WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011300230001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
On file Department of Agriculture release instructions apply.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
CI WS 76-023
No. 0023/76
June 4, 1976
N2 14
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued evoty Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi-
velopments of the week through noon on Thursday, It
ly includes material coordinated with or prepared
ice of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and- Technology.
CONTENTS
1 Middle East
Lebanon; Kosygin Visit;
Portugal; Iceland-UK;
Euro-Arab Dialogue;
Romania-USSR
6 Western Hemisphere
Argentina
6 Far East
Thailand
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
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LEBANON 1.- Z-
Syria sent more troops and tanks into
Lebanon this week, dropping all pretense
that it has none of its own military forces
there. The Syrians apparently moved to
defuse the increased fighting in the north
and east that was endangering
president-elect Sarkis' delicate
negotiations with the various warring
n agat
Oubayyat
Lebanese leftist leaders were sharply
negative, although their forces did not
offer any significant resistance. Yasir
Arafat and Kamal Jumblatt sent an
urgent appeal to Soviet Premier Kosygin,
then visiting Damascus, to intercede with
the Asad regime to withdraw its forces.
Despite the outcry, the move appears to
have given a boost to Sarkis' efforts at
reconciliation. After temporarily suspen-
ding his political consultations over the
weekend because of the heavy upsurge in
fighting, Sarkis-who has astutely dis-
sociated himself thus far from the latest
Syrian intervention-won the endorse-
ment of several leftist leaders for his peace
proposals this week.
More importantly, Sarkis finally gain-
ed Jumblatt's public support for round-
table discussions after a joint meeting on
June 2 with Jumblatt and Bashir
Jumayyil, the militia chief of the Chris-
tian Phalanges Party. It was the first such
high-level meeting between the Christian
and Muslim sides in several months.
For the time being, Syrian forces have
stopped their advance and dug in near
Zahlah. Damascus apparently hopes its
show of force will convince the leftists and
Palestinians to cooperate with Sarkis, but
Syrian leaders are probably prepared to
send in more forces if necessary.
Prime Minister Rabin and other Israeli
leaders, meanwhile, played down the
latest Syrian move into Lebanon as they
had the initial crossing of Syrian regulars
in April. Defense Minister Peres observed25X1
that Israeli intervention at this point
would only aid Arafat's Palestinians-the
Kosygin Visit to Iraq and Syria .5??-.5
Lebanese factions and his eventual in-
stallation in office.
A Syrian armored battalion broke up
leftist Muslim sieges on the two Christian
villages of Andaqat and Qubayyat in
northern Lebanon. An armored brigade,
which had been astride the border since
mid-April, entered the Bekaa valley to
separate Christian and Muslim forces
battling around the encircled Christian
town of Zahlah.
Initial reactions of Palestinian and
Soviet Premier Kosygin this week was
on a hastily arranged visit to Iraq and
Syria to reassert Soviet influence in the
Middle East and to prevent a further
deterioration in Moscow's relations with
its remaining clients, particularly Syria.
Kosygin's first stop, in Baghdad from
May 29 to June 1, appeared to be inciden-
tal to his visit to Syria. Public coverage of
the Baghdad stop suggests that Kosygin
was only partly successful in smoothing
over differences arising from Iraq's grow-
ing economic ties with the West, its in-
transigent opposition to a negotiated
Arab-Israeli settlement, and its harsh
treatment of local Communists.
If the Soviets sought to ease strains in
Syrian-Iraqi relations, it was not apparent
from the rhetoric surrounding the visit.
Nor did it seem that Kosygin was trying
to fashion a "rejectionist front" as some
diplomatic and press speculation has held.
Although Kosygin probably hoped to
forestall improved Iraqi and Syrian ties
with Egypt, the Soviets have long been
wary of basing their Middle East policy
on the militant Iraqi and Libyan ap-
proaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Kosygin probably received an unpleas-
ant shock when he learned that Syria had
stepped up its intervention in Lebanon on
the eve of his arrival in Damascus on June
1. The Soviets have been complaining that
Damascus has kept them in the dark
regarding its policy in Lebanon, and the
Syrians probably decided to confront
Kosygin with an accomplished fact.
The Syrian action immediately pro-
duced stronger pressure on Moscow from
its clients among the Palestinians and the
Lebanese left to rein in Damascus.
