WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011500060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
NGA Review
Complete
Secret
CG WS 77-006
February 11, 1977
NGA Review Complete
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The WEEKLY ~'IUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Current Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant
dt selopments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
cluently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Eco-
nonnic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of
Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence,
and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
CONTENTS
1 USSR - Eastern Europe
Dissidents; CEMA
Cosmonauts
2 Africa
Ethiopia; OAU; Botswana;
Sudan
5 Middle East
Egypt; Turkey
6 Europe
France
6 Asia
India; China;
7 Western Hemisphere
Jamaica-Guyana-USSR
8 The Arab Peace Offensive
11 Iraq: Communist Military and Economic Ties
14 Ethiopia: Regime's Enemies Stronger
18 Mexico: Lopez Portillo's First Sixty Days
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly,
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DISSIDENTS
The arrest by Soviet authorities over
the past week of a number of leading
dissidents and the expulsion of an Amer-
ican journalist are clear signs of ris-
ing Soviet irritation with human rights
activism in the USSR and with Mos-
cow's bad press on the issue in the West.
The most prominent of those arrested
are Yury Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg,
leading members of the unofficial group
set up last May to monitor Soviet com-
pliance with the human rights provisions
of the 1975 Helsinki accords. The group
has been subjected to harassment and ac-
cusations, especially since the KGB
searched several members' apartments in
late December and early January. Police
reportedly planted foreign currency,
possession of which is normally illegal in
the USSR, in the apartments of Ginzburg
and others.
Shortly before Ginzburg's arrest, he
and other leading human rights activists
defiantly met with Western newsmen and
expressed their determination to carry on.
Ginzburg publicly acknowledged that he
has managed the Moscow end of a fund
set up in 1974 by exiled author Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn to aid Soviet political
prisoners and their families, but he denied
all charges of illegal foreign currency
transactions.
The journalist was also accused of il-
legal financial dealings, but the real
reasons for his ouster were almost certain-
ly his fluency in Russian and his extensive
contacts in the Soviet dissident commu-
nity.
Ginzburg reportedly has been taken to
a provincial town south of Moscow where
he is a legal resident. This step suggests
that he may be the first of the group to be
formally charged. His friends fear he will
be prosecuted not for his political crimes
but for foreign currency manipulation, a
serious criminal offense.
Two members of the Ukrainian
chapter of Ginzburg's group have also
been arrested. They may be charged
with illegal possession of arms, which
they say had been planted in their
apartments during police searches.
Several other members of the Ukrain-
ian group reportedly had their homes
searched on February 5, but were not
Aleksandr Ginzburg OC /
arrested. So far, none of the members of
the Lithuanian branch of the monitoring
organization have been singled out for
similar treatment.
Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak government is main-
taining pressure on the supporters of the
Charter 77 human rights manifesto. The
authorities remain wary of issuing in-
dictments unequivocally linked to the
document, but "unofficial" messages to
activist dissidents warning them of their
vulnerability to punitive legal action have
increased.
A Czechoslovak media campaign late
last month suggested that the protesters
might be happier living in the West, and
the government reportedly tried un-
successfully to persuade several of them to
sign emigration applications. Subsequent-
ly, a broadcast by Prague television
denied Western press speculation that the
regime was planning to deport some
leading dissidents.
The number of signers of the manifesto,
meanwhile, has been growing; spokesmen
for the group say the total has passed 400.
Nonetheless, the impact of Charter 77 on
the Czechoslovak public does not appear
to be significant. The government has
sought to demonstrate that a substantial
segment of the population is opposed to
the charter, and pressure on workers to
sign anti-charter statements should pre-
vent widespread open support for it.
The controversy over human rights in
Czechoslovakia has created some inter-
national difficulties for President Husak's
regime. The Italian foreign minister
recently canceled a planned stopover in
Prague on the way home from the USSR.
The Norwegians canceled a ministerial
visit, and other planned official visits may
now be in doubt.
The controversy could also cause
problems for all the East European coun-
tries in connection with the Belgrade con-
ference this summer that will review com-
pliance with the Helsinki accords. Soviet
propaganda has reflected this concern. It
has sought to play down the Charter 77
issue, putting emphasis instead on alleged
Western failures in the human rights field.
Yugoslavia
A resurgence of open political dissent in
Yugoslavia is dimming the Tito regime's
hope that serving as host for the Helsinki
review talks this summer will enhance
Yugoslavia's prestige. The dissenters
are cautiously playing on increased
Western criticism of Yugoslavia's per-
formance on human rights to press Bel-
grade to relax its ideological and political
strictures.
The first public step by the dissenters
came last week, when a document
protesting travel restrictions on persons
regarded by the regime as troublemakers
was leaked to the Western press. Sixty
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Yugoslavs signed the document, which
had been privately circulating since last
summer. Several dissidents have recently
told Westerners that the document is only
the of of an iceberg.
Since a major purge of liberals in 1972,
the Yugoslav regime has shut down dissi-
dent journals, given stiff prison terms for
a wide range of political "crimes," and
gradually restored arbitrary police powers
that is had scrapped after a period of
abuse in the mid-1960s. The regime
rationalizes that such measures are need-
ed to help prevent problems in the
post-Tito era.
Some Yugoslav leaders would like to
case the "vigilance campaigns" and rein
in the secret police. Tito and many of the
nien who became powerful after the 1972
purge, however, have adamantly opposed
any cancessions. The more moderate
leaden have thus been unable to ac-
complish more than a feeble propaganda
effort :outing "socialist democracy" and
mildly rebuking authoritarians in general.
The moderates could still make some
headway if the dissidents keep up the
pressure and continue to avoid excesses
that might trigger a sharp reaction from
Lieulenant Colonel Mengistu Haile
Mariam emerged last week as the most
powerful member of the ruling military
council following factional fighting at
the council's headquarters that resulted
in the deaths of some of his major ri-
vals. 4engistu's increased influence
will intensify animosity between the
governrient and its domestic opponents
and furi.her alienate Ethiopia's neighbors.
Ethiopia's head of state, General Teferi
Bentz, and several senior members of the
council were killed in this latest bloody
episode in a power struggle that has gone
Tito. The dissenters, however, are loosely
organized, and hotheads among them
could take intemperate stands that would
amount to a direct challenge to Tito's
authority
CEMA COSMONAUTS
The USSR apparently has begun train-
ing the first contingent of cosmonauts that
are to represent the members of the
Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance in planned joint missions on
Salyut-class space stations. Prospective
cosmonauts from Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and East Germany arrived at the
Soviet cosmonaut training center in late
December; others from Bulgaria,
Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia, and Romania
are scheduled to come this year.
The joint missions apparently are in-
tended to foster an atmosphere of frater-
nal cooperation among CEMA countries
and may also provide useful data for the
development of earth resources.
The Soviets have said such missions
could begin as early as 1978, but this may
not allow enough time to integrate
on virtually since the council took over the
government 28 months ago. Teferi's
predecessor was killed in a similar shoot-
out in 1975. Mengistu, who had lost in-
fluence in a reorganization in December,
portrayed the events of February 3 as a
foiled coup attempt.
Mengistu's faction has pushed for the
swift transformation of the country along
Marxist lines. He is responsible for many
of the arbitrary arrests and executions
that have occurred under the council's
rule.
No member of the council is powerful
enough to challenge Mengistu at present.
Second Vice Chairman Atnafu, who has
criticized him in the past, seems recon-
ciled to his leadership for now.
Commanders of major military units
have conveyed their approval of the kill-
ing of the council "plotters," whom
trainees of dissimilar background and
language. In order to launch CEMA
cosmonauts as soon as possible, the
USSR may initially limit them to conduc-
ting scientific experiments and not permit
them to perform crew functions on hoard
the space station.
The ambitious joint CEMA scientific
space station program was officially an-
nounced in September 1976 during the
flight of Soyuz 22. That flight, which used
East German photographic equipment,
was hailed by the Soviets as the first in a
new series of cooperative space flights
with CEMA countries. According to the
announcement, the multinational
program will continue through 1983.
Cooperation is likely to involve the con-
tinued use of equipment from CEMA
countries before CEMA cosmonauts are
included in actual flights in any capacity.
