WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010900180001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 29, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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`'~ Secret
Weekly Summary
DIA review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
No. 0048 / 74
29 November 1974
CcpY N? 7 0
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY? issued every ..Friday morning by
the Q#fice of Current Intel#igence, xeports and analyzes signif_
leant develaprnents df the week thrpugh noon on Thursday. It
frequent{y includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the' C7ffice of .Strategic
Research, and the [lirectorate of; Science and Technology.
'topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Spscia{ Reports are :fisted in the
contents.
CONTENTS (November 29, 1974)
1
Breaking the Ice at Vladivostok
2
Ethiopia: The Blood Flows
3
Israel: Digging in Its Heels
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
4
Palestinians: After the Vote
5
etition Gro
l
Co
i
A
6
ngo
a:
w
ng
mp
Jordan: New Cabinet
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
7
Japan: A New Prime Minister
7
Australia: Troubles for Whitlam
9
Vietnam: Le Duc Tho; Thieu's Men
EUROPE
10
11
Laos: Storm Warnings Subside
The Cyprus Equation
13
Iceland: Another Fishing Dispute
14
EC-Arab Dialogue Stalled
15
World Food Conference Concludes
16
RYAD Computer Production Lags
17
Romania: On a Note of Defiance
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
1$
Argentina: The Government Scores
19
Mexico: Listening to the Public
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~reak~~g the ~7ce at 1~ladwvstvk
-
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~~
Moscow is obviously pleased with the
Vlzidivostok summit. General Secretary Brezhnev,
delivering a speech on November 26 in Mongolia,
characterized his first meeting with President
Ford as confirming and reinforcing the trend
toward improved Soviet-American relations. He
referred specifically to a "considerable step for-
ward" in the quest for curbing and reducing
nuclear arms, and, in an unusually explicit com-
mitment, stated that he and the President had
agreed to conclude an arms limitation pact in
coming months.
Not surprisingly, Soviet and East European
media have echoed Brezhnev's high praise for the
summit and have implied that the two leaders got
along well personally. Pravda on November 25 ran
the joint communique on the front page and also
carried the US-Soviet statement on strategic arms
limitation.. Another mass-circulation daily,
Sovetskaya Rossiya, said there had been "great
progress" toward a new arms control agreement,
adding that cooperation has become the political
norm between the two states. On Wednesday,
President Ford's "thank you" message to Brezh-
nev for playing host at the summit was front page
news in the Soviet Union. Several commentators
stressed the value of summit-level meetings; one
described such personal contacts as essential to
detente.
Moscow has publicized heavily the favorable
reaction to the meeting, both domestic and for-
eign, including US media articles, especially those
on the significance of the SALT elements. This
positive coverage was tempered by only
occasional references to obstacles still to be over-
come before detente becomes irreversible. Most
of these zeroed in on the efforts of "certain
circles" in the US to blocb< normalization of com-
mercial relations.
There has been no public discussion by the
Soviets of the details of the SALT understanding
nor any hint of misgiving over the terms of the
accord. These could surface later, however. A
persistent theme of earlier Soviet articles on
SALT, althogh less in evidence recently, was
that US "forward-based systems" and other
asymmetries must be taken into account to
ensure "equal security."
During his address in Mongolia, Brezhnev
made a point of mentioning the participation of
the US and Soviet foreign ministers in the
Vladivostok deliberations. His reference to
Gromyko, a fellow Po(itb~uro member, may have
been a way of sharing some of the responsibility
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Ethiopia: The Blood
~in a sudden and bloody climax to the con-
flict that had developed between the ruling mili-
tary council and General Aman, the head of the
provisional government, the council last weekend
shot Aman along with 59 military officers and
former high civilian officials who had been in
detention for several months. This extreme
action, which seems sure to have far-reaching
repercussions, came after the council had con-
cluded that Aman was bent on challenging its
authority and becoming Ethiopia's strong man.
ThE; council has announced that the remain-
ing forrrier officials being detained on charges of
corruption, maladministration, and counter-
revolutionary activity will be tried shortly by
military tribunal; many of these may also be
executed. Nothing has been said officially about
former emperor Haile Selassie, but his fife is
almost certainly in jeopardy.
No one has been named yet to replace
Aman. Fiis removal leaves Major Mengistu, who
last weeb; was appointed first vice chairman of the
council, the ranking government official. The
council has said, however, that the new head of
government will come from outside its ranks.
The council's differences with Aman came
to a head last week over his refusal to go along
with a council decision to send army reinforce-
ments to Eritrea Province to begin an offensive
against insurgents of the Eritrean Liberation
Front. Gn November 22, the council placed
Aman under house arrest; the next day, his
removal as head of government was announced.
Within hiours, Aman was dead. The council
announced on November 24 that he had been
executed along with the 59 detainees, but later
acknowledged he had died in a shoot-out at his
house.
The other victims were killed, reportedly in
groups of 20, in a courtyard of a prison in Addis
Ababa. The bloodbath was apparently intended in
part to cow military supporters of the popular
Aman and in part to counterbalance his removal
with a dramatic action against the discredited
flows r ~-- ~ ~
luminaries of the Haile Selassie era. The decision
to move against Aman and carry out the mass
executions appears to have had broad support
within the council, although previously only a
minority of the members had favored such sum-
mary treatment of leaders of the old regime.
The executions mark an abrupt change from
the military's previous policy of avoiding blood-
shed, and most Ethiopians will probably conclude
that the revolution has entered a new phase. The
arbitrary nature of the killings and the council's
refusal to allow relatives to claim the bodies have
probably alienated some segments of the popula-
tion that until now had generally supported the
council.
