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September 13, 1974
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Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Secret Weekly Summary State Dept. review completed Secret No. 0037/74 13 September 1974 copy N2 59 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 CONTENTS (September 13,1974) The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif- icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology, Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the 25X1 contents. Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary, EAST ASIA PACIFIC 2 Japan - South Korea: Crisis Worsens 3 South Vietnam: Fighting May Get Heavier 4 New Zealand: New Leadership MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 5 Mozambique: Independence Set 6 Egypt: Nudging the PLO 7 Ethiopia: End of a Reign 8 India-USSR: Asking for Food 9 UK: Election in Prospect 10 Cyprus 12 EC: The Dubious Prospect 13 Portugal: Domestic Flux 14 Bulgaria: The 30th Anniversary 14 Grornyko Sets Visit to Bonn WESTERN HEMISPHERE 15 Argentina: The Peronist Left 16 OAS To Consider Cuba 17 Bolivia: Elections-Promise or Ruse? 17 Mexico: Kidnaping Victims Saved 18 Chile: A Year Later 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 lfto~ btu ht I CHINA CHOU'S HEALTH AGAIN of prior official commitments, was related to a meeting with MaolFThe Chairman has been vaca- VFor a while last week, it looked as though tioning at a resort area outside Peking. Although the eathwatch over ailing Premier Chou En-lai he usually receives foreign visitors in his own `had begun, but press speculation proved to be a residence, his meeting last week with the visiting false alarm. Chou's physical condition is report- Togolese President was not said to have taken edly worse than it was last July, when he received place at his residence, and it appeared from Senator Henry Jackson in a hospital room. Later photographs to have been held at another site erang id ec b i p was sa that monin, Chou ou nicely, but since then he has apparently slipped -Meanwhile, vice premiers Teng Hsiao-ping backward. There is as yet no evidence that the and Li Hsien-nien continue to divide representa- Premier has suffered another acute heart seizure tional duties in Chou's absence. Both have re- of the sort that hospitalized him last summer. He cently played host to visiting heads of state and is evidently seriously-but not critically-ill) have stated explicitly that they were acting on Chou's behalf. The Premier's wife, who herself \Rumors that Chou's health had taken a sud- has been ailing for sever. I years, has also been on den turn for the worse were sparked by inac- hand to greet the visitors curate press reports that several high ranking Chinese officials had been abruptly called away from a banquet given by the visiting US congres- I ~hinese media continue to keep Chou's sional delegatior1 In fact, the two relatively low- name before the public in an apparent effort to 3 level officials who left the banquet had explained convey the impression that the Premier is still in advance that they would be able to stay only functioning and, more importantly, to forestall long enough to greet their hosts -'speculation that he is in political troublee[A num- ber of messages bearing Chou's signature have lBoth officials-one is reputedly Mao's recently been sent to foreign governments and, niece-seem to have frequent and ready access to just this week, the President of Mauritania re- the Chairman. It is possible that their brief ap- ceived an invitation to visit China issued in the pearance at the banquet, excused on the grounds name of the Premier. Chou En-lai and others leave reception in August Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 v`vi .L I JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: CRISIS WORSENS )1j (President Pak is taking an extremely hard j,- line, especially on the need for a crackdown on Chosen Soren, the association of pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan, in order to: ? put the organization on the defensive, and reinforce his claim that opposition to his regime is inspired by outside elements, ? divert attention from his own domestic troubles, ? and perhaps most important in the longer term, cause bad blood between Japan and North Korea, as Chosen Soren is an in- strument of the Pyongyang regime. Pak may believe that this would deflect any possible Japanese move toward a more neutral posi- tion between the two Koreas:? rl Ll Suspicions about Tokyo's motives, as well as mor emotional anti-Japanese sentiment, were no doubt heightened by what Seoul regarded as a callous initial reaction in Tokyo to the assassina- tion incident. While Seoul was accusing North Korea of having a hand in the affair, Japanese officials made a number of ill-timed public state- ments, such as that of Foreign Minister Kimura discounting the "threat from the North." This statement-when qualified as it later was-did not deviate from established Japanese policy, but it appeared in Seoul to reflect at best insensitivity to South Korean interests, and perhaps deliberate attempts by Tokyo to put some distance between itself and the Pak regime. 