WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
Iq
DIA review
State Dept. review
completed
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
completed. Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
DIA review completed.
Secret
No. 0043 / 75
October 24, 1975
Copy N2 1403
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
quiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
CONTENTS (October 24, 1975)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
2 USSR-France: A Chilly Visit
3 Europe: Communist Party Conference
4 Romania: Merchant Fleet Expansion
4 NATO-Greece: Talks To Begin
6 West Germany: L'Affaire Rall
7 Egypt-US: Sadat Visit
8 Spanish Sahara: Moroccan March
10 Lebanon: No Solution
11 Syria-Israel: Golan Tensions
12 Angola: Dim Prospects
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
13 Canada: Trudeau Challenged
14 SELA Created
15 Bolivia-Chile-Peru:
Talk, No Action
16 Chile: Security Crackdown
17 Argentina: Peron's Return
18 Honduras-EI Salvador:
Treaty Unlikely
19 Brazil: Oil Decision Unpopular
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
20 The Korean Question at the UN
21 Australia: Political Crisis
22 Laos: The Communists Celebrate
23 China's Computer Industry
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
A EKL.Y SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi-
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
fitly includes material coordinated with or prepared
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
Noy chief Brezhnev greets President Giscard in Moscow
'SSR-FRANCE: A CHILLY VISIT
I w `~= viet-Trench "special relationship"
3oked a little frayed around the edges at the end
-rcn(-n President Giscard's four-day visit last
week. There apparently was less than met the eye
t~_ tfte (;id-visit changes in Giscard's schedule, but
is two countries are obviously having to strain
hair: to find new areas of substantive agreement.
its final act. Another phrase, however, suggests
that the implementation will be achieved Through
"bilateral agreements and understandings," an
apparent nod toward the Soviet view that the
agreements made in Helsinki concerning im-
proved Fast-West contacts are not automatically
self-implementing.
le oriricipai documents signed by Giscard
mmimc oarty chief Brezhnev were a orief formal
~:)mmuniaue and a friendship declaration. The
declaration speaks of the need to deepen bilateral
c-nsuitations. but does not formally change the
V-)70 protocol on consultations. It stresses the im-
portance of summit meetings and agrees to hold
them on a "periodic basis," which may be a step
?)Jard formalizing the annual summit conclaves.
I rs > i- f'a(-h endorsed the Soviet proposal to
onvene a world disarmament conference,
:aTobably because they regarded this as the least
Painful way to appear responsive to Soviet
r)ressure on disarmament matters. ne declara-
non maKes no explicit mention of the European
t.irre reduction talks. which the French have
ivfrnsed to join.
}tt='leciaration refers in glowing terms to the
zaropean security conference, with both sides
pledging to implement fully all the i rovisions of
The French made some progress on
East-West contacts. The Soviets agreed -o issue
multiple exit-entry visas for journalists along the
lines of the US-Soviet accord, and also
agreed-unenthusiastically according to the
French-to consider convening a working group
to discuss improved working conditions for jour-
nalists.
Bilateral agreements were signed on
cooperation in civil aviation, tourism, and energy.
Most of these had been negotiated beforehand
and were intended mainly to ensure some tangi-
ble results from the talks. Sizable trade
agreements were also signed, and Giscard said
that the possibility of increasing French oil im-
ports from the Soviet Union was discussed, but no
agreements were reached.
What would have been a routine visit at-
tracted considerable attention on the second day
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
SECRET
when the Soviets abruptly postponed for two days
Giscard's talks with Brezhnev and the related
ministerial meetings. Some mystery still surrounds
this decision. The two leaders had differed over
the propriety of ideological detente the night
before, and it is possible Brezhnev decided a
show of diplomatic pique was appropriate.
It is also possible that Brezhnev's health was a
factor. Over the past year Brezhnev's physical
stamina has waned. He can and does work quite
hard in spurts, but he apparently can no longer
sustain a heavy schedule over a long period. In
the ten days before Giscard's visit, Brezhnev met
with Portuguese President Costa Comes, par-
ticipated actively in the three-day visit to Moscow
of East German party chief Honecker, and con-
ferred with Syrian leader Asad. It is possible that
EUROPE- COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE
Delegations from 27 communist and
workers parties that met in East Berlin on Oc-
tober 9 and 10 apparently made some progress
toward holding a European conference of
communist parties. The Soviets evidently
decided that just getting the conference held
was more important than holding out for a
strongly worded and binding final conference
document. Asa result, they apparently made
some concessions. A number of problems must
still be overcome before the formal conference
can be held, but the outlook for its convening
late this year or early next year has improved.
the draft
of the con erence document presented in East
Berlin was more acceptable than its
predecessors, the East Germans were
nevertheless instructed to produce yet another
draft incorporating the comments and
criticisms made at the East Berlin meeting. A
sub-working group will meet in East Berlin
11
sometime next month to discuss the latest ver-
sion before referring it to an editorial commis-
he felt the need to slow his pace last week in view
of his busy schedule between now and the party
congress next February.
