WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5
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January 9, 2008
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July 19, 1974
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 -"oC 25X1 Secret Weekly Summary State Dept. review completed Secret No. 0029/74 DIA review(s) 19 July 1974 completed. COPY N2 70 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 ce. reports and analyzes signir- ;ek through noon on Thursdav. 't coordinated with or prepared ny r? the Office of Strateu c Science and Technoioav,,. Fnurehensive treatrnent and therefore CONTENTS (July 19, 1974) MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 4 Portugal: New Cabinet; Africa 6 France: Giscardis Foreign Policy 7 Dutch Equivocate on Defense Policy Western Europe: Labor Unity Iceland: Coalition Prospects Balkan Mavericks Meet Bulgaria: Leadership Changes USSR: Defense, Spending Rises USSR-Somalia:' Friendship Treaty? 15 Israel: The Palestine Question 15 Spanish Sahara: Controversy Rekindled 17 New Look in Arab Investments 17 Pakistan: Neighbor Troubles WESTERN HEMISPHERE 19 Argentina: Struggle on the Right 20 Chile: A Revamped Team 21 Uruguay: Institutional Solutions? 21 Mexico: The Figueroa Case 22 OAS: Loose Lid on the Cuba Issue EAST ASIA PACIFIC 24 South Vietnam: Ballots and Bullets 25 Laos: A New Crisis Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summer Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 -,. SE(rKL I _ CYPRUS AFTER THE COUP "i4 _ Gj The ouster of Archbishop Makarios by the Gre -led Cypriot National Guard on June 15 has touched off intensive diplomatic consultations and raised the real possibility of Turkish military intervention in the island state. The Turkish gov- ernment publicly professes to believe that the Greek junta instigated the coup to bring about enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, and Turkish armed forces have been preparing for a possible air and sea assault across the 50 miles of ocean between the southern coast of Turkey and Cyprus. Ground forces have been moved to the southern port of Mersin, and ships that could be used to transport them to Cyprus are in the area. On July 18, there were reports that a regiment- sized unit was boarding amphibious ships at a staging area west of Mersin. In addition, finds the new government of Nicos Sampson 5X1 ig totally unacceptable. The Soviet Union alsc, aircraft at two airfields west of Ankara- skisehir strongly opposes the take-over, and it is likely to and Baliskesir-have been armed with general- press for the return of Makarios to power. purpose bombs, air-to-air missiles, and air-to- Makarios' escape from the presidential palace complicated the task of consolidating the new government, despite the fact that the Na- tional Guard has succeeded in establishing control of the island. Makarios wants to bring his case before the UN in an effort to gain broad interna- tional support for his position as the legitimate leader of Cyprus. Before traveling to New York, Makarios held talks in London with British leaders London was also the scene this week of talks between Prime Minister Wilson and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit. Ecevit is apparently exploring all possibilities for either a peaceful resolution or for joint action with the British to restore the status quo on Cyprus. Under a 1960 treaty, Britain, Turkey, and Greece are guarantors of the in- dependence of Cyprus. Prior to the prime minis- ters' meeting, some Turkish diplomats had in- dicated their belief that London was inclined to accept the situation as it was evolving. If so, under the terms of the treaty Turkey would be free to act unilaterally; there are indications that they are resolved to do so, and that they are preparing militarily. Parliament was called into session on July 18 and was asked to give blanket approval for Ecevit's policies. While the Prime Minister has been consulting and waiting for the situation on Cyprus to clarify, anits at four Turkish airfields are on alert. ground missiles. A fighter bomber squadron, which was moved to Incirlik the day after the coup, is also armed with bombs and missiles. Although the armed forces of both Greece and Turkey have been in a general state of readiness as a result of the recent dispute over the Aegean seabed, there is no evidence of unusual activity or war preparations by the Greeks. The Greek army is, however, going ahead with a scheduled "rotation" of part of its 950-man force on Cyprus. Although Athens has denied the charge, the Turks have accused the Greeks of using the rotation as a cover to strengthen their forces on the island. In spite of the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots over Turkish Cypri- ots, and the presence of the 10,000-man Greek- led National Guard, the close proximity of the Turkish mainland would give the Turks the advantage in the event of hostilities. On Cyprus itself, the new Sampson govern- ment is trying to convey the feeling that it is in complete control. It has lifted the daylight curfew imposed when it first took over, although the nighttime restrictions remain in force. The new government is also seeking to reassure