WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT DETENTE AND THE STIRRING OF SOVIET DISSIDENCE

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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2008
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• Publication Date: November 15, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Detente and the Stirring of Soviet Dissidence
Navy review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
November 15, 1974
No. 0046/74A
N?_ 67
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Socialist realism is an artistically creative method whose guiding principle is the truthful,
historically concrete presentation of reality in its revolutionary development, and whose
most important task is the communist education of the masses.
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia,
(second edition, 1957; Vol. 40, p. 180)
The lie can pit itself against much in this world, but not against art.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Summary
the Soviet leadership is faced with a long-standing problem that is
entering a new and more difficult phase-how to gain the advantages of
better relations with the West without eroding its control over Soviet
society. It appreciates the tangible, material benefits and a greater sense of
legitimacy and prestige derived from detente, but recognizes that any moves
to increase personal and cultural freedom would cause strains in the closed
Soviet society. All levels of the Soviet body politic are aware of this conflict,
and a variety of groups outside the power structure-intellectuals, minorities,
active dissidents, and political prisoners-sense a new opportunity in the
recently announced link between an easing of Soviet emigration procedures
and US trade policy toward Moscow to press for a more general relaxation of
domestic policies.
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Civil Rights Focus on Emigration
Some Soviet dissidents, certainly over-
optimistically, read the price the regime has paid
for US trade concessions as the "opening of the
floodgates." Despite the lack of reporting on the
subject by Soviet media, the public is becoming
aware of the substance of the letters dated Octo-
ber 18, exchanged between Secretary Kissinger
and Senator Jackson, and the White House clar-
ifying statement, tying the emigration issue to
passage of the trade reform bill, which would
grant most favored nation status to Moscow. Only
three days before the US announcement, Brezh-
nev publicly reiterated for the record the line that
it is impermissible to set conditions for detente.
Despite this disclaimer, the negotiations on em-
igration are certainly seen by all Soviet citizens,
not just Jews, as an unprecedented concession in
an area of hitherto sacrosanct domestic policy.
The right to freedom of movement within
the USSR and, above all, the right to emigrate,
have been goals shared by all, not just Jewish,
dissidents. Some, at least, go further and consider
the core of a general civil rights guarantee for all
Soviet citizens.
It is this view and its consequences that the
regime is apparently intent on curbing and cor-
recting, although at what cost is still unclear. The
problem must still be a matter of debate within
the leadership. This would explain some of the
recent signs of contradictory policies in domestic
cultural affairs and the seesaw Soviet posture on
freedom of movement issues at the European
Security Conference.
Signs of Conservative Retrenchment
The leadership's concern over the potentially
corrosive effect of detente-generated popular
expectations on its domestic controls is perhaps
most readily apparent in the nationwide ideolog-
ical vigilance campaign that got under way late
this summer. Heralded by the Central Commit-
tee's generally critical assessment in late August
of party ideological work in the Belorussian
Republic, the pervasive campaign has been
striking out mainly at "consumerism," nation-
Special Report - 3 -
alism, religion, and other bourgeois "ills." The
drive is designed to improve the technical and
ideological expertise of party workers, to rein-
vigorate the propaganda apparatus at all levels,
and to restore popular faith in the curative
powers of Marxism-Leninism. It is thus the most
conspicuous sign that a significant relaxation of
domestic policy is not imminent. Party conserva-
tives probably see the campaign as a major tool
for promoting their views; when articles of faith
are at issue, moderation can be labeled a vice.
Heaping praise on a period characterized by
cultural repression is another way open to con-
servatives intent on frustrating any change in
domestic policy. An editorial in Pravda on the
10th anniversary of Khrushchev's ouster, for
example, praised Brezhnev's stewardship over a
period of "collective" rule and denigrated
Khrushchev's more freewheeling style. In the
symbol-studded world of Soviet internal politics,
Pravda was also criticizing the relatively liberal
cultural policy of the Khrushchev era.
More significantly, the sensitive issue of
Soviet historical interpretation of Stalin and his
rule has again reappeared after a hiatus of many
years. Under Khrushchev, censuring Stalin
became a symbolic advocacy of a change in the
status quo; now even limited praise of Stalin has
become a symbol of retrenchment. This weather
vane is closely watched by both establishment
and dissident cultural elements. The recently
announced publication of a revised version of
Marshal Zhukov's memoirs is thus another signif-
icant negative sign. The book, which as yet is
unavailable in the West, modifies a chapter in the
original version that questioned Stalin's wartime
leadership.
Stemming directly from the ideological cam-
paign are several recent appointments of veteran
ideologists to important and long-vacant posts in
the party's central propaganda apparatus. Con-
servatives and cultural hard liners have been
recently appointed to the chief editorship of the
Central Committee's journal Kommunist and of
the embattled, but hitherto still relatively liberal,
literary journal Novy Mir.
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Water truck disrupts Moscow art show on September 15
The most dramatic sign of bold conservative
action occurred on September 15, when bull-
dozers and water cannon were used to disrupt an
attempt by Moscow's unconventional artists to
stage an open air exhibit. Although the artists
received permission to hold a public show two
weeks later-and did so-many of them have sub-
sequently reported that they have been subjected
to increased official harassment. Some have been
charged with "parasitism," i.e., failure to hold
gainful employment, and one was pressed to sign
an affidavit renouncing any intention to organize
or participate in similar future exhibits. Moreover,
an article in the Moscow party organization's
daily on October 17 indirectly praised the ideo-
logical work of the district in which the disrup-
tion of the initial show occurred. The message
seemed to be that the original decision to prevent
the exhibit was correct, even if the methods used
were excessive, and that the subsequent permis-
sion to hold the show should not be regarded as
precedent setting.
The only statement on this issue so far by a
member of the leadership came on November 10
Special Report -4-
4 -
when President Podgorny said that "the slightest
when
departure from our principles is inadmissible in
any kind of art." Speaking on the 150th anniver-
sary of Moscow's Maly theater, Podgorny tied his
warning against any deviation from socialist
realism to the ideological campaign by adding
that art must be used to combat "apolitical, con-
sumer psychology."
The conservatives' jealous defense of domes-
tic controls and stonewalling on cultural issues are
inevitably reflected in their opposition to eased
emigration procedures. There are sporadic but
continuing reports of harassment of Jewish
activists and of Jews who have declared their
intention to emigrate. Since the US Congress has
not yet passed the trade bill, the Soviet regime
probably does not regard these actions as a breach
of the US-Soviet understanding. A number of
Soviet Jews, however, have already made that
charge in public statements.
Moreover, isolated reports of continued
harassment of non-Jewish would-be emigrants by
Soviet officials are intensifying fears among
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non-Jewish dissidents in Moscow that the regime
is determined to restrict any easing of emigration
to Jews, despite the non-exclusive wording of the
Kissinger-Jackson letters.
The Other Side of the Ledger
Along with these signs of intent to preserve
the status quo are others suggesting something
less than total inflexibility in the Kremlin.
One such sign came on September 2, when a
monument for Khrushchev's grave-a bust of the
former leader by maverick sculptor Ernst Neiz-
vestny-was unveiled at Moscow's Novodevichy
Cemetery. The sculptor, a Jew, began work on
the monument at the request of the Khrushchev
family soon after the leader's death in 1971.
Permission to install it was withheld, however,
until mid-April of this year; Neizvestny claimed
that the decision was conveyed to him by a
person close to Brezhnev.
The unveiling of the monument was prob-
ably seen by Moscow's unconventional artists as
evidence of a partial rehabilitation of Khrushchev
and of official acceptance of Neizvestny's own
unconventional work. They may have been en-
couraged by this to try to stage the open air art
show, hoping the move also signaled a shift in the
direction of the more relaxed cultural policies of
the Khrushchev era. Although the attempt itself
was a fiasco, the dissidents were no doubt
heartened by the confusion in the Moscow city
bureaucracy following the disruption of the show,
signs of high-level intervention, and the successful
staging of the second exhibit. Moreover, in early
October the party chief of the Moscow district in
which the initial disruption occurred was
ousted-evidently as a scapegoat-and sent into
diplomatic exile as ambassador to Hanoi. On Oc-
tober 4, a deputy editor of Pravda privately
apologized to a US embassy officer for the
manhandling of US correspondents during the
aborted art show.