If the Soviets conduct the first manned
flights in this program in 1978, it would
give them a lead of several years on the
joint US-European program for multi-
national space crews. The US space
shuttle is scheduled to orbit a European
Mengistu has linked with an underground
group working to overthrow the govern-
ment. Some of the military are almost
certainly concerned, however, about
Mengistu's consolidation of power.
In strongly worded statements after the
fighting last week, Mengistu showed an
uncompromising determination to
eliminate his domestic opponents by
force. He has also lashed out at some of
Ethiopia's neighbors, especially Sudan,
Somalia, and Saudi Arabia, for aiding the
various insurgent groups active in
Ethiopia. He will probably seek closer ties
with Libyan President Qadhafi, an enemy
of the Numayri regime in Sudan.
He will probably also press for swift
implementation of the military purchase
agreement reached with the Soviets in
December, and may ask them for ad-
ditional aid. The Soviet ambassador was
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Rhodesian patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo (left) and
quick to praise Mengistu's actions against
the alleged plotters and pledged Soviet
support for the new lineup in Addis
Ababa. (An analysis of the numerous dis-
sident and insurgent domestic groups that
the embattled military council is trying to
suppress by force appears in the feature
section o this ublication.)
OAU
The Rhodesian Patriotic Front of
Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe last
week received the backing of the
22-member African Liberation Com-
mittee of the Organization of African
Unity. The committee stopped short,
however, of exclusive recognition of the
Front, leaving the door open for OAU
members to deal with other Rhodesian
nationalist factions.
The Front apparently now will be the
recipient of any additional military
assistance to the Rhodesian nationalist
movement through OAU channels.
Nigeria reportedly has pledged a substan-
tial amount to the committee's fund, some
of which will probably be earmarked for
use by liberation groups from Namibia
and South Africa.
Nigeria apparently played a key role in
opposing a determined effort by several
countries to give equal status to all the
Rhodesian nationalist factions. The
Nigerians provided the formula that was
finally adopted.
J i
The Nigerians were aided by a strong
desire on the part of OAU members not
to risk another split in their ranks such as
occurred over Angola. In that case, the
existence of OAU resolutions giving equal
backing to the three nationalist groups
that had fought the Portuguese led finally
to a divisive struggle between supporters
of the rival Angolan governments
proclaimed during the civil war.
Still undetermined is the question of
military assistance for Mozambique,
which has borne the brunt of attacks by
Rhodesian security forces against Rhode-
sian guerrillas. A meeting of the OAU
defense commission was to have taken
place immediately following the liberation
committee session to discuss Mozam-
bique's problems. but many countries
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BOTSWANA
The arrival in Botswana last week of
400 to 500 black students from Rhodesia
highlights the squeeze on Botswana
because of its role as a front-line state
in the Rhodesian conflict and its inter-
est in maintaining close economic ties-
and avoiding military confrontation-
with iG white-ruled neighbors.
Y he Rhodesian government asserted
that the students were abducted by
guerrillas at gunpoint from a mission
school near the border. Botswana said
they came voluntarily. Most of them have
spurned pleas from their parents to return
home.
Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African
People s Union will be recruiting among
these new refugees for its guerrilla force,
which is much smaller than that of the
Zimbabwe African National Union,
Nkomo's ally in a "Patriotic Front."
ZAPU operates from Zambia-and to a
lesser degree from Botswana-into
western and southwestern Rhodesia.
Although Botswanan President Khama
has never authorized the Rhodesian
guerrillas to operate out of his country, its
400-man mobile police unit is unable to
patrol tie border adequately.
Botswana has also been a haven for
refugee, from the civil war in Angola, the
riots in South Africa, and South African
counterinsurgency measures in Namibia.
During the past six months the refugee
flow has increased, primarily from South
Africa and Rhodesia. The Botswanan
government generally has tried to move
the refugees on to other countries, since it
lacks sufficient resources to care for them.
After considerable agonizing, however,
Khama decided recently to let them re-
main in Botswana.
The growing refugee community could
serve as a catalyst for opposition to
Khama's policies. There is a vocal opposi-
tion in Botswana's multiparty democratic
political system that strongly criticized
the country's relatively weak support for
African liberation groups and its
economic links with South Africa and
Rhodesia. Large numbers of Botswanans
are employed in South Africa, and the
Rhodesian-run railroad is crucial to ex-
ports of Botswanan beef and minerals as
well as imports of foodstuffs.
Botswana's tiny security force,
moreover, is not likely to be able to pre-
vent the refugees from supporting dissi-
dent activity against both Rhodesia and
South Africa. The emergence of more ac-
tive guerrilla operations from Botswana
against Rhodesia may prompt the
Rhodesians to mount sizable cross-border
attacks as they have done in Mozam-
bique, where ZANU guerrillas are based.
Until now, Rhodesia has staged only
minor raids against suspected guerrilla
concentrations in Botswana.
SUDAN
Sudanese government forces crushed an
attempt last week by some soldiers in
southern Sudan to seize control of an air-
port at Juba, the regional capital.
Although the unrest posed little im-
mediate threat to the central government
in Khartoum, it reflected problems that
continue to plague President Numayri's
regime.
Fighting broke out in Juba on February
2. The action by the troops, who were ac-
companied by some civilians, followed the
arrest in Juba two days earlier of about 30
Sudanese soldiers and civilians for
allegedly plotting against Numayri. The
against him. Most Sudanese are in-
different to the regime and protest only
when there are economic problems, such
plotters, who reportedly were followers of
an exiled tribal leader, were said to be
planning to assassinate Numayri and
other leaders, seize control of the south,
and use it as a base for further operations
against the government.
Numayri probably will face more such
challenges because of his lack of broad
support. There have been five serious
attempts to oust him since he came to
power nearly eight years ago. All but one
were led by members of the military, on
which Numayri depends for his political
survival.
Sudan's three diverse Islamic groups
remain sources of active dissidence. Stu-
dent groups, although limited in number,
also have engaged in considerable anti-
regime activity. They are kept in check
only by the security forces and frequent
closings of Khartoum University.
The Sudanese Communist Party, of-
ficially banned since 1971, is one of the
largest and best organized communist
parties in the Middle East. In southern
Sudan, the non-Arab, non-Muslim blacks
of the region are united only in their
animosity for their Arabic-speaking,
Muslim countrymen of the north.
Numayri's success in maintaining his
position has been based primarily on the
inability of his opponents to cooperate
as rising prices or commodity shortages.
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President Sadat has been working to
repair the damage done to his prestige and
that of his government by the rioting that
shook Egypt in mid-January. His efforts
apparently have been at least partially
successful, but he has been unable to find
any quick or easy solutions to Egypt's
pressing economic problems, the basic
cause of the civil unrest.
Over the past two weeks Sadat has held
a series of meetings with educators,
students, and workers, and made a major
address to the nation. I n each case, he has
sought to deflect criticism from himself
and his government by blaming the unrest
on leftist conspirators. He has refused to
bow to pressures to oust Prime Minister
Mamduh Salim, who is widely blamed for
Egypt's economic woes, and instead has
sacked the interior minister for his failure
to head off the riots. Sadat has also an-
nounced tax reforms directed against the
wealthy and held a referendum on
February 10 on tough new law-and-order
measures designed to discourage further
demonstrations.
These moves probably have pleased
politically conservative Egyptians and
those in the middle class who fear further
domestic upheavals. The harsh security
measures, however, are not likely to be
well received by Egyptian students and
other politically sophisticated groups,
which have enjoyed greater freedom un-
der Sadat's recent political liberalization
program. The President's get-tough
policy will receive its first major test with
the reopening of Egypt's universities, now
scheduled for February 12.
Sadat's activities indicate that the un-
rest has refocused his attention on the
country's domestic troubles and the needs
of its people. This could be an important
positive side effect of the riots. In recent
months the President has appeared to be
out of touch with the great majority of
Egyptians and the magnitude of the
problems facing them daily.
Sadat himself realizes there is little he
can do to alleviate the immediate
economic hardships that are the primary
cause of the Egyptian public's unhappi-
ness. He has appealed for patience dur-
ing the "four lean years" he says the
country is facing.
For now, Sadat is hoping for new cash
aid from wealthy conservative Arab
states to shore up his position. Even that
would provide little short-term relief,
however, and long range solutions will be
difficult and not easily accepted by the
hard-pressed Egyptian people.
