WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0037/75
September 12, 1975
Copy N2 62
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he WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Ice of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
search, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
search, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and
therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed
in the contents.
CONTENTS (September 12, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 Portugal: Anti-Communist Gains
2 Italy: Political Drift
5 Cyprus: Talks Stalemated
6 Soviets Concerned About Detente
7 Egypt: Battening Down
8 Sudan: Coup Quashed
9 Angola: National Front Set Back
10 Lebanon: Army Called In
12 Ecuador: Adjusting to Realities
13 Cuba: Counterweight to Detente
14 Peru: The Second Stage Begins
14 Argentina: Counterterrorism
15 Panama: Talks Stir Optimism
16 China: New Signs of Strain
17 Laos: Enter the Soviets
18 Cambodia: Return of the Prince
19 Burma: Focus on Foreign Policy
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC:
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PORTUGAL: ANTI-COMMUNIST GAINS
Anti-Communist officers have improved
their position in the Portuguese military govern-
ment in the wake of the political decline of
pro-Communist, General Goncalves. The extent
of the gains made by the anti-Communist An-
tunes faction will be clearer, however, when a
new government is formed to replace Goncalves'
Communist-leaning cabinet.
The Antunes group, refusing to accept Costa
Comes' efforts to keep Goncalves in a leadership
position as armed forces chief of staff, resorted to
pressure tactics to ensure his ouster. The show-
down came at the September 5 meeting of the
Armed Forces General Assembly. At the urging of
the Antunes faction, the army and air force
boycotted the assembly, sending only the chiefs
of the two services to demand Goncalves' dis-
missal. A communique was issued after a "rump
session" of the assembly, announcing that Gon-
calves had decided to "decline" the armed forces
chief of staff post.
Goncalves' decision to back down was not a
clearcut victory for the anti-Communists. The
revised membership of the Revolutionary Council
appears to reflect concessions to all factions, with
major representatives of both the Goncalves and
Antunes factions left out. There was speculation
that President Costa Comes had again attempted
to arrange a compromise that would prevent any
faction from attaining complete superiority. One
source told US embassy officials that Costa Comes
was interested in maintaining a role for the Com-
munists in order to reinforce his own position as a
mediator between warring factions.
The anti-Communist group associated with
Antunes appears to have a plurality of votes on
the council. In the first meeting of the revamped
council on September 8 the council decided to
appoint Antunes-supporter Lourenco to head a
committee to reorganize both the Revolutionary
Council and the left-leaning General Assembly to
make them representative of the Movement.
They also voted to reinstate anti-Communist
leaders Antunes and Alves on the council, but
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balanced their addition somewhat by also adding
former council member Costa Martins-a Gon-
calves sympathizer.
The council demonstrated a determination to
cement its renewed authority by strictly limiting
press coverage of military events, a decision that
brought cries of censorship by the Communist
Party and the Communist-influenced press. The
council further prohibited contact with the press
by any military figure other than council members
in an effort to prevent public statements by Gon-
calves or other pro-Communist officers.
The composition of the new cabinet now be-
ing formed by Prime Minister-designate Azevedo
will indicate whether the anti-Communists have
indeed turned the tide. In the meantime, Gon-
calves and his cabinet continue in a caretaker
capacity.
The new cabinet is expected to contain
representatives of the three major political par-
ties-the Socialists, center-left Popular
Democrats, and the Communists--but they are to
sit in the cabinet as individuals and not as
representatives of their respective parties.
Azevedo hopes this compromise will be accepted
by the feuding Communists and Popular
Democrats who are refusing to attend negotiating
sessions together. The Communists have renewed
their attacks, labeling the Popular Democrats as
"reactionary" and hope to regain support in the
military. Having suffered a. serious setback with
the loss of Goncalves, the Communists appear
determined not to be cut out of the action
altogether.
Both the Socialists and the Popular
Democrats set strict conditions for joining the
new government to assure that they will not once
again be in an underdog role. The parties worked
with the anti-Communists in the military against
Goncalves, but the cooperation may break down
if the parties present excessive demands. Both
groups hope to use this opportunity to move Por-
tugal back toward a civilian government by
preparing for national assembly elections next
spring. At this time, however, it does not appear
that the military-and President Costa Gomes in
particular-plans an early return to the
ITALY: POLITICAL DRIFT
2
As a new political season gets under way the
governing parties seem inclined to postpone dif-
ficult decisions rather than run the risk of a con-
frontation that could precipitate early national
elections. The tendency will aid Communist ef-
forts to consolidate the sharp gains they scored in
regional and local elections three months ago.
Prime Minister Moro is the other beneficiary
of political drift. His cabinet of Christian
Democrats and Republicans-which relies mainly
on Socialist votes for its parliamentary ma-
jority-is recognized by everyone as an interim
government, but Moro is not likely to be
challenged until politicians have a clearer idea of
how to replace him. To bring Moro down with no
alternative in sight would increase the possibility
of early elections. Even the Communists are op-
posed to early elections because they want to
make the most of their local successes before fac-
ing a showdown on the question of Communist
participation in the national government.
The key to what comes after Moro still lies
with the Christian Democrats, but they are im-
mobilized by the internal feud that erupted in the
aftermath of the election debacle. Since the elec-
tions, the Christian Democrats have been able to
put together only transient internal majorities,
first to oust Fanfani and later to elect Benigno
Zaccagnini to preside as interim leader while the
party prepares for its yet-to-be scheduled
national congress.