7 )( Even if the immediate impasse is resolved, Seoul-Tokyo difficulties will continue since they are part of a continuing process of adjustment by two close allies of the United States to the changing environment in East Asia. To some extent, the events reflect South Korean fears of abandonment in an era of detente and, in Tokyo, Japan's increasingly ambivalent attitude toward the South in its competition with the SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 South Vietnam FIGHTING MAY GET HEAVIER 10 Fighting continues to be brisk in the north- ern provinces, but has slackened off in the south. Communist forces have not attempted to make a major push against the former imperial capital of Hue, but they have forced the government to withdraw from positions south of the city that were close to populated areas and Route 1. On two occasions, North Vietnamese troops have temporarily interdicted Route 1 between Da Nang and Hue, demonstrating their potential for disrupting land resupply of government forces in the north in the event of heavier action." SA more interesting development, involving main forces on both sides, could be shaping up near the former district capital of Thuong Duc in Quang Nam Province. The First Brigade of the government's crack Airborne Division has been cautiously preparing to retake this district town, which was captured by the Communists this sum- mer. The government forces have been moving slowly to control the high ground before mount- ing an ass, ult on the town, which lies at the head of a valley the Communists have now move regim is of their 304th Division into positions from which they hope to hit the flanks of the Airborne forces. In response to this move, South Vietnamese commanders are planning new rein- forcements for their units-1 )b \Positional battles such as the one that may be developing around Thuong Duc have become increasingly characteristic of the war since the first of the year. In the past, South Vietnamese counterattacks usually quickly forced Communist forces from towns they had captured. Now, the Communists have the advantage of a logistic net- work developed since the cease-fire, which pro- vides them with the maneuver and supply capa- bility to defend some of the positions they have captured. Also, recent reductions in the amount of ammunition and air support provided to gov- ernment infantry forces will further restrict South Vietnamese efforts:; It) frhe Communists would like to inflict a sub- stantial defeat on the crack First Airborne Bri- gade, which they believe would adversely affect the morale of other South Vietnamese units. F another good boutti i - namese unit, the 1s Infantry Division, has taken heavy casualties in fighting during the past two weeks in southern Thua Thien Province. Two of its regiments are now said to be "almost combat ineffective." If both the 1st and Airborne Divi- sions sustain substantial losses, this would con- stitute a serious setback for the government. SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 SECRET NEW ZEALAND: NEW LEADERSHIP ' 3 U he New Zealand Labor Party's selection )ecently Rowling has been friendly toward the US. last week of Wallace Rowling as prime minister He signaled his interest in maintaining will ease the party's feeling of being cast adrift bye New Zealand's cordial relationship with the US the sudden end of Norman Kirk's ten-year domi- by giving first place to the US ambassador in the nance. Rowling is intelligent and capable, and courtesy calls normally tendered a new head of projects confidence-qualities that will stand him 21governrrrent. Rowling's only stand that might in good stead in filling the leadership gap left by affect US interests has been his advocacy of strict Kirk's unexpected death]LAs a conservative controls on investment in New Zealand by OLaborite, Bowling did not have trade union back- multinational companies. The new Prime Minister ing for the prime ministership, but he is never- has no record in foreign policy, but his decision theless widely accepted in the party, which will to handle foreign affairs himself was intended to help him to consolidate his hold demonstrate that there will be no break with the Rowling will be a strong standard-bearer in the general election that the party anticipates is still over a year away. A seasoned and wily poli- tician, he is probably the Laborite most able to match the aggressive style of Robert Muldoon, the new head of the opposition National Party. The opposition already looks like it is campaign- ing, even though-in view of Labor's strong hold on parliament--it has no hope of forcing early elections:] Kirk government's policie3) -0 fhe selection of leftist-leaning Robert Tizard as deputy prime minister strikes an ideological balance to Rowling that is important in the diverse Labor Party. Tizard held the health and public service portfolios under Kirk, and his handling of these two important jobs established his reputation in new Zealand's welfare-oriented government. In the new administration, Tizard takes over Rowling's old job as minister of fi- Tizard and Rowling Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 MOZAMBIQUE: INDEPENDENCE SET d-5_/Lisbon and the black insurgent Front for the Liberation of Mozambique signed an agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, last weekend providing for the independence of Mozambique next June and the immediate installation of a joint Front-Portuguese transitional government. The signing provoked a short-lived rebellion by dissident whites demand- ing that all of Mozambique's political groups be represented in the interim regim4. 2s 1The dissidents seized two radio stations in Lourenco Marques and temporarily occupied the airport. Although Lisbon ordered reinforcements from northern Mozambique into the capital, mili- tary forces acted with restraint in order to avoid violence. Nevertheless, demonstrations both sup- porting and opposing the rebellion broke out in Lourenco Marques and in the port city of Beira during which as many as 100 persons were killed or injured. The white dissidents finally agreed to give up in order to avoid further bloodshed. The rebellion sparked a black backlash in the suburbs of Lourenco Marques, where it was interpreted as an attempt by white separatists to seize control of the government. Local authorities in Lourenco Marques declared martial law in order to stem a wave of vandalism, looting, and arsonl Discouraging protest "~buring their incipient rebellion, the dissi- d nts met with two special representatives sent by President Spinola to hear their grievances. Al- though they may have received some encourage- ment that their demands would be considered by Lisbon, it seems unlikely that they gained any concessions. Lisbon cannot revoke its agreement with the Front, and the Front is not likely to consider modifying the agreement to allow its political enemies a role