WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011400200001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
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Secret
CI WS 76-045
No. 0045/76
November 5, 1976
Copy N?: 1418
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CONTENTS
14 Soviet, East European Trade Deficits
16 Thailand: Back to Square One
18 Prospects for Caribbean Mini-States
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly
Summary,
1 Europe
Italy; France-West Germany;
Norway-USSR;
5
NATO-C
USSR; Eas
Asia
SCE; Portugal;
t Germany
6
China; Nor
Middle East
th Korea; India
Lebanon
; Egypt-USSR;
7
Africa
Rhodesia;
Burundi
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Italian Prime Minister Andreotti has
made a further compromise with the
Communists on the formulation of
economic policy by agreeing to formal
bilateral consultations with them and the
leaders of other parties on additional
economic austerity measures.
The concession by Andreotti prompted
the postponement of the cabinet meeting
that had been slated to discuss the
economic program in preparation for the
parliamentary debate next week.
Communist Party chief Berlinguer had
proposed last week that the government
meet in a conference with all nongovern-
ment parties, except the neo-fascist and
Q P 1
left-wing splinter parties, to discuss the
proposed austerity program, which
Berlinguer termed inadequate. The Chris-
tian Democrats rejected Berlinguer's for-
mula-which would have been a long step
toward the "emergency government" ad-
vocated by the Communists and
Socialists-but the Prime Minister has
sought to soften his party's action by
offering to meet formally with the Com-
munists.
The arrangement allows the Com-
munists to present a victory of sorts to
their rank-and-file, who continue to ques-
tion whether the party is getting enough in
return for its present cooperation with the
government. This concession is not likely
to satisfy the Communists for long, and
further demands for tangible evidence of
their influence on the government are
almost certain.
The parliamentary debate on the
austerity measures, which will begin on
November 10, could be stormy. Two par-
(AM
ties are already preparing to challenge the
economic program. The Socialists, feeling
themselves badly outmaneuvered by the
Communists, reportedly are preparing to
submit their own alternative austerity
program during the debate. The fiscally
conservative Republicans apparently plan
to offer suggestions designed to frustrate
Andreotti's efforts to tread a fine line
between the demands of the unions and
those of the non-communist parties that
continue to support
through their
his government
abstentions.
25X1
FRANCE - WEST GERMANY
France plans to reduce the number of
its troops in West Germany from 60,000
to 46,000, according to the US embassy in
Bonn. French officials reportedly told the
Germans that the withdrawals will be
spread over the next two years and will be
part of the overall reorganization of the
French army.
A senior West German military official
told the US embassy in Bonn that about
5,000 men will return to France this year
as three artillery regiments are
withdrawn. Two of these regiments will be
re-equipped with Pluton tactical nuclear
missiles and reassigned to units in
northeastern France.
The other 9,000 men will return to
France over the next two years as part of
France's program to reorganize its 5 ac-
tive divisions into 16 smaller divisions
equipped with additional medium tanks
and armored vehicles. The program, an-
nounced this spring, calls for a slight
reduction in the size of the army and the
elimination of some intermediate levels of
command. The reorganization is designed
to improve command and control of
French forces and probably will enhance
their mobility.
French and West German officials have
been discussing the reductions since early
this year, but the French only recently
confirmed German estimates of how
many troops are to be withdrawn. The
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French have assured the Germans that
France's combat capability in West Ger-
many would be unimpaired and would
even be improved because a smaller, more
mobile force will be better able to respond
to a conventional threat and be more
effective in combat.
The French government has denied
press reports linking the reductions with a
desire to emphasize France's nonpar-
ticipation in the force reduction talks in
Vienna.
French attaches in Bonn told the US
defense attache in August that France was
considering an increase in the number of
its divisions in Germany from two to
three. The restructuring of French forces
and the elimination of the intermediate
commands will enable France to station
three smaller divisions across the Rhine
while reducing the number of troops
NORWAY-USSR
The agreement last month by Norway
and the USSR on a 10-year reciprocal
fishing pact has raised hopes in Oslo for
progress in talks later this year on the dis-
pute over a demarcation line in the
Barents Sea. The Soviets, however, show
no sign of relaxing their position on issues
relating to Norwegian administration of
Svalbard. Last month, they accused
Norway of violating the demilitarization
provisions of the 1920 treaty that gave
Norway sovereignty over the archipelago.
The fishing agreement does not include
Soviet endorsement of the 200-mile
economic zone Norway plans to declare
on January 1, 1977, nor does it set an an-
nual fishing quota. The Norwegians
assert, somewhat lamely, that they did not
ask for Soviet endorsement of the
economic zone, and that the preamble of
the agreement, in any case, implies de fac-
to recognition.
Norway had hoped to settle the demar-
cation line issue before the fishing agree-
ment, but the Soviets balked during the
last round of talks in June. Norway was
prepared to compromise on its proposal
for a median line zigzagging between each
country's Arctic islands, but the Soviets
did not budge from their position favor-
ing a straight sector line. The Soviets
have underscored their position many
times by firing missiles into the disputed
area, an action they repeated earlier this
week.
On Svalbard, where the Soviet colony
ignores the Norwegian administration,
the Soviets recently brought in five large,
assault-type helicopters without re-
questing Norwegian permission. When
Oslo protested, Izvestia charged Norway
had violated the 1920 treaty by permitting
its naval ships to visit Svalbard and
by allowing military aircraft to land
there.
Norway admitted that its military ships
and planes had visited the islands since
1925, but denied that this violated the
treaty. As Svalbard has no year-round
commercial transportation links, military
connections often provide the only contact
the small Norwegian community has with
the mainland. The Soviet charge,
nevertheless, increases pressure on
Norway and probably reflects Soviet
determination to resist Norwegian inten-
tions to promote economic development
on Svalbard and adjacent off-shore areas
in the far north.
NATO
NATO representatives have begun the
search for agreement among themselves
on how to approach the conference in
Belgrade next summer that will review
implementation of the Helsinki agree-
ment on security and cooperation in
Europe. The allies agreed to press for a
"full and candid" assessment of the East's
record of compliance. At the same time,
they made clear their belief that US stan-
dards for measuring the East's perfor-
mance are too rigid.
Western governments view recent
domestic dissatisfaction with detente,
coupled with the East's marginal record
of compliance, as requiring a candid look
at how the agreement is being im-
plemented.
The allies expect the East, for its part,
to try to play down the Belgrade con-
ference and to make countercharges of
its own. Accordingly, the allied represen-
tatives agreed that the West should seek
to focus the conference on the East's
deficiencies, while presenting new
proposals to enable the West to retain
the initiative.
While the Europeans agree that nothing
should be done to alter the Helsinki agree-
ment, they have nonetheless been trying
since last spring to differentiate their 25X1
stance from what they see as the US "all
or nothing" approach to Eastern com-
pliance.