There is particular uneasiness in Asmara, the
capital of Eritrea, over the council's decision to
send additional forces there. The Eritreans believe
the council will follow the execution of Aman, an25X1
Eritrean who favored a peaceful solution to the
insurgency, with the imposition of tighter con-
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Israel: Digging in Its
Tel Aviv this week reacted to setbacks in the
UN and recent widespread anti-Israeli manifesta-
tions on the occupied West Bank by reaffirming
its refusal to be pressured or cowed into negotia-
tions with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
It also demonstrated its determination to retain
control of the West Bank pending a peace
settlement.
Prime Minister Rabin, in an interview pub-
lished this week in Time magazine, emphasized
that Israel will never negotiate with terrorist
organizations like the PLO, even if the US should
recognize such a group. Rabin repeated the
standard Israeli position that negotiations con-
cerning the West Bank are impossible without
Jordanian participation.
Demonstrating anew that Israel runs the
West Bank, the cabinet on November 24 voted to
authorize the establishment of a large industrial
park nine miles east of Jerusalem as part of a
larger development plan for the city. Israeli press
reports state that the cabinet was divided on the
issue, with several liberal ministers arguing that.
such decisions increase political tensions because
they are interpreted abroad as signs the govern-
ment intends to establish a permanent Israeli
presence in the area.
Information Minister Yariv issued a public
disclaimer of any such intent, saying that
implementation of the government's decision
would not require Israel to annex any new land
"for the time being." He also said the cabinet's
action should not be construed as Israel's "an-
swer" ~to the Rabat Arab summit last month or
the UN votes on the Palestinian question. The
Israeli press had speculated that the timing of the
cabinet decisions was meant to convey this
impression.
Anti-Israeli demonstrations in the occupied
territories subsided during the week, in part
because of rigorous Israeli security measures. The
government, continuing its crackdown on Arab
dissidents, in the West Bank, made numerous
Heels ~~-~~~
arrests and expelled several prominent West
Bankers on charges ranging from instigating
strikes and demonstrations to membership in the
Palestine National Front, a West Bank amalgam
formed earlier this year by fedayeen, non-PLO
Palestinian nationalists, and Arab Communists.
This week, more Israelis-including a grow-
ing number of cabinet members-began calling for
a "national emergency" government that would
include the rightist Likud bloc. In support of
their position, these Israelis pointed to what they
regard as the growing Arab threat and the coun-
try's increasing economic difficulties resulting
from its effort to counter this danger.
Rabin's small coalition partner, the Inde-
pendent Liberal Party, voted on November 21 to
support the formation of such a government, and
a party delegation met with Rabin this week to
discuss the matter. Rabin's other coalition
partner, the National Religious Party, has long
been on record as favoring Likud's inclusion in
the cabinet and pressed its case in separate meet-
ings this week with President Katzir and Labor
Party leaders. Information Minister Yariv, in an
Israeli television interview on November 23 also
reaffirmed his long-standing support of an en-
larged coalition, saying he would do all in his
power to achieve it.
Despite the increasing pressure to include
the Likud, Rabin, influential Labor Party figures
such as Mrs. Meir, Pirihas Sapir, and Abba Eban,
and the majority of ilhe dominant Labor Align-
ment remain opposed to such a step. They believe
that bringing in the ultraconservative Likud could
produce a split in the Labor Alignment. They also
maintain that basic differences on foreign policy
matters-such as Likud's inflexible attitude
toward making territorial concessions in return
for a peace settlement with the Arabs-preclude a
national unity government at this time.
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 PALESTINIANS: AFTER THE VOTE
~i 5 , aim ]
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman
Yasir Arafat is striving, in a flurry of diplomatic
activity since his recent appearance before the UN
General Assembly, to maintain what he sees as
steadily building momentum toward wider inter-
national recognition of the PLO, His trip to the
USSR this week follows visits to Cuba and seven
Arab states. He will probably make at least one
stop in Eastern Europe before returning to the
Middle East.
In Moscow, Arafat is almost certainly seek-
ing to temper the Soviets' cool reaction to his UN
speech as well as to elicit more vigorous backing
for Palestinian political goals. He wants an
ranqualified statement of Soviet support for the
I'LO as the sole representative of the Palestinians
and a reaffirmation of the Soviet position that the
PLO should participate as an equal partner in any
suture peace negotiations.
The Soviets, who are trying hard to carve
out a direct role for themselves in Middle East
diplomacy, undoubtedly welcome Arafat's visit.
Moscow seems likely to offer more explicit recog-
nition to the PLO than it has in the past in view
of the backing Arafat and the PLO won at the
Arab summit in Rabat and at the UN. Arafat may
meet publicly for the first time with General
Secretary Brezhnev.
The Soviets, however, will probably stop
short of giving Arafat a full endorsement. They
Vvill almost certainly caution him against repeat-
ing his more extravagant demands and will con-
tinue to stress their recognition of Israel's right to
exist. The Soviets have publicly sought to dis-
sociate themselves from Arafat's call for a secular
Palestinian state.
Neither Arafat nor representatives of the
Arab states have shown uneasiness over the fact
that support for the Palestine resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly late last week was
confined to the nonaligned bloc and the Com-
munist states. PLO spokesmen have said only that
the number of those who abstained or voted "no"
means that "we must do more to make them
understand our cause."
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- - ---- --
The PLO's momentum was threatened last
weekend by the hijacking in Dubai of a British
Airways airliner. Prompt condemnation of the
incident by Arafat, however, minimized the
repercussions for the PLO, which has a policy of
condemning international terrorism while con-
doning or approving strikes directly at Israel. The
hijacking-carried out by Palestinian radicals who
in the past have operated from Libya and Iraq-
was the first directed against an Arab state other
than Jordan. It was immediately condemned by
virtually all Arab governments, including Libya
and Iraq.
