WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8
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S
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26
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December 21, 2016
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March 16, 2009
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1
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Publication Date: 
October 3, 1975
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SUMMARY
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25X1 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 o~ Iq~ Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied State Dept. review completed DIA review completed. Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Secret 25X1 /,~E~ucEH A z v 0 G,l~r~O STATES OF P~~~`GP Weekly Summary Secret No. 0040/75 October 3, 1975 Copy N2 5 4 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 CONTENTS (October.:?, 1975) The WEEKLY SUMMARY, Issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre- EUROPE 25X6 quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research. the Office of Strategic I Spain: Execution Aftermath Research, the Office of. Geographic and Cartographic 2 France: Defense S endin ; S ace Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. j?opic r requiring more comprehensive treatment and omania- ugoslavia: China Ties therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed 5 Austria: To the Polls 25X1 in the contents. MIDDLE EAST AFRICA 6 Lebanon: A Shaky Truce / India: External Matters Rhodesia: Nationalists Split 9 Ethiopia: Unrest Growing EAST ASIA PACIFIC 10 China-Vietnam: Signs of Coolness 10 Thailand: Musical Chairs 25X6 12 Cambodia: Diplomatic Activity 13 Timor: No Solution in Sight 1 I China: A Restrained National Day WESTERN HEMISPHERE III Brazil's Trade Initiative at the UN 14 Peru: Seventh Anniversary 1.6 Ecuador: Coup Plotting Continues 1 Argentina: Campora Returns 18 Chile: No Relaxation 25X6 .uba: Promotinq Puerto Rico 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET SPAIN: EXECUTION AFTERMATH The enthusiastic pro-Franco rallies staged in Madrid and the provincial capitals this week will reinforce the government's decision to stand firm in its campaign against terrorism in spite of vehe- ment criticism from abroad. The storm of foreign protest over the execution on September 27 of five terrorists for killing policemen constitutes a major setback, however, to Spain's effort to achieve closer political, economic, and military relations with its European neighbors. Franco's short speech at a rally in Madrid on Wednesday was drowned out by cheering crowds. The impressive attendance-estimated by the US embassy at over 200,000-reflects a patriotic backlash to foreign criticism. This out- burst of pro-Franco sentiment and the government's anti-terrorism campaign are likely to make more difficult the transition to a more open system in the post-Franco period. those West Europeans who see the Franco regime as the last remnant of fascism on the continent. East and West Europeans alike have voiced out- rage through official statements, withdrawal of ambassadors, mass demonstrations, and some violence. The governments of Western Europe are try- ing to limit the damage to their long-term relations with Spain, but moves to establish closer relations with the Franco regime are precluded for now. One of the first casualties will be the negotiations, scheduled to begin this month, to establish closer economic ties between Spain and the EC. In a televised speech to the nation on Tues- day night, Prime Minister Arias labeled Western criticism hypocritical and intolerable interference in Spanish affairs. In a further show of disdain for foreign sentiment, the government reportedly in- tends to bring to trial soon 15 more Basques, in- cluding the guerrilla leader accused of the assassination in 1973 of Premier Carrero Blanco. The few significant breaks in public order within Spain since the executions have been a fairly effective two-day general strike in the Bas- que provinces and the killing of four more policemen in terrorist attacks. Three of these ap- parently were well-coordinated attacks in Madrid. This brings to 16 the number of Spanish police killed by terrorists this year. The government's hope of reducing foreign reaction by sparing the lives of 6 of the 11 con- demned terrorists was dashed by the widespread and vehement protests. The executions of the other five loosed deeply felt emotions among SECRET K1 Paae 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 3. 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Roman demonstration against Spanish executions Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET 25X1 25X1 French President Giscard has come under sharp criticism for his government's allegedly weak efforts on behalf of the Spanish terrorists. The French Communist Party, seizing the oppor- tunity to pose as a defender of liberty after a long embarrassment over Portugal, has been extremely vitriolic and will do what it can to keep the issue alive. The Socialists have also protested vociferously, and even the center and right have been critical, although less inclined to blame Giscard personally. In the UK, leading government spokesmen have defended London's effort to obtain clemen- cy for the five terrorists. Union leader Jack Jones has called for a labor boycott of Spanish ships, air- craft, and trucks. Anti-Spanish sentiment has also surfaced at the UN. Delegates from Mexico and a number of East and West European countries boycotted a policy speech by the Spanish representative. The Security Council, however, rejected Mexican President Echeverria's request for an urgent Council session to consider suspending Spanish membership. FRANCE DEFENSE SPENDING propose de tense spending for next year will amount to 50 billion francs-the equivalent of about $11 billion dollars at current exchange rates. This is a 14-percent increase over this year's outlay for defense. The increase in real spending, however, will come to no more than 5 percent after inflation is taken into account. The National Assembly will debate the proposal this month. Defense Minister Bourges said earlier this year that France could not keep its forces at pre- sent levels and also put his reform program into effect unless the 1976 defense budget grew by at least 20 percent. President