The Europeans disagree with the view
that communist initiatives should be re-
jected out of hand until the compliance
record of the East improves. This is a
reflection of the desire of the Europeans
to maintain their independence in the face
of what they view as a cooling of relations
between the super powers and their deter-
mination to make the most of Soviet in-
terest in expanding the dialogue with the
West.
A report on allied preparations for the
Belgrade conference will be presented to
the NATO foreign ministers next month,
and detailed preparations for the Belgrade
meeting will continue through next spring.
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AV
vehicle of party head Sa Carneiro, the top
leadership was expanded, and Sa
Carneiro moved from the
secretary-generalship to the party
presidency. He will continue to dominate
the party, but the shift will help to mollify
party liberals and keep them from drifting
toward the Socialists.
Portugal's two largest parties, the rul-
ing Socialists and the Social
Democrats-formerly the Popular
Democrats-held party congresses last
week.
The Socialists remain troubled by fac-
tionalism. An outright split between
leftists and rightists was avoided, but the
leftists did resist Prime Minister Soares'
efforts to present a single slate for the
151-man national committee. The leftist
slate made a strong showing and picked
up one third of the committee positions.
By this action, the left wing has es-
tablished itself as a force to be reckoned
with, although it is still too weak directly
to challenge the party's mainstream.
Shortly after the congress, the
long-rumored resignation of leftist
Agriculture Minister Lopes Cardoso, who
led the effort to set up the separate slate,
was announced. Other leftist leaders may
be maneuvered out of positions on the
party secretariat..
The Social Democrats, in contrast,
emerged from their congress a stronger
and more unified party. In an effort to
make the party more than the personal
USSR
The Soviet news agency Tass an-
nounced on October 12 that General
Anatoly Gribkov has been appointed chief
of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces, filling
the position left vacant by the death of
Army General Shtemenko last April.
Gribkov will serve as a deputy to War-
saw Pact Commander Yakubovsky, who
is said to be seriously ill, and will probably
fill in for the commander when necessary.
If past practice is followed, Gribkov will
also be a first deputy chief of the General
Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The delay in naming Shtemenko's
successor may indicate difficulty in find-
ing someone with the proper military
qualifications who was also politically
acceptable.
Some Pact members probably pressed
for an East European officer for the posi-
tion. The recent "Shield-76" exercise in
Poland may have given Defense Minister
Ustinov an opportunity to discuss the
issue with Pact representatives and
perhaps settle Gribkov's nomination.
The 57-year-old Gribkov served as a
major in the corps of General Staff of-
ficers who were sent to field units as
representatives of the General Staff dur-
ing World War II. He was elected to the
Supreme Soviet of Armenia in 1967.
Since 1973, Gribkov has commanded the
key Leningrad Military District. In June,
he directed the much publicized exercise
"Sever"-the second Soviet exercise an-
nounced in compliance with the Helsinki
accords. Late last month, Gribkov was
promoted to General of the Army.
25X1
During the 25th Party Congress earlier
this year, Gribkov was elected a can-
didate-member of the Central Com-
mittee.
EAST GERMANY
In a major shake-up last week, East
German party leader Erich Honecker
assumed the position of head of state,
further strengthening his pre-eminent
status in the political hierarchy.
Prime Minister Horst Sindermann was
replaced by Willi Stoph, the head of state
since 1973. Sindermann was given the
largely ceremonial post of president of
parliament.
Honecker's predecessor, Walter
Ulbricht, also held both the leading party
and state positions. Honecker can also
cite the examples of his East European
colleagues who, with the exception of
Hungary's Kadar and Poland's Gierek,
also hold both posts.
Sindermann's dismissal seems to stem
in part from East Germany's vexing
economic problems. As the coordinator
of the regime's vast administrative struc-
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ture, Sindermann had considerable in-
fluence in the economic bureaucracy.
Both Honecker and Stoph spoke critically
last week of the performance of ministries
in the economic sphere.
Stoph was prime minister from 1964 to
1973 and has served more than 20 years in
high levels of both the party and the
government. He has a reputation as an
effective and conscientious party
pragmatist. He has been in poor health
for several years, however, and his ap-
pointment may be only temporary.
An exchange of jobs by two of East
Germany's top economic officials just
after the leadership shake-up strengthens
party control over the implementation of
economic policies.
Guenter Mittag stepped down as first
deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers and returned to the far more
powerful post of party secretary for
economic affairs-a job he held from
1963 to 1973. Mittag has long been
acknowledged as the party's economic
wizard. He is a prominent member of the
group of younger technocrats that
spearheaded East Germany's efforts to
modernize industrial production and
decentralize planning and administration.
Mittag's replacement on the Council of
Ministers is Werner Krolikowski, who
held the party secretariat position for
economics after Mittag's departure three
years ago. As party economic boss,
Krolikowski was a tough taskmaster, but
he probably lacked Mittag's broader
managerial skills and energy, which ap-
parently are now called for.
Both men retain their policy-making
posts on the Politburo, where party chief
Honecker may well want to take advan-
tage of Krolikowski's tough approach to
the resolution of conflicting economic in-
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CHINA
The Chinese leadership issued a state-
ment on November 2 that seemed design-
ed to reassure both domestic and foreign
audiences that recent changes in China do
not signal a sudden break in policies at
home or abroad.
On the domestic front, the statement
may have meant to reassure those who
sympathized to some degree with the
ideology of the four fallen leftist leaders
that the Maoist vision of a revolutionary
society will not be abandoned. The state-
ment, however, made no reference to two
pet projects of the left-the need to
preserve the policies of the; yultural
revolution and the cAmpaign y(o,3eriticize
former vice premier Teng Hsiao-ping.
In the international sphere, the state-
ment implied that current Chinese foreign
policy is immutable. This seemed design-
ed to scotch speculation that Chinese
policy toward the USSR is now subject to
change.
The statement, however, may have
signaled some modification of China's at-
titude toward the Marxist-Leninist
splinter groups that were sponsored by
China in the early 1960s as a way to
counter Soviet international influence.
China lost interest in these groups in 1971,
but the statement suggested Peking may
now be prepared to resume its paternal
relationship with them. If so, this may
mean that the current Chinese leadership
is somewhat skeptical as to the degree it
can rely on the US connection to offset
what it sees as worldwide Soviet pressure
against China.
Recent events have given the leadership
a number of personnel assignments to
make. An official Chinese spokesman
denied that Peking has named a new
premier, a new de facto head of state, or a
new defense minister. Assignments to
some of these posts may be under con-
sideration, but it appears that no firm
decisions have yet been made.
The regime has moved decisively,
however, to fill the leadership vacuum in
the leftist stronghold of Shanghai. The
top three positions there were held by
three of the four fallen leftists on the
Politburo. Two alternate members of the
Politburo and the party boss of a
neighboring province have been sent to
Shanghai to take overthe top city jobs.
