WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010800050002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/21: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800050002-8
NOW
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
Secret
Secret
26 April 1974
No. 0017/74
Copy N!
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PMM
CONTENTS April26, 1974
1 Ode to Detente
2 Egypt-USSR: Adjusting Relations
I ? ieeiigence, repor is and analyzes siy? if-
week Through noon on Thursday. I t
rdinated with or preparers oy
arch, the Office of Strata:gic
of Science and Technology.
rehefisive treatment and the:relore
3 EC: Tensions Easing
4 France: Party Dissension
5 West Germany: Brandt and the Arabs
6 Warsaw Pact Summit: No Change
7 Romania: Wrestling with the Economy
8 Portugal: Military Uprising
8 Portuguese Africa: Lisbon's Black
Janissaries
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
10 Israel: A New Leader
11 Fighting on the Golan
12 USSR Offers More Aid to Syria
14 Ethiopia: Taking a Stand
15 Sri Lanka: Muzzling the Opposition
16 Afghanistan: More Soviet Arms
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
17 China: A Target Appears
18 South Vietnam: Keeping the Lid On
18 Cambodia: The Rural Campaign
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 OAS in Atlanta: A Positive Mood
21 Chile: On Trial
22 Colombia: Liberal Party Sweep
23 Bolivia: Banzer Yields
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Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summer
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The Soviet "peace offensive" came in for
fresh attention in Kremlin pronouncements over
the past week. Moscow is saying that the road to
international detente is littered with obstacles,
but that patient pursuit of Soviet policies will
lead to new successes. The defensive quality of
some of these statements suggests, however, that
the Soviet leaders are concerned that the near-
term outlook is not so bright]
~n a speech delivered earlier this week on the
occasion of the anniversary of Lenin's birth,
candidate Politburo member Ponomarev paid
customary tribute to Moscow's foreign policy and
to Brezhnev's personal role in formulating it. Mos-
cow's globalist policies, according to Ponomarev,
have produced concrete results, with the
Kremlin's voice now being listened to with
"massive attention" everywhere. Ponomarev
rioted that further "stubborn efforts" will be re-
quired if the "systematic provocations" against
Moscow's peace offensive are to be overcome, and
detente is to become irreversible. In a defensive
aside, Ponomarev asserted that there was no
reason to change Soviet foreign policy merely
because of "temporary political situations." Mos-
cow, he said, will continue to implement the
"peace policies" adopted at the 24th CPSU Con-
gress.1
a- ' Party leader Brezhnev also found an occa-
sion this week to speak out in behalf of detenteil
[Addressing the Soviet Communist youth congress
in Moscow, Brezhnev said that the words "peace
offensive" indeed aptly describe the Soviet for-
eign policy line, which is progressing steadfastly
though not without certain difficulties. Brezhnev
blamed the Maoists in Peking and imperialist
circles elsewhere for attempting to undermine
Soviet detente policies, but the Soviet leader
maintained that his gradualist, step-by-step ap-
proach would produce positive results.7
rA more-qualified assessment of the prospects
for detente was offered by Moscow's leading
Washingtonologist, Yury Arbatov, in a recent
article written especially for United Press Interna-
tional. Addressing US-Soviet relations, Arbatov
said that the improvement so far in bilateral rela-
tions may not prove to be lasting if steps are not
taken soon to give it more substance. Arbatov
argued that Soviet students of American affairs
regard the present US commitment to detente as
"very complicated and contradictory." He singled
out alleged US efforts to interfere in Soviet
internal affairs as endangering mutual trust and
confidence. If obstacles to trade and other eco-
nomic matters are not removed, Arbatov pro-
fessed, there may be a serious setback in relations.
In a possible allusion to Soviet preferences regard-
ing arms control issues that might be raised at the
forthcoming summit in Moscow, Arbatov warned
that the arms race may step up unless measures
are taken soon to go beyond the provisions of the
ABM treaty concluded in May 1972.
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Egypt-USSR: Adjusting Relations
[President Sadat publicly softened his tone
toward the Soviets last week, after several weeks
of belaboring them in speeches and interviews. At
the same time, however, he served notice on Mos-
cow that he wants to reduce the leverage it has on
him by virtue of Egypt's dependence on Soviet
military supplies. He is seeking, he said, to
diversify Egypt's source of arms?
