WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011500140001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 8, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
DIA review
completed.
Secret
CG WS 77-014
April 8, 1977
Copy N? 66
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The WEEKLY SU RY, issued every Friday morning by the
Current Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Eco-
na, f c Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of
Scrarttific Intel igence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence,
an; the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
CONTENTS
1 Africa
USSR-Southern Africa;
Zaire
3 USSR
US Relations; Japan Fishing
4 Middle East
USSR-Egypt; Lebanon;
Turkey; Egypt-Libya
5 International
World Tin
6 Europe
Czechoslovakia; Italy; Spain
7 South Asia
Pakistan
8 USSR: The Impending Oil Crisis
11 The Cuban Presence in the Third World
14 South Africa: Growing Uranium Supplier
15 Political Developments in the Red Sea Area
Comments and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly,
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USSR-SOUTHERN AFRICA
In Moscow's view, the signing of the
Soviet-Mozambican Friendship Treaty
probably was enough to make Soviet
President Podgorny's recent trip to Africa
a success. Moscow sees such treaties as
tangible measures of the success of its
diplomacy. The trip, which lasted about
two weeks and covered four countries, will
almost certainly lead to a greater Soviet
presence in Tanzania, Zambia, and
Mozambique, but just how much in-
fluence the USSR will gain from it is
questionable. Although all three countries
appreciate Moscow's willingness to sup-
port their military efforts against
Rhodesia, they still would prefer to keep
Soviet and Cuban involvement to a
minimum.
Somalia was added to the trip at the
last minute, probably to give Podgorny an
opportunity to try to alleviate
Mogadiscio's suspicions about Moscow's
growing commitment to Somalia's arch
rival, Ethiopia. Preliminary indications
are that he was not too successful.
The friendship treaty with Mozam-
bique closely parallels the treaty Moscow
signed last fall with Angola. Although the
treaty contains the usual promise to con-
sult whenever either side perceives a
military threat, the Soviets do not inter-
pret such language as involving a mutual
defense commitment. Soviet spokesmen
are also insisting that the treaty does not
provide for Soviet military bases, and
Mozambican President Machel probably
would resist any such Soviet request.
Zambian President Kaunda greets President Podgorny at Lusaka Airport
The treaty calls for Moscow to continue
its military assistance to Mozambique,
and the need for increased arms was
probably the primary reason Machel
signed the treaty. Mozambique is the
target of increased Rhodesian attacks
on guerrilla bases, and Machel is in-
tent on improving the military capa-
bilities of the guerrillas.
The Tanzanians claim that Podgorny
tried and failed to get a similar treaty
from them.
Podgorny's Purpose
The principal aim of Podgorny's trip
was to increase Moscow's role in the
evolving situation in southern Africa by
taking advantage of the front-line states'
desire to strengthen the guerrilla forces
and increase the military pressure on
Rhodesia.
The Soviet President took along a large
delegation of economic and military aid
experts who reportedly offered military
and some economic assistance. Informa-
tion on the specifics of Moscow's offers is
still coming in. Black nationalist groups
and Tanzania probably fared well.
Tanzania until recent years has received
most of its military aid from the Chinese.
In 1974, however, Tanzania signed two
agreements with Moscow worth about
$74 million. Most of the equipment
ordered under those agreements has
already been delivered.
Tanzania's arms acquisitions are
motivated both by its involvement in the
Rhodesian guerrilla effort and by its fears
about neighboring Kenya and Uganda.
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Tanzanian President Nyerere considers
Ugandan President Amin a threat to Tan-
zanian security and has given aid and
refuge to Ugandan exiles.
After meeting in Zambia with Joshua
Nkomo, leader of the African People's
Union, Podgorny refused to meet in
Mozambique with Robert Mugabe of the
Zimbabwe African National Union,
Nkomo's partner in the loosely allied
Patriotic Front. Mugabe apparently had
rejected a Soviet invitation to see Podgor-
ny in Zambia. The Soviet leader may have
wanted to see the two Rhodesian
nationalists together in deference to his
hosts, who are supporting the Patriotic
Front.
The African National Union, the
stronger of the two Rhodesian guerrilla
groups, has traditionally been more close-
ly aligned with the Chinese, but in recent
month,, has received increased Soviet :aid.
Podgorny's failure to meet with Mugabe
may mean that Tanzania and Mozam-
bique, rather than the USSR, made the
decision on the disposition of Soviet aid.
Moscow's generosity in military aid ap-
parently was not matched by offers of
economic assistance, except possibly in
Mozambique. Tanzania reportedly will
receive another $20 million in Soviet
economic assistance, and Zambia
reportedly will obtain considerably less.