Nevertheless, newsmen who saw Brezhnev
on the closing day of the talks said he was looking
well. Despite the cold, lie accompanied the
French President to the airport for his departure
and seemed animated and in good spirits.
By the end of the visit, both Soviet and
French officials seemed anxious to put to rest the
rumors of serious substantive or health problems.
Brezhnev brushed off his absence, saying it was
due to a cold. The impression remained,
nevertheless, that the Giscard-Brezhnev
relationship has not yet achieved the amicability
that existed between Brezhnev and Pom-
pidou.
sion later in November.
Among the problems still to be resolved
are how to describe the relationship between
the communist and Western socialist parties,
and how to sell Moscow's interpretation of the
Helsinki summit document. 'Independent-
minded parties such as the Italians, Romanians,
and Yugoslavs still differ with the Soviets over
these points.
New-Times, a Soviet foreign affairs weekly,
said the recent Berlin meeting was an "impor-
tant" step forward,_ but stopped short of
predicting that -a European Communist con-
Terence is a certainty. By conveying a positive
impression of the conference- preparations, the
journal is showing how the separate parties in-
tend to exploit its outcome. If a bland noncon-
troversial-final document is eventually signed
by the European Communist parties, each will
be able to cite those portions that accord best
with its own positions and to portray the con-
ference outcome as a victor for its wn prin-
ciples.
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY flcf 24 7q
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
;ECRET
OMANIA: MERCHANT FLEET EXPANSION
4c}marirans are ex pariL inv., tneir
pant fleet so it can carry a grey er share of
:Hair growing foreign trade. It now cxirries about
eta percent of the country's seaborne foreign
tr,ide. Since 1971, the fleet has nearly doubled in
,,.Wage, adding about 500,000 dead-weight tons,
major portion coming rrom Ron ania's own
,;;ipyards.
Domestic yards have supplied nearly 200,000
3-adweight tons to the fleet since 1971, nearly all
c-J which are general cargo ships and bulk carriers.
)omesticaily produced tonnage represents nearly
ri percent of all acquisitions and 75 percent of dry
i(go additions to the fleet since 1971
)ve one nail of Romania s dcrnestic ship
oductiun goes to other countries. roistered by a
:uaratiteed Soviet market for its surpi is products,
hc-;#3 yards export dry cargo vessels t i the Soviet
)ni inn, hulk coal carriers to India, aiiI semi-con-
tiiiner ships to Norway.
Sic: zrairrnt Live-year plan uegai with a fleet
33 shins, totaling 595,000 deadweiFnt tons. Ac-
itions during the first three years were
dest,, totaling only 112,000 tons. I ie additions
three Japanese-built tankers totaling nearly
000 tons and substantial other tonnage
night acquisitions in 1974 to 373,000 tons. hotal
iiiditions for 1975 should go over 1{0,000 tons if
rilk ore carriers are delivered.
c ,t "3970, genera!-crurpose dry
ships and tankers each accounted for about
blind of the fleet. the purcriase of the
nese-built tankers brought the i,~nker inven-
to nearly 40 percent of the fleet )y mid-1975.
pite the acquisition of bulk carriers totaling
:'1,1)00 tons since 1971, their share or total fleet
-ct's portion of dry cargo tonnage also fell
Jghtly to 25 percent during this peri)d.
1,976-1950 plan calls for an ocean-going
ea+ o nearly 200 shins totaling 3.2 million
deauweight tons, an increase of 1.8 million tons
over 1975. Tankers and bulk carriers will account
for much of the expandea tonnage. Panned
growth will allow Romanian ships to carry wer 70
percent of its seaborne foreign irade by
NATO-GREECE: TALKS TO BEGIN
on the eve of negotiations to restore reece
to foil partnership in the alliance, the outlook is
for protracted talks with chances for success
heavily influenced by whatever progress :s made
.11 the Cyprus negotiations.