In the midst of these events the daily paper
of the Communist Youth League on September
17 published what could only have been viewed
as an implicit defense of Khrushchev's rewriting
Special Report -5-
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Sergei Khrushchev viewing the newly
unveiled monument for the grave of his father
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JCl.rrsiz
of Stalinist history. The reviewer of Ivan
Stadnyuk's War, a novel glorifying Stalin's war-
time leadership, rebuked the author for glossing
over Stalin's errors and failing to take into ac-
count "the clear assessments of our historical
science." This was the first positive endorsement
of Khrushchev's rewriting of Stalinist history to
appear in years. Whether the review was a
stimulus or a response to the apparently pro-
Stalin revision of the Zhukov memoirs is a moot
point; it is the re-emergence of the symbolic
debate between advocates and opponents of the
status quo that is significant.
Another series of positive signs, contrasting
with the continued harassment of individual
Jewish would-be-emigrants, has been the selective
but markedly more lenient posture toward the
Jewish community in Moscow. For example, the
public religious observances of the holiday of
Sirnchas Torah in October proceeded without the
customary harassment in front of the Moscow
synagogue by the police.
Another case in point is the unusual course
of the trial of Viktor Polsky, a prominent Jewish
activist. Polsky was charged with having struck a
girl with his automobile. The victim is the
daughter of a man identified in 1972 as a ranking
official of the USSR Procuracy. Polsky contended
that the girl had leaped in front of his car in a
suicide attempt. Polsky, a physicist, lost his job
soon after he applied for emigration and claimed
he had been "hounded" because of his desire to
emigrate. At the trial, however, a physician who
treated the girl after the accident appeared
"unexpectedly" to testify in Polsky's defense, an
ambulance driver corroborated Polsky's account
of the incident, and the defense attorney-a
Jew---successfully undercut the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, including that of the girl's
father. Moreover, prominent Moscow dissidents,
among them the wife of Andrey Sakharov, and
several Western correspondents were admitted to
the courtroom. Polsky was found guilty only of
negligence, was sentenced to pay a nominal fine,
and was released.
These examples of leniency suggest that at
least some elements of Soviet officialdom have
been instructed to try to avoid adverse Western
publicity, especially while the trade legislation is
still pending in the US Congress. This interpreta-
tion is reinforced by the failure of Moscow police
Unconventional art show on the outskirts of Moscow on September 29
Special Report -6- November 15, 1974
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to arrest three young Jews who on October 29
demonstrated in the streets for the right to
emigrate to Israel. It was the first such demonstra-
tion since the announcement of the US-Soviet
emigration understanding.
An Uncertain Prognosis
The conflicting signs in Soviet policy in the
area of human rights suggest that the leadership is
still debating the issue of greater flexibility,
Podgorny's remarks on November 11 notwith-
standing. Podgorny, generally identified with cul-
tural conservatives, clearly does not have the last
word on cultural policy.
The leadership's discussion almost certainly
hinges on the price, i.e., the benefits accruing
from detente, being right. Recent events also
show how vulnerable the regime's domestic
practices are to Western publicity, and both the
leadership and the dissidents are well aware of
this.
Kremlin advocates of detente may believe
that some relaxation of domestic controls will
deflect adverse publicity and help the Soviets in
other areas of East-West negotiations. They may
fear that if incidents like the art show are handled
piecemeal, the energies of the leadership as a
whole will be sapped, and latent divisions on
other policy issues could rise to the surface.
The leadership will be concerned that
evidence that it was not adhering to its bargain
with the US on emigration would be viewed by
influential segments of Western political opinion
as casting doubt on Soviet good faith in other
detente-related negotiations. The leaders are prob-
ably not of one mind in their assessment of what
the West would regard as non-adherence, but they
are almost certainly agreed that they must try to
limit the domestic impact of the emigration
accord as much as possible. In the short term,
they will probably test US determination to insist
on the terms of the agreement. The longer trend
Special Report - 7 -
An example of socialist realism, raised to
the heroic scale, is this monument in the heart of
Donetsk honoring the coal miners of the Don
Basin. Similar massive statuary, featuring mus-
cular workers and peasants, dots the Soviet
landscape.
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Religious services conducted in Moscow's central synagogue
could be toward some easing of internal condi-
tions, providing the relaxation appears to the
public as the regime's own decision and not-as in
the case of the art show-an embarrassed response
to internal and external pressure.
This will not be an easy task. So far, the
generally fragmented nature of Soviet dissidence
has been an asset to the regime. The dissidents,
though often vocal, are numerically insignificant,
and the Soviet masses are generally apathetic and
unsympathetic. Although the dissidents are
spread thin over the political spectrum, and
frequently divided on both goals and methods,
they are united-as were their historical predeces-
sors---in their desire to gain the right to voice
unorthodox views. They are united in viewing the
foreign press as a pulpit without which their
voices would now be ignored. And they all sup-
port the right to emigration-despite the ambigu-
ous feelings arising from the traditional Russian
attachment to the motherland. Some dissidents,
like the democratic group clustered around
Andrey Sakharov, support emigration as a matter
of principle; others, such as the authoritarian
Russian nationalists, frequently favor it for anti-
Semitic reasons.
The emigration issue is also likely to
embolden Soviet dissidents to test the limits of
the regime's flexibility on other matters.
Sakharov has announced that the hunger strike he
claims occurred in several Soviet labor camps on
October 30 will become an annual event. Mos-
cow's unconventional artists have announced
plans to stage a second, indoor, public exhibit of
their work in December. Their colleagues in
Leningrad are pressing authorities there to permit
a similar public show. All concerned probably
view the coming months as a test of both Soviet
and Western attitudes, and the dissidents may
anticipate a period in which they have a new
weapon--Western attention to the emigration
agreement--to advance their cause
Special Report
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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0046/74
15 November 1974
Copy NO
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (November 15, 1974)
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
SPECIAL
REPORT
1 Middle East: Options Narrow
2 Palestinians at the UN
3 Austerity Measures in Israel
4 Greece: First Elections in a Decade
6 Turkey: New Prime Minister Named
6 EC Searches for Energy Policy
8 Spain: New Defense Ties with US
8 Western Europe: Civil Aircraft
10 Italy: Critical Crossroads
11 USSR: Anniversary; Lunar Mission
12 Bulgarian Government Changes
13 Whither the OAS?
14 Bolivia: Elections Canceled
15 China-USSR: Peking Proposes
Nonaggression Pact
16 Vietnam: Calling for Talks; Military
17 China: Mao Sets the Tone
18 A Troubled Japan
20 South Korea: Recession
(Published separately)
Detente and the Stirring of
Soviet Dissidence
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`,r J C Ir K C I % ..r
The Middle East: Options Narrow
Arab and Israeli reaction to Secretary Kis-
singer's visit last week, as reflected in their respec-
tive media, has been muted, and neither side has
struck any notes of optimism on the prospects for
further peace negotiations. The circumspect press
commentary is partly due to the fact that so little
information on the visit has been made public.
Even more, it probably reflects recognition on all
sides that the options for restoring negotiating
momentum have narrowed considerably since the
Arab summit last month.
Both Egypt and Israel still appear to be
focusing on a further disengagement in the Sinai
as the only means of breaking the present dead-
lock. The Israeli press has speculated that Secre-
tary Kissinger may pursue this subject in another
visit to the Middle East next month or else invite
Egyptian and Israeli representatives to begin talks
then in Washington. Israeli Foreign Minister
Allon, however, has stated publicly that "a great
deal of clarification is needed before negotiations
can be revived." The US embassy in Tel Aviv adds
that the Israelis are not optimistic because, as one
leading daily noted, there is an "abysmal gap"
between Israel's demands for a political settle-
ment with Egypt and the more narrow military
agreement Egyptian President Sadat is prepared
to concede.
During the Secretary's visit, Sadat publicly
affirmed his belief that a step-by-step approach
remains viable, and he clearly would prefer to
pursue unilaterally a further disengagement in the
Sinai. Nevertheless, there were indications during
the Arab summit that he was heavily pressured by
other Arab leaders not to proceed before extract-
ing a commitment from the US and Israel that
Syria would also be included in any future phase
of negotiations. Syria thus continues to play the
pivotal role. Prospects for breaking the deadlock
on the Arab side appear to hinge on whether or
not President Asad believes that Sadat is ready to
insist on linking another Israeli withdrawal in the
Sinai with one on the Golan Heights.
Sadat has continued to hedge his bets on this
subject in public. He has claimed both that the
Arab summit decisions have not impaired Egypt's
freedom to negotiate and that future negotiations
must be "on all fronts."
Despite the persistent Syrian misgivings
about a step-by-step approach and about Egypt's
attitude, it seems most likely that Sadat has had
to give Asad some private assurances that Egypt
will demand simultaneous progress in negotiations
and, perhaps, even that Egypt will support Syria
if it is attacked. The crucial question at the
moment appears to be whether or not Syria can
be sufficiently mollified to allow some form of
preliminary Egyptian-Israeli talks to take place
that could be billed as the first step in a "simul-
taneous" negotiating process.