in the transitional government'1 5 [The dissidents were able to publicize the unrepresentative nature of the interim govern- ment, however, and it appears that their action attracted considerable sympathy, if little active backing, from numerous political organizations in the territory. These organizations-made up of whites, blacks, and mulattoes-adamantly oppose a Front "take-over" and may be encouraged to make another attempt to derail the transitional government? a Vhe transitional period legally took effect upon the signing of the Lusaka agreement on September 7. Front officials announced on Sep- tember 9 that they will be ready to move into Lourenco Marques next week to begin setting up the transitional government. Under terms of the agreement, the Front will appoint a prime minis- ter and two thirds of a nine-member cabinet. The Portuguese will be represented by a high com- missioner and the remaining cabinet members. he two sides will establish a joint military com- mission, with equal representation, to deal with security problems. The Front, with only about 3,000 armed troops, would be hard-pressed to quell any disorders without active Portuguese ) assistancet Even without further dissidence, the transi- tion l government faces a broad array of prob- lems. Front leaders have been living in exile throughout their insurgency and are not ac- quainted with the complex economic structure and social needs of Mozambique. For some time to come, they will need to rely heavily on Portu- guese technical expertise if they are to be ready to assume full power next June. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 SECRET EGYPT: NUDGING THE PLO Vin an effort to bring the Palestinians to a long-delayed decision to commit themselves to peace negotiations in concert with Jordan, Presi- dent Sadat has leavened his privately tough approach to the Palestine Liberation Organization with public sweeteners:( The Egyptians are vigorously supporting a PLO-initiated strategy to bring the Palestinian problem to greater world attention by raising the issue as an agenda item at the UN General Assembly session that begins next week.) t the UN, the PLO is seeking the right to address the General Assembly, as well as a resolu- tion focusing on the Palestinian situation as a separate political issue rather than as a refugee problem solely of humanitarian concern. Presi- dent Sadat apparently sees support for the PLO's UN effort as a relatively painless trade-off for his demand that the organization acquiesce, as Sadat has done, in Jordan's right to negotiate for the return of the Israeli-occupied West Bank) UJ (Although the Arabs have not yet developed their UN strategy, the broad outlines set out in a statement of policy by the Arab League last week envision a UN resolution confirming the basic political rights of the Palestinian people, par- ticularly that of self-determination. From the Egyptian viewpoint, the promise of self-determi- =nation, backed by the UN assembly, would give the Palestinians hope of establishing a future separate state on the West Bank after Jordanian- Israeli negotiations for the territory `Sadat is undoubtedly counting on this to 'ae JPalestinian inhibitions about participating in those negotiations, as an interested party if not initially as a principal. The Egyptians have begun canvassing for support of the resolution from key UN members! Cairo's efforts have as yet produced no re- sults. For two months, the PLO has refused to attend a tripartite conference with Egypt pnd Syria for the purpose of reaching an agreed Arab negotiating stance. The PLO reportedly reiterated its refusal to attend during an executive com- Sadat's balancing act SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 JCUrAC I N..r% ETHIOPIA: END OF A REIGN By removing Emperor Haile Selassie on September 12, the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee has further strengthened its control of the government. The committee-formally designating itself the Provisional Military Govern- ment-also named General Aman, who has been defense minister, as chairman of the provisional government and prime minister. Aman is popular with the military and has been taking on in- creasing importance in the government in recent weeks. He is believed to be working with the more moderate forces on the committee. Other3f cabinet changes are likely. The committee has been working through the facade of a civilian prime minister and a largely civilian cabinet for several months. favor the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and reconciliation of the disparate ele- ments in Ethi ian society apparently still have the upper hand he forced removal of Haile Selassie appears to h Ave been carefully prepared, and the com- mittee may be able to continue to guide the revolution in a generally bloodless manner. So far, there have been no reports of unrest or demon- strations of support for Haile Selassie in the rural areas, once his stronghold. Moderate members of the committee, however, may have difficulty con- -trolling radical students and military elements who are demanding that the measured pace of the revolution be intensified.