The Cuban Angle
It is still difficult to determine whether
Cuban President Castro timed his
African trip to coincide with Podgorny's
travels. The clearly ad hoc way Castro
arranged his itinerary suggests that he was
acting on his own. The Soviets probably
would have preferred that Castro visit
Africa some other time. The enthusiastic
reception accorded Castro by most
Africars stood in sharp contrast to the
more correct reception afforded Podgor-
ny and considerably undercut the impact
of the first Soviet leadership venture into
southern Africa. By traveling at the same
time as Podgorny, Castro only revived
Western and moderate African concerns
about the Soviet-Cuban connection in
Africa, and that is something the Soviets
presumably would have wished to avoid.
Castro is receiving a high level recep-
tion in his current visit to Moscow and if
he did not coordinate his African tour
with the Soviets in advance, he now
probably is working out a coordinated
strategy for the future.
Invading Katangan forces have now
been in Zaire for a month. They are
currently consolidating their control in
the southwestern part of Shaba region
about 70 kilometers west of the important
industrial center of Kolwezi. Very little
military action was reported this week,
and although heavy rains may have
hampered Katangan advances to some ex-
tent, the slow pace of the invasion appears
to be part of Katangan strategy. They are
adhering to the cautious military style
that they learned from the Popular Move-
ment forces in Angola.
The lull in the fighting has given the
Zairian military an opportunity to put
together a more organized force. Abler
officers have been put in command, im-
proved logistic support is being arranged,
and improved defensive plans are under
consideration. But the Zairian army still
has enormous problems. Some of the
command changes have provoked fac-
tionalism in army headquarters, and the
rank and file continue to desert at an alar-
ming rate. Given another week or two, the 25X1
Zairians might be able to put together a
creditable defense, but the government's
ability to stop a determined push by the
Katangans is doubtful. Civilian support
for the Mobutu regime is shaky as well. A
mass meeting held in Kinshasa last Sun-
day as a demonstration of popular sup-
port for the regime was almost a disaster.
The President is still counting on
foreign assistance to bail him out, and it is
not materializing very rapidly. French
and Belgian advisers are playing a larger
role, and the ambassadors of the two
countries flew to Kolwezi this week to
look over this threatened area. The
French have set up their own radio
network and will soon start to train an in-
fantry battalion and mortar crews.
Belgian advisers are working mostly in
the logistic field.
Mediation efforts, largely in the hands
of the Nigerians, who are more sym-
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pathetic to the Angolans than to the
Zairians, is proceeding even more slowly
than the fighting. The Katangans could
well take all of Shaba before any
negotiated agreement is reached.
US RELATIONS 1~ 3 .~Z
Foreign Minister Gromyko's extraor-
dinary press conference after Secretary of
State Vance left Moscow on March 31
continues to receive heavy play in the
Soviet media. The US embassy in
Moscow believes the press conference was
prompted by concern at the highest levels
of the Soviet leadership that the USSR's
response to Secretary Vance's proposals
on strategic arms and other subjects was
not receiving adequate coverage in
Western media. The Soviets seemed par-
ticularly sensitive to the suggestion that
the USSR no longer had the "initiative"
in the field of disarmament.
The entire 90-minute press conference
was shown on Soviet television, and the
follow-up treatment in the Soviet media
emphasizes the main themes enunciated
by the Foreign Minister-that the US
proposals are unrealistic and a departure
from the agreement reached at the
Vladivostok summit in late 1974. While
the new US administration is directly and
strongly criticized, most of the articles do
end on some sort of a positive note.
One such note was offered by senior
political commentator Aleksandr Bovin
in Izvestia two days after the Gromyko
press conference. He said that the Soviets
had been forced to reject the entire pack-
age because a part of it was unaccept-
able, implying that the US comprehensive
proposal does contain elements that may
be acceptable to the USSR. Gromyko's
threat to resurrect the issue of US for-
ward-based systems on the periphery of
the USSR has not been replayed.
Gromyko's performance does not
appear to be intended to signal a major
shift in Soviet policy. The Foreign
Minister himself emphasized that all
points in contention on strategic arms
curbs remain open for discussion and that
there are no insurmountable obstacles to
an agreement. What does seem clear is
that the Soviets remain wedded to the
terms of the 1974 accord. Any decision
significantly at variance with that would
require time, given the Soviet propensity
for a highly bureaucratic decision-making
process.
General Secretary Brezhnev offered
some brief remarks on US-Soviet
relations during his speech at the dinner
for Cuban President Castro in Moscow
April 5. While Brezhnev asserted
that the US is losing its "constructive ap-
proach" and has offered only "a one-sided
position," he cited the continued existence
of "a rather good basis" for practical
steps in strategic arms control.
JAPAN FISHING
Moscow's recent declaration of a 200-
mile fishing zone has created new strains
in Japanese-Soviet relations, which are
already cool. From the start of the current
fisheries negotiations last month, the
Soviets have put forward tough political
demands. The Soviets insist that Tokyo
affirm Soviet sovereignty in the disputed
northern islands and permit Soviet fishing
in Japan's planned 12-mile limit before
any fishing quotas in Soviet waters can be
discussed. The demands have stalled the
talks and provoked unusually harsh
anti-Soviet rhetoric in Tokyo.
