WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 5, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 7, 1977
Content Type:
SUMMARY
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5.pdf | 3.63 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
NGA Review Complete
Secret
CG WS 77-001
January 7, 1977
Copy
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
CONTENTS
1 Soviet Union
US Relations; Middle East
Negotiations;
3 Europe
East Germany; Spain; EC;
France
6 Africa
Botswana-China; Ethiopia;
Libya-USSR
8 Western Hemisphere
Peru-Chile-Ecuador
8 Asia
Laos-Cuba; Japan; Sri
Lanka
10 Spain: Pressure for Regional Autonomy
13 USSR: Vexed by the Dissident Problem
14 France: Wage Restraint Policy
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05
US RELATIONS
Soviet comments on t:he incoming US
administration are focusing on the
strategic aspects of Soviet-US relations.
General Secretary Bre:zhnev's endorse-
ment of a summit meeting, which was
reported on December 2!~ by Tass, implies
that the date for such a meeting may de-
pend on when the current impasse in
negotiations on strategic. arms limitations
is broken.
In November and early December, the
Soviet media appeared to be cautioning
that a new administration in the US
would not necessarily mean progress for
Soviet-US relations. In a Pravda article
on December ] 1, Georgiy Arbatov-the
head of the USA Institute-referred to a
new skepticism in the US about Soviet
policy and concluded that trends evident
during the US election campaign could
complicate future relations. The in-
stitute's journal carried articles in its
December issue describing a "con-
siderable shift to the right" in the US
away from cooperation with Moscow.
More recently, Arbatov has empha-
sized optimism about Soviet-US ties,
dismissing problems raised during the
campaign as "imaginary" and "unes-
sential." In broadcasts he made in
English on December 28, he referred
to US public opinion polls showing
sentiment strongly in faivor of an easing
of East-West tensions.
Current Soviet commentary on the in-
coming administration appears to be less
critical of some individuals, particularly
Zbigniew Brzezinski, whio have previously
been attacked. On December 29, Pravda
cited Brzezinski's support for the
strategic arms talks; other Soviet re-
porting has cited President-elect Carter's
pledge to give prioriity attention to
strategic matters. The President-elect's
support for a weapons freeze has been
referred to as an example of a "positive
attitude" toward negotiations to limit
nuclear weapons.
Brezhncv's remarks on future
Soviet-US relations emphasized the need
for a second agrecment at the "earliest
possible date" limiting strategic arms. He
said President-elect Carter has an
"understanding of the urgency" of the
problem.
hbr the moment, Moscow seems bent
on conveying the notion that a certain
level of amity is essential in Soviet-US
relations if only to facilitate com-
munications on issues of strategic impor-
tance.
MIDDLE EAST
NEGOTIATIONS
The USSR appears concerned that it
will be left out of renewed Middle East
peace efforts. The Soviets seem par-
ticularly anxious that no alternative to a
resumption of the Geneva conference be
considered.
Since early December, the Soviets have
publicly criticized Egyptian media for
emphasizing the US role in the effort to
bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement.
At the same time, the Soviet press has
condemned as a "notorious initiative"
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's proposal
for a Helsinki-type Middle East con-
ference.
Rabin's proposal of an alternative
forum and the Egyptian focus on the US
role presumably evoke Soviet suspicion
that Moscow will be cut out of the settle-
ment process. 'The chief of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Near East depart-
ment, in a conversation with a US em-
bassy official in late December, stressed
the importance of returning to the Geneva
forum and even tried to be flexible on the
question of Palestinian participation at
the conference.
The Soviet official made no reference, 25X1
for example, to the usual Soviet formula
f'or Palestinian participation in the con-
ference on a "basis of full equality and
from the very beginning." Moscow and
Washington should work together, he
said, "to find a common language and a
common approach on how to proceed as
co-chairmen" of the conference.
The official's remarks suggest that
Moscow will rely on hints of flexibility to
try to encourage the incoming US ad-
ministration [o resume negotiations. In
the Soviet view, Geneva remains the only
possibility for the USSR to become a
major participant in the Middle East
negotiating process and a guarantor of
any eventual agreement.