( 3' \In other moves, the committee dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, banned strikes and demonstrations, and imposed a 357 prospects for avoiding violence may depend curfew. It plans to set up a military tribunal to on what happens to Haile Selassie, who is being try government officials charged with corruptioM detained at 4th Division headquarters in Addis Ababa along with other nobles rounded up Haile Selassie's ailing son, 57-year-old Crown~J earlier. Anti-monarchist sentiment is running high rrince Asfa Wossen, was chosen to succeed to the in Addis Ababa, and radicals on the committee throne, but the committee stated that he would 35 have been pressing for Haile Selassie's trial and t b in e J be a "figurehead" and would carry the title of possible execution. Moderates appear o "king," a step below an emperor in Ethiopia's favor of allowing the 82-year-old deposed mon- royal hierarchy. Since early 1973 the Crown arch to live out his years at one of his countryside Prince has been living in Europe where he has palaces. At present, the committee is apparently been slowly recovering from a stroke that left him concentrating on overcoming Haile Selassie's re- seriously incapacitated. An unassertive person ported resistance to its demands that he yield his when he was well, he would be easily manipulated overseas assets? by the committee tAsfa Wossen may be unwilling to return, 3c he committee will probably be preoccupied however. He may be frightened off by the treat- for some time with domestic matters, and the ment meted out to his father, the recent arrests of removal of Haile Selassie is unlikely to bring any other close relatives, and the military committee's immediate shift in the government's foreign harsh public statements against the entire royal 3, policy. Although there have been some reports family that the government has been looking for Soviet 't has enerall retained its ties to the West. y ,IS -Yin that event, the military may turn to Asfa Wossen's 21-year-old son, Prince Zara Yacob, or it may take the occasion to abolish the monarchy and establish a republic. Radicals in the com- mittee have been pushing hard for such a move. As of now, moderate committee members who i arms, g Following the removal of the Emperor, some preliminary foreign policy guidelines were issued. They provide that the government will maintain a "nonaligned" foreign policy, respect Ethiopia's international obligations, and strengthen ties with all African countries. SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Sbi Hb I INDIA-USSR: ASKING FOR FOOD C oreign Minister Swaran Singh visited Mos- cow this week to stress Ipdia's economic needs. Singh received a cordial reception, including a meeting with party chief Brezhnev on September 10, but he apparently was unable to extract a promise of a sizable loan of food grain. S9 JLast year, when the Soviets had a good har- vestY, they loaned India two million tons of wheat. GNew Delhi apparently would like a similar amount this year, but the prospects for the Soviet harvest in 1974 are not encouraging. Although Brezhnev characterized the harvest overall as "not bad" in a speech on September 7, he acknowl- edged that the situation in the important wheat- growing areas of the eastern USSR, hard hit by drought, was "not entirely favorable.'` ~t'I Moscow may also be reluctant to hand over morel food grain for fear that responding to Indian requests two years running might imply a continuing commitment. The magnitude of India's needs would place a heavy demand on the Soviets' normally limited supplies of exportable grain. By lessening its deliveries to India, Moscow would gain greater flexibility in meeting require- ments elsewhere in the world and hence in ex- ploiting , other opportunities to increase its influence( 1.4 )Singh's visit may help to set the stage for a Meeting later this month in Moscow of a bilateral commission on economic matters. New Delhi will probably press Moscow for balance-of-payments relief. In past years, India's trade surplus with the USSR has usually been sufficient to cover its debt service payments to Moscow. This year, because of the increased prices Moscow is charging for fertilizers and kerosene, India's surplus is ex- pected to be cut in half/. 3'1, [Because the Indian press and public have been giving considerable attention to the coming i! visit by Secretary Kissinger and to the general improvement in Indo-US relations, New Delhi may have arranged Singh's trip partly to reassure Moscow of the importance India attaches to its relationship with the Soviet Union. In addition, Prime Minister Gandhi has accepted an invitation to visit Moscow later this year, although no date has been set .J '19 tFor its part, Moscow probably sought to probe India's intent regarding nuclear develop- ments, particularly for any indication that New Delhi is developing nuclear weapons. The Soviets did not have advance warning of India's first explosion last May. Since the test, India has asked for Soviet advice on peaceful uses of nuclear power, but Moscow has attempted to discourage the Indians even on this score. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 %Wi JCL,F L. i Nor* UK: ELECTION IN PROSPECT y rime Minister Wilson's success last week in seLuring the support of the British trade unions has prepared the way for an early election. Wilson met with the Queen last weekend to gain her formal assent to holding national elections. The polling date, probably in early October, was expected to be announced late this week lSS- The highlight of the annual convention of ~fhe ten-million-member Trades Union Congress was the debate over Wilson's "social contract," a policy of voluntary restraint in wage demands. 46 Primary opposition came from the engineering workers, Britain's second largest union, who insisted they could not support even a voluntary limit on wage bargaining. Following an 11th-hour appeal by Len Murray, general secretary of the Trades Union Congress, the engineering workers agreed to abstain from voting in the interest of solidarity, but noted that they had not retracted any of their views. The only vote against the social contract came from the civil and public services workers The unions again endorsed the Labor Party's stn on the EC. The convention passed a resolu- tion opposing British membership and demanding a continued boycott of certain EC institutions, but rejected a proposal for immediate withdrawal from the community. Instead, the delegates approved Labor's less radical program to renego- tiate the terms of membership and to hold a referendum on the question-1 ',L (4 '.abor continues to lead in the opinion polls. A poll released on September 6 gives Labor almost 43 percent of the vote, the Conservatives 36, and the Liberals 17. According to the latest Gallup poll, Labor has a margin of only 4 percent, having almost 41 percent of the vote, compared with 37 percent for the Conservatives