NORTH KOREA c '
The North Korean regime is trying to
limit the damage from the recent highly
publicized',~'expulsions of its diplomats
from the Nordic countries for trafficking
in drugs, duty-free liquor, and cigarettes.
Since the issue came to the surface in
mid-October, North Korea has:
? Acknowledged privately that
some of its representatives were engag-
ed in illegal activities.
? Withdrawn ambassadors and
staff members as requested without a
major public protest-an implicit ad-
mission of guilt.
? Avoided any retaliatory acts
against Scandinavian officials in
Pyongyang.
? Moved quickly to replace the
ousted diplomats.
The North Koreans are anxious to
forestall any move to use the smuggling
scandal as a pretext for terminating
several incomplete and financially troubl-
ed industrial development projects in
North Korea. The Danes and Japanese
are jointly constructing a large cement
plant, the Swedes are building an ore-
processing facility, and the Finns have
supplied equipment for a paper mill.
The illegal actions in Scandinavia were
part of a systematic effort by the North
Koreans to exploit their diplomatic status
for profit. Similar activities-although
not on the same scale-have been
reported in Burma, Nepal, Malaysia,
Switzerland, Egypt, and Argentina.
The illegally acquired funds are used to
help defray operating expenses for North
Korea's embassies and trade missions as
well as to finance intelligence and
propaganda activities abroad. Plagued
with an acute shortage of foreign ex-
change, North Korea in the past year or
so has been cutting back some of its larger
overseas staffs in an apparent effort to
reduce expenses.
So far, none of the countries in which
North Korea abused its diplomatic
privileges has indicated it will break
diplomatic relations. The Scandinavian
countries, for example, all have noted that
they do not wish the expulsions to disrupt
relations with Pyongyang further, and
none of them has yet ordered the closure
of a North Korean mission
Replacements for the expelled North Korean diplomats arrive in Helsinki
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On November 2, Prime Minister
Gandhi's large majority in the lower
house of Parliament cleared the way for
creating a permanent basis for the un-
precedented power she now holds. The up-
per house and at least half of the 22 state
governments must also approve Gandhi's
broad constitutional amendment, but the
party's majority in the upper house and its
control of most state governments make
these steps assured.
The amendment
unequivocally es-
ed generally high under the emergency,
and she seemed a sure bet to win another
parliamentary majority if an election was
held next year. Gandhi, however, ap-
parently wants time to make additional
changes in India's governmental system
and to deal with such matters as scattered
opposition to the government's family
planning program, restlessness in organiz-
ed labor, and organizational problems
tablishes the prime minister as the
supreme authority in the government and
institutionalizes many repressive
measures in effect since Gandhi imposed a
national emergency in June 1975. The
amendment sharply curtails the power of
the judiciary to challenge legislative and
executive actions and to safeguard civil
liberties. It also enables the government
to ban groups and activities it considers
"antinational."
During the next two years, Gandhi is
authorized to make additional con-
stitutional changes in order to remove any
"difficulties" that stand in the way of im-
plementing the new amendment. For
more than a year, she has asserted that
revisions in the 26-year-old constitution
are needed to speed important social and
economic changes.
Many features of the amendment,
however, indicate that Gandhi's chief aim
is to retain the vast power she had-held on
a temporary basis since June 1975. Her
performance during a decade of rule
suggests she is unlikely to impose any far-
reaching policies aimed at redressing the
basic inequities in Indian society.
Parliamentary action on the amend-
ment was preceded on October 30 by a
government announcement that the life of
the present legislature will be extended at
least until March 1978. The present
term-already extended for one
year-was to expire next March. The
move was denounced by the opposition
parties, most of which are boycotting the
current session.
Public support for Gandhi has remain-
LEBANON 1
Lebanese President Sarkis and General
Ghunaym, the Egyptian commander of
the Arab League peacekeeping force,
spent much of this week trying to work
out arrangements for implementing the
provisions of the cease-fire accord ap-
proved by key Arab leaders in Riyadh last
month. Sarkis is expected to unveil a plan
by this weekend, but he is said to be
pessimistic that it can be put into effect
peacefully.
SECRE f A
Some additional slippage in carrying
out the Riyadh agreement seems in-
evitable. New contingents for the League
force have been slow in arriving in
Christian objections to the stationing of
Muslim peacekeeping troops on their side
of the cease-fire lines may have been over-
come by a reported plan that would en-
trust the task to Christian soldiers former-
ly with the regular Lebanese army. In a
sudden about-face, hard-liner Camille
Shamun joined Phalanges leader
Jumayyil this week in publicly praising
the efforts of Arab League negotiators
and expressing optimism about the
prospects for peace.
If such an arrangement has been work-
ed out, leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt can
be expected to refuse to withdraw his
forces from their positions unless similar
arrangements are made for policing areas
now under leftist control. In a transparent
attempt to gain some leverage, Jumblatt
this week raised new and patently im-
possible conditions for his cooperation by
insisting that Egyptian troops be added to
the peacekeeping contingent and that the
entire Arab force be restricted initially to
between 8,000 and 10,000 men.
Thus far, only the Palestinians have
begun to withdraw at least in limited
numbers from central Lebanon. A senior
Syrian officer acknowledged this week
that Palestinian forces were moving back
into the Arqub region and elsewhere in
southern Lebanon. The Syrians'
willingness to facilitate this movement,
however, does not indicate that Damascus
plans to encourage a resumption of
fedayeen cross-border operations into
northern Israel or has abandoned its ef-
forts to bring the guerrillas under more
effective control.
The Syrians are well aware of Israeli
sensitivities and would doubtless prefer to
keep the threat of renewed guerrilla ac-
tivity in reserve in order to increase
Syrian leverage in future negotiations
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EGYPT-USSR
The joint statement issued following the
talks between the Soviet and Egyptian
foreign ministers in Sofia, Bulgaria, on
November 3 and 4 is terse and suggests
that both sides remain wary of each other.
The statement notes that:
? The situation in the Middle East
received "primary attention."
? The two sides agreed to "quick
resumption" of the Geneva Middle
East peace conference.
? They exchanged views on the pre-
sent state of relations and the "dimen-
sions for their development."
There was no sign of progress toward
solving such problems as rescheduling the
Egyptian debt to the USSR and supplying
Egypt with Soviet military equipment.
The two sides agreed to continue dis-
cussions on bilateral issues. The next op-
portunity to do so will be when a Soviet
trade delegation arrives in Cairo later this
month.
The decision to continue talking is all
25X1
RHODESIA
cover and concealment for guerrilla
movements.
The number of white civilians killed in
encounters with the insurgents increased
last month to an all-time high. Two in-
cidents involved tourist facilities in the
western part of Rhodesia, an area that has
had little rebel activity to date.