Kosygin did issue a veiled public criticism
of Syrian actions in Lebanon, saying that
Moscow opposes "imperialist in-
terference" there in "any form what-
soever."
It seemed unlikely that the Soviets
would go much beyond this kind of jaw-
boning lest they alienate Damascus. They
still value Syria as a counterweight to
Egypt and want to avoid any action that25X1
might encourage Damascus to rely on the
US to arrange a settlement with Israel.
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INDIA /4!p~
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is con-
tinuing to marshal political support for
the emergency she imposed a year ago
and for constitutional changes that will
clip the wings of India's judiciary.
National and state Congress Party
leaders again endorsed Gandhi's emergen-
cy rule at a meeting in New Delhi last
weekend. Party leaders also approved a
package of proposed constitutional
changes. The approval was pro forma, but
cleared the way for easy parliamentary
approval of the package later this year.
The proposed changes represent a ma-
jor effort to diminish the review powers of
the judiciary. Gandhi wants to eliminate
this potential obstacle to her programs.
Included is a proposal that would prevent
the Supreme Court from reviewing con-
stitutional amendments approved by
parliament.
This will in effect give Gandhi a free
hand to amend the constitution, since she
has compliant majorities in both houses of
parliament and controls most of the state
governments. Amendments must be
ratified by the two houses of parliament
and at least half of the state legislatures.
In one of her speeches during the party
conference, Gandhi noted the continuing
efforts of several opposition parties to
unite in a single party and warned that
no group would be allowed to stand in
the way of the nation's progress.
There was no mention of elections, and
Gandhi seems to lean toward further
delay. Gandhi shared the limelight with
her increasingly prominent son, Sanjay,
endorsing his efforts to hasten implemen-
tation of such programs as family plan-
ning and slum clearance.
Gandhi also stressed her commitment
to socialism despite some concessions by
her government to private enterprise dur-
ing the past year. This probably was
meant, in part, to reassure the USSR, as
was her denial that India would repudiate
old friends following its recent decision to
improve relations with China. Gandhi is
scheduled to arrive in Moscow on June 8
for an official visit.
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PORTUGAL
Five candidates registered by the
deadline last Friday to compete in Por-
tugal's presidential election on June 27,
but the real contest will be between only
two, Prime Minister Azevedo and army
chief General Eanes.
Eanes is widely believed to have an ear-
ly edge over Azevedo because he has been
endorsed by the three major political par-
ties-the Socialists, the centrist Popular
Democrats, and the conservative Social
Democratic Center-as well as by three
groups on the far left. He may be
hampered, however, by his reticence and
rigid bearing, which inhibit quick rapport
with an audience.
Prime Minister Azevedo, whose
easygoing public demeanor contrasts with
Eanes' awkwardness before a crowd,
plans to build on his widespread reputa-
tion as the man responsible for repulsing
Communist-backed power plays last year.
He also hopes to overcome his lack of
organizational backing by portraying
himself as independent of party pressures.
Even though the bulk of the vote will
undoubtedly be divided between the two
front-runners, the three remaining can-
didates could play the role of spoilers. If
their share of the vote is large enough that
neither Eanes nor Azevedo wins an ab-
solute majority, a runoff vote must be
held within three weeks.
Former security chief Otelo de Car-
valho appears to be the only one of the
three planning to campaign on the same
scale as Eanes and Azevedo, but his
appeal is expected to be limited to the far
left. Carvalho, currently on conditional
liberty pending trial for his role in the
abortive military uprising in November,
was granted special permission by the
army to engage in political activity.
The other two candidates, Communist
Party central committee member Octavio
Pato and Angolan refugee Pompilio da
Cruz, had different motives for entering
the race. The Communists hope Pato's
candidacy will help them to negotiate a
position in the new government, while
Pompilio da Cruz wants to take advan-
tage of the free media coverage allotted to
presidential candidates to publicize the
plight of the more than 600,000 refugees
in Portugal.
2a-ZC
ICELAND-UK
Iceland and the UK signed a six-month
interim agreement in Oslo in June 1 end-
ing the protracted cod war for the time
being. The new accord followed nearly
two months of intermittent secret
diplomacy by the Norwegian foreign
minister, acting in part as mediator for
NATO.
The agreement, which is almost iden-
tical to the Icelandic offer made in April,
allows a daily average of 24 British
trawlers to fish inside the 321-kilometer
(200-mile) limit. The presence of fewer
trawlers on a given day will allow a
greater number to operate within the
fishing waters at another time but never
more than 29 on the same day.