Syria's principal concern is that the opening
of any new Egyptian-Israeli discussions would
reduce its leverage on Israel and give Tel Aviv an
excuse for postponing further any consideration
of concessions on the Golan Heights. Earlier this
month, Prime Minister Rabin reiterated that Israel
is ready to resume negotiations with Syria, but
there have been no indications that the Israelis are
preparing to make new proposals. If Israel con-
tinues to balk, Asad could attempt to force the
issue by pressing for reconvening the Geneva con-
ference.
What Syria does about the renewal of the
mandate of the UN observer force on the Golan
front, which expires at the end of this month, has
been regarded as a key indicator of Asad's
attitudes and intentions. Speculation continues
that he may refuse to extend the mandate to
demonstrate at home and abroad his dissatisfac-
tion with Israel's failure to offer concessions. This
week there were some signs that military con-
siderations could prevent Asad from playing this
card.
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Asad's military advisers presumably rec-
ognize that hostilities, once begun, could not be
confined to a repetition of the artillery duels and
patrol actions that Syria employed to reinforce its
bargaining points in the disengagement talks last
spring. If Asad should decide that ending the
mandate involves too much risk of a destructive
Israeli attack, he might justify a limited extension
of a few months as necessary to allow time both
for more vigorous diplomatic efforts and for the
completion of military training and defense con-
struction programs.
When Asad makes his play on the mandate
issue, it will be based as much on political as on
military factors. He probably believes that the25X1
negotiating options have not yet been completely
exhausted. As usual, however, he has his cards
Palestinians at the UN
Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir
Arafat asked the UN General Assembly on
November 13 to back the Palestinians' right to
return to their homeland, to determine their own
future, and to establish a national authority on
any Palestinian territory "from which Israeli
occupation is removed."
These points were drawn from a com-
prehensive policy statement approved by the
PLO's parliamentary body in Cairo last June.
Arafat, in his address at the UN, did not repeat
the more radical planks of that platform, notably
the standard PLO threats directed at Israel. In
June, Arafat approved a statement that the PLO
would use all means, "foremost of which is armed
struggle," to liberate Palestinian land; at the UN,
he asked that there be no more bloodshed.
Arafat did not repeat either the Palestinians'
usual rejection of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, which provides the legal basis for the
Geneva peace talks, or their frequent denuncia-
tions of Jordan's King Husayn. These omissions
almost certainly reflect the PLO leaders' current
inclination to hint at compromises with Israel and
Jordan in the hope of gaining a meaningful role in
peace negotiations and eventually winning control
of a truncated Palestinian state.
Arafat's resort to intangible appeals for
justice for the Palestinians and his tactic of avoid-
ing threats to Israel were designed to gain wide
support for the Palestinians and to avoid giving
offense to Israel's backers, particularly the US.
The PLO chief decried US support for Israel,
which he charged is not in the interest of the
"American masses." He appealed to the American
people for friendship and for more fruitful rela-
tions with the Arab world.
Because the Palestinians have no official
status at the UN, Arafat did not offer a specific
proposal for a resolution on the Palestine
question. Such a proposal will be introduced later
in the debate, probably by Egypt.
Debate on the Palestine question is expected
to last until November 21. In order to ensure that
its views are heard, Israel has reserved the right to
address each session. The Arabs responded by
claiming the same prerogative for Syria, their
spokesman.
In an initial reaction to Arafat's UN speech,
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin said it challenged
Israel's very existence and was made on the
assumption that Jews have no right to a state.
Rabin emphasized, however, that Israel would
continue the search for peace with the Arabs in
every way-directly or indirectly.
Arab residents in the Israeli-occupied West
Bank staged several demonstrations in support of
the PLO this week. A general strike called for on
the West Bank by PLO broadcasts to mark
Arafat's UN debut met with only limited success,
however, in the face of intensive Israeli pressure.
The major exception came in Nablus-long a
hotbed of anti-Israeli activity-where the strikes
was almost totally effective.
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V L.VI l" I N` eI
Nwe
The cabinet announced a number of new
economic measures this week, highlighted by a
43-percent devaluation of the pound. The new
measures are the latest in a series of steps
designed to correct the country's economic ills
caused by the burden Israel's military program
places on the country's resources. Last July the
government implemented a number of measures
aimed at slowing the rate of inflation and
trimming nonessential budget outlays. A third
economic package that will concentrate on wage,
income, and tax reforms has yet to be announced.
The latest measures deal almost exclusively
with slowing Israel's foreign currency drain. In
addition to the devaluation of the pound from
4.2 to 6 per US dollar, the government has moved
to:
? Freeze imports of certain luxury goods,
including autos, for six months.
? Raise the foreign travel tax.
? Increase utility taxes and the prices of
petroleum products.
? Reduce subsidies on many basic com-
modities.
? Extend the national wage agreement for
one year.
Finance Ministry officials said the new eco-
nomic program was made imperative by the large
decline in foreign exchange reserves. At the end
of September official reserves stood at $1 billion,
a drop of $800 million since the beginning of the
year. According to Israeli officials, the new
measures will save an estimated $700 million in
foreign exchange.
Israel's current account deficit has soared to
$3.5 billion this year from a deficit of only $1
billion before the war. Arms purchases from
abroad have accelerated and put added pressures
on reserve holdings. Defense imports this year will
probably total $2.4 billion, compared with
$500-600 million a year before the war. Although
the US is covering the bulk of Israel's arms
imports with official aid, Israel apparently has
purchased up to $400 million in arms under
commercial contracts. The sharp rise in world
food prices also has contributed to Israel's trade
woes.
The new measures will surely aggravate infla-
tion, which has increased 40 percent since the
war. The reduction in basic foodstuff subsidies
alone has caused the consumer price index to rise
17 percent-some officials are speculating that
prices could rise as much as 50 percent within a
year.
Much will depend on whether the Histadrut
labor federation, whose support is vital to the
program's success, agrees to go along with the
government's desire to hold the line on wages.
Prime Minister Rabin's bargaining position was
strengthened when the Knesset voted 59 to 41 on
November 12 to approve the economic package.
Nevertheless, Rabin will probably have to make
some concessions to the Histadrut. The govern-
ment has already promised to work with the
union to ameliorate the effects of price increases
on low income groups, large families, poor elderly
people, and welfare recipients.
Although the Israeli public anticipated many
of the government's actions, their severity when
officially unveiled came as a shock and led to a
series of demonstrations, brief strikes, and rioting
in parts of Tel Aviv. Arabs in the Israeli-occupied
West Bank-which is closely linked to the Israeli
economy-also demonstrated against the rise in
price of basic commodities. Violent protests such
as occurred in Tel Aviv were the exception, how-
ever. Press commentary on the new program was
generally favorable, conceding the necessity for
harsh measures, but cautioning the government to
ensure that their impact is distributed equitably.
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The conservative New Democracy Party led
by Prime Minister Karamanlis is favored to win
the elections this Sunday. Much is riding on voter
confidence in Karamanlis, who has made his
experience and proven ability to govern one of
the main issues in the campaign. The size of his
victory will determine how flexible he can be on
Cyprus, NATO, and in relations with the United
States. It will also influence Greece's future politi-
cal structures, as the new parliament is em-
powered to revise the constitution.
Should Karamanlis fail to gain an outright
majority in parliament, he will form a coalition
government with the centrist Center Union - New
Forces led by George Mavros, which is expected
to come in second. Such a coalition would be
much like that which took over this summer
when the military stepped down. Mavros is less
flexible than Karamanlis on Cyprus and NATO
and less favorably disposed toward the US. A
coalition dependent on Center Union support
might therefore prove unwieldy at times, but can
be expected to keep Greece on a basically pro-
Western course and act responsibly on the Cyprus
and Aegean issues.
Issues in the campaign have been over-
shadowed by the leading personalities, most of
whom were active in politics before the 1967
military coup. The parties have been recon-
stituted, however. Karamanlis has dropped con-
servatives who collaborated with the junta and
has tried to broaden the base of his support by
bringing in a large number of new faces. Mavros
has picked up several colorful candidates who had
been associated with resistance to the junta, such
as the would-be assassin of ex-President Papa-
dopoulos. Mavros' leadership and party organiza-
tion is weak, however. More important, as Kara-
manlis' former foreign minister, he has found it
difficult to establish a separate identity for him-
self and his party, which is, in many ways,
ideologically similar to that of Karamanlis.