Relations with the USSR-
Recent new apti-Soviet actions by the"
Egyptians and another postponement by
the USSR of negotiations on a bilateral
trade protocol for 1977 have aggravated
long-standing strains in Egyptian-Soviet
relations.
The Soviet move in late January was es-
pecially irritating to the Egyptians as it
was the third time Moscow had deferred
the talks in less than two months. The So-
viets were apparently reacting in part to
charges in the Egyptian media that the
USSR had helped fuel the antigovern-
ment food riots; Egypt had also moved to
obstruct several Soviet cultural
delegations in Cairo. The introduction of
a bill in the Egyptian parliament on
January 26 calling for severing diplomatic
relations with the USSR may have been
an additional spur to the Soviet decision.
In any event, the postponement was
followed by new and harsher public
criticism of the USSR by Sadat, who was
doubtless already irked by the extensive
and prolonged Soviet media coverage of
the rioting episode. This time, the Egyp-
tian President flatly accused the Soviets of
responsibility for the riots.
Trade relations between the two coun-
tries will continue even if the two sides
never get around to initialing the 1977
protocol. Soviet-Egyptian trade reached a
high level in 1974, for example, without a
formal trade protocol.
Apart from the new irritants in
Soviet-Egyptian relations, Moscow
remains determined to keep pressure on
Sadat and to refrain from any significant
inducements to the Egyptians as long as
Cairo gives priority to its ties with the US
and ignores Soviet complaints. Moscow
has been particularly incensed at Sadat's
domestic policies, which continue to
de-emphasize socialist institutions in
favor of the entry of Arab and Western
capital.
At the same time, the Soviets do not
want to make bilateral relations still
worse and have therefore been reticent in
their response to Sadat's charges. Some
effort to smooth over the latest quarrel
may be attempted by a Soviet Foreign
Ministry official who arrived in Cairo for
talks on February 8.
The official's primary focus, however,
will almost certainly not be bilateral
relations, but rather the question of Mid-
dle East peace negotiations. His main
mission probably is to convey to the
Egyptians, in advance of Secretary
Vance's arrival in Cairo next week, the
importance attached by Soviet leaders to
a return to the Geneva negotiating forum.
The Soviets remain highly concerned
that a new power balance may be emerg-
ing in the Middle East that will diminish
their influence further and cut them out of
Turkey's coalition government is under
increasing pressure because of continuing
violence between militant young rightists
and left-wingers, which resulted in 21
deaths last month. The disorders have
also added to strains among the four dis-
parate parties that make up the coalition.
Civil disorder has become an important
issue for the election scheduled for this
fall, with opposition leader Ecevit charg-
ing that the government is unable to en-
sure internal security.
The government is especially vulnerable
on the issue because one coalition par-
ty-the extreme-right Nationalist Action
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Party--is held responsible for most of the
disorders caused by rightist students.
Prime Minister Demirel had been unwill-
ing to -ein in Action Party leader Turkes,
who is a deputy prime minister, but-early
this month he reportedly did strip Turkes
of general supervisory responsibility for
internal security.
Another coalition partner, the small
centrist Republican Reliance Party, has
threatened to withdraw from the coalition
unless the government adopts stronger
measures to deal with the disorders and
corrects what the party regards as a
failure to adhere to the coalition program.
Witt.drawal of the Reliance Party,
which has only a few seats in parliament,
probably would not bring down the
government, but would clearly weaken it.
The government is facing two impor-
tant votes on the budget this month.
Further dissension within the coalition
could cost the government its majority on
one of these votes. This would not require
Prime Minister Demirel to step down, but
precede:nt-and a possible decision by
Demirel that the coalition's liabilities are
heginriing to outweigh its advan-
tages-could lead him to do so.
The Supreme Military Council-con-
sisting of senior civilian and military
leaders--is reviewing Turkey's domestic
securit) problems. It will presumably
recommend stronger measures to curb the
violence, possibly including the imposi-
tion of martial law in certain provinces.
Demirel has been hamstrung in his efforts
to control the violence because of lack of
cooperation from his two rightist coali-
tion partners.
Last week, following a regular meeting
of the Turkish General Staff, President
Koruturk issued a statement warning that
failure to handle the unrest adequately
could have unfortunate effects on
democratic stability-as was the case in
1971 when the military intervened and
forced Demirel's resignation as Prime
Minister. Senior officers still appear loyal
to the government, however, and there
seems to be almost no chance of military
intervention at this point
Ambitious Gaullist leader Jacques
Chirac has rejected a compromise with
President Giscard that would have allow-
ed the government coalition to enter next
month's important Paris municipal elec-
tion with a show of unity.
Chirac last week turned down an offer
by Minister of Industry and Research
d'Ornano, a member of Giscard's
Independent Republican Party and the
President's personal choice for mayor of
Paris, to prepare joint lists in sectors of
Paris that are vulnerable to the
Socialist-Communist opposition. The
Gaullist leader said he would run his own
competing lists and that he would per-
sonally stand for office in the fifth district,
where he is assured of election.
The Independent Republicans, angered
by Chirac's open defiance, reportedly are
determined to try to block his election to
the prestigious new post of mayor of
Paris. They believe the Gaullists will win
more of the 109 municipal council seats
than any other party but not enough to
assure Chirac's election without the help
of other parties.
They hope to deny Chirac a-majority in
the first two rounds of mayoral balloting
among council members and then com-
promise with him on the third ballot,
where a simple plurality suffices. The
Independent Republicans would be will-
ing to accept Gaullist Bernard Lafay, the
current president of the Paris municipal
council, as a compromise mayoral can-
didate, but Chirac is not likely to go
along.
Under the Republicans' strategy, it is
possible-but unlikely-that a Socialist
or Communist opposition candidate could
he elected mayor. The Socialist-Com-
munist alliance is deeply divided and so
far not in a position to profit from the dis-
array of the majority. The Communists
are more strongly entrenched in Paris
than the Socialists and up to now have
been unwilling to compromise on joint
lists or a single candidate for mayor of
Paris.
In the end, Chirac is likely to be elected
mayor. The post should keep him in the
limelight as he conducts a vigorous cam-
paign for the 1978 election, and serve as a
steppingstone to a possible bid for the
presidency in 1981. Should the opposition
win the national election next year,
Chirac would have in the Paris mayoralty
a power base from which he could rally
anticommunist forces against the left.
Prime Minister Gandhi so far has
prevented additional leading members of
her Congress Party from joining with
Jagjivan Ram, her former agriculture
minister who quit the party and cabinet
last week. Ram, a spokesman for India's
untouchables, has established a new
political party and plans to cooperate with
the noncommunist opposition in the
parliamentary election scheduled for
March.
Gandhi has obtained statements of sup-
port from most key Congress Party
members, including a leading potential
defector, the chief minister of the pop-
ulous state of West Bengal. These com-
mitments, however, may have been ob-
tained at some political cost to her son
Sanjay.
Many older party members have been
unhappy with the rapid growth of San-
jay's power since the imposition of the
emergency in June 1975. It is now likely
that the party will nominate fewer of his
followers as candidates for parliament
than had originally been planned.
Although the Prime Minister has at
least temporarily forestalled defections,
some other aspects of the campaign are
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not going well:
? The crowd that attended a
Congress Party rally in New Delhi on
February 5 was unenthusiastic and un-
ruly. Sanjay, who was to have been the
main speaker, did not attend, and the
Prime Minister spoke instead.
? A major opposition rally in New
Delhi on February 6 drew a
significantly larger and more respon-
sive crowd than had attended Gandhi's
rally.
? The press has been more out-
spoken since the lifting of censorship
last month than many expected.
Gandhi still seems committed to
holding the election, but she may decide
to reimpose restrictions on the press and
political gatherings. She says she will not
tolerate a return to a situation of political
turbulence like the one that prompted her
to impose the emergency.
The Prime Minister is aware that such
a tightening of controls would cast doubt
on the validity of the election, which she
presumably still expects to win. Further
setbacks nonetheless could lead her to
take such action or possibly even to cancel
the election. A cancelation would require
stretching the constitution and would be
generally seen as an admission of defeat.
Chinese leaders are continuing to give
top priority to the campaign against the
four leftist Politburo members purged last
October and their lower-ranking sup-
porters. The status of former vice premier
Teng Hsiao-ping apparently remains at
issue, although steps taken during the past
week seem to have brought him closer to
rehabilitation.