The trawlers must remain from 32 to 48
kilometers (20 to 30 miles) offshore,
depending on which of the six fishing
zones around Iceland they are plying, and
no British vessels may fish in the special
conservation areas. Icelandic patrol boats
have the right to stop any British trawler
suspected of violating the agreement.
If there is an infringement of the fishing
regulations, the nearest British support
vessel will be summoned to escort the
trawler from Icelandic waters and the
ship's name will be struck from the list of
vessels permitted to fish under the agree-
ment.
The British also have agreed to allow
Iceland to enjoy tariff concessions under
an EC agreement drafted in 1972.
The fishing agreement will remain in
force for six months. London hopes dur-
ing that time to initiate negotiations aim-
ed at extending the agreement in case the
Law of the Sea conference fails to agree
on new fishing limits for coastal states. To
facilitate these talks, both countries
restored diplomatic relations, which were
broken in February.
The fact that the dispute was settled
through the good offices of a NATO
member should reduce pressure in Iceland
for removal of the US-manned base at
Keflavik. The base issue could come up
again, however, in the context of Iceland's
desire for fast US patrol boats for enfor-
cing the agreement, or as leverage on
other issues. During an emotional high
point in the recent fracas, Icelandic
Foreign Minister Agustsson threatened
that, whatever the outcome of the cod
war, foreign troops should leave Iceland.
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nn''b oaAC ea
!t/
EUR -AR DIALOGUE
Ambassadors from the 9 EC and 20
Arab League states, along with represen-
tatives of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, recently agreed in Luxem-
bourg to take several modest-but impor-
tant-steps to expand economic ties.
The participants at the conference on
May 18-20 set up permanent committees
to monitor cooperative efforts in
agriculture, industry, government serv-
ices, finance, trade, science and
technology, and cultural and labor
matters. They agreed to concentrate in-
itially on projects in areas such as
telecommunications, vocational training,
trade promotion, foreign investment, port
congestion, and agricultural development.
Only limited progress was made on the
more complex issues of trade diversifica-
tion, benefits for migrant Arab workers,
the transfer of technology, and financial
cooperation.
The EC avoided a potentially divisive
political debate on the Middle East, while
the Arabs came away satisfied that they
had succeeded in promoting the political
character of the dialogue. The EC's
refusal to acknowledge in the joint com-
munique that attitudes toward the
political situation in the Middle East had
been discussed threatened at one point to
disrupt the conference, but the issue was
resolved by noting in the communique
that "each side had studied carefully the
other's view"-a reference to the intensive
and generally constructive exchanges that
dominated informal conversation in Lux-
embourg.
The Nine held to their decision not to
move beyond previously expressed EC
positions on the problem, although some
EC members had argued strongly for a
more forthcoming community stance.
The conciliatory line taken by the PLO
representative, speaking for the Arabs,
surprised the EC delegates. He demanded
EC recognition of the PLO, but also in-
vited the Nine to play a role in the Middle
East commensurate with the Com-
munity's prestige and economic power.
The next session of the dialogue will be
Page 5
held in an Arab capital later this year, and
the Arabs will probably push for a
ministerial-level conference.
ROMANIA-USSR
Moscow is putting pressure on
Bucharest, presumably in reaction to par-
ty chief Ceausescu's intensely
nationalistic campaign in late April and
early May challenging the Soviets public-
ly on "proletarian internationalism."
The Soviets initiated a series of talks
with the Romanians on April 29 and 30,
when Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head
of the Soviet party's international depart-
ment, visited Bucharest. Zagladin met
with Stefan Andrei, Romanian party
secretary for foreign relations.
On May 19, Soviet party secretary
Katushev, who specializes in inter-party
relations, called in Romania's am-
bassador in Moscow, probably to
reiterate the Kremlin's view of inter-party
relations, Five days later, General
Yepishev, chief of the Soviet armed
forces' main political directorate, arrived
in Bucharest, He left on May 28, the day
Katushev arrived for a three-day "friendly
WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 4, 76
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SECRET
visit" at the invitation of the Romanian
party central committee. An invitation
from the central committee is highly un-
usual, and suggests that Ceausescu
wanted to stage a show of unity and of
collective accountability in case he must
yield to Moscow.
