic differences among the Islamic states, aggravated by rising oil prices, were only papered over by a vague conference commitment to help the poorer Muslim nations. Two resolu- tions calling for concrete action failed to pass. One would have established an Islamic Solidarity Fund, and the other proposed different oil prices for rich and poor nations. The declaration criticized the support given Israel by some countries, "particularly the USA." Despite this phrase, included at Syria's insistence, anti-US sentiment was muted in Lahore, and Paki- stani Prime Minister Bhutto in his welcoming address spoke favorably of U5 peace efforts. In addition to Israel, the only other nations specifi- cally mentioned unfavorably were Rhodesia, Por- tugal, and South Africa. The Muslims agreed to support the Africans a ainst these coun- tries. 25X1 SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 ~~~nc. i RHODESIA: INSURGENCY CONTINUES The African nationalist insurgency against Prim Minister Smith's white-minority govern- ment is now well into its second year. Although the rebels remain confined to the large and sparsely populated northeastern area where they began operating in December 1972, they appear capable of continuing their activities indefinitely: The rebels are well supplied with Communist arms-mostly Chinese-and continue to receive help from their anti-Portuguese counterparts in Mozambique, who assist them to cross into Rho- desia from Zambia and Tanzania ~' Smith's government has been unable to halt this infiltration even with the help of some 1,400 South African police who operate against the guerrillas inside Rhodesia anti who als relieve Rhodesian forces of routine border patrol. ~~ The rebels have suffered some setbacks. hey have been unable for example, to maintain the high level of terrorist attacks on isolated white farms that they recorded initially; local defense measures against such attacks have proven quite effective. Moreover, support from rural Africans seems to have fallen off despite resent- ment over the government's forced resettlement program and harsh security Iegislatiort~Since last {~ June at least 8,000 local inhabitants have been moved from the frontier zone, and the govern- ment claims that some 3,000 of these have reset- tled voluntarily in "protected villages" built by the government '_;~ The Rhodesian economy, on the whole, has held up well under the added strains imposed by the insurgency. The economy suffers from a man- power shortage, however, and civilian morale has been affected because of the large number of white reservists who have been on almost contin- ual active duty. In early February the government announced measures intended to reduce call-ups of white reservists without cutting back on the counter-insurgency effort. The measures included earlier conscription of white youths, increased incentives for conscripts to r~e-enlist, and forma- tion of a second black infantry battalion. Areas of Guerrilla Activity ~~~~ Zimbabwe African National Union ~,r Mozambique Liberation Front ,. ._ -~ 55331 }74 CIA Over the long run, other developments may take a heavier toll on the economy and on white morale than the insurgency. For example, white immigration declined significantly last year, prob- ably in part because of the guerrilla war. Al- though the country showed a small net gain of immigrants for 1973, the figure was substantially lower than the 1972 total. Last month, Smith announced a world-wide campaign to attract white settlers. Developments in neighboring Mozambique could also affect Rhodesia's prospects. Rebels there have become more active in recent weeks and have carried out a number of attacks on the rail line from the port of Beira to Salisbury, one of Rhodesia's vital lifelines. SECF~ET Page g WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 ~..' ~7LVi t~ i .r.r EC-ARAB COOPERATION ?;~' 3~~ The nine ~ countries are planning to ex- plore wide-ranging cooperation with the Arab states despite some concern that Washington may view such talks with disapproval. Even those EC states that are cooperating with the US in the activities following the Washington Energy Con- ference see the new effort as a way to assert an independent role for Europe in relations with the Arabs. They point out that: ? the European moves can complement US policy; ? the practical effect of the Nine's efforts will, in any case, be long term; ? the attempt is necessary to heal the rift with France within the community. At a meeting in Brussels set for March 4, the foreign ministers of the EC are expected to give final approval to the proposal, first made by France, for cooperation with the Arabs in a vari- ety of