Giscard reportedly settled on 14 percent after he had heard from the minister of finance. Most of the budget increase probably will be used to cover the cost of pay raises and other personnel benefits ordered earlier this year to alleviate morale problems in the armed forces. Operating costs will absorb about 58 percent of the military budget, up 2 percent from 1975. This growing imbalance is causing problems on the capital expenditures side of the budget, and the government will have to re-evaluate its priorities for new military hardware. All branches of service will feel the effects. Even so, France has one of the most ambitious defense spending programs in Europe, and the percentage of spen- ding devoted to hardware purchases probably will still top that of many of France's neighbors. The nuclear programs will retain a most- favored status. Nearly one third of all equipment funds will go for these programs with more going to the strategic programs than the tactical ones. An increase in funds has also been authorized for France's Pacific nuclear test center, probably because of the higher cost of underground testing. The air force will order 33 of the new Fran- co-German Alpha Jet trainers for delivery begin- ning in 1978, and the tactical air forces will get 10 more Anglo-French Jaguar fighter-bombers. Budgeting for future aircraft programs will be kept to a minimum, and the fate of the next generation ACF fighter and a proposed long-range transport will remain in doubt. The navy will receive two new conventionally powered attack submarines, and construction on several new frigates and corvettes will continue. Money reportedly has been authorized to begin construction of France's first nuclear-powered at- tack submarine, and design work on a nuclear- powered helicopter carrier will continue. The navy will slow its purchases of Super Etendard at- tack aircraft and additional Exocet anti-ship mis- siles. Little information has been released on procurement plans for the ground forces. The army apparently will get some money for im- proved Hawk surface-to-air missiles. SECRET Dn.... 7 1A1CC1il v nl ,w w.. w n Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA~RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SPACE PROGRAM TAKES A BREAK The French successfully launched a scientific satellite into space last weekend, using a Diamant BP4 rocket fired from French Guiana. This marked the last of three shots using this improved version of the Diamant-B rocket. France will now concen- trate on developing the larger Ariane-an all European satellite launch vehicle. The Ariane launch vehicle is a cooperative program of the ten-nation European Space Agen- cy (ESA). The booster is based on the former French L-3S satellite launcher and will be capable of launching satellites of up to 1,650 pounds into a geosynchronous orbit, or a payload of 5,500 pounds into a low-earth orbit. France will take on almost two thirds of the development costs. West Germany will be the other major con- tributor-about 20 percent. The ending of the Diamant program and the development plans for the Ariane rocket have left the French base in Guiana without a planned satellite launching until the summer of 1979, when the Ariane is ready. Meanwhile, the rocket base will be maintained in a caretaker status. Ground testing of the assembled Ariane is not ex- pected for at least another two years. Civil engineering work at the construction site of the Ariane launch pad reportedly has begun and will take about two years to complete. The French will continue to pay at least two thirds of the operating costs of the facility when it reopens. The other members of ESA will con- tribute the balance. Because of this larger share, the range will remain French, and Paris will retain the right to use the facilities for purely national purposes. The French say that priority will be given to ESA projects. Many European political leaders have questioned the need for Europe to develop an in- dependent launch capability. Previous failures-most notably the Europa launcher program-have prompted them to ask whether Europe might be better advised to leave launcher development to the US and spend its money on spacecraft. Diamant BP4 The French Space Agency this year estimated that between 20 and 40 Ariane launchers could be required between 1980 and 1990, provided the European rocket could be offered at a com- petitive price. The French have long argued that Europe needs an independent launch capability. Although they recognize that the US probably will continue to offer launch vehicles that will cost much less than.the Ariane, they point out that the US has not been willing to provide launchers without restrictions on using them for orbiting either communications or military satellites. Although French military space projects ap-25X1 parently are still in early development, Paris has indicated an intent to launch satellites with military applications. 25X1 SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 3, 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET 25X6 SECRET ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA: CHINA TIES Ceausescu and Tito seem to be working together to expand their contacts with China and thus to counter what they regard as Moscow's "hegemonist" aspirations. An unprecedented number of high-level Romanian delegations-five at last count-went to China last month. They were led by such rank- ing officials as the party secretary for cadre affairs, the secretary for economics, the head of military intelligence, and a deputy defense minister. These visits-coming in the wake of fresh assaults on Peking by the Kremlin-underscore Romanian determination to resist any Soviet pressure to read the Chinese out of the inter- national communist movement. They also suggest a high degree of confidence that Ceausescu will be able to cope with the irritation that the visits are certain to cause in Moscow. 25X6 While the Romanians were in Peking, Belgrade was making the final arrangements for a long-delayed upgrading of its contacts with China. Premier Bijedic-the highest ranking Yugoslav ever to make an official trip to Peking--is scheduled to arrive on Monday for a six-day visit. Just prior to Bijedic's departure, his Roma- nian counterpart went to Belgrade to set up a mid-October meeting between Tito and 25X1 Ceausescu. Their talks will probably center on still further cooperation that could be read as a message of defiance in Moscow. 