WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
Cl WS 76-017
No. 0017/76
April 23, 1976
Copy N?_ 1411
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CONTENTS
Current intelligence
o +anerts of the wee
Economic
morning bythe
rnolyzes signifi_
Thursday. it
prepared
the Office of Geo rapf
and the Directorc+te of Science
rid Cartographic
and Technology,
1 Middle East - Africa
Lebanon; USSR-Lebanon;
Israel; Iraq-Syria; Rhodesia;
South Africa - Israel
3 South Asia
India
4 East Asia - Pacific
China; Cambodia
5 International
Brazil-France
6 Europe
Italy; Arms Standardization;
European ommunity;
Soviet Food
Shortages; Czechoslovakia
8 Western Hemisphere
Mexico; Argentina
9 Portugal: F7ecliou Preview
13 Kenya: Worried Ahout Neighhors
[dp,' omments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome They may be
rected to the editor of the Weekl
ummary
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LEBANON ?~.
Developments in Lebanon this week
were heavily influenced by an agreement
worked out in Damascus on April 16 by
Syrian President Asad and Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat. The agreement was
aimed in part at patching over differences
between the Syrians and Lebanese leftists
led by Kama[ Jumblatt after Syrian
regular forces moved into Lebanon earlier
this month.
Asad agreed to a request by Jumblatt,
through Arafat, for the revival of thejoint
Syrian- Palestinian- Lebanese truce com-
mittee to police the new cease-fire that
went into effect on April 20. Asad rebuff-
ed Jumblatt's demand that Syria
withdraw its forces and gained Arafat's
public support for a continuation of
Syrian mediation. Both Asad and Arafat
rejected publicly other Arab or inter-
national participation in future settlement
talks.
Asad may have given certain private
assurances to Arafat to mollify Jumblatt
and win leftist support. In any event,
Jumblatt has no choice but to acquiesce so
long as the mainline Palestinian groups,
which provide the bulk of his arms and
fighting men, are prepared to cooperate
with the Syrians.
The Syrian-Palestinian agreement
caused immediate concern among
Lebanon's top Christian leaders. Presi-
5,, ~ Soviet Views of Syrian Role in Lebanon
Moscow, although increasingly uncom- movement best serves their long-term in-
fortable with Syria's role in Lebanon, still terests.
seems to regard it as the best way out of The Soviets seem suspicious that what
the crisis. they view as tacit US-Syrian cooperation
The Soviets have come under pressure over Lebanon could open the door to
from Lebanese leftist leader Jumblatt and more US influence in Damascus.
Palestine Liberation Organization chief Moscow is also concerned that the mis-
Arafat to urge Syria to end its interven- sion of Ambassador Brown and the
tion in Lebanon. Moscow has clearly been presence of the Sixth Fleet might mean
discomfited by the growing gulf between that the US is preparing its own formula
the Syrians and its Palestinian allies and to end the conflict. Moscow has kept up a
Lebanese leftist friends. One Soviet of- steady drumbeat of criticism of US naval
ficial in Moscow recently acknowledged movements off the Lebanese coast, charg-
that while Syrian mediation may still be a ing they represent a return to the
good thing, it had led to considerable dis- "bankrupt gunboat diplomacy" of the
agreement and Arab disunity. The official past.
was particularly disturbed by the confu- Despite these misgivings, Moscow has
sion in fedayeen ranks. The Soviets are continued to endorse Syrian mediation ef-
concerned that if Syria dominates forts publicly, although in cooler terms
Lebanon, Arafat's leadership of the PLO than before. Moscow welcomed the recent
could be challenged by its pro-Syria fac- agreement between Arafat and Asad and
tion. Although the Soviets have had their must be particularly pleased by their
problems with Arafat, they think his public rejection of a US role in settling the
leadership of an independent Palestinian conflict.
dent Franjiyah-apparently with the en-
couragement of Interior Minister
Shamun-attached new conditions to
signing the constitutional amendment that
provides for the early election of his
successor. Franjiyah and Shamun fear
that Asad may have secretly agreed to
scrap the February political settlement,
under which the Christians would salvage
much of their political position.
Damascus has denied this publicly and
privately. Saiga leader Zuhayr Muhsin
reportedly told representatives of the
Christian Phalanges Party at a meeting of
the truce committee this week that Syria
had made no secret commitments to
Arafat, and Asad probably gave similar
assurances to a special envoy of Franjiyah
who visited Damascus on April 21.
The restoration of the truce committee
has reduced the level of fighting, which
late last week had again become intense in
Beirut and nearby mountain villages. By
midweek, however, the committee was
still having trouble suppressing violence in
the capital, with elements on both sides
continuing to trade artillery and mortar
fire.
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Interior Minister Shamun A P
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ISRAEL - / I
A march staged in the Israeli-occupied
West Bank on April 18-19 by the Jewish
ultraconservative Gush Emunim group
touched off a new round of violent an-
ti-Israeli demonstrations this week by
West Bank Arabs strongly opposed to the
group's demands that Jews be permitted
to settle in greater numbers in the
territory.
Some 30,000 Israelis reportedly par-
ticipated in the march, which began near
Ram Allah and ended at Jericho. The
event was timed to influence a govern-
ment debate on West Bank settlement
policy tentatively scheduled for the end of
April. Disagreement among Israeli
political factions over the wisdom of per-
mitting the march will sharpen the debate.
In Nabulus, one Arab demonstrator
was killed and eight others wounded by
Israeli troops attempting to restore order.
Another Arab was wounded by Israeli
soldiers in a similar incident at Jenin. One
of the largest demonstrations occurred in
Ram Allah, triggered by the accidental
shooting late last week of a six-year-old
Arab boy by Israeli troops. The Israelis
were trying to disperse a crowd quarreling
over the results of the municipal council
elections on April 12.