Athens' decision last summer to withdraw
iruiir the military side of NATO, made after
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, has never ue-n fully
iiriplernenled. Greece now occupies a rosition
pl~"1111, tire alliance somewhere between its
original commitment and the French exarnple of
total military withdrawal. This may prove difficult
to alter because a modified Greek cominii-Went is
generally suited to the present requirements of
Greek policy.
Surrounded by unfriendly neighbors and
lacking adequate means for its own cefense,
Athens retains an interest in maintaining ties to
Alliance. Yet the present at-rangen ent of
J lilted membership is acceptable to thr vreek
public, which continues to hold the iiiance
responsible for failing to prevent the I uryish ac-
tion against Cyprus. In order to free attention and
resources for the Turkish problem, Grea~ce has
sought to convene a Balkan Conference that
would encourage good reiations with J s com-
munist neighbors. To guard against dif;iomatic
and political isolation from its European allies,
Athens has pledged fealty to Euio e and
vigorously pressed its application for EC
iticmbership. These efforts to buttress Greek in-
dependence nevertheless do riot adequately
satisfy Greece's security requirements.
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
SECRET
The negotiations with NATO will focus on
two related issues: the renewal of regional com-
mand ties with Turkey and the restoration of
Greek forces to NATO command.
Prospects for restoration of Turkish com-
munications and overflight rights on the southern
flank appear good. There are strong military
reasons for ending Turkey's strategic isolation,
and the allies are determined to bring pressure to
bear on Greece to satisfy NATO requirements as
well as Turkish needs. Athens has recently in-
dicated willingness to discuss these points.
Furthermore, Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis is
prepared to argue that such concessions do not
compromise a qualified Greek commitment to
NATO because this type of regional cooperation
satisfies Greece's own defense needs in the event
of an East-West conflict.
Restoring Greek forces to NATO command is
likely to prove more difficult. A substantial im-
provement in Greek-Turkish relations would be
necessary before this could take place.
Greece indicated recently that it is prepared
to soften earlier reservations regarding the com-
mitment of its forces to NATO command, which
again suggests a new willingness to reconsider its
present position in the alliance. Evidence of a
Greek desire to retain substantial control over its
forces was also clear, however, in the failure of
the Greeks to clarify the precise terms of the new
Greek relationship.
Turkey has argued that unless and until
Greece agrees to submit its troops to the authority
of NATO's integrated command, Athens will not
have met the minimal political and military re-
quirements of an ally. The alliance itself is in
agreement on this point and is sensitive at the
moment to the need to emphasize allied political
unity. Accordingly, it will allow the negotiations
to go forward at a leisurely pace out of a prudent
respect for the political barriers to Greek-Turkish
cooperation. The allies will continue to
emphasize that financial assistance and the con-
tinued commitment of tactical nuclear weapons
to Greece's defense depend upon an unqualified
Greek commitment.
Progress on the Cyprus question is clearly
critical to progress in the NATO talks. Yet Prime
Minister Caramanlis' assurances that a satisfactory
settlement of this question will enable Greece to
resume full military participation in the alliance is
probably exaggerated. Other problems, such as
the dispute over Turkey's rights in the Aegean,
are likely to continue to aggravate Greek-Turkish
relations. Under these conditions, Greece is likely
to seek to retain for a while the benefits of securi-
ty at reduced cost. In the long run, however,
Greece needs the alliance, and a return to
something resembling the original Greek com- 25X1
mitment seems likely, provided there is progress
in the Cyprus negotiations and some negotiating
skill on the part of the allies.
D- 5 \AIG1:VI v ci inAft eAnv nrf 7Q 7ri
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
WEST GERMANY: L'AFFAIRE RALL
West German Defense Minister Georg Leber
is under attack as a result of allegations of covert
ooperation between West Germarv and South
Africa in military and technical matters. Although
hard pressed by leftists in his own Social
Democratic Party who are demanding his resigna-
tion, Leber is relying on the backing of Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt and the reputation he has es-
tablished as an exceptionally able Defense
Minister.
Her .Spiegel, a widely read and influential
newsmagazine, will print in its next edition a copy
of a letter in which the South African ambassador
in Bonn advised Pretoria that he and Leber had
discussed the possibility of a visit to South Africa
by West German General Rail. I he Defense
Minister had denied any knowledge of the trip
when queried earlier by Schmidt and members of
he cabinet.