25X1 Paae 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY lrt 3 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET AUSTRIA: TO THE POLLS Austrians go to the polls on October 5 to determine whether Socialist Chancellor Bruno Kreisky will retain his mandate for another four years. The Socialists probably will obtain a plurali- ty, but Kreisky's hope to retain the majority he won in 1971 is in some doubt. If he narrowly mis- ses a majority, he may form a minority govern- ment, as he did in 1970, or co-opt selected members of other parties into a "government of experts." Although generally opposed to a coalition government, Kreisky may have to consider the possibility if the gap is more than a few seats short of a majority. The tiny Liberal Party would be his most likely partner and Kreisky probably would only consider a "grand coalition" with the People's Party as a last resort. The scarcity of issues has made for a dull cam- paign. With the possible exception of the economy and one or two regional questions, most talk has centered on personalities. The problem with the economy is that after nearly six years of boom, moderate inflation and marginal unemployment have begun to stir up discontent. The fuel crisis in 1973 marked the beginning of a gradual decline in economic growth rates. Although inflation is well below that of most industralized countries-Austria's rate was 8.3 percent in June-dissatisfaction among consumers is widespread. Unemployment is about 2 percent, also below the West European average, but one of the most debated issues in the campaign. Kreisky began an anti-inflationary stabiliza- tion program in 1972. He has emphasized that he will not create more unemployment in order to curtail inflation. The main thrust of the op- position's campaign, nevertheless, is the specter of greater joblessness. A few regional issues have played a small part in the campaign. Delay in completion of the country's south autobahn has annoyed Austrians and tourists alike, but the government probably will plead austerity on this issue. Kreisky's failure to provide bilingual road signs in Carinthia has alienated the Slavic minority in that state, but may win some support from the German-speaking majority there. No significant foreign policy elec- tion issues have surfaced. Kreisky's challenger is the chairman of the People's Party, 42-year-old Josef Taus, who was elected after the accidental death of Karl Schleinzer in July. Taus-a self-made man from a working class family-has general appeal and, un- like his predecessor, is on an intellectual par with Kreisky. 25X1 SECRET Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 3. 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Chancellor Kreisky Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET LEBANON: SHAKY TRUCE Fighting in Beirut between Christian and left- ist militias flared up again in midweek after several days of relative calm during which the cease-fire announced last week appeared to be finally taking hold. A collapse of the fragile truce would probably bring to a quick end the current reconciliation talks among the leaders of Lebanon's numerous competing factions. The latest fighting followed the shooting deaths on September 30 of eight people, at least three of whom were members of the Druze sect, in a Christian suburb of the capital. Progressive Socialist Party leader Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze, blamed the shooting on the Phalangists and demanded that the killers be turned over to the authorities. The Druze have in the past tended to side with the Shia Muslims. The 20-man national reconciliation com- mittee under the leadership of Prime Minster Karami has thus far focused largely on security issues. Agreements were reached early in the week to remove barricades and end sniping and kidnaping. After the incidents on October 1, however, barricades went back up in many areas and a number of people were kidnaped. SECRET D, .,o 1A/Cr-VI V ci 1K AkA A n\J n,.4 .~ 7G Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Destruction in downtown Beirut Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 Problems raised by the make-up of the com- mittee, which includes 10 Muslims and 10 Christians, could complicate the talks. Conser- vative Shia Muslims and some Christians claim they are underrepresented. The leftists, however, are opposed to any attempt to increase the com- mittee's membership. The committee has put aside, at least temporarily, the troublesome ques- tion of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, which had been raised by Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil. Christians, Muslims, and Palestinians are almost certainly all engaged in re-equipping and rearming their forces. The more moderate fedayeen organizations as well as the Shias and the pro-Syrian Baath Party of Lebanon probably have been receiving arms and ammunition from Syria. The US embassy in Beirut reports that sub- stantial damage has been done to the capital dur- ing the latest round of fighting. The damage to the commercial and industrial areas alone is es- timated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The middle class, made up of shopkeepers and other self-employed businessmen, has been particularly hard hit. About one quarter of this group is said to be on the verge of destitution. The embassy now estimates that since the fighting broke out in late August at least 500 persons have died. INDIA: EXTERNAL MATTERS The military-led coup in Bangladesh in August was a distinct setback for India, costing New Delhi the strong influence it had exerted in Dacca since Bangladesh became independent in 1971. It now appears Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government may be unwilling to stand idly by while the new regime in Dacca seeks to balance its foreign relations and establish ties with India's adversaries, China and Pakistan. The desire of Bangladesh's new leaders for a more balanced foreign policy is clearly viewed with suspicion by New Delhi. The Indians see ear- ly recognition of the new regime by Pakistan and China as part of a scheme aimed at introducing an element of uncertainty for India on its eastern flank. Dacca is aware of New Delhi's distrust and has tried to reassure the Indians that the In- do-Bangladesh friendship treaty, signed in 1972, is still a cornerstone