Sadat's assertions of continued friendship
with Moscow, which have been absent in recent
months, raised the temperature of the relation-
ship only slightly above the frigid level. He con-
tinued to harp on points of difference, chiefly
over Soviet failure to deliver the arms Egypt ex-
pects, although he termed these differences "mis-
understandi.'gs" between friends]
He made something of an attempt to mollify
Soviet misgivings over his new foreign policy
orientation, noting that he seeks "positive neu-
trality" between the US and the USSR and does
not intend to maintain ties with one at the ex-
pense of the other. He reasserted, however, his
categorical rejection of any Soviet attempt to
dictate his domestic policy; Egypt's policies are
Egypt's business, he said, and outside comment-a
reference to the criticism of Soviet propagan-
dists-is in "bad taste." I
rSadat's emphasis on Moscow's alleged failure
to meet Egypt's arms demands is more an excuse
for his carping than the real reason for it, which
runs deeper. Sadat has always chafed at Egypt's
position as a Soviet client state. Egyptian military
achievements during the war have given Sadat a
sense of freedom from Soviet tutelage that he
could never before justify or successfully assert;
the role of the US in the negotiations since the
war has convinced him that Soviet political sup-
port is at present not necessary to reach a settle-
ment. I
k Sadat's continuing criticism of the Soviets is
also in part a reaction to charges from some
Egyptians and other Arabs that he has transferred
Egypt's dependence to the US. By characterizing
the Soviets as unreliable allies and the US as a
new but still not fully tested friend, he justifies
his turn toward Washington without seeming to
place too much reliance on the USA
4 (Finally, Sadat's portrayal of Moscow as a
friend that cannot be depended upon militarily is
designed to convince Syria, and other Arabs as
well, that political dependence on the Soviets also
does not pay off. Sadat suspects Moscow of
encouraging Syrian intransigence in disengage-
ment negotiations, and he is seeking to persuade
the Syrians they will achieve nothing by heeding
Moscow's advice.?
The Soviets are not likely to take much
comfort from Sadat's most recent expressions of
guarded friendship, although they might hope
that he is prepared to tone down the anti-Soviet
rhetoric. Moscow will interpret Sadat's reference
to weapons diversification, as Sadat intends, as a
signal that he will not be blackmailed into
changing his policies in exchange for Soviet hard-
ware. Sadat's assertion of Egyptian neutrality and
his positive references to the US will be seen,
moreover, as evidence that he has no present
intention of arresting Cairo's move toward a more
balanced foreign policy]
(The Soviets are continuing their indirect-
but nevertheless barbed-campaign to discredit
Sadat both within Egypt and among other Arabs.
Last week, for example, the Soviets apparently
were behind the publication in Beirut of "docu-
ments" defending the USSR against Sadat's
charges of lukewarm support during the October
war- I
- ]Party chief Brezhnev apparently responded
to some of Sadat's criticisms in a letter to the
Egyptian leader on April 23. According to the
Cairo press, Brezhnev replied to Sadat's proposal
for a meeting to discuss mutual problems, but
there is no indication of the nature of his reply.
The letter also reviewed Soviet attitudes toward
the Middle East situation. Again, there is no infor-
mation available on whether the letter mentioned
Soviet arms aid to Egypt
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EC Foreign Ministers
EC: TENSIONS EASING
At an informal meeting in West Germany
, last weekend, the EC foreign ministers seemed to
make some headway toward easing tensions
within the community. The complexion of this
meeting was in sharp contrast to the EC Council
session earlier this month, which had dwelled on
the potential crisis over British demands for
"renegotiation" of its membership.
The improved atmosphere among the eight
ministers---the caretaker Belgian Government was
not represented-was most obvious in the dia-
logue on "European union."
