WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011200080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0047 / 75
November 21, 1975
Copy N! 67
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MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
1 Angola: After Independence
4 Lebanon: Truce Continues
5 Ethiopia: Power Shift
6 Bangladesh: Trying to Cope
7 Spanish Sahara: Madrid Agrees
9 North Yemen - Saudi Arabia: Relations
10 Portugal: Cabinet Goes on Strike
12 Iceland: Troubled Waters
14 West Germany - USSR: Cordiality and
Detente
15 UN Considers Cyprus Issue
17 USSR - Middle East: Diplomatic Note
17 Soviet Debt Mission to Cairo
18 USSR: Antarctic; Grain
CONTENTS (November 21, 1975)
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Brazil: Human Rights
21 Cuba: Still Revolutionary-Minded
21 Colombia: Security Crackdown
22 Argentina: Fighting Back
23 Guyana: The Road to Socialism
24 Surinam Achieves Independence
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
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7
ANGOLA: AFTER INDEPENDENCE
The country's first days of independence
have been marked by more fighting between
forces of the two rival "regimes" that are vying for
recognition as the legitimate government. With
the continuing efforts of the Africans' regional
organization to arrange a truce apparently getting
nowhere, the outlook is still for a protracted
military struggle in which the foreign support go-
ing to the two sides may be decisive.
The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola remains under heavy
pressure in areas of eastern and central Angola
from the more moderate National Front for the
Liberation of Angola and National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola. On November 18,
the National Union announced that its forces,
which are operating with elements of the
National Front, had taken Malanje, one of the
Popular Movement's few remaining strongholds
in central Angola. Its fall leaves a wide gap
between the Movement's forces in Luanda and
important units operating from Henrique de Car-
valho.
succeeded late last week in beating off an inva-
sion attempt from Zaire by a Cabindan separatist
group that is supported by Zairian President
Mobutu. There have been no recent reports of
further fighting in Cabinda.
On the political level, the Luanda-based
Popular Movement regime headed by Agostinho
Neto late last week installed an 18-man cabinet in
which Neto's lieutenant, Lopo de Nascimento,
holds the post of prime minister. He was the
Movement's principal representative in the four-
party transitional government that collapsed last
summer. Both the political and military wings of
the Popular Movement are represented in the
cabinet. The rival National Front - National Union
"government," meanwhile, has had trouble get-
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Forces of the National Front that have been
moving toward Luanda from the south apparently
reached Dondo this week, putting them close to
the hydroelectric plant that supplies power to
Luanda. North of the capital, the Front may be
about to abandon its effort-stalled for nearly a
month-to break through the Popular
Movement's defenses around Quifangando.
Instead, the Front may try to move on the capital
from the east.
In Cabinda, where the Popular Movement is
strongly entrenched, its forces apparently
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ting off the ground. A leadership slate has still not
been announced, but it now appears that neither
National Front leader Holden Roberto nor the
National Union's Jonas Savimbi will take top
positions. Each is hesitant to become too closely
linked with the joint government, which they
both regard as a marriage of convenience to
provide a focus for anti-Soviet foreign support.
Foreign Reaction
Partly because of the existence of the com-
peting regimes, most nations-including the bulk
of the 46-member states of the Organization of
African Unity-are withholding recognition from
either Angola claimant. Some 25 governments, in-
cluding the USSR, Cuba, ten other Communist
countries, and ten African states, have recognized
Neto's government, however, while no state has
formally accepted the National Front - National
Union regime. This week, Neto's people un-
successfully sought admission to the current
meeting in London of the International Coffee
Council.
The Organization of African Unity is still try-
ing to resolve the Angolan situation through a
government of national unity, but its efforts have
been impaired by the failure of the ten African
states-all radical regimes-that have recognized
Neto to abide by the OAU's request to remain
neutral. Other OAU members want to avoid any
further division over the Angola issue. At present,
OAU Chairman Amin's proposal for sending an
African peacekeeping force to Angola and calls
by Somalia for a summit meeting and by Ethiopia
for a foreign ministers' conference show little sign
of getting off the ground.
Moscow provided fresh evidence during the
past week of the importance it attaches to a vic-
tory by the Popular Movement, the group the
USSR has supported for years. With the
Movement's forces continuing to retreat in most
sectors and the threat to its hold on Luanda ap-
parently growing, the USSR mounted another
substantial airlift of military supplies and
equipment-its second within about two weeks.
The operation, which began on November
13, was carried out by a number of heavy
transports that staged through Conakry, Guinea.
Specific details about the cargo rushed to
Neto's hard-pressed forces are not available, but
it surely included substantial quantities of the
small arms and ammunition expended so freely in
the Angolan fighting. After the earlier airlift, there
were reports that the Soviets had sent up to 12
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MIG-21 fighters and some rocket launchers. No
such aircraft have been seen and the reports re-
main unconfirmed.
At present, there is no firm evidence that
Moscow is planning additional supply flights to
Angola soon. The Soviets will be watching the
military situation closely, however, and may well
provide further support to the Popular Move-
ment if its fortunes continue to decline.
The USSR has had to pay a price in black
Africa for its strong military and diplomatic sup-
port of Neto's regime, although Soviet leaders
presumably had made a prior determination that
the prospect of gaining significant influence in
southern Africa was worth the price. A number of
African states have been particularly upset by the
Kremlin's flouting of the OAU's call for neutrality
in the Angolan dispute.
Soviet pressure on Uganda's Amin-the OAU
chairman-to recognize Neto's government con-
tributed to the recent temporary rupture in
relations between Moscow and Kampala. Nigeria,
long an important target country for the Soviets in
Africa, has publicly criticized the Soviet Union's
"flagrant interference" in Angola's affairs. Zaire is
trying to make an issue in the UN Security Council
of the Soviets' support for their Angolan protege.
Concurrent with the Soviet supply airlifts,
Havana, probably with a nudge from Moscow, has
stepped up its airlift of troops to support the
Popular Movement's military operations. Cubans
have advised and trained Neto's forces for years,
both in Cuba and in Africa. The number of
Castro's people involved in the situation has risen
sharply in recent months, particularly since the
end of September when the airlift apparently
began.
Cubana Airlines planes have made at least 16
flights to black Africa via Barbados, more than half
of them this month. The Cuban aircraft, mostly
Bristol Britannia's, fly to Guinea-Bissau and then
to Brazzaville with some now continuing on into
Luanda. The flights made so far could have carried
well over 1,000 troops. Adding in additional
Cuban personnel reported to have arrived by sea
over the past two months, Neto's Cuban helpers
may now total more than 3,000.
The Cubans have almost certainly become
more directly involved in the Angolan fighting
since the tide of battle turned against the Popular
Movement last month. They probably played an
important role, for example, in the Movement's
successful defense, so far, of its position in Cabin-
da. If Moscow has provided Neto with fighter air-
craft, they most likely would be flown by Cuban
pilots.
Peking Finesses
The Chinese, who have long viewed the
Angolan strife in the broader context of
Sino-Soviet rivalry, have taken ill-concealed
delight in the African backlash to Moscow's
heavy-handed involvement with the Popular
Movement. Peking's media have been saturated
with replays of anti-Soviet articles and statements
from numerous African capitals, and Chinese
propagandists have authored a number of articles
clearly aimed at fanning African emotions.