The Christian Democrats, however, have not
been able to agree on how to deal with the Com-
munists' vastly expanded influence. Last month,
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the party. Most notable so far is the defection of
Foreign Minister Rumor from the largest centrist
faction, which in recent years has controlled
about a third of the party. Rumor seems to be
moving closer to Moro and Zaccagnini, who are
somewhat to the left of center. Strains are also
evident between Treasury Minister Colombo and
Budget Minister Andreotti who head the other
centrist faction.
The problem that will make it most difficult
for the Christian Democrats to avoid calling early
national elections is the firmness of the Socialist
Party's refusal to join any new national govern-
ment that leaves the Communists totally in op-
position. The Socialists want an arrangement that
would permit formalized consultations with the
Communists on the national government's
program-a formula that has been adopted by
some of the new regional governments, which ex-
clude the Communists from actual participation.
Zaccagnini did get the Christian Democratic
directorate to endorse a formalized dialogue with
the Communists on the local level to discuss
legislative programs, but that was not so much a
policy change as' a recognition of reality. The
Communists now share power with the Socialists
in most major cities, 5 of the 20 regions, and near-
ly a third of the 94 provinces.
One symptom of the Christian Democrats'
search for a coherent internal majority is a loosen-
ing of the traditional alliances among certain key
faction leaders, particularly those in the center of
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CYPRUS: TALKS STALEMATED
The intercommunal talks came close to a total
collapse this week when Greek and Turkish
Cypriot negotiators Clerides and Denktash were
unable to agree on an agenda or a date for
another round of talks after three days of
meetings with UN Secretary General Waldheim in
New York.
The impasse developed when Denktash in-
dicated he was not prepared to follow through on
romise in Vienna last month to address the
hi
s p
important territorial question in return for Greek
Cypriot acceptance of some principal Turkish
Cypriot demands.
Denktash told Waldheim that problems with
the Turkish Cypriots and the unwillingness of
Ankara to commit itself prior to the senate elec-
tions on October 12 made it impossible for him to
offer territorial proposals at this time. He in-
dicated his willingness to address the question
sometime after the Turkish elections.
With an eye to the approaching US con-
gressional debate on the arms embargo against
Turkey, however, Denktash tried hard to per-
suade Clerides to discuss other issues to give the
appearance of movement in the talks. The an-
nouncement by the Turkish General Staff last
week that some 750 of the estimated 32,000
Turkish troops on Cyprus were being withdrawn
was also made with the aim of influencing
Congress to lift the embargo.
Concerned about his own political future,
Clerides remained steadfast in his refusal to par-
ticipate in formal negotiations in the absence of
concrete proposals by Denktash on the territorial
question. Clerides apparently was under strong
pressure this time from Athens as well as from
President Makarios to avoid giving the talks a
positive gloss in the absence of real progress and
thereby aid the Turkish case in Congress.
Waldheim was "just barely" able to prevent a
complete breakdown of the talks. At one point,
Denktash reportedly threatened to resettle the
Greek section of Famagusta, which for the most
part has been left vacant, and to declare the
Denktash meets with UN Secretary General Waldheim
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Turkish Cypriot zone an independent state if the
Greek Cypriot side broke off the talks. At
Clerides' insistence, no date was set for another
round of talks. A terse communique noted only
that Waldheim would remain in contact with the
two parties in regard to "future action."
With the intercommunal talks stalled, the EC
Nine may take the initiative to bring the two sides
closer together. The EC earlier offered to mediate
the dispute and subsequently made a demarche
to the interested parties urging flexibility. The
Nine decided, however, to await the results of the
New York talks before taking additional steps. The
Turkish side has generally been cool to an EC role
in the negotiations.
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots are making
preparations to take their case to the UN General
Assembly in the hope of putting additional
pressure on the Turks to be forthcoming. The
Greek Cypriots have been encouraged by the
strong support they received at the recent
Nonaligned Conference in Lima.
SOVIETS CONCERNED ABOUT DETENTE
Moscow's apprehensions about the strength
of the US commitment to detente go back to the
resignation of President Nixon, but they have
grown, or at least been more openly expressed, in
recent months. The controversies over the
Helsinki summit and Soviet grain purchases have
drawn particular attention. Last week two promi-
nent members of the USSR's Institute of the USA
and Canada rose to the defense of detente against
Western critics, and perhaps against domestic
skeptics as well.
Izvestia on September 4 published a lengthy
article by Georgy Arbatov, director of the institute
and Moscow's leading academic authority on the
US. Evidently responding to Western denigration
of the European security agreement, Arbatov
defended the USSR against charges of non-
compliance, especially with the human contacts
provisions, by launching a sharp counterattack
aimed at discrediting the right of the West to pass
such judgments. Arbatov's tough line may have
been intended to set the tone for future rebuffs to
Western efforts to "interfere" in Soviet internal
affairs. He may also have wanted to assure the
Soviet people that Moscow's interest in
promoting detente will not lead to an easing of its
tight control over domestic affairs.
In a message clearly aimed at the West, Ar-
batov denied that the Soviets are seeking to use
detente to "nudge forward" class and national
liberation struggles. He denied that the dif-
ficulties facing the US in Greece, Turkey, and Por-
tugal are a consequence of Soviet actions, but he
expressly rejected any interpretation of detente
entailing a Soviet obligation to preserve the
"social status quo." In essence, Arbatov argued
that the USSR has every right under detente to
support its friends.