The insurgents are also continuing to
have some success in recruiting in
Rhodesia. Several hundred teenage school
children recently disappeared from mis-
sion schools in the Mozambique border
area, presumably to join the insurgency.
In general, however, insurgent activity
has not increased significantly in the six
weeks since Prime Minister Ian Smith an-
nounced his acceptance of black majority
rule within two ears.
of-activity as the rains produce better
that can be expected at this stage of the in developments in the Middle East. The
Soviet-Egyptian impasse. Egypt is USSR is similarly trying to impress the
primarily interested in its relations with US that the USSR has a role to play in
the USSR as a way to sustain US interest the Middle East negotiations and is a
potential guarantor of any eventual agree-
Rhodesian security forces struck at25X1
several guerrilla camps in both southeast
and northeast Mozambique on October
31 and November 1. They seized large
quantities of arms and supplies and ap-
parently killed a number of guerrillas.
The Rhodesians expect an upsurge25
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25X6
Burundian military officers deposed
President Michel Micombero on
November 1, a few weeks before the 10th
anniversary of his own seizure of power in
the former Belgian colony.
The officers said they had taken over
because Micombero had assumed ex-
cessive power and had failed to address
the country's pressing political and
economic problems and because corrup-
tion was rife.
The officers set up a 29-man Supreme
Revolutionary Council to run the country.
The chairman of the council and new chief
of staff of the armed forces is Colonel
Jean Bagaza, who apparently led the
takeover.
Colonel Bagaza attended the Belgian
Royal Military School in 1971 and served
as deputy chief of staff from 1972 until the
takeover. In that position he paid official
visits to China and the USSR to arrange
for limited military assistance and train-
ing.
Burundi, situated between Zaire and
Tanzania, was the scene of violent tribal
feuding in 1972 that resulted in ap-
proximately 200,000 deaths. We see no in-
dications that this week's change of
government will trigger any new outburst
The Peruvian government has again ex-
tended the state of emergency imposed in
July. Though Interior Minister Cisneros
asserted that special powers are needed to
control subversive groups, in fact the
emergency decree has been used primarily
to clamp down on labor unrest. On Oc-
tober 13, the government moved against
municipal workers who were trying to
launch the first nationwide strike since
June. At the same time, a police dragnet
swept Lima's low-income neighborhoods
to round up radicals as well as criminals.
t A more serious challenge to the govern-
ent was a strike by fishermen on Oc-
tober 18, the day the second phase of the
anchovy season was to begin. The
fishermen hoped to delay denationaliza-
tion of the fleet, which they saw as reduc-
ing the number of jobs and eliminating
guaranteed salaries. Pescaperu, the
state-owned fishing enterprise, responded
by revoking labor contracts and rehiring
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those fishermen who agreed to cooperate.
This procedure allowed removal of union
activists and reduction of the work force.
By October 28, Pescaperu had a suf-
ficient number of men to operate the fleet,
but many remained on strike and the
government sent patrols into fishermen's
neighborhoods and imposed a curfew in
two ports. Violence and as many as 20
deaths have been reported as the
fishermen attempted to enlist the support
of other workers' groups.
As the strike entered its third week, the
government had lost as much as $40
million, but its firm action seems to have
kept the demonstrations from spreading
to other unions. The government will con-
tinue its tight rein under the state of
emergency decree, and the resulting irrita-
tion, in combination with the economic
austerity measures and reports of pay
raises for the military, could provoke a
general labor protest in coming weeks.
PERU-USSR
A Soviet team reportedly arrived in
Lima on October 31 to handle final details
of the long-rumored purchase of Soviet
fighter-bombers.
In a press conference on November 3,
Foreign Minister de la Puente said the
Soviets offered the best deal available,
and "we accept the proposal." This an-
nouncement immediately received
widespread international press coverage,
but within a few hours a government
spokesman denied that de la Puente's
statement had confirmed the purchase.
Apparently, the foreign minister learned
that he had made the announcement
prematurely.
This will be Peru's first purchase of
Soviet fighter aircraft. We believe the
plane to be sold Peru will be the SU-22, a
variant of the SU-17 Fitter. If the
reported $250 million price tag for 36
SU-22s covers only aircraft, spare parts,
and technical assistance-and not radar,
airfield construction, and support
facilities-then the price is relatively high.
The SU-22 is likely to be comparably
priced to the SU-20-$3.5 million per air-
craft, plus parts and technical assistance.
circulated for m'oriths, but in the past two
weeks the Morales Bermudez administra-
tion has endeavored to reassure its
neighbors that they have nothing to fear
from Peru's ac uisition of hi h erfor-
mance aircraft.
In addition, Peru has sought to mo i y
the US by asserting that the purchase has
no political implications and that the
Soviet role would be limited to pilot train-
ing and advisory teams. The purchase is
nonetheless likely to open wider the door
to Soviet influence in Peru.
BRAZIL
Brazil is planning to cut public invest-
ment growth next year in a major effort
to curb inflation. Price increases are
likely to exceed 50 percent this year,
compared with 30 percent in 1975. Prices
have risen despite a tight money policy,
soaring interest rates, and a ceiling
on wage increases.
Although details still are being worked
out, the investment cuts apparently will
affect key areas in which the public sector
is deeply involved-energy, iron and steel,
chemicals, and mining industries, as well
as transportation and other services.
The private sector, which accounts for
more than 80 percent of total fixed invest-
ment, has been bearing the brunt of
austerity measures. Tax and credit incen-
tives to private investors have been selec-
tively reduced since last year. The
state-owned National Economic Develop-
ment Bank has cut back loan dis-
bursements to private development proj-
ects, originally slated to reach nearly $4
billion this year.
These measures are beginning to slow
excess demand, but stiff import controls
that limit the supply of goods and sharply
increase the cost of imports continue to
fuel inflation. Raw material shortages are
becoming severe and black markets are
appearing in some industrial raw
materials.
Brazil, nevertheless, intends to main-
tain import controls for at least another
year and may even tighten them further in
an attempt to reduce the current-account
deficit. The deficit is now expected to ex-
ceed $6 billion this year, down a little
from $6.8 billion in 1975.
The proposed investment cuts, along
with the previous controls, probably will
hold real economic growth to less than 5
percent in 1977. By delaying the comple-
tion of plants that are to produce import
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substitutes, the cuts would also help
prolong Brazil's dependence on imported
goods.
The government's critical review of
public investment programs has already
heightened tension within the cabinet and
probably is largely responsible for a re-
cent spate of rumors of an impending
shake-up. Ministers responsible for run-
ning state enterprises will continue quiet
lobbying to forestall budget cuts until
final decisions are made.
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Soviet leaders clearly have their minds on the problem of
preparing for the succession to top party and government jobs.
Their actions at present, however, are taking them further away
from a long-term solution to the question.