The ultimate fate of the hijackers is un-
settled. The PLO, the Tunisian government, and
the other Arabs, for the moment, are all claiming
that the hijackers should be forced to "pay the
price," although none will be eager to shy
responsibility for exacting that price.
ANGOLA: COMPETITION GROWING
1~.~ -~~1
Angola's three liberation groups, whose
rivalry has stymied progress toward decoloniza-
tion, are each attempting to improve their mili-
tary and political positions inside the territory.
Their efforts are likely to increase suspicions and
could lead to violent clashes.
The Zairian-based National Front for the
Liberation of Angola is taking the lead. The Front
is believed to have over 200 lightly armed troops
in the city of Luanda and another 2,000 or so in
the countryside. Some of these troops were in
Angola before the coup in Portugal last April;
others, along with political organizers, have been
brought in over the past few months with the
help of the Zairian government. During the recent
outbreak of violence in Luanda, the Front helped
local Portuguese forces restore order. Although it
was rebuffed in its attempt to assume a major
security role, the Front has continued to publi-
cize its willingness to assist in the maintenance of
order.
The Front's chief rival, the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola, has few troops
inside Angola. The Movement's president, Agos-
tinho Neto, still faces a stiff challenge to his
leadership fro ion within the
or anization.
Neto seems, nevert a ess, o enjoy s rong
support in Luanda. Clashes between his sup-
porters and members of the Front accounted for
a large part of the recent disturbances.
The smallest of t:he three insurgent groups,
the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, shares with the Front the advantage of
operating from long-established bases inside
Angola. It has not, howe e able to match
the strength of its rivals.
Both Front leader Holden Roberto and
Union leader Jonas Savimbi believe that the Por-
tuguese privately favor the Popular Movement
and that they are working covertly to facilitate a
take-over of Angola by that group. Roberto and
Savimbi also maintain that the Movement, which
has long enjoyed Soviet support, will turn Angola
into a Communist state.
25X1
25X1
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Last weekend, Savimbi and Roberto dis-
cussed prospects for Angolan decolonization with
President Mobutu, who shares their feelings about
Neto and the Movement. They also talked with
Portuguese Foreign Minister Snares, who was
visiting Kinshasa. A press report from Lisbon
early this week stated that Savimbi and Roberto
had signed an agreement to cooperate.
As the rival nationalist groups strengthen
their positions and maneuver against each other,
the likelihood of their resorting to force to settle
their differences will increase. Even now, it is
questionable whether the Portuguese could halt a
military clash between the liberation groups. The
Portuguese already realize that locally recruited
troops cannot be rel%ed on to quell disturbances 25X1
involving fellow Africans. As time goes by, troops
from Portugal are also likely to refuse toto rim
dangers of trying to maintain order.
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VLVI LL
JORDAN: NEW CABINET
~ r
jLate fast week, King Husayn acted on his
intention to reorganize his government. The
King's move came in reaction to the decision of
the recent Arab summit conference to back the
claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization to
the Israeli-occupied West Bank territory. In a
message to Zayd Rifai, who was reappointed
prime minister, the King indicated that hence-
forth greater emphasis would be placed on East
Bank concerns. At the same time, however, he
attempted i:o reassure the local Palestinian com-
munity that it will receive fair treatment.
On November 23, Husayn dissolved parlia-
ment, appointed a new cabinet, and accepted the
resignations of a number of major palace advisers.
A principal immediate effect was a significant
reduction irr Palestinian participation in Jordan's
government with the number of Palestinians in
the cabinet dropping to four from ten. The new
cabinet is largely a mixture of technicians with a
reputation for efficiency and of traditional East
Bank personalities; an exception is the minister of
information and culture, Salah Abu Zayd, a long-
time adviser to the King who is expected to play
an important role in the formulation of foreign
policy. Husayn also apparently made a conscious
effort to achieve regional balance: four ministers
each are from the northern, southern, and central
sectors of the East Bank, and four are from the
'West Bank.
Prior tee the announcement of the new gov-
ernment, reFrorts were circulating that the King
would choose his uncle, Sharif Husayn, to be
prime minister. Widespread criticism of the
anticipated choice-Sharif Husayn is both ailing
zrnd ineffectual-apparently persuaded the King to
change his imind and reappoint Rifai. Rifai's
retention is sure to displease East Bank conserva-
tives for whom he has become a symbol of both
corruption and neglect of East Bank interests.
The Palestinian community, on the other hand, is
likely to be reassured by the reappointment of
Rifai, who can be expected to move slowly in
making domestic changes. Despite the King's
assurances of moderation, the Palestinians have
been apprehensive about their status following
the Rabat conference.
'The replacement of five powerful palace
advisers-including Bahjat Talhuni, the chief of
the King's personal secretariat, and Abd-al-Munim
Rifai, the King's aide for international affairs-is
apparently Husayn's response to continued pres-
sures from hard-line East Bankers to "clean out"
the unpopular palace crowd who have been the
object of public criticism for corruption or bad
policy advice to the King on the West Bank issue.
The appointment of Mudhar Badran, an East
Bank conservative, as chief of the secretariat will
give the palace staff a decidedly more tradi-
ISRAELI AIR FORCE: STATUS REPORT
7'he Israeli air~orce apparently is encounter-
ing personnel problems. In the past six weeks, the
Israelis have lost four fighters and a helicopter in
accidents. One F-4 and three A-4s were lost in
training flights, apparently because of pilot error.