Arbatov also felt it necessary to reassure his
audience that support for detente remains-strong
in the US. He implicitly cautioned his Soviet
readers not to overestimate the strength of
detente's opponents and not to turn away from a
policy that has brought the USSR "striking"
achievements.
I he message that US-Soviet relations are still
generally headed in the right direction was also
conveyed in an article appearing in the
September issue of the Soviet journal Inter-
national Affairs. Written by Genrikh Trofimenko,
a senior staff member of Arbatov's institute, the
article contended that bilateral relations have at-
tained a "certain stability" that can sustain ten-
sion-producing shocks. For example, the 1973
Middle East crisis and 1974 US trade legislation, he
said, had created tensions that have now been ful-
ly dissipated.
Trofimenko argued that the complex of
bilateral agreements concluded since 1972 has
created a stabilizing basis for relations which, if
not unshakable, has at least permitted the two
sides to weather problems without a dams in
"ripple" effect. 25X1
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EGYPT: BATTENING DOWN
President Sadat has taken a barrage of
criticism from other Arabs and the Soviets since
the signing last week of the second Egyp-
tian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Buttressed
by apparent support at home, however, Sadat is
returning blow for blow in the verbal battle.
Although the Egyptians anticipated criticism,
they seem surprised and disturbed by its ferocity
and, in some!cases, its source. They are particular-
ly upset that Syria's Baath Party issued a public
denunciation of the agreement, and they are not
inclined to listen to excuses about the domestic
political considerations that led Syrian President
Asad to associate himself with the statement.
Jordan's private criticism and its public dis-
sociation from an erroneously quoted statement
of support for the accord also rankle. As for the
Palestinians, the Egyptians probably expected lit-
tle else from that quarter, but the outcry from less
radical leaders causes additional discomfort.
Similarly, Cairo is probably not surprised at the
Soviet reaction, but it is nonetheless angered; it is
also concerned about the Soviets' potential for
mischief-making.
President Sadat lashed out at his critics during
a speech last week originally intended to explain
the terms of the agreement. Ignoring ex-
planations, Sadat counterattacked. With anger
and emotion, he accused the Soviets of
deliberately distorting Egypt's position in an effort
to divide the Arabs, and he castigated Syria and
the Palestinians for falling for the Soviet ploy.
Such direct criticism of Arab allies is rare; never
before did Sadat attack Syria and President Asad
by name, and he has seldom so openly directed
his wrath at Yasir Arafat and the less radical
Palestinian leaders.
Sadat challenged the other Arabs to prove
that they could, by their own tactics, match
Egypt's accomplishments. He rehearsed the
history of the Arab struggle with Israel and
asserted that a quarter century of sloganeering
and paper resolutions had produced nothing for
the Arabs. He said the Arab people deserve better
than "soporific promises," and he claimed full
credit for starting them on a course that has
brought not only gains for Egypt, but a territorial
return for Syria and greater international recogni-
tion for the Palestinians.
In the course of his defense, Sadat minimized
the territorial gains made by Egypt in the latest
agreement in order to demonstrate Cairo's con-
tinued loyalty to the Arab cause. He said he had
not obtained all he had hoped for and, in the
most telling justification of his position, asserted
that if he had meant to abandon the other Arabs
as they have charged, he could have regained the
entire Sinai through considerably less arduous
negotiations.
The criticism from outside appears to have
closed Egyptian ranks around Sadat. His attack on
fellow Arabs and the Soviets won repeated
applause from his audience of Egyptian political
and legislative leaders, and they later passed a
resolution that with uncharacteristic enthusiasm
endorsed Sadat and his policies.
Some opposition from Egyptian leftists is in-
evitable, and radical Arabs or the Soviets could
use the agreement to stir up subversive elements
within Egypt, but for the present most Egyptians
seem relieved that a period of relatively assured
stability is on the horizon. Businessmen are
reportedly already expressing satisfaction that the
agreement will provide an atmosphere conducive
to commercial planning uninterrupted by war.
The government is capitalizing on this senti-
ment to reinforce its support at home. It is now
stressing the respite the agreement will provide
Egypt in which to cope with domestic economic
difficulties. The average Egyptian is more vitally
concerned with economic improvements in Egypt
than with regaining Palestine for the Palestinians
or Golan for the Syrians.
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SUDAN: COUP QUASHED
Last week, Jaafar Numayri, Sudan's pragmatic
socialist leader, survived another attempt to top-
ple his six-year-old regime. This time the move
came from military supporters of extremist
Muslim organizations. Numayri seems bound to
come out of the espisode with his prestige
heightened and hold on power reinforced.
In contrast to the near-successful effort
;against Numayri by the Sudanese Communist Par-
ty in mid-1971, the latest coup attempt never
posed a serious challenge to the President's rule
and fizzled out within two hours. Apparently less
than 100 military dissidents were involved.
In a radio address on September 8, Numayri
claimed that his security service had been aware
of the plot, which he said had been mastermind-
ed by the National Front-a coalition of the out-
lawed, ultra-conservative Muslim Brotherhood
and the Ansar sect, a political-religious organiza-
tion. Both groups have a history of opposition to
Numayri. On the same day, Numayri ordered
Khartoum University, a stronghold of the Muslim
Brotherhood, closed indefinitely following the
reported discovery there of a large cache of arms
and ammunition.
Numayri has also announced that the
Sudanese Parliament will meet in special session
to discuss the drafting of constitutional
amendments to "safeguard" the 1969 revolution.