Early this week, the Chinese sent an official
letter to OAU Chairman Amin indicating that, in
line with the organization's stand on Angola,
China would not recognize any regime until
"national unity" is achieved and lambasting
Soviet "interference in Angolan and African
issues."
Anticipation of precisely such a propaganda
windfall led Peking, in the immediate
pre-independence period, to lower the visibility
of its own involvement in Angola. China
withdrew military advisers from Zairian programs
for training units of the National Front-the
primary recipient of past Chinese assistance.
Future Chinese support for the National Front -
National Union coalition will almost certainly be
of the type that can be funneled through African
intermediaries in a way that will leave Peking with
a plausible case for denying any direct role.
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LEBANON: TRUCE CONTINUES
The cease-fire implemented in Beirut on
November 2 is still basically holding, although the
security situation deteriorated somewhat late this
week as extremists attempted to spark a resump-
tion of heavy fighting. The country's less intran-
sigent Muslim and Christian leaders are edging
toward compromises on some political issues, but
are being pressed by their militant coreligionists
to avoid making important concessions. The
politicians therefore have not addressed the basic
issues that keep tensions high.
Splinter groups on the far left apparently
have been responsible for most of the sniping at-
tacks in Beirut this week. These attacks have oc-
curred in several areas of the city, but have not yet
drawn the large private militias into renewed
clashes. At least ten far-left organizations have
been involved in the recent incidents; these
groups are especially belligerent now as a result
of Prime Minister Karami's offer last weekend to
reach a political compromise with the Christians.
On November 25, Karami won cabinet ap-
proval for a proposal that he and President Fran-
jiyah get together and come up with specific plans
for ensuring Muslim and Christian equality in
parliament and the civil service, for limiting un-
employment, and for reviving the economy. The
Prime Minister did not directly threaten the
powers of the presidency-held by a Christian
under Lebanon's present system-and his
program fell short of the fundamental changes
Suggested only last week by the committee on
political reform.
Officials of the right-wing Christian
Phalanges Party-which is not represented in the
cabinet-have cautiously approved Karami's
proposals. They are relieved at his willingness to
compromise and probably regard alteration or ul-
timate abandonment of the system of propor-
tional representation in government jobs as in-
evitable. Christian leaders take some consolation
in the knowledge that their followers are general-
ly better educated than the Muslims and
therefore would be better able to compete under
any future merit system.
The Christians' cautious acceptance of the
proposals stems partly from reassurances on
security matters offered by Karami on November
7. He called on the country's warring factions to
allow the Lebanese army and internal security
force to play a greater role in restoring civil order
and said that only after the country is calm will the
government be able to implement comprehen-
sive political, social, and economic changes.
Karami's assertion that security and reform are in-
separable was an attempt to be evenhanded; his
statement that order must be restored before
reforms can be implemented, however, was a
concession to right-wing Christians.
On November 15, Karami joined with the
rest of the cabinet in approving a proposal by
Interior Minister Shamun, the group's most
powerful Christian, to form a new 300-man
security force to patrol Beirut. Because the new
unit is made up of commandos from the army as
well as from the internal security force, its crea-
tion is also a concession by Karami. The force was
to have been provided heavy arms and moved
into the streets by midweek, but by the end of the
week there still were no signs that it had begun
patrolling.
Muslim leftists on the reform committee and
some Beirut newspapers are attacking the
Christians for refusing to make greater con-
cessions and Karami for his willingness to com-
promise. Representatives of most Palestinian and
Lebanese leftist groups met on November 18 to
"review their support" for the Prime Minister, but
they are unlikely to turn against him. Kamal
jumblatt, spokesman for the leftists, has demand-
ed that Karami spell out the details and ultimate
aims of the changes he is proposing.
Karami has not responded to such calls. In his
appearances before parliament and the press over
the past two weeks, the Prime Minister has limited
himself to lengthy but obscure statements design-
ed to convince Muslims that changes are coming
and to assure the Christian community that the
changes will involve "reinterpretations rather
than amendments" of Lebanon's constitution.
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15_26
ETHIOPIA: POWER SHIFT
A power struggle within the ruling military
council has increased the influence of General
Teferi Benti, the group's chairman, who had
previously played a figurehead role. The two most
powerful members during the past year, Major
Mengistu and Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu, no
longer dominate the council, although they retain
their positions as vice chairmen. The council ap-
parently is now considering-and discussing with
various groups-possible revisions in its policies
in an attempt to accommodate its major op-
ponents and halt increasing unrest throughout
the country.
Rivalry between the two vice chairmen for
supremacy contributed to their political eclipse.
Other council members' dissatisfaction with cons-
tant jockeying by the two increased sharply last
month when a standoff between them threatened
the junta's survival. Teferi took advantage of the
weakening of their authority to make his own bid.
He was aided by the dissatisfaction of key military
units-expressed directly to the ruling
group-with policies pushed by the council un-
der Mengistu and Atnafu.
The new prominence of Teferi and his sup-
porters has not ended maneuvering in the
and he is not likely to establish himself as a strong
man. His survival will probably continue to rest on
his ability to act as arbiter among competing
groups.
Meanwhile, the power struggle among the
council factions has resulted in an erosion of the
authority of the group as a whole within the arm-
ed forces. The regular military hierarchy and ma-
jor units have gained influence, at least tem-
porarily, at the council's expense.
The council's floundering has led to
widespread discussion of alternatives to Ethiopia's
current leadership and policies. Even some coun-
cil members appear to be losing confidence in the
ruling group's ability to deal with pressing
national problems, especially the Eritrean in-
surgency and the increasingly better organized
"CI
rebellions in other provinces. The council,
without abandoning its commitment to a socialist
framework for transforming Ethiopian society, has
shown a willingness to consider new approaches
and a desire to gain more popular support.
As part of the reassessment, council members
are engaging in a low-key dialogue with some in-
fluential civilians. Atnafu and Mengistu, ap-
parently chastened by their recent setbacks, are
holding consultations with military units in the
Addis Ababa area. The units have been deman-
ding such a dialogue for many months.
In an address late last week to military and
police representatives, Atnafu adopted a con-
ciliatory tone. He admitted the council had made
mistakes and said it was now studying a revision of
past policies and ideologies. He indicated the
civilian ministries would be given a more impor-
tant and independent role.
Mengistu's and Atnafu's efforts seem aimed
primarily at keeping the present ruling group in
power. Each is probably also attempting,to lay the
groundwork for a possible comeback.
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BANGLADESH: TRYING TO COPE
The two-week old regime dominated by
army chief of staff General Zia continues to be
preoccupied with the collapse of discipline within
the armed forces and the possibility of Indian in-
terference. Zia, who apparently retains a wide
following in the military, probably represents the
best chance of eventually re-establishing authori-
ty over the troops. More incidents of military in-
discipline, however, could undermine both Zia's
reputation and the martial law ad-
ministration-the country's only governing
authority-nominally headed by President Sayem.