Page 1
25X1
25X1
I
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
SECRET
~ ~ i ~~
HARVES RESULTS
The USSR announced o^ January 5 a
record grain harvest of 223.8 million
metric tons in ] 976. Good weather and
some improvements in organization of the
harvest were largely responsible for the
big crop.
The previous record was 222.5 million
tons in 1973; the poorest crop in the last
decade was the 140 million tons harvested
in 1975. As in the past, last year's crop
will presumably be subject to some
post-harvest losses during transportation,
processing, and storage.
The USSR purchased an additional
12.6 million tons of grain in 1976, despite
the record harvest. Part of these
purchases stem from the poor 1975 crop,
,.Soviet wheat harvest in the Oshskaya reginn
and 6.4 million tons were purchased under
the US-USSR long-term grain agree-
ment, which commits the Soviets to buy
at least 6 million tons of US grain annual-
ly until 1980.
The Soviets expect potato produc-
tion-their most important non??grain
crop-to be slightly more than 85 million
tons. Although this is about 5 percent
below the average for the past five years,
supplies for consumers should be ade-
yuate. Potatoes supply nearly one-tenth of
per capita daily caloric intake in the
USSR and are also important as feed for
livestock.
The Soviets have also announced an
85-million-ton sugar-beet crop, 3.5
million tons below the 1975 harvest. if the
sugar content of the beets is average, the
crop will fall about one half million tons
short of the USSR's plan to produce 9.7
million tons of sugar. The slack will be
taken up by imports from Cuba.
The figure announced for the cotton
harvest is 8.3 million tons-only 100,000
tons short of the record crop two years
ago. Moscow's activity in the world cot-
ton market dropped significantly last
year, apparently because of a decline in
Soviet cotton output in 1975. Exports
probably will rise in 1977 when last vear's
crop is available.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
SECREY
EAST GERMANIY
~~~ f ~ ~~
The East German regime introduced
measures last weekend apparently aimed
at strengthening its long-maintained
claim to full sovereigm:y over East Berlin.
New visa procedures were imposed on
all non-German visitors entering the East
German capital frorri West Berlin. In
effect, visitors must now obtain a visa
even for one-day visits, valid only until
midnight of the day of issuance. Previous-
ly, foreigners were permitted an overnight
stay in East Berlin without a visa. The
new regulation does not apply to West
German citizens, pernnanent residents of
West Berlin, or mernbers of the Allied
forces.
In addition, the East Germans have
removed the border control posts they had
maintained at points .along the boundary
between East Berlin and East Germany.
The posts were used primarily to ensure
that visiting Westerners had proper visas
for East Germany and, as a practical
matter, to prevent Allied vehicles Eton
straying beyond East Berlin. Removal of
the posts may be part of the regime's ef-
fort to support its contention that East
Berlin is an integral part of East Ger-
many.
Propaganda explaining the new
procedures has emphasized the line that
East Germany has a right to exercise full
control over its capital. In his New Year's
address, party boss Honecker implicitly
echoed this theme and stated again, in
strong terms, that Bonn must accept the
existence of two independent, sovereign
German states as a precondition for
cooperation.
East German leaders have been adopt-
ing amore strident position toward the
West German government. In part, this
attitude reflects the leadership's sensitivi-
ty over West German media exploitation
of East Germany's internal problems,
particularly reports about the rising
number of applications to leave East Ger-
many. Honecker, in his speech last week,
attacked West German "provocations"
against the boundaries of East Germany.
He also commented that his regime "has
made enough proposals" for normal
relations with Bonn-suggesting that no
further initiatives can be expected from
the East German side at this time.
SPAIN
The government last week released
Spanish Communist leader Santiago
Carrillo on bail and abolished the con-
troversial Public Order Court, a political
tribunal that had handled his case. The
moves should help ease tensions in Spain.
The government also removed terrorist
offenses from military jurisdiction.