Numayri is likely to be increasingly intolerant of
opposition.
The public reaction to the coup attempt
suggests that support for Numayri's leadership has
increased. In the past, the President's staying
power often seemed attributable less to his own
strength and popularity than to the absence of
alternatives to him. On this occasion, there were
apparently spontaneous pro-Numayri
demonstrations in the streets, even before it was
evident that the tide was going against the
plotters.
In his speech on September 8, Numayri all
but accused Libyan President Qadhafi of financ-
ing the bid to oust him. Numayri demanded the
extradition of Sudanese Muslim extremists who
have been living in Tripoli. In recent months,
although aware that Qadhafi was supporting the
exiles, Numayri had attempted to maintain cordial
relations with Libya in the hope that Tripoli would
give Sudan financial help for its hard-pressed
economy.
the offing.
Numayri may be less concerned now over the
decline of relations with Tripoli because he
believes he has had some success in forging closer
ties with Cairo and Riyadh. Numayri has recently
met with both President Sadat and King Khalid.
The government-controlled press in Khartoum
has speculated that a formal economic
relationship among the three countries may be in
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ANGOLA: NATIONAL FRONT SET BACK
The National Front for the Liberation of
Angola suffered a major new military and political
defeat during the past week. As a result, the rival
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is
gaining increased credibility as the only one of
Angola's three nationalist groups capable of
assuming power upon independence.
On September 8, military pressure by the
Popular Movement forced the National Front to
withdraw from its stronghold at Caxito, some 40
miles northeast of Luanda. Prior to the action, the
Front was claiming that it had advanced from Cax-
ito to within ten miles of Luanda. The Popular
Movement's attack on the stronghold appears to
be part of a major offensive against the Front,
perhaps planned with the intent of driving it out
of Angola entirely. At present, Front forces are
regrouping at Ambriz, one of the organization's
major bases in northern Angola.
Since it was forced out of Luanda last July, the
Front had relied on its presence in Caxito to dis-
credit the Popular Movement's claims that it is the
only liberation group capable of taking over from
Portugal at independence on November 11.
Unless the Front can stage a dramatic comeback
in the near future, it will be isolated in northern
Angola and its chances for a meaningful role in
the post-independence government will be
greatly reduced.
Meanwhile, in central Angola the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola, the
territory's third nationalist group, is also having
military problems. Its attempt to recapture Luso is
stalled, and it has been unable to build up a force
large enough to attack the major rail and port
cities of Benguela and Lobito, which it recently
lost to the Popular Movement.
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,Ambriz
,Caxito
Zaire
SouthWest Africa
(International Terr.)
The Popular Movement is losing no oppor-
tunity to publicize its increasingly dominant posi-
tion in the territory. With the exception of the
Portuguese, who no longer exercise any real con-
trol in Angola, the Popular Movement is the only
group with access to the national media. It is using
the press and radio increasingly to project an im-
age of effectiveness and responsibility and ap-
parently plans a propaganda blitz to advance its
bid for national popular support.
The new Portuguese high commissioner, Ad-
miral Cardoso, arrived in Luanda last Friday but so
far has remained in the background. He has ap-
parently discovered that the only functionaries
available to keep a transitional government struc-
ture operating are either officials or sympathizers
of the Popular Movement. He is hardly likely
within the next two months to be able to establish
an administration that will include significant
representation from the other two nationalist
groups.
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LEBANON: ARMY CALLED IN
Prime Minister Rashid Karami announced on
September 10 that he had called on the 17,000-
man Lebanese army to help stop fighting between
Christians and Muslims in the Tripoli area of
northern Lebanon. The violence, which began
last week with a dispute following an automobile
accident, came to involve several hundred
militiamen on each side and resulted in heavy
casualties and extensive property damage.
According to Karami's announcement, the
army will create and man a buffer zone between
Tripoli district, which is 78-percent Sunni Muslim,
and adjoining Zagharta district, which is 90-per-
cent Maronite Christian. The army will seek to
avoid being drawn into the fighting by staying out
of the metropolitan areas of Tripoli and Zagharta,
where security will remain the responsibility of
the Lebanese internal security forces. The army
will, Karami explained, "separate the combatants
if fighting breaks out again." In fact, the
fighting-although sharply reduced-has not yet
stopped, and army units are sure to suffer some
casualties while moving into position.
The heavy fighting this week did not spread
to Beirut-where the internal security forces
fought with radical Lebanese and fedayeen dur-
ing April, May, and June of this year-or to the
southern port cities of Tyre and Sidon. Security in
the southern ports was nevertheless threatened
by general strikes imposed by Palestinians
protesting the second Egyptian-Israeli interim
agreement. Although the strike was only partially
effective in Beirut, the capital was already jittery
from demonstrations by Palestinians and leftists
protesting actions of the security services in the
eastern Lebanese town of Zahlah, where intermit-
tent fighting between Christians and Muslims has
been going on since late last month.
This is the first time the army has been used
to help curb civil unrest in Lebanon since the
spring of 1973. At that time, the army's fight with
the fedayeen brought Syria to the verge of mov-
ing troops into Lebanon and led to a prolonged
government crisis in Lebanon. Deployment of the
army this time was made possible by the fact that
the major Palestinian groups were not involved in
the fighting. Their willingness to stay on the
sidelines paved the way for a compromise
between Karami, a Muslim who opposed using
the predominantly Christian-officered army, and
President Franjiyah and Interior Minister Shamun,
Christians who demanded that the army be
brought in.