USSR: Politics and the Succession Issue
CA
-,A&~~~ ~kR
Soviet party secretary Kirilenko, by
placing a protege on the secretariat at the
Central Committee plenum last week, im-
proved his status and advanced his claim
to be next in line for the post of party
leader. The absence of moves enhancing
the positions of younger leaders amounts
to a net loss in their standing in the
succession lineup.
Focus on Succession
The Soviet leadership is now ap-
proaching all key personnel changes with
an eye to their effect on the succession.
During the early 1970s when General
Secretary Brezhnev's authority was being
reinforced, younger opponents were
eliminated and efforts were made to
maintain a balance among Brezhnev's
colleagues within the collective
leadership.
Submerging the succession issue during
these years has made it all the more
troublesome now, when there is a clear
need to fill vacant jobs and to decide
questions of protocol precedence. The
stalemate that persists at present seems to
reflect the balance of power and rivalry
among the senior leaders and also their
fears for their own positions if successors
are designated.
Premier Kosygin's extended illness last
summer, which raised the possibility that
he would have to relinquish his post, must
have forced the Politburo to concentrate
more sharply on the succession. As the
focus of politics has changed, the arena
has shifted from the Politburo to the
secretariat-the executive arm of the Cen-
tral Committee.
Between 1968 and this year, only one
new party secretary was appointed and
only one was dropped. At the party
Congress earlier this year, however, two
new secretaries were appointed-Pravda
chief editor Zimyanin and the head of the
Central Committee's general department,
Chernenko. Also this year, the Politburo
dropped Agriculture Minister Polyansky
and added two new full members, Defense
Minister Ustinov and Leningrad party
chief Romanov.
The plenum last week made no changes
in the Politburo. It elected another
secretary-Ryabov-and retained
Ustinov on the secretariat despite his new,
full-time government job as defense
minister.
Contenders Blocked
Any serious candidate for the principal
succession prize, Brezhnev's job, would
undoubtedly have to be a member of the
secretariat. The appointments to the
secretariat of Brezhnev's protege
Chernenko and Kirilenko's protege
Ryabov block the way for more qualified
candidates.
Seemingly obvious candidates, such as
Leningrad party chief Romanov and
Ukrainian first secretary Shcherbitsky,
have still not been transferred to jobs in
the capital. The unusual retention of
Ustinov may result from the game of
secretariat politics now being played.
One Moscow job, chief of the trade un-
ions, remains open after a year and a
half-even though a trade union congress
has been announced for next March. Part
of the difficulty in filling the vacancies
may be that ambitious younger persons
are unwilling to take unpromising
assignments when a generational change
seems likely soon to offer better
prospects.
Kirilenko Gains Ground
Last week's plenum demonstrates that
not bringing leaders such as Romanov
and Shcherbitsky to Moscow helps those
who, however deficient in qualifications
for a top post, are already on the scene.
The 70-year-old Kirilenko was the notable
beneficiary.
Kirilenko's blatant self-promotion at a
ceremony on October 14 naming him a
Hero of Socialist Labor appears to have
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been a critical point in the pre-plenum
maneuvering. He may have been making
a plea finally to be recognized as the par-
ty's second secretary and heir to
Brezhnev.
Brezhnev did not repeat at the plenum
his success at the Congress, when he
brought his crony Chernenko into the
secretariat. For the first time since he has
been General Secretary, Brezhnev
accepted an obvious client of another
leader into the central councils. His own
man, Tikhonov, did not make it.
Brezhnev Acclaimed
Brezhnev nevertheless has enjoyed a
wealth of new honors and acclaim this
year, and still more adulation is probably
in store on the occasion of his 70th birth-
day in December. Kirilenko, while
pushing himself forward, went to unusual
lengths at the award ceremony to praise
Brezhnev. He referred to Brezhnev as
"vozhd," a term for leader rarely used
since Stalin.
Publication of Brezhnev's plenum
speech, which does not conform to the
usual practice since Brezhnev became
General Secretary, is also a plus for him.
Brezhnev normally delivers the main
report at plenums, but withholding
publication of the proceedings has been a
means of protecting the image of collec-
tive leadership.
In the foreign affairs section of his
speech, Brezhnev dwelt on the stead-
fastness of the policy of detente and on his
personal role in conducting foreign policy,
including plans to visit West Germany
and France. This is the policy area and
role that has done the most to enhance
Brezhnev's leadership position. The
success of his policies abroad will
probably continue to affect Brezhnev's in-
fluence within the leadership.
State of Play on Succession
Kirilenko's recent behavior breaks with
the gray, subservient image that he has
maintained for over a decade as
Brezhnev's deputy. In arranging the ap-
pointment of Ryabov to the secretariat he
has elevated an unmistakable protege;
Ryabov, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk
region, began his party career there under
Kirilenko.
Kirilenko seems to have been active in
pushing himself and Ryabov forward even
before Kosygin fell ill. On June 23, Prav-
da ran a lengthy interview with Ryabov
and followed it three days later with com-
ments on the interview from Sverdlovsk.
On July 14, Kirilenko took the unusual
step of participating in a session of the
Council of Ministers that reviewed the
five-year plan and the 1977 plan and
budget. Recent Moscow gossip alleging
that the other senior secretary, Suslov, is
a has-been and spends little time at the of-
fice may have been inspired by partisans
of Kirilenko.
Suslov has not been inactive. The
promotions of Romanov and Zimyanin
this year were probably congenial to
him. Although Romanov seems to have
good relations with many of the senior
leaders, Suslov appeared to be cham-
pioning Romanov's interests as his own
during his trip to Leningrad in September.
As long as Kosygin is able to carry on,
the senior leaders will probably be inclin-
ed not to make a change in the
premiership. It is not clear whom Kosygin
sees as his successor, although
presumably he would favor his long-time
first deputy, Mazurov. Brezhnev's protege
Tikhonov was probably not Kosygin's
choice for promotion to first deputy
premier in early September.
Both first deputies were slighted at the
plenum. Tikhonov failed to get on the
Politburo, although the position he holds
has usually merited this status and a press
picture last month showed him standing
with the full members of the Politburo.
The designation of Gosplan chairman
Baybakov to substitute for Kosygin in
delivering the report on the five-year plan
to the Supreme Soviet last week denied
Mazurov a public sign that he is in line for
the premiership.
The problem of succession will continue
to cause maneuvering and tension.
Kirilenko, for example, may now be in a
somewhat exposed position that could
prompt countermoves by others. Much
depends on whether Brezhnev decides to
try to line up his own successor. The
history of Soviet leadership politics and
the developments last week suggest that
he and the other seniors will act cautiously
and slowly on the issue.
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Prospects are good that the USSR will be able to reduce its
hard-currency trade deficit this year, but Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany will probably go further in
debt.