Political and terrorist cases will now be
handled by ordinary civilian courts. These
judicial reforms had long been demanded
by the opposition, which condemned the
special courts as instruments of Francoist
repression.
The moves will anger rightist diehards
but seem likely to give a boost [o govern-
ment negotiations with the opposition.
The recent ouster of rightists from five
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
key security positions may also aid the
_;overnn~ient's effort to persuade the leftist
,~ppositi:~n to participate in the political
~roces; and will strengthen the
c;cwernrr~enfs ability to deal with trouble
i~n>m thr right. One major problem for the
;;overntrent will be protecting Carrillo
from bs;ing physically attacked by ul-
+._ruighiists.
lnasrruch as the Communist Party is
still banned in Spain, it cannot operate
~:~peniy as a political party; the govern-
ment has nevertheless allowed it con-
;iderable freedom. Nrime Minister Suarez
,~robabh~ hopes that allowing Carrillo
freedom of movement until his
+riai-w rich probably will not take place
until after the legislative election next
spring if at all-will accustom the elec-
torate to his presence and facilitate some
?orm of accommodation with the party.
Military resistance to legalization of
the party almost certainly remains strong.
the yue;tion will probably be addressed
during negotiations between the govern-
ment amp the opposition concerning the
coming election. The negotiations may
start soon; they had been delayed by
i~ickerin~ among the opposition parties,
>y Soarer' apparent refusal to meet with a
team that includes a Communist
representative, and most recently by the
arrest of Carrillo. An analysis o% the
problenes faring the .Spanish ,government
over the increasing demands Jor greater
autonomy for some of .Spain's provinces
appears in the feature section of this
~)
i/ EC: Nuclear Fusion Program in Jeopardy
The European Community's ther-
rnonuclear fusion program is likely to die
hecause of the clash among member states
over the site of the program's joint
research facility
Construction of the facility is already a
year behind schedule because of the
deadlock over its location. Italy and the
I:C Commission propose huilding it in
Ispra, Italy, the site of a number of other
LC nuclear research projects. The other
members favor other sites.
The tJK, West Germany, and Italy
recently accepted a proposal to decide the
issue by majority vote in the F.C Research
Council, which had been scheduled to
meet last month. The vote would probably
have favored locating the facility in either
the UK or West Germany where research
in nuclear fusion has been under way.
France refused to go along, and the
meeting was canceled.
A high-ranking EC official believes the
program still has a slim chance for sur-
vival if France can be persuaded to change
its position or if the decision on a site is
transferred to the Commission. Alter-
natives may also emerge outside the EC
framework, but no EC country has the
resources to pursue such a project alone.
The end of the fusion program would
destroy Europe's technological lead in fu-
sion research, according to the EC of-
ficial. The impact on fusion research
overall would be uncertain because a
variety of methods are being pursued in
this field.
Whatever happens to the fusion
program, the EC Joint Research Center,
which oversees the program and other
nuclear research projects, will probably
still be funded through 1980. Its budget
has been substantially increased.
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
SECRET
FRANCE
The Communist-Socialist alliance in
France is making steady political gains.
The trend is evident in voting patterns,
public opinion polls, and recent studies by
[he Ministry of the Interior.
According to a voter survey in
December, the left would win 53 to 56 per-
cent of the vote in a parliamentary elec-
tion. This is the best showing ever made
by the left in a poll and, if translated into
votes in the March 1978 balloting, could
assure it a majority. E~rench polls are
much less reliable, however, in predicting
a parliamentary election than a presiden-
tial contest.
The Socialists have made strong gains
in all of the almost 20 by-elections held
since 1973; the Communists have done so
in five.
A strong performance by the
left in medium-sized and big cities will
add to its momentum for the national
election in 1978. The governing coalition
has been hurt by the steady decline in
President Giscard's popularity. A poll last
month showed that only 39 percent of the
French were satisfied with his perfor-
mance, an all-time low.