Enlisted men at the major army base in Dacca,
where the disturbances in the military began on
November 7, have apparently not been brought
totally under control. Many officers at the Dacca
base are reportedly being transferred to other
posts in an effort to prevent a resurgence of op-
position.
Early this week, mutinies broke out in military
and police units in at least four northern districts
and at naval bases in Chittagong and Khulna. It is
questionable whether the government has effec-
tive authority at any of these locations. At least
some of the defiant enlisted men may have been
encouraged by reports that mutinous troops in
Dacca were given pay raises. As word of the in-
cidents spread, still other units may be affected.
In an effort to reimpose discipline, the
government this week announced new martial
law regulations that provide for the death penalty
for inciting mutinies. Zia and one of his two fellow
deputy martial law administrators each made at
least one trip from Dacca to talk to restive units.
They also addressed separate nationwide appeals
to the troops for unity and discipline. Zia made a
special bid to assure enlisted men that their
grievances would get prompt attention.
Zia may have tried to arrange an accom-
modation with leaders of the National Socialist
Party, the radical group that has gained some in-
fluence among the troops and has attempted to
exploit their differences with the officers. After
the mutiny in Dacca broke out, Zia released two
leaders of the party who had been detained by
former president Mujib.
Zia has also tried in various ways to allay
public uneasiness resulting from the shattering
events of this month and the coup last August. In
Dacca, he has had army convoys circulate and put
troops on patrol at night in an effort to show that
the military is in control. Both Zia and President
Sayem have publicly emphasized the need at pre-
sent for martial law, but have also stressed their
regime's commitment to end it as soon as possi-
ble. Last week the President announced that elec-
tions for parliament, which was suspended after
Mujib's overthrow in August and then dissolved
by Sayem earlier this month, would be held
before March 1977.
Both Zia and Sayem realize that to stabilize
the situation confidence must be restored, es-
pecially among the middle class, the mainstay of
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the bureaucracy and the officer corps. Civil ser-
vants at both the national and district levels are
demoralized and foundering in the absence of
direction from above.
Many Bengalees, meanwhile, continue to
fear that India may take advantage of the
weakness and instability of the Dacca regime.
Their concerns are reflected in rumors that Indian
agents and provocateurs have been especially ac-
tive in the past two weeks. The US embassy in
Dacca reports widespread fear that India will
make Bangladesh pay for the ouster and deaths of
Mujib, a friend of India, and General Musharraf,
who allegedly was supported by New Delhi in his
short-lived bid for power early this month.
Bengalee concern over Indian intentions has
been fueled by reports of recent clashes between
Bengalee troops and Indian forces along the
border. The Indian army commander for eastern
India, however, told US officials privately this
week that the Indian army had not been involved
in any incidents along the border since the up-
heavals in Bangladesh began early this month. He
was less categorical in denying that paramilitary
border security troops had engaged in clashes.
The commander insisted that India would not in-
tervene in the neighboring country, regardless of
the political complexion of the regime there, un-
less. the Hindu minority is mistreated.
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SPANISH SAHARA: MADRID AGREES
On November 14, Spain announced it had
agreed to transfer the administration of its Sahara
territory to Morocco and Mauritania next March.
The accord is a victory for Morocco's King Hassan
and the confrontation tactics he pursued to in-
duce Madrid to approve a direct turnover of the
territory he has long claimed. Algeria, excluded
from the negotiations, has denounced the accord
and will continue diplomatic efforts to block its
implementation and probably also continue its
support for a pro-independence Saharan guerrilla
movement.
Under the agreement, the three countries are
to set up an early tripartite Saharan administra-
tion. This week the Spanish parliament paved the
way for such action by passing legislation es-
tablishing a legal basis for decolonizing the
territory. Spain will pull out entirely by February
28, 1976, leaving Morocco and Mauritania in con-
trol.
Although the full details have not yet emerg-
ed, the semi-official Moroccan press has asserted
that the accord includes economic provisions
concerning the exploitation of minerals and
fishing rights. These arrangements presumably
will assure Spain a return on its investment in the
Sahara. Meanwhile, Madrid, relieved of the threat
of possible armed conflict with Morocco, will be
able to carry out an orderly withdrawal.
The agreement apparently provides for
limited "consultations" with the Saharan people
on the future of the territory. As co-ad-
ministrators, Rabat and Nouakchott will be able to
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Algeria
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"consult" with hand-picked Saharan tribal
leaders, primarily from the territorial general
assembly, who will be responsive to their direc-
tion. The tribal leaders would almost certainly
agree "voluntarily" to a partition of the territory
that gives Morocco the northern region with its
rich phosphate deposits and Mauritania the
southern portion with its ore.
To get the agreement, Spain abandoned its
earlier insistence on a UN solution involving a
referendum. With the chips down, Madrid ap-
parently decided to risk a period of poor relations
with Algeria, which has long championed
self-determination by the Saharans through a
UN-supervised vote.
Algiers, outmaneuvered by the accord, will
exert diplomatic pressure on Spain and seek in-
ternational support to reverse the agreement. On
November 14, the official Algerian news agency
warned Madrid that its action will jeopardize
Spanish interests in the region. The Boumediene
regime has strongly reiterated its support for the
principle of self-determination, and will continue
to push at the UN for a referendum. Moroccan
and Mauritanian spokesmen, who will seek to
limit debate on the issue, can be expected to
argue that the consultations their governments
have agreed to are all that is required to deter-
mine the popular will.
Algeria is threatening to request a meeting of
the Security Council as soon as the terms of the
agreement are made public. The Algerians will
argue that the proposed consultations are not in
accord with the advisory opinion issued by the
International Court of Justice in October, which
upheld the Saharans' right to self-determination.
Algiers will also insist that only the General
Assembly has the authority to determine the ap-
propriate means of decolonization. Previous
assembly resolutions have endorsed self-deter-
mination.
Algiers, while probably avoiding direct
military intervention in the territory, will surely
continue to provide arms, training, and possibly
some "volunteers" to the Polisario Front, a
Saharan group that wants complete in-
dependence. With a sanctuary across the
territory's border with Algeria and sufficient arms,
a relatively small number of Front guerrillas could
carry out terrorist attacks and sabotage in the
territory. The Front, which claims to control part
of the Sahara, has requested the UN to condemn
the agreement as a violation of existing UN
resolutions. It also wants a UN observer mission
sent to the territory where Front guerrillas have
recently clashed with Moroccan forces moving
into areas in the northeast already abandoned by
Spanish troops.
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NORTH YEMEN - SAUDI ARABIA
Uneasy Relationship
North Yemeni strong man Ibrahim Hamdi
and his supporters are again nervous about
Riyadh's intentions toward his reformist regime.
Two recent instances of ambiguous Saudi
behavior in matters of high concern to Sana have
set the North Yemenis on edge.
Since his take-over in June 1974, Hamdi has
never felt entirely confident of the support of
Saudi Arabia's rulers, which is essential to his
regime. Accustomed to exerting influence in
North Yemen by supporting conservative tribal
elements, especially those led by the powerful
Abdallah al-Ahmar, the Saudis took some time
before finally endorsing Hamdi's military regime.