Ceausescu generally maintained a low
profile last month, but he did use an unan-
nounced mobilization and alert exercise to
show Romania's determination.
The Romanians have recently become
somewhat defensive about preparations
for the European party conference.
Bucharest will try to avoid giving its in-
dependent friends-particularly the
Yugoslavs-the idea that it has "caved
in" to Moscow. Until Soviet pressure
eases, however, Ceausescu will probably
have to rely on the other independents to
fight his battles.
ARGENTINA l ~ _q
ti
Political violence by the left as well as
the right is spreading, and the inability of
the government to stop it is causing
widespread concern.
Since last weekend security forces kill-
ed 20 presumed leftist terrorists in 3
separate clashes. One battle reportedly in-
volved the storming of a Buenos Aires
police headquarters by a group of
guerrillas; the others occurred in rural
areas. Leftists also kidnaped the military
admini 3trator of the nation's main labor
confederation while another military
man, abducted weeks ago, remains cap-
tive.
After more than two months in power,
the regime has made little demonstrable
progress toward carrying out its pledge to
curb leftist terrorism, and rightist excesses
also are posing problems. The recent kill-
ing of four Uruguayan political exiles in
Buenos Aires, for example, is certain to
call into question President Videla's abili-
ty to control the security forces. The
assassinations are widely believed to have
been the work of off-duty officials using
vigilante-style tactics.
The incident is the most dramatic of
several that worry those who fear the jun-
ta will not be able to adhere to the
moderate course it had promised to
follow. There have been other
vigilante-style killings and kidnapings,
and the number of political arrests has ex-
ceeded the junta's own earlier promise.
The federal government has taken over
more labor unions than it had said it
would, and press censorship was reim-
posed after a brief suspension.
Some military officers have been press-
ing Videla to adopt much harsher policies.
These officers are convinced that Videla's
preferred approach is inadequate to deal
with entrenched terrorists, undisciplined
workers, and irresponsible politicians.
Videla is committed to solving national
problems without recourse to violent
repression, but he is in for a difficult
struggle with aggressive subordinates bent
on provine that his approach cannot
THAILAND
sd s
Foreign Minister Phichai announced in
a nationwide address on June 1 that the
Seni government had decided to adhere to
an earlier policy of calling for the
withdrawal of all US security installations
foreign minister reaffirmed that a US
personnel stationed at Ramasun, as well
as equipment at the site which cannot be
operated by the Thai, must be removed by
July 20.
Phichai said that the Seni government
would continue negotiations to retain
other equipment that can be operated by
Thai personnel and to obtain additional
US military supplies. Phichai emphasized
that the cabinet had reached, its decision
on Ramasun unanimously after studying
recommendations by the Thai National
Security Council.
In offering last month to reopen talks
with the US over a residual security
presence, both Prime Minister Seni and
the foreign minister hoped to put Thai-US
relations back on a more positive track.
The Seni government clearly hoped
Thailand would get increased US military
assistance in return for Thai permission to
operate at least a portion of tRamasun
facility under US control
The
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Chinese military procurement, measured in terms of the
dollar cost of reproducing the Chinese program in the US, rose
significantly last year. The principal factor in the magnitude
and pattern of estimated dollar costs has been aircraft procure-
ment.
A I _~6 4.VC.
China: Military Procurement Costs
The estimated dollar costs of Chinese
military procurement in 1975 rose some
12 percent over the almost constant level
of the preceding three years.
Procurement as used here is a measure
of what it would cost to reproduce the
Chinese programs in the US. It includes
only the cost of producing military equip-
ment, not any costs associated with
research, development, testing, and
evaluation, or those for facilities, per-
sonnel, operations, and maintenance.
The estimated annual dollar costs of
Chinese military equipment have fluc-
tuated sharply over the past 10 years, The
changing political situation has been
partly responsible. During 1967-the first
full year of the Cultural Revolution-
military equipment procurement declined
by about 25 percent to $2.2 billion. When
the Cultural Revolution ended and
Sino-Soviet tensions heightened, military
procurement rose rapidly to a level of
almost $5.5 billion in 1971.
In 1972, military procurement again
declined, to about $3.2 billion, where it
remained until it rose again to about $3.6
billion last year. At present, Chinese
military procurement in dollars is less
than one third that of the US, and about
one sixth of the estimated dollar cost of
Soviet procurement.