IThe response of the other foreign ministers
was vague. The notion was raised of retaining
national states and borders while, above the na-
I tional level, there would be a "federal or con-
federal level." Mention was made of a European
government with independent powers having a
parliament composed of a house of states and a
house of the peoples. EC Commission President
Ortoli, who was present, argued that these con-
cepts would tend to substitute intergovernmental
cooperation for integration./
Callaghan proposed that EC officials should,
without prior commitment, examine the various
t
meanings of European union and prepare a paper
for public debate. This proposal was not ac-
cepted, but the fact that it was made suggests that
the West Germans were successful last weekend in
their basic purpose of getting Callaghan to think
in terms of the community. The ministers agreed
that work would resume on the Political Com-
mittee's report on European Union. Callaghan
may now realize the UK is in as good a position
to influence this report as any other country?
rlt had been clear even in Luxembourg that
the new British minister found satisfaction in the
political consultations of the Nine although the
arcane mysteries of community bargaining were
tiring for him. Foreign Minister Scheel, now
phasing out of the ministry in expectation of
moving to the German presidency, may well feel
that helping to create a more reasonable attitude
on the part of the British makes up in part for the
lack of substantial positive achievements during
Germany's present six-month term as EC chair-
man7
[With respect to EC consultations with the
US, the French apparently gave way on their
previous insistence that the Nine consult only
after unanimous agreement among themselves.
They agreed that the Nine should use bilateral
channels fully and multilateral channels on occa-
sion.
(from left: Jobert, France; Callaghan, UK; Thorn, Luxembourg; Ortoli, EC
president; Vanderstoel, Netherlands; Scheel, W. Germany; Moro, Italy; Guldberg, Denmark)
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The EC members rejected the "organic"
link to the US suggested by Washington, but
remain divided on whether a requirement for con-
sultation should be incorporated into a US-
European declaration in the NATO context)
!The next steps in the European-Arab dia-
logue are likely to depend on an analysis of
Chancellor Brandt's recent visits to Algiers and
Cairo. Brandt publicly stated during his trip that
the organized dialogue will begin in the course of i
the year, but there is still no clear picture as to
what the form and content of that dialogue will
1-~
)Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the official Gaullist
presidential candidate, still has not gained his
party's full support and continues to slip further
behind Valery Giscard d'Estaing as well as Social-
ist Francois Mitterrand in public opinion polls.
)Staunch Gaullists who support Chaban have
threatened the dissidents, led by Interior Minister
Chirac, with expulsion from the party if they
explicitly endorse Giscard. Chirac is determined,
however, to continue meeting with the group of
about 40 Gaullist members of the legislature and
cabinet to plan behind-the-scenes su ort for
Giscard
-- I Interim President Alain Poher also is helping
Gisc'ardffPoher, who is president of the Senate,
shares that body's sense of gratitude for Giscard's
opposition in 1969 to De Gaulle's referendum
proposal, which would have taken away most of
the Senate's powers.)
' )Prime Minister Messmer on April 21 gave
Chaban a lukewarm endorsement but added that
he would not campaign for him before the first
round of the election. The Prime Minister, who
joined Chirac in two well-publicized efforts to
force Chaban to withdraw from the race, also
warned Chaban not to attack Giscard in the
campaign
The continued Gaullist dissidence-as well as
his own problems as a campaigner-precipitated
Chaban's slippage to several percentage points
behind Giscard in the latest series of public
opinion polll.1 Giscard's advisers expect Chaban's
well-organized campaign machinery to enable him
to pull ahead again in the polls, but they are
confident Giscard will beat him in the first round
on May 5. Giscard's improved performance in the
polls has stimulated contributions that have
begun to ease his campaign's financial problems/
On the left, Mitterrand's campaign is
advancing smoothly, but the Communists are
irritated over his efforts to appear more moder-
ate. Mitterrand had not consulted with the Com-
munists on his platform, and they were particu-
larly unhappy about his announced intention to
name a fellow Socialist as prime minister.F-
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4ftwl 5LUKI I
I k'o 1\fter his five-day trip to Algeria and Egypt,
,-,Chancellor Brandt seemed gratified that he had
succeeded in improving European-Arab, as well as
1 West German - Arab, relations. In both Algiers
and Cairo, the "European" aspect of Brandt's
visit--Germany currently is in the EC council
chair-was underscored.
on the Middle East. The German leader asserted
that a conference of Arab and European leaders
should be held before the end of the year. Brandt
also expressed his government's belief that the
final document emerging from the CSCE would
link European security to the evolution of events
in the Middle East
[Brandt's meetings with Algerian President J Brandt, the first Western head of govern-
Boumediene, which lasted a total of seven hours, ment to make an official visit to Egypt since the
established an easy, informal relationship between