Israeli authorities imposed curfews on
several towns and reinforced their
military and police forces in the territory.
By midweek an uneasy calm appeared to
be returning to the West Bank, and some
curfews were lifted. Israeli officials are
also appealing-as they did during the
Arab demonstrations in February and
March-to the members of municipal
councils in the area to help maintain
order. Many of these councilmen,
however, were elected last week on
nationalist slates favoring the Palestine
Liberation Organization. The Israelis are
likely to have difficulty securing 'r
cooperation.
IRAQ-SYRIA
Iraq cut off oil to Syria on April 9, forc-
ing Damascus to seek high quality crude
elsewhere to meet its commercial and
military needs. The Syrians have tem-
porarily curtailed or suspended domestic
air service to conserve aviation fuel and
have approached the Saudis to help make
up the shortfall.
The transit pipeline agreement between
Iraq and Syria, under which Syria had
been buying 50,000 barrels per day of
Iraqi crude at a price of only $3.00 per
barrel, expired last December. Since then,
differences over the future sale price of
Iraqi oil and over Syrian transit fees have
prevented Damascus and Baghdad from
concluding a new agreement.
Syria depends exclusively on Iraq for
light crude. Syria earned some $150
million last year in transit fees on the oil
passing from Iraq through Syria to the
Mediterranean.
Damascus could buy light crude from
other suppliers-at world market prices,
more than $11.50 per barrel. Syria would
also incur additional transport costs in
getting the oil to the Homs refinery. If
Damascus purchases light crude from
Saudi Arabia, the Saudis might provide
some concessions, but Syria would still
have to pay substantially more than under
the Iraqi terms in effect until last
December.
The move may have been timed to
hamper Syria's efforts to resolve the
Lebanese crisis. The Iraqis have supplied
arms and money to fedayeen radicals in
an effort to undercut Syrian mediation ef-
forts there and have been vocal in their
criticism of recent Damascus policies.
Baghdad would like to see a Syrian failure
in Lebanon lead to the overthrow of Presi-
dent Asad.
The two rival Baathist regimes in Syria
and Iraq have been bickering more or less
openly since last spring when Damascus
cut off water to Iraq from the Euphrates
River after Iraq allegedly meddled in
Syria's internal affairs. If Syria decides to
put pressure on Iraq to resume oil
shipments, cutting the flow of water again
would be the most obvious and effective
RHODESIA
Rhodesian nationalist guerrillas based
in Mozambique have for the first time at-
tacked important lines of communication
in southeastern Rhodesia.
A train on the Rutenga-Beitbridge
railway was damaged last weekend by an
explosive device. Earlier this month,
Rhodesian security forces had removed an
unexploded device from the tracks.
The Fort Victoria - Beitbridge highway
was temporarily closed by the Rhodesian
police on April 19 after three South
African tourists were killed and another
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wounded in a terrorist attack the previous
night.
Until now, most guerrilla activity in the
southeast has been within 10 to 15 miles
of the Mozambique border, but a few
small guerrilla groups have penetrated
farther into southern portions of the coun-
try. The recent incidents occurred about
85 miles from the border.
Most guerrillas operating in Rhodesia
are in the northeast, long the focus of in-
surgent activity. There are probably now
only a few hundred guerrillas in the
southeast. With the end of the rainy
season at hand, however, the insurgents
may be shifting more of their activity to
the southeast where natural cover is better
during the dry season.
SOUTH AFRICA - ISRAEL
South African Prime Minister Vorster,
following his recent four-day visit to
Israel, announced that the two countries
have reached a broad agreement to ex-
pand economic and scientific cooperation.
Vorster probably at least explored
possibilities for obtaining Israeli ar-
maments to strengthen South Africa's
armed forces.
Vorster said that a joint ministerial
Prime Ministers Forster (1) and Rabin during their talks in Jerusalem
o ea
committee would meet regularly to
promote projects using South African raw
materials and Israel's skilled manpower.
Prospects appear slim, however, for a
significant expansion in nonmilitary
trade, which is now less than 1 percent of
either state's total foreign trade.
Speculation that the South Africans are
shopping for Israeli arms has been
prompted by the 40-percent increase in
the defense budget for the coming year
that Vorster submitted to his parliament
last month. South Africa in fact could
become one of Israel's best markets for
arms and technical military assistance.
Early this year Israel sold to South
Africa 10 tank hulls, from which South
Africa will probably try to assemble ar-
mored vehicles. Pretoria has reportedly
been negotiating since late 1974 for
Reshef-class patrol boats and Gabriel
naval cruise missiles; sales of these items
have not been confirmed.
Other Israeli weapons that might in-
terest South Africa are the Kfir fighter,
the Shafrir air-to-air missile, and the
Arava STOL transport. Since Pretoria
has Mirages in its inventory, South
African air force personnel would have lit-
tle trouble in adapting to the Kfir, which
is based on a Mirage. Any sales or
transfers of the Kfir, which has US
engines, would require US approval,
however.
Favorable reactions to the visit in
South Africa have apparently strengthen-
ed domestic support for Vorster's efforts
to increase the limited number of states
openly supportive of South Africa. Ap-
parently, Rabin is willing to lend himself
to South Africa's attempt to play up the
importance of Vorster's visit even though
it might hinder Israel's efforts to
re-establish ties with black Africa and
provide additional grist for Israel's
detractors in the UN. 125X1
INDIA 2 CPS -2 t
During the past week Prime Minister
Gandhi's government moved to improve
relations with China and Pakistan. On
April 15, Foreign Minister Chavan an-
nounced the appointment of an am-
bassador to Peking. Four days later, New
Delhi announced its willingness to discuss
with Pakistan several major unresolved
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issues and the resumption of diplomatic
relations.