Early this month, Riyadh irritated-and
worried-the North Yemeni leader by dis-
patching an uninvited mission to Sana to mediate
a flare-up between Hamdi's increasingly assertive
central government and disaffected tribalists led
by al-Ahmar. The Saudi mediator was Prince Turki
al-Faysal, deputy to royal counselor Kamal Adham
and younger brother of the Saudi foreign
minister. Turki's visit, which lasted nearly two
weeks, was interpreted by Sana as gratuitous
meddling in North Yemen's internal affairs, and
Hamdi's leftist rivals have seized on it as proof of
their charge that he is a Saudi stooge.
Still more upsetting to the Hamdi govern-
ment was the public impression Turki created of
Saudi backing for al-Ahmar. This apparently en-
couraged al-Ahmar to adopt a more intransigent
position i his conflict with Hamdi. At the same
time, the widespread resentment over the Turki
visit may make it harder for Hamdi to agree to a
compromise.
Relations between Sana and Riyadh have
been complicated further by the results of the
visit to Saudi Arabia in early November by North
Yemeni chief of staff Ghashmi. Ghashmi has told
Hamdi and the US ambassador that the mission
was a failure because the Saudis did not extend
the offers of military assistance Sana has been ex-
pecting. Ghashmi also claimed that Saudi Defense
Minister Prince Sultan made allegations about
continuing leftist influence in Sana, thereby
seemingly calling Riyadh's support for the Hamdi
regime into doubt.
The Saudi military attache in Sana, who was
present during the talks, has provided a different
account. He says that details of proposed Saudi
military assistance to North Yemen were discuss-
ed at considerable length, including a January
starting date for the program.
The Soviet Aid Ploy
Whatever the case, Sana is resorting to a
familiar ploy to generate greater motion in
Riyadh: it is threatening to turn to the Soviets for
military aid. A member of the ruling command
council left for the USSR on November 13 to
observe some Soviet military maneuvers,
although he was not authorized to engage in
serious talks. Hamdi himself broke with tradition
to attend the Soviet national day celebration in
Sana along with everyone of importance in his
government; he has never attended a similar
Western function.
The Yemenis may well be overreacting. The
Although there are clearly divisions among
Saudi leaders over the extent to which Hamdi
ought to be backed, there seems at present to be
a basic consensus in Riyadh that he should be
supported and his government made strong
enough to resist external threats from radical
states-notably South Yemen and Iraq. Saudi sup-
port for the North Yemeni tribes is not likely to
end entirely, however, providing, at the least, a
continuing irritant.
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I',- 1$
PORTUGAL: CABINET GOES ON STRIKE
The Portuguese cabinet suspended its func-
tions in an unprecedented move on November
20, blaming divisions within the armed forces for
its inability to govern. Renewed left-wing
challenges to the Azevedo government have ex-
posed its vulnerability and thwarted Prime
Minister Azevedo's efforts to establish control
over the government through a step-by-step cur-
tailment of leftist influence.
The cabinet, which called on the all-military
Revolutionary Council to resolve the question of
authority two weeks ago, brought the issue to a
head by threatening to resign unless President
Costa Gomes, in his capacity as armed forces chief
of staff, guarantees military backing for the
cabinet and its policies. Costa Gomes has a
penchant for compromise, but he may find it dif-
ficult to wriggle out of this situation gracefully. It
is a daring move for Azevedo since Costa Gomes
may try to settle the matter by increasing left-wing
participation in the cabinet or even dissolving the
sixth provisional government altogether.
The Communists stand to gain the most from
any cabinet changes. They have gone along with
the protests of the extreme left wing against the
government, but most party leaders appear reluc-
tant to attempt a grab for power at this time. Gains
in the cabinet and the Revolutionary Council
would restore a large measure of the influence
lost by the Communists following the ouster of
prime minister Goncalves this fall.
The cabinet's decision to suspend its func-
tions may have resulted from the appar-
ent success of the left wing in frustrating efforts
to bring about changes in the government and
the military high command. The anti-Communists
had continued to press for the reduction of
left-wing influence in the armed forces, even
though this goal became more difficult to achieve
because of the left's growing assertiveness.
Security chief General Carvalho's boycott of
the Revolutionary Council and his active
courtship of the left convinced many senior
military officers that he was the major stumbling
block to the restoration of discipline. When
reports were leaked of the impending reassign-
ment of Carvalho and several other radical com-
manders in the Lisbon area, the Communists and
the far left rallied their forces to block the move.
The left's campaign against the government
had gathered steam when a protest march by
striking construction workers on November 12
turned into a Communist-led siege of the con-
stituent assembly building and the adjoining
residence of Prime Minister Azevedo. Assembly
delegates were released after spending the night
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in Sao Bento palace, but Prime Minister Azevedo
was detained for 36 hours until he agreed to the
workers' demands for an average salary hike of 28
percent. A permanent contract is to be completed
by November 27. By acceding to the workers'
demands-only three days after an economic
austerity plan was published in the Lisbon
press-the government damaged its chances for
enacting effective measures for economic
recovery.
The left dealt a further blow to the Azevedo
administration by turning out tens of thousands
for an anti-government demonstration on
November 16. The increased leftist activity had
raised fears among the democratic parties that the
left was building up to an effort to take over the
government. The left, in turn, has accused the
right of coup-plotting. Democratic parties were
acutely aware of their helplessness in the face of
left-wing militancy and sent party leaders to safer
locations in the north until the situation in Lisbon
clarified. There were calls for the government and
the constituent assembly to move to the northern
city of Porto and leave Lisbon to the radicals.
Opposition to the Communists' moves could
be weakened by dissension between the Socialists
and the Popular Democrats. The Socialists charg-
ed that the Popular Democrats were trying to use
a joint demonstration in the northern town of
Viseu on November 16 for partisan purposes and
withdrew their support at the last minute. The
Popular Democrats since then have insisted that
relations between the two parties are good, but
the Socialists are concerned that the Communists
might make serious inroads into Socialist support
on the left if the party appeared to be
collaborating closely with the Popular Democrats.
The latest Communist offensive in Lisbon has
given rise to a new surge of independence senti-
ment in the Azores. The six-man regional gover-
ning council issued a communique on November
15 demanding that mainland security forces sup-
port the government. The junta warned that if the
unsettled conditions in Lisbon continue, the
Azores will refuse to submit to a government in a
"state of anarchy." Mass demonstrations in the
islands this week made clear the overwhelming
President Costa Gomes (1) with security chief General Carvalho
?1
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Icelandic Foreign Minister Augustsson (r) meets with British officials
ICELAND: TROUBLED WATERS
Prospects for at least a limited rerun of the
cod war of 1972-73 increased last week following
the expiration of the existing Icelandic-UK fishing
agreement and the failure of the two nations to
break a deadlock in negotiations for a new agree-
ment.
The talks last weekend, the third since
September, broke off shortly after they opened
because of basic disagreement over the size of the
annual catch to be allowed British fishermen.
Iceland raised its offer from 50,000 tons to 65,000
tons, but the UK proposed to reduce its catch
only to 110,000 tons from the 130,000 tons allowed
under the old pact.
The tone of the talks was also unpromising.