the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In a conversation on July 17 with newly installed Foreign Minister Dimitriou, a US official was told that the Sampson govern- ment will not attempt to achieve enosis and will welcome the continued existence of British bases on the island. Despite this seemingly moderate approach, Sampson is widely remembered as a SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 19, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 SECRET guerrilla assassin of both British subjects and Turkish Cypriots in the period prior to independ- ence, and has since then been a right-wing cham- pion of enosis. As such, he remains totally unac- ceptable to both Turkish Cypriots and Ankara. If Sampson is unable to consolidate his position-and there is growing talk of a possible 25X1 compromise replacement because of the strong international reaction to the coup-it could seriously weaken the position of the Greek strop man, General loannidis. Sampson with demonstrators in 1964 Balikesir }Eskisehir T U R K E Y *ATHENS r I EGYPT - \v *ANKARA Incirlik Mersin Adana Iskenderun LEBANON ISRAEL On July 17, Moscow issued an official state- ment which reiterated support for Cyprus' in- dependence, called for international support for Archbishop Makarios, and condemned Greek interference. The statement, however, was mod- erate in tone, avoiding threats or any assertions that the USSR sees its security affected by devel- opments on the island. The statement does not commit the Soviet Union to active assistance for any movement to return Makarios to power, although Moscow's initial comment on the coup had suggested that the USSR was holdin such a course open. It seems unlikely, however, that the Soviets have SECRET Finike Bay CYPRUS Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 19, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 SECRET made a firm commitment of military backing to the Turks. 11 DEVELOPMENTS AT T E UN The Security Cou cil took up the Cyprus issue on July 16. Secretary General Waldheim presented a brief report on the situation and explained his actions in granting Makarios "UN protection." He added that the mandate of the UN force on Cyprus did not allow it to intervene until continued violence ran the risk of involving the Turkish community. Despite the demands of the Cypriot representative for a resolution calling for a cease-fire and for withdrawal of all Greek National Guard officers from the island, the Council meeting ended inconclusively and no resolutions were tabled. 25X6 While awaiting the arrival of Makarios to address the Security Council-perhaps on July 19-UN activity has centered on informal discus- sions of draft resolutions. Makarios has already declared that the final resolution must provide for recognition of himself as the legitimate head of government, withdrawal of all Greek National Guard officers, and a pledge by Athens not to recognize the Sampson government. The British are circulating a compromise resolution that pro- vides for the withdrawal of the Greek officers but only obliquely recognizes Makarios' legitimacy. The legal and political consequences of rec- ognizing Makarios as the legitimate head of state, meanwhile, continue to cause concern. The non- aligned members of the Council originally took the lead in drawing up a proposal that pointedly avoided the question of Makarios' legitimacy and called only for largely noncontroversial actions by the concerned states, but there were later indica- tions that they intend to take a more active role in supporting Cyprus, one of the original members of the nonaligned movement. Soviet tactics and Chinese intentions remain largely unclear. The Soviets supported the Cypriot demands at the Security Council meeting on July 16 and urged the council to take decisive steps to end the armed interference in Cyprus. The Chinese did not speak at the meeting and appear to have remained in the background in the discussions regarding the proposed resolutions.' THE ATTITUDE OF THE WEST-ERN ALLIES In Western Europe, virtua y all reaction to the oup stressed the strategic importance of the island. Condemnation of Greece was almost universal and popular feeling generally favored a restoration of Makarios. At the same time, there is little taste for military intervention and a pref- erence for solutions being worked out through NATO and the UN. 25X6 Faced with a crisis between two of its NATO allies, who-like Britain-are also guarantors of Cyprus' independence, London has decided to take a hard line toward Athens. The Wilson gov- ernment, with strong parliamentary support, has sent a demarche to Athens calling on it to replace the Greek officers serving in Cyprus. The NATO allies have held three special ses- sions to consider possible steps to ease the crisis. Most members were highly critical of Greece and endorsed London's suggestion to replace the Greek officers now with the Cypriot National Guard and expressed support for the regime of Archbishop Makarios. The allies also called on Greece to consult fully both in the council and under the 1960 Cyprus agreements.\ SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 19, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 MWWW% SECRET The installation on July 19 of a new cabinet headed by Colonel Vasco Goncalves as Prime Minister has ended the political crisis that erupted ten days ago following the resignation of prime minister Palma Carlos and four other centrists and the subsequent dismissal of the rest of his cabinet. The most striking characteristic of the new cabi- net is the increased prominence of the organizers of the April coup. Although clearly in control since then, they have preferred to avoid the lime- light. The political coloration of several ministers is not yet known. The changes, however, appear to have been made to ensure that the major aims of the Armed Forces Movement-to restore democracy and end the wars in Africa-are carried out.! Although the new cabinet contains a ma- jorit of civilians drawn from the parties repre- sented in its predecessor, the military make up the largest unified group. The seven officers in the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, are drawn mostly from the Armed Forces Movement, which engineered the coup. In addition to getting two ministers without portfolio, the military took over the key ministries of interior, information, and labor. They retained the Defense Ministry, which will continue to be occupied by Colonel Mario Miguel, who was President Spinola's origi- nal choice for prime minister The Communists do not seem to have been especially favored in the cabinet reshuffle. Unless they gained some of the three ministries filled by appointees whose political coloration is not yet known, the Communists may have suffered a real loss. They did not retain the Labor Ministry, nor did they gain the interior and information minis- tries, as they would have liked. Their leader, Alvaro Cunha], did retain his position as a minis- ter without portfolio. IThe Socialists have the greatest number of hovers. Mario Soares, the Socialist Party secre- tary general, stayed on as foreign minister, and party loyalists held on to the justice and inter- territorial-relations portfolios. The centrists have only one carry-over, Joaquin Magalhaes Mota, who moved from interior to minister without portfolio. Two centrist economists will head the separate ministries of finance and economy'. i (Perhaps as a result of the outgoing cabinet's difficulties in controlling labor unrest, President Spinola and his military advisers have taken addi- tional steps to maintain control. A decree issued last week established a Continental Operations Command empowered to intervene directly in the maintenance and re-establishment of order when normal police forces are inadequate. Although the command will be directed by General Francisco d a Costa Gomes, chief of the armed forces General Staff and a close supporter of General Spinola, the Armed Forces Movement will be able to keep close tabs on the new command through Otelo de Carvalho, one of the leaders of the Movement who was appointed deputy chief of the new group and als made commander of the Lisbon Military District Now that members of the Armed Forces Movement are assuming more prominent roles in the government, their political orientation will be- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 SECRET come clearer. From the time the group was organ- ized several years ago as the "captains' move- ment," a minority of these officers has been reported to have leftist leanings. The main orien- tation of the Movement, however, is considered to have been reformist and nationalist, and these ideas likely still predominate, although it is possi- ble that leftists may be making some inroads.) ~pinola's political problems had little impact `n the African territories, as the new government will reiterate Lisbon's commitment to self-deter- mination for the territories. In Portuguese Guinea, a final agreement between Portugal and the rebels is apparently at hand. An upsurge in rebel activity in Mozambique and racial disturb- ances in Angola, however, have provided Lisbon with new reminders that its authority in those territories is eroding. `; LL Despite the month-long suspension of talks between Lisbon and the rebels in Portuguese passe in negotiations, evidence is accumulating that Lisbon secretly offered major concessions to the insurgents before Spinola dismissed his cabi- net last week. Portuguese officials, including Foreign Minister Soares and the governor of the territory, apparently were confident that the rebels would accept the concessions and that an agreement could be announced in the near future. Changes in the Portuguese government are not likely to affect adversely any pending agreement, although formal announcement could be delayed. An agreement probably would be based on Lis- bon's recognition of the rebels' "Republic of Guinea-Bissau" in exchange for the rebels' agree- ment that the Cape Verde Islands be treated as a separate issue. The rebels have long claimed to represent the islands, while Lisbon wants to retain them because of their strategic value] fin Mozambique, the cease-fire negotiations were stalled before the cabinet crisis. Soares claimed that secret talks were taking place, but this seems unlikely in view of a sudden increase in guerrilla activity during the past week, clearly de- signed to