China and India withdrew ambassadors
prior to the Sino-Indian border war of
1962. Relations were never severed, and
small diplomatic missions have continued
to operate. Occasional efforts to improve
relations in recent years have come to
nothing because of recurrent disputes and
occasional border clashes.
China has long insisted that India,
which was the first to withdraw its am-
bassador, be the first to return one. The
Indians have been reluctant to comply in
the absence of an unequivocal commit-
ment by China to reciprocate. New Delhi
finally conceded to the Chinese demand,
with only a verbal understanding that
Peking would send an ambassador to New
Delhi shortly after the Indian diplomat
presents his credentials.
The announced Indian willingness to
meet with the Pakistanis to discuss possi-
ble renewal of overflights, resumption of
rail and road communications, and
restoration of diplomatic ties, came in
response to a Pakistani decision to drop a
five-year-old case against India before the
International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion. Negotiations are likely to be difficult
and could bog down once again in an ex-
change of recriminations.
In any event, India will still face un-
resolved problems with both countries.
China and India have conflicting border
claims; Kashmir will remain an unsettled
issue between Pakistan and India.
India probably hopes by these latest
moves to improve its position among
Third World countries prior to the non-
aligned summit meeting in August. India
is regarded by many of these nations as
too closely tied to the Soviet Union.
Indian officials presumably informed
Soviet diplomats of the proposed in-
itiatives prior to the public an-
nouncements and, probably not coin-
cidentally, announced on April 15 the
signing of a major trade pact with the
Soviet Union. Gandhi reportedly is plan-
ning to visit Moscow early in June to con-
fer with Soviet leaders.
CHINA 2 ~ - 3
Senior military leader Yeh Chien-ying,
a staunch supporter of ousted Teng
Hsiao-ping, returned to Peking last week
after a three-month absence, reportedly
in south China. His return suggests he is
reasonably satisfied with the compromises
arranged after Teng's fall. It is also a
further indication that moderates have
come through that event relatively un-
scathed.
Yeh reportedly walked off his Defense
Ministry job in protest last January, when
Teng was not named to succeed Chou
En-lai as premier. The defense job had ap-
parently been kept open for Yeh. To mask
this high-level disagreement over the at-
tack on Teng, Peking issued a document
claiming that Yeh was "ill" and that his
duties were being performed by Politburo
member Chen Hsi-lien. Chen was never
identified-publicly or privately-as act-
ing defense minister and has not
Yeh Chien-ying
appeared in public since February 28.
Yeh was not identified as defense
minister in his public appearance last
week, but that in itself is not particularly
significant. He is not usually so identified
when he appears in public. It seems un-
likely that he would have returned to Pe-
king if he had lost the Defense Ministry
job, although it is possible that this posi-
tion, as well as that of chief of staff, is still
subject to bargaining. Yeh is the last
leading moderate to appear since Teng's
fall and was himself reportedly under
criticism in February. His return to public
view makes even more glaring the absence
of all but one of the party leftists leading
the attack on Teng. Their nonappearance
suggests serious dissatisfaction with the
recent turn of events.
The moderates appear to have been
successful in restricting the campaign to
Teng and protecting his supporters. Mao
himself reportedly stated recently that the
Cultural Revolution of the mid- I960s was
"30 percent bad" because too many inno-
cent officials were overthrown. Coming
just after Teng's ouster, the Chairman's
remarkable admission seems to indicate
that Teng's fall is not the opening shot in
another round of leaders hi purges.
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CAMBODIA
The Khmer communists, one year after
their take-over, completed their
governmental reorganization last week,
announcing appointments to top
positions. The announcements followed a
three-day session of the popular assembly,
elected last month, which ratified the ap-
pointments and officially accepted the
"retirement" of Prince Sihanouk and the
resignation of the former cabinet.
Khieu Samphan was named chairman
of the new State Presidium and will
doubtless continue as the regime's leading
spokesman. Several other leading com-
munist figures have kept their cabinet
positions-most notably deputy prime
ministers leng Sary and Son Sen who
retained the portfolios for foreign affairs
and defense respectively. They have held
these posts since last August. Their wives
have also been given cabinet posts.
A number of figures not previously
BRAZIL-FRANCE 72,74
President Geisel hopes to forge closer
ties with France when he meets with
President Giscard d'Estaing in Paris next
week. Consultations between the two
nations have become frequent during the
past year, and an exchange of visits by the
foreign ministers helped set the stage for
this state visit.
The meeting could produce some major
agreements since commercial talks are
planned and the groundwork is being laid
for closer economic and cultural ties. Dur-
ing the past week, Brazil and France have
already agreed to cooperate in space ex-
ploration and, according to press reports,
are making preparations for large scale
mineral exploration in Brazil and for the
construction of a major hydroelectric
project.
Q
identified as holding positions of respon-
sibility have received high-level jobs. They
The topics to be discussed are likely to
include the newly independent nations of
Portuguese Africa. Both countries are in-
terested in strengthening relations there.
President Giscard will probably also show
interest in the state of Brazilian-US
relations in the aftermath of the visit by
Secretary Kissinger.
Much of the potential for a significant
improvement in relations apparently still
hinges on the issue of nuclear cooperation.