Under the compromise, army commander
Iskandar Ghanim, a Christian supporter of Fran-
jiyah, was replaced by Hanna Said, formerly com-
mander of a military region in eastern Lebanon.
Said, like Ghanim, is a Maronite Christian, but he
has generally supported centrist Christian and
Muslim politicians who over the years have been
at odds with the more conservative Franjiyah and
Interior Minister Shamun. His is therefore
something of a compromise appointment.
Karami announced that the cabinet had
decided to use the army only after having made
"contacts with the disputing parties. The Muslim
and Christian factions that have been fighting in
the Tripoli area were probably receptive to such a
proposal. Both have suffered heavy casualties,
and-because they have not been resupplied by
the major fedayeen groups or the large Christian
militias-are short of ammunition.
According to the US embassy in Beirut,
Karami also sought the acquiescence of Palestine
Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat.
Some Palestinian and leftist Lebanese leaders
have already gone through the motions of con-
demning Karami, but none are likely to take up
arms against the army. Some have even
volunteered statements indirectly supporting his
action. Zuhayr Muhsin, head of the Syrian-con-
trolled Saiga group and the PLO military depart-
ment, said on September 11 that the Palestinians
regard use of the army in northern Lebanon as a
"domestic decision" for Lebanon and will not op-
pose it.
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President Rodriguez returns to the National Palace following coup attempt
ECUADOR: ADJUSTING TO REALITIES
President Rodriguez has made a series of per-
sonnel changes in the military government, as
well as in the armed forces high command, in the
wake of last week's attempted coup. The number
of army officers in the 11-member cabinet has
been increased from five to seven and air force
representation has gone from one to two. The
support of the air force and all but two small army
units was instrumental in Rodriguez' quick victory
over the rebels. Only two civilians remain in the
cabinet, and the navy, which remained neutral,
has lost its one position.
The ministerial changes are not altogether a
matter of rewarding the faithful. The new minister
of government, General Ruben Dario Ayala, was a
key troop commander at the time of the coup
attempt. He made his loyalty to Rodriguez con-
tingent on the President's becoming less of a
left-leaning authoritarian, particularly on
economic issues. Ayala was relieved of his troop
command and after a "decent" interval,
Rodriguez will probably move him further from
the sources of power, perhaps posting him
abroad as an attache.
The political conservatism of the new cabinet
members and service chiefs strongly suggests that
Rodriguez will back away from his most con-
troversial economic policies.
Instead of relying on these unpopular
measures to stem the steady outflow of foreign
exchange, the government will seek to increase
revenues by raising the volume of its petroleum
exports. It has already begun to curry favor with
international oil companies by eliminating all im-
port duties on materials and equipment used for
oil exploration and exploitation. In addition,
Quito reportedly will try to revive the foreign oil
companies' flagging interest in exploration in
Ecuador by offering attractive service contracts.
President Rodriguez is weathering the after-
math-of the ouster attempt almost as smoothly as
he weathered the attempt itself. This period is
clearly a turning point in his tenure, however, and
his cabinet and other advisers are certain to play a
greater role in the policy - making
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CUBA: COUNTERWEIGHT TO DETENTE
Cuban President Dorticos' address on Mon-
day to the closing session of the Puerto Rican
solidarity conference indicates that Havana plans
to continue to press the Puerto Rican in-
dependence issue even at the risk of slowing the
process of accommodation with the US. It is clear
from the way that Havana handled the con-
ference, however, that the Cubans do not want
the Puerto Rican issue to stop the detente process
altogether.
Dorticos, speaking at a rural secondary
school named for a Puerto Rican leftist, rejected
the concept of Puerto Rico's status being a US in-
ternal matter. He promised "on behalf of the
Cuban people, their communist party, and the
Cuban Revolutionary Government" to provide
"unlimited support" for the Puerto Rican cause.
"Unlimited support," however, is not likely to in-
clude-at least for the time being-paramilitary
assistance.
Dorticos also pledged to continue activity in
the United Nations in behalf of Puerto Rico's in-
dependence and indicated that the international
propaganda campaign Cuba is conducting will
grow rather than wane. Dorticos' comments are
the strongest yet by a high government official
and indicate that the Castro regime's determina-
tion to press the issue cannot easily be overcome.
The speech can be taken as a direct response to
Washington's strong diplomatic representations
to various governments prior to the UN
Decolonization Committee's vote on the Puerto
Rico resolution.
The Cuban leadership apparently believes its
pursuit of detente with the US requires a parallel
effort to re-emphasize its commitment to
revolutionary, anti-imperialist principles. The
Puerto Rican issue fills this need and also serves as
a substitute for those fading issues-such as Viet-
nam and the US embargo-long used by Havana
to maintain an aura of confrontation in Cuban-US
relations. There are signs of opposition within the
Cuban revolutionary ranks to any modification of
Havana's anti-US stance, and this domestic
pressure must be dealt with while Castro pursues
the longer range goal of an accommodation with
the US. Castro therefore is likely to persist in his
Puerto Rican independence campaign even
though he has been warned that it could slow the
process of reconciliation.