Commentary published last weekend in
the Chinese media charged that local
leaders have not exercised adequate
leadership to advance the anti-leftist cam-
paign. The articles point in the direction
of a fairly hard-line campaign, but there
still may not be full agreement on the
issue in the Chinese hierarchy.
The articles seem to reflect a concern
that local leftists will go unidentified and
unreformed and will be free to continue to
create local political disturbances. There
is no evidence of any serious recent
violence, but low-level leftists have caused
some embarrassment in Peking and
elsewhere. They may have been responsi-
ble for wall posters that attacked Polit-
buro members last month during ac-
tivities honoring the memory of Chou
En-lai. They also apparently continue to
cause trouble for some provincial leaders
as well as for local leaders in Shanghai.
Peking's effort to increase local
political activity against leftists may pose
a threat to certain provincial leaders who
last year were in the forefront of the
leftist-inspired campaign against Teng
Hsiao-ping. So far none has been publicly
associated with the fallen leftists, but
some may still have to clear themselves of
responsibility for either their own actions
or those of their subordinates.
Part of an editorial published last
weekend appeared to advance Teng
another step toward restoration to some
office. It called "deepening exposure and
criticism of the gang of four" the current
"key link," but made only passing
reference to "class struggle," which
through 1976 had been the "key link."
Teng previously had been criticized for
failing to take "class struggle" as the "key
link." Another possible step toward
Teng's return was the reappearance in
public of his brother this week.
China's leaders still have not decided
what position to give Teng when he is
rehabilitated. They appear stalemated
over the issue of whether to restore him to
his original positions, including that of
senior vice premier, or to follow Chou
En-lai's wishes and elevate him to the
premiership.
Teng's return could affect the status of
other members of the leadership, especial-
ly that of Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng,
who was the main beneficiary of Teng's
fall. Teng leas ties throughout the
hierarchy, which Hua has yet to establish.
JAMAICA-GUYANA-USSR
Guyana and Jamaica, faced with
economic difficulties and problems in ob-
taining assistance from the West, are
seeking closer economic ties with
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Among
their specific objectives, the Guy-
anese want an economic agreement
with the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance.
Jamaica is taking similar initiatives.
Prime Minister Manley's government
recently ended its long stall on granting
the Soviets permission to set up an em-
bassy in Kingston and invited them to do
so. Two high-level CEMA officials have
been invited to visit Kingston, and
Manley is reportedly considering an
economic agreement with that organiza-
tion. A Jamaican trade delegation will
soon leave for Moscow.
Guyana and Jamaica both have huge
current-account deficits. Lower sugar
prices and rising import costs have offset
much of the recent recovery in bauxite
and alumina sales. The two countries' in-
ability to obtain sufficient foreign funds to
cover these deficits has forced them to
adopt severe austerity measures.
The USSR and other CEMA members
are unlikely to provide much, if any, cash
aid to either country; they might barter
machinery and equipment for sugar,
bauxite, and alumina.
At least Burnham may be willing to
make political concessions to the Soviets
to get their help, particularly for a major
hydroelectric complex he wants to con-
struct. The Guyanese have approached
the Soviets on it before without success;
this time, Burnham may be willing to ac-
commodate the USSR by appearing to
grant a more active role in the govern-
ment to the Moscow-oriented opposition
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r,,gypi and Syria, having patched up their recent quarrel,
are making a concerted effort to reopen Middle East peace
talks at Geneva. Neither country expects rapid progress, but
both .i/'them-and Saudi Arabia-will be looking to the US to
use its influence to end the negotiating stalemate this year.
The Arab Peace Offensive
1 he principal Arab states, having over-
come the paralyzing divisions produced
by tie Egyptian-Syrian quarrel over
Egypt's conclusion of a second Sinai ac-
cord with Israel in 1975 and by Syria's in-
tervention in Lebanon last year, are now
in a rosition to apply strong diplomatic
pressure for an early reconvening of the
long-r.cessed Geneva conference on a
Middlr, East peace settlement.
the Egyptians are fostering high expec-
tations of diplomatic movement in 1977
and a-e attempting to marshal as much
Arab and international support as possi-
ale to press the US and Israel to resume
serious, comprehensive peace
negotiations.
There are fundamental constraints on
the flexibility of the Arabs, but their
strategy in coming months will be to pro-
ject an image of reasonableness on such
key issues as the future of a Palestinian
state, an end to the state of war, and oil
pricing.
Despite lingering mutual suspicion,
Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian
President Asad are likely to be able to
maintain sufficient unity to resist any
pressures to resume the step-by-step
negotiating process in lieu of a return to
Geneva. They may also be able to sell
previously unpalatable positions to their
Arab colleagues, at least on matters of
procecure and implementation.
Asad has learned from the confron-
tations of the past year that Syria's in-
terests are best served when he works in
harmony with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
By winning their endorsement of Syria's
prominent role in Lebanon at the Riyadh
and Cairo summits, Asad ended Syria's
diplomatic isolation and eased the finan-
cial burden of its Lebanese campaign.
Reconciliation with Egypt also paid off
in reduced domestic tension and prepared
the way for what Syria believes will be
further substantial financial assistance
from conservative oil states.
Sadat, in turn, learned that he could not
challenge Asad so long as Asad has Saudi
backing and that he could not lead in for-
mulating Arab strategy without the sup-
port of both Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Should negotiations reach a stalemate
because of US or Israeli positions, there
would probably be no disruption of Egyp-
tian-Syrian coordination. Instead, failure
to achieve whatever the Arab side con-
siders substantial diplomatic progress by
the end of 1977 almost certainly would
lead to friction between the US and both
Egypt and Syria, to Saudi support for
further oil price increases, and to renewed
Arab preparations for at least a limited
war to achieve their political objectives.
Preparing for Geneva
Egypt and Syria have called for a
resumption of the Geneva conference by
March-not intending that this date
should be taken literally, but wishing to
underscore the urgency of the Arab peace
offensive. The Syrians are almost certain-
ly even more skeptical than the Egyptians
that rapid movement is possible; Asad is
less optimistic than Sadat about the ex-
tent of Israeli flexibility and the degree to
which the US is able to influence Israel.
The key Arab leaders nonetheless will
expect immediate movement to convene a
Geneva meeting soon after the Israeli
election set for May 17, regardless of the
outcome of the election.
A particularly important juncture may
come at the next ministerial meeting of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, scheduled for July. If by then
the Saudis are disappointed with the US
response on peace negotiations, they
probably would go along with the oil price
hikes demanded by most other OPEC
members.
The commitment of Egypt and Syria to
a "peace offensive" does not mean they
will be more flexible on substantive
matters if negotiations in Geneva resume.
Both countries probably now have a
realistic appreciation that any com-
prehensive negotiations will be
protracted. Neither Sadat nor Asad is
prepared to reach a peace settlement as
defined by the Israelis, one that would in-
clude diplomatic recognition, commercial
intercourse, and "defensible borders."
The Arabs' overall negotiating goals still
are Israel's withdrawal from the territory
occupied in 1967 and restoration of
Palestinian rights. Asad does apparently
now share Sadat's willingness to discuss
the end of the state of war with Israel.
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The two leaders differ in their inter-
pretation of Palestinian "national rights"
and in their willingness to make sacrifices
for the Palestinian cause, but both appear
to agree on the ultimate goal of creating a
small Palestinian state consisting of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and on the
need to find a formula for including the
Palestinians in the negotiating process.
Sadat and Asad may be prepared to go
back to Geneva initially without the PLO,
but would be likely to press the US and
Israel on Palestinian representation once
talks begin. Without a resolution of the
representation issue, it is uncertain that
any of the Arab front-line states would be
willing to conclude new territorial
agreements.
Egypt is on record as proposing that the
Palestinians should have a separate
delegation at Geneva. There is little
doubt, however, that Egypt would endorse
Syria's recently announced preference for
a single, joint Arab delegation. Palestine
Liberation Organization chief Yasir
Arafat, who privately has long been will-
ing to go to Geneva if invited on accept-
able terms, would find it hard to reject a
formula acceptable to Syria and Egypt.
The two countries would apparently
also be agreeable to a combined PLO-Jor-
danian delegation, and they have urged
King Husayn and Arafat to reach a
political accommodation. Talks between
the Jordanians and Palestinians are
scheduled to begin this weekend in Am-
man.