Farlier reports of the trip taken last year by
t;eneral Rail, until recently West Germany's
representative to NATO's military committee,
were based on documents stolen from the South
African embassy and leaked to the West German
press by exiled black South African dissidents.
While in South Africa, Rail visited a pilot uranium
g'nrichment plant, an action South African dis-
sidents claim as evidence that Bonn is helping
Iretoria produce nuclear weapons.
The revelations have already soured West
termany's relations with black Africa and
weakened Leber's political position in the cabinet
and in his own party.
It has also placed Chancellor Schmidt in a
delicate position. If he supports Leber, he will
further alienate left-wing Social Democrats who
have attacked the minister at every opportunity
and who may demand his resignation at the par-
ty's national congress in Mannheim next month.
I he political costs of asking Leber to resign,
however, could damage Schmidt even more.
Leber is generally popular with the nation's
basically conservative electorate, and even the
opposition Christian Democrats hold hirr in high
regard. Schmidt's coalition partners-tie Free
Democrats-would be deeply upset at Leber's
departure and might reconsider their alliance
with the Social Democrats if the left wing
succeeds in forcing Leber's
resignation.
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
EGYPT-US: SADAT VISIT
SECRET
President Sadat will arrive in Washington next
week in search of both a symbolic and a tangible
affirmation of a friendship that is now more vital
than ever to Egypt and to his own position within
Egypt. Sadat's leadership of the Arab world is
hanging in the balance as a result of the second
Sinai disengagement agreement. Even his position
at home, although apparently secure at present, is
vulnerable over the longer term.
He will use his trip to demonstrate to Egyp-
tians and to other Arabs the symbolic importance
of his success in winning the good will of the US
after years of estrangement. To give substance to
the symbol, he will seek expressions of that
friendship in the form of economic: and military
aid. He needs this aid to compensate for his grow-
ing isolation in the Arab world and, more impor-
tantly, to reassure his domestic constituents that
his foreign policy has not bankrupted Egypt.
Sadat's chief purpose in signing the interim
accord with Israel last month was to obtain a
respite from preparations for war so he could
devote total attention to revitalizing Egypt's badly
neglected economy. He will look to the US for
financial and technical assistance in overcoming
the many obstacles that confront this endeavor,
ranging from the immediate problems of an
enormous balance-of-payments deficit to the
longer range problems posed by bureaucratic in-
ertia and Egypt's inability to plan adequately for
economic development. Sadat will probably seek
a multi-year commitment for economic support,
US government assistance in attracting private US
investment in Egypt, and technical assistance in
orienting Egypt's socialist economy toward
greater liberalization.
Sadat will also ask the US for arms. The fact
that the US delivers arms to Israel does not in itself
bother Sadat; he recognizes this relationship as a
necessary ingredient in Washington's ability to
press Israel for diplomatic concessions. The fact,
on the other hand, that the US does not deliver
arms to Egypt as well does bother Sadat. To him, it
is a symbol of virtually the only thing still wrong in
the US-Egyptian-Israeli triangle: that the US still
puts Egypt in a second-class status and still regards
Israel's interests as more deserving of attention.
Sadat needs US arms, moreover, as a support
for his own domestic position. He has long been
subject to criticism from the Egyptian military es-
tablishment for so estranging the Soviets that
Egypt's source of arms and spare parts has been
endangered. The fact that he has successfully
used the concomitant improvement in relations
with the US to regain Egyptian territory-and has
at least begun the process of obtaining arms from
the West-has eased the criticism. Unless he ob-
tains US arms, however, he may come under
heavy' criticism from the military for seeming to
condone US efforts to reinforce Israel's military
superiority while allowing Egypt to lapse still
deeper into a position of militar in-
feriority.
Paoe 7 WEEKI Y RI IMMARY Oct 24. 75
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
")ECRET
SPANISH SAHARA MOROCCAN MARCH
Hassan accelerated preparations this
week for a mass march into Spanish Sahara by
t50,000 unarmed Moroccans; the first groups may
r ac" the border early next week. Despite
Hassan's protestations that the march will be
eaceful,clashes could occur with Spanish forces
or with armed elements of indigenous Saharan
political groups that want independence for the
region. Both Spain and Algeria are clearly unhap-
y over the King's latest gambit in his effort to
annex the disputed territory.
iw ;first contingent left by bus, truck, and
-ain on October 21 from Ksar es Souk in the Atlas
Mountains for Tarfaya. More than 500,000 Moroc-
cans reportedly volunteered to participate;
Moroccan authorities are said to have selected
only those physically fit to endure the trek. Most
Of the volunteers seem unconcernec about the
Hardships they will face, accepting or blind faith
mat the monumental logistic problems will be
overcome.