The major factor in both the magnitude
and the pattern of the estimated dollar
costs has been the variation in China's
aircraft production. Between 1966 and
1975 procurement of aircraft exceeded
that for any other type weapon. Much of
the decline after 1971 resulted from a
sharp drop in aircraft production, but
there was some slowdown in almost all of
the Chinese weapons procurement
programs.
The distinct rise in estimated procure-
ment costs in 1975-although the level is
still much below the 1971 peak-was
caused largely by procurement of more
costly aircraft and by some increase in
ship production.
China's past history of sudden bursts
and reductions in defense production
makes it difficult to judge whether the up-
turn in 1975 is a temporary phenomenon
or the beginning of a long-term trend.
Over the next several years, as the
Chinese begin to replace obsolescent
equipment with more modern systems,
procurement costs can be expected to
grow somewhat even if production in
terms of numbers of units does not in-
crease. In 1975, for example, the in-
creased production costs of a few rela-
tively more modern and expensive
weapon systems more than offset savings
from the reduced production of older and
cheaper weaponry.
US, USSR and China:
Estimated Military Procurement in 1975
INDEX US= 100
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Political leaders in other West European countries are un-
easy about the possibility that communists will be brought into
the next Italian government. Most believe that outspoken op-
position on their part would only make matters worse, and they
are looking for less visible ways to influence events in Italy.
West Europeans View Italian Election
Most West European governments
have decided for now to deal with the
threat of Communist participation in the
next Italian government by avoiding
public statements, quietly funneling
economic and financial aid to Rome to
help stabilize the internal situation, and
using well-established party ties with
Italian democratic parties to urge quietly
that the Communists be kept out of the
government if possible.
The low profile is deliberate and
reflects a number of considerations:
? Many West European leaders
question whether they can reverse a
trend that has developed over decades
in Italy and at this point influence
Italian internal affairs in any fun-
damental way.
? Many are highly critical of Chris-
tian Democratic rule in Italy and can-
not envisage a viable political com-
bination that does not include the
Communists or Communist support in
some form.
? Some fear that crude intervention
might bring a strong nationalist
backlash from the Italians that could
enhance the Communists' prospects in
the election.
? They believe that open in-
terference would undermine the
"democratic process" that Italy has
strived to restore since the fascist era.
The "democratic process" argument is
particularly strong among European
Socialists and Social Democrats who for
years have criticized right-wing, non-
democratic regimes in or associated with
NATO.
A sign of the low profile policy is the
small number of West European leaders
who have openly or frankly expressed
their fears on the Italian situation.
NATO Secretary General Luns, EC
President Thorn, and West German
Foreign Minister Genscher are among the
few who have been vocally concerned
about giving the Italian Communists a
governmental role. British and French of-
ficials have chosen to temper their public
remarks for fear of triggering a negative
reaction among Italian voters.
French President Giscard spoke out
recently on his deep concern over the
threat the Italian Communists may pose
for the European Community, but he
emphasized that his government would
adhere to the principle of noninterference.
Even West German Chancellor
Schmidt has shifted recently in his public
statements from all-out opposition to
Communist participation in NATO
governments to a less vocal opposition,
stressing the need to minimize the
political fallout should they come to
power. Schmidt is one of the most conser-
vative Social Democrats in Western
Europe, but he does not presently con-
sider that it would be necessary to expel
Italy from NATO and cites the Alliance's
ability to deal with Communists in the
Portuguese and Icelandic governments.
One reason for the position of officials
is their belief that even if the Communists
are in the government, the Christian
Democrats and other democratic parties
will retain control of key cabinet posts
that deal with NATO and EC matters.
Advantages vs Disadvantages
Most West European leaders, however,
are in fact worried about the situation.
They are torn between a desire to abide by
a decision of Italian voters and the possi-
ble need to protect interests that may be
adversely affected by that decision.
Many West European officials are
privately apprehensive, for example, that
if the Communists enter the government,
Washington might "reassess" its commit-
ment to Western Europe-perhaps even
reducing US troop levels on the continent
in response to Congressional pressure.
There are nevertheless West European
leaders who are more optimistic. Many
Socialists believe that the Italian situation
could ultimately work to the West's ad-
vantage and are eager not to foreclose any
such opportunities that may arise.