At Geneva
Even if the Geneva conference is
reconvened, rapid progress is unlikely this
year. There are no signs that any of the
principal parties are prepared to make
significant new concessions, and
procedural wrangling and public postur-
ing would almost certainly delay progress.
On the other hand, neither the Arabs
nor the Israelis apparently believe it to be
in their interest to force-or to be held
responsible for forcing-the collapse of
negotiations as long as talks on substan-
tive issues are proceeding.
The most promising approach at
Geneva probably would include aban-
doning plenary sessions in favor of small
working groups. These might permit
bilateral talks between representatives of
Israel and each of the Arab states, or dis-
cussions by separate groups that would
focus on different aspects of the general
settlement problem, such as territorial
withdrawals, demilitarization,
guarantees, verification, the boycott,
propaganda, and the role of the UN and
the US.
Discussing a range of issues in a variety
of forums would not necessarily speed
progress on all issues, but it probably
would allow headway to be made on
some, and would at least delay failure and
the perception of failure.
The Palestinian Problem
A resolution of the Palestinian
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representation issue, for which the Arabs
will press hard, would not assure progress
on the substance of the Palestinian and
West Bank issues, including the intrac-
table Jerusalem problem. The Israelis are
adamantly opposed to giving up any part
of Jerusalem and to the establishment of
an independent Palestinian state. They
would much prefer to put off negotiations
over the West Bank-even with Jor-
dan--until much later.
For Egypt and Syria, the major
problerr will be to force the Palestinians
to accei)t a truncated state, comprising
the West Bank and Gaza, and coexistence
with Israel. The repair of the Egypt-Syria
rupture has reduced Arafat's room for
maneuver and sharply diminished his
potential for disrupting any negotiating
strategy agreed upon by the key Arab
states.
fhe complexities of Egyp-
tian-Syrian-Palestinian relations,
however, will tend to limit the pressure on
the PLO and lead to disputes between
Egypt a id Syria over the degree to which
either should exert control over the
Palestin ans.
Arafat is not yet in a position to deliver
the entire Palestinian movement on Egypt
and Syria's terms. But the debacle suf-
fered by the Palestinians in Lebanon ap-
parently has led him to conclude that the
PLO should moderate its political stance,
in part as a means of deflecting Egyptian
pressure and forestalling Asad's efforts to
replace him with a pro-Syrian leader.
Arafat privately has implied that he
would accept a Palestinian state in the
West Bank and Gaza, and his position has
been publicly echoed by other Palestinian
spokesmen.
Arafat's goal in coming months will be
to achieve a united Palestinian position to
present to the various parties to the
Geneva conference. Recent discussion of
forming a government-in-exile, a move
long urged by the Egyptians, is one indica-
tion of this, as is the call for a session of
the Palestine National Council.
The PLO leader will continue to meet
stout resistance from the various fedayeen
"rejectionists," and bickering among the
disparate factions is likely to preclude a
unified Palestinian position.
Complete unanimity among the
Palestinians is not, however, a necessary
precondition for their participation in the
10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
peace process. Arafat still speaks for the
majority of the Palestinians, and Sadat
and Asad are likely to lean heavily on the
PLO leadership to support him.
Asad would prefer to replace Arafat
with a leader more amenable to Syrian in-
fluence, but there is no other leader who
could hope in the short run to exercise
comparable authority over the Palestinian
movement.
In the meantime, Syria will work to un-
dermine the rejectionist fedayeen. Much
of the occasional fighting in Lebanon is a
result of the efforts of Syrian forces or
Syrian-backed PLO groups to weaken the
rejectionist groups' military capability
and to arrest or assassinate some of their
leaders.
Coordination of negotiating strategy
between the PLO and Egypt and Syria
has barely begun and will be a complex,
quarrelsome process. The outcome,
however, is likely to be influenced by two
major lessons the moderate Palestinians
have learned from the Lebanese civil war:
? None of the key Arab states is go-
ing to sacrifice its national interests by
backing maximum Palestinian goals or
endorsing fedayeen radicalism.
? Syria's prohibition of cross-
border fedayeen operations from
Lebanon has forced the Palestinians to
abandon guerrilla tactics against Israel
in favor of negotiations for the return
of' a portion of Palestinian territory.
This does not mean that some Palesti-
nian elements will not continue to oppose
negotiations by attempting terrorist acts
against both Israel and the conservative
Arab states. Nor does it mean that
Palestinian irredentism has been curbed;
even Arafat and other so-called
moderates will try to justify settling for a
small state now by arguing that long-term
demographic trends in Israel are in the
Arabs' favor.
Saudi Position
Next to Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia
will play the most important role on the
Arab side if there is movement toward
peace talks. The willingness of the Saudis
to risk undermining the long-standing
Saudi political goal of unity of the OPEC
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countries is in part a result of the peace
offensive of Egypt and Syria.
The Saudis have worked behind the
scenes to ease Egyptian-Syrian
differences and to help bring about a
tenuous peace in Lebanon. They believe
the Egyptian-Syrian peace initiative has a
real chance-provided the US cooperates.
They think their action to hold down
prices has created an obligation on the
part of the US to understand and
cooperate with Arab efforts.
The Saudis' action was not solely
motivated by their desire to support and
encourage the peace offensive; they also
hoped to prevent an unfavorable US
response in other areas affecting Saudi in-
terests, specifically with regard to US
arms sales and the Arab boycott against
firms doing business with Israel.
Egypt and Syria can expect the Saudis
to back them with a further rise in oil
prices if the Saudis conclude this is
necessary to spur the negotiating process.
The Saudis almost certainly would take
such a step, although they probably would
not take direct action-such as an em-
bargo against the US-in 1977.
They would, moreover, continue to ex-
ercise some restraint on future OPEC
price rises, primarily because they fear the
effects of a very large price hike on
Western political and economic stability.
Jordan
Jordan's role in the peace offensive will
be limited largely to supporting Egypt and
Syria and serving, as it has in the past, as
a conduit for conveying Syrian views to
US policy makers. King Husayn can take
no territorial negotiating initiatives on his
own, and he is unlikely to contest
adherence by Egypt and Syria to the
resolution adopted at the 1974 Arab sum-
mit meeting that empowered the PLO to
negotiate the return of the West Bank.
Jordan's role will become important
only when negotiations are under way on
the formation of a Palestinian state. Jor-
dan's Palestinian connection is a major
reason for its diplomatic importance, and
the roughly one million Palestinians in
Jordan comprise the largest single group
of expatriate Palestinians anywhere in the
area. To protect his security interests,
King Husayn is likely to seek some form
of confederation or other close political
association with a new Palestinian state.
President Sadat's recent suggestion
that any such state be linked with Jordan
may be indicative of an Arab intention to
press for such an arrangement, once nego-
tiations begin, in order to bypass Israeli
objections to dealing with the PLO.
Asad has expressed tentative support
for this idea, but he and Sadat may only
be testing US and Israeli willingness to
work out a satisfactory compromise on
the Palestinian question.
The USSR and Iraq have laid aside political differences in
favor of closer military and economic ties. Last week, they may
have concluded a major new military aid agreement.
Iraq: Communist Military and Economic Ties
The joint communique issued after
Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn's visit
last week to the USSR reflects a con-
siderable improvement in political
relations since he last traveled to Moscow
in April 1975. The Iraqis and Soviets may
have completed agreement on a major
new military package on which
negotiations may have started during
Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to
Baghdad last May.
At the time of Saddam Husayn's 1975
trip, there were signs of strain between the
two states. He did not meet with Soviet
party chief Brezhnev, and the visit was cut
short without explanation. Moscow was
concerned that the rapprochement
between Iraq and Iran in March of that
year would mean a diminution of the
USSR's influence in Iraq, and the
Iraqi leader apparently did little to calm
Soviet anxieties. Nor was any progress
apparently made toward resolving long-
standing political differences such as
the treatment of Iraqi Communists by the
ruling Iraqi Baath Party.
In contrast, the statement issued on
February 3 at the end of Saddam
Husayn's recent visit indicates that the
two sides have reduced their political
squabbling. The communique also ex-
plicitly referred to military assistance,
something that had not appeared in such a
joint statement since 1974.
Political Aspects
The most significant political aspect of
the communique was the Soviets'
willingness to give their blessing to the
Baathist "revolutionary experiment,"
which suggests that the Soviets have
stopped making a major issue over Sad-
dam Husayn's treatment of the Iraqi
Communist Party.