This is in marked contrast with the air force's
normally high standards, and the nature of the
accidents suggests a shortage of qualified air
crews.
The Israelis most likely are having diffi-
culties training enough pilots, both to replace
those lost during the last war and to man new
aircraft delivered by the US.
According to the US defense attache in Tel
Aviv, the Israelis have doubled the number of
cadets undergoing flight training. This increase
probably means the air force has had to lower its
qualifications for pilot-trainees. The attache be-
lieves that the pilot shortage will occur principally
in support and lower performance jet aircraft
rather than in F-4s and Mira es to which the
raduates are
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~.,~ StLKt l
JAPAN: A NEW PRIME MINISTER
~3~I
CWith the announcement on November 26 of
Prime Minister Tanaka's decision to resign, atten-
tion in Japan is focused on the ruling party's
efforts to choose a successor before the Diet
convenes on December 11. Tanaka's resignation
w i II not take effect until the new Liberal
Democratic Party president is named on Decem-
ber 10, but conflicting interests have so far
blocked agreement on a method for choosing a
successor.
Former finance minister Fukuda, the aging
leader of the party's conservative wing, favors a
negotiated settlement of the succession problem
by Liberal Democratic Party elders. This would
give him a greater chance of becoming prime
minister than he would have in a party conven-
tion. Finance Minister Ohira, the other top con-
tender, is widely believed to hold the edge in any
potential showdown by ballot at a convention.
Tanaka, still a major power broker in the
ruling party, is adamantly opposed to the acces-
sion of Fukuda, his most bitter critic. The Prime
Minister's position on Ohira, his chief political
ally over the past two years, is less clear. Tanaka
would throw his faction behind Ohira in a con-
vention vote againsi: Fukuda, but might be willing
to settle for a compromise candidate in negotia-
tions.
At this juncture, it is unlikely that either
Fukuda or Ohira-because of their intense
rivalry-could be selected through negotiations.
Fukuda, however, estimating that he would lose
in an electoral showdown, might agree to support
an alternate "consensus" candidate. Otherwise,
the party will gather on December 10 for an
election in which Ohira is now the favor-
ite.
AUSTRALIA: TROUBLES FOR WHITLAM
/ocT SC1taq+c6n
The Labor government, beset by mounting
economic problems, is drawing increased opposi-
tion from its main, base of political support-the
labor unions. The discontent in the unions comes
at a time when polls show a sharp decline in the
government's popularity, leaders of the Labor
Party are increasingly dissatisfied with the per-
formance of Prime Minister Whitlam, and the
party has suffered heavy losses in a number of
recent local elections.
Bob Hawke, the head of the Australian
Council of Trade Unions, claims he has warned
Whitlam that sentiment is growing among the
workers that the government is not "supporting
the people who elected it." Hawke said he was
under pressure for a change in government
policies. The head of the textile union, for
example, has charged that 13,000 textile workers
have lost jobs as a direct result of the govern-
ment's policy of liberalizing imports and has
asserted that his union will not support the Labor
Party financially in future elections. The postal
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union is threatening similar nonsupport unless the
government drops its opposition to a wage in-
crease for postal workers.
The trade unions are especially concerned
over the sharply rising unemployment. Registered
unemployment reached 2.5 percent of the work
force in October-extremely high for Australia.
The government announced a number of eco-
nomic measures in mid-November to stimulate
the economy, placate the unions, and improve
employment, but it will be some time before
these measures take full effect. They include
easing some restrictions on business credits, cuts
in personal and corporate income taxes, increases
in import dutie_~ on foreign cars, and more funds
for housing loans.
~c r .~,..,azbD
d~hese measures will help stimulate the
economy, but they could also push the inflation
rate, now about 22 percent, even higher. The
governrrrent's success in controlling inflation
depends heavily on restraining the trade unions
from seeking further wage increases, and the
prospects of doing so are not very bright.
in another move on the economic front,
Whitlam announced late last week that leftist
Deputy Prime Minister Cairns, currently minister
for overseas trade, would assume the post of
treasurer in mid-December. The appointment will
make Cairns officially responsible for overall gov-
ernment economic policy. Whitlam apparently
hopes that Cairns will be more effective than the
former treasurer in bringing analytical resources
to bear on the country's economic problems and
in maintaining support for the government's
policies within the Labor Party's parliamentary
caucus.
Although Cairns is ideologically committed
to socialism, he has advocated relatively moderate
policies since joining the Whitlam government. In
his new post, he is certain to be identified with
the hard economic decisions that are bound to be
unpopular, thereby running the risk of losing his
support from the Labor Party's vocal left wing.
Whitlam's planned five-week trip to Europe
may make matters worse between the Labor
Party and the trade unions. He seems certain to
evoke criticism from the unions as well as the
political opposition not only for leaving the coun-
try amid such serious economic problems, but
also because of the length of the trip and its
emphasis on "tourist" spots.
Officials involved in planning the trip report-
edly are referring to it as "Whitlam's swan song,"
reflecting a growing opinion among political ob-
servers in Canberra that Whitlam's political trou-
and that the Labor Party will ha r~afaa+ed, ~~ ~tix~
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~.r` J t C~ I-t t I ~.?~
rA North Vietnamese delegation headed by
Politburo member Le Duc Tho arrived in Paris on
November 25 for aten-day visit at the invitation
of the French Communist Party: Tho's delegation
left Hanoi on November 18 and made a brief
stopover in Peking before heading on to Moscow
and then Paris. While in Moscow, the North Viet-
namese met with Soviet Politburo member Suslov
,end party secretary Katushev. In what appears to
be a routine reaffirmation of Soviet policy,
IVloscow pledged to give "all-round and effective
support" to Hanoi's "just struggle."