and 18 percent for the Liberals1 i.ki Wilson's victories coincided with a series of setbacks for Ted Heath, leader of the Conserva- tive opposition. The Ulster Unionist Party en- dorsed Enoch Powell, a Tory rebel and long-time Heath nemesis, as the candidate for its South Down seat, lessening chances that the Unionists would support a post-election Conservative- Liberal coalition. A parliamentary seat would also provide Powell with a powe base to rally Con- servative opposition to Heath SECRET 25X1 25X1 Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 J t U l-' t I cl ~ N ~ ~ , I lopes for progress toward a negotiated solu- tion of the Cyprus conflict in the near future rest on the current talks between representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash have met twice since September 6 re- garding prisoners of war and refugees. Athens and Ankara have become somewhat more flexible toward eventual negotiations, but seem content to let Clerides and Denktash come up with some local accommodations. Clerides and Denktash met on September 6 and agreed to set up arrangements for the release of prisoners, with priority given to the sick and wounded and those over 50 or under 18 years of age. On September 11, the two leaders said they agreed to release those given priority, but no specific date was given. What to do with other prisoners was not decided. This problem touches on one of the basic disagreements that prevents progress toward political negotiations. Clerides wants the prisoners returned to their homes or released where cap- tured. Denktash insists that Turkish Cypriot prisoners be released in the Turkish-controlled sector of the island, reflecting the Turkish desire to bring Turkish Cypriots from all over the island into the Turkish-controlled area. Clerides refuses to accept what amounts to a population ex- change, considering it tantamount to de facto partition of Cyprus. How much freedom of movement both Cypriot leaders are given by Greece and Turkey will determine the outcome. Denktash, in particu- lar, appears to be on a short leash. If no progress is made within the next week or so, the Greek side seems prepared to take its case to the UN General Assembly later this month. Whether the Cyprus issue is inscribed on the agenda or not, it will undoubtedly be a subject for discussion at the General Assembly. The foreign ministers of Clerides and Denktash agree before a UN mediator SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 o ~} I s DO \ I, F_ Greece and Turkey, as well as British Foreign Secretary Callaghan, plan to attend, which raises the possibility of informal talks between the guarantor powers if there are any indications that the logjam can be broken. The USSR is still trying to be more actively involved in a Cyprus solution. A delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev ar- rived in Ankara on September 11 and is scheduled to proceed to Nicosia and Athens. Ilichev may take soundings on Turkish, Greek, and Cypriot attitudes toward discussion of Cyprus at the UN General Assembly. Soviet public comments about Cyprus have taken an increasingly pro-Greek tenor, but Mos- cow still seems to be refraining from criticism of25X1 the Turks. The Soviets are treating Ankara's nega-25X1 tive position on their proposal for an interna- tional conference on Cyprus with kid gloves, SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 JCUKC 1 he EC resumes a heavy schedule of meet- in nhis month, but the prospect of halting the drift in community affairs is dubious. Inflation has sapped what momentum there was toward economic and monetary union, and has put fur- ther strains on the common agricultural policy. Adding to the gloom is the lack of public support for the EC in Britain and the ambivalent attitude of the UK's Labor government. Recognizing what one French official has called the "sorry state" of Europe, Paris hopes to inspire some improve- ments in EC procedures-where the French have always dragged their feet in the past. The French concede that their ideas are modest, however, and are not sanguine about their effect: ~ One potentially bright spot is the consid- eration now being given to the idea of joint community borrowing to help members deal with their balance-of-payments deficits. The loan would be an important demonstration of financial solidarity as well as of an independent capability for action on the problem of "re-cycling" oil revenues, which is the subject of much interna- tional concern. The loan, however, is likely to be small-the original goal of $5 billion has been reduced to about one billion-and debate over such crucial details as to how it will be guaranteed could prevent action until the end of the yeai. cf The finance, foreign, and farm ministers will all Jeet separately next week, but have agreed to hold more frequent joint sessions in the future. EC economic policies could therefore be better meshed, but it is a reform that may be too late, given the increasing temptation to respond to inflation with national measures. Moreover, fears of recession and concern over US economic policies are beginning to rise in Europe. The effect of this on the community is to subordinate action to consultation in wider forums. Recession fears may also dampen interest in the GATT trade negotiations, on which the EC will try to reach an agreed position this month. 