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I R A Q
\~:~w~`hHt oil field
Najlbryeh ThermalRRSS44''
Habbaniyah Dam I I * BAGHDAD
Fallujah Dam
l he Baathist-Communist relationship
has been uneasy at best, but at this point
the Soviets apparently are not trying to
induce better relations among Iraq's
squaDbling political groups-a position
that will not please Iraqi Communists.
TIc resurgence of Moscow's interest in
Iraq is explained in part by Soviet set-
hacks in Egypt and Syria. Significant
Soviet influence in the Middle East now
appears confined to Iraq and Libya.
The Soviets have long disagreed with
these two states, however, over an ap-
proach to Arab-Israeli peace talks, with
Moscow insisting on renewal of the
Geneva peace conference. Soviet
diplomacy has not narrowed this
difference, but Moscow is content to
overlook the divergent approaches.
F he Soviets used Saddam Husayn's
visit to take swipes at both Egypt and
Syria. The joint communique condemned
"outside interference" in Lebanon, which
is the standard Soviet formulation aimed
at Syrian activities there. Kosygin's ad-
dress at a banquet for the Iraqi leader
stressed that Soviet economic programs
abroad did not constitute a "charitable
Nf'.NE
~ 7~5NE
V,1
activity" and that Moscow would have to
take into account "mutual interests and
requirements," an obvious warning to
Cairo.
Record Military Deals in 1976
Kosygin reportedly agreed last spring
to supply Iraq with several major weapon
systems. Meanwhile, Soviet military
deliveries to Iraq under earlier
agreements rose markedly last year,
reaching a record level of $460 million.
Aircraft to support air force moderniza-
tion plans were by far the most important
category. At least 86 planes, valued at
over $250 million, were received.
This is the largest number of aircraft
the USSR has sent Iraq in a single year
and more than three times the number
sent in 1975.
Recent Iraqi military purchases from
the West and other attempts to diversify
arms suppliers have contributed to the
Soviet willingness to provide more
military equipment. The USSR is deter-
mined to maintain influence in the Arab
world and retain access to Persian Gulf
maritime facilities. Continued access to
Iraq's crude oil also has been an impor-
tant factor in increased Soviet support for
Iraq. The Soviets ship all of the 5 million
tons of crude they import from Iraq each
year to third-country customers to earn
hard currency.
Other Communist Suppliers
Hungary and Czechoslovakia supplied
most of the $80-million worth of equip-
ment delivered from Eastern Europe in
military-related equipment were made by
North Korea under a $19-million agree-
ment signed in 1975.
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Iraq also signed agreements last year to
buy an additional $90 million of arms
from East European countries and North
to spend $9 million in Poland for un-
specified military goods and services, and
$30 million in North Korea for more than
600 ZPU-4 air-defense machine
guns-North Korea's largest arms agree-
ment with a third-world country.
To support Iraq's newly organized jet
fighter squadrons, the Soviets and East
Europeans increased the number of their
military advisers and technicians by 100,
to 1,100 in 1976. Some 300 Iraqi military
personnel went to the USSR, mostly for
pilot and aircraft training.
Economic Relations
The overwhelming concentration of
Soviet aid in Iraqi power, water, and
crude oil development will become more
pronounced as a result of new agreements
in 1976. A pact signed in May during the
Kosygin visit reportedly will triple
economic assistance in the next five years,
compared with the last five.
The agreement, like most recent Soviet
economic accords with less developed
countries, probably is open-ended, calling
for separate negotiations of credits for in-
dividual projects. Commitments in 1976
under the agreement are conservatively
estimated at $150 million for power and
irrigation contracts; they will probably be
financed by long-term Soviet credits.
In December, Iraq also signed con-
tracts valued at $1 billion covering four
major irrigation and power projects-the
Hadithah and Habbaniyah dams on the
Euphrates River and two canals linking
irrigation areas in western and northern
Iraq. Also discussed was further Soviet
participation in the Hindiyah and Fallu-
jah dams, which have a projected total
cost of $1 billion.
Soviet power and irrigation projects
now in progress or under discussion would
add 3 million megawatts of installed
power capacity and bring 2.2 million hec-
tares under irrigation. Soviet specialists
are preparing a comprehensive land and
water use program for Iraq as a guide for
development activity over the next 25
years.
Soviet-aided projects completed in 1976
included a 200-megawatt expansion of the
Najibiyah thermal power plant, the
42-kilometer Tharthar irrigation canal
system, the first phase of the Mushrif oil
field, and the Baghdad-Basrah pipeline
(although the pipeline was not yet in
operation at year end). About 2,900
Soviet technicians were in Iraq during
1976 to support the projects. Priority
attention was given to solving pressuriza-
tion problems at the Rumaila oil field,
which had been developed with Soviet aid.
Output at the field is running at less than
half the 800,000 barrel-per-day rate
scheduled for the end of 1975. Water in-
jection equipment ordered in August un-
der the new economic agreement could
raise output substantially by 1978.
Work continued at five other fields as
part of Moscow's 20-year oil development
plan for Iraq. Soviet-developed oil
facilities have been financed by more than
$120 million in credits beginning in 1969.
New dimensions could emerge in Iraq's
economic relations with communist coun-
tries through the relationship established
with the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance in 1975. The first meeting of
the Iraq-CEMA Joint Commission ended
in November with a protocol establishing
working groups to recommend suitable
projects for multilateral cooperation.
Fields under study include petroleum,
agriculture, and light industry.
East European Economic Aid
Iraq's apparent willingness to barter oil
for industrial equipment and services
makes Iraqi projects particularly attrac-
tive to East European countries faced with
rising oil import bills. Romania signed a
new economic agreement last May that
identified petroleum development, land
reclamation, agriculture, and inland
fisheries as priority targets for Romanian
efforts.
Czechoslovakia will continue to expand
the Basrah refinery, which was completed
in 1974 with $27 million in Czechoslovak
credits. East Germany will participate in
construction of a railroad between
Baghdad and the Syrian border, while
Bulgaria is to complete food processing
and livestock projects in 1977. Hungary
has expanded oil exploration under a 1969
credit and agreed to construct several
housing projects.
No financing arrangements for new
projects have been announced, but it is
likely that most East European countries
are allowing a fast drawdown of their
$275 million of outstanding credits. Most
of the credits call for repayments in oil,
and the East Europeans probably pressed
hard for additional barter shipments to
cover current account items such as
technical services.
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As the power struggle continues within the ruling military
group that overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974, the regime appears
to be losing ground both to an urban-based Marxist terrorist
organization and to a variety o/ insurgent groups engaged in
uerrilla war/are in the provinces.
Ethiopia: Regime's Enemies Stronger
The deaths of several inner-circle
members of Ethiopia's ruling Provisional
Mi itary Administrative Council in
another bloodletting last week is unlikely
to result in any softening of the policies
tha. have made the 28-month-old military
regime widely unpopular. Radical First
Vic. Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam,
who appears more than ever to be calling
the tune in Addis Ababa, has pledged to
keen the regime on course and declared
war anew on all the council's foes.
he council's intractability seems
hound to cause further growth of an
already extensive underground leftist
civi ian opposition centered in the capital
and of multiple provincial insur-
gencies that have been eroding the re-
gime's control in the countryside for
some time.
Urban Agitation
I he council's refusal to give civilians a
significant role at the top levels of govern-
men ensures continued opposition from
the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Par y, a clandestine organization led by
Marxist intellectuals. The allegations that
the dead council members had been in-
volved with the party, and the increased
power of Mengistu-the party's main an-
tagonist-will intensify the enmity
between the party and the government.
the party's principal demand is an im-
mediate return to civilian rule: its other
policies differ little from the
government's, which are avowedly
soci 3hst.
The People s Revolutionary Party
steadily gained strength last year and now
has a network of supporters in several
provinces. Its primary supporters are
students, teachers, and trade unionists,
but it probably has the secret sympathy of
some military officers and government of-
ficials, including members of the ruling
council. Most of these sympathizers do
not share the party's leftist views, but see
it as a means to hasten the downfall of the
council.
Last summer and fall, the party carried
out a number of terrorist attacks in Addis
Ababa directed especially against the
council's civilian advisers who are
members of a body popularly known as
the politburo. Two members and four
employees of the politburo were killed,
and its headquarters was bombed. The
party was distributing a regular publica-
tion and other antigovernment tracts and
posters.