Popular discontent with the past seven years
of military rule plus anti-American sentiment over
Cyprus provide the left wing with promising ter-
rain to exploit, but the left is split between
Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Move-
ment and the United Left. Papandreou has been
exploiting themes of betrayal in Cyprus, hostility
to NATO, neutralism, a vague socialism, and anti-
Americanism to obtain considerable popularity
among intellectuals, radicalized students, and
youth.. He is mistrusted by the farmers and the
middle class, as well as by the establishment,
however. In addition, complicated registration
procedures and the requirement that voters must
cast their ballots in their place of origin may limit
the turnout of student voters. Papandreou is also
running more political unknowns than any other
party and is fielding candidates in only 38 out of
56 electoral districts. He and the Center Union -
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New Forces are expected to split about 40 per-
cent of the vote, with the Center Union getting
the larger share.
The United Left, a grouping of two Commu-
nist parties and a former communist-front group,
is the only major group in the election that has
been ruled a coalition by the Supreme Court. This
means that the United Left must obtain 30 per-
cent of the vote in order to be eligible to partici-
pate in more than the first "distribution" of seats
under Greece's complicated proportional repre-
sentation law. Most observers do not give the
United Left more than 15 percent of the vote.
With perhaps as much as 30 percent of the vote
the leftist groups-the United Left plus Papan-
dreou-could be a vocal factor in the new
parliament.
Except for Papandreou, the parties have
treated the Cyprus issue gingerly. They all sup-
port a solution "safeguarding the rights" of their
ethnic brothers on the island. The Panhellenic
Socialist Movement and the United Left have
urged the return of Archbishop Makarios. The
Center Union urges a solution through inter-
communal talks, while Karamanlis has been re-
minding voters that a strong Greek government
with a decisive policy is in the best position to
handle the Turks.
Punishment of those who supported the
junta has been a key issue. Karamanlis has de-
fused it somewhat by exiling the five key mem-
bers of the junta that overthrew the civilian gov-
ernment in 1967 and promising legal action
against them. He has avoided taking harsher
measures in order not to alarm the army and the
extreme right.
Right-wing forces, represented by the Na-
tional Democratic Union led by Petros Garou-
falias, are unlikely to win more than 5 percent of
the vote. They are apprehensive about the legal-
ization of the Communist Party and other mea-
sures they interpret as a leftward drift, but appear
to be willing to give Karamanlis time to work
things out. Although pro-junta forces cannot be
completely discounted as potential perpetrators
of a coup against Karamanlis, they probably lack
sufficient support in the army to bring Kara-
Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland have
decided to join the US-backed International
Energy Program but with certain conditions
attached that relate to their neutrality. The
decisions represent an important political
milestone, given the fact that the neutrals
have heretofore consistently avoided align-
ment with any politically committed group.
Joining the program will mean a break with
that tradition, even though it does not por-
tend moves toward closer cooperation with
Western Europe on political and security
matters.
The realities of the oil shortage and the
memory of last winter's oil embargo com-
pelled the three to give serious consideration
to joining. Each is concerned, however, that
its neutral status not be compromised. In or-
der to soften the impact of an affirmative
decision and to justify it domestically, the
three are insisting that a neutrality statement
be attached to final acceptance of member-
ship. The neutrality declaration is not in-
tended to act as an escape mechanism, and
the three have promised to adhere strictly to
the obligations of membership.
The International Energy Program was
developed by the Energy Coordinating Group
established last February in Washington. Un-
der the emergency plan, the US, Canada, Ja-
pan, and all of the EC countries except
France would share oil reserves and reduce
energy consumption in the event of a future
oil embargo or cutback in production. Eu-
rope's other neutral, Finland, reportedly is
studying the possibility of some sort of affilia-
tion with the IEP, but will have to consider
the likely Soviet reaction before making a
manlis down. Nonetheless, the unofficial cam-
paign slogan of New Democracy-"Karamanlis or
the tanks"-is probably an effective reminder for
the voter of the past seven years of military
dictatorship.
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Jtuht
TURKEY: NEW PRIME MINISTER NAMED
With the naming of Sadi Irmak as Prime
Minister-designate, President Koruturk appears to
have found a formula for breaking the eight-week-
old political stalemate. Irmak, a political neutral,
has begun a series of talks with leaders of Tur-
key's major political parties in an effort to put
together a broad coalition that will move the
nation toward early elections next spring or sum-
mer.
The breakthrough apparently came after
President Koruturk threatened to resign unless
the party loaders reached agreement on forming a
government. Democratic Party leader Bozbeyli
then proposed a broad coalition government that
would be headed by an independent and would
exclude the participation of party leaders. Most
of the party chiefs had rejected former Prime
Minister Ecevit's call for early elections as a con-
dition for a new government, but Koruturk re-
portedly has persuaded them to accept that idea
as well.
tion" composed of all the major parties except
the National Salvation Party, Ecevit's former
coalition partner whose disruptive tactics brought
about the current government crisis.
The 70-year-old Irmak, who was inactive in
politics for 24 years before he was named to the
senate as a presidential appointee this year, will
have difficulty molding this disparate group into a
working government. His primary role will be to
act as caretaker until new elections can be held
that will give one party or another a clear
mandate to govern.
Despite the preliminary approval the party
leaders have given to this formula, Irmak still has
several hurdles to clear. The formal process of
organizing a government requires Irmak to:
? Name a full cabinet, which with presi-
dential approval will become the acting gov-
ernment of Turkey.
? Prepare a government program for sub-
mission to parliament.
? Present this program for debate and a
vote of confidence.
There are a number of pitfalls along the way,
particularly the distribution of cabinet portfolios.
Although the agreement arranged by Koruturk
reportedly calls for the coalition parties to share
the posts on a basis proportional to their repre-
sentation in parliament, disputes could arise over
which parties will get the more prestigious assign-
ments. Irmak could also run into difficulty
persuading parliament to go along with early elec-
tions, inasmuch as many of the deputies will fear
that Ecevit's national popularity-as a result of
Cyprus-will carry his Republican People's Party
to victory.
Except for the right-wing National Salvation
Party, there appears to be general agreement
among Turkey's political leaders on policy toward 25X1
Cyprus. Irmak has announced that he plans to
continue the Cyprus policy of former prime
minister Ecevit,
For inis er dunes is likely to
succeeds in forming a "national coalition," it
might defuse Cyprus as a political issue by sharing
among all the likely contestants in the next elec-
tion the accolades or blame resulting from any
effort to negotiate a settlement with the
EC SEARCHES FOR ENERGY POLICY
EC deliberations on a common energy policy
are picking up after being stalled for years. There
is concern lest community functions be usurped
by the new International Energy Agency to be
inaugurated November 15 as an autonomous body
within the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development. Movement on an EC
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policy is also seen as a way to induce France to
join the international agency and to assure a role
for the EC as an entity in the conference between
producers, consumers, and developing countries
that France has proposed.
French President Giscard's bid for a confer-
ence early next year to discuss oil prices caused
embarrassment among Paris' EC partners. They
have not wanted to rebuff a French initiative, and
they share to some extent the French desire to
avoid an atmosphere of "confrontation" with the
Arab producers. Nevertheless, they know that the
French plan would not adequately allow for the
prior development of a consumer position, one of
the principal aims of the US-backed international
agency.
France also wants a common EC policy that
would, among other things, lay down guidelines
for restrictions on consumption and for
developing alternative energy sources. Most of
France's partners may now be taking a friendlier
look at EC Commission proposals along these
lines, not least because agreement on EC
measures-even in a watered down form-could be
hailed a success of the December summit of the
Nine.
French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues him-
self made an attempt at this week's ministerial EC
political cooperation meeting to marry Paris' own
earlier proposals with Commission proposals and
to take account of responses to the conference
idea. While calling for agreement by the summit
on elements of an internal EC policy-deliberately
left vague as to targets and dates in order to
minimize possible opposition-the new proposal is
more positive about the contribution the inter-
national agency could make toward cooperation
among consumer countries. In return, the French
want the EC leaders to "note with satisfaction"
France's proposal for the consumer-producer con-
ference and to agree that the EC intends to
participate in it as a single entity.
France's conciliatory suggestions-including
an observer role for the Commission at the inter-
national agency-found initial favor among the
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Sauvagnargues (r) and Irish Foreign
Minister Fitzgerald (1) at the meeting
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 15, 74
Nine, although the British still appear quite
reserved about the consumer-producer meeting.
By aiming at positive decisions at the December
summit, Paris may be implicitly recognizing its
partners' criticism that a "preparatory meeting"
this month for the consumer-producer conference
would be premature.