The Brazilians have already obtained a
full nuclear fuel cycle from the West Ger-
mans and do not want to be committed to
specific projects by the French. France,
however, has expressed a desire to
prospect for uranium ore in Brazil and to
establish uranium enrichment facilities
there. Earlier this year Foreign Minister
Sauvagnargues publicly denied reports of
a major dispute, but an agreement setting
the parameters for nuclear cooperation
that expired in 1974 has not been
probably were active in the communist
movement during the war years, but only
now are beginning to surface. The new
prime minister, for example, is Pol
Pot-an individual the Cambodians have
not further identified, but whom the Lao
described in a congratulatory message as
secretary general of the party central
committee. Nuon Chea, a vice chairman
of the communist military forces during
the war, is now chairman of the popular
assembly's standing committee. Other
new faces include Sao Phim and Nhim
Ros as deputy chairmen of the Presidium.
Former prime minister Penn Nouth
was named to an honorary position of
"high counselor," but he is the only im-
portant figure associated with Sihanouk
to be kept on in the new government. His
retention suggests that he will continue to
perform ceremonial duties and be used as
the one remaining symbol of noncom-
munist participation in the government.
renegotiated.
Demonstrations by French leftist par-
ties could mar the festivities. A French
Communist newspaper has already scored
the visit, and leftists have called for
protest demonstrations on the grounds
that Geisel will be trying to attract in-
dustrial investment to Brazil, with its
cheap labor market, at a time when firms
are laying off workers in France. The
probability of serious disruptions is re-
duced, however, by the fact that the Bra-
zilian delegation will be housed on the
outskirts of Paris, and the main banquet
is to be held at Versailles.
Even if little of substance results from
the talks, they will serve to underscore
Brazil's claim to be an independent
emerging power that can deal with great
nations on an equal basis. It is with this in
mind that Geisel also plans to travel to
Great Britain next month. 25X1
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Christian Democratic leader Zac-
cagnini has so far received little en-
couragement from other party leaders in
his last minute consultations aimed at
avoiding an early parliamentary election.
Zaccagnini went ahead with the talks
despite the fact that the Socialists last
week appeared to rule out a compromise
when they called on all of the other parties
to join in asking President Leone to dis-
solve parliament and schedule an election.
The Socialists had been demanding either
an election or the replacement of the
Moro government by an emergency
government that would depend on Com-
Zaccagnini
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munist parliamentary support. The Chris-
tian Democrats' counterproposal would
leave the Moro government in place but
have it negotiate emergency economic
measures and a compromise on the abor-
tion question with all parties except the
neo-fascists.
The Socialists at first refused even to
discuss the Christian Democratic offer
but agreed to meet with Zaccagnini when
the other parties cautiously left the door
open to further negotiations. After
meeting with Zaccagnini this week,
Socialist chief De Martino came close to
rejecting his proposal but said that the
Socialists would not reply formally until
the Christian Democratic leader had con-
sulted the other parties.
At this point, it appears that Zac-
cagnini's only hope of avoiding an elec-
tion centers on the possibility of finding
enough common ground with the Com-
munists to bring pressure on the Socialists
to reconsider their position. Zaccagnini
and the Communists share a desire to
postpone the contest but differ on how to
do it. The Communists are pushing their
own emergency formula under which the
government would consult with them in
parliament on a much broader range of
issues than Zaccagnini proposes.
Conservative Christian Democrats
have so far refused to consider the Com-
munist Party's solution, because they fear
that, in practice, it would enable the Com-
munists, through the back door, to
become part of the government's
parliamentary majority. Under the
proposal that the Christian Democrats
have authorized Zaccagnini to present,
the Communists would still be considered
part of the opposition, despite their con-
sultative role.
President Leone did not appear very
confident this week that Zaccagnini would
succeed in averting an electoral show-
down. In recent months, Leone has stead-
fastly opposed an early election.
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ARMS STANDARDIZATION
Ten European members of NATO's
military organization and France met in
Rome April 9 to consider steps to
promote European collaboration in arms
standardization and production.
The principal order of business at the
meeting was the assignment of tasks to
key national participants. Belgium, which
was largely responsible for gaining French
participation in the arms talks, will chair
a steering group that will coordinate four
joint European arms projects: a tactical
combat aircraft, tank ammunition, a
short-range antitank weapon, and
minesweepers.
The British will collate national require-
ments and draw up an overall schedule
for European equipment replacement.
The Germans have been given the
politically sensitive task of working out
the guidelines for European arms
cooperation. Bonn has stressed the impor-
tance of maintaining momentum and en-
suring that "political principles" not be
lost sight of in the pursuit of specific pro-
jects. Critical issues for the group are how
it will be related to NATO and how it will
achieve a "two-way street" in arms trade
with the US.
Other important questions to be resolv-
ed are how to preserve national produc-
tion capabilities within a comprehensive
European framework and how to com-
pensate countries like Greece, which lack
the industrial capability to share in many
common production efforts.
Efforts of this group to work out
collaborative production arrangements
have tended to eclipse separate NATO
standardization discussions, limiting
the latter to the establishment of com-
mon equipment standards for each ally to
meet. Most of the European members of
the Alliance favor such a "standard-set-
ting" role for NATO and an enhanced
production role for Western Europe. They
see such an arrangement as furthering
their goal of recognition of Western
Europe as an equal partner in the
Alliance.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The EC Commission expects income
disparities among member countries over
the next five years to continue to widen.
Community cohesion as a result will be
further strained, policy coordination will
become more difficult, and pressure for
adopting trade restrictions will intensify.
The commission estimates that during
1976-80 the annual real growth rate of the
community will be 4.4 percent, inflation
will average 7.5 percent, and unemploy-
ment will remain relatively high by EC
standards-probably 3.2 percent in 1980.
Worse than average performance is
generally expected in Great Britain, Italy,
Ireland, and Luxembourg.
