WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
Secret
No. 0037/74
13 September 1974
copy N2 59
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CONTENTS (September 13,1974)
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology,
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
25X1 contents.
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be directed to
the editor of the Weekly Summary,
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
2
Japan - South Korea: Crisis Worsens
3
South Vietnam: Fighting May Get Heavier
4
New Zealand: New Leadership
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
5
Mozambique: Independence Set
6
Egypt: Nudging the PLO
7
Ethiopia: End of a Reign
8
India-USSR: Asking for Food
9
UK: Election in Prospect
10
Cyprus
12
EC: The Dubious Prospect
13
Portugal: Domestic Flux
14
Bulgaria: The 30th Anniversary
14
Grornyko Sets Visit to Bonn
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
15
Argentina: The Peronist Left
16
OAS To Consider Cuba
17
Bolivia: Elections-Promise or Ruse?
17
Mexico: Kidnaping Victims Saved
18
Chile: A Year Later
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lfto~ btu ht I
CHINA
CHOU'S HEALTH AGAIN of prior official commitments, was related to a
meeting with MaolFThe Chairman has been vaca-
VFor a while last week, it looked as though tioning at a resort area outside Peking. Although
the eathwatch over ailing Premier Chou En-lai he usually receives foreign visitors in his own
`had begun, but press speculation proved to be a residence, his meeting last week with the visiting
false alarm. Chou's physical condition is report- Togolese President was not said to have taken
edly worse than it was last July, when he received place at his residence, and it appeared from
Senator Henry Jackson in a hospital room. Later photographs to have been held at another site
erang
id ec
b i
p
was sa
that monin, Chou ou nicely, but since then he has apparently slipped -Meanwhile, vice premiers Teng Hsiao-ping
backward. There is as yet no evidence that the and Li Hsien-nien continue to divide representa-
Premier has suffered another acute heart seizure tional duties in Chou's absence. Both have re-
of the sort that hospitalized him last summer. He cently played host to visiting heads of state and
is evidently seriously-but not critically-ill) have stated explicitly that they were acting on
Chou's behalf. The Premier's wife, who herself
\Rumors that Chou's health had taken a sud- has been ailing for sever. I years, has also been on
den turn for the worse were sparked by inac- hand to greet the visitors
curate press reports that several high ranking
Chinese officials had been abruptly called away
from a banquet given by the visiting US congres- I ~hinese media continue to keep Chou's
sional delegatior1 In fact, the two relatively low- name before the public in an apparent effort to
3 level officials who left the banquet had explained convey the impression that the Premier is still
in advance that they would be able to stay only functioning and, more importantly, to forestall
long enough to greet their hosts -'speculation that he is in political troublee[A num-
ber of messages bearing Chou's signature have
lBoth officials-one is reputedly Mao's recently been sent to foreign governments and,
niece-seem to have frequent and ready access to just this week, the President of Mauritania re-
the Chairman. It is possible that their brief ap- ceived an invitation to visit China issued in the
pearance at the banquet, excused on the grounds name of the Premier.
Chou En-lai and others leave reception in August
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v`vi .L I
JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: CRISIS WORSENS
)1j (President Pak is taking an extremely hard
j,- line, especially on the need for a crackdown on
Chosen Soren, the association of pro-Pyongyang
Koreans in Japan, in order to:
? put the organization on the defensive,
and reinforce his claim that opposition to his
regime is inspired by outside elements,
? divert attention from his own domestic
troubles,
? and perhaps most important in the
longer term, cause bad blood between Japan
and North Korea, as Chosen Soren is an in-
strument of the Pyongyang regime. Pak may
believe that this would deflect any possible
Japanese move toward a more neutral posi-
tion between the two Koreas:?
rl Ll Suspicions about Tokyo's motives, as well as
mor emotional anti-Japanese sentiment, were no
doubt heightened by what Seoul regarded as a
callous initial reaction in Tokyo to the assassina-
tion incident. While Seoul was accusing North
Korea of having a hand in the affair, Japanese
officials made a number of ill-timed public state-
ments, such as that of Foreign Minister Kimura
discounting the "threat from the North." This
statement-when qualified as it later was-did not
deviate from established Japanese policy, but it
appeared in Seoul to reflect at best insensitivity
to South Korean interests, and perhaps deliberate
attempts by Tokyo to put some distance between
itself and the Pak regime. 7
)( Even if the immediate impasse is resolved,
Seoul-Tokyo difficulties will continue since they
are part of a continuing process of adjustment by
two close allies of the United States to the
changing environment in East Asia. To some
extent, the events reflect South Korean fears of
abandonment in an era of detente and, in Tokyo,
Japan's increasingly ambivalent attitude toward
the South in its competition with the
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South Vietnam
FIGHTING MAY GET HEAVIER
10 Fighting continues to be brisk in the north-
ern provinces, but has slackened off in the south.
Communist forces have not attempted to make a
major push against the former imperial capital of
Hue, but they have forced the government to
withdraw from positions south of the city that
were close to populated areas and Route 1. On
two occasions, North Vietnamese troops have
temporarily interdicted Route 1 between Da
Nang and Hue, demonstrating their potential for
disrupting land resupply of government forces in
the north in the event of heavier action."