The British negotiator, State Secretary Hattersley,
in a talk with US officials following the failure of
the talks described Icelandic politicians as "im-
possible and incompetent." For their part, Icelan-
dic negotiators considered Hattersley overbear-
ing, arrogant, and threatening. No date has been
set for the next round of talks.
Since the expiration of the agreement on
November 13, which permitted some fishing
within 50 miles of the coast, the Icelandic coast
3/
091
guard has begun gradually to enforce the new
200-mile jurisdiction that Reykjavik declared on
October 15. Iceland's six coast guard vessels have
warned many of the estimated 50 British trawlers
in the area to leave and have cut the lines of three
that were caught within the 50-mile zone.
The British have issued a public warning that
they will protect their fishermen against harass-
ment. London has dispatched three unarmed oil
rig protection vessels outfitted with fenders, but
reportedly will not send in Royal Navy frigates un-
less Icelandic gunboats fire at the trawlers. There
were sporadic confrontations among trawlers,
gunboats, and frigates at the height of the last cod
war.
Public opinion in Iceland remains strongly
opposed to concessions to foreign fishermen. in
an apparent effort to alter this view, the
newspaper of Prime Minister Hallgrimsson's party
last week ran two editorials pointing out that
Iceland is too weak to enforce its will and stands
to gain more from negotiations than intran-
sigence. Saddled with an indecisive coalition
partner, however, Hallgrimsson probably cannot
afford to bend far to meet British demands before
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tensions rise even higher; he fears pressures to
withdraw from NATO will revive.
Despite the impasse with the UK, Iceland is
on the verge of reaching a fishing agreement with
West Germany, following relatively smooth
negotiations. Foreign Minister Agustsson went to
Bonn this week to iron out the few remaining
details and hopes to initial a pact. Hallgrimsson
runs some risk of negative public reaction to the
proposed terms, but the Germans have tried to
ease his position by accepting a number of key
Icelandic demands. Bonn reportedly will agree to
a 60,000-ton catch limit and is prepared to allow
Reykjavik to determine where the fish can be
caught if Iceland will accept ambiguous German
language on the 200-mile claim.
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WEST GERMANY - USSR
The state visit of West German President
Scheel and Foreign Minister Genscher to the
USSR last week was watched closely for in-
dications of a fundamental shift in Soviet attitudes
toward the West in the light of French President
Giscard's seemingly troubled visit a month
before. Whatever it was that disturbed the
Giscard visit seemed not to have carried over to
the West Germans. The Soviets made con-
siderable effort to create the appearance of cor-
diality and dedication to detente. Initial reporting
on the current visit of Italian President Leone
shows that the Soviets are determined to make his
trip, too, congenial and successful.
No meeting with Brezhnev had been includ-
ed in the agenda for the Scheel visit, but the
General Secretary surprised the West Germans by
spending 90 minutes with them on November 11.
Brezhnev seemed determined to impress the
West Germans with his vigor and his un-
CRS
diminished commitment to detente, and he ap-
parently succeeded in both. Brezhnev was in an
unusually expansive mood and assured Scheel
that the forthcoming party congress will reaffirm
Soviet detente policy toward the West. To our
knowledge, this is the first time that Brezhnev has
made such a prediction.
In all, the visit was detente the way the
Soviets like it-showy, platitudinous, and
generating the atmosphere necessary for in-
creased access to Western technology without
pinning down the Soviets on sensitive bilateral
issues, especially ones involving domestic
policies. The West Germans went with little ex-
pectation of concrete results, and so, while some
of the major sore points were discussed--Berlin
affairs, family reunification, emigration of ethnic
Germans from the USSR-they were not surprised
that progress was limited.
Interpreting Detente
Both sides stated their differing inter-
pretations of detente and the implications of the
CSCE agreement. But the Soviets again praised
the concept of European security and reiterated
their intentions to abide by the provisions of the
CSCE agreement-at least as they interpret them.
Soviet reaction to West German entreaties on
CSCE implementation was in line with what seems
to be an emerging pattern of behavior. While
stressing aspects of CSCE they regard as favorable,
the Soviets have shown no willingness to go
beyond their interpretations of the letter of the
document to accommodate the West and have
complied only reluctantly even with the letter.
Moscow's sensitivity was illustrated when Scheel's
remarks on family reunification were censored
from the published version of his televised
speech.
Thus far, the major Soviet gesture on "human
contacts" that are subjects of concern to the West
has been to grant multiple exit/entry visas for US
and French journalists. This procedure is
specifically provided for in the CSCE final act, but
it was implemented only grudgingly.
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UN CONSIDERS CYPRUS ISSUE
The UN General Assembly continued to
grapple with the troublesome Cyprus issue
throughout much of the week amid indications
that a consensus on the wording of a resolution
might not be reached.
The Greek Cypriots, anxious to score a moral
victory and take advantage of the growing an-
ti-Turkish sentiment in the assembly, introduced a
strongly worded resolution reaffirming the one
last year and expressing regret that it had not
been implemented. That resolution, favorable to
the Greek Cypriots, called for the withdrawal of
foreign troops, the return of refugees to their
homes, and, as a concession to the Turkish
Cypriots, negotiations by the two communities
"on an equal footing." The Greek Cypriot resolu-
tion also noted the lack of progress in
negotiations and condemned unilateral actions,
including any aimed at changing the
demographic composition of the Cypriot popula-
tion. The latter refers to various reports of Turkish
"colonization" of the Turkish Cypriot zone.
The Turks and Turkish Cypriots came to New
York determined to secure a non-substantive
resolution that would note-but not reaf-
firm-the one the Ecevit government consented
to last year and, if possible, to secure equal status
for the Turkish Cypriot community with its larger
Greek Cypriot counterpart.
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials backed
up their demands with threats to delay or in-
definitely postpone intercommunal talks if the
assembly adopted a resolution hostile to Turkish
interests. One Turkish Cypriot representative
alluded to the possibility of a declaration of in-
dependence by the Turkish community if the
Greek Cypriots pressed their resolution.
The main debate took place last week in the
special political committee where the Greek
Cypriot delegate described the issue as one of
Turkish aggression and continuing occupation of
an independent state. The Turkish Cypriot
spokesman viewed the problem as an effort by
one community to dominate another and called
for a solution based on the "'new realities." A
Turkish resolution on Wednesday to get a hearing
for Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash in the
assembly, as was earlier accorded the Greek
Cypriot foreign minister, was defeated by a lop-
sided vote.
Representatives of five nonaligned countries
tried hard to bridge the gap. With Greek help,
they succeeded in slightly modifying the Greek
Cypriot position, but the Turks remained ada-
mant. Finally, they formulated their own resolu-
tion, which met some Turkish demands but still
favored the Greek Cypriots, particularly in the
reaffirmation of last year's resolution and incor-
poration of the provision condemning efforts at
colonization.
The nonaligned made a final effort at a con-
sensus and declared they would not introduce
their resolution if any of the interested parties op-
posed it. As the debate moved toward a conclu-
sion, there were indications that the Greek and
Greek Cypriot delegations would withdraw their
h
e
resolution in favor of the nonaligned s, while t
Turks were expected to abstaiin or even oppose it.