Le Duc Tho received lower level treatment
from the Chinese during an overnight stop. A
middle echelon member of the Chinese Politburo
held a banquet for Tho and his party, and the
Chinese press barely mentioned the visit. During
Isis many stopovers in Peking on previous trips to
Paris for the Vietnam peace talks, Tho was
usually received by Premier Chou En-lai and
senior Politburo mernbe:r Chang Chun-chiao.
While in Paris, Tho can be expected tcx meet
with various French Communist and leftist
groups. He probably vvill use these meetings to
denounce the Saigon government and the US for
failing to implement the 1973 Paris Agreement.
President Thieu has selected replacements
for the four cabinet ministers who resigned fast
month, but he is not ready to make the list
public. There have been rumors that more minis-
terial resignations are in the offing, and it is
possible that Thieu may want to complete these
moves before publicly announcin the com osi-
tion of his new cabinet.
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LAOS: STORM WARNINGS SUBSIQE
Tensions have apparently eased following
the disturbances in Vientiane last week that
threatened to undermine the fragile stability of
the eight-rrionth-old coalition government. Never-
theless, both the Communists and non-Commu-
nists remain inherently suspicious of each other,
and this will almost certainly complicate Lao ef-
forts to achieve unity and national reconciliation.
own veterans, making it unmistakably clear both
to the protest leaders and to the Pathet Lao that
demonstrations by former nun-Communist sol-
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-The precise reasons for the full-scale alert
last week by military forces on both sides are still
unclear, but there is no evidence of serious coup
plotting by either side. It seems more likely that
the unrest was related to the threat of large-scale
demonstrations by war veterans in Vientiane, and
that both t:he Communists and the non-Commu-
nists heightened their military posture to deal
with anticipated disorders.
The latest war of nerves in Vientiane was
doubtless exacerbated by the absence of key
political leaders who would have been able to
counsel moderation and restraint. Prince Sou-
phanouvong, Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi
Vongvichit, and other senior Lao Communist
leaders were in Sam Neua for a reported meeting
of the central committee, while non-Communist
Deputy Prirne Minister Leuam Insisiengmay and
Defense Minister Sisouk were in Europe. Prime
Minister Souvanna was convalescing in the royal
Lao capital of Luang Prabang, and both sides
were probak~ly reluctant to involve him in a tense
situation that might prove detrimental to his
failing health.
Non-Communist politicians have become in-
creasingly #rustrated in recent weeks by what
they perceive as a concentrated effort by the
Pathet Lao to subvert student, labor, veteran, civil
servant, and other groups throughout the non-
communist zone. In their frustration, the non-
communists are beginning to look on the Royal
Lao Army ass the only organized and unified force
on their side capable of countering such subver-
sion. The army did in fact move swiftly against its
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l
Acting President Clerides
went to London
last week to apprise Archbishop Makarios of the
situation in Cyprus and, possibly, to persuade him
to delay his return. Clerides is concerned about
his own status, but he is also known to believe
that Makarios' insistence on a multiregional fed-
eration as a solution to the Cyprus problem is
unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, who prefer
a biregional geographic federation. Clerides also
believes that Makarios' return will harden the
negotiating position of the turkish Cypriots be-
cause of their distrust of the archbishop. Clerides
had earlier announced his willingness to consider
the Turkish Cypriot demand for a biregional geo-
graphic federation.
Makarios apparently remained adamant in
his opposition to the Turkish Cypriot proposal.
He reiterated his call for a multiregional fed-
eration in a press conference on November 22,
following a meeting with Clerides and British
Foreign Secretary Callaghan. He also announced
that he would return to Cyprus on or about
December 6.
Makarios' tough negotiating position may
well be toned down at the Athens summit this
weekend, where Gree4; Prime Minister Karamanlis
is likely to urge an approach that lies somewhere
between the uncompromising stance of Makarios
and the accommodating position of Clerides. At
the meeting, the Acting President is likely to
insist that he will continue as negotiator for the
Greek Cypriot side only if he is given a wide
measure of freedom to conduct the negotiations
as he sees fit.
On Cyprus
Preparations are being made in the Greek
sector of Cyprus for Makarios' return. The gov-
ernment is trying to deter possible violence
between pro- and anti-Makarios groups by coun-
seling moderation and pointing to the Turkish
threat to the Greek Cypriot community in the
event that the Greek Cypriots begin fighting
among themselves.
While Turkish Cypriots have voiced their dis-
pleasure over Makarios' return and have rejected
his call for a multiregional federation, Turkish
forces are not likely to move against the Greek
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JCI~I~C I ~ ~'
Cypriot sector unless violence between Greek
Cypriot factions threatens the security of Turkish
Cypriots living within the Greek Cypriot sector of
the island.
In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot sector
is fast assuming the character of a de facto state.
Denktash announced recently that a constituent
assembly wiill soon be convened to establish the
constitutional basis fora "Turkish Cypriot wing"
of a federated state. Various government posts
have been upgraded to ministries, and foreign
companies are required to register with Turkish
Cypriot authorities. Turkish Cypriot officials also
announced recently that Greek Cypriot properties
in the Turkish Cypriot sector will be temporarily
"leased" to Turkish Cypriots and will be turned
over to therri in the event of a settlement.
After successfully completing the exchange
of over 5,000 prisoners, Clerides and Denktash
have now turned their attention to other "human-
itarian" issues. They agreed to the exchange of
certain categories of aged, infirm, and isolated
individuals, which will affect some 2,000 Turkish
Cypriots and an equal number of Greek Cypriots.