Although Paris will continue to press for
such a conference, which would enhance French
pretensions to be an honest broker between con-
sumers and producers, this week's EC meetings
seem to have reinforced the priority to be given
consumer cooperation within the international
agency, on the one hand, and to establishing
common EC internal policies, on the other. The
UK may still be an obstacle to early agreement on
internal measures. London would prefer that the
summit give a boost to the Labor government's
hopes for renegotiation of its EC membership
terms rather than concentrate on energy matters. 25X1
Differences between France and its partners
persist, moreover, over how free a common EC oil
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,J L_ V I IL_ I
SPAIN: NEW' DEFENSE TIES WITH US
Spanish negotiators formally advised a visit-
ing US delegation last week that Madrid intends
to seek a new defense relationship with the US.
For some time the Spanish press has been citing
the inadequacy of the present agreement of
friendship and cooperation that covers US use of
base facilities in Spain. Suggested solutions have
ranged from calls for a mutual defense treaty all
the way to demands that the US get out.
During the initial round of negotiations on
renewing the present agreement that expires next
September, the Spaniards stopped short of asking
for a mutual defense treaty. Nevertheless, by em-
phasizing the desirability of joint military
planning and coordination of the Spanish defense
role with that of the US and NATO, the Span-
iards made it clear that a treaty is what they
want.
The Spaniards are trying to use the bilateral
Declaration of Principles governing relations be-
tween Spain and the US, which was signed in July
to parallel the NATO declaration, as a lever to get
a firmer defense tie. They argue that the declara-
tion went beyond the provisions in the present
agreement governing the use of defense facilities
in Spain and signaled a stronger US commitment
to grant the Spaniards the same treatment in the
defense field as that accorded the NATO allies.
Consequently they want the new agreement to
incorporate the spirit of the declaration. The
Spaniards argued that they could no longer justify
to their people the increased threat to Spain
brought on by the presence of US bases without
being able to cite closer Spanish defense ties to
the West.
The principal US negotiator has asserted the
willingness of the US to continue and strengthen
defense . cooperation, but argued that the US
believes this could be accomplished within the
framework of the current agreement.
The next plenary session will be held early
next month in Washington. The agenda will cover
the nature of the defense relationship and closer
coordination of Spain's defense planning with
that of the West. The chief Spanish negotiator
Page 8
stated that these two items constituted the main
concern of his government and would have to be
agreed upon before Spain would consider two
other items proposed for future meetings: renego-
tiation of terms governing use of facilities pro-
vided to the US as well as conditions governing
their utilization, and renegotiation of the military
quid pro quo.
Two additional items were also proposed:
economic, technical, and cultural coopera-
tion-which will be considered by specialized
study groups-and the composition and function-
ing of joint institutions to administer the
agreement.
At the December session the Spanish nego-
tiators can be expected to make a strong pitch for
a treaty in spite of US warnings of the difficulty
of getting congressional ratification. This will re-
flect sentiment expressed with growing frequency
in the Spanish press that Madrid is negotiating
from a position of strength. The installation of a
leftist government in Portugal and the threat to
the eastern flank of NATO created by the Cyprus
crisis may have convinced Madrid that base rights
in Spain are all the more vital to US interests and
will enable Spain at long last to insist on the
security treaty that many Spanish officials have
Western Europe
CIVIL AIRCRAFT SALES DOWN
Major manufacturers of civil aircraft in
Western Europe--concentrated in France, the UK,
West Germany, and the Netherlands-have been
rocked by new developments in the already
troubled industry.
? Recent financial reports show severe
losses for many international airlines, includ-
ing several in Western Europe.
? Spain's Iberia Air Lines canceled an or-
der for four of Europe's consortium-built
A-300 Airbuses. Ironically, Spain is a member
of the consortium.
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? Hawker-Siddeley decided to halt devel-
opment work on the new four engine HS-146,
a 70-100 passenger short-haul feeder-line
aircraft.
These events are part of the general eco-
nomic uncertainty facing the civil aircraft in-
dustry in Western Europe. Rising fuel costs and
lagging traffic demand are cutting into the opera-
tions of many international airlines, and the car-
riers are reluctant to make commitments for addi-
tional aircraft, either in Europe or elsewhere.
Consequently, Europe's consortium and national
aircraft programs have suffered, and the industry
has kept going only because there are still back-
logs of unfilled orders.
Both of Europe's major consortium air-
craft- the Anglo-French Concorde and the Air-
bus-are in trouble. Despite technological suc-
cesses, mounting costs for the Concorde are se-
verely limiting sales. French support-which in
the past was unwavering-now appears in doubt.
Some government officials have mentioned that
any aircraft produced after the initial production
run of 16 might cost $90 million. At the current
$45-million price, which is triple the original esti-
mate, only 9 Corcordes have been sold to the
captive markets of Air France (4) and British
Airways (5). Iran, which may buy 2 by the end of
1974, is the only other country expected to pur-
chase the aircraft in the near future.
Orders for the A-300 Airbus-a joint effort
of five European countries-have been poor. Sales
were hurt by delays in early production schedules
in 1969-70, allowing US manufacturers to get at
least a two-year jump on deliveries of the similar
widebodied McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and Lock-
heed L-1011. These delays, coupled with lagging
traffic, have limited sales over the past several
years to 23 aircraft-less than one tenth of the
estimated break-even point of 250. Despite this
slow pace, however, many Europeans remain opti-
mistic about the aircraft's long-term prospects.
The failure of consortium programs has
undermined many of Europe's national civil air-
craft activities. In France, problems have been
compounded by a host of difficulties with new
aircraft, including the 150-passenger Mercure, the
feeder-liner Falcon 30, and the Corvette Exec jet.
In the UK heavy costs involving the Concorde
have undermined development of new com-
mercial aircraft and forced the industry to rely on
existing orders for aircraft currently in produc-
tion. West Germany and the Netherlands have
benefited from lesser involvement in the major
consortiums and met with some success in the 25X1
jointly manufactured F-28 and the new VFW
Fokker 614, both shorter range aircraft of a type
not currently being produced elsewhere.
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StLF-i~ I
ITALY: CRITICAL CROSSROADS
The search for a new Italian government
entered a decisive phase this week. Although
there is no hope for reviving the center-left coali-
tion in the immediate future, Foreign Minister
Moro may secure agreement on a formula for a
caretaker government that would keep the cen-
ter-left alive in principle. His negotiations, how-
ever, have left the dominant Christian Democrats
in a difficult position.
Moro, who leads the Christian Democratic
left, is trying! to set up an all-Christian Democratic
cabinet supported in parliament by the other
coalition parties. During the postwar period,
Italian politicians frequently resorted to this
arrangement--the so-called "monocolore" govern-
ment-to let the dust settle after a major political
blowup. Such an administration would preserve a
semblance of partnership among the parties and
could pave the way for a later attempt to resusci-
tate the center-left coalition, still the only work-
able non-Communist government that can be
drawn from the present parliament.
Among the former coalition partners, only
the Social Democrats refuse to support such a
solution. The Social Democrats have maintained
throughout the six-week-old crisis that any gov-
ernment relying on Socialist support would be
"open to the Communists"; they now insist that
the loose structure of a "monocolore" administra-
tion would make it doubly vulnerable to Commu-
nist influence.
The Socialists and the other parties are play-
ing down the Communist issue, and Moro would
like to put the matter on ice for the time being.
He wants to first nail down an agreement on
economic policy; the parties are close to a com-
promise on bread-and-butter issues.
Moro would just as soon dump the Social
Democrats if they remain adamant in the face of
agreement among the other parties on economic
policy. The key question is whether he can
persuade the rest of his party to take such a step.
Although Social Democratic support is not
needed for a majority, the Christian Democrats
have kept them in the cabinet to dilute Socialist
influence.
Dropping the Social Democrats from the
parliamentary majority of a caretaker government
could establish a precedent for excluding them
from the next center-left coalition-a move that
would inevitably strengthen the influence of the
Socialists and give the coalition a more leftist
complexion.
Moro appears to have qualified support from
Christian Democratic boss Fanfani, and this could
tip the balance against the Social Democrats.
There is still resistance to the idea, however, in
the party's key center faction and among right-
wing Christian Democrats.
All of this means that the Christian Dem-
ocrats may have to choose the lesser of two evils.
If they jettison the Social Democrats, they
eventually will have to yield more of the
perquisites of power to the Socialists. If, instead,
they side with the Social Democrats against the
Socialists, they will not be able to muster a
center-left majority. At that point, the only thing
standing between the Christian Democrats and
new elections-in which they would probably lose
votes-would be a right-leaning coalition including
the small, conservative Liberal Party. Although it
is a numerical possibility, such a coalition could
not govern effectively or for long against the
opposition of the Socialists, Communists, and
labor unions.