A crackdown begun in September
resulted in a three-month lull in the par-
ty's activities in Addis Ababa, but it ap-
parently renewed its terrorism last month
with the assassination of another pol~t-
huro member. The party is probably also
responsible for the recent attacks on the
USIS library and the British cultural of-
fice in Addis Ababa.
The party played a role in organizing a
recent boycott of classes by university
students. The students ostensibly struck
over university administrative matters,
but there is little doubt their action was
primarily a protest against the council.
The party also has a military wing that
conducts insurgent activity in at least
three provinces.
The People's Party lacks the means to
overthrow the council, but it can probably
expand its antigovernment activity and
thus further discredit the regime.
Insurgent Activity
Major insurgent groups in different
parts of the country have steadily expand-
ed their activity in recent months. Some
of the groups are leftist; others are led by
former aristocrats who held high office in
the old regime. Some are seeking in-
dependence or autonomy from the central
government; others want to force a
change of government in Addis Ababa.
Several have submerged their differences
to work jointly against the military coun-
cil.
The secessionist guerrillas in Eritrea
Province have for years conducted hit-
and-run attacks on army garrisons, am-
bushed convoys, and mined roads. In
mid-1976 they began staging conventional
attacks on isolated army posts in some of
the smaller towns.
The new strategy is proving effective.
Within the past two months, the rebels
have overrun two towns near the
Sudanese border and an army post in
southern Eritrea. Despite two major ef-
forts, the government has failed to break
the five-month siege of a town in central
Eritrea. Insurgent pressure has forced the
army to abandon some isolated garrisons
it cannot keep supplied.
The guerrillas' success reflects in part
their effective use of the large numbers of
recruits that have joined the movement
during the past two years. Government
weaknesses have also helped. Government
forces suffer from poor morale and dis-
cipline, inadequate logistics, and a
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shortage of qualified leaders. All these
problems are growing.
The government is likely to suffer
further reverses in the next few months,
but it will probably be able to maintain
control of the major cities and highways
by abandoning outlying posts and concen-
trating its forces-a strategy it has ap-
parently begun implementing. The
government can use its air power, armor,
and heavy weapons more effectively in
defense of the larger cities than of the
smaller garrisons.
If the rebels attempt to mount sustain-
ed large-scale attacks, their own deficien-
cies will become more evident. They suf-
fer from inadequate communications and
have only a few heavy weapons. They also
face problems in maintaining a steady
flow of supplies because their supply
routes from Sudan are long and cross dif-
ficult terrain.
The rebels are weakened by personality
clashes and ideological, religious, and
ethnic differences. There are now three
major factions. One group, formed last
year, operates independently. The other
two work together only sporadically.
Lack of unity is straining the in-
surgents' relations with the Arab coun-
tries that supply almost all their financial
and military assistance, Although Arab
threats to end aid unless the insurgents
unify their forces may force the guerrilla
factions to cooperate more closely, the
three rebel groups are unlikely to become
a unified fighting force in the near future.
No insurgent leader can claim to speak
for the whole movement.
The ruling council has recently shown
renewed interest in opening negotiations
with the Eritrean insurgents, but the coun-
cil's efforts are not likely to bear fruit. In
late January, it instructed a group of
Eritrean elders-traditional religious and
ethnic leaders-to convey to the guerrillas
the council's willingness to talk with in-
surgent representatives without precon-
ditions. The council on previous occasions
has used the elders as emissaries, but their
efforts have not resulted in significant
progress toward negotiations.
The insurgents have long insisted they
will negotiate only after the government
agrees to grant Eritrea complete in-
dependence. They rejected a government
proposal last May that would have
granted the province a degree of local
autonomy.
Another insurgent group, the Ethiopian
Democratic Union, has made recent gains
in Begemdir Province. It is led by exiles
who held important positions in the old
regime. Its leaders include two former
generals, Nega Tegegne and Iyasu
Mengesha, who have joined forces with
Ras Mengesha Seyoum, the traditional
leader of the Tigre people, one of the two
leading ethnic groups in Ethiopia.
The Democratic Union has attracted
other former aristocrats and conservative
landlords in northern Ethiopia, as well as
small farmers and peasants dissatisfied
with the military regime's disruption of
their traditional society and land tenure
system. The group's professed aim is to
bring about the downfall of the military
regime in Addis Ababa and replace it with
a government that will carry out reforms
with more moderation and without the
trappings of Marxist ideology.
Sudan has provided the group with
some arms and probably some financial
assistance and allowed the guerrillas to
use Sudanese territory as a base of
operations. The group has also received
arms and money from the Eritrean
guerrillas and conducted joint military
operations with the Eritrean Liberation
Front, one of the rebel factions, but the
alliance reportedly is becoming strained.
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A combined force last month gained
control of two neighboring towns near
the Sudanese border on the provincial
boundary between Eritrea and Begem-
dir. The commander of the army battalion
guarding one of the towns defected to the
Dem Jcratic Union along with most of his
troops. Union forces have fought sharp
clashes with the army in other parts of the
province, at times inflicting heavy
casu~.lties on government troops. An-
tigo%ernment activity is increasing
throughout the province, and the govern-
ment has arrested suspected sympathizers
in Gondar, the provincial capital.
Also fighting the government's forces in
Begerndir Province are members of the
small military wing of the Ethiopian
Peop.e's Revolutionary Party; they are
conducting operations in the eastern sec-
tor. I'he Democratic Union and the
Peop e's Revolutionary Party, despite
ideological differences, have apparently
reached a tacit understanding not to in-
terfere with each other in order to main-
tain combined pressure against the
military council.
Other Insurgencies
The Tigre People's Liberation Front is
active in Tigre Province. Theorganization
is led by a Marxist ideologue, and its
propaganda reflects a leftist ideology,
although some of its rank and file are
probably nonleftists.
The Tigre group has concentrated its
activity along a primary east-west road
connecting major provincial towns. The
towns are controlled by the government,
but the guerrillas control much of the
countryside, and government traffic can
move along the highway only in heavily
armed convoys.
Insurgent activity isgoing on in Wollo
Province, too. In the north and
northwestern areas, there are guerrillas
led by prominent local landlords who have
ties to the Democratic Union. They also
appear to be cooperating with a small
People's Revolutionary Party force in the
province.
In eastern Wollo, the Afar Liberation
Front conducts sporadic raids along the
border with the French Territory of the
Afars and Issas. The Afars, who enjoyed a
great deal of autonomy under the old
regime, revolted in 1975 when the military
council tried to impose central govern-
ment authority over their tribal lands.
The Afar leaders maintain close ties to
the Ethiopian Democratic Union.
Somalia Involved
Major insurgent activity is also under
way in southern and eastern Ethiopia. The
insurgents in these regions include both
ethnic Somalis and dissident tribesmen
who have a long history of resistance to
Addis Ababa. Somalia is assisting both
groups.
The tribesmen are recruited in
Ethiopia, sent to Somalia to receive train-
ing and arms, and infiltrated back across
the border. Some Somali regular troops
have accompanied the insurgents into
Ethiopia.
It has long been Mogadiscio's aim to
annex the Somali-inhabited portions of
Ethiopia. Somalia also supports the in-
surgents in order to divert Ethiopian
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military resources that could be used
against Somalia in a war over the French
Territory of the Afars and Issas.
The insurgency in these regions is most
serious in Bale Province, where guerrillas
have deeply eroded the government's con-
trol of the countryside. In Sidamo and
Harar provinces insurgents stage sporadic
raids on government installations and
make travel without armed escort hazar-
dous in some areas. The insurgents in all
three provinces have laid mines, staged
terrorist incidents, and proselytized
among the local villagers.
Outlook: More Trouble
The council is continually increasing
the size of its forces. A 5,000-man
counterinsurgency division trained by
Israeli advisers was formed last year. A
new division is in the process of being
formed with men from existing units and
from the police.
The council has taken preliminary steps
to form still another division. It is also
devoting considerable effort to es-
tablishing militias throughout the country
to be used primarily in fighting in-
surgents. Several thousand men have
already been recruited and provided small
arms and rudimentary military training.