press Lisbon at a time of political un- certainty. Last week, the rebels opened a new front in Zambezia District in central Mozambique near the Malawi border, an area where they have not been active since the late 1960s. The rebels also increased their attacks on transportation lines to the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project, a major rebel target for several years.] I In Angola, Lisbon faces more problems from lt',e local population than it does from the insur- gents, who remain as divided as ever. The murder of a white taxi driver in Luanda last week sparked a number of racial clashes and demonstrations. Authorities eventually restored order but not be- fore some 30 persons had been killed. Scattered incidents of looting and vandalism continued to be reported at week's end. A special mission has arrived from Lisbon to investigate the disturb- ances ~he clashes were instigated by vengeful white taxi drivers, who are well-armed, quick on the trigger, and notoriously anti-black. Some local officials suspect that black counter- demonstrations were spurred by agitators sup- porting the insurgent Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola? )Angolans, both black and white, seem more uncertain about their future relationship with Lisbon than do people in Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, where it is widely assumed that ac- commodation with insurgents and subsequent in- dependence is only a matter of time. The absence of talks with the Angolan insurgents, together with Lisbon's failure to show support for in- creased local autonomy is enough to make many Angolans fear-unrealistically-that Lisbon has no intention of loosening its grip on the territory. SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 SECRE I FRANCE: GISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICY Foreign policy, overshadowed until recently by pressing domestic problems, may receive more attention now that France has assumed the EC presidency for the next six months. President Giscard emphasizes that his foreign policy will not differ markedly from that of his Gaullist predecessors. There has already been a lessening of tensions in Atlantic relations, however, and this has led Atlanticists and Europeanists alike to look to Paris for increased flexibility. [Giscard has made it clear that relations with the EC will take precedence in French foreign policy. France has reaffirmed the objective of European union by 1980, and Prime Minister Chirac has already promised an early French initiative to achieve this goal. Some of the meas- ures possibly under consideration by the Quai are: Strengthening the EC parliament, with the possibility of direct elections. ? Establishment of an EC political secre- tariat, presumably in Paris. ? Creation of an embryonic "European executive" through periodic, institutionalized EC summits/ Giscard hopes to convene an EC summit later this year, by which time France and Italy are expected to have stabilized their economies and the UK will have held its anticipated election.] wants to participate in the follow-up activities to the Washington Energy Conference, and that it would like this to take place in the framework of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Devel opmentl 3 iscard and other French officials have indi- cated that they will try to improve relations with the US. Although the atmosphere has warmed perceptibly, Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues has privately urged the US to avoid public statements concerning improvements in French-US relations, which could alienate the Gaullists upon whom iscard depends for his parliamentary majority. he US embassy in Paris, though optimistic about the possibility of better relations, warns that major differences will remain. As reasons, the em- bassy cites French opposition to links between the US and the EC, as well as French suspicion of US-Soviet detente and their insistence on in- dependence of action in dealing with the Arabs. I l Trench relations with the USSR will con- tinbe on a reasonably steady course, but the "special" nature of French-Soviet political contacts has lost its luster. The emphasis will in- lRelations with Germany will be a key factor ) 7creasingly be on economic exchanges and indus- ? ?a+ on GGiscard and Itrial cooneration. Numerous sources of friction r .._ n min- the French Chancellor Schmidt have already met twice since taking over their respective governments. Their remain, however, and in mid-July ister of economics and finance warned Moscow that its recent price hike on raw materials may block development of trade between the two countries. Another sour note has been sounded by reports that Michel Poniatowski, Giscard's out- spokenly anti-Communist minister of the interior, wants to reduce the Soviet diplomatic presence in France. meetings have concentrated largely on economic issues Energy policy remains of paramount impor- tan to Giscard. There are signs that France SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 19, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 JCL NC I The Dutch government is attempting to ap- pease domestic critics who are demanding a re- duction in the defense budget by