A medium-term EC economic program
is still being developed. The commission
would give top priority to job-creating in-
vestment and anti-inflation measures. It
suggests investment subsidies, continued
curbs on labor immigration from third
countries, subsidies for hiring new
workers, and liberalizing retirement rules.
It also favors formal pacts among
business, labor, and government-ap-
parently to control wage increases, slow
inflation, and encourage investment.
Diverging economic trends coupled
with domestic political pressures
guarantee continuing disagreement
among members over future community
economic policies. Britain and Italy can
he expected to advocate measures to
stimulate production and employment,
while West Germany will press for strict
anti-inflationary policies and will resist
calls for greater transfer of its resources.
Persistent economic disparities within
the community may encourage individual
members to opt for trade controls, con-
trary to the wishes of the commission.
Projected economic conditions in Italy
and Britain will increase pressures in these
countries to restrict third country im-
ports. Any such unilateral moves would
violate the Treaty of Rome and further
undermine community cohesion.
F_ I
USSR
55 5 7
The failure of the Soviet grain harvest
last year is causing more and more
localized food shortages.'In rural areas es-
pecially, there are reports of food shor-
tages that in some cases may be severe.
Supplies of most foods are adequate in the
central parts of major cities.
Food shortages will ease as the new
crop becomes available, but meat supplies
will become increasingly tight. We es-
timate that total meat production in 1976
may fall by as much as one quarter below
1975 levels. State-operated packing plants
will be hard-pressed to meet meat produc-
tion goals already reduced 18 percent
from 1975.
Private sector meat output, about one
third of the total, may be off even more.
Scattered reports indicate difficulties in
obtaining feed for privately owned
livestock. In order to maintain herds in
the "socialized" sector, collective and
state farms may refuse to sell pigs from
the spring farrowing to private
households. These piglets are a primary
source of private sector meat production.
Soviet authorities are taking steps to
deal with the meat shortages. The USSR
has just purchased from New Zealand
35,000 tons of mutton and beef, costing
about $28 million. The meat is to be
shipped between January and July, the
period when we expect domestic supplies
to be most restricted. Since the beginning
of the year, there have also been rumors
of meat im ort contracts with Australia
and France.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
President and party chief Gustav
Husak appears to have emerged from the
Czechoslovak party congress last week
with a stronger grip on the party ap-
paratus. He also received a fresh vote of
confidence from the Soviet Union.
Soviet Politburo member Andrey
Kirilenko-unofficial deputy to party
leader Brezhnev-conveyed Moscow's
strong endorsement of Husak's
stewardship, labeling him an "outstan-
ding personality of the international
workers movement" and a "great friend
of the Soviet Union."
Husak extended in the name of the
Central Committee a controversial offer
of conditional rehabilitation to former
party members who were purged or left
the party after the Soviet-led invasion in
1968. The critical test for Husak will
come when the rehabilitation drive meets
expected obstruction from firmly en-
trenched hard liners in the lower levels of
the party apparatus.
The re-election of all the members of
the party presidium except the 80-year-
old and ailing former president Ludvik
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EC
Svoboda underlined continuity in the top
policy-making body. Changes in the
secretariat suggest that Husak now feels
strong enough to put his personal stamp
on day-to-day party business. The
membership of the secretariat increased
with the re-election of Rude Pravo editor-
in-chief Svestka and the addition of three
party officials who have risen to
prominence during Husak's tenure.
The Central Committee elected at the
congress was expanded to 120 full
members. There was an unusually high
turnover; of the 45 newcomers, 39 had not
served as candidate members. Among the
39 members who were not re-elected were
a number of ultraconservative holdovers
from the Novotny period. The changes
were even more striking among the can-
didate ranks. Of the 52 elected, 47 are new
members.
MEXICO
The Echeverria government is under
fire from two of its most important con-
stituents. The business community is up in
arms over a draft law on urban land use,
and angry campesinos are courting
violence in their efforts to obtain more
land. Both problems could carry over into
the administration of President
Echeverria's successor, Jose Lopez Por-
tillo, who takes over in December.
The draft "human settlements" law has
sparked the most bitter business-govern-
ment dispute in recent years. Its main pur-
pose is to curb land speculation by giving
local governments the power to zone land
for "socially beneficial" uses. Its intent is
to establish a system to deal with an ex-
pected huge urban population growth.
The private sector views the legislation
as an unconstitutional assault on private
ownership and part of a trend under
Echeverria toward statism. Government
proponents say the intent is not to con-
fiscate but to correct chaotic urban
growth by channeling new migration into
sparsely settled areas and restraining land
speculators.
As a result of the proposed law, the
business community's initial enthusiasm
for Lopez Portillo as the next president
has waned. Still too much in the
President's shadow to take an indepen-
dent stand, Lopez Portillo has sided with
Echeverria on the issue.
Illegal land seizures in the countryside
are worrying the government even more.
Earlier this month, farm laborers carrying
guns occupied a 400-hectare plot in the
rich Yaqui Valley in the state of Sonora,
Lopez Portillo V ?I
where large and highly productive private-
ly owned farms predominate. Violence
was averted, but landowners fear that
failure to dislodge these squatters will en-
courage others. Land invasions on a
smaller scale did in fact take place recent-
ly in four other states.
While acknowledging that invasions
usually precede a change in ad-
ministrations as campesinos try to
pressure the incoming president,
Echeverria and Lopez Portillo have
spoken out forcefully on the incidents,
calling on the campesinos to avoid
violence.
The government has staves] Off similar
trouble in the past by sending egbinet
ministers to make promises to the
campesinos and to relieve the fears of lan-
downers. This time, however, officials are
concerned that the practice of buying time
has reached the point of diminishing
return and that serious violence is a real
possibility.