The two also agreed to make a renewed effort to
solve the island's educational problems, and to try
to improve the living conditions of the Greek and
Turkish inhabitants in their respective sectors. In
addition, they said they would make a special
effort to locate the several hundred people,
mostly Greer: Cypriots, reported to be missing.
The lack of movement on political questions
can be partly attributed to Clerides' lack of a
clear mandate as a result of Makarios' planned
return and the unsettled political situation in
Ankara. Following the Athens summit, the Greek
side will likely be ready to focus on political
questions. The talks are not expected to gain
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ICELAND: ANOTHER FISHING DISPUTE
~A long-simmer~ng dispute ~etween Iceland
and West Germany over fishing rights developed
into a skirmish last weekend when the Icelandic
Coast Guard seized one West German trawler and
chased another from its unilaterally declared
50-mile fishing zone. Bonn, charging piracy, de-
manded the release of the trawler and closed one
of its ports to an Icelandic ship.
The two incidents are the first between Ice-
land and West Germany since a compromise
agreement ended the 15-month-long "cod war"
with the UK in 1973. Since the spring of 1972,
Iceland and West Germany have held intermittent
negotiations on a similar agreement. That agree-
ment reduced the UK's annual fish catch and gave
Iceland limited jurisdiction over British craft in-
side the 50-mile fishing zone. This compromise
agreement was not reached, however, until after
many Icelanders questioned the value of their ties
with NATO and the US. The Icelandic govern-
ment charged that both the US and NATO should
have done more to help end the conflict.
The UK-Iceland dispute revolved around
what areas would be open to the British and how
large a catch they would be allowed. The main
issue between Reykjavik and Bonn is the type of
fishing boat that would be allowed to operate
within the 50-mile zone. Iceland would like to
limit, if not completely ban, West German trawl-
ers to prevent massive catches that would deplete
resources. Large factory and freezer trawlers
make up the bulk of the West German fleet.
During a round of talks last month, Iceland
and West Germany reached a tentative agreement
permitting some freezer trawlers to operate
within the 50-mile zone. Iceland later canceled
this agreement because of opposition within the
governing Independence-Progressive coalition. Al-
though the canceled agreement was more restric-
tive than the one negotiated with the UK last
year, critics claimed that the presence of even a
limited number of trawlers was unacceptable.
Iceland's past disputes over fishing rights
have evolved into contests among its political
parties. They have vied with one another in advo-
cating an aggressively nationalistic line to protect
Iceland's most important industry. The current
government, formed last August, is anxious to
prove that it can be just as tough as the previous
center-left coalition. Even though Iceland is ap-
parent-y determined to crack down on fishing
violations, Prime Minister Hallgrimsson has not
ruled out negotiations with Bonn, and the recent
incidents could lea n rl re i n
talks.
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~- SECRET
EC-ARAB DIALOGUE STALLED
C ~5 -- 707
}The Nine have been unable to agree thus far
on a response to an Arab League demand that the
PLO be given observer status in the EC-Arab talks
on economic cooperation initiated early this year.
As a result, the Arabs refused to attend the first
meeting of the joint general commission, which
had been scheduled to meet in Paris last week to
set up working groups. The EC is likely to pro-
pose acompromise that might permit an organiza-
tional meetiing with the Arabs before the end of
the year.
The EC foreign ministers, at their political
consultation meetings last week, agreed that they
would not accept Arab conditions that would put
a "political burden" on the dialogue. If, as ex-
pected, the Arabs introduce political subjects at
an eventual general commission meeting, the EC
president has been authorized to reiterate the
EC's declaration on the Middle East of November
1973, and to note that the present dialogue is not
concerned with issues related to a political settle-
ment in the Middle East.
The Arabs' refusal to hold the Paris meetings
is clearly a pressure tactic designed to exploit the
EC's eagerness to establish a closer relationship in
the hope that this will help protect oil supplies
and aid in recycling petrodollars. Arab obduracy
will lead to intensified efforts by the Nine to
reach a compromise among themselves that would
permit PLO attendance while preserving the EC's
intention to keep the dialogue from becoming a
political forum for Middle East problems.
Attitudes toward granting the PLO observer
status vary within the EC-France, in particular,
has tried to accommodate the Arabs-and the
matter may have to be resolved at the EC summit
next month. It is unlikely that the general com-
mission meeting will take place until after the
first of the year. The Nine may, in fact, propose
an indefinite postponement of the general com-
mission meeting-and thus put off the question of
PLO observers-but suggest that the two sides get
i:ogether next month, in an as yet undecided
forum, to set up working groups. By such a tactic,
i:hey apparently count on the Arabs not to reit-
erate their demand that the PLO also have ob-
server status in the working groups.
The EC Commission expects the dialogue to
continue to develop slowly. It has proposed draft
guidelines that attempt to make the proposed
cooperation of practical value to the Arab states,
some of which are very poor and in need of the
kind of technical and commercial assistance that
the EC could provide. The guidelines include:
? giving priority to a few relatively modest
agricultural projects that can be implemented
quickly and primarily in the poorer Arab
countries;
? financing of initial projects by the oil-
producing countries, with the Nine providing
technical assistance;
? vocational training of young Arabs in
the EC countries;
? priority for "inter-Arab" projects in-
volving more than one country;
? possible establishment of an ad hoc com-
mittee for mineral exploration in the Arab
countries.
Meanwhile, EC solidarity on the PLO ques-
tion held up reasonably well during UN votes last
week. The Arabs made a strong pitch for the
Nine's support of the UN resolution affirming the
rights of the Palestinians, going so far as to soften
somewhat the text at the last minute. Although
some EC members-including the West Germans
and the British-felt strongly that the final res-
olution still demanded a negative vote, a common
position supporting abstention was mainta-fined.