There is circumstantial evidence that Castro
made some effort to limit the impact of the Puerto
Rican campaign on the detente process: he had a
quasi-governmental organization rather than the
Foreign Ministry prepare for and conduct the
solidarity conference. In what appears to have
been a deliberate effort to ensure that the con-
ference was not spotlighted in the US, he limited
US media coverage and even canceled the
scheduled visit by a US television network cor-
respondent. In addition, he chose to have Dor-
ticos make the speech, although he himself was
present and could easily have delivered it. Castro
can thus portray himself as not wedded personally
to the Puerto Rican issue and may even argue that
his government is involved only peripherally. He
probably believes that Dorticos, who appears
destined to cede the presidency to Castro follow-
ing the first party congress this December, is ex-
pendable and therefore a good candidate to
deliver the strong address that he believed cir-
cumstances called for on Monday.
The solidarity conference itself failed to live
up to its advance billing, judging from its final
declaration. Aside from the expected progaganda
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hold another conference within three
years.
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PERU: THE SECOND STAGE BEGINS
President Morales Bermudez' steps to loosen
the restraints on civil liberties that were imposed
under former President Velasco have created an
air of expectancy in Lima. Traditional political par-
ties are cautiously hopeful that they will be allow-
ed to engage in open and perhaps unfettered ac-
tivity. Another beneficiary of the new openness is
the Peruvian navy, which felt humiliated and
powerless under Velasco. Its leaders are now
sanguine about an expansion of its role in govern-
ment affairs as a result of the new President's in-
creased willingness to consult naval officers on
matters affecting that service.
Despite the auspicious start of what Morales
Bermudez has called the "second stage" of the
Peruvian revolution, there remains some uncer-
tainty regarding the future course of the regime.
Various groups tend to view Morales Bermudez in
the light most favorable to their interests, ap-
parently reflecting the general lack of insight into
the President's real political views, a degree of
wishful thinking, and perhaps a propensity to
read too much into the reform measures an-
nounced already.
Morales Bermudez probably intends to allow
more press freedom and political discourse as
part of his effort to increase the popularity and ef-
ficiency of the military government. These moves
in large part are expected to be implemented
without discriminating against one group or
another. At the same time, however, the regime
will be careful to ensure that the process does not
develop too rapidly or without careful monitor-
ing. Morales Bermudez is likely to pay closest
attention to the activities of communists and
other more radical groups. He also reportedly
remains wary of several previously pro-Velasco
generals who, because of their seniority and sup-
port, remain in high government and military
posts. These indications suggest that, despite
Morales Bermudez' nearly complete military sup-
port, undercurrents of distrust and political rivalry
are likely to continue to influence government
policies. For the time being, at least, we believe
that such facoors are of only minimal significance.
Relations with the US show signs of im-
proving, particularly since Morales Bermudez
appears firmly committed to reaching an
amicable settlement on the problem created by
the Marcona expropriation. Any agreement,
however, is likely to be couched in terms that will
avoid the appearance of Lima's suddenly "caving
in" to pressure from Washington.
Other economic policies may be announced
later this month after the new team headed by
civilian Economy Minister Barua has assessed the
country's situation. One measure apparently un-
der c onsideration is a currency
devaluation.
ARGENTINA: COUNTERTERRORISM
Responding to an unprecedented upsurge in
left-wing violence and kidnapings, President
Maria Estela Peron has formally outlawed the
Montonero guerrillas as the first step in what may
become a major offensive against all Argentine
terrorists.
The Montoneros supported the return of
Juan Peron from exile in 1973, but declared "war"
against his widow in September 1974. Her govern-
ment had avoided taking official action against
them for fear of further antagonizing liberal
Peronists who, while not necessarily agreeing
with the Montoneros, were being alienated by
the administration's conservative policies.
Because of their position and strength the Mon-
toneros have played an effective political role
through agitation within the Peronist labor move-
ment and have even fielded candidates under the
banner of the "Authentic Party" in a recent
provincial election.
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The government's decision gives security forces
greater freedom of action in counterinsurgency
operations. Until now, sympathetic newspapers
and broadcasting stations could force the release
of Montonero guerrillas held without charge,
simply by publicizing their names. Such actions in
behalf of outlawed groups are forbidden under
current censorship restrictions.
Other measures are likely to be announced
soon. The new army commander, General Jorge
Videla, has told newsmen that the army's an-
ti-guerrilla operations in Tucuman
Province-where the principal opponent has
been the People's Revolutionary Army-could be
extended throughout the country "if the cir-
cumstances warranted it." He added that a federal
organization might be formed to coordinate the
actions of all the security forces.
The Montoneros and the People's
PANAMA: TALKS STIR OPTIMISM
US Ambassador Bunker's arrival in Panama
City on September 7 for another round of trea-
ty talks has stirred considerable optimism
among Panamanian officials. Recent visits by
US Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, JCS
chairman General Brown, and Assistant
Secretary of State Rogers, and the widely
publicized reports of State Department and
Pentagon agreement on a negotiating position
have also buoyed Panamanian hopes. Torrijos
has stated his belief that the US now favors a
"satisfactory arrangement" on the canal-an
arrangement he characterizes as "the one that
Panama is seeking." If the current round of
negotiations should result in little progress, dis-
appointment would be high.
Panamanian government officials and the
press continue to emphasize, however, the
Panamanian position that a new treaty's dura-
tion cannot extend beyond the end of the cen-
tury, that no more than 3 military bases (there
are presently 14) should be allowed, and that
far greater tracts of land and water must be
handed back than the US has offered. Such
Revolutionary Army hope to goad the armed
forces leaders into ousting Peron's civilian
government, which they regard as insufficiently
radical. The expected popular revulsion against
military administration, they believe, would vir-
tually assure a left-wing political victory once
elections were held. In pursuit of this long range
goal, the guerrillas have been focusing their
terrorist attacks on all branches of the armed
forces.