7,6-
ARGENTINA
Argentina's military rulers acted with
moderation in an early test of their ability
to handle labor's reaction to the recently
announced economic austerity program.
Troops arrested a few workers in stopping
a wildcat strike at the General Motors
Buenos Aires plant last Monday.
Further government-labor tests may lie
ahead. Slowdowns and extensive sabotage
of production have been reported at other
automotive plants in Buenos Aires and
Cordoba. Absenteeism, which dropped
sharply following the coup on March 24,
is rising again.
Ford workers in Buenos Aires are said
to be ready to demand a 40-percent wage
hike, an increase incompatible with the
terms of the government's stabilization
program.
Labor problems in the automotive in-
dustry are especially touchy because the
plants are foreign owned. Potential
foreign investors that Argentina hopes to
attract will be observing how vigorously
the government deals with troubles in
these plants. Moreover, automotive
products are important earners of urgently
needed foreign exchange.
Success of the government's program
to restore economic stability will depend
on its ability to control labor. The govern-
ment faces a difficult choice. If disruptive
actions continue, more repressive
measures will be needed. Greater repres-
sion, however, could strengthen popular
support for leftist movements and make
the government's other main task-the
ment of terrorism-more difficult.
F7
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The three major noncommunist parties are expected
to divide most of Sunday's vote, with the Communists
running a distant fourth. Actual formation of a new
government must await election within 60 to 75 days of
a new president, who will play a major role in negotiating
its composition.
Portuguese voters go to the polls on
April 25-the second anniversary of the
overthrow of the Caetano regime-to
select their first freely elected parliament
in half a century. The election represents
another victory for the noncommunist
parties and military officers in their ef-
forts to thwart the Communists' drive for
power, although it may not be the final
round in the struggle.
The results of the election on Sunday,
coupled with the outcome of the presiden-
tial election to be held 60-70 days later,
will determine the shape of the new
government to be installed this summer.
Tight security measures have been im-
posed to assure that the balloting for the
new 263-seat Assembly of the Republic
takes place without serious disruption.
The "operational" wing of the military
led by army Chief of Staff Ramalho
Eanes, which has insisted on returning the
government to civilian hands and has been
cooperating closely with the democratic
parties, has been successful in keep-
ing the widespread violence during the
campaign from getting out of hand.
With the pronounced shift away from
the left since last summer, the center and
center-right parties should do well. The
latest polls still show a large number of
uncommitted voters, however, which,
combined with a degree of voter apathy,
could result in a low voter turnout.
This could work in favor of the better
organized left.
Although 14 parties are participating,
only 4 appear to have a chance of ob-
taining a significant percentage of the
vote-the Socialists, the centrist Popular
Democrats, the center-right Social
7~- e~ Z~
Portugal: Election Preview
Democratic Center, and the Communists.
Socialist Party
The fact that a democratic election is
being held at all owes much to the persis-
tent opposition of Mario Soares and other
Socialist leaders to former prime minister
Vasco Goncalves and his Communist sup-
porters. The irony is that the conservative
backlash, which the Socialists by their
criticism of the left helped to trigger, will
cut into the Socialists' own vote,
The Socialists-who have repeatedly
stated their opposition to joining a
post-election coalition-hope to obtain
enough assembly seats to control the
Mario Soares ~C
government. To accomplish this, they say
they must capture 40 percent or more of
the popular vote. The party has portrayed
itself as the only realistic alternative to an
unstable government of the right, attempt-
ing to convince voters that the Socialists
are in the best position-because of their
good international connections-to
oversee Portugal's economic recovery.
To succeed, the Socialists will have to
retain most of the plurality vote which
they gained in the constituent assembly
election last year, make inroads into
Communist strength, pick up support
from the Popular Democratic Party's
alienated left wing, and hold their own
among first-time voters, many of whom
come from the largely conservative ranks
of Angola returnees. A lagging effort in
the closing weeks of the campaign in-
dicates that they will probably fall short
of their goal and have to settle for 30 to 35
percent of the vote.
Popular Democratic Party
The Popular Democrats, led by Fran-
cisco Sa Carneiro, are hoping to
capitalize on the shift to the right to im-
prove substantially on the 26-percent
share of the vote they received last year,
which they believe would assure participa-
tion in the new government.
The party's strategy of seeking a
post-election coalition with the Socialists
will be complicated by its campaign tactic
of attacking Snares' party and attempting
to link the Socialists with the Communists
in the public mind.
The Popular Democrats have a strong
natural constituency in both the north and
in the Azores and Madeiras, but they have
been hampered in broadening their sup-
port by a lack of funds and of experienced
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campaigners-the result of a split by the
party's left-wing leaders in December.
The Popular Democrats have developed
close ties with the Angola refugees and
with small farmers, who are incensed at
the Socialist-supported government land
reform program.
Francisco Sa Carneiro ? ,Z
In order to achieve their election aims,
the Popular Democrats must hold their
strength in the north while picking up
significant numbers of those who voted
Socialist in the Constituent Assembly
election last year. Opinion polls, which
put the Popular Democrats' strength at 28
to 35 percent, would appear to give them
an outside chance of supplanting the
Socialists as the plurality party.
Social Democratic Center
The Popular Democrats probably could
have hoped for even greater gains were it
not for the campaign surge of the Social
Democratic Center, the only major party
which has not participated in recent
governments. Ably led by Diogo Freitas
do Amaral, the party has effectively
presented itself as a fresh alternative to a
succession of leftist governments whose
"socialist" policies have "destroyed" the
economy. In seeking votes from much the
same constituency as the Popular
Democrats, particularly in the north, the
Center has attempted to tie the rival party
to the government's failings.