of Bangladesh's foreign rela- tions. Developments in Bangladesh probably have also contributed to a downward trend in In- do-Pakistani relations. Two sets of bilateral negotiations-one related to the design of an In- dian dam that will affect Pakistan's water supply and another on the restoration of civil air flights-are now deadlocked. Additionally, the in- termittent propaganda war between New Delhi and Islamabad has heated up, and the two coun- tries are engaged in a bitter contest for a two-year term on the UN Security Council. In contrast, Indo-US relations could be on the upswing. On October 6-7, Foreign Minister Chavan will be in Washington to inaugurate a bilateral commission aimed at expanding relations in the fields of economic, commercial, educational, cultural, scientific, and technological affairs. Gandhi's bid for closer relations presumably is motivated largely by the economic incentive for increased US aid and trade, but also by a desire to demonstrate that India remains a nonaligned state despite its strong ties with the USSR. Nonetheless, Gandhi's basic suspicion of US intentions and activities abroad and her sen-25X1 sitivity to Western criticism of her authoritarian rule stand in the way of a truly harmonious relationship. SECRET Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 3, 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET RHODESIA: NATIONALISTS SPLIT Rivalry among factional leaders of the Rhodesian African National Council, the umbrella organization formed by four black nationalist groups last year, has pulled the council apart. A national congress in Salisbury last weekend elected Joshua Nkomo, a moderate who favors negotiating a settlement with Prime Minister Ian Smith's white regime, to the council presidency. Other council leaders condemned the national congress as illegal and scheduled a rival congress for October 19. Nkomo's election by several thousand delegates who convened in the Rhodesian capital lends some support to his claim that his faction controls a majority of the council's local branches inside Rhodesia. Nkomo faces bitter opposition, however, from Ndabaningi Sithole, the militant leader of an important rival faction that has long wanted to scrap settlement talks and resume all-out guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa, who was installed as a compromise figurehead president of the council when it was formed in December 1974, also vehemently op- poses Nkomo's bid for leadership. Although Muzorewa has advocated a negotiated settle- ment, his breach with Nkomo has sealed his dependence on Sithole and the other militant ex- iles. Last month Muzorewa expelled Nkomo from the council for setting up the recent congress over Muzorewa's objections. The presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Botswana, who have been trying to unify the council for talks with Smith, subsequently met with the Rhodesian nationalists in Lusaka, but were unable to heal the rift. The reaction of the four presidents to Nkomo's election is not yet known, but it will be a critical test of their cohesion. There have been in- dications that Zambia's Kaunda, who does not want new fighting, in Rhodesia because it would intensify his country's economic problems, and perhaps President Khama of Botswana, might accept Nkomo. It is doubtful, however, that Kaunda and Kharna could persuade Tanzanian President Nyerere and Mozambique's Machel, who have had closer ties with Sithole's faction, to go along. At this point:,, the four presidents probably have no firm ideas about how to proceed. They SECRET n--- a %A/CCIVI V QI MAIAAOV n,+ '2 7G Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Ndabaningi Sithole Bishop Muzorewa Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET 25X1 may await the results of the rival congress before committing themselves to new courses of ac- tion. ETHIOPIA: UNREST GROWING Faced with strikes by disgruntled workers, the ruling military council this week issued a tough state of emergency declaration in Addis Ababa. The coercive tactics forced most of the strikers to resume work, but the council has apparently widened the breach between it and influential leftist union elements. Meanwhile, insurrections led by conservative landlords are posing an in- creasingly serious threat to the council's control of the northern provinces. Labor leaders for some time have been dis- satisfied with military rule and the council's failure to satisfy specific labor grievances. On September 22, the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions, the country's central labor organization, adopted a resolution threatening a general strike unless power was returned to civilian hands within a month. The resolution also said workers would strike if any confederation leaders were arrested or if the council attempted to interfere with distribution of the resolution, which is highly critical of the military leadership. Late last week at least seven workers were killed and 19 wounded in a clash with security forces who were attempting to arrest airline employees for distributing copies of the labor resolution. In a separate incident, the council also arrested about 30 teachers for distributing an- ti-regime leaflets. In response, workers in Addis Ababa began leaving their jobs, but the council's crackdown prevented a general strike. The sweeping emergency proclamation, issued on September 3.0, permits the arrest of all strikers who do not return to work, the search of homes without warrants, and the detention of individuals for an unlimited period without charges. During the past several weeks insurgent ac- tivity in Wollo, Tigre, Begemdir, and Gojjam provinces has grown markedly. Conservative peasants appear to be cooperating with traditional leaders in carrying out increasingly better organized operations against government security forces. The insurgents recently killed the chief administrator and three other officials of Begemdir Province and also forced the evacua- tion of Chinese road builders. Last month the council airlifted troop reinforcements to the area from the Ogaden, the region adjoining Somalia. 25X1 Begemdir and Tigre are the home provinces, respectively, of former general Nega Tegegne and Ras Mengesha Seyoum, two important tribal leaders. They fled Ethiopia last year and have con- tacted other former officials about planning a resistance movement. Some of the recent dissi- dent activity was almost certainly carried out by their followers. The US embassy, in fact, recently received information that Ras Men esha has returned to Tigre. Port SAUDI ARABIA Sudan; SUDAN - .