The Communists are lying low. They have
little to lose no matter what the Christian
Democrats decide. The Communists prefer to
avoid an electoral battle now, but if it came they
would probably do well. On the other hand, if the
Social Democrats end up in the opposition, the
number of anti-Communist voices in the iov-
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1400.1 0 EI..1 I"IE I ts'
The 57th anniversary of the Bolshevik Rev-
olution last week brought forth the traditional
speeches and ceremonies, and few surprises. For-
eign Minister Gromyko-representing the Polit-
buro-delivered the major address on November
6. He concentrated on a routine cataloguing of
Soviet foreign policy accomplishments and posi-
tions, replete with flattering references to Brezh-
nev. His moderately optimistic remarks included a
statement that the USSR favors agreement with
the US on halting the quantitative and qualitative
arms races. He said the Soviets will strive to make
the Vladivostok summit a meeting of great impor-
tance to the continued improvement of US-Soviet
relations.
Gromyko called again for an early conclu-
sion to the European Security Conference, imply-
ing that a successful outcome in Geneva is a
prerequisite to progress at the Vienna force reduc-
tion negotiations. He was particularly pleased
with the state of Soviet relations with France,
West Germany, Finland, and India among the
non-Communist nations and exhorted Japan to
match Soviet overtures of good will.
Turning to the Middle East, he reaffirmed
Soviet support for Palestinian statehood and pre-
dicted that Brezhnev's visit to Egypt in January
would be of "tremendous significance."
Gromyko reiterated earlier Soviet accusa-
tions that China's leaders have aligned themselves
with the enemies of detente and against the So-
viet Union and the socialist community. His
tough statement provoked a walkout by the Chi-
nese ambassador, a ritual occurrence in recent
years. Gromyko's speech preceded by four hours
a Chinese broadcast of greetings to the Soviet
government, a message containing an unexpected
proposal for dealing with the Sino-Soviet border
dispute.
On November 7, Defense Minister Grechko
made a brief speech in Red Square prior to the
traditional parade. He acknowledged the reduced
threat of nuclear war, but pledged to defend the
gains of socialism against the "forces of interna-
tional reaction" which, he said, have not laid
down their arms. He expressed satisfaction with
the Soviet armed forces and assured his listeners
that the Soviet party and government are paying
urgent attention to strengthening the country's
defenses.
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SI UKL I
The military parade included no new weap-
ons systems. The civilian portion was canceled,
apparently at the last moment, with inclement
weather given as the reason. This unusual step
may have been taken to guard the health of aging
Politburo members, most of whom were review-
ing the proceedings from atop Lenin's tomb.
Early this week the Soviets suffered another
failure in their program for obtaining soil samples
from the moon. The Luna 23 spacecraft-
launched from Tyuratam on October 28-was
damaged nine days later while landing on the
moon in rough terrain, according to a Tass state-
ment. As a result, the drilling device designed to
collect the samples failed to operate. The drill, a
modification of earlier designs, was intended to
collect lunar rock from a depth of as much as
nine feet-considerably deeper than past missions.
The Soviets continue to have difficulty land-
ing spacecraft of this sort on the moon. Of the
five soil-sampling spacecraft that have reached the
moon, only two-Luna 16 in September 1970 and
Luna 20 in February 1972-landed intact col-
lected samples, and returned to earth.
The failure of Luna 23 is but one of many in
the Soviet lunar space program. Of the 51 moon-
related space probes launched since the fall of
1958, only 19 have been successful. Soviet per-
formance has been improving in recent years,
however. Seven of the nine lunar spacecraft
launched since October 1970 have performed
well. These successes include the two soil col-
lection missions, one circumlunar and two orbit-
ing missions, and exploration by two Lunokhod
rover vehicles. The Soviets appear to be ex-
panding the scope of their Lunar program, which
is expected to continue at least through the end
of the decade. A manned lunar landing by the
Soviets may still be planned. but is unlikely be-
fore 1980.
The government personnel shifts announced
on October 31 reflect Sofia's continued concern
over ideology and the economy. The changes
seem to have been designed to give the Bulgarian
Council of State new responsibilities in these two
areas.
Two deputy premiers-Ivan Popov and Petur
Tanchev-were transferred to vice presidential
slots on the State Council. Popov, a noted scien-
tist who advocates greater use of Western tech-
nology to modernize the economy, is a trusted
adviser of Zhivkov, who is also the council's chair-
man.
Tanchev was deputy premier for agriculture,
and he may retain this responsibility on the coun-
cil. He is also the working head of the Agrarian
Union, the so-called opposition party, and his
transfer may be intended to give substance to the
contention that the council is, in fact, the "cor-
porate head of state" it was designed to be when
created in 1971.
Among the other changes, Mitko Grigorov,
the party's former ultraconservative ideologue,
was promoted from member to vice president of
the council, and Evgeni Mateev, a talented econo-
mist, was made a member. Neither man has been
among Zhivkov's friends, and their promotions
will probably lead to speculation that the move
was a concession to a faction within the party
leadership. It is more likely, however, that their
assignments were part of the effort to strengthen
the council rather than the result of political
infighting. In any case, none of the changes af-
fects the balance in the top party leadership.
The new appointments also preserve the
balance of the Council of State's membership,
which from the outset has embraced representa-
tives of all sectors of Bulgarian society. In addi-
tion to its protocol and ceremonial duties, the
council will probably now become more deeply
involved in the day-to-day running of the coun-
try. It may take some of the burden off the
Council of Ministers for supervising local and 25X1
district administrations. Up until now, the Coun-
cil of State and Council of Ministers have shared
this responsibility.
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WHITHER THE OAS?
The practical and political consequences of
this week's OAS vote on the proposal to rescind
the sanctions against Cuba, which fell two short
of the needed two-thirds majority, will be a
mixed bag. The final tally-12 for, 3 against, and
6 abstentions--provides certain domestic satisfac-
tions for all the delegates. The 12, which either
already have diplomatic relations with Havana or
want that option open, now feel that their obliga-
tion to respect the sanctions has been wiped out
by the recorded opposition of a clear majority of
the OAS members. The three voting against the
proposal took home a major and unexpected
diplomatic coup, since it had been widely
assumed that the sanctions would be rescinded.
The six have offended no particular portion of
their constituencies.
The outcome, however, deals a hard blow to
the OAS, which was already considered by many
a weak and unresponsive organization. It is too
early to measure the damage to the dialogue
established this year between the US and Latin
America, but many governments are making no
Page 13
secret of their unhappiness with the neutral posi-
tion of the US throughout the Quito conference.
Various delegates left with a particular sense
of defeat or concern. Costa Rica's foreign minis-
ter, one of the sponsors of the aborted resolution,
suffers the special embarrassment of having given
personal assurances that he had the required two-
thirds majority wrapped up. The Ecuadoreans, as
hosts, will be chagrined that "Quito" stands, in
many minds in the hemisphere, for an inter-
American debacle. The Argentines, who are set to
host the next scheduled foreign ministers' meet-
ing next March, are probably particularly
unnerved. They were given the task of polling the
Latin and Caribbean governments on whether
Cuba should be invited to the Buenos Aires
meeting.
Fidel Castro was sitting pretty no matter
what the result of Quito. He could have played a
vote to lift the sanctions as a vindication of Cuba.
But he is probably even more pleased to have the
sanctions juridically in effect but flouted in
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practice. Several Latin American governments
have announced their intention to establish rela-
tions with Havana, as seven OAS members already
have done. Castro has made clear his preference
that such ties be made in violation of OAS rules.
He remains unalterably opposed to the organiza-
tion and would like to be able to take credit for
BOLIVIA: ELECTIONS CANCELED
President Banzer has temporarily strength-
ened his position by using last week's abortive
coup attempt as justification for banning political
activities and canceling the national elections set
for next June. Even before the small insurrection
occurred in an outlying province, however,
Banzer reportedly had the consent of his military
commanders to call off the elections.
Last Thursday, Banzer quickly put down a
rebellion by a few dissident politicians and an
army infantry unit in the provincial capital of
Santa Cruz, located approximately 350 miles
southeast of La Paz. The fact that Banzer per-
sonally commanded reinforcements in restoring
order indicated that he had full confidence in his
senior military advisers who remained in the
capital.
SOVIET SHIPS LEAVE CUBA
The small Soviet naval group that had
been in the Caribbean during the past eight
weeks left Cuba on November 10. The ships-
two Kresta-class guided-missile cruisers and an
oiler---are now southeast of Bermuda and will
probably cruise the western Mediterranean for
a short time before returning home to North-
ern Fleet waters.