SA more interesting development, involving
main forces on both sides, could be shaping up
near the former district capital of Thuong Duc in
Quang Nam Province. The First Brigade of the
government's crack Airborne Division has been
cautiously preparing to retake this district town,
which was captured by the Communists this sum-
mer. The government forces have been moving
slowly to control the high ground before mount-
ing an ass, ult on the town, which lies at the head
of a valley
the Communists have now move
regim is of their 304th Division into positions
from which they hope to hit the flanks of the
Airborne forces. In response to this move, South
Vietnamese commanders are planning new rein-
forcements for their units-1
)b \Positional battles such as the one that may
be developing around Thuong Duc have become
increasingly characteristic of the war since the
first of the year. In the past, South Vietnamese
counterattacks usually quickly forced Communist
forces from towns they had captured. Now, the
Communists have the advantage of a logistic net-
work developed since the cease-fire, which pro-
vides them with the maneuver and supply capa-
bility to defend some of the positions they have
captured. Also, recent reductions in the amount
of ammunition and air support provided to gov-
ernment infantry forces will further restrict South
Vietnamese efforts:;
It) frhe Communists would like to inflict a sub-
stantial defeat on the crack First Airborne Bri-
gade, which they believe would adversely affect
the morale of other South Vietnamese units. F
another good boutti i -
namese unit, the 1s Infantry Division, has taken
heavy casualties in fighting during the past two
weeks in southern Thua Thien Province. Two of
its regiments are now said to be "almost combat
ineffective." If both the 1st and Airborne Divi-
sions sustain substantial losses, this would con-
stitute a serious setback for the government.
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Sep 13, 74
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NEW ZEALAND: NEW LEADERSHIP
' 3 U he New Zealand Labor Party's selection
)ecently Rowling has been friendly toward the US.
last week of Wallace Rowling as prime minister He signaled his interest in maintaining
will ease the party's feeling of being cast adrift bye New Zealand's cordial relationship with the US
the sudden end of Norman Kirk's ten-year domi- by giving first place to the US ambassador in the
nance. Rowling is intelligent and capable, and courtesy calls normally tendered a new head of
projects confidence-qualities that will stand him 21governrrrent. Rowling's only stand that might
in good stead in filling the leadership gap left by affect US interests has been his advocacy of strict
Kirk's unexpected death]LAs a conservative controls on investment in New Zealand by
OLaborite, Bowling did not have trade union back- multinational companies. The new Prime Minister
ing for the prime ministership, but he is never- has no record in foreign policy, but his decision
theless widely accepted in the party, which will to handle foreign affairs himself was intended to
help him to consolidate his hold demonstrate that there will be no break with the
Rowling will be a strong standard-bearer in
the general election that the party anticipates is
still over a year away. A seasoned and wily poli-
tician, he is probably the Laborite most able to
match the aggressive style of Robert Muldoon,
the new head of the opposition National Party.
The opposition already looks like it is campaign-
ing, even though-in view of Labor's strong hold
on parliament--it has no hope of forcing early
elections:]
Kirk government's policie3)
-0 fhe selection of leftist-leaning Robert Tizard
as deputy prime minister strikes an ideological
balance to Rowling that is important in the
diverse Labor Party. Tizard held the health and
public service portfolios under Kirk, and his
handling of these two important jobs established
his reputation in new Zealand's welfare-oriented
government. In the new administration, Tizard
takes over Rowling's old job as minister of fi-
Tizard and Rowling
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MOZAMBIQUE: INDEPENDENCE SET
d-5_/Lisbon and the black insurgent Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique signed an agreement in
Lusaka, Zambia, last weekend providing for the
independence of Mozambique next June and the
immediate installation of a joint Front-Portuguese
transitional government. The signing provoked a
short-lived rebellion by dissident whites demand-
ing that all of Mozambique's political groups be
represented in the interim regim4.
2s 1The dissidents seized two radio stations in
Lourenco Marques and temporarily occupied the
airport. Although Lisbon ordered reinforcements
from northern Mozambique into the capital, mili-
tary forces acted with restraint in order to avoid
violence. Nevertheless, demonstrations both sup-
porting and opposing the rebellion broke out in
Lourenco Marques and in the port city of Beira
during which as many as 100 persons were killed
or injured. The white dissidents finally agreed to
give up in order to avoid further bloodshed. The
rebellion sparked a black backlash in the suburbs
of Lourenco Marques, where it was interpreted as
an attempt by white separatists to seize control of
the government. Local authorities in Lourenco
Marques declared martial law in order to stem a
wave of vandalism, looting, and arsonl
Discouraging protest
"~buring their incipient rebellion, the dissi-
d nts met with two special representatives sent by
President Spinola to hear their grievances. Al-
though they may have received some encourage-
ment that their demands would be considered by
Lisbon, it seems unlikely that they gained any
concessions. Lisbon cannot revoke its agreement
with the Front, and the Front is not likely to
consider modifying the agreement to allow its
political enemies a role in the transitional
government'1
5 [The dissidents were able to publicize the
unrepresentative nature of the interim govern-
ment, however, and it appears that their action
attracted considerable sympathy, if little active
backing, from numerous political organizations in
the territory. These organizations-made up of
whites, blacks, and mulattoes-adamantly oppose
a Front "take-over" and may be encouraged to
make another attempt to derail the transitional
government?