fields. As a first step, the West Germans- presently holding the chairmanship of the com- munity bodies-would inform the Arab govern- ments of the interest of the Nine in early continu- ation of the dialogue initiated when four Arab leaders visited Copenhagen during the summit of EC leaders last December. Foreign Minister Scheel would ask the Arabs to designate one or more representatives for future contacts in such fields as industry, agriculture, energy, raw materials, science and technology, financial cooperation, and vocational training. In the next phase, the European and Arab states could establish joint committees to work out the principles and possi- bilities of cooperation in detail. A conference of Arab and European ministers, which would de- cide how to implement the cooperative measures, would be convened, perhaps in the autumn of 1974. The plan for cooperation was worked out earlier this year by a group of Middle East experts from the foreign ministries of the EC states, and was approved by the political directors in early February. The cooperative venture would include matters within the purview of the EC as well as others-such as cultural relations-that are out- side. For this reason, the political committee recommended that the German foreign minister should carry on the negotiations in both his roles-as president of the political consultative group and as president of the EC Council. A number of EC members are pressing for early action, with an eye on the rotational pattern for the EC presidency. The West Germans are in the chair until July, but the French will take over for the following six months, followed by the somewhat Francophile Irish. Paris could thus reap inordinate political benefit from a delay of several months in initiating the negotiations. EC circles are nevertheless wary of Wash- ington's reaction to EC-Arab moves. Reports are circulating in Brussels that the US is adamantly opposed to the prospect of an EC dialogue with the Arabs. The West Germans have been at pains to emphasize their determination that the EC- Arab dialogue should neither conflict with nor burden the US peace efforts in the Middle East. Some Europeans believe that the US is opposed to possible EC offers of technical help to the comprehensive aid-for-oil agreement. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 TUR~EY IRAQ: TRUCE WITH KURDS EXPIRING '~ 9J,~ a :;c, to ~,ty ~ ~ The truce that halted figftting four years ~go between the central government and Iraqi Kurds led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani is due to expire on March 11. Unless it is extended, an early resump- tion of hostilities seems likely; the two sides have not agreed on even basic provisions of the autono- mous status promised to the Kurds. Iraq's two million Kurds constitute about 18 percent of its population. In March 1970, the Baghdad government promised to grant auton- omy within four years to areas of northeastern Iraq where the Kurds are in a majority. Since then, the Kurdish areas have remained generally quiet except for occasional limited clashes be- tween Barzani's forces and local army units. For some time, however, and apparently with some justification, the Kurds have been ac- cusing the government of trying to reduce the area in which Kurds predominate by forcing en- tire villages to migrate north and east and re- placing them with Arabs. Last December, the government finally offered a sketchy autonomy plan that the Kurds generally view as a device to keep ultimate au- thority in Baghdad. The Kurds want a larger "autonomous area," greater representation in the central government, and more of the national budget. They are also uneasy about the future of the Kurdish armed forces. The most important bone of contention is control of the Kirkuk oil fields. The Kurds claim that: the entire Kirkuk area is within their rightful area of jurisdiction, but the government strongly contests this claim. If the Kurds refuse to go along with the government's autonomy plan, as SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 SECRET `~''' seems probable, Baghdad may try to impose it anyway, hoping to enlist the support of some of Barzani's rivals. In that event, renewed fighting on a large scale would seem certain. Barzani's Kurdish force, which numbers about 30,000 men with an estimated 50,000 tribesmen in reserve, is reported to have been re-equipped recently with new weapons, largely with Iran's help. The Kurds lack armor, heavy artillery, and air support, but they are capable of defending their mountainous homeland, where heavy equipment would be of little use. They are also capable of guerrilla forays that could prove costly to