6- fihe effect of the international scene on the cohimunity is also apparent in the energy area, where the initiative is now clearly with the US-sponsored Energy Coordinating Group. France would like to revive movement toward an EC policy, but even if the British lift their pre- vious objections, any accord is likely to fall short of the Commission's original aims.I '54 C Next week, the agricultural ministers will be hard pressed to come up with new ways to main- tain farmers' incomes. While inflation has sent expenses soaring, community prices for several important agricultural commodities have been held below world levels; at the same time, cur- rency changes have played havoc with the con- cept of a single EC market. What threatens now is an even more complete restoration of national farm marketsl 5 -J (Paris' ideas for resuming progress toward European union, which Chancellor Schmidt may have endorsed in his bilateral talks with Giscard on September 2, center around restoring majority voting in the EC Council, at least on certain selected issues. In another reversal of traditional French attitudes, Paris is apparently willing to propose expanded powers for the European Par- liament. Also on Paris' agenda are more inter- governmental cooperation on matters not cov- ered by EC treaties and more frequent summit sessions "in a community framework."l 5`~ fhe informal dinner to be hosted by Giscard in aris on September 14 for the leaders of the Nine is designed to sound out the prospects for community movement and a more formal summit later this year. Paris will doubtless consider it a success if the Nine arrest the current sense of erosion and reawaken interest in European in- tegration on both sides of the Atlantic. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 too Political activity in Lisbon has become more spirited as the host of parties that have organized in recent months prepares for the elections to the constituent assembly in March. Frictions have developed in the center-left alliance at a time when a center-right coalition has emerged after a long period of silence from that quarter. The atmosphere has been marred by incidents of po- litical violence. ~hree right-of-center parties have formed a " 3 coalition to present what they call a non-Marxist democratic alternative." With the provisional gov- ernment soon to promulgate a law setting nu- merical minimums that political groups must meet in order to qualify as "parties," the an- nouncement of the rightist coalition prpbably was designed to enhance its qualifications)) Unless the coalition softens its right-wing image and im- proves its grass-roots organization, however, it is not expected to appeal to more than five or ten percent of the electorate.( Meanwhile, the Socialist Party has officially withdrawn from the Communist-dominated Democratic Movement. The move came after it became evident that the Communists intended to turn the loosely organized coalition, which also included a centrist party, into a separate political party. The Communists apparently were counting on running candidates from the Movement in areas where Communist support was weak, and candidates from their own party in district where _ they had a reasonable chance of succeslSuch a 3c~President Zhivkov's praise of the Soviet Union was much more reserved than in Septem- ber 1973, when his emotional statement that the two countries have "the same circulatory system" prompted speculation that Sofia intended to become a part of the USSR. This time, Zhivkov's sole reference to integration was an observation that the two countries are following a course of all-round cooperation and ever closer unity. The Soviets may have requested that Zhivkov be less fawning this year. Moscow was reportedly embar- rassed by the slavish language of last year, and has no wish to raise new fears that Bulgaria may become a Soviet republic] Soviet President Podgorny, the most pres- tigious foreign dignitary present, spoke glowingly of Bulgaria as a "beloved sister of the USSR," and, as if to underscore Moscow's rejection of political union, added: "This has always been the line and remains such today. It will be the same tomorrow also." Zhivkov's discussion of Bulgarian economic development stressed the "extremely positive role" of the Council for Mutual Economic Assist- ance, but admitted-without elaboration-that the "unlimited possibilities" of the socialist system and the economic council were not being fully utilized.} r+ In praising the socialist countries of the world, Zhivkov listed by name those with which Bulgaria is linked by "strong militant friendship." The list notably omitted Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, which were singled out for separate treat- ment. In discussing Yugoslavia, Zhivkov left the impression that relations with Belgrade are still far from happy; regarding Albania, he mentioned that "we want to improve relations and coopera- tion." By contrast, he condemned Mao Tse-tung's "adventurous, revisionist, and nationalist course" as a threat to the socialist achievements of the Chinese people. He also said that Bulgaria "reso- lutely repudiates and condemns anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slanders by Peking," at which point the Chinese ambassador and his Albanian colleague stalked out of the assembly. rAmerican observers noted that crowds showed little emotion or enthusiasm for the parade and paid scant attention to the speeches. Young marchers, especially students, seemed par- ticularly slack and almost self-conscious in their participation. Crowds dwindled as the parade went on, and eventually marchers outnumbered spectators. (?(' Poviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will visit West Germany on September 15-16, the first high-level contact between Moscow and the Schmidt government. Chancellor Schmidt is scheduled to visit Moscow later this year) 5L he West Germans believe the atmosphere for the visit is fairly good, now that the uproar over the establishment of the Federal Environ- mental Office in West Berlin has quieted. They plan to press Gromyko for a more conciliatory Soviet attitude on such issues as West Germany's ties to West Berlin and the repatriation of German nationals from the USSF1. 