On a second resolution giving the PLO observer
status at the UN and at all UN-sponsored ~on-
ferences, however, the French broke ranks by
voting in favor while the other ei ht
abst in
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WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE CONCLUDED
[; 71 - 73]
The UN World Food Conference ended on
November 16 with general agreement on long-
term goals to meet world food needs. A World
Food Council was established to deal with the 22
resolutions adopted by the 130-nation confer-
ence. Key recommendations include:
? a food aid program of at least 10 million
tons of grain a year;
? an internationally coordinated system of
national grain reserves;
? an international agricultural develop-
ment fund;
? a global information and early warning
system on food and agriculture.
Official reaction to the results of the World
Food Conference from both developed and de-
veloping states has been marked by cautious
optimism in spite of critical press reaction to the
alleged failure of the conference to deal with
immediate food aid problems. Much of the press,
however, did acknowledge that the conference's
aim was to set the stage for worldwide coopera-
tion on long-term food supply problems and that
it was not intended to deal with immediate food
needs.
Most states are still analyzing the impact of
the conference's myriad resolutions and are wait-
ing for follow-up initiatives to begin, Although
current food needs were not on the agenda, Food
and Agriculture Organization Director Boerma
has called a meeting on November 29 to discuss
the immediate grain needs and financing problems
of the larger grain-deficit nations, particularly
India, Bangladesh, and other Asian countries.
Major grain exporters, including the US, will
participate. The meeting will again test the
wil-ingness of the major grain exporters and the
oil-rich states to provide aid. In separate initia-
tives, the US is, working to convene a grain ex-
porters' planning group in London in January.
This group would review grain production plans
in light of the resolutions passed at the World
Food Conference and lay the groundwork for a
plan for longer term food assistance and f'or a
follow-up meeting of a larger international co-
o rd i n ating body to discuss national reserve
policies.
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~~.~n~ i
Although most of the conference delegates
returned home in a positive and conciliatory
frame of mind, the generally well-balanced and
constructive resolutions and provisions for follow-
on organizations and committees must still be
formally cleared by the UN Economic and Social
Council and by the General Assembly. Radical
states among the developing countries' Group of
77 could try to impose extreme positions that
many develaped states would oppose. Food
issues, however, are of such great concern to the
poorer developing countries that support for
measures that would damage the results, attained
at the Rome conference are unlikely.
USSR: RYAD COMPUTER PRODUCTION LAGS
f-~~1
ne soviet program to build modern third-
generation computers is off the ground but
moving slowly. Last year, the USSR and Eastern
Europe together produced an estimated 100 to
150 RYADs, far below the 3,000 to 4,000 units
per anroum implied in earlier forecasts by Soviet
officials. The Soviets have produced most of
them, and they are overwhelmingly the slow
speed, low capacity ES-1020 type. Higher
capacity models are being produced in very small
numbers or are still in prototype. Moreover,
speeds of models in production are 25 to 50
percent belov~r original design goals. The fastest
and highest capacity machine-the ES-1060-is
still in the design stage.
At the principal Soviet RYAD manufac-
turing facility, RYADs compete with MINSK-
32s-a second generation computer that is
obsolete by US standards-for production time,
space, and resources. Both systems are produced
on the same line, and by the same labor force,
during alternate days or weeks. Assembly opera-
tions are largely manual and lack modern high-
productivity nnachinery and techniques. Further,
because uncompleted or defective parts and sub-
assemblies are replaced or repaired only after all
assembly operations have been completed, up to
three RYADs are cannibalized to produce one
workable machine.
In the USSR most high quality integrated
circuits are pre-empted by the military. The
Soviets do not yet produce in commercial quan-
tities the more advanced type of integrated cir-
cuits needed for the largest systems in the RYAD
family. East European production of RYADs is
dependent upon hard-to-get components and
parts from the USSR and the West.
Shortages of modern peripherals, or input-
output devices, are also delaying production of
RYADs. Some necessary peripherals are in limited
production, and others depend upon Western
imports for critical parts.
RYADs that have been produced and de-
livered have limited usefulness owing to shortages
of software programs and the absence of efficient
maintenance support services. IBM-360 series
software, which the Soviets had hoped to use
directly, cannot now be run on RYADs without
costly modifications. Moreover, because of tech-
nical variations among RYAD models, the same
IBM programs may require separate modifications
for use with each RYAD system. Soviet develop-
ment of software needed to make all RYADs
compatible with each other is apparently still
several years away.
Without massive Western help, the RYAD
program will continue to limp along, further de-
laying Soviet plans for a nationwide data process-
ing network and for improving efficiency in
Soviet plants. The Soviets already have indicated
that the Minsk plant, which could boost RYAD
output by as much as 600 units annually, even
with existing outdated manufacturing methods,
will continue to produce mainly MINSK-32s at
least thraugh 1975.
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ROMANIA; ON A NOTE OF DEFIANCE
Z~s-s~
President Ceausescu opened the 11th party
congress on November 25 with one of the most
forceful reaffirmations of Romanian national
policy and independence since 1964. Speaking to
an audience that included Andrey Kirilenko,
Brezhnev's unofficial deputy in the Soviet party,
Ceausescu called for a new order both in inter-
national relations and in the world Communist
movement. He repeatedly emphasized the need
for equality, sovereignty, and noninterference in
the internal affairs of other states pointing out
that these needs are nowhere greater than in the
Communist movement itself.