They argue that the Italian and French
Communist decision to abandon
traditional Marxist dogma and tactics
could turn out to be another watershed in
the disintegration of monolithic com-
munism. They believe that the transfor-
mation of West European communism
would be a severe setback for Moscow
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and could have a major impact on East
European regimes which accept Soviet
leadership.
Political Counsel
A number of West European
governments have begun drafting con-
tingency plans in anticipation of Com-
munist entry into the Italian government.
Given their reluctance to become too in-
volved in the Italian situation, however,
their options are quite limited.
Most West European leaders are work-
ing through party-to-party channels to in-
fluence the leaders of Italy's democratic
parties. The West German Social
Democrats have urged Italian Socialists
to cooperate with the Christian
Democrats to form the next government.
Giscard has sent a representative to urge
the Italian Christian Democrats to under-
take internal reform.
Some also want to involve the Italian
democratic parties more closely with pan-
European federations-such as the
Socialist International and the recently
formed Christian Democratic and Liberal
associations-to prevent the Italians from
drifting away from the European consen-
sus.
Pressure is being exerted on the Italian
Communists to demonstrate conclusively
their commitment to the democratic
process. In initial party-to-party contacts
this month, the Dutch Socialists sharply
questioned the Italian Communists on
why they retain their ties with the Soviets
and still call themselves Communists. The
responses were not very convincing. The
West Europeans can be expected to raise
these questions again and again.
Economic Assistance
Consideration has also been given in
Western Europe to whether economic
pressure should be brought to bear on the
Italians, but this approach was judged
counterproductive and rejected.
Most West Europeans believe that
Italy's political problems cannot be dealt
with unless and until its economy is
stabilized. Chancellor Schmidt, for exam-
pie, justified a $2 billion loan to Italy in
1974 in large part on the grounds that it
might enable the Christian Democratic
government to reverse the deteriorating
economic situation.
At present, no government appears to
be planning large loans or credits as the
Schmidt government did two years ago.
West Germany is the only West European
country economically strong enough to do
so, but the approach of its own election
campaign, plus Bonn's previous generosi-
ty, makes a new loan unlikely in the near
term.
The European Community, however, is
moving to help the Italians. The 90-day
Italian import deposit scheme approved
by the EC Commission plus the previous
Community decision to halt the conver-
sion of high denomination Italian lira
banknotes in other member states have
helped buoy the lira during the past few
weeks.
EC Central Bank governors agreed on
May 1 1 to lend Rome $485 million from
the Community's short-term borrowing
facility. In conjunction with this loan, the
Bank for International Settlements has
also authorized a short-term credit of
$600 million to Italy.
This short-term financial assistance
package is designed to place at the Chris-
tian Democratic government's disposal
adequate resources to keep the lira stable
on foreign exchange markets during the
delicate period leading up to the national
elections on June 20-21. The EC may link
the potential conversion of the $1.1 bil-
lion in short-term loans into a medium-
term credit with an Italian commitment
to end the import deposit scheme after
the national elections.
Impact on the EC
EC officials generally doubt that Com-
munist participation in the Italian govern-
ment would have a major impact on the
workings of the Community in the short
run.
In fact, the succession of weak and in-
effectual governments in Rome has been a
problem for the EC. The Italian Com-
munists would support calls for desirable
institutional changes and reforms, both
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for reasons of efficiency and balance, and
probably join those who urge a stronger
EC regional development policy.
A Communist presence in the Italian
government, however, would undoubtedly
pose difficulties for the EC. Communist
support for import restraints could
strengthen protectionist pressures
throughout the Community. A Com-
munist presence could also greatly com-
plicate the Community mechanisms for
coordinating the members' foreign policy.
Impact on NATO
On security matters, the European view
is of course much less sanguine than it is
on EC affairs.
NATO officials are deeply concerned
that Italy might fail to fulfill its respon-
sibilities as a full participant in the
Alliance. Italy's strategic importance has
been enhanced in recent years by uncer-
tainty over the willingness of other NATO
members in the area to meet their
Alliance obligations and by the growth of
Soviet forces in the Mediterranean.
NATO's southern tier theater head-
quarters is in Italy, as are four of five
regional sub-commands, and a large US
military contingent. Italy's armed forces
constitute a major portion of the southern
theater's military capabilities, and Italian
officers hold key subordinate commands.
Most West European leaders seem
prepared to adopt measures to limit the
damage to NATO's internal security.