a Vhe transitional period legally took effect
upon the signing of the Lusaka agreement on
September 7. Front officials announced on Sep-
tember 9 that they will be ready to move into
Lourenco Marques next week to begin setting up
the transitional government. Under terms of the
agreement, the Front will appoint a prime minis-
ter and two thirds of a nine-member cabinet. The
Portuguese will be represented by a high com-
missioner and the remaining cabinet members.
he two sides will establish a joint military com-
mission, with equal representation, to deal with
security problems. The Front, with only about
3,000 armed troops, would be hard-pressed to
quell any disorders without active Portuguese
)
assistancet
Even without further dissidence, the transi-
tion l government faces a broad array of prob-
lems. Front leaders have been living in exile
throughout their insurgency and are not ac-
quainted with the complex economic structure
and social needs of Mozambique. For some time
to come, they will need to rely heavily on Portu-
guese technical expertise if they are to be ready
to assume full power next June.
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EGYPT: NUDGING THE PLO
Vin an effort to bring the Palestinians to a
long-delayed decision to commit themselves to
peace negotiations in concert with Jordan, Presi-
dent Sadat has leavened his privately tough
approach to the Palestine Liberation Organization
with public sweeteners:(
The Egyptians are vigorously supporting a
PLO-initiated strategy to bring the Palestinian
problem to greater world attention by raising the
issue as an agenda item at the UN General
Assembly session that begins next week.)
t the UN, the PLO is seeking the right to
address the General Assembly, as well as a resolu-
tion focusing on the Palestinian situation as a
separate political issue rather than as a refugee
problem solely of humanitarian concern. Presi-
dent Sadat apparently sees support for the PLO's
UN effort as a relatively painless trade-off for his
demand that the organization acquiesce, as Sadat
has done, in Jordan's right to negotiate for the
return of the Israeli-occupied West Bank)
UJ (Although the Arabs have not yet developed
their UN strategy, the broad outlines set out in a
statement of policy by the Arab League last week
envision a UN resolution confirming the basic
political rights of the Palestinian people, par-
ticularly that of self-determination. From the
Egyptian viewpoint, the promise of self-determi-
=nation, backed by the UN assembly, would give
the Palestinians hope of establishing a future
separate state on the West Bank after Jordanian-
Israeli negotiations for the territory
`Sadat is undoubtedly counting on this to
'ae JPalestinian inhibitions about participating in
those negotiations, as an interested party if not
initially as a principal. The Egyptians have begun
canvassing for support of the resolution from key
UN members!
Cairo's efforts have as yet produced no re-
sults. For two months, the PLO has refused to
attend a tripartite conference with Egypt pnd
Syria for the purpose of reaching an agreed Arab
negotiating stance. The PLO reportedly reiterated
its refusal to attend during an executive com-
Sadat's balancing act
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JCUrAC I N..r%
ETHIOPIA: END OF A REIGN
By removing Emperor Haile Selassie on
September 12, the Armed Forces Coordinating
Committee has further strengthened its control of
the government. The committee-formally
designating itself the Provisional Military Govern-
ment-also named General Aman, who has been
defense minister, as chairman of the provisional
government and prime minister. Aman is popular
with the military and has been taking on in-
creasing importance in the government in recent
weeks. He is believed to be working with the
more moderate forces on the committee. Other3f
cabinet changes are likely. The committee has
been working through the facade of a civilian
prime minister and a largely civilian cabinet for
several months.
favor the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy and reconciliation of the disparate ele-
ments in Ethi ian society apparently still have
the upper hand
he forced removal of Haile Selassie appears
to h Ave been carefully prepared, and the com-
mittee may be able to continue to guide the
revolution in a generally bloodless manner. So far,
there have been no reports of unrest or demon-
strations of support for Haile Selassie in the rural
areas, once his stronghold. Moderate members of
the committee, however, may have difficulty con-
-trolling radical students and military elements
who are demanding that the measured pace of the
revolution be intensified.(
3' \In other moves, the committee dissolved
parliament, suspended the constitution, banned
strikes and demonstrations, and imposed a 357 prospects for avoiding violence may depend
curfew. It plans to set up a military tribunal to on what happens to Haile Selassie, who is being
try government officials charged with corruptioM detained at 4th Division headquarters in Addis
Ababa along with other nobles rounded up
Haile Selassie's ailing son, 57-year-old Crown~J earlier. Anti-monarchist sentiment is running high
rrince Asfa Wossen, was chosen to succeed to the in Addis Ababa, and radicals on the committee
throne, but the committee stated that he would 35 have been pressing for Haile Selassie's trial and
t b in
e
J
be a "figurehead" and would carry the title of possible execution. Moderates appear o
"king," a step below an emperor in Ethiopia's favor of allowing the 82-year-old deposed mon-
royal hierarchy. Since early 1973 the Crown arch to live out his years at one of his countryside
Prince has been living in Europe where he has palaces. At present, the committee is apparently
been slowly recovering from a stroke that left him concentrating on overcoming Haile Selassie's re-
seriously incapacitated. An unassertive person ported resistance to its demands that he yield his
when he was well, he would be easily manipulated overseas assets?