By staging a civilian rnarch, King Hassan
hopes to avoid a direct confrontation, with
superior Spanish military forces. He has given
notice, however, that Morocco will fight in any
encounter with non-Spanish forces, presumably
meaning any Saharans and possibly Algerians who
might try to oppose the marchers.
Hassan apparently hopes to head off a debate
on the Spanish Sahara issue in the UN General
Assembly this year. Rabat's cause was seriously
weakened by the opinion issued last week by the
'riternationaLCourt of justice, which in effect en-
dorsed self-determination for the territory, and
the King probably fears that any General
Assembly debate would culminate in a new and
stronger resolution in favor of self-determination.
Morocco and Mauritania claim historic
sovereignty over Spanish Sahara and insist that
Madrid should turn the territory over to them on
the basis of the principle of territorial integrity.
The planned march is clearly intended to over-
come Spain's reluctance to settle the issue
,..-. A(F'_VI V CI IAAKAAPV (L-t 74. /'i
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
SECRET
through direct negotiations with Rabat and
Nouakchott.
Contacts between Madrid and Rabat this
week have made some Spanish officials optimistic
that an agreement can be reached that would at
least reduce the tension surrounding the march.
e ing, owever,
restated in a speech on October 23 his intention
to proceed as planned.
Meanwhile, Spain petitioned the UN Security
Council to enjoin Morocco from staging the
march on grounds that it jeopardizes peace and
ignores the rights of the Saharans to self-deter-
mination. On October 22, the Council approved a
resolution requesting all parties to exercise
restraint and begin a dialogue. The resolution also
authorized Secretary General Waldheim to begin
immediate consultations to resolve the dispute. It
avoided, however, any direct mention of Moroc-
co's planned mass march.
In El Aaiun, the Saharan General Assembly,
comprised of indigenous tribal and religious
leaders, has condemned the Moroccan march
and announced plans to resist the "invasion" of
their territory. The major Saharan political parties
in the territory-the Spanish-backed Saharan
National Union Party and the Algerian-backed
Polisario Front-have said they would stage a
countermarch north to the border. Both groups
probably have access to arms. Should either
become involved in clashes with the Moroccans,
the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroccan troops deployed in
southern Morocco might well intervene. Such an
intervention could escalate and involve Spanish
and Algerian forces in the area.
Algeria, surprised by Morocco's move, has
begun a diplomatic and propaganda campaign in
support of self-determination for Spanish Sahara.
On October 20, the Foreign Ministry summoned
Arab, Islamic, and African ambassadors in Algiers,
presumably to stress that the Saharans' right to
self-determination must be respected, in keeping
with the Court's opinion and a recent report by a
UN fact-finding group. The Algerian press has
labeled Morocco's policy as imperialism. On Oc-
tober 22, the government-controlled radio charg-
ed that Algerians living in Morocco are being
prevented from leaving the country and that
Rabat has suspended rail service between the two
countries.
Algerian officials have indicated they would
prefer a transition period in which Spain would
have a considerable role. This would be followed
by a referendum offering a range of options from
independence to union with Morocco and
Mauritania.
Algeria is also taking defensive precautions
along its western border with Morocco. Although
Algiers will probably not initiate hostilities with
Morocco, its reinforcement of the border area
will exert pressure on King Hassan and may tie
down a large number of Moroccan troops. The 25X1
Algerians can be expected to provide arms to the
Polisario Front and possibly some
"volunteers."
Canary Islands
o O
C? T%ifaya
EII'Aaiun
Spanish
Sahara
Port
Agadi
Spain
Madrid t
Jr Rabat
Orocco
rrekech' K5a_r-`e 'Sauk
'ouar:eiate
~Gouljunitie
*Tan-tan
Mauritania
Nouakchott
Algeria
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24. 75
Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A011200040001-5
SECRET
11BANON: NO SOLUTION
irintrr'rtt and sometimes tit=.ivy fighting
-en Muslim and lettist elements and their
Asti, n adversaries continued it Beirut this
at t*;_'s be making no pr egress. [he
,nor=sic damage from the one crisis is moun-
1 ?t ; e sighting was tit belt its southern
.nn rern