Ceausescu indicated that Romania would
participate in preparatory meetings for a con-
ference of European Communist parties, but
rejected Moscow's claim to hegemony in the
movement. In language scarcely calculated to
please the Kremlin, he asserted that:
? absolutely nothing must be undertaken
to weaken the unity of any Communist party;
? no interference by any party in the af-
fairs of another party can be tolerated;
? other parties should not be discussed,
criticized, or condemned;
? Romania will not become involved in
censuring other parties;
? a world Communist conference is "not
of topical interest."
In his treatment of international issues,
Ceausescu expressed "great joy" over Romania's
improved relations with Peking, and noted that
relations with Yugoslavia are progressing. He also
pointed to the joint declaration signed with the
US in 1973, noting that it incorporates many of
his principles for building confidence and trust in
international relations. He even acknowledged a
role for the middle class in the struggle to build
new relations between nations.
The Romanian leader came down hard on
the need to do away with "antagonistic military
blocs." His call to dismantle foreign military bases
and to withdraw all foreign troops from the terri-
tory of other states strikes equally at NATO-and
the Warsaw Pact.
On the domestic side, he held out Kittle hope
of relief from the hectic pace of forced industrial-
ization. In a move that enables him to undercut
critics of .his so-called personality cult, Ceausescu
put on an unusual display of modesty in turning
down a proposal that he be elected as the party's
secretary general for life.
praise for Soviet initiatives in pursuit of detente,
thus keeping relations with Bucharest at their
Ceausescu's stubborn restatement of Roma-
nia's independent positions probably came as no
surprise to Moscow If past practice is any guide,
the Soviets will focus their commentaries on
Ceausescu's recognition of the importance of cul-
tivating close relations with the USSR and his 25X1
present level of chilly politeness
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ARGENTINA: THE GOVERNMENT SCORES
~.53 -~~~
~fhe Argentine government has taken strong
action against political leftists and terrorists in
outlying provinces. Early this week, President
Maria Estela de Peron ordered the dismissal of the
leftist Peronist governor of Salta. In Cordoba,
security forces captured a large number of ter-
rorists and several arms caches.
The removal of Governor Raul Ragone of
Salta concludes a "corrective" process begun by
Juan Peron to replace leftist governors, who carne
to power under Hector Campora, with more con-
servative Peror~ists. Seven provincial governments
have been overturned--the remaining 15 provinces
were already under "orthodox" leadership.
National security forces are having a measure
of success in their drive to stamp out leftist guer-
rillas. The capture in Cordoba last week of a large
number of extremists working for the People's
Revolutionary Army and the retrieval of weapons
there and elsewhere could deal a setback to the
subversive cause.
Evidence is still fragmentary, but improved
communication between the army and police
probably accounts for the government's headway
in finally getting the counter-terrorist program
under way after a number of embarrassing false
starts and failures. Press reports suggest that the
police, acting under a stage of siege that gives
them broad search and arrest powers, -have
improved their intelligence capability and are
scaring major successes for the first time.
The tide, however, has probably not turned
yet. The two principal guerrilla groups, which
may now be cooperating with each other, have
withstood reversals in the past and have resumed
the offensive with a vengeance. ~
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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J~~..n~ i ;..~
MEXICO: LISTENING TO THE PUBLIC
~~~ ~ ~T~
The Echeverria administration, faced with an
outcry over recent tax proposals, has shown a rare
willingness to listen and respond to public opin-
ion. The urban middle class, hardest hit by the
taxes, made its discontent known through the
media and the congress. Although all of the taxes
originally proposed will be in effect by the first of
the year, public pressure forced the government
to make some significant accommodations.
The tax on low-grade gasoline was reduced,
public transportation was exempted from the
gasoline tax, and taxes on restaurant tabs will
apply only to luxury restaurants. Heavy taxes on
sales of automobiles, boats, and beer will remain
as originally proposed. An additional income tax
will be levied later on higher wage earners. The
government is billing the package as essential to
control inflation and to reduce the country's
dependence on foreign credits. It argues that new
revenues are needed to stimulate the lagging pro-
duction of food and to deve-op long-neglected
rural areas.
This rationale has not convinced middle-class
Mexicans, the country's most disparate, under-
represented group. Citizens of all political persua-
sions are especially rankled by the steep (50
percent) tax on gasoline, questioning such a hike
at a time when important oil discoveries have
been made.
Echeverria, evidently anticipating resistance
to the taxes, invited comment. Although Mexican
congresses rarely tamper with a president's legisla-
tive proposals, congressmen-including several
from the governing party-for once delved into
substance and expressed their misgivings. Opposi-
tion spokesmen condemned the government for
penalizing middle-class wage earners for its own
ineptness and dishonesty in managing the
economy.
The liveliest debate was in the press, which
the Echeverria government has given a somewhat
freer rein during the last year or so. The com-
plaint most often expressed is that the urban
middle class was being asked to bear a dis-
proportionate burden. The left faulted the gov-
ernment for allowing foreign-dominated busi-
nesses to escape new taxes. What is needed, said
the left, is radical fiscal reform to shift the weight
of development to those reaping the profits. The
right asserted that the government is wasteful and
corrupt, and called for more austerity and
integrity. One middle-of-the-road columnist
sneered: "If Mexicans are going to pay taxes like
Frenchmen and Americans, I assume they will
also enjoy similar benefits, like free elections, a
representative congress, and an end to bureaucrats
who enrich themselves at the public trough."
Mexico's authoritarian political system is
hardly likely to undergo that sort of reform, but
the government's handling of the tax legislation
demonstrates that, when pressed, it is willing to
heed public opinion, debate issues on their merit,
and concede to Congress some degree of the
lawmakina power assigned to it by the constitu-
tion.
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Secret ~ `'~
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