by the committee
tAsfa Wossen may be unwilling to return, 3c he committee will probably be preoccupied
however. He may be frightened off by the treat- for some time with domestic matters, and the
ment meted out to his father, the recent arrests of removal of Haile Selassie is unlikely to bring any
other close relatives, and the military committee's immediate shift in the government's foreign
harsh public statements against the entire royal 3, policy. Although there have been some reports
family that the government has been looking for Soviet
't has enerall retained its ties to the West.
y
,IS -Yin that event, the military may turn to Asfa
Wossen's 21-year-old son, Prince Zara Yacob, or it
may take the occasion to abolish the monarchy
and establish a republic. Radicals in the com-
mittee have been pushing hard for such a move.
As of now, moderate committee members who
i
arms, g
Following the removal of the Emperor, some
preliminary foreign policy guidelines were issued.
They provide that the government will maintain a
"nonaligned" foreign policy, respect Ethiopia's
international obligations, and strengthen ties with
all African countries.
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INDIA-USSR: ASKING FOR FOOD
C
oreign Minister Swaran Singh visited Mos-
cow this week to stress Ipdia's economic needs.
Singh received a cordial reception, including a
meeting with party chief Brezhnev on September
10, but he apparently was unable to extract a
promise of a sizable loan of food grain.
S9 JLast year, when the Soviets had a good har-
vestY, they loaned India two million tons of wheat.
GNew Delhi apparently would like a similar
amount this year, but the prospects for the Soviet
harvest in 1974 are not encouraging. Although
Brezhnev characterized the harvest overall as "not
bad" in a speech on September 7, he acknowl-
edged that the situation in the important wheat-
growing areas of the eastern USSR, hard hit by
drought, was "not entirely favorable.'`
~t'I Moscow may also be reluctant to hand over
morel food grain for fear that responding to
Indian requests two years running might imply a
continuing commitment. The magnitude of
India's needs would place a heavy demand on the
Soviets' normally limited supplies of exportable
grain. By lessening its deliveries to India, Moscow
would gain greater flexibility in meeting require-
ments elsewhere in the world and hence in ex-
ploiting , other opportunities to increase its
influence(
1.4 )Singh's visit may help to set the stage for a
Meeting later this month in Moscow of a bilateral
commission on economic matters. New Delhi will
probably press Moscow for balance-of-payments
relief. In past years, India's trade surplus with the
USSR has usually been sufficient to cover its debt
service payments to Moscow. This year, because
of the increased prices Moscow is charging for
fertilizers and kerosene, India's surplus is ex-
pected to be cut in half/.
3'1, [Because the Indian press and public have
been giving considerable attention to the coming
i! visit by Secretary Kissinger and to the general
improvement in Indo-US relations, New Delhi
may have arranged Singh's trip partly to reassure
Moscow of the importance India attaches to its
relationship with the Soviet Union. In addition,
Prime Minister Gandhi has accepted an invitation
to visit Moscow later this year, although no date
has been set .J
'19 tFor its part, Moscow probably sought to
probe India's intent regarding nuclear develop-
ments, particularly for any indication that New
Delhi is developing nuclear weapons. The Soviets
did not have advance warning of India's first
explosion last May. Since the test, India has asked
for Soviet advice on peaceful uses of nuclear
power, but Moscow has attempted to discourage
the Indians even on this score.
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%Wi JCL,F L. i Nor*
UK: ELECTION IN PROSPECT
y rime Minister Wilson's success last week in
seLuring the support of the British trade unions
has prepared the way for an early election. Wilson
met with the Queen last weekend to gain her
formal assent to holding national elections. The
polling date, probably in early October, was
expected to be announced late this week
lSS- The highlight of the annual convention of
~fhe ten-million-member Trades Union Congress
was the debate over Wilson's "social contract," a
policy of voluntary restraint in wage demands.
46 Primary opposition came from the engineering
workers, Britain's second largest union, who
insisted they could not support even a voluntary
limit on wage bargaining. Following an 11th-hour
appeal by Len Murray, general secretary of the
Trades Union Congress, the engineering workers
agreed to abstain from voting in the interest of
solidarity, but noted that they had not retracted
any of their views. The only vote against the
social contract came from the civil and public
services workers
The unions again endorsed the Labor Party's
stn on the EC. The convention passed a resolu-
tion opposing British membership and demanding
a continued boycott of certain EC institutions,
but rejected a proposal for immediate withdrawal
from the community. Instead, the delegates
approved Labor's less radical program to renego-
tiate the terms of membership and to hold a
referendum on the question-1
',L (4 '.abor continues to lead in the opinion polls.