These leaders might request Italy to
withdraw from the Nuclear Planning
Group, the body that deliberates on the
deployment and use of tactical nuclear
weapons. They would also support
proposals to exclude Italy from sharing
sensitive political and military in-
telligence, most of which relates to the
USSR. Limiting access to sensitive
NATO material was done when the Com-
munists entered the Portuguese and
Icelandic governments.
Should the Communists put pressure
on Rome to reorient its foreign policy or
withdraw from the military side of the
Alliance-an unlikely event at least in the
short run-NATO officials would have to
consider whether to:
? relocate the headquarters of
NATO's southern command currently
stationed in Naples;
? discontinue the US Sixth Fleet's
use of Italian facilities.
Few West European officials at the mo-
ment are willing to discuss such even-
tualities-keeping their fingers crossed
that Italian Communist leader Berlinguer
will stand by his public commitment to
maintain Italy's membership in NATO so
lone as the Warsaw Pact exists.
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The General Assembly of the Organization of American
States convenes today in Santiago, Chile for a session that will
probably last two weeks. Latin American members will ex-
amine US attitudes toward the region and take a hard look at
Chile under the Pinochet government.
W- 9
The OAS Meeting in Chile
The venerable but ineffective Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) does not
receive much concrete backing or con-
tinuing interest from its 24 member states,
in spite of efforts by Secretary General
Orfila to turn its lumbering bureaucracy
into a responsive and dynamic staff. Yet
there is considerable interest in the next
meeting of the OAS General Assembly,
which opens in Santiago, Chile, on June 4
and which will probably last two weeks.
Some view the session as an opportuni-
ty to gauge the state of relations between
the US and Latin America, a relationship
most Latins feel has been neglected by
Washington.
Even more interest will focus on the
conference hosts; it will be a chance for
the many delegates, observers, and media
representatives to take a closer look at
Chile, which had become the pariah of the
hemisphere. Whether this special atten-
tion will be helpful to Chile-or to the
OAS, which is also in dire need of a
boost-is questionable.
The OAS Meeting
The Chileans hope for an amicable,
frictionless display of inter-American
cooperation. Despite the routine nature of
the formal agenda, however, and despite
agreements to limit the private meetings
among foreign ministers to informal,
businesslike procedures, hazards abound.
Mexico is boycotting the conference
because of the venue, and legislators in
Costa Rica and Venezuela have advised
their governments to do the same.
Opponents of the Pinochet government
might try to provoke incidents to em-
barrass Chile during the meetings. Some
of Chile's security measures could play
into their hands. The curfew, special
documentation procedures for conference
delegates and for journalists, and possible
limits on what journalists may cover are
likely to guarantee a generally bad press.
A number of issues may place countries
or blocs of countries in conflict:
? OAS reform and the Panama
Canal, both on the agenda as cursory
status reports, are touchy issues which
some delegates may decide to raise for
immediate discussion.
? There are rumors that one or
more governments might re-introduce
the Cuban problem, whose divisiveness
has been revived by Cuba's African
adventures. A recent round of dis-
cussions among Chile, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina
about the need to strengthen the
inter-American security system lends
substance to these rumors.
? Discussions of the US Trade Act
of 1974 may broaden the criticism of
the US role vis-a-vis the developing
countries already expressed by Brazil
and Venezuela in other forums. Latins
doubt whether the US wishes to be
helpful to the region and question any
administration's ability to follow
through on commitments in the face of
congressional resistance.
? The Commonwealth island states
of the Caribbean may make an issue of
the Latin countries' wariness about ad-
mitting Guyana, Belize, and emerging
island mini-states that would further
anglicize the OAS.
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? Accounts of brutality toward dis-
sidents in a number of member states
will induce others to take a strong
stand opposing such abuses.
To a large degree, the mood of inter-
American gatherings depends on the
momentary state of the region's mercurial
relations with the US. Notwithstanding
the many divisions within the
Latin-Caribbean bloc, its members agree
on the need for cohesiveness in dealing
with the US. How the bloc reacts to
various US positions at the conference
will largely determine the tone and utility
of the General Assembly.
The Chilean Setting
One item on the agenda-the issue of
human rights-is bound to focus a large
amount of attention on the host country.
Despite the serious foreign policy
problems caused to Chile by the con-
troversy over human rights, the leaders
have been slow to deal with the situation,
in part because they believe their hard-line
approach is working to keep down dis-
sidence inside the country.