The use of inexperienced troops and
poorly trained and armed militia will not
significantly improve the government's
military capabilities. The logistic system
will be unable to support the increased
manpower adequately. The new troops
may help the government's defenses in
some areas, but they will. not enable the
government to take the offensive against
any of the insurgents.
Indeed, the insurgents may well gain
control of additional territory and con-
solidate their control over areas they
already hold over the next. few months.
The several insurgencies do not have
sufficient force to overthrow the council in
Addis Ababa. They do, however, weaken
the government's staying power. The ar-
my's reverses have caused a further
decline in morale and discipline. Defec-
tions are increasing, although they have
not yet reached major proportions.
Dissension is particularly serious
among the armed forces in Eritrea. A
delegation supposedly representing all the
troops responsible for the defense of one
of Eritrea's major cities flew to Addis
Ababa late last month to demand that the
regime negotiate a peaceful settlement of
the Eritrean problem.
Further government setbacks at the
hands of guerrillas could cause more unit
commanders to question the council's
leadership. The killing of the council
members last week doubtless created new
enemies for the Mengistu faction and
',-t,tganda
Ire
17 WEEKLY SUMMARY Feb 11, 77
could lead to more coup plotting. At
present, however, dissidents in the armed
forces are dispersed and leaderless, and no
one military leader has a strong enough
base of support to challenge the council
directly.
There may be further upheaval over the
next six months within the council itself.
A continuing inability to solve the coun-
try's problems could lead to
recriminations and a search for
scapegoats among council members.
Saudi
Arabia
Ethiopia
Interns -o boundary
-~ Province boundary
National capital
? Province capital
-- Railroad
Road
F.T.A.I.
IF~.t: DJIBOUTI
S;omaIIa
MOGAOISC''t0#
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President Lopez Portillo has already done much to restore
public confidence in Mexico. He arrives in Washington next
week for a visit that he says is intended to demonstrate the im-
portance he attaches to close ties with the US.
Mexico: Lopez P-ortillo's First Sixty Days
A ter two months in office, Mexican
President Jose Lopez Portillo has done
muci to restore public confidence, which
had been badly shaken by a series of
economic and political blows in the wan-
ing days of the Echeverria administration.
The new President has established
economic stabilization as a primary goal,
set priorities for increased output of food
and energy, selected a moderate
cabinet, and moved quickly to reorganize
the government. He has also given early
signals of greater cooperation with the US
on bilateral issues in expectation of
reciprocal assistance.
Lopez Portillo arrives in Washington
on Fsbruary 14 to begin a state visit that
he has said is intended to demonstrate the
importance he attaches to close ties with
the L'S. It is also likely to provide further
reassirances to the Mexican public and to
enhance his own personal image.
A "New Style"
Under the Mexican system, the power
of the presidency is almost limitless, and
Lopes Portillo's personal style of govern-
ing will influence Mexico's course for the
next .ix years.
With an excellent record as an ad-
ministrator, he has thus far proven to be a
more deliberate, pragmatic decision
maker than his predecessor.
Basic Mexican policies will probably
not change much. Lopez Portillo reflects
in many ways the system that produced
him, from his administrative team of
long-time confidants to his rhetorical
defense of the revolutionary myth-the
notion that the Revolution of 1910 that
ideologically underpins the Mexican
government and official party is a con-
tinuing, institutionalized revolution.
Domestic Priorities
Lopez Portillo has candidly
acknowledged that Mexico's economic
difficulties will remain serious at least
through midyear. Economic stabilization
is clearly his top short-term priority. He
has sought the support of private business
through a series of agreements calling for
combined public-private investments of
$5 billion over six years to stimulate
production and create jobs.
He has persuaded labor to accept a
modest 9- to 10-percent wage hike,
arranged for private manufacturers to
provide 90 basic consumer goods at
reduced prices, and created a national
workers' bank.
The President has designated self-suf-
ficiency in food and energy as his ad-
ministration's other top priorities. He ap-
parently favors land collectivization for
more efficient agricultural production,
but will have to take care not to arouse
campesino groups by appearing to con-
travene the revolutionary ideal of
agrarian reform.
He must also reassure private land-
owners that their farms are secure before
many will make the investments necessary
to increase production. In the meantime,
he is quietly negotiating a compromise in
the dispute that arose last fall between
peasants and landholders in Sonora and
Sinaloa states, when former president
Echeverria's expropriation of private
holdings sparked land invasions by
peasants.
Another priority, and one that Mex-
icans hope will be their salvation in years
to come, is oil. Lopez Portillo apparently
intends to pursue rapid development of
newly discovered reserves.
Government Reorganization
Since the late 1960s, Lopez Portillo has
urged that the Mexican government be
reorganized. After one month in office he
restructured the executive branch. The
most important new cabinet ministry is
the Secretariat of Programming and
Budget, which supersedes the Presidency
Secretariat.
This office is to be the government's
financial center and key economic plan-
ning agency. Its responsibilities include
budget matters, supervision of govern-
ment expenditures and investments,
overall management of the state sector,
and liaison with other secretariats on
economic matters.
Another major change is the merging of
the National Patrimony Secretariat with
industrial development responsibilities
from the former Industry and Commerce
Secretariat; the new Secretariat will
provide uniform management of govern-
ment industries, promote private and
public industrial development, and con-
trol natural resources. Commerce will
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regulate production, distribution, expor-
tation, and import control.
Human Settlements and Public Works
were consolidated to coordinate housing,
population, and welfare programs.
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
were joined to increase agricultural out-
put. The government will also reorganize
the nearly 800 autonomous agencies and
make them subordinate to the cabinet
secretariats.
The New Cabinet
The new cabinet members, mostly close
personal friends of the President, span the
political spectrum, but collectively seem
to be a more moderate team than that of
Echeverria. This has enhanced public con-
fidence, especially among businessmen.
The selections of Jesus Reyes Heroles
as secretary of government and Santiago
Roe] as foreign secretary were the only
major surprises. Roel is well-connected
abroad, but has had little: diplomatic ex-
perience. His appointment may be
politically motivated; he is from
Monterrey, the home base of a powerful
conservative business clique that was con-
stantly at odds with Echeverria.
Reyes Heroles is an academic and a
political ideologue with wide top-level ad-
ministrative experience in government
and the official party, but he may lack the
toughness needed for the secretariat of
government.
The secretary of programming and
budget, Carlos Tello, is a young
economist who gained the President's
confidence while serving under him in the
Finance Secretariat. Since Lopez Portillo
will probably use the new ministry as a
base for his personal direction of
economic policy, Tello may become more
of an executive officer than an
authoritative policy maker in his own
right.
Another key figure will be Jorge Diaz
Serrano, Director of PEMEX, the
government petroleum agency. He is a
tough administrator with broad ex-
perience in the private oil industry. As a
comparative outsider he will try to im-
prove PEMEX's efficiency and overcome
opposition from conservationists within
PEMEX who would like to restrict
production.
Relations with the US
Reports have consistently indicated
that Lopez Portillo's general foreign
policies will be more narrowly focused
and pragmatic than Echeverria's, that
Mexico's third-world role will be more
moderate, and that the Mexicans will
cooperate more with the US in inter-
national forums.
The expected new slant has not yet
become apparent, however, perhaps
because of policy inertia from the
previous administration. Since Lopez
Portillo's inauguration:
? Foreign Secretary Roe] has
declared that Mexico will continue its
efforts on behalf of' nuclear disarma-
ment, a stand that has led to disagree-
ment with the US in past UN debates.
? The Mexican UN delegation has
resisted US efforts for a treaty on cor-
rupt practices because Mexico believes
it would delay substantive work on a
code of conduct for transnational cor-
porations.
? In the current International
Telecommunications Union's Broad-
casting-Satellite Conference, Mexico
brusquely dismissed a US proposal on
evolutionary planning without the
customary prior consultation.
? Roel has said Mexico will con-
tinue to press industrialized nations to
accept the principles of the
Echeverria-sponsored Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.
In bilateral issues with the US, on the
other hand, there are clearer signs that
Lopez Portillo will pursue moderate,
cooperative policies.
? He has advised US officials that
restrictive laws on foreign investment
will be interpreted flexibly.
? Mexico has offered to sell the US
emergency supplies of natural gas and
crude oil.
? Lopez Portillo has shown that he
will cooperate in strong narcotics en- 25X1
forcement, despite the appointment of
a known trafficker as Federal District
police chief.
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Secret
Secret
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