A poll released on September 6 gives Labor
almost 43 percent of the vote, the Conservatives
36, and the Liberals 17. According to the latest
Gallup poll, Labor has a margin of only 4 percent,
having almost 41 percent of the vote, compared
with 37 percent for the Conservatives and 18
percent for the Liberals1
i.ki Wilson's victories coincided with a series of
setbacks for Ted Heath, leader of the Conserva-
tive opposition. The Ulster Unionist Party en-
dorsed Enoch Powell, a Tory rebel and long-time
Heath nemesis, as the candidate for its South
Down seat, lessening chances that the Unionists
would support a post-election Conservative-
Liberal coalition. A parliamentary seat would also
provide Powell with a powe base to rally Con-
servative opposition to Heath
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cl
~ N
~ ~
,
I
lopes for progress toward a negotiated solu-
tion of the Cyprus conflict in the near future rest
on the current talks between representatives of
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
Acting President Clerides and Vice President
Denktash have met twice since September 6 re-
garding prisoners of war and refugees. Athens and
Ankara have become somewhat more flexible
toward eventual negotiations, but seem content
to let Clerides and Denktash come up with some
local accommodations.
Clerides and Denktash met on September 6
and agreed to set up arrangements for the release
of prisoners, with priority given to the sick and
wounded and those over 50 or under 18 years of
age. On September 11, the two leaders said they
agreed to release those given priority, but no
specific date was given.
What to do with other prisoners was not
decided. This problem touches on one of the
basic disagreements that prevents progress toward
political negotiations. Clerides wants the prisoners
returned to their homes or released where cap-
tured. Denktash insists that Turkish Cypriot
prisoners be released in the Turkish-controlled
sector of the island, reflecting the Turkish desire
to bring Turkish Cypriots from all over the island
into the Turkish-controlled area. Clerides refuses
to accept what amounts to a population ex-
change, considering it tantamount to de facto
partition of Cyprus.
How much freedom of movement both
Cypriot leaders are given by Greece and Turkey
will determine the outcome. Denktash, in particu-
lar, appears to be on a short leash. If no progress
is made within the next week or so, the Greek
side seems prepared to take its case to the UN
General Assembly later this month. Whether the
Cyprus issue is inscribed on the agenda or not, it
will undoubtedly be a subject for discussion at
the General Assembly. The foreign ministers of
Clerides and Denktash agree before a UN mediator
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\
I, F_
Greece and Turkey, as well as British Foreign
Secretary Callaghan, plan to attend, which raises
the possibility of informal talks between the
guarantor powers if there are any indications that
the logjam can be broken.
The USSR is still trying to be more actively
involved in a Cyprus solution. A delegation
headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev ar-
rived in Ankara on September 11 and is scheduled
to proceed to Nicosia and Athens. Ilichev may
take soundings on Turkish, Greek, and Cypriot
attitudes toward discussion of Cyprus at the UN
General Assembly.
Soviet public comments about Cyprus have
taken an increasingly pro-Greek tenor, but Mos-
cow still seems to be refraining from criticism of25X1
the Turks. The Soviets are treating Ankara's nega-25X1
tive position on their proposal for an interna-
tional conference on Cyprus with kid gloves,
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JCUKC 1
he EC resumes a heavy schedule of meet-
in nhis month, but the prospect of halting the
drift in community affairs is dubious. Inflation
has sapped what momentum there was toward
economic and monetary union, and has put fur-
ther strains on the common agricultural policy.
Adding to the gloom is the lack of public support
for the EC in Britain and the ambivalent attitude
of the UK's Labor government. Recognizing what
one French official has called the "sorry state" of
Europe, Paris hopes to inspire some improve-
ments in EC procedures-where the French have
always dragged their feet in the past. The French
concede that their ideas are modest, however, and
are not sanguine about their effect:
~ One potentially bright spot is the consid-
eration now being given to the idea of joint
community borrowing to help members deal with
their balance-of-payments deficits. The loan
would be an important demonstration of financial
solidarity as well as of an independent capability
for action on the problem of "re-cycling" oil
revenues, which is the subject of much interna-
tional concern. The loan, however, is likely to be
small-the original goal of $5 billion has been
reduced to about one billion-and debate over
such crucial details as to how it will be guaranteed
could prevent action until the end of the yeai.
cf The finance, foreign, and farm ministers will
all Jeet separately next week, but have agreed to
hold more frequent joint sessions in the future.
EC economic policies could therefore be better
meshed, but it is a reform that may be too late,
given the increasing temptation to respond to
inflation with national measures. Moreover, fears
of recession and concern over US economic
policies are beginning to rise in Europe. The
effect of this on the community is to subordinate
action to consultation in wider forums. Recession
fears may also dampen interest in the GATT trade
negotiations, on which the EC will try to reach an
agreed position this month.
6- fihe effect of the international scene on the
cohimunity is also apparent in the energy area,
where the initiative is now clearly with the
US-sponsored Energy Coordinating Group.