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USSR - MIDDLE EAST: DIPLOMATIC NOTE
Moscow has sought to project a picture of ac-
tivism in Middle East diplomacy by delivering a
note to the US on November 8 which again stress-
ed the need for reconvening the Geneva con-
ference. The Soviets actually see little prospect for
the conference anytime soon and probably
hoped that the note would help demonstrate
their support of the Arab cause and of the
Palestine Liberation Organization in particular.
The Soviets called Geneva "the only correct
route" and, for the first time in a major statement,
explicitly stated that the PLO must take part in the
conference from "the very beginning." Moscow
knows that this is acceptable to neither the US nor
Israel.
The note did not explicitly rule out additional
interim measures in which the Soviets would have
a role-such as a new Golan Heights disengage-
ment agreement-and Soviet President Podgorny
told a visitor last week that the Soviets are not op-
posed in principle to further partial steps.
The note will nevertheless make it more dif-
ficult for the Soviets to pursue US suggestions that
informal Middle East negotiations be undertaken.
It may be that the Soviets think Syria is not ready
to move on a new Golan Heights disengagement
accord and are resigned to a stalemate in the Mid-
dle East.
Moscow apparently has one eye on Egyptian
President Sadat's advocacy at the UN last month
of a resumption of the Geneva talks, with PLO
participation. The Soviets do not want to be out-
flanked by their Egyptian antagonist and may have
hoped to compel him to acknowledge that on at
least one issue, he and Moscow are on the same
side.
The Soviets, who have been defensive about
their exclusion from Middle East diplomacy, may
also have wanted to suggest that they still have a
major role in the area. One press article, for ex-
ample, said the proposal gives the lie to "short--
sighted Arabs" who say that Moscow has "virtual-
ly disassociated itself" from Middle East affairs.
The Kremlin may want to get a similar message
across to its domestic audience in the months
prior to the 25th party congress.
.r' i - ? c
SOVIET DEBT MISSION IN CAIRO
A Soviet delegation arrived in Egypt on
Tuesday to resume discussions on rescheduling
Egypt's economic and military debt to the
USSR, which totals at least $2 billion. Although
the Soviets are apparently prepared to offer
some counterproposals to Cairo's demand for a
ten-year moratorium, these will probably fall
far short of Egyptian desires. Soviet-Egyptian
trade relations are also being discussed.
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USSR _...) 3 -;, e'
LARGE ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION
The annual Antarctic expedition this year will
begin construction of a temporary research base
on the Weddell Sea, in addition to the usual
scientific research and exploration. The first ships
have already left for the south polar area.
Russian interest in the Antarctic is long stan-
ding. Russian captains Bellingshausen and Lazarev
led an expedition in 1819. The first Soviet expedi-
tion was in 1955; this year's is the 21st. Probably
the most significant measure of this growing
Soviet interest is the number of scientists on each
expedition who stay through the austral winter
(April through November). The number has
grown steadily over the past 14 years, with 255
scheduled to do so next year-three times the
winter population at US bases.
Since the expedition in 1955, the Soviets have
sent expeditions annually to the Antarctic during
the austral summer. They have established six per-
manent stations that circle the continent; a
seventh was under construction, but they have
been unable to reach it for the last few years.
In addition, temporary bases were set up,
and the new one on the Weddell Sea will be in
operation during the summer for about five years.
Recent negotiations between the 12
signatories to the Antarctic treaty have focused on
how to control future exploitation of the con-
tinent's fuel and mineral resources. The only
agreement reached so far is to continue to seek
an international arrangement and to restrain
commercial exploration.
A Soviet announcement that the new base
would be used for geological and mineral ex-
ploration was interpreted by some as a breach of
the agreement. Soviet officials were quick to
stress that the exploration will be scientific rather
than commercial in intent.
A wide range of meteorological and
geophysical observations regularly have been
conducted at all stations. Meteorological research
is facilitated by the use of small sounding rockets
launched from the Molodezhnaya station.
The monitoring of Soviet activity has become
more difficult, even though the 12-nation Antarc-
tic treaty requires annual written reports on all
Antarctic explorations. In recent years, the Soviet
reports have been incomplete and have been
submitted late.
Signatory nations have the right to visit each
other's research stations. The US has sent one
scientist to work at a Soviet station each year, and
the Soviets have reciprocated. The US
supplements these exchanges by inspections of
one or two Soviet stations every three or four
years.
Five ships will participate in the Soviet ex-
pedition now en route. The flagship is the newly
constructed research ship, Mikhail Somov, which
has a strengthened hull for ice operations. The
Somov's predecessor, the Ob, was stuck in the ice
for four months in 1973 after trying to reach the
Russkaya station.
Three of the ships left Leningrad during the
past month and are heading south. One probably
will stop at Australia to pick up about a third of
the Soviet party for transport to Antarctica. This
has been standard Soviet procedure on the last
seven or eight expeditions.
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Antarctic station Leningradskaya
The severe drought this year has left impor-
tant winter grain areas far short of the soil
moisture reserves required for a good crop. Per-
sistence of drought conditions-while facilitating
fall sowing-has already hurt the crop by limiting
germination and retarding hardening, making the
plants more vulnerable to winterkill.
The winter crop, which usually accounts for
one third of total grain production, is critical
because grain stocks are extremely low. In an ef-
fort to recover from the 1975 harvest failure, the
Soviets planted winter grains on 37 million hec-
tares, the largest area sown since 1970.
At the end of October, soil moisture reserves
were at a record low in parts of the Baltic
republics and Belorussia, in the eastern and
southern Ukraine, and in parts of the Black Soil
Zone, the Northern Caucasus and the Volga
valley. Conditions are particularly severe in the
southern Volga region where a year-long drought
remains unbroken. The area affected normally ac-
counts for half of all winter grain, and about a
third of this area is critically low in soil moisture.
The crucial period for winter grains is just
beginning. Continued dry conditions, coupled
with a cold winter, could destroy an above
average proportion of the crop before spring.
Acreage lost to winterkill-which has ranged in
the past from negligible to 30 percent of the total
crop-would have to be replanted to the lower-
yielding and more drought-vulnerable spring
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President Geisel ^ #,,MMA
BRAZIL: HUMAN RIGHTS L-
The death of newsman Vladimir Herzog in a
Sao Paulo jail almost a month ago is still a focus for
international criticism of Brazilian violations of
human rights.
Herzog is only one of several political
prisoners who have died recently under
mysterious circumstances, but he has become a
"cause celebre" because of special circumstances
surrounding his death. A prominent television
director and film maker, he is known to have
gone voluntarily to military headquarters for
questioning on the day he died. Regional army
authorities claim he committed suicide after con-
fessing membership in the illegal communist par-
ty, but they refused family requests to view his
body or to hold an autopsy. In addition, even
though Herzog was Jewish, the Roman Catholic
Cardinal held an ecumenical memorial Mass in
his honor that was attended by thousands, and
the Jewish community had him buried in con-
secrated ground. The wide publicity given these
events represents a sharp, if passive, rebuke to the
system of military justice by liberal elements of
the population.