Soviet, East European Trade Deficits
Efforts by the USSR and the East
European countries to reduce their hard-
currency trade deficits this year have
produced mixed results.
Because of improving trade, the
USSR's hard-currency trade deficit for
1976 will probably be about $5
billion-down from $6.3 billion last year.
Soviet hard-currency imports in the last
half of 1976 should be well below the $7.9
billion recorded from January through
June. Grain imports are likely to fall from
$2 billion to about $1 billion. Other im-
ports should continue to rise
slowly-about 10 percent above the first
half. Soviet exports should be .28 percent
above the January to June level of $4.5
billion. In addition to the traditional
Soviet fourth quarter export spurt, ex-
ports are likely to be bolstered by Western
economic recovery.
Up to 60 percent of the Soviet deficit
this year probably will be covered by
largely government-backed medium- and
long-term credits. The balance will be
covered by general purpose borrowing on
the Euromarket, a drawdown on cash
reserves, and gold sales.
The USSR apparently has not obtained
large amounts of untied credits on the
Eurodollar market this year. Because the
Soviets borrowed more than $4 billion in
1975, many Western banks are near or at
their lending limits to the USSR. The
Western banking community in general
has become far more selective about ad-
ditional lending.
To protect its credit rating and remain-
ing borrowing capacity on the Eurodollar
market, the USSR has taken several steps
to reduce its dependence on this type of
financing. It has:
? Tightened controls over foreign
exchange expenditures, including
deferment of cash down-payments on
some orders until 1977.
? Made greater use of promissory
note financing for equipment imports.
As a result, Soviet gross liabilities in-
creased over the first quarter at half the
rate of the preceding quarter.
Poland probably will not reduce its
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trade deficit with the West from last
year's $3 billion level. In the first half of
this year, despite some recovery in ex-
ports, Poland incurred a deficit of $1.5
billion-the same as in the first half of
1975. Large imports of grain and fodder
and the delivery of machinery and equip-
ment ordered far in advance will continue
for the balance of the year.
Poland is finding it difficult to arrange
for Western loans to cover its trade
deficits and repayments on existing debt.
Most Western lenders are willing to par-
ticipate only in loans tied to Polish im-
ports of Western equipment. During the
first half of the year Poland apparently
borrowed $2 billion, less than half backed
by Western governments. Most of the
Czechoslovakia, East Germany
Czechoslovakia and East Germany also
failed to reduce their trade deficits in the
first half of 1976 compared with the first
half of 1975 and are not likely to do better
for the remainder of the year. Although
Czechoslovakia permitted little growth in
imports, its deficit grew as exports con-
tinued to stagnate. The East Germans
managed to boost exports by about 5 per-
cent, but imports from the West also rose
slightly.
Czechoslovakia is borrowing more in
the Eurocurrency market than in the past.
It recently received a $200-million loan
from a consortium of four West German
banks. It has previously relied mainly on
government-guaranteed credits, but its
hard-currency needs have apparently
become too large to be covered by these
sources.
The East Germans borrowed about
$600 million on the Euromarket in the
first quarter of the year and are now seek-
ing another $400 million to finance large
imports of grain and fodder. Unlike
Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Ger-
many are finding Western bankers recep-
tive.
Bulgaria and Romania, already carry-
ing extremely heavy debt burdens, and
Hungary-usually a cautious
borrower-have taken stringent measures
to bring their trade deficits into line. The
Romanians brought their first half of
1976 trade almost into balance; Bulgaria
and Hungary also kept down their new
borrowing.
All three countries are likely to hold
imports down for the remainder of the
year. The Bulgarians may in part be reac-25X1
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plans for imports from the West and for
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Thailand's new military government has yet fully to sort
out its domestic priorities, In foreign affairs, it is showing in-
terest in better relations with the US, and the momentum
toward closer ties with communist Indochina has slowed.
In some respects, politics in Thailand
has come full circle since 1973 when stu-
dent demonstrations forced a military
strongman into exile. The military have
now resumed a direct political role. They
have quickly produced a constitution to
make their authority legitimate and are
selecting a "legislature" to rubber stamp
the decisions of the executive-common
characteristics of past military
governments in Thailand.
In other respects, the new administra-
tion is atypical. The selection of a civilian
prime minister and cabinet and the
promise of a phased return to represen-
tative government-however
remote-reflect an appreciation of the
public's continuing regard for democratic
institutions despite disappointment with
their frailties in Thailand.
The weaknesses of parliamentary
democracy in Thailand were made
palpable by the growing polarization of
Thai political forces and the frequent un-
rest generated by protest politics since
1973. The return from exile of former
military strongman Thanom Kittikachorn
generated the turmoil that led to military
intervention, largely by bringing to a head
a number of disruptive problems.
Thanom's presence energized a divided
and languishing student movement. It
provided right-wing groups-eager for a
showdown with leftist students-an op-
portunity to marshal their forces. And it
highlighted the government's inability to
deal effectively with a crisis, putting
further pressure on a coalition already
weakened by the jockeying for advantage
Thailand: Back to Square One
among coalition leaders and by the
deepening divisions in Prime Minister
Seni's Democratic Party.
Deputy Prime Minister Praman
Aderecksan had been pressing Seni hard
for the Defense Ministry portfolio, a posi-
tion that would have permitted him to
strengthen his political base in the army
and one that Prime Minister Seni was
determined to deny him. Praman's party
was rumored to be financing both right-
and left-wing protest groups, hoping the
ensuing unrest would force a cabinet
reorganization that would strengthen his
position.
Threatened by Praman and repudiated
by the liberals in his own party who were
demanding Thanom's expulsion, Seni
could see nothing ahead but a worsening
political crisis, a prospect that left him no
alternative but martial law to re-establish
stability and direction to the Thai govern-
ment.
Even so, the government might have
survived if reports that students had of-
fended the royal family with a mock hang-
ing of the crown prince had not inflamed
public sentiment, removed any restraint
on right-wing reaction, and led to violence
and unprecedented brutality on the Tham-
masat campus. The bloodshed at Tham-
masat and the continuing right-wing
demonstrations against the government
convinced the military that the time had
come to step in.
The military did not need much convin-
cing. They were never comfortable with
the free-wheeling political atmosphere of
the "democratic experiment" or with
their relegation to the sidelines. But the
military's impatience to intervene was
held in check by the threat of bloody stu-
dent resistance and by the opposition of
the King
e New Regime
Admiral Sa-ngat, Air Chief Marshal
Kamon, and General Soem, commander
of the Royal Thai Army-the leaders of
the National Administrative Reform
Council established on October
6th-represent the more professional and
apolitical elements of the Thai armed
forces. Sa-ngat pressed vigorously for the
rapid formation of a new civilian ad-
ministration-largely a facade for the
military's continuing domination of
government policy, but one he hopes will
permit the military to lower its visibility
and gradually reduce its involvement.
