WEEKLY SUMMARY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 5, 2008
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 7, 1977
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5.pdf3.63 MB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Secret Weekly Summary State Dept. review completed. NGA Review Complete Secret CG WS 77-001 January 7, 1977 Copy Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 CONTENTS 1 Soviet Union US Relations; Middle East Negotiations; 3 Europe East Germany; Spain; EC; France 6 Africa Botswana-China; Ethiopia; Libya-USSR 8 Western Hemisphere Peru-Chile-Ecuador 8 Asia Laos-Cuba; Japan; Sri Lanka 10 Spain: Pressure for Regional Autonomy 13 USSR: Vexed by the Dissident Problem 14 France: Wage Restraint Policy Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Q Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 US RELATIONS Soviet comments on t:he incoming US administration are focusing on the strategic aspects of Soviet-US relations. General Secretary Bre:zhnev's endorse- ment of a summit meeting, which was reported on December 2!~ by Tass, implies that the date for such a meeting may de- pend on when the current impasse in negotiations on strategic. arms limitations is broken. In November and early December, the Soviet media appeared to be cautioning that a new administration in the US would not necessarily mean progress for Soviet-US relations. In a Pravda article on December ] 1, Georgiy Arbatov-the head of the USA Institute-referred to a new skepticism in the US about Soviet policy and concluded that trends evident during the US election campaign could complicate future relations. The in- stitute's journal carried articles in its December issue describing a "con- siderable shift to the right" in the US away from cooperation with Moscow. More recently, Arbatov has empha- sized optimism about Soviet-US ties, dismissing problems raised during the campaign as "imaginary" and "unes- sential." In broadcasts he made in English on December 28, he referred to US public opinion polls showing sentiment strongly in faivor of an easing of East-West tensions. Current Soviet commentary on the in- coming administration appears to be less critical of some individuals, particularly Zbigniew Brzezinski, whio have previously been attacked. On December 29, Pravda cited Brzezinski's support for the strategic arms talks; other Soviet re- porting has cited President-elect Carter's pledge to give prioriity attention to strategic matters. The President-elect's support for a weapons freeze has been referred to as an example of a "positive attitude" toward negotiations to limit nuclear weapons. Brezhncv's remarks on future Soviet-US relations emphasized the need for a second agrecment at the "earliest possible date" limiting strategic arms. He said President-elect Carter has an "understanding of the urgency" of the problem. hbr the moment, Moscow seems bent on conveying the notion that a certain level of amity is essential in Soviet-US relations if only to facilitate com- munications on issues of strategic impor- tance. MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS The USSR appears concerned that it will be left out of renewed Middle East peace efforts. The Soviets seem par- ticularly anxious that no alternative to a resumption of the Geneva conference be considered. Since early December, the Soviets have publicly criticized Egyptian media for emphasizing the US role in the effort to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement. At the same time, the Soviet press has condemned as a "notorious initiative" Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's proposal for a Helsinki-type Middle East con- ference. Rabin's proposal of an alternative forum and the Egyptian focus on the US role presumably evoke Soviet suspicion that Moscow will be cut out of the settle- ment process. 'The chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East depart- ment, in a conversation with a US em- bassy official in late December, stressed the importance of returning to the Geneva forum and even tried to be flexible on the question of Palestinian participation at the conference. The Soviet official made no reference, 25X1 for example, to the usual Soviet formula f'or Palestinian participation in the con- ference on a "basis of full equality and from the very beginning." Moscow and Washington should work together, he said, "to find a common language and a common approach on how to proceed as co-chairmen" of the conference. The official's remarks suggest that Moscow will rely on hints of flexibility to try to encourage the incoming US ad- ministration [o resume negotiations. In the Soviet view, Geneva remains the only possibility for the USSR to become a major participant in the Middle East negotiating process and a guarantor of any eventual agreement. Page 1 25X1 25X1 I Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 SECRET ~ ~ i ~~ HARVES RESULTS The USSR announced o^ January 5 a record grain harvest of 223.8 million metric tons in ] 976. Good weather and some improvements in organization of the harvest were largely responsible for the big crop. The previous record was 222.5 million tons in 1973; the poorest crop in the last decade was the 140 million tons harvested in 1975. As in the past, last year's crop will presumably be subject to some post-harvest losses during transportation, processing, and storage. The USSR purchased an additional 12.6 million tons of grain in 1976, despite the record harvest. Part of these purchases stem from the poor 1975 crop, ,.Soviet wheat harvest in the Oshskaya reginn and 6.4 million tons were purchased under the US-USSR long-term grain agree- ment, which commits the Soviets to buy at least 6 million tons of US grain annual- ly until 1980. The Soviets expect potato produc- tion-their most important non??grain crop-to be slightly more than 85 million tons. Although this is about 5 percent below the average for the past five years, supplies for consumers should be ade- yuate. Potatoes supply nearly one-tenth of per capita daily caloric intake in the USSR and are also important as feed for livestock. The Soviets have also announced an 85-million-ton sugar-beet crop, 3.5 million tons below the 1975 harvest. if the sugar content of the beets is average, the crop will fall about one half million tons short of the USSR's plan to produce 9.7 million tons of sugar. The slack will be taken up by imports from Cuba. The figure announced for the cotton harvest is 8.3 million tons-only 100,000 tons short of the record crop two years ago. Moscow's activity in the world cot- ton market dropped significantly last year, apparently because of a decline in Soviet cotton output in 1975. Exports probably will rise in 1977 when last vear's crop is available. Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 SECREY EAST GERMANIY ~~~ f ~ ~~ The East German regime introduced measures last weekend apparently aimed at strengthening its long-maintained claim to full sovereigm:y over East Berlin. New visa procedures were imposed on all non-German visitors entering the East German capital frorri West Berlin. In effect, visitors must now obtain a visa even for one-day visits, valid only until midnight of the day of issuance. Previous- ly, foreigners were permitted an overnight stay in East Berlin without a visa. The new regulation does not apply to West German citizens, pernnanent residents of West Berlin, or mernbers of the Allied forces. In addition, the East Germans have removed the border control posts they had maintained at points .along the boundary between East Berlin and East Germany. The posts were used primarily to ensure that visiting Westerners had proper visas for East Germany and, as a practical matter, to prevent Allied vehicles Eton straying beyond East Berlin. Removal of the posts may be part of the regime's ef- fort to support its contention that East Berlin is an integral part of East Ger- many. Propaganda explaining the new procedures has emphasized the line that East Germany has a right to exercise full control over its capital. In his New Year's address, party boss Honecker implicitly echoed this theme and stated again, in strong terms, that Bonn must accept the existence of two independent, sovereign German states as a precondition for cooperation. East German leaders have been adopt- ing amore strident position toward the West German government. In part, this attitude reflects the leadership's sensitivi- ty over West German media exploitation of East Germany's internal problems, particularly reports about the rising number of applications to leave East Ger- many. Honecker, in his speech last week, attacked West German "provocations" against the boundaries of East Germany. He also commented that his regime "has made enough proposals" for normal relations with Bonn-suggesting that no further initiatives can be expected from the East German side at this time. SPAIN The government last week released Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo on bail and abolished the con- troversial Public Order Court, a political tribunal that had handled his case. The moves should help ease tensions in Spain. The government also removed terrorist offenses from military jurisdiction. Political and terrorist cases will now be handled by ordinary civilian courts. These judicial reforms had long been demanded by the opposition, which condemned the special courts as instruments of Francoist repression. The moves will anger rightist diehards but seem likely to give a boost [o govern- ment negotiations with the opposition. The recent ouster of rightists from five Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 key security positions may also aid the _;overnn~ient's effort to persuade the leftist ,~ppositi:~n to participate in the political ~roces; and will strengthen the c;cwernrr~enfs ability to deal with trouble i~n>m thr right. One major problem for the ;;overntrent will be protecting Carrillo from bs;ing physically attacked by ul- +._ruighiists. lnasrruch as the Communist Party is still banned in Spain, it cannot operate ~:~peniy as a political party; the govern- ment has nevertheless allowed it con- ;iderable freedom. Nrime Minister Suarez ,~robabh~ hopes that allowing Carrillo freedom of movement until his +riai-w rich probably will not take place until after the legislative election next spring if at all-will accustom the elec- torate to his presence and facilitate some ?orm of accommodation with the party. Military resistance to legalization of the party almost certainly remains strong. the yue;tion will probably be addressed during negotiations between the govern- ment amp the opposition concerning the coming election. The negotiations may start soon; they had been delayed by i~ickerin~ among the opposition parties, >y Soarer' apparent refusal to meet with a team that includes a Communist representative, and most recently by the arrest of Carrillo. An analysis o% the problenes faring the .Spanish ,government over the increasing demands Jor greater autonomy for some of .Spain's provinces appears in the feature section of this ~) i/ EC: Nuclear Fusion Program in Jeopardy The European Community's ther- rnonuclear fusion program is likely to die hecause of the clash among member states over the site of the program's joint research facility Construction of the facility is already a year behind schedule because of the deadlock over its location. Italy and the I:C Commission propose huilding it in Ispra, Italy, the site of a number of other LC nuclear research projects. The other members favor other sites. The tJK, West Germany, and Italy recently accepted a proposal to decide the issue by majority vote in the F.C Research Council, which had been scheduled to meet last month. The vote would probably have favored locating the facility in either the UK or West Germany where research in nuclear fusion has been under way. France refused to go along, and the meeting was canceled. A high-ranking EC official believes the program still has a slim chance for sur- vival if France can be persuaded to change its position or if the decision on a site is transferred to the Commission. Alter- natives may also emerge outside the EC framework, but no EC country has the resources to pursue such a project alone. The end of the fusion program would destroy Europe's technological lead in fu- sion research, according to the EC of- ficial. The impact on fusion research overall would be uncertain because a variety of methods are being pursued in this field. Whatever happens to the fusion program, the EC Joint Research Center, which oversees the program and other nuclear research projects, will probably still be funded through 1980. Its budget has been substantially increased. Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 SECRET FRANCE The Communist-Socialist alliance in France is making steady political gains. The trend is evident in voting patterns, public opinion polls, and recent studies by [he Ministry of the Interior. According to a voter survey in December, the left would win 53 to 56 per- cent of the vote in a parliamentary elec- tion. This is the best showing ever made by the left in a poll and, if translated into votes in the March 1978 balloting, could assure it a majority. E~rench polls are much less reliable, however, in predicting a parliamentary election than a presiden- tial contest. The Socialists have made strong gains in all of the almost 20 by-elections held since 1973; the Communists have done so in five. A strong performance by the left in medium-sized and big cities will add to its momentum for the national election in 1978. The governing coalition has been hurt by the steady decline in President Giscard's popularity. A poll last month showed that only 39 percent of the French were satisfied with his perfor- mance, an all-time low. The Socialists and Communists have reached an agreement on common lists in over half of the 220 cities with popula- lions between 30,000 and 300,000; the Ministry of the Interior believes they will also reach agreements in most of the re- mainder. The left will probably win about 140 cities in this category and show substantial gains in five of France's larger cities, including Paris. Because of the alliance, the Com- munists will place their first members in many city councils now dominated by the Socialists. Socialist-held municipalities that will be opened to the Communists through common lists are much more numerous than Communist bastions that will be opened to the Socialists. The Com- munists are pressing their Socialist partners for a maximum number of seats on the municipal councils, which is caus- ing some concern to the more moderate Socialists. -- French Socialist Party leader Fra~rcois Mitterrand (lJ and Communist Party leader Georges Marchais SECRET 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jan 7, 77 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 SECRET BO~~SWANA-CHINA President Khama's moderate govern- ment. which is deeply concerned over its weak less in the face of increasing border violations by Rhodesian security forces pursuing nationalist rebels, has apparen[- fy rec~,ived a shipment of arms supplied by China. [t is Botswana's first from any communist source. Iwo 7_ambian air force transports carryi og arms arrived in Botswana on .fanua-y 2- Circumstantial evidence left little doubt tha? the arms shipment Khama recently announced he was ex- panding and re-equipping the country'; 400-man mobile police unit-Botswana', only military force-which is currently tryinp* to patrol the 800-kilometer border with Rhodesia. Botswana has been seek- ing arms in both the US and the UK but has been reluctant to buy because of the prices asked and the bureaucratic re- quirements. Even with new weapons and a larger police force, Botswana will not be able to prevent border incursions by the Rhodesians. In a recent press interview, the Soviet. amhassador to Botswana said that the USSR is ready to give Botswana military help to repulse Rhodesian troops. Khama, however, is uneasy over the aggressive role the Soviets have been playing in southern Africa and would prefer to keep their influence to a minimum. He probably views the Chinese as a more acceptable source of military sup- port. Their aid reportedly is free, and they have kept a low profile in their sizable aid programs in Tanzania and Zambia. The Chinese undoubtedly are interested in maintaining the good position they have established in Botswana and in minimizing the Soviets' role. They sent an ambassador long before the Soviets, who opened a mission in Gaborone just last September, and they arranged for Khama to visit Peking last summer,) ETHIOPIA A reorganization of Ethiopia's ruling rilitary council was announced in Addis Ababa last week. The move was an effort to reaffirm collective leadership and to restore halance to power relationships within the council. The reorganization is designed par- ticularly to limit the power of First Vice Chairman Mengistu by clearly defining his authority and depriving him of control over some organizations that had been part of his power base. Mengistu remains a key figure, however, because of his new WEEKLY SUMMARY First Vice Chairm?n Mengistz~ duties as chairman of the Council of Ministers. He will probably use the posi- tion to try to regain his previous dominant influence. The formal positions of General Teferi, the chairman of the military council who has been largely a figurehead, and Second Vice Chairman Atnafu were strengthened by the reorganization, but neither may in fact play a more influential role. Although Teferi has new opportunities to do so, he is not a strong leader and probably will not be any more inclined than previously to exercise his powers. Atnafu was given new responsibilities for security matters, but his actual control of the security forces is unclear. The US embassy in Addis Ababa believes the changes may improve the regime's performance some and possibly lead to less arbitrary decisions. At the same time, the reorganization suggests that the military is seeking to perpetuate its control of the government rather than to prepare the way for civilian rule. 'The announcement reaffirmed the regime's in- tention to follow Marxist-Leninist nrin- 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A011500010001-5 SECRET LIBYA-USSR The Libyan navy has taken delivery of its first submarine, aSoviet-built F-class torpedo attack boat. The diesel-powered submarine, flying a Tripoli on December 27. India is the only other country to whi