9 \Schmidt is said to be urging Foreign Minister Genscher to try to conclude a few bilateral agree- ments that will preserve the appearance of some movement in Ostpolitik. The West Germans do not intend to respond favorably to Gromyko's anticipated soundings for favorable credit terms unless the Soviets show some give regarding Berlin' (~0 JGromyko undoubtedly will restate Moscow's position that the environmental office violates the letter and spirit of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. The Soviets have refrained from blam- ing the Schmidt government for the hassle over the environmental office, however, and Moscow will do its best to preserve a civil atmosphere, if only to avoid clouding the prospects for the Euro- pean security conference and force reduction ne- gotiations. SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 v JCUKC I w ~,(_ IThe declaration of war against the gov- ernment } last week by Montonero guerrillas who L cJ claim to speak for the "revolutionary tendency" of the Peronist youth formalizes a split between left-wing and orthodox Peronists that had grown steadily worse since Juan Peron's death over two . / months ago. The tempo of violence is likely to increase, thereby adding to the serious problems facing Mrs. Peron's government) (0 ~ At a clandestine press conference on Sep- tember 6, Montonero leader Mario Firmenich announced that his organization would go under- ground. The decision came only hours after the government shut down La Causa Peronista, the last radical publication still printed openly. In recent weeks, the tone of its editorials had become highly caustic and defiant. The final prov- ocation came in an article by Firmenich describ- ing his personal role in the kidnap-murder of former president Aramburu in 1970. Although the disclosure was not new, the cold-blooded account of the Montoneros' most spectacular operation quickly developed into a cause celebre, in part because it implied that Juan Peron sanc- tioned the killing" )() Firmenich claimed that the return to armed resistance was in response to the government's campaign of "intimidation and repression." He vowed that the struggle would be waged as long as Lopez Rega-the President's controversial ad- viser-remained as the government's strong man. At the same time, Firmenich admitted that his followers were responsible for a recent kidnaping as well as several killings and bombings, which he said signaled the beginning of "popular re- sistance."l the Montoneros were joined in their stand by a half dozen Peronist student and labor groups that oppose Peron's widow. The amalgamation of left-wing organizations led by the Montoneros SECRET draws most of its adherents from the universities, where its socialist tenets are widely espoused. Disturbances have already erupted at the sprawl- ing University of Buenos Aires, where a confron- tation with the government had been brewing for months. The naming of a new education minister led students to occupy buildings to protest any changes in personnel or policies, particularly the removal of acting rector Raul Laguzzi, who is reportedly a Montonero sympathizer. Right-wing ~~i~r llrlr~/yl l/l y rr.q?nrr r~~Z,/~~rl~/~~~~ylr~/~~~~~1%y9~ll"l ~~~~~~~~~71/IlA~~7/!lIHH~~ Guerrilla leader Firmenich Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 SECRET terrorists, possibly acting with quasi-official sanc- tion, planted a bomb in the rector's apartment that killed his infant son) Because of the tense situation at the univer- sity, new clashes are likely, especially if the gov- ernment moves to close it, In that event, the Montoneros could streets against the government. Already, 300 persons have been arrested as police and army forces sought to break up a major demonstration last week be -expected to encourage students to go into the ~-S' i-lard-core Montonero militants will no doubt try to make good their threats of violence, but internal divisions and criticism over strategy will cause some desertions. Nevertheless, the Montoneros have a much broader following than the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army, which is credited with most leftist terrorism in Argen- tina, and are quite capable of pulling off spec- tacular abductions or assassinations. Firmenich hinted that the two organizations might even find common ground in combatting the government. Among their shared objectives is a desire to prod security forces into an overreaction that would alienate the public (~,,I president Peron's government has thus far-), responded cautiously to the Montonero threat. No action has been taken to declare them illegal, .- although military and police officials reportedly?3 have been instructed to move more vigorously against the guerrillas now that the lines have been firmly drawn. Stronger legislation and new secu- rity mechanisms are under study, but these have proved ineffective in the past. If the army has accepted the inevitability of greater participation in the fight against terrorism, the government's ability to cope with the challenge will improve somewhat. Over the short term, however, the struggle between left and right will be a bloody one. OAS TO CONSIDER CUBA f'he foreign ministers of Costa Rica, Co- loml5ia, and Venezuela have begun proceedings that will lead to an OAS foreign ministers' review of the Cuba sanctions on November 11. Several governments have made clear their view that Cuba remains a threat to hemispheric tranquility, but they will not oppose a reconsideration of the issue.1 iLl he sponsors of the move have been careful to I( couch the rationale in terms of a changed world situation and a spirit of detente. They stress that a vote to lift the sanctions will imply no judgment of the Castro regime, but rather will release OAS members from obligations that have been in force since 1964 although recently honored mainly in the breach. Latin American sensitivity about outside interference in matters of national policy has caused the anti-Castro forces to be ill at ease about obstructing sister republics that want to open the door to Cuba? Using the co-existence argument, Costa Rica A others are confident that they can secure the necessary two-thirds majority vote of the 23 members to overturn the sanctions. A blocking one third plus. one, once assured by the unity among Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US, seems likely to break down in the absence of a strong diplomatic blitz. Various governments have noted the relative serenity with which Washington has viewed the latest developments