Sa-ngat and his like-minded colleagues
clearly do not believe that Thailand can or
should turn the clock back to the days
when the generals ran the country for per-
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sonal economic advantage and the
professional caliber of the armed forces
suffered from the political preoccupations
of its leaders.
Sa-ngat's leadership and policy of a
restrained military role have not gone un-
challenged, however. The ambitions of
General Yot, army deputy commander
and recent commanding officer of the
First Army, are already threatening the
stability of the military council. Yot is
trying to exploit his residual influence in
the First Army to build a dominant posi-
tion from which he could challenge
Sa-ngat and his more moderate
colleagues. The First Division of the First
Army is the Bangkok garrison that has
often led coups.
Yot's maneuvering has been balanced
by the opposition of the majority of the
council who have thrown their weight
behind Sa-ngat. If the new First Army
commander begins to assert himself,
Yot's influence may diminish.
Nonetheless, the absence of strong army
leadership-General Soem, the army
commander, has little following in the ar-
my-bodes ill for the future stability of
the present government.
Sa-ngat is defense minister in the new
cabinet-a post he held for the last day of
the Seni government and one that should
strengthen his hand against Yot. Kamon
is chairman of the new Prime Minister's
Advisory Council, a truncated version of
the National Reform Council intended to
represent the military's interests in the
government, although the full Council
reportedly will continue to operate behind
the scenes at least until a national
assembly is selected. General Kriangsak,
who built a reputation for skillful handl-
ing of the US military presence in
Thailand, is the Vice Chairman of the Ad-
visory Council and concurrently
Secretary General of the full Council; he
is emerging as one of the principal figures
of the new regime.
The civilians are expected to be
thoroughly dominated by the military,
although Prime Minister Thanin
Kraiwichian reportedly was the personal
selection of the King. If true, that connec-
tion would give Thanin added strength in
dealing with the generals. Thanin's strong
anti-communist sentiments and his
reputation as a counterinsurgency
specialist (which made him an attractive
choice for the King) reflect a basic com-
patibility with the military.
Thanin's views-reformist to the point
of puritanical-are out of character for
Thai political leaders and may strike the
easy-going Thai as extremist. The Thai,
thoroughly sick of protest politics, are
looking for a firm hand on the tiller.
Thanin's concern about the communists,
which apparently borders on an obsession,
runs the risk of going too far and
generating an atmosphere of repression
that could cause a backlash against the
government.
Although most of those arrested on Oc-
tober 6 in connection with the Thammasat
riots have now been released, another
3,000 persons, including 1,000 Vietna-
mese, have been picked up since then.
Initial public reaction to the anti-com-
munist campaign was one of smug ap-
proval, but the scope of arrests and re-
ports of abuses have already produced
signs of some disquiet.
Prospects for Stability
The King is clearly a stabilizing factor.
His support for the new administration
should give ambitious army generals
pause; his open opposition would halt any
countercoup plans. Even so, fissures in the
military will be a continuing source of ten-
sion. There appears to be a basic division
between the reformists led by Thanin and
Sa-ngat and the more typical
wheeler-dealers led by Yot who have
come up the traditional military ladder to
power and no doubt are eager for the
lucrative rewards that usually have ac-
companied senior military positions. The
government's appeals against corruption
and the stern admonitions for a more
austere life style for the military will
probably be ignored but if pushed serious-
ly could be an irritant.
Threats from the "outs" do not yet
appear serious. The Praman clique is
frustrated by its sudden exclusion from
power but lacks the requisite military
muscle for a serious challenge. The urban
left has gone underground, its cadre either
lying low or vanished into the jungle
redoubts of the Communist Party of
Thailand. Most of the students attracted
by the excitement of protest politics are
now trying to clear themselves and return
to school, and it is unlikely that more than
the hard core of the radical movement will
Admiral Sa-ngat (center) and two cabinet members at a Buddhist temple
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opt for the rigors of the jungle.
It is too early to assess the impact of the
return to authoritarian government on the
communist insurgency. The current flurry
of military activity in the northeast is in
an area of frequent unrest and may reflect
more aggressive activities by the Thai
army than a new stage of communist
operations. The Communist Party has
always subordinated its urban operations
to its activities in the countryside, and
with the departure of its urban assets is
probably not likely to undertake a
program of urban terrorism in the near
future.
Foreign Policy Implications
The Thai military were never comfor-
table with the constitutional government's
post-Vietnam war approaches to its com-
munist neighbors, and the new leaders are
now drawing back from what they think
was a policy of over-anxious accommoda-
tion. Relations with Hanoi have shifted
into acrimonious exchanges. The Thai in-
itially insinuated that Vietnam was in-
volved in the student demonstrations, and
the Vietnamese became exercised over the
large-scale arrests of Vietnamese
residents in Thailand and concerned
about the implications of closer Thai-US
relations.
Vietnam has kept up a drumbeat of
hostile rhetoric against the new regime
and canceled plans to open an embassy in
Bangkok. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese
on October 13 released 53 Thai fishermen
who had been taken prisoner two months
earlier, and the government of Laos, fre-
quently a stalking horse for Vietnam's
policies, seems to be softening its initial
hostility.
Neither side has completely repudiated
previous policies of accommodation, and
the Thai clearly want to avoid a confron-
tation with the Indochinese communists.
Even so, the momentum toward closer
Thai relations with communist Indochina
has been significantly slowed.
At the same time, Bangkok is eager to
restore a special relationship with the
US-acknowledging that US forces are
probably gone for good, but hopeful that
a generous military and economic aid
program can be re-established.
A number of steps have been taken
with an eye toward wooing the US-
the appointment of recent ambassador
to the US Upadit Pacnariyangkun as
foreign minister, the announcement
of a narcotics suppression campaign,
and the sacking of the Permanent Sec-
retary for Foreign Affairs, Anan Pan-
yarachun, who was active in negoti-
ating the expulsion of US forces from
Thailand in recent talks with Vietnam
Overpopulation, unemployment, and racial antagonisms
make for a bleak future as the English-speaking mini-states in
the Caribbean rush toward independence.
Prospects for Caribbean Mini-States
A num er of t e island mini-states of
the English-speaking eastern Caribbean
appear to be moving swiftly toward in-
dependence. Three have already cut their
ties with the UK-Trinidad and Tobago
in 1962, Barbados in 1966, and Grenada
in 1974. The five West Indies Associated
States-Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vin-
cent, St. Lucia, and Dominica- are likely
to follow suit within the next few years.
With a total population of about
450,000 and a land area of less than
2,600 square kilometers (1,000 square
miles), the five will have severe eco-
nomic problems. Some also seem des-
tined, like Grenada, to drift toward
domination by autocratic leaders.