Prevented from campaigning by leftist
agitators and hampered by a rightist im-
age in last year's election, the Social
Democratic Center received only 7.6 per-
cent of the vote. Its goal this time is to tri-
ple that figure. If the party receives 18 to
25 percent of the vote, as-some polls have
indicated, it will have a strong claim to
participation in the government.
Communist Party
The decision to hold-free elections is a
sharp setback for the Communists, who
have lobbied vigorously against them and
tried to provoke a postponement behind
the scenes. Sensing his party's increasing
isolation, Alvaro Cunha] has attempted
during the campaign to lay the
groundwork for a "popular front" coali-
tion government with the Socialists. This
strategy also appears to have little
chance of success, although some re-
ports indicate that the Communists may
have infiltrated the Socialist Party's
left wing in order to influence that
party's decision after the election.
The Communists-who won 13 percent
of the vote last year-are hoping to garner
at least 10 percent to give at least some
credibility to their argument that they
should be in the new government.
Although the party expects to lose ground
because of the conservative backlash,
much of this may be offset by inheriting
most of the 4.5 percent cast last year for
its front organization, the Portuguese
Democratic Movement, which is not run-
ning candidates of its own. The Com-
munists should poll between 8 and 12 per-
cent of the vote.
The Far Left
The significance of the eight far left
parties on the ballot is that they will draw
votes away from the Communists. They
have effectively used free media exposure
to disparage ties between Cunhal's party
and Soviet leaders-portrayed as
"neo-Hitlers" and "monsters" bent on
military expansion who deprive their peo-
ple of political rights. The far left parties
should retain the 4 percent they received in
the elections last year, giving them
at most two or three assembly seats.
Alvaro Cltnhal
SoyF)TO
Government Possibilities
It appears unlikely that a clear winner
will emerge from Sunday's balloting. A
rough split of the electorate among the
three noncommunist parties, with the
Communists trailing a distant fourth, as
the polls are predicting, is likely to result
in a coalition government comprising the
Socialists and one or both of the parties
on their right. Such a coalition would
have the blessing of the military as well as
a broad base of popular support, but
could be rent by deep-seated differences
over government policy.
Should the Socialists win anywhere
near the 40 percent they are seeking, they
will probably try to form a government on
their own with support from in-
dependents. Such a government is likely
to be viewed with somewhat less favor by
the "operational" military, who, although
they have worked closely with the
Socialists since November, oppose many
of the programs supported by the party's
left wing. Soares and other party
moderates are also concerned about the
strength of the left wing and may
seek to sharply limit its role in
party policy after the election.
Even though the Popular Democrats
and the Social Democratic Center could
win a majority of the assembly seats, a
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two-party right wing coalition with no
labor credentials would lack stability. The
Socialists' labor support appears vital if
the new government is to deal with Por-
tugal's serious economic and social
problems. If there is difficulty in finding a
workable coalition formula, calls for a
national unity government that would in-
clude the Communists are likely to be
heard, especially from leftist officers. The
vital importance of labor peace may also
be advanced as an argument for Com-
munist participation.
The Presidential Election
Whatever the outcome of the assembly
election, the new president-who is given
extensive powers under the con-
stitution-will play an important role in
forming the government.
Disagreement among members of the
Revolutionary. Council-which has ruled
Portugal for the past two years-over the
advisability of running military can-
didates has led to speculation that a
civilian may be considered for the office.
A near-majority vote for one of the non-
communist parties could increase the
likelihood of a civilian president. An in-
conclusive parliamentary election,
however, would seem to dictate the selec-
tion of a strong military figure, capable of
arbitrating policy differences among the
parties in the coalition likely to emerge.
The present head of state, Costa
Gomes, Prime Minister Azevedo, and
army Chief of Staff General Eanes appear
to be fading from contention. Eanes is
considered irreplaceable in his present
position, while party and military support
for both Costa Gomes and Azevedo has
noticeably declined. Northern military
region commander Pires Veloso has
emerged as the military front-runner, with
some support in each of the three major
noncommunist parties.
Pires Veloso is a tough professional
soldier and a rigid disciplinarian who has
been discreetly campaigning behind the
scenes. Recent statements by the general
indicate that as president he would adopt
a hard line against leftist manipulation of
the labor sector, which has contributed
strongly to the present economic malaise.
The two-month interregnum between
elections could see various attempts to
disrupt the relative stability Portugal has
enjoyed since November. A poor election
showing, coupled with probable exclusion
from the government, could prompt the
Communists to take some rash action, in-
cluding an attempt, in collusion with left-
ist military officers, to have the election
results suspended.
Within the Revolutionary Council
itself, the rivalry between the "political"
officers led by Costa Gomes and Foreign
Minister Melo Antunes and the
"operationals" who look to General
Eanes also could reach a flashpoint as the 25X1
"politicals" are faced with turnip ower
over to elected civilians.
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Kenya's traditional concerns over two of its hostile
neighbors-Somalia and Uganda-have been aggravated
by fear that it might be drawn into a possible war over
the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.
top
Kenya: Worried About Neighbors
Kenya believes it is seriously threatened
by two hostile neighbors-Somalia and
Uganda-armed with sophisticated
Soviet weapons and eager to advance
claims to parts of Kenyan territory.
Nairobi maintains one of the smaller
armies in sub-Saharan Africa, preferring
to emphasize economic development
rather than military strength.
Tribal considerations may also enter
into the decision to keep the army
relatively small. It is the only significant
institution in Kenya not dominated by
members of President Kenyatta's Kikuyu
tribe, although recent reorganizations and
promotions are gradually shifting the
balance to the Kikuyu.