Nevertheless, the government has taken
some steps to reduce the repression.
A decree of the Chilean government in
January 1976 purported to put teeth in
earlier edicts regulating the conduct of
arrests and the treatment of prisoners.
The frequency of torture appears to have
diminished. Following Secretary Simon's
visit in early May, the junta seemed to be
speeding up the release of detainees.
Chilean spokesmen have made public the
trial and conviction of some security of-
ficials for grave abuses of human rights
and said others were standing trial for
similar offenses. Pinochet has authorized
his interior minister and the president of
the Supreme Court to investigate possible
violations of human rights.
On the other hand, the government has
given no indication that it may lift the
state of siege that gives security forces
wide latitude in exercising their authority.
Draconian measures continue to be used
against opponents, although there are
signs of greater selectivity. Reports of il-
legal detentions and disappearances are
still being heard, albeit on a reduced scale,
as officials either circumvent or openly
disobey the laws governing their conduct.
Political and economic pressures may
force the government to adopt more effec-
tive safeguards against future infractions
of human rights, but there is little reason
to believe that it will ease its heavy-
handed restrictions in other areas.
Politics Downgraded
The junta's attempts to eliminate the
political system that existed before the
coup are consistent with its announced
aim of building a new society based on
vague concepts of nationalism, Christian
humanism, and authoritarianism. The
military has made little headway toward
creating a popular or institutional base for
its new society, but there is no real
challenge to its domination. The military
clearly plans to play a prominent role for
the indefinite future.
Public support for the junta has waned
notably since its take-over, but not
enough to have a decisive impact on the
overall political situation.
Military attitudes toward the Christian
Democratic Party-the country's
largest-had long been hostile, and its
leader, former president Eduardo Frei, is
regarded with almost as much hostility as
that focused on the communists. The
armed forces harbor deep suspicions
of politicians generally, and the Chris-
tian Democrats have been blamed in large
part for Allende's accession to power.
Chances of reconciliation between the
military and the Christian Democrats
appear remote. The regime has used ex-
panded censorship provisions to clamp
down on the Christian Democrats' radio
and press outlets, and apparently wants to
destroy the party by splintering and
weakening it.
As long as the junta continues on this
course, the Christian Democrats, weak-
ened by internal divisions, stand to be
shoved further to the periphery of na-
tional life.
Friction has not been limited simply to
opposition parties and the press.
Relations with the Catholic Church are
sharply antagonistic, but both,sides have
refrained from taking positions that
would force an open break. The church
hierarchy believes-probably cor-
rectly-that the government is bitter
about the church's role on behalf of
human rights and considers it a rallying
point for antigovernment agitators. ,
Labor leaders are increasingly out-
spoken in their opposition to the regime
and frustrated over their inability to in-
fluence policies or protect the workers' in-
terests. They are aware, however, of the
futility of open protest. Fearing greater
suppression, they will probably remain
quiescent. Sweeping purges of the univer-
sities and other educational institutions
have demoralized intellectual circles and
intimidated student and faculty op-
ponents.
Some other groups previously con-
sidered staunch supporters of the junta
are becoming disaffected. Leaders of the
conservative National Party and small
businessmen are restive under the impact
of the economic depression and the
vacuum created by the curbs on political
expression. This loss of confidence does
not threaten the military regime im-
mediately, but it does portend a signifi-
cant long-term erosion that could leave
the junta with only its hardcore following.
Government leaders nevertheless
believe they are on the right track, and in
the past few months, they have displayed
fresh confidence reflecting their belief that
the worse obstacles have been overcome.
Recent economic and political
developments have confirmed-in the jun-
ta's eyes-the correctness of its policies.
They see Cuban-Soviet moves in Angola
as reinforcing their view of the dangers of
communism. The coup in Argentina is be-
ing interpreted as yet another in a series of
justified military take-overs in response to
anarchic political conditions created by
Marxists.
The generals in Santiago view with
gratification and approval the growing
ideological affinity with most of their
South American neighbors. Pinochet's re-
cent state visit to Uruguay, for example,
underscored the creation of closer ties
based on mutual antipathy toward com-
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Prospects are dim for early agreement on a world grain
reserve. Major grain-trading nations disagree on the main pur-
poses of such a reserve. International pressure for the develop-
ment of a program to assure world food supplies has diminished
since the World Food Conference in Rome 18 months ago.
11b, k~, a pt