Leaders in some of the smaller states
seem increasingly attracted to Cuban or
Guyanese models as possible solutions to
their problems. The growing tendency
toward leftist authoritarianism, however,
appears largely a consequence of mount-
ing economic and social ills rather than a
direct effect of Cuba's efforts to extend its
influence. The two larger and more stable
countries in the area--Trinidad and
Tobago and Barbados-have shown little
susceptibility to radicalism.
Overpopulation and Unemployment
Population densities of the
English-speaking states are among the
highest in the Western Hemisphere,
averaging almost 550 persons per square
mile. The shortage of land is acute. The
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migration from rural areas to urban
centers with the consequent increase in
poverty and overcrowding has increased
crime and spawned other social ills.
The economies of most of the islands
are heavily dependent on one- or two-crop
agriculture and tourism. Development of
industry is hampered by small internal
markets, high wage demands, and
political and economic uncertainties that
discourage foreign investment. Mineral
resources, with the exception of the oil
fields of Trinidad, are generally lacking.
In the past two years, rising fuel prices, a
drop in banana and sugar production, and
a decline in tourism have added to the
already serious economic problems.
Unemployment is now estimated at
over 20 percent among adults in Barbados
and Trinidad and considerably more in
the smaller islands and among young peo-
ple. Emigration is becoming less feasible
as the UK and Canada have limited the
influx of migrants, and only the US con-
tinues to absorb them in significant
"TSP
BRNAMAS
numbers.
The inhabitants of the eastern Carib-
bean islands are becoming increasingly
militant as a result of rising expectations
for employment, housing, and education.
The better educated younger people are
becoming aware of long-standing social
and racial inequities. Many regard foreign
investment and expatriate ownership of
desirable land as an extension of
colonialism and see their own poverty as a
product of racism.
The blacks' hostility toward whites and
lighter skinned peoples is a major factor
in political alignments. In Trinidad, for
example, the dominant People's National
Movement is largely the party of the
blacks while the allegiance of the East In-
dians, who are almost as numerous as the
blacks, is divided among minority parties.
Race is also a factor in the region's
policy definition. Prime Minister Eric
Williams of Trinidad recently said racial
considerations were responsible for
"abandonment" of the Caribbean by
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whites and that the welfare, if not the sur-
vival, of black societies depends on their
alignment with the third world.
Toward Independence
Increased political consciousness,
strongly influenced by the rising wave of
nationalism throughout the world, has
stimulated the five remaining West Indies
Associated States to seek full in-
dependence from the UK. Two probably
will be independent within the next year or
so.
Last April, Premier John Compton of
St. Lucia declared that his island would
become independent in December, but
foot-dragging by the main opposition par-
ty is likely to delay independence. In
August, Premier Patrick John of
Dominica stated that his island state
would become independent in 1977, a
move that could occur as early as
February.
Premier Robert Bradshaw of St.
Kitts-Nevis has pressed the UK to es-
tablish a timetable for independence, but
the prospect that Nevis might secede
probably will deter Bradshaw from mov-
ing quickly. If Bradshaw should declare
independence unilaterally and try to con-
trol Nevis by force, the Nevisians would
probably resist.
Until early this year, Antigua appeared
likely to be the first to declare in-
dependence. That prospect has been set
back several years, however, by the upset
election victory in February of Vere Bird,
who has indicated that he does not favor
immediate independence.
Premier Vincent Cato of St. Vincent
has also publicly endorsed the principle of
independence, but he has privately in-
dicated that he believes it would be unwise
to seek independence alone.
An Associated State can achieve in-
dependence by a two-thirds vote in a
referendum or by persuading the UK of
overwhelming popular sentiment for in-
dependence. According to John and
Compton, however, independence would
not require either a referendum or a
general election.
The British representative to the
Associated States believes that if any
Pan 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 5. 76
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C P 5
Associated State leader unilaterally
declares independence, the UK will do
nothing. The British would like to end the
financial drain, some $10 million annual-
ly, imposed by the Associated States.
Other British colonies in the eastern
Caribbean could follow the Associated
States into independence. Chief Minister
Willard Wheatly of the British Virgin
Islands recently predicted autonomy by
1980 and full independence shortly
thereafter.
Officials in both colonies, however, had
earlier told US embassy officers that they
had no desire to change their status.
Anguilla, another British colony in the
eastern Caribbean, also has indicated its
clear preference to retain its ties to the
UK.
Barbados and Trinidad
Recent elections in Barbados and
Trinidad-where the citizens are better
educated and more sophisticated and
prosperous-provide a contrast to the
leftward movement in some of the smaller
Caribbean countries. The victory of
"Tom" Adams and the Barbados Labor
Party in the general election on
September 2 was a setback for Cuban am-
bitions in the Caribbean.
Adams has categorically stated that he
did not believe the charges of
"destabilization" made against the US by
his predecessor, and it seems evident that
he will not cooperate extensively with
Cuba. Although the Adams government
did not reverse a decision made in August
to allow the Cubans to use Barbados as a
stopover for regularly scheduled Cubana
flights to Africa, it has made clear its op-
position to the resumption of Cuban
military flights to Africa that use Bar-
bados as a stopover.
In Trinidad, Prime Minister Williams'
largely black-based People's National
Movement was returned to office on
September 13. As long as Williams is in
control, Cuba's chances of developing
closer ties with Trinidad will be limited.
Williams apparently views Cuba's Castro
as a young upstart and rival. In addition,
the essentially democratic character of the
Movement has tended to preclude the
appeal of radical socialist ideology.
Outlook
Racial tensions and bleak economic
prospects in most of the islands are likely
to result in serious political turmoil and
some violence. As they gain in-
dependence, the islands are likely to move
toward repression and dictatorial rule by
one person or one party.
Prospects for a federation of newly in-
dependent eastern Caribbean states seem
poor. All past efforts to federate have fail-
ed, and local leaders view federation as a
threat to their own positions. Regional
economic cooperation, such as the Carib-
bean Community, has fared somewhat
better. Because the economies of the
island states are largely competitive,
however, actual economic benefits have
been small and unequally distributed.
Given the likelihood that some of the
smaller states will indeed opt for radical
solutions, Cuban assistance to and in-
fluence in those states will develop more
rapidly. Dominica and St. Lucia, in par-
ticular, may establish close ties with
Cuba.
Cuba's influence over the short run in
Barbados and Trinidad is unlikely to in-
crease substantially. Should high un-
employment continue for several years,
however, the commanding positions of
moderates in both countries could be
weakened.
In Trinidad, Williams has not tapped a
successor, and his death would leave the
People's National Movement seriously
split. This could open the way for leftists
to gain strength and possibly even even-
tual control of the government.
Cuba's approach to the eastern Carib-
bean states probably will be similar to its
approach in Jamaica and Guyana: in-
creased personal contacts between Cuban
leaders and local political leaders; offers
of security assistance; increased contacts
between youth and labor organizations;
and offers of technical aid. F
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