I n the past, the Kenyans depended upon
their mutual defense pact with Ethiopia
and a long-standing tacit agreement with
the UK providing for British assistance in
the event of an attack on Kenya.
Nairobi now believes it can no longer
count on British assistance and realizes
that the chances of help from Ethiopia
have been diminished by Addis Ababa's
problems with Somalia and troubles with
insurgencies in Eritrea and elsewhere.
The Kenyans are in fact concerned that
the quarrel between Ethiopia and Somalia
over the future of the French Territory of
the Afars and Issas will lead to open war-
fare and that Kenya will be drawn into
the conflict.
Kenya's policy toward the Horn of
Africa is marked by friendship with
Ethiopia, its partner in a 13-year-old
defense pact, and distrust of Somalia,
which claims about one fifth of Kenya.
Addis
Kenya supports Paris' announced inten-
tion to grant independence to the French
Territory of the Afars and Issas.
Somali designs on the territory-and
Ethiopia's determination to thwart
them-worry the Kenyans, however,
because they fear their defense pact with
Addis Ababa might embroil them in any
military conflict that develops.
Nairobi also believes that a successful
Somali take-over of the territory would
encourage Mogadiscio to act on its claims
to the northeastern part of
Kenya-inhabited primarily by ethnic
Somalis-perhaps by starting a new in-
surgency there. The disputed area is
sparsely settled and all but impossible for
Kenya to defend.
The Soviet presence in Somalia has
heightened Kenyan concerns. Kenya has
been suspicious of the Soviets ever since
Moscow supported some Kenyan leftists
in the 1960s.
In keeping with the terms of the
Kenya-Ethiopia defense pact, officials
from both governments met early this
year to coordinate contingency planning
against Somalia. Nairobi has tentatively
agreed to permit Ethiopia's armed forces
to use Kenyan airports and other facilities
in the event of war between Addis Ababa
and Mogadiscio.
Kenya would be reluctant, however, to
commit its own weak forces directly
against Somalia, Should Ethiopia request
direct Kenyan intervention, Nairobi
would probably do little more than rein-
force its border units so as to tic down
Somali troops.
The Kenya-Uganda Balance
Relations between Kenya and Uganda,
difficult since Idi Amin came to power in
1971, reached a new low recently. In
February, Amin publicly claimed part of
western Kenya, and Nairobi responded by
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organizing anti-Amin demonstrations and
refusing to allow goods imported through
Kenya's harbors to he transshipped to
Uganda.
The Kenyans later eased the restriction,
but imposed a number of other economic
penalties, such as cutting in half Uganda's
fuel allotment from the Nairobi refinery.
These sanctions appear, to be hurting
the Ugandan economy and may have
provoked cross-border forays by
helicopter-borne Ugandan _ troops this
month-ostensibly seekin
Kenyan leaders, alwa
Amin's erratic behavior, now are even'
more concerned by his accumulation of
Soviet weapons and advisers, and by
Uganda's ties to radical Arab states and
Somalia. The Kenyans suspect that
Amin's claims to parts of Kenya were
made in collusion with Somali President
Siad; we have no evidence to support this
suspicion.
Kenya fears that if Mogadiscio does
renew the insurgency in northeast Kenya,
Uganda might lend support by staging
some form of military diversion.
President Amin's term as chairman of
the Organization of African Unity ends in
July, and the Kenyans think he may feel
free thereafter to take more aggressive ac-
tion against Kenya. They are handling
him very carefully. Kenyatta returned the
Ugandan helicopters and several soldiers
captured during the recent incursions with
a stern warning to Amin.
Nairobi may also ease the economic
restrictions in order to avoid giving Amin
justification for a military move against
Kenya on the grounds that it is strangling
Uganda economically.
Kenyan leaders worry about Amin 's
superiority in weapons and numbers of
troops. Kenyan units are generally better
trained and disciplined,
Comparative Strengths and Major Equipment
Personnel
Tanks
Armored Vehicles
Anti-Tank Weapons/Rocket Launchers
Mortars
Field Artillery
E Recoilless Rifles
AAA Weapons
Personnel
Bombers
Jet Fighters
SAM Battalions
Helicopters
Somalia
Kenya
Uganda
22,000
6,500
17,000
250
0
73
375
73
100
136
475
20
130
129
80
232
0
53
0
20
36
420
0
80
Kenya is seeking military aid Irons t e
US and probably from others as well. Ef-
forts to interest the British in providing
troops or aircraft for a joint exercise or
some other show of force, preferably near
the border, have been unsuccessful.
The Uganda Side
Amin has his own army problems. In
addition to chronic indiscipline and plot-
ting in the military, sonic officers are
reportedly unhappy with his hostility
toward Kenya and with shortages of food
and supplies resulting from Kenya's
economic restrictions.
Nevertheless, Aniin apparently feels
the need for an almost constant external
threat to divert popular attention from the
effects of his five years of maladministra-
tion and turmoil.
In the event of a conflict between
Ethiopia and Somalia, Amin probably
would, at a minimurn, make military
gestures that would tie down Kenyan
troops on the western border.
It is far less likely that Amin would
strike out on his own against Kenya.
Under the right circumstances,
however-such as a period of turmoil that
might follow Kenyatta's death-the
Uganda leader might try to seize a piece
of Kenyan territory.
Uganda's military superiority over
Kenya would give it an initial advantage,
but it probably could not sustain major
operations for long. Uganda has few
well-trained ground force officers and
even fewer qualified jet pilots.
A military campaign would bop down
quickly because of logistics problems and
the military indiscipline that has resulted
from Amin's frequent reorganizations,
transfers, and purges suncc coming to
power.
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