Argentine society cannot long endure the
twin assaults of economic deterioration and
mounting violence, which feed on each other and
in time could bring about the political polariza-
tion the extremists seek. Recent statements by
military leaders strongly indicate that they have
decided to support the government in the in-
itiative against the terrorists rather than allow the
public statements will make it difficult for the
Panamanians to compromise on these issues
and avoid domestic charges of a sellout.
The release last week by a small, ul-
tranationalist student group of what it claims
are secret government documents revealing in-
itial US-Panamanian conceptual agreements on
defense, administration, and jurisdiction in the
Canal Zone may further complicate the
negotiations. The student group claims that the
accords reflect US rather than Panamanian
aspirations and has demanded that the govern-
ment denounce them. A nationalistic, an-
ti-government radio station has aired similar
charges. According to the station, however,
chief Panamanian negotiator Tack has stated
that the documents are not official and do not
reflect the topics under discussion. No other
media outlet has commented on the
documents. Whether true or false, however,
the charges are increasing pressure on the
government to toughen its neogitating
stance.
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CHINA: NEW SIGNS OF STRAIN
After year-long calls for unity and stability,
China's leaders have shown in recent weeks that
their own internecine battles are far from over. In
late August, criticism of the ancient novel "Water
Margin," known to be a favorite of Mao, sudden-
ly emerged on the scene and raised some highly
contentious issues.
Among these is the need to "oppose the
emperor," a common theme of several articles
which began on August 23. The emperor figure
has been used in Chinese propaganda for the last
two years as a surrogate for Mao, and the call to
oppose the emperor has very likely been read in
China as criticism of the Chairman. Reinforcing
this notion is a remarkable passage in a People's
Daily article that forcefully states it is necessary to
"oppose the emperor" in order to save the
revolution. In addition, an article in China's sec-
ond leading newspaper made an unmistakable
defense of Marshal Lin Piao, who fell after
allegedly attempting a coup against Mao. Using
historical analogy, the article praised a marshal for
attempting to seize the imperial throne by force
and called this person a hero for defying the
emperor. Lin Piao is the only one of China's ten
marshals ever accused of trying to unseat Mao.
4, nearly two weeks after the literary criticism
began, seemed to turn the debate around. For the
first time, Mao himself was credited with
launching the criticism, and the major theme was
not opposition to the emperor but national
"capitulation," specifically capitulation to the
An editorial in People's Daily on September
The national capitulation theme seems aimed
at some elements in the military who were ac-
cused in last year's anti-Confucius propaganda of
advocating a less hostile attitude toward Moscow.
Mao himself has seemed genuinely concerned
that a change in China's policy toward the Soviet
Union will occur after his death unless those ad-
vocating any change are purged. To this end, he
has apparently pushed strongly for a purge within
the military despite the destabilizing effects of
such a move. Nevertheless, his apparently persist-
ent efforts to remove important military men
from office have thus far not been successful.
It seems likely that Mao is using the "Water
Margin" debate, whether or not he initiated it, as
another move against his elusive military targets.
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SECRET Now
If so, the articles calling for opposition to the
emperor may have been efforts by the military to
stave off another onslaught from the Chairman.
The literary debate seems to have toned
down since the publication of the People's Daily
editorial. The editorial called for unity, relegated
the criticism to a "discussion" movement, and
generally appeared to be an effort to damp down
the potentially explosive repercussions of the
literary criticism.
The national media have had little to say since
the editorial was published, and the response in
the provinces has been slow and relatively
low-key. Clearly, some in the leadership do not
want to see the "Water Margin" criticism develop
into a full scale national campaign, with its im-
plications for continued factional strife and
general unrest.
LAOS: ENTER THE SOVIETS
The Soviet presence in Laos has been steadily
increasing since the departure of most Americans
in late May. The Soviets have been careful not to
reveal the size of their mission, but it is estimated
at 300 to 500 people, a substantial increase from
the 75 to 100 before the US exodus.
Soviet personnel have been helping to im-
prove and operate airfields and flying and main-
taining transport aircraft for the Pathet Lao. Late
last month, a seven-man Soviet economic
assistance team and several construction experts
arrived to begin work on projects covered in an
assistance pact signed in December. There will be
a further substantial increase in Soviet personnel
when the Soviets start full-scale work on these
projects.
The Lao communist decision to increase the
Soviet presence may reflect a desire to strike a
new balance in relations with Moscow and Pe-
king. Until a few months ago, the Soviets had few
direct dealings with the Lao communists. Moscow
worked exclusively through Hanoi; all Soviet
military aid was sent through the North Viet-
namese; and no Soviet personnel were stationed
in the communist-controlled parts of Laos.
The Chinese, in contrast, have dealt directly
with the Lao communists for years, although Pe-
king did not seek to challenge Hanoi's
pre-eminence. Peking provided some direct arms
assistance, launched a major road-building
program, which is still under way, and sent more
than 20,000 troops to northwest Laos.
The Lao remain under the tutelage of the
North Vietnamese, and any shift toward the
Soviets would almost certainly reflect a decision
taken in Hanoi. The Vietnamese may have en-
couraged the Lao to move closer to Moscow for
fear the Chinese would seek to fill the void left by
the departure of the Americans and by the end of
US assistance. The Chinese, because of
geographical proximity and to a lesser extent
because of long-standing contacts with Lao
leaders, would be more of a threat than the
Soviets in any competition with the North Viet-
namese for influence in Laos.