France would like to revive movement toward an
EC policy, but even if the British lift their pre-
vious objections, any accord is likely to fall short
of the Commission's original aims.I
'54 C Next week, the agricultural ministers will be
hard pressed to come up with new ways to main-
tain farmers' incomes. While inflation has sent
expenses soaring, community prices for several
important agricultural commodities have been
held below world levels; at the same time, cur-
rency changes have played havoc with the con-
cept of a single EC market. What threatens now is
an even more complete restoration of national
farm marketsl
5 -J (Paris' ideas for resuming progress toward
European union, which Chancellor Schmidt may
have endorsed in his bilateral talks with Giscard
on September 2, center around restoring majority
voting in the EC Council, at least on certain
selected issues. In another reversal of traditional
French attitudes, Paris is apparently willing to
propose expanded powers for the European Par-
liament. Also on Paris' agenda are more inter-
governmental cooperation on matters not cov-
ered by EC treaties and more frequent summit
sessions "in a community framework."l
5`~ fhe informal dinner to be hosted by Giscard
in aris on September 14 for the leaders of the
Nine is designed to sound out the prospects for
community movement and a more formal summit
later this year. Paris will doubtless consider it a
success if the Nine arrest the current sense of
erosion and reawaken interest in European in-
tegration on both sides of the Atlantic.
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too Political activity in Lisbon has become more
spirited as the host of parties that have organized
in recent months prepares for the elections to the
constituent assembly in March. Frictions have
developed in the center-left alliance at a time
when a center-right coalition has emerged after a
long period of silence from that quarter. The
atmosphere has been marred by incidents of po-
litical violence.
~hree right-of-center parties have formed a
"
3
coalition to present what they call a non-Marxist
democratic alternative." With the provisional gov-
ernment soon to promulgate a law setting nu-
merical minimums that political groups must
meet in order to qualify as "parties," the an-
nouncement of the rightist coalition prpbably was
designed to enhance its qualifications)) Unless the
coalition softens its right-wing image and im-
proves its grass-roots organization, however, it is
not expected to appeal to more than five or ten
percent of the electorate.(
Meanwhile, the Socialist Party has officially
withdrawn from the Communist-dominated
Democratic Movement. The move came after it
became evident that the Communists intended to
turn the loosely organized coalition, which also
included a centrist party, into a separate political
party. The Communists apparently were counting
on running candidates from the Movement in
areas where Communist support was weak, and
candidates from their own party in district where
_ they had a reasonable chance of succeslSuch a
3c~President Zhivkov's praise of the Soviet
Union was much more reserved than in Septem-
ber 1973, when his emotional statement that the
two countries have "the same circulatory system"
prompted speculation that Sofia intended to
become a part of the USSR. This time, Zhivkov's
sole reference to integration was an observation
that the two countries are following a course of
all-round cooperation and ever closer unity. The
Soviets may have requested that Zhivkov be less
fawning this year. Moscow was reportedly embar-
rassed by the slavish language of last year, and has
no wish to raise new fears that Bulgaria may
become a Soviet republic]
Soviet President Podgorny, the most pres-
tigious foreign dignitary present, spoke glowingly
of Bulgaria as a "beloved sister of the USSR,"
and, as if to underscore Moscow's rejection of
political union, added: "This has always been the
line and remains such today. It will be the same
tomorrow also."
Zhivkov's discussion of Bulgarian economic
development stressed the "extremely positive
role" of the Council for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance, but admitted-without elaboration-that the
"unlimited possibilities" of the socialist system
and the economic council were not being fully
utilized.}
r+ In praising the socialist countries of the
world, Zhivkov listed by name those with which
Bulgaria is linked by "strong militant friendship."
The list notably omitted Yugoslavia, Albania, and
China, which were singled out for separate treat-
ment. In discussing Yugoslavia, Zhivkov left the
impression that relations with Belgrade are still
far from happy; regarding Albania, he mentioned
that "we want to improve relations and coopera-
tion." By contrast, he condemned Mao Tse-tung's
"adventurous, revisionist, and nationalist course"
as a threat to the socialist achievements of the
Chinese people. He also said that Bulgaria "reso-
lutely repudiates and condemns anti-Soviet and
anti-Communist slanders by Peking," at which
point the Chinese ambassador and his Albanian
colleague stalked out of the assembly.
rAmerican observers noted that crowds
showed little emotion or enthusiasm for the
parade and paid scant attention to the speeches.
Young marchers, especially students, seemed par-
ticularly slack and almost self-conscious in their
participation. Crowds dwindled as the parade
went on, and eventually marchers outnumbered
spectators.
(?(' Poviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will visit
West Germany on September 15-16, the first
high-level contact between Moscow and the
Schmidt government. Chancellor Schmidt is
scheduled to visit Moscow later this year)
5L he West Germans believe the atmosphere
for the visit is fairly good, now that the uproar
over the establishment of the Federal Environ-
mental Office in West Berlin has quieted. They
plan to press Gromyko for a more conciliatory
Soviet attitude on such issues as West Germany's
ties to West Berlin and the repatriation of German
nationals from the USSF1.