hinting that it is prepared to re-examine The Hague's commitment to its Western allies to retain current troop levels if the MBFR negotiations break down. In recent interviews, both Prime Minister den Uyl and Defense Minister Vredeling have made it clear that the Dutch will feel free to cut their troop levels if the force reduction talks collapse., Fin response to queries from their NATO allies, however, the Dutch have been more equiv- ocal and heave tried to avoid being pinned down on the course of action they intend to pursue if the MBFR talks fail. The original Dutch defense white paper, submitted to NATO for consultation on May :21, simply outlined projected force reductions? The draft ten-year plan would sig- nificantly decrease the number of active bat- talions in the Dutch army and reduce air force and naval strength. The plan also calls for the replacement of 102 F-104s.1 1 IThe reaction of the Netherlands' NATO partners to the original white paper was quick and sharp. Their major objection centered on the pro- posed reductions in the armed forces. The Belgian representative, describing the plan as "dis- astrous," said that it would increase the defense burdens of the other allies, violate Dutch defense commitments to NATO, a d could lead to similar actions by other members, A. Lin response to this strong criticism, Dutch that the Netherlands intended to link the reduc- tions to a successful conclusion of the MBFR talks. He further clarified the Dutch position in a statement on June 24, in which he told the al- liance's Defense Planning Committee that the ready strength of the Dutch army would not be reduced as long as the negotiations were stil going on and had not achieved "desirable results." \Den Uyl and Vredeling, both political prag- matists, have been forced to walk a narrow path 25X1 between the three leftist parties in the coalition, who are pledged to reduce defense spending, and the two pro-NATO coalition parties, who have threatened to leave the government if a defense plan satisfactory to NATO cannot be worked SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 19, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 he European Trade Union Confederation decided last week to admit the Communist- - dominated Italian federation to membership. The move breaks a 25-year-old ban on Communist participation in West European regional trade union affairs. It also means that virtually all major factions of organized labor in Western Europe are now represented in a single confederation ment of their nationals, has also been evident among those fostering the regional labor group- ing. Organized labor in countries where migrants are numerous, however, may be reluctant to press for effective action. -I )A favorable decision on the Italian applica- tion had been building for some months. It received a decisive boost when the Italians moved away from total adherence to the pro-Soviet World Federation of Trade Unions, claiming to hold only "associate" membership., )Separate consideration of the Communist-? dominated federation of France also helped the Italians. In early 1973, members of the European Confederation felt that admitting Italy would commit them to accepting the French also, a move they were reluctant to take. The French federation is less acceptable because it has histori- cally been more responsive to Soviet direction and takes a less favorable stand on the EC. In addition, the relative unity of the Italian labor movement contrasts sharply with the divisions on the French labor scene.? The 17-month-old confederation has de- voted much of its time to organizational ques- tions and has been relatively ineffective as a pres- sure group. Now that the key membership issues have been decided, however, active programs may be in prospect. Proponents of a regional labor organization of Western Europe have had their eye on a number of possibilities, including coordi- nated efforts to win concessions from multi- national corporations, and lobbying for labor in- terests in the EC, especially on social policy] [Concern for the protection of migrant workers, who are being threatened as a number of governments take steps to safeguard the employ- ICELAND: COALITION PROSPECTS The conservative Independence Party seems to be having difficulty putting together a coali- tion, despite the relatively strong mandate the party received in the election last month. Party chairman Gier Hallgrimsson, named formateur on July 5, was expected to take several weeks to form a new government, presumably with the Progressives, the main partner of the outgoing three-party, center-left coalition. Developments have been slow, however, and recent reports sug- gest that the conservatives are less optimistic now than they were immediately following the elec- tion.7 The Progressives, the second largest party in parliament, probably would be asked to form a government if Hallgrimsson fails. Such a move would have an adverse effect on negotiations to retain the US-manned NATO base at Keflavik. Nevertheless, Hallgrimsson's position re- mains basically strong, and he apparently intends to continue to try to form a government despite the handicaps he faces. His party won more seats in the last