The Chinese presumably are unhappy that
they have been confined to the relatively remote
northwest while the Soviets are active throughout
the rest of the country. Given the Pathet Lao's
dependence on North Vietnamese guidance,
however, there appears little Peking can do to
prevent a more substantial Soviet
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CAMBODIA
Cambodian "head of state" Prince Sihanouk,
accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Khieu
Samphan, returned to Cambodia on September 9.
He received a warm reception in Phnom Penh;
Deputy Prime Minister Son Sen delivered the
welcoming address. Among those greeting
Sihanouk were Information and Propaganda
Minister Hu Nim (in his first reported public
appearance since the communist take-over),
"other ministers and deputy ministers," represen-
tatives of the Buddhist clergy, army, National
United Front cadre, worker groups, mass
organizations, and a "vast" crowd.
Prime Minister Penn Nouth, the ailing Sihanouk
loyalist and noncommunist, also returned to
Phnom Penh. With the presence of both the chief
of state and prime minister in Cambodia, little
remains of the Royal Government of National
Union in Peking. The members of Sihanouk's en-
tourage who stayed in China are reportedly
attempting to obtain exit visas for France and
other countries, but the Chinese have not yet
given them permission to leave and are taking the
position that this is a matter for the Cambodian
government to decide.
Sihanouk's stay in Phnom Penh will apparently
be short, however, since he is to return to China
to attend the National Day celebrations on Oc-
tober 1. The Prince reportedly will address the
United Nations General Assembly in early Oc-
tober, go on to Pyongyang for the anniversary of
the Korean Workers Party on October 10, and
return to Peking to celebrate his birthday on Oc-
tober 31.
The Khmer communists have been trying to
entice Sihanouk to return to Cambodia for some
time. The invitation given the Prince in mid-July
when he was in Pyongyang was reportedly not the
first he had received since the communist
take-over last April. Although Sihanouk has
dutifully performed his ceremonial duties since
Sihanouk bids farewell to Teng Hsiao-ping
at Peking airport
the take-over, the Cambodian leadership clearly
wants to end the residence abroad of their "head
of state," and gain more control over his actions.
The Khmer communists are beginning to
welcome some Asian communist diplomats in
Phnom Penh. The Chinese news agency an-
nounced Tuesday that Chinese ambassador to
Cambodia Sun Hao had departed for Phnom
Penh to take up his duties. The Chinese envoy is
the first foreign ambassador to be allowed back in
Phnom Penh since the communist take-over, and
his presence may signal the arrival of other am-
bassadors from Cambodia's communist neighbors
in the relatively near future.
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BURMA: FOCUS ON FOREIGN POLICY
Rangoon is increasing diplomatic activity
partly in reaction to communist victories in In-
dochina, but also to attract more aid. Burma was
one of the first countries to announce recognition
of the new regime in Phnom Penh, and it is open-
ing a new ambassadorial-level post in Hanoi.
Foreign Minister HIa Phone visited Laos last
month and joined in a statement welcoming the
"admirably changed situation in Indochina."
Burma's somewhat higher diplomatic profile
is also reflected in the decision to abandon its
long-standing policy of abstaining on major con-
troversial issues at the UN.
Burma's most pressing foreign concern has
been over Chinese support for the Burmese com-
munist insurgency. The Ne Win government has
appeared more relaxed and confident about this
issue in the past year, but Foreign Minister HIa
Phone apparently raised the matter when he
visited Peking last month-the first high-level
Burmese visit to China since Ne Win was in Peking
in 1971. The Burmese may feel the time is ripe, in
view of Chinese reassurances on the same issue to
other Southeast Asian countries, to try to get
some commitment from Peking to reduce sup-
port for the insurgents. The Chinese are not like-
ly, however, to abandon the Burmese communists
entirely.
China undoubtedly has warned Burma about
Soviet intentions in Southeast Asia and hopes to
get the Burmese to sign the same kind of an-
ti-hegemony statement that Thailand, Malaysia,
and the Philippines have signed recently. The
Burmese, however, would be reluctant to make a
public declaration, so clearly aimed at Moscow.
Rangoon in fact is being careful to balance its
relations with the major powers and has recently
made some gestures to improve relations with the
Soviets, including a visit to Moscow by Deputy
Prime Minister U Lwin last June. Rangoon ex-
pressed some interest in the possibility of Soviet
military aid earlier this year, but apparently was
not satisfied with Moscow's response since the
Burmese have not followed up on the matter.
Despite their more receptive approach to
communist states, the Burmese are also showing
interest in better relations with the US and the
West. Their need for foreign aid has led to in-
creased participation in those international
bodies that deal with economic matters. As part of
a shake-up of diplomatic posts abroad, Rangoon
has replaced its incompetent ambassador in
Washington with a capable, professional foreign
service officer. In addition, the Burmese are
cooperating with the US on narcotics matters, and
are seeking additional aid for their anti-drug cam-
paign after obtaining some helicopters.
Despite the adjustments now under way in
Burmese policy, Rangoon's basic "go-it-alone"
foreign approach will remain unchanged. There
has been no sign of any warming in Burma's
traditionally cool relations with Thailand, and un-
like the other noncommunist countries of the
area, Burma does not appear interested in closer
regional ties as a means of protection against the
new communist regimes in Indochina. The
members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations have frequently tried to persuade Burma
to join, but Ran oon shows little si n of being in-
terested.
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