During the Cuban stay-the 12th such
visit since 1969-the Soviet ships made visits
to Havana and Cienfuegos. Unlike other re-
cent visits, there was only a minimum of joint
activity with the Cuban navy, probably
because no Soviet submarines were included
Banzer then announced that elections would
be postponed until at least 1980. In his speech he
sought to emulate other military strong men in
South America by stating that the government
intends to fulfill its mission of national recon-
struction. Although development policies have
consisted largely of empty promises and rhetor-
ical flourishes, this stance makes Banzer look
good when compared with his disorganized and
inept opponents.
Banzer has taken other measures to stabilize
his government. Official charges of subversion
against two cabinet ministers, who had been in-
volved in previous moves against the President,
have resulted in a minor cabinet reshuffle.
Military support has rallied behind the gov-
ernment for the time being, but Banzer now de-
pends solely upon the good will of his generals for
his political survival. They have previously told
him that he must soon step down in favor of an
acceptable military replacement. The current
front-runner is General Juan Lechin, the second
highest official in the government. If Banzer balks
at stepping down, the members of the high com- 25X1
mand will probably abandon their current efforts
at achieving an orderly transfer of power and
in the latest group. In the past, the surface
ships usually were accompanied by a sub-
marine, which acted as a target for Cuban
patrol boat training. Although two sub-
marines were observed trailing the Krestas
across the Atlantic en route to Cuba, the
Soviets apparently changed sailing orders as
the submarines neared the Caribbean, and the
two units returned to home waters. No fur-
ther information has become available regard-
ing this change in plan.
If the Soviets follow the pattern of the
past two years, another naval task group will
visit Cuba next spring.
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China-USSR
PEKING PROPOSES NONAGGRESSION PACT
Last week Peking surfaced a proposal for
dealing with the Sino-Soviet border dispute. The
proposal, contained in a message to the Soviets on
the occasion of the anniversary of their October
Revolution, called for a pact renouncing aggres-
sion and the use of force, a mutual troop pullback
from disputed border areas, measures to avert
conflicts, and maintenance of the status quo of
the border itself.
The Chinese had made a similar proposal in
private during the early rounds of border talks in
1969, but had never before publicly urged a non-
aggression pact. Peking had greeted earlier and
well-publicized Soviet calls for such a pact with
public silence and private contempt. The Chinese
have consistently argued that any nonaggression
and nonuse-of-force pact would have to be ac-
companied by a withdrawal of Soviet forces from
the frontier, a position that the Soviets have
categorically rejected. Because this linkage re-
mains in the new Chinese proposal, Peking almost
certainly expected that Moscow would find the
package unacceptable.
There were other indications that the pro-
posal was a tactical maneuver. Chinese diplomats
were quick to scotch speculation that the package
signaled an upturn in Sino-Soviet relations, point-
ing out to American and Japanese diplomats that
the proposal contained nothing new. The message
still has not been replayed by the New China
News Agency nor has it been broadcast inside
China, something Peking would almost certainly
do in case of a major new development in Sino-
Soviet relations. The substance and tone of
Chinese and Soviet propaganda directed at one
another, moreover, have not changed in any way
since the proposal was made.
Moscow maintained official silence on the
substance of the package and has withheld publi-
cation of Chinese terms for agreement. Soviet
spokesmen have privately claimed that Peking has
not offered anything new and that border talks
can resume whenever Peking presents a fresh
proposal. The Soviets are probably reluctant to
make any authoritative response until they can
determine whether Peking intended anything
Soviet border guards along the Ussuri River
more in publicizing its proposal than to gain some
propaganda advantage.
In their message to the Chinese on PRC
National Day, the Soviets included references to
their own proposals for lowering Sino-Soviet ten-
sions. The Chinese, not to be outdone in this
display of flexibility, have replied in kind. In a
clear public relations gesture, moreover, the
Chinese embassy in Moscow took special pains to
distribute the full text of the proposal to foreign
embassies and news services there after the
Soviets had published it only in censored form.
The Chinese may hope to enhance their
leverage both with the US and USSR by con-
veying an impression of a more forthcoming
attitude regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute and by
implying that China is less concerned about the
Soviet threat than it was a few years ago. By
appearing accommodating, Peking also probably
hopes to create a favorable impression among
foreign Communist parties and complicate Soviet
efforts to organize an international Communist
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JCVNf
Saigon last week called on the Communists
to resume political and military discussions with-
out preconditions. The South Vietnamese initia-
tive was, in effect, the government's response to a
Viet Cong statement on October 8 that called for
the removal of President Thieu as a precondition
for resuming negotiations and implementing the
Paris Agreement. The Communists quickly re-
jected Saigon's initiative, characterizing it as a
"deceptive move" designed to confuse public
opinion. Viet Cong officials in Saigon and Paris
repeated their demands of October 8 and main-
tained that there would be no new talks as long as
Thieu remains in office. Hanoi's party journals
quickly publicized the Viet Cong rejection.
Political talks between the two sides were
suspended by the South Vietnamese in April fol-
lowing the North Vietnamese capture of a ranger
outpost north of Saigon. At that time, the govern-
ment sharply curtailed the privileges of the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese military delegations
in Saigon, which in turn led to a Communist
walkout from the Saigon military talks. These
discussions were resumed by the two sides in
June, following the government's restoration of
privileges to the Communist delegations, but they
were quickly broken off again by the Com-
munists.
erally moderate to low level of action continues
throughout most of the rest of the country. The
usual Communist midmonth mini-highpoint in
the delta went off, but the action was spotty and
concentrated in several areas. In Vinh Long Prov-
ince--one of the hardest hit areas--at least ten
government outposts were lost and several roads
interdicted, necessitating the movement of troops
of the 7th Division into the province for the first
time in several months.
Deteriorating weather conditions and heavy
casualties on both sides have somewhat slowed
the ongoing battles for a number of strategic
high-ground positions in the northern provinces.
Several of these positions have been retaken by
government forces, but the South Vietnamese 1st
Division has been unable to make significant
progress against Communist forces dug in just
south of Hue. The regional commander is con-
templating moving in fresh combat units to help
out, because he considers these positions vital to
the defense of the lowlands south of the city.
The current lull in fighting in the central
provinces can best be described as an intermission
for the opposing forces while the monsoon moves
to the coast and the highlands begin to dry out.
The latest South Vietnamese move meshes
neatly with other recent actions of President
Thieu designed to answer the charges of his polit-
ical opposition. By placing the onus for the pres-
ent lack of movement on negotiations squarely on
Hanoi, Thieu no doubt hopes to undermine the
efforts of Buddhist dissidents to exploit public
frustration over the continuing hostilities and the
ineffectiveness of the Paris Agreement. Neither
Buddhist nor Catholic opposition leaders have as
yet reacted to Saigon's call for the resumption
of negotiations. Opposition activity continued at
a low level during the week with protests con-
fined to rallies and meetings in pagodas and
churches.
Communist: military activity picked up early
~n the week in the delta provinces, but the gen-
The South Vietnamese thus far have been
successful in blunting Communist efforts to
establish a commanding high-ground position
overlooking the North Vietnamese supply route
in the An Lao Valley of Binh Dinh Province.
There has been an increase in Communist
harassment and interdiction of key roads,
especially the lateral routes from the lowlands to
the highlands and north-south Route 1.
The military scene also remains reasonably
quiet in the provinces around Saigon with the
Communists continuing their terrorist and sapper
attacks. Most of the Communist main-force
combat units are being refurbished for dry-season
action while COSVN is restructuring and stream-
lining its command and control structure. I 25X1
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J L_ %_# I IL_ I
*fto
1*0010,
A statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung-in
a recently issued central directive-that the Cul-
tural Revolution has gone on long enough under-
scores the focus on political unity that typifies
Peking's current propaganda line. Mao adds that
the time is ripe for convening the National
People's Congress, China's rubber-stamp parlia-
ment; in fact, preparations for the congress are
well under way. A corollary to the damping down
of political struggle has been an emphasis on
production, and both themes have been forcefully
expressed in a series of central directives going
back to July. As a whole, these developments
show that moderate elements retain the upper
hand in Peking.
The political and policy trend since last sum-
mer has been displeasing to Mao's left-leaning
wife, Chiang Ching. Arrangements for the suc-
cession to the party chairmanship have apparently
been completed. Despite Chiang Ching's most
recent attempts to portray herself as Mao's suc-
cessor--expressed in the form of media articles on
an historical empress who ruled China after the
death of her husband-youthful party vice-
chairman Wang Hung-wen appears to be the one
designated. Moreover, two of Chiang Ching's Cul-
tural Revolution opponents seem to have the suc-
cession to the premiership locked up between
them. The madame has not made much headway
with her ambitions.