9 \Schmidt is said to be urging Foreign Minister
Genscher to try to conclude a few bilateral agree-
ments that will preserve the appearance of some
movement in Ostpolitik. The West Germans do
not intend to respond favorably to Gromyko's
anticipated soundings for favorable credit terms
unless the Soviets show some give regarding
Berlin'
(~0 JGromyko undoubtedly will restate Moscow's
position that the environmental office violates the
letter and spirit of the Quadripartite Agreement
on Berlin. The Soviets have refrained from blam-
ing the Schmidt government for the hassle over
the environmental office, however, and Moscow
will do its best to preserve a civil atmosphere, if
only to avoid clouding the prospects for the Euro-
pean security conference and force reduction ne-
gotiations.
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v JCUKC I w
~,(_ IThe declaration of war against the gov-
ernment }
last week by Montonero guerrillas who L
cJ claim to speak for the "revolutionary tendency"
of the Peronist youth formalizes a split between
left-wing and orthodox Peronists that had grown
steadily worse since Juan Peron's death over two . /
months ago. The tempo of violence is likely to
increase, thereby adding to the serious problems
facing Mrs. Peron's government)
(0 ~ At a clandestine press conference on Sep-
tember 6, Montonero leader Mario Firmenich
announced that his organization would go under-
ground. The decision came only hours after the
government shut down La Causa Peronista, the
last radical publication still printed openly. In
recent weeks, the tone of its editorials had
become highly caustic and defiant. The final prov-
ocation came in an article by Firmenich describ-
ing his personal role in the kidnap-murder of
former president Aramburu in 1970. Although
the disclosure was not new, the cold-blooded
account of the Montoneros' most spectacular
operation quickly developed into a cause celebre,
in part because it implied that Juan Peron sanc-
tioned the killing"
)() Firmenich claimed that the return to armed
resistance was in response to the government's
campaign of "intimidation and repression." He
vowed that the struggle would be waged as long as
Lopez Rega-the President's controversial ad-
viser-remained as the government's strong man.
At the same time, Firmenich admitted that his
followers were responsible for a recent kidnaping
as well as several killings and bombings, which he
said signaled the beginning of "popular re-
sistance."l
the Montoneros were joined in their stand
by a half dozen Peronist student and labor groups
that oppose Peron's widow. The amalgamation of
left-wing organizations led by the Montoneros
SECRET
draws most of its adherents from the universities,
where its socialist tenets are widely espoused.
Disturbances have already erupted at the sprawl-
ing University of Buenos Aires, where a confron-
tation with the government had been brewing for
months. The naming of a new education minister
led students to occupy buildings to protest any
changes in personnel or policies, particularly the
removal of acting rector Raul Laguzzi, who is
reportedly a Montonero sympathizer. Right-wing
~~i~r llrlr~/yl l/l y rr.q?nrr r~~Z,/~~rl~/~~~~ylr~/~~~~~1%y9~ll"l ~~~~~~~~~71/IlA~~7/!lIHH~~
Guerrilla leader Firmenich
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SECRET
terrorists, possibly acting with quasi-official sanc-
tion, planted a bomb in the rector's apartment
that killed his infant son)
Because of the tense situation at the univer-
sity, new clashes are likely, especially if the gov-
ernment moves to close it,
In that event, the Montoneros could
streets against the government. Already, 300
persons have been arrested as police and army
forces sought to break up a major demonstration
last week
be -expected to encourage students to go into the
~-S' i-lard-core Montonero militants will no
doubt try to make good their threats of violence,
but internal divisions and criticism over strategy
will cause some desertions. Nevertheless, the
Montoneros have a much broader following than
the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army, which
is credited with most leftist terrorism in Argen-
tina, and are quite capable of pulling off spec-
tacular abductions or assassinations. Firmenich
hinted that the two organizations might even find
common ground in combatting the government.
Among their shared objectives is a desire to prod
security forces into an overreaction that would
alienate the public
(~,,I president Peron's government has thus far-),
responded cautiously to the Montonero threat.
No action has been taken to declare them illegal, .-
although military and police officials reportedly?3
have been instructed to move more vigorously
against the guerrillas now that the lines have been
firmly drawn. Stronger legislation and new secu-
rity mechanisms are under study, but these have
proved ineffective in the past. If the army has
accepted the inevitability of greater participation
in the fight against terrorism,
the government's ability to cope with the
challenge will improve somewhat. Over the short
term, however, the struggle between left and right
will be a bloody one.
OAS TO CONSIDER CUBA
f'he foreign ministers of Costa Rica, Co-
loml5ia, and Venezuela have begun proceedings
that will lead to an OAS foreign ministers' review
of the Cuba sanctions on November 11. Several
governments have made clear their view that Cuba
remains a threat to hemispheric tranquility, but
they will not oppose a reconsideration of the
issue.1
iLl he sponsors of the move have been careful
to I( couch the rationale in terms of a changed
world situation and a spirit of detente. They
stress that a vote to lift the sanctions will imply
no judgment of the Castro regime, but rather will
release OAS members from obligations that have
been in force since 1964 although recently
honored mainly in the breach. Latin American
sensitivity about outside interference in matters
of national policy has caused the anti-Castro
forces to be ill at ease about obstructing sister
republics that want to open the door to Cuba?