~ NORTH YEMEN- _ - Khartoo o *Sana BEGEM- TIGRE DIR *Aden , o* )0-1 , I- WO[LO ' .' T.A.i. ,,,, . i Djibouti GOJJAM - `? ~Berbera s - Addis Ababa, . ': ETHIOP IA ' GGADE~/ P' gP f l J ya il,d;or U GA N D A f'ru_ ~/1 * Mogadiscio Kapala K E N Y A _ *Nairobi TANZANIA rn i~ss 9,8@03 10 75 SECRET Paae 9 WEFKI Y.1;1 IMMARY (-+'1 79 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET CHINA-VIETNAM: SIGNS OF COOLNESS A North Vietnamese delegation, led by party chief Le Duan, apparently ran into heavy sledding in talks with its Chinese hosts during a visit to Pe- king last week. Although agreements were signed on trade and the provision of an interest-free loan to Hanoi, signs of coolness between the two sides were evident throughout the visit. Chinese press coverage was less enthusiastic than it was during Le Duan's last visit in 1973, and the speeches on both sides reflected differences of view-notably regarding Moscow's role in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Most significantly, no joint com- munique was issued at the end of the visit, and the North Vietnamese failed to host a reciprocal banquet for the Chinese. The reference to an interest-free loan in the economic agreement is itself new and suggests that Peking no longer feels an obligation to provide Hanoi with non-refundable aid. This con- trasts sharply with Peking's attitude toward the new communist regime in Cambodia, to which the Chinese only two months ago agreed to provide grant aid. The question of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea may also have upset the discussions in Peking. Just prior to the delegation's departure for Peking, two Chinese broadcasts to Vietnam underscored Peking's claims to both island groups. 25X1 Le Duan returned to Hanoi after the China trip, and a few days later departed for Eastern Europe. The Soviets will surely try to take advantage 25X1 of current Hanoi-Peking differences to improve their own influence in Hanoi and will offer at least matching economic assistance. 25X1 THAILAND: MUSICAL CHAIRS The desire of newly retired army commander Krit Siwara to remain a power in Bangkok by assuming a high-level cabinet post has created serious strains in the Khukrit coalition govern- ment. It seems likely that General Krit's political ambitions will force Prime-Minister Khukrit to shuffle his cabinet and possibly realign the ruling coalition as well. Krit is lobbying for the defense portfolio. He sees the position as a means of retaining his in- SECRET Parry 1 n WFFKI Y .41 IMMARY Ort 3. 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Le Duan and Chairman Mao during recent meeting Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET fluence in the army, protecting his considerable financial interests, and furthering his political am- bitions. Krit's plans, however, have run into a serious snag. The current defense minister, Praman Adireksan, has made it clear that he is not prepared to step aside to make room for Krit. Prime Minister Khukrit is in a difficult situa- tion, because he cannot afford to alienate either Krit or Praman. Krit was instrumental in bringing together the various conservative factions in sup- port of Khukrit last April. Praman, on the other hand, heads the Thai Nation Party, the third largest in the National Assembly and a key member of the coalition. He is threatening to pull his party out of the government if Krit is given the defense portfolio. Khukrit has announced that he will not shuf- fle his cabinet until the budget bill is passed by the National Assembly; this should take place within the next two weeks. By postponing choos- ing between Praman and Krit, Khukrit probably hopes each will use his considerable influence in the National Assembly to ensure passage of the budget. If Praman does thwart Krit's desire to become defense minister, Khukrit's most likely option would be to offer Krit another cabinet post. While it is possible that the Krit-Praman clash could bring down the governing coalition, Khukrit would almost certainly come out on top of any new coalition to emerge from the National Assembly. 25X1 25X6 25X6 SECRET Paqe 11 WEEK[ Y SUMMARY C)-+ *Q 7r Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET CAMBODIA: DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY 'The communist regime in Phnom Penh has stepped up its diplomatic activity recently in an apparent effort to broaden its international con- tacts. France Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs leng Sary told newsmen in Paris in mid-September that he wanted to normalize Cambodian-French relations "in the near future" and that Paris could play an important role in Cambodia. Although the French are still miffed over the treatment their people received when the communists took over Phnom Penh, they are nevertheless eager to re-establish their presence in Cambodia. The French intend to treat Prince Sihanouk cordially when he stops in Paris early this month on his way to New York to address the UN, and talks on re-establishing relations could well be in the offing. The Cambodians probably regard France as a potential aid donor. Thailand There has also been progress in the develop- ment of Cambodian-Thai relations. Officials of the two countries have held meetings in New York, and the Thai foreign minister announced recently that a high-level Cambodian of- ficial-either Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak or possibly leng Sary-had agreed to visit Bangkok, probably in late October. Topics on the agenda will include the establishment of diplomatic relations, trade, and probably border security problems, and the status of Cambodian refugees in Thailand' as well. Special Friends The North Vietnamese ambassador to Cam- bodia arrived in Phnom Penh on September 19. The Chinese ambassador arrived earlier in the month. There are also signs that Phnom Penh may receive other envoys from friendly communist and nonaligned countries. Diplomatic sources in Peking have claimed that Cambodia will allow the opening of ten embassies in the capital by the end of the year. The others: Yugoslavia, Egypt, North Korea, Algeria, Albania, Romania, Mauritania, and Laos. USSR The Cambodians will proceed carefully in working out new relationships with Moscow. Ties between the USSR and the Khmer communists have been strained and tenuous, as indicated by Moscow's refusal to break relations with the Lon Nol government until the last days of the war. Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan and Sihanouk met with Soviet representatives in Hanoi in early September, but there has been no indication that the dialogue will be continued soon. Other Moves The Cambodian embassy in Peking has also begun to acknowledge earlier recognition of the Khmer communist regime by several non-com- munist countries.. Letters have been sent thanking the governments of Australia, Japan, and other non-communist Asians. Although the Japanese consider that relations have been re-established, they are proceeding cautiously and have no near-term plans to follow up on Phnom Penh's response on recognition. The establishment of Cambodian-Mexican relations at the am- bassadorial level was also recently announced, following a brief visit by leng Sary to Mexico City in mid-September. Despite the appearance of a more forthcoming Cambodian attitude, it will probably be some time before ambassadors from non-communist countries are permitted to reside in Phnom Penh. The Khmer communists are highly suspicious of "foreign" influence and do not want non-communist diplomats in Phnom Penh at this earl stage reporting on conditions in the country. SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET TIMOR: NO SOLUTION IN SIGHT The impasse over Portuguese Timor con- tinues. The new Portuguese government says it is ready for talks that would lead to an incorpora- tion of Timor into Indonesia, and President Suhar- to has again agreed to sound out the Portuguese. The Indonesians remain skeptical of Portugal's motives, however, and have little hope that any settlement will emerge. The radical Fretilin party, whose forces now control most of Portuguese Timor, is adamantly opposed to even participating in any talks that in- clude its local rivals. Fretilin asserts that its de fac- to control of the territory entitles it to represent all Timorese in any discussions about the territory's future. The pro-Indonesia forces, even with the aid of Indonesian special forces units, apparently have been no match for Fretilin's troops. For the short term, Fretilin has the upper hand and may soon decide to announce Portuguese Timor's in- dependence. Suharto, for his part, is still standing firm against the desires of the Indonesian military to send large numbers of Jakarta's troops into Por- tuguese Timor. 25X1 CHINA: A RESTRAINED NATIONAL DAY National Day ceremonies this year were more subdued than usual. For the first time in four years, there was no authoritative editorial in Peking's major publications, and the festivities were marred by the absence of ailing Premier Chou En-lai. Most national leaders were on hand for 'a reception given in Chou's name on September 30 and for parties in Peking's parks the follow- ing day. Young party Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen appeared in his home town ' of Shanghai. He reportedly has been in neighbor- ing Chekiang Province to oversee efforts to restore order there. Senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping,' who served as host at the reception, emphasized unity, stability, and economic progress inn his toast. He made no reference to the current dis- cussion of the ancient Chinese novel Water Margin, suggesting that study of the novel is not intended to become a major political cam- paign. The large turnout at the reception reveal ed some new appointees to the national military hierarchy. Former, chief of staff Lo Jui-thing, who was rehabilitated without an of- ficial post two months ago, has apparently join- ed the national military apparatus. Another rehabilitated official_with close ties to Teng has also gained a central military post, reflecting Teng's.; continuing' efforts to consolidate his power in the military. In addition, several, military men who until recently were serving in the provinces have apparently been named to positions in the national rrtilitary structure. Several former cultural and: propaganda officials made their first public appearance since the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s These were second-echelon bureaucrats, but their rehabilitation adds weight to reports that leading cultural figures of the past, who were 25X1 among the earliest victims of the Cultural Revolution, have been reinstated to part ` ositions in ding. 25X1 SECRET Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY .,,..& 0 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET BRAZIL'S TRADE INITIATIVE AT UN Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira is continuing efforts to focus world attention on his proposal to reform trade relations between the developed and less-developed nations. During the past month, Silveira has made two speeches to the UN General Assembly recommending that a new framework be es- tablished for conducting bilateral negotiations. Silveira argues that there is a growing need to give less-developed countries effective access to in- dustrial markets and at the same time guarantee developed nations adequate supplies of raw materials. Although his initiative has been moderate in tone-apparently designed to por- tray Brazil as a constructive spokesman for the less-developed countries-it constitutes a marked departure from the low profile Brazil usually maintains in international forums. There is reason to believe that Silveira is largely representing his own views and not necessarily those of the Brazilian government. During his assignment as head of Brazil's delega- tion to the UN office in Geneva from 1966 to 1969, Silveira reportedly favored the use of large deliberative bodies to resolve trade issues. Also, he is not known to have obtained wide support within the government prior to his appearances at the UN, nor has he followed up with specific plans for implementing his proposals. The fact that :Silveira has come back to the subject twice within a three-week period suggests that he at least has the backing of President Geisel. Brazil, as an emerging world power, can appreciate the major concerns of industriaiized nations and can understand common problems of economic growth among the less-developed countries. Brasilia may now see its international role as a mediator between com etin , in- terests. PERU: SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY The military government today celebrates its seventh anniversary-under new leadership and amid signs of important administrative changes affecting the pace and style of the revolution. At the same time, President Morales Bermudez faces many of the same political and economic problems, including intra-military rivalries and labor unrest, that stymied his predecessor. Since taking office August 29, Morales Ber- mudez has indicated his administration will tackle Peru's many problems with more flexibility and SECRET 25X1 25X1 D_ ?0 1 n \A/GGVI V QI IUAAAAQV (lrf '2 7FS Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Foreign Minister Silveira Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET less personalism than did President Velasco. Over the longer term, this approach is likely to yield some success in building greater popular support for the armed forces and in providing the govern- ment with a more efficient and responsive bureaucracy. For the time being, however, Morales Bermudez will be pressed to convince more radical officers that his new economic policies, including a 12.8-percent devaluation, will reverse recent setbacks and that this and other measures will not increase civilian antipathy for the military. The devaluation, announced last week by the new civilian economy minister, is a sharp depar- ture from Velasco's policy. The former president was particularly sensitive since the previous devaluation by civilian president Belaunde had figured prominently in his ouster by the armed forces in 1968. Morales Bermudez' own economic expertise-he served as economy minister from 1969 through 1973-and his currently strong military support should afford him sufficient time to undo some of the economic excesses of the Velasco administration. The President's plan for streamlining the cumbersome military bureaucracy in order to create a more efficient policy mechanism and allow top officials more time to concentrate on long-range policies includes measures to weaken some of the prerogatives of the presidency. A likely offshoot of this program will be a greater role for civilians in setting government policy. Morales Bermudez' concern for maintaining sup- port of the radical officers at least for the time be- ing may cause this process to move slower than he would like, but some further loosening of restraints on political and journalistic freedom is likely. Reported maneuvering by less extremist of- ficers to get the President to move against more radical officers is indicative of the mistrust and ideological disagreement present beneath the facade of military unity. Like his predecessor, Morales Bermudez is certain to have difficulty in balancing these various factions and personalities. For the time being, the President's desire and need for solid military backing for his domestic programs will probably cause him to seek some compromise. He may be counting on the success of economic and political liberalization measures to enable him to resist pressure from the radicals. A more immediate problem for the President is the threat to the viability of his economic programs posed by recalcitrant labor groups. Many of the unions are led by leftists who de- mand frequent and sizable wage increases and other unrealistic concessions by the government. At this time, Morales Bermudez can probably 25X1 count on solid military support in resisting labor opposition, but other military leaders-particular- ly those who strongly supported Velasco-might go into opposition if prolonged or serious resistance to the new policies develop s. 25X1 SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY nr+ 2 7', Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Morales Bermudez Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET ECUADOR: COUP PLOTTING The military and political discontent that precipitated a coup attempt on September 1 has not gone away, and President Rodriguez Lara faces an uncertain future. The army is upset about personnel policies affecting it and the failure of the government to replace obsolete equipment. Rodriguez' recent cancellation of approved expenditures for new military equipment, although dictated by economic necessity, has further irritated military leaders. A number of military officers are deeply con- cerned about the government's handling of the economy. In conservative business circles, there is considerable talk about the military government's ineptness in managing the economy. Politicians and the news media are complaining more vigorously that the President has yet to fix any sort of schedule for a return to constitutional govern- ment. As a consequence, the divided political leaders are reportedly drawing together in an ef- fort to bring down the government, which they perceive to be considerably weakened by the events of last month. Rodriguez and his closest supporters are acutely aware of the government's present vulnerability. The euphoria induced by his quick victory over a handful of coup leaders quickly gave way to dismay as Rodriguez learned that many more senior officers had considered joining the plot. Initially surprised by the widespread dis- satisfaction within the armed forces, he is now reported to realize that he is becoming daily more separated from the military and that there is no quick and easy way to reverse this trend. To gain time for an orderly return to civilian government, Rodriguez has placed heavy emphasis on winning back and maintaining the support of the military. He is working against strong odds. The question of how to deal with the military officers involved in the coup attempt would appear to be the biggest immediate problem. If justice is harshly imposed, Rodriguez' hopes of rebuilding the armed forces' unity will collapse, and he could precipitate another coup. SECRET 25X1 25X1 1 . \A/C1771/1 V C`I IAA, AA M%/ (l..-!? ? 