Herzog's death could have occurred acciden-
tally at the hands of a zealous military in-
terrogator, but his arrest was part of a wider
pattern of official repression by security agencies,
who have put hundreds of people behind bars on
charges of subversion in the last few months. The
crackdown has tended to focus on prominent
citizens-journalists, lawyers, professors, labor
leaders, and members of the legal opposition par-
ty-and may have developed out of arrests early
this year of suspected communists. It also appears
to be a calculated and even ostentatious effort by
conservative military groups to force a complete
reversal of the political liberalizing trend initiated
by President Geisel.
While no one has publicly disputed the right
of security forces to detain and question suspects
in connection with the fight against subversion,
there has been open criticism under Geisel of in-
terrogation methods, and increasing
charges-especially by church and opposition
political leaders-that military security officials
routinely violate human rights through illegal
arrests and torture. Although Geisel apparently
does not know about or approve of many of these
actions, he has yet to discipline those who
operate independently of his authority.
The resurgence of criticism appears to be for-
cing some military leaders to try to dissociate
themselves from the issue, while driving those
responsible for internal security into an even
more intransigent position. Some army leaders
reportedly are trying to persuade federal police to
assume a greater public responsibility for national
security affairs. This suggests that at least some
generals find the human rights spotlight uncom-
fortable. There is no evidence that the police
want to accept responsibility for suppressing
communists or that hard-line elements in the
military would be willing to give it up. On the
contrary, the most likely prospect is that the con-
troversy over human rights will serve to deepen
divisions within the armed forces as well as within
the Geisel administration.
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~-7-ki-
CUBA: STILL REVOLUTIONARY-MINDED
Recent Cuban statements suggest that
Havana's interest in improving relations with the
US takes a distinctly second place to its desire to
further the revolutionary cause in Africa. Havana
has not yet acknowledged the presence of Cuban
fighting men in Angola, but it appears ready to
justify their involvement and the inevitable
casualties as a necessary response to US
"imperialist" intervention in Africa, whatever
problems this may cause later in dealing with
Washington.
The Foreign Ministry has released a declara-
tion calling on "revolutionary, progressive, and
independent peoples of the world" to aid the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
against the "racist oligarchy of South Africa, the
imperialist forces, and their reactionary African
allies."
Also, a Foreign Ministry official, who some-
times serves as a commentator on the island-
wide television network, was even more pointed
in his accusations, charging that the resistance
to the Popular Movement was part of a vast
CIA plot a ainst Angola and Portugal.
COLOMBIA: SECURITY CRACKDOWN
President Lopez has ordered a military and
police crackdown on public disorders and
terrorism throughout the country.
The hard line apparently stems both from in-
creasing military pressure on Lopez to take more
forceful action and his belated recognition that
the recent wave of crime, kidnapings, and strikes
has undermined popular confidence in and sup-
port for his government. Last June, Lopez
declared a state of siege to curb student protests
and country-wide demonstrations against
economic hardships. Army units were called on to
help police maintain order. This time he has
emphasized that restoring public safety is his
primary concern. Lopez traveled twice this month
to Medellin, the country's major commercial
center, which has been badly shaken by a rash of
kidnapings. He told local officials there that he
would soon decree further measures to combat
terrorism. At the same time, municipal and
national police officials in Bogota announced the
preparation of an overall security plan, including
the assignment of troops to patrol Bogota and
major cities.
Although the local media are giving much
play to the government's security measures, with
heavy emphasis on arrests of suspected criminals
and counterinsurgency operations, there is no in-
dication that these measures have had more than
a palliative effect on the security problem, which
has deep economic, political, and social roots.
Several strikes have been brought under control,
but a more serious challenge lies ahead with
reported plans for a nationwide strike by com-
munist-controlled bank unions. Police, military,
and other security forces are paid through the
banks, and strikes in this vital area would have
serious repercussions on the general security
AT,
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CR5
ARGENTINA: PERON FIGHTS BACK
The administration this week made two im-
portant political moves-one conciliatory, the
other defiant-which, by design or not, are
almost certain to add to the disarray of President
Peron's opponents.
On Monday, the government announced
that presidential elections would be advanced
from 1977 to late next year. The decision was
probably urged on Peron by top government of-
ficials anxious to lessen the possibility of a military
take-over that would scuttle their own chances to
compete for the presidency. It also constitutes
something of a concession to presidential critics
by signaling Peron's willingness, for the moment
at least, to be responsive to them. With the selec-
tion of a successor to the discredited President
more nearly at hand, her numerous foes may well
ease pressure on her to resign. Moreover,
national attention should quickly focus on cam-
paigning and preparations for the elections.
The decision could, however, be a ploy
designed to ease strains temporarily while Peron
or one of her intimates works out some other
bold move. There is ample precedent for this.
Also on Monday, the administration moved
to block a congressional inquiry into alleged
widespread corruption in the executive branch,
especially in the welfare ministry. The govern-
ment challenged the legality of the investigation
and implied that those who favor it harbor
"coup" and "treasonous" motives. It also ad-
vanced one argument-the duplication of effort
between this investigation and one already being
conducted by the attorney general-that might
get it off the hook. Some of its critics may decide
that-with earlier elections in prospect-one in-
vestigation might suffice, even though the at-
torney general is much more susceptible to
manipulation by the executive branch.
Peron's ability to stay in office-despite her
administration's many failures and despite
repeated threats to remove her-stems from the
factionalism and lack of resolve among those op-
posed to her. No one group, including the
military, has enough cohesiveness or backing
from other sectors to dare the final step of ousting
the President. Peron's many enemies, though
they agree on the need for another solution,
seem unable to find one.
The administration's latest moves will add to
this disarray of the forces ranged against it. Most
critics will oppose the government's rejection of
the congressional investigation, but many of them
will welcome the advancing of elections, an idea
that was proposed some time ago by the opposi-
tion Radical Party. On balance, the government,
by signaling its intention to compromise on one
issue and wage protracted legal battle if need be
on another, seems likely to give administration
critics considerable pause and buy Peron still
more time.
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GUYANA: ROAD TO SOCIALISM
Prime Minister Forbes Burnham is trying to
speed Guyana's evolution into a de facto one-par-
ty socialist state. In recent weeks, he has spelled
out proposals for a radical shift in his country's
economic and political life and the rapid subor-
dination of the government to his political party,
the People's National Congress.
Specific measures are reportedly being
developed by cabinet and party officials. They
seem likely to include:
? A compulsory national service
system with heavy political indoctrination
for the nation's youth.
? Increasing political censorship and
monopoly control of the media.
? Further pressure on trade unions to
make them subordinate to the party.
? Politicization of the educational
system, with eventual Chinese-style com-
pulsory five-day boarding facilities.
? Further state control of the
economy, with early moves against the
largely foreign insurance and banking firms.
? Tighter currency and emigration
control.
? Further identification in inter-
national forums with socialist countries and
communist parties.
In order to bolster his and his party's position
in the bureaucracy and the Guyanese Defense
Force, Burnham has inaugurated compulsory
"development courses" lasting several weeks at
interior training centers. Several hundred senior
civil service personnel and the top military com-
mand have already gone through what some of
them have derisively described as
"brainwashing." Last month, four hundred
members of the overwhelmingly black defense
force began their political indoctrination.