in the OAS, and have become increasingly worried that the US will alter its policy and abandon its old allies on the issue. Hedging against such a development, Bolivia, Uruguay, and others have begun to open the way to flexibility on the sanctions issue, while con- tinuing to assert both their intention to remain diplomatically aloof from Cuba and their opposi- tion to an inter-American embrace of the Castro SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 `-' SECRET .01 BOLIVIA: ELECTIONS-PROMISE OR RUSE? 77 ]President Banzer's recent promise to hold both civilians and military men for some time. intional elections next year touched off a new ~-The mounting pressure to hold the election 25X1 period of uncertainty in Bolivia. Last week, At sooner stems from the suspicion that given Banzer threatened to resign in response to reports enough time, Banzer would devise a stratagem to that civilian politicians were forming a united perpetuate himself in office. front to urge that the election date be moved up from October 1975 to May or June. This dra- matic gesture was apparently calculated to neu- tralize the politicians by eliciting new protesta- tions of support from the government's military backer I. MEXICO: KIDNAPING VICTIMS SAVED \Banzer's threat was quickly withdrawn, how- A Mexican security forces scored a major ev~r, and spokesmen for the various parties have succdss against terrorists last weekend, but they now begun to press for major electoral reforms, k are still a long way from eliminating the guerrillas' 'I A I' b th rnment b ve t t l t y o em arrass a go y o exi e po i-y-capabi ity including the granting of amnes ticians and labor leaders. Even right-wing leader isolated acts of kidnaping and terrorism: Mario Gutierrez, who had been one of Banter s chief supporters, has publicly urged that elections be held as soon as possible and has formally declared his own candidacy. According to an assessment by official US observers, there is very little popular sentiment in favor of maintaining Banzer in office, and a majority within the mili- tary as well as most politicians would prefer to see a new man take over the presidency/ /( [Although Banzer so far has not rescheduled elections, he has adopted a conciliatory approach to his critics, and has reaffirmed his stated in- tention not to run for office. Earlier this week, 23 the labor minister reportedly told union officials that several exiled leaders will be allowed to return to Bolivia. According to a national radio broadcast, the government has told its consulates to issue visas` \Twice before, Banzer has promised to hold elections and has reneged, but it is doubtful that he could successfully pull that trick again. Bo- -7ivia's economic problems have been costing the ~Banzer government important support among p b \ Senator Ruben Figueroa, who had been held captive since May, was rescued on September 8 Wafter a gun battle in which soldiers wounded 9i several members of Lucio Cabanas' guerrilla group ! and arrested others. Cabanas is Mexico's best- known guerrilla and enjoys widespread support and sympathy among the peasants in the state of Guerrero. On September 7, another group of terrorists freed President Echeverria's father- in-law, Jose Guadelupe Zuno, who had been kidnaped 11 days earlier. The government had refused to talk with the kidnapers about terms for the freedom of either man? [Until Echeverria became president in 1970, politically motivated violence of this sort had been absent from Mexico since the late 1920s. About 15 guerrilla groups have sprung up since 1971, but only a handful are now active. The groups are small and not well-organized, but they have the capability to carry out spectacular acts of violence and terrorism and are likely to con- tinue being a real nuisance to the government. SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Stl:Kt 2 Iy e$s) he military government ma~ked its first squeeze on wage and salary earners will help keep year In power on September 11 without incidents discontent over the austere recovery program by leftists. The anniversary was highlighted by from ballooning into general disaffection with the junta President Pinochet's speech. government, but it will also hinder the fight Two of his announcements could have a major effect on the treatment of present prisoners and future offenders. Pinochet ended the state of internal war, thereby placing military courts under less severe peacetime rules on offenses, punishments, and appeals. The courts will con- tinue to function under the state of siege. Pinochet further declared that the govern- ment is "disposed" to release en masse prisoners who want to leave the country for good, and challenged Cuba and the Soviet Union to make a similar gesture. Positive responses probably will not be preconditions for Chilean action, however. In fact, former ambassador to the US Letelier already has been released. On the economic front, Pinochet disclosed that automatic quarterly wage readjustments henceforth will keep pace fully with increases in the cost of living. This move to ease the economic The remoteness of return to civilian rule was emphasized by some of the junta President's strongest language yet on the evils of politics. Noting that in the period prior to the military's overthrow of president Allende's Marxist govern- ment political parties had become "the symbols of national divisions and decay," Pinochet declared that resumption of political activity would have to await the emergence of a "new generation of Chileans" dedicated to national rather than partisan causes. Pinochet brought his audience of regime of- ficials and supporters to its feet with a peroration that pictured their country as a small nation locked in "frontal combat" with the forces of international communism and declared that, united, Chile would prevail. SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Sep 13, 74 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6 Iftor Now Secret Secret Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A010900070001-6