local army units, as well as to the oil fields in the north. Government forces have better equipment, but would have to keep one eye on the Iranian border, where recent clashes have in- creased tensions. MOROCCO: RESTLESS ON THRONE DAY An atmosphere of uneasiness~prevai~s with/ the approach of March 3, the 13th anniversary of King Hassan's accession to the throne. A year ago on the same date, short-lived disorders broke out in central Morocco. The government is concerned over the security situation and has taken a number of precautionary measures. Security patrols in Rabat and Casablanca have been increased, and numer- ous road blocks have been set up throughout the country. The local rumor mill and the announce- ment that a small group of Moroccan dissidents was recently captured after crossing the border from Algeria have also made the public nervous. The government believes the current subver- sion is backed by Libya. Tripoli has made no attempt to hide its hostility to King Hassan since President Qadhafi prematurely gave public sup- port to a coup attempt against Hassan in 1971. Military officers, from whose ranks came the leaders of two abortive coup attempts within the past three years, remain the chief threat to the King. Following the last attempt in 1972, Hassan assumed direct control of the armed forces, exe- cuted those officers who were implicated, isolated potential challengers in the military, and dis- persed most of the units upon which a military contender might rely. While these actions have tightened Hassan's control of the military, many officers are in- creasingly restive because of their direct subor- dination to the King and Morocco's lack of mod- ern military equipment. There is no firm evi- dence, however, of organized opposition within the armed forces. Hassan has sought to prevent another chal- lenge from the military in part by balancing it against the security services. His growing reliance on Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, his chief intelligence adviser, may be weighting the scales too far the other way, however. Although there have been no signs that Dlimi is becoming disaffected, he may soon be in a position powerful enough to engineer or facilitate a coup. Hassan continues to demonstrate consider- able skill in political manipulation as well as a willingness to deal summarily with dissident activ- ity. The concentration of effective power in the palace has increased rather than diminished over the past three years; opposition political parties are as weak and divided as ever. Moreover, the throne has some popular support as a symbol of legitimacy, and the King's narrow escapes from the two coup attempts are seen by many as proof of divine favor. Nevertheless, the King remains vulnerable to a coup generated by his own refusal to change his method of governing or to eliminate official corruption. SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Q Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 SECF~E~T EASTERN EUROPE: FORE:IG~I TRADE BOOM tip d ~'~") Eastern Europe s f~reign trade boomed in 197, and most of the countries plan even larger growth this year. While Eastern Europe as a whole accumulated a record hard??currency deficit with the West, its trade with tlhe Soviet Union was again in surplus. Total trade grew some 17 percent last year- double the average annual rate for 1960-72-and a 20-percent increase is planned for 1974. With the exception of Hungary, all the countries ran hard- currency deficits. Total debt to the developed West-almost $5 billion at 'the end of 1972-grew substantially. Poland and Czechoslovakia amassed record hard-currency deficits of $1 billion and $300 million, respectively. East European imports were paced by large purchases of high-priced agri?~ cultural products and raw materials-corn, soy~~ beans, and cattle hides. V1lestern machinery and equipment also remained in high demand, witrl purchases by Romania and Poland leading the way. Eastern Europe's large surplus with th~~ Soviet Union last year reflected the USSR's con- tinued heavy purchase of consumer goods. Soviet deliveries of fuels and other raw materials were on schedule. Planned deliveries of these commodities through 1975 should be sufficient to forestall major energy problems in f=astern Europe. Poland and Romania, the countries with the fastest growing trade withl the West, do not plan to cut back on their purchasing this year. Czecho- slovakia also is likely 'to buy more Western machinery. East Germany will probably reduce its trade with the West, while machinery imports by Hungary and Bulgaria will rise moderately. This pattern will probably coni:inue through 1975. In the next plan period-1976-80-the East Europeans face serious raw-material supply 1971 1972 1973" 1974`* *Preliminary; based on 1973 plan fulfillment documents ,,h5 ft~ t ,u **Based on 1974 plans and supplemental information problems. Soviet deliveries probably will level off in volume but cost substantially more. East Euro- pean investments in the exploitation of Soviet resources will not begin to pay off until late in the 1970s. The East European countries are likely; therefore, to have to plan on reduced rates of economic growth during the 1976-80 period. SE:CF~ET 1Li ,.