Q ItS
Defense leaders for the most part have gone
along with Burnham's politicization of their ser-
vice. Early this year, Burnham instituted a sweep-
ing change in the top personnel, placing party
partisans in key positions.
Although some less radical members of the
cabinet have privately criticized Burnham's
policies, they have not voiced these reservations
publicly. The only public opposition has come
from some members of the East Indian communi-
ty and leaders of the several religious
organizations who have become increasingly
fearful of the radical socialist program of the
government.
Although such criticism particularly from the
religious communities is disquieting to the
government, it is obviously insufficient to deter
Burnham. The active involvement of the still
passive and leaderless East Indian community and
of additional middle class blacks will be necessary
before such opposition can hope to have any ap-
preciable impact. At present there is little
likelihood that those disparate groups will join
forces or that a leader can be found to marshal
opposition to the government.
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SECRET
SURINAM ACHIEVES INDEPENDENCE
Surinam will become South America's second
non-Latin independent nation on November 25.
The country has weathered a parliamentary im-
passe that threatened to upset the established
timetable, but enmity between the two major
ethnic groups, the creoles (blacks) and East In-
dians, endangers prospects for future stability.
Centrist Minister-President Henck Arron
heads a predominantly black coalition of both
militants and non-militants. The actions of the
leader of the left wing of the coalition, rabid black
nationalist Edward Bruma, have exacerbated the
fears of East Indians-the country's largest ethnic
group with 37 percent of the population- as well
as of the less numerous Javanese and Chinese,
that Surinam is rapidly following the path of its
neighbor Guyana toward becoming a creole-
dominated state.
Jagernath Lachmon, leader of the Hindustani
Reformed Party (VHP) that represents the East In-
dian community, has steadily opposed in-
dependence, for without Dutch protection his
group's interests will be even more ignored. In a
last ditch effort, he delayed independence
preparations for six weeks by persuading three
legislators from Arron's ruling coalition to defect,
thereby stripping the government of its majority.
The political deadlock handcuffed the Staten
(parliament) until mid-October, when George
Hindorie, a prominent Hindustani Reformed Par-
ty member, announced that he would cooperate
with the government long enough to permit
enactment of necessary pre-independence
legislation.
The Netherlands has been determined that
there would be no delay in granting in-
dependence. The government is under domestic
pressure to end the influx of poor Surinamers into
Holland's urban slums. Over the past few years
approximately a fifth of Surinam's population of
400,000 has gone to the Netherlands. Most of
them are East Indians, who are lured by visions of
economic improvement, fearful of their future in
a creole-run Surinam, and aware that emigration
to Holland will be far more difficult after in-
dependence.
The final debate in Surinam's Staten got un-
der way this week, with the major items on the
agenda consisting of the adoption of a constitu-
tion that would protect the civil liberties of the
East Indian community and the reaching of an
agreement that would alleviate economic dis-
crimination against certain non-creole groups. A
grievance that has aroused especially bitter
feelings is the charge that Minister of Economics
Bruma has used the state purchasing and dis-
tributing agency to squeeze East Indian farmers
and Chinese merchants in order to gain populari-
ty with poor urban blacks.
Arron's coalition now has a two-vote majority
because of resignations and absences, and the
government appears ready to make concessions
to placate the Hindustani Reformed Party. Even
Bruma has agreed not to interfere. While there is
still a possibility that isolated disturbances will
mar the festivities, the US consulate expects the
celebration to come off as planned-.
The next major step is likely to be elections to
the Staten. Arron is reported to have promised
early elections in return for Hindorie's support in
breaking the parliamentary impasse. The party
alignment for an election is uncertain at this time.
In view of the popularity of the government with
the creoles and the disunity of the East Indians,
Arron may reason that continuing the present rul-
ing coalition offers the greatest assurance of
success. The Minister-President played a major
role in creating the alliance of parties that
brought the creoles to power in 1973, and he is
not likely to dismantle it lightly.
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SECRET
SOUTH KOREA: THE ENERGY PROBLEM
During the past decade, South Korea has
emerged as a major oil consumer and now ranks
as the third largest importer among developing
countries. While total energy consumption rose 8
percent annually in 1967-74, oil usage increased
three times as fast. Oil, with 300,000 barrels now
consumed per day, supplies about half of all
energy used. Industry uses about 50 percent of
the oil. The transport and household sectors take
most of the remainder.
Growth in oil consumption slowed to 3 per-
cent last year, largely because of an industrial
slump. This year, faced with mounting
SOUTH KOREA
Energy Consumption*
1,460.0
Oil
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Wood/Charcoal
Coal
1966 1971 1974 1981
Projected
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balance-of-payments pressures largely reflecting
greatly increased oil prices, the government is en-
forcing tougher conservation measures that
should hold growth in oil consumption under
10-percent. Normally oil consumption would rise
faster than industrial output, which will jump
12-percent this year. Commercial consumption
appears to be rebounding after last year's slump,
and unusually dry weather has required a sharp
rise in the use of fuel oil by the electric power in-
dustry.
Over the longer term, Seoul expects oil con-
sumption to increase rapidly. According to
government estimates, requirements will reach
about 850,000 barrels per day in 1981, nearly triple
the current level. The pattern of consumption is
not likely to change much; the industrial share
will be buoyed by the requirements of several
major petrochemical plants now under con-
sideration. Plans now call for oil to supply nearly
60 percent of total energy needs by the early
1980s.
Because all oil requirements are met from
abroad, import patterns have closely followed
consumption trends. In 1974, and earlier this
year, however, oil imports increased somewhat
faster than consumption because of government
efforts to increase stocks. In addition to normal
commercial inventories, Seoul wants to increase
energy stocks to a 45-day supply. At the time of
the 1973 oil embargo, South Korea was caught
with little more than a 20-day stockpile.
Saudi Arabia supplies 60 percent of crude im-
ports; Kuwait and Iran supply the remainder.
Small amounts of petroleum products are
purchased abroad, chiefly from Japan. South
Korean hopes to reduce dependence on im-
ported oil by developing offshore fields in the
Yellow and East China Seas have been damped by
conflicting territorial claims. Only a few wells
have been drilled so far on the East China Sea
continental shelf, which is claimed in part by the
Japanese. Chinese claims have interfered with
work in the Yellow Sea.
Although of declining importance in recent
years, coal remains a major energy source.
Government aid is expected to boost coal
production by a million tons annually through
1981. Imports are expected to provide 35 percent
of coal supplies by 1980, compared with only 5
percent at present.
Nuclear energy plans are highly ambitious.
Although no nuclear power plants currently are
in operation, Seoul expects nuclear power to
provide 6 percent of total energy needs by the
early 1980s.
Financing a nuclear program of this scale will
be most difficult. The cost, now estimated at $32
billion, is sure to rise substantially. Seoul already
has borrowed heavily to finance record trade
deficits in 1974 and 1975 and will continue to need
foreign credits for several years even without
large-scale imports of nuclear equipment.
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Secret
Secret
A"O
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