The Socialists and Communists have
reached an agreement on common lists in
over half of the 220 cities with popula-
lions between 30,000 and 300,000; the
Ministry of the Interior believes they will
also reach agreements in most of the re-
mainder. The left will probably win
about 140 cities in this category and
show substantial gains in five of France's
larger cities, including Paris.
Because of the alliance, the Com-
munists will place their first members in
many city councils now dominated by the
Socialists. Socialist-held municipalities
that will be opened to the Communists
through common lists are much more
numerous than Communist bastions that
will be opened to the Socialists. The Com-
munists are pressing their Socialist
partners for a maximum number of seats
on the municipal councils, which is caus-
ing some concern to the more moderate
Socialists.
--
French Socialist Party leader Fra~rcois Mitterrand (lJ and Communist Party leader Georges Marchais
SECRET
5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jan 7, 77
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
SECRET
BO~~SWANA-CHINA
President Khama's moderate govern-
ment. which is deeply concerned over its
weak less in the face of increasing border
violations by Rhodesian security forces
pursuing nationalist rebels, has apparen[-
fy rec~,ived a shipment of arms supplied by
China. [t is Botswana's first from any
communist source.
Iwo 7_ambian air force transports
carryi og arms arrived in Botswana on
.fanua-y 2- Circumstantial evidence left
little doubt tha? the arms shipment
Khama recently announced he was ex-
panding and re-equipping the country';
400-man mobile police unit-Botswana',
only military force-which is currently
tryinp* to patrol the 800-kilometer border
with Rhodesia. Botswana has been seek-
ing arms in both the US and the UK but
has been reluctant to buy because of the
prices asked and the bureaucratic re-
quirements. Even with new weapons and a
larger police force, Botswana will not be
able to prevent border incursions by the
Rhodesians.
In a recent press interview, the Soviet.
amhassador to Botswana said that the
USSR is ready to give Botswana military
help to repulse Rhodesian troops. Khama,
however, is uneasy over the aggressive
role the Soviets have been playing in
southern Africa and would prefer to keep
their influence to a minimum.
He probably views the Chinese as a
more acceptable source of military sup-
port. Their aid reportedly is free, and they
have kept a low profile in their sizable aid
programs in Tanzania and Zambia.
The Chinese undoubtedly are interested
in maintaining the good position they
have established in Botswana and in
minimizing the Soviets' role. They sent an
ambassador long before the Soviets, who
opened a mission in Gaborone just last
September, and they arranged for Khama
to visit Peking last summer,)
ETHIOPIA
A reorganization of Ethiopia's ruling
rilitary council was announced in Addis
Ababa last week. The move was an effort
to reaffirm collective leadership and to
restore halance to power relationships
within the council.
The reorganization is designed par-
ticularly to limit the power of First Vice
Chairman Mengistu by clearly defining
his authority and depriving him of control
over some organizations that had been
part of his power base. Mengistu remains
a key figure, however, because of his new
WEEKLY SUMMARY
First Vice Chairm?n Mengistz~
duties as chairman of the Council of
Ministers. He will probably use the posi-
tion to try to regain his previous dominant
influence.
The formal positions of General Teferi,
the chairman of the military council who
has been largely a figurehead, and Second
Vice Chairman Atnafu were strengthened
by the reorganization, but neither may in
fact play a more influential role. Although
Teferi has new opportunities to do so, he
is not a strong leader and probably will
not be any more inclined than previously
to exercise his powers. Atnafu was given
new responsibilities for security matters,
but his actual control of the security
forces is unclear.
The US embassy in Addis Ababa
believes the changes may improve the
regime's performance some and possibly
lead to less arbitrary decisions. At the
same time, the reorganization suggests
that the military is seeking to perpetuate
its control of the government rather than
to prepare the way for civilian rule. 'The
announcement reaffirmed the regime's in-
tention to follow Marxist-Leninist nrin-
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
SECRET
LIBYA-USSR
The Libyan navy has taken delivery of
its first submarine, aSoviet-built F-class
torpedo attack boat.
The diesel-powered submarine, flying a
Tripoli on December 27. India is the only
other country to whi