~~~~~~ v ci innnnol~v Mar 1, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 SECRET USSR: GROMYKO'S TRAVELS ,,L ~ Less than two weeks after his visit to Cuba ~nd he US, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was on the road again, trying to keep up the momentum of detente in Europe even though the Middl East situation was still very much on his mind. ~ During his visit to France from February ~/ ~ One reason for Gromyko's trip to Rome ~~-1 Gromyko did not make much headway 'frn~ FPhr~~ar? isz_~~-~..,.,.~.._ .___~_~ ... . ,_.__._...., ,..w,. ~~~?~ uN~,caicu ni J Soviet-French relations over the past few months, but he at least kept them from getting worse.~:~ Paris has been troubled by what it regards as a Soviet failure to consult adequately during the Middle East war, while Moscow has serious reser- vations about the interest the French are showing in West European defense cooperation. The So- viets have also been disturbed by France's unwill- ingness to participate in MBFR, and may feel that this attitu~,ie is spreading to other West European countries./ l- I Many of these problems can only be resolved at the summit, if at all. Some progress may be made during President Pompidou's trip to the USSR, which has been under consideration for some time. During Gromyko's stay in Paris, it was 25X1 25X1 announced that tree trip will take place in early March, probably next week. Looking further ahead, the Soviets, who are presumably aware of Pompidou's declining health, will have to consider the policy they will take toward France after his departure from the political scene' one Italians-was to see the Pope. The Vatican has recently been displaying a more pragmatic ap- proach toward church-state relations in commu- nist countries. With Moscow's approval, the East European regimes with large Roman Catholic populations have been responding in kind, The Soviets probably believe that in an era of detente, with East-West contacts increasing, it is useful to neutralize a potential source of internal discord in Eastern Europe: While in Rome, Gromyko touched on the Middle East situation, expressing Moscow's irrita- tion at being pushed from center stage in the negotiations. To reassert the Soviet role, the For- eign Minister embarked on his own tour of Arab capitals-going to Damascus on February 27 and ~uiiU~~~H!1~4n'~ ~ ~ ~~I~IIIPV 'q~ ~~ ~m .,,awiwmnn~nll~,~iN11~ .,,~~;n maim unmu~~nnnun?i i ,~(V' ~~ ~np116 ',a1 ~~iH~liliH~~~,;. Gromyko and Jobert Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 SECRET YUGOSLAVIA: THIRD CONSTITUTION '~~ ?'Yugoslavia promulgated its third post-war constitution on February 21 with great pomp and circumstance but without President Tito, who 'was reportedly ill with a "cold." Many of his countrymen will see his absence as another sign that they may soon have to get along without him -~ ~~ jThe constitution is important to Tito be- ca se it attempts to codify his approach to ruling SECRET Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 Approved For Release 2007/11/19 :CIA-RDP79-00927A010700070001-8 `'~ SECRET `"~ Yugoslavia, and thus to ensure that his political and administrative concepts will continue to dom- inate national life. It also seeks to guarantee the survival of Yugoslavia's unique socialist system after his death. Under preparation for four years, the long and complicated document sets out in detail the future goals of workers' self-manage- ment and strengthens the party as the leading political force in the country. (~ff The composition of the collective presi- ~IdncJ, the highest level of state power, has been altered. It will now contain 9 instead of 23 mem- bers. President Tito will preside over this body during his lifetime but, upon his death, the posi- tion of chief of state will rotate among the mem- bers on an annual basis"l j The Yugoslavs now face the demanding task /of i~plementing the constitution in stages. If Tito remains physically and mentally active, it would greatly facilitate the process and provide for a smoother transition into the post-Tito era]~His absence from the promulgating ceremony, how-