71Z Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 President Rodriguez Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET ARGENTINA: CAMPORA RETURNS Former president Hector Campora has returned to Argentina, undoubtedly hoping to cash in on the growing confusion and fragmenta- tion within the Peronist movement. Campora, at one time the darling of the Peronist left, reportedly promised the govern- ment that he would stay out of politics if allowed to return from exile in Mexico. He specifically ruled out any dealings with the dissident Au- thentic Peronist Party, from which he dissociated himself last July. It will be difficult for Campora to remain out of the political limelight for very long. Although his spokesmen announced that he had no political plans, Campora could not resist telling reporters on September 27 that he had come back to be "a factor of unity and characterizing himself as a "man of involvement. Two days later he issued a platitudinous statement invoking the name of Juan Peron and offering his services "to the cause of the people." Campora's presence undoubtedly is viewed with disquiet in conservative Peronist and military circles. They recall the extreme leftist influence in the government and the indignities the armed forces suffered during Campora's six-week presidency in May-July, 1973. Loyal Peronists will also remember that from his deathbed Peron ordered Campora fired from his ambassadorship in Mexico and expelled from the Justicialist Party. Peron's move came after Campora hurriedly returned to Buenos Aires to sniff the political wind upon learning that the ag- ing dictator was seriously ill. Campora will have to exercise extreme political and personal circumspection. He will need to eschew leftist connections and keep off the target lists of the right-wing death squads who earlier threatened to assassinate him. Campora probably will try to appeal first to the middle road of Peronism. Because he is unlikely to find sup- port there, he will be susceptible to blan- dishments from the left wing, which badly needs a figure of national prominence as a rallying point. The 66-year-old Campora has survived the25X6 rough and tumble of Peronist politics for over 30 years, and he may gradually e able to rebuild his political fortunes. e may25X6 be drawn too soon into the political arena, and his trv for a political comeback will be short-lived. 25X1 SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 3, 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Hector Campora Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET CHILE NO RELAXATION Actions of the past week leave little prospect that the government will soon relax its tough ?;tance on security or its ban on politics. When a dozen former Allende officials were released on September 12, it was announced that some charges remained pending against them. Now the navy has begun proceedings against at least six of these persons, including Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the Communist Party, on charges of "subversion." The Ministry of Interior also announced that the Christian Democratic Party--Chile's largest-will not be permitted a voice in running the government. The statement came alter public airing of correspondence between two party leaders, which in effect reaffirmed the party's desire to reach an understanding with the military government so that the country eventually could return to traditional democratic processes. The government's reaction was a categorical rejection of any possible constructive dialogue with the party on this basis. The government's statement raised the threat of punishment for activity con- trary to terms of the political recess. One effect of the statement will be to com- plicate President Pinochet's proposal on September 11 to form a "council of state," com- posed of former presidents and prominent Chileans, to advise the government. Former presi- dent Frei, the most prominent Christian Democrat, will find it even more difficult to par- ticipate now that his party has been so strongly rebuffed. Internally, these issues will have little lasting effect. On the international scene, however, they come at a bad time for Chile. Efforts to improve its standing will be severely damaged. Belgium, West Germany, and the UK hope to sponsor a resolu- tion in the UN condemning Chile's human rights stance. Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Several other countries apparently approve the Belgian draft. In the meantime, Pinochet reportedly has conducted an investigation of the human rights In July, the President warned.the high oc mm and of the armed forces that severe disciplinary action would result if authority in these areas was "exceeded." In yet another effort to improve its image abroad, Chile has begun a campaign to have the 1976 OAS General Assembly held in Santiago. The regime believes that if Chile succeeds in these ef- forts, representatives of the American nations can see for themselves that Chile's enemies have ex- aggerated the human rights issue. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X6 SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 3. 75 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 25X6 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Q Iq~ Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 SECRET the risk of slowing the accommodation with the US. 25X6 CUBA: PROMOTING PUERTO RICO Prime Minister Fidel Castro gave further evidence in a speech this week that his govern- ment intends to uphold the Cuban position of promoting Puerto Rican independence even at In endorsing this position, he lent his per- sonal prestige to an issue that has become a major stumbling block in the path of normalizing relations with the US. His remarks apparently were intended as a response to what he labeled "strong statements" by US officials. In a speech devoted largely to internal affairs, Castro spoke briefly about Puerto Rico and the US. He implied that Cuban solidarity with the cause of Puerto Rican independence is a matter of principle that will not be renounced in order to improve relations with the US. He added, "If that is not understood, we will know how to be as patient as necessary." Contrary to some press accounts of the speech, Castro did not depart from the now-stan- dard Cuban position regarding Puerto Rico. Nothing that he said indicated a retreat from his stated willingness to begin negotiations with the US to settle bilateral differences. There may be more flexibility in the Cuban position than appearances suggest. In the final analysis, rather than risk torpedoing the chances for a normalization of relations with the US, the Castro regime would probably accept some for- mula that would trade a temporary softening of its Puerto Rican independence campaign for US negotiating concessions. SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200010001-8 0 Next 23 Page(s) In Document Denied