In fact, she may have slipped a little. A
Chiang Ching was e in
a move to put inese women in skirts, but
surprisingly went on to criticize the idea as not
necessary and not good for China. But most sig-
nificant has been Madame Mao's obvious inability
to take advantage of Chou En-lai's serious health
problems. Chiang can still hurl propaganda barbs
and make her weight felt in the cultural sphere,
but she and her ultraleftist supporters appear to
have been outmaneuvered, at least for the
present.
The rehabilitation of officials purged during
the Cultural Revolution continues, and a reported
central directive ordering the abolition of revolu-
tionary committees, if carried out, seems sure to
offend leftist sensitivities. Established in 1967,
the committees still symbolize leftist Cultural
Revolution ideals and have been the object of a
political tug of war for some time. An earlier move
to replace these committees with people's coun-
cils, the pre - Cultural Revolution organs of gov-
ernment control, was allowed to lapse after the
campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius began in
August 1973.
While the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign
is now apparently being phased out, factional
differences, although they may be muted, will not
disappear. A period of relative calm will probably
ensue and improvements in production and social
order in several provinces may well result, but the
political contestants will keep their hatchets close
at hand. In particular, Chiang Ching and her left-
ist allies will remain vigilant for an opening, and 25X1
current succession arrangements, no matter how
clearly defined, will be tested when the time
comes for them to be put into effect.
Posters criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius
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JCL.RC I
President Ford will be visiting Japan next
week at a rather turbulent time. A controversy
over the alleged presence of US nuclear weapons
in Japan has generated some opposition to the
President's visit. Moreover, Prime Minister Tanaka
is in the midst of a political crisis stemming from
charges of financial corruption.
These issues, along with continuing high in-
flation, will be the subject of demonstrations and
strikes while the President is in Japan. But there
are mitigating factors:
scheduled for days when the President will not be
in the city. Socialist leaders are now saying that
they do not intend to harm good relations be-
tween the US and Japan, but are opposing the
visit solely out of fear that it will lead to a
stronger military alliance between the two coun-
tries. Opinion polls, meanwhile, show a majority
favoring the visit, and Japan's major news dailies
weighed in late last week with supporting editori-
als. In short, a consensus is developing that a
courteous reception is in order, and a massive
security effort by the Japanese police should con-
tain any attempts by radical youth groups to
cause problems.
? Protest activities will be orderly and will
cause a minimum of disruption.
? Most Japanese political groups, the
press, and a large majority of the public wel-
come the President's visit.
A Besieged Tanaka
? Although Tanaka may well resign before
the end of the year, he and his rivals within
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have de-
clared a truce until the President's visit is
over.
The Current Atmosphere
During November, a more favorable atmo-
sphere for the President's visit has been develop-
ing, and opposition groups have trimmed their
scheduled activities accordingly. Last week, one
opposition party withdrew from further demon-
strations against the President, and others have
yet to agree on a unified effort.
The major groups still opposing the visit-the
Communists, Socialists, and the largest labor fed-
eration-are committed to holding demonstra-
tions, but they are emphasizing their nonviolent
character. The themes they will stress, moreover,
focus more on inflation and Tanaka rather than
on the US and the President's visit.
In an effort to avoid a sense of confronta-
tion over the trip, the major rallies in Tokyo are
At present there is no clear successor to
Tanaka. Despite his many ups and downs and his
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% D Nftwlf Iw
Prime Minister Tanaka flanked by Finance Minister Ohira (r) and Trade and Industry Minister Nakasone
sagging popularity, he retains considerable power
in the party, and carrying out an orderly transfer
of such authority can be a difficult and time-
consuming process under the best of circum-
stances.
Tanaka and his rivals within the party have
clearly agreed to hold their differences in abey-
ance during President Ford's tour. But thereafter
Tanaka will find it exceedingly difficult to stabi-
lize his position and retain the prime ministership
for long. 25X1
Page 19
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6L(;KF-
I
South Korea's economy is in its first pro-
nounced slump in over a decade. Although real
growth in 1974 will amount to 8 to 10 percent,
most of the gain came during the first six months.
The growth will continue slow well into 1975.
Although the long-term outlook remains bright,
near-term prospects have dimmed because of the
continued economic downturn projected for
major Western industrial nations that take the
bulk of Korean exports. In the past, brisk foreign
sales have been the basis of Korea's rapid eco-
nomic growth.
Industrial output through June was more
than 25 percent above last year's average, but has
dropped since then. The downturn has been
limited so far to a few consumer-oriented export
industries. Hardest hit are the labor-intensive
textile, clothing, plywood, and electronics in-
dustries. Heavy industry, in contrast, continues to
do relatively well.
Unemployment, although not yet serious, is
rising. Some 100,000 workers have been laid off
so far this year, a cut of some 6 percent of the
manufacturing work force. The unemployment
burden has thus far been borne mainly by young
women rather than male heads of households.
Korea Exchange Bank in Seoul
Nevertheless, labor unrest in the cities is growing
as inflation cuts deeper into real income, and
unemployment threatens to increase. In response,
the government is encouraging businesses to re-
duce work hours rather than cut payrolls, and will
back generous pay hikes even at the risk of aggra-
vating inflationary pressures next year. Labor is
pushing for hefty wage increases as pay boosts
this year have generally not kept pace with the
rising cost of living-consumer prices have already
risen 25 percent this year despite subsidized food
prices.
Seoul has also shifted from curbing inflation
to bolstering output and employment. This year's
budget, which showed a surplus through Septem-
ber, is now in deficit, and next year's budget
provides for substantially greater spending on de-
fense, industrial projects, public works, and wel-
fare. Seoul is also extending loans to financially
pressed small- and medium-sized firms to help
avoid a rash of bankruptcies and is offering loans
to hard-hit larger firms in labor-intensive indus-
tries to help them maintain employment levels.
Sluggish export growth and soaring import
costs-the oil import bill has tripled this year to
around $1 billion-has sharply increased the trade
deficit. As a result, the current payments deficit
will reach some $1.5 billion, or five times last
year's deficit. With direct foreign investments
sharply off last year's pace, Korea has stepped up
its foreign borrowing, especially short-term cred-
its. Korea's good international credit rating and
relatively low debt service burden have enabled it
to meet its financing needs.
For next year, Seoul hopes to reduce short-
term borrowing by obtaining more long-term cap-
ital, although this may prove difficult. As a pre-
caution, besides borrowing from its usual lenders,
Seoul is seeking increased credits from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and Middle East oil pro-
ducers. Seoul has attracted a $20-million loan
from Abu Dhabi thus far. Direct foreign invest-
ments are likely to pick up next year, however, as
several leading US and Japanese firms are going
ahead with investment clans involving over $800
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`wl SECRET _WXF
OPEC countries will earn more than $105
billion and actually receive about $94 billion
from oil exports in 1974. The difference results
from an average two-month lag in payments by
oil companies to the producing countries. The
bulk of 1974 OPEC oil receipts will be concen-
trated in the last half of this year-$60 billion,
compared with $34 billion in the first half.
Second half receipts will reflect all of the January
and most of the July price increases and are
inflated by an additional $10 billion in retroactive
payments resulting from nationalization moves.
The bulk of OPEC oil receipts in 1974 will
go to relatively few countries. The two largest
producers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, will receive
about $43 billion, over two thirds in the second
half of the year. Together, the five largest pro-
ducers-Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela,
and Kuwait-will account for over 70 percent of
total OPEC revenue this year.
OPEC oil receipts should decline when the
retroactive payments are completed early next
year. Any further price increases will be partly
offset by decreased demand. If present pro-
duction and prices are maintained, oil payments
in the first quarter of 1975 would total $26.9
billion-almost $4 billion below the level of
receipts in the third and fourth quarters of 1974.
Even if currently anticipated price hikes are in-
stituted, payments will still drop by about $2
billion for the first quarter of 1975.
Estimated OPEC Oil Receipts by Country, 1974
(In million US $)
Algeria
1668
2061
3729
Ecuador
355
197
552
Indonesia
1111
1835
2946
Iran
6963
11196
18159
Iraq
2173
2904
5077
Kuwait
1215
6162
7377
Libya
3459
3226
6685
Nigeria
3063
5563
8626
Qatar
610
915
1525
Saudi Arabia
7446
17159
24605
United Arab Emirates
1829
4720
6549
Venezuela
4207
4263
8470
EDITOR'S NOTE: On page 3 of the Special Report, Detente and the Stirring of Soviet
Dissidence, No. 0046/74A, November 15, 1974, the final sentence of the second paragraph
should read: "Some, at least, go further and consider these freedoms the core of a general civil
rights guarantee for all Soviet citizens."
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Secret
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