election than at any time since World War II. Furthermore, the stand taken by the Independence Party in favor of retaining the US- manned NATO base in pretty much its present form was approved by more than 50,000 citizens who signed a pro-base petition earlier this year. Hallgrimsson has recently tried to shift public attention away from the defense issue, however, and he is now concentrating on Iceland's pressing economic problems. He blames the former government for the soaring inflation which is running at an annual rate of about 45 percent. SECRET Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 1-9, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 W I= HN 't [wit A&k~ 1%00 Ceausescu and Tito meet _h1_1 972 BALKAN MAVERICKS MEET resident Tito's visit to Romaniafm July 8 to 11 refurbished the image of good relations between Belgrade and Bucharest and allowed the two leaders to narrow some areas of disagree- ment. At the time of the Arab-Israeli war last October, for example, Yugoslavia backed the Arab cause without reservation, while Romania maintained full diplomatic and economic ties with both Israel and the principal Arab antag- onists. In the communique, Tito and Ceausescu called for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory, but also urged that the sovereignty and integrity of all states in the region be pro- tected. The communique toned down Yugoslav irri- tation over Romania's efforts to play a greater role in the Third World. In addition, the two leaders praised nonalignment as "an important factor in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism." They also smoothed over their differences about Balkan cooperation by returning to their earlier position that the coun- tries in the region should conduct their relations without outside interference, particularly by the great powers. The two leaders devoted particular attention to the sensitive problem of minorities. Ceausescu, in effect, lined up on the side of Tito in Yugoslavia's feud with Bulgaria over the Macedonian problem. The communique expressed satisfaction with the development of bilateral party relations based on the principles of "independence, equality, noninterference, and responsibility of each party to its working class." The two sides pledged to work for greater unity among all parties- presumably including the Chinese-on the basis of these principles. The only state-to-state agreement signed, however, was a long-range economic, technical, and scientific accord. All the same, the 12th meeting between Tito and Ceausescu in nine years a ears to have one better than ex pected. BULGARIA: EARSHIP CHANGES Recent p rsonri?el shifts in the party and stat hierarchy are designed to strengthen the hand of hard liners who fear detente and to improve the performance of the economy. The party changes, announced at a Central Committee plenum on July 3, include the promo- tion of two members of the Secretariat to concur- rent full membership on the Politburo and the naming of four new candidate Politburo mem- bers. Three candidate members were removed. The chief gainers are Aleksandur Lilov, the party's ideological watchdog, and Georgi Filipov, an expert economist and planner. Lilov's promotion confirms his status as a very promising comer. He also was the spokesman for Bulgaria's stringent ideological guidelines for detente. The most important of the new candidate- members are Minister of Defense Dzhurov, and 38-year-old Foreign Minister Mladenov, who is the youngest member of the leadership. The other new candidate-members are the party first sec- retaries in Varna and Plovdiv. The major loser in the party is 44-year-old Ivan Abadzhiev, who had risen rapidly in recent years to become the third-ranking man in the party hierarchy. Abadzhiev may have been the target of Lilov's accusation in February that there was ideological weakness in the party itself and that some people "even in high positions" did not understand what detente was all about. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jul 19, 74 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 Approved For Release 2008/01/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A010800170002-5 AMR% StLI-(t I IT USSR: DEFENSE SPENDING RISES ;d AF Soviet defense sperling grew by more than 5 percent in 1973, following a period of little change between 1970 and 1972. Based on projections of future Soviet forces, an increase of roughly the same size should occur in both 1974 and 1975. Such growth is substan- tially above the long-run annual rate of increase, which has averaged less than 3 percent since 1960. Soviet defense expenditures (not including -civilian" space programs) are estimated at about 25.5 billion rubles for 1974. The estimated equiv- alent dollar cost of the 1974 Soviet defense effort-what it would cost to purchase and oper- ate Soviet military forces in the US-is approxi- mately $93 billion. The increase in spending from 23.1 billion rubles in 1972 to 26.8 billion rubles in 1975 is due primarily to the extensive modernization of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Soviets are replacing a large portion of the SS-11 force. In Estimated Soviet Defense Expenditures (Billions of 1970 Rubles) SOI~%N