Using the co-existence argument, Costa Rica
A others are confident that they can secure the
necessary two-thirds majority vote of the 23
members to overturn the sanctions. A blocking
one third plus. one, once assured by the unity
among Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US, seems likely to
break down in the absence of a strong diplomatic
blitz. Various governments have noted the relative
serenity with which Washington has viewed the
latest developments in the OAS, and have become
increasingly worried that the US will alter its
policy and abandon its old allies on the issue.
Hedging against such a development, Bolivia,
Uruguay, and others have begun to open the way
to flexibility on the sanctions issue, while con-
tinuing to assert both their intention to remain
diplomatically aloof from Cuba and their opposi-
tion to an inter-American embrace of the Castro
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BOLIVIA: ELECTIONS-PROMISE OR RUSE?
77 ]President Banzer's recent promise to hold both civilians and military men for some time.
intional elections next year touched off a new ~-The mounting pressure to hold the election 25X1
period of uncertainty in Bolivia. Last week, At sooner stems from the suspicion that given
Banzer threatened to resign in response to reports enough time, Banzer would devise a stratagem to
that civilian politicians were forming a united perpetuate himself in office.
front to urge that the election date be moved up
from October 1975 to May or June. This dra-
matic gesture was apparently calculated to neu-
tralize the politicians by eliciting new protesta-
tions of support from the government's military
backer I.
MEXICO: KIDNAPING VICTIMS SAVED
\Banzer's threat was quickly withdrawn, how- A Mexican security forces scored a major
ev~r, and spokesmen for the various parties have succdss against terrorists last weekend, but they
now begun to press for major electoral reforms, k are still a long way from eliminating the guerrillas'
'I A I' b th rnment b
ve
t
t
l
t
y
o em arrass a go
y
o exi e po i-y-capabi
ity
including the granting of amnes
ticians and labor leaders. Even right-wing leader isolated acts of kidnaping and terrorism:
Mario Gutierrez, who had been one of Banter s
chief supporters, has publicly urged that elections
be held as soon as possible and has formally
declared his own candidacy. According to an
assessment by official US observers, there is very
little popular sentiment in favor of maintaining
Banzer in office, and a majority within the mili-
tary as well as most politicians would prefer to
see a new man take over the presidency/
/( [Although Banzer so far has not rescheduled
elections, he has adopted a conciliatory approach
to his critics, and has reaffirmed his stated in-
tention not to run for office. Earlier this week,
23 the labor minister reportedly told union officials
that several exiled leaders will be allowed to
return to Bolivia. According to a national radio
broadcast, the government has told its consulates
to issue visas`
\Twice before, Banzer has promised to hold
elections and has reneged, but it is doubtful that
he could successfully pull that trick again. Bo-
-7ivia's economic problems have been costing the
~Banzer government important support among
p b \ Senator Ruben Figueroa, who had been held
captive since May, was rescued on September 8
Wafter a gun battle in which soldiers wounded
9i several members of Lucio Cabanas' guerrilla group
! and arrested others. Cabanas is Mexico's best-
known guerrilla and enjoys widespread support
and sympathy among the peasants in the state of
Guerrero. On September 7, another group of
terrorists freed President Echeverria's father-
in-law, Jose Guadelupe Zuno, who had been
kidnaped 11 days earlier. The government had
refused to talk with the kidnapers about terms for
the freedom of either man?
[Until Echeverria became president in 1970,
politically motivated violence of this sort had
been absent from Mexico since the late 1920s.
About 15 guerrilla groups have sprung up since
1971, but only a handful are now active. The
groups are small and not well-organized, but they
have the capability to carry out spectacular acts
of violence and terrorism and are likely to con-
tinue being a real nuisance to the government.
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Stl:Kt
2 Iy e$s)
he military government ma~ked its first squeeze on wage and salary earners will help keep
year In power on September 11 without incidents discontent over the austere recovery program
by leftists. The anniversary was highlighted by from ballooning into general disaffection with the
junta President Pinochet's speech. government, but it will also hinder the fight
Two of his announcements could have a
major effect on the treatment of present prisoners
and future offenders. Pinochet ended the state of
internal war, thereby placing military courts
under less severe peacetime rules on offenses,
punishments, and appeals. The courts will con-
tinue to function under the state of siege.
Pinochet further declared that the govern-
ment is "disposed" to release en masse prisoners
who want to leave the country for good, and
challenged Cuba and the Soviet Union to make a
similar gesture. Positive responses probably will
not be preconditions for Chilean action, however.
In fact, former ambassador to the US Letelier
already has been released.
On the economic front, Pinochet disclosed
that automatic quarterly wage readjustments
henceforth will keep pace fully with increases in
the cost of living. This move to ease the economic
The remoteness of return to civilian rule was
emphasized by some of the junta President's
strongest language yet on the evils of politics.
Noting that in the period prior to the military's
overthrow of president Allende's Marxist govern-
ment political parties had become "the symbols
of national divisions and decay," Pinochet
declared that resumption of political activity
would have to await the emergence of a "new
generation of Chileans" dedicated to national
rather than partisan causes.
Pinochet brought his audience of regime of-
ficials and supporters to its feet with a peroration
that pictured their country as a small nation
locked in "frontal combat" with the forces of
international communism and declared that,
united, Chile would prevail.
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Iftor Now
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