A highly publicized anti-Soviet rally
was held in Tokyo last week, and
Japanese media are accusing the Soviets
of "hegemony diplomacy" in connection
with the talks. All opposition par-
ties-including the Communists-have
endorsed the government decision to
resist Moscow's demands. The Japa-
nese have sent a senior official to
Moscow in an effort to move the talks off
dead center. Tokyo is also reportedly
planning an early declaration of a 200-
mile fishing zone to gain some leverage
against the Soviets.
The Soviets probably recognize that
Tokyo will not bow to their demands.
They may be staking out bargaining
positions to assure optimum benefits in
the final agreement. The Soviets have
been hard hit by the increasing number of
200-mile national fishing zones claimed in
regions where they traditionally have
taken large catches. On a worldwide
basis, the restrictions on fishing that have
been announced recently could reduce the
Soviet catch by one quarter or more. Fish
provide about 15 percent of the animal
protein in the average Soviet diet.
Moreover, much Soviet fishing is done in
Japanese waters. Nearly 80 percent of the
important Soviet sardine catch, for exam-
ple, is taken inside Tokyo's proposed 12-
mile limit.
Soviet fishing grounds are also ex-
tremely valuable to Japan. Last year the
Japanese took about 12 percent of their
total catch within 200 miles of the USSR
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USSR-EGYPT )A
The acrimony and 'recriminations that
have characterized Soviet-Egyptian
relaticns since the first of the year sub-
sided enough last month to allow a Soviet
trade delegation to visit Cairo and sign
the annual 1977 trade protocol. The trade
negotiations had been postponed for four
months.
Suci annual protocols are not a good
indication of the overall state of
Soviet-Egyptian relations, and the new
pact does not signal a meaningful lessen-
ing or tensions. The touchy issue of
long-term debt repayment is still unset-
tled.
Trade for 1977 has been planned at
about the same level as last year-$1
billion compared with some $820 million
for 1976. The slight increase may merely
reflect increases in the cost of goods. The
quantities listed this year are not substan-
tially different from those agreed to for
1976. The Soviets will be exchanging
metal products, timber, and chemicals for
Egyptian cotton, citrus fruits, and textiles.
Actual trade varies significantly from
planned levels-both prices and quantities
are commonly renegotiated throughout
the year.
The new accord reportedly provides for
an Egyptian surplus of $200 million. If
such a surplus materializes, most of it
would certainly be used to help pay off the
outstanding Egyptian debt.
Trade could fall significantly below the
plan this year. The Egyptians are under
considerable pressure from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and Arab donors
to increase hard-currency earnings and
would not hesitate to divert goods from
the USSR if better markets develop. The
USSR, for its part, has threatened to
reduce critical exports to Egypt in retalia-
tion for unacceptable political behavior,
and the Egyptians have clearly
demonstrated a willingness to take actions
The fighting between Christian ex-
tremists and Palestinian-leftist forces in
southern Lebanon, which has been almost
continuous since late January, increased
significantly two weeks ago. Over the
past few months, Christian forces have
been increasing the amount of territory
under their control along Lebanon's
southern border. In late March., the
Christians began to move against re-
maining Palestinian-controlled villages
in the border area, capturing the im-
portant Palestinian base at Tayyibah.
Last weekend, Christian forces took
four more Palestinian-controlled villages
and began shelling the area around Bint
Jubayi, the last Palestinian stronghold in
the south. On April 4, the Palestinians
counterattacked and recaptured
Tayyibah. By April 7, the Palestinians
were on the offensive. They captured the
town of Khiyam, which the Christians
took last year, and were threatening the
Christian base at Marj Uyun.
The Christian forces rely heavily on the
Israelis-across the border-for artillery
support and some operational planning.
There were reports this week that the
leftist Palestinian forces had the help
of Syrian artillery in recovering Tayy-
ibah, but the Syrians have been careful
up to now to avoid any direct involve-
ment in the fighting in the south, and
the reports of Syrian participation have
not been confirmed.
Turkey: Parliamentary Election Scheduled
An early parliamentary election de-
signed to end the paralyzing divisions
within Turkey's four-party coalition has
been officially scheduled for June 5.
Both Prime Minister Demirel's Justice
Party and opposition leader Ecevit's Re-
publicaii People's Party hope to gain
enough votes to reduce the role of
Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan's Na-
tional Salvation Party, which has been
obstructing progress on key domestic
and foreign policy issues.
Neitl er of Turkey's major parties is
likely t:) win a clear majority, and the
pattern of unstable coalitions, which dates
back to the inconclusive parliamentary
election in 1973, will probably continue.
No hard policy decisions are likely to be
made in Turkey until the parliament
reconvenes next fall.
Demirel believes that his party's
strength has peaked and that economic
conditions will be more favorable in June
than they will later on. He has favored
early elections for some time as a means
of increasing his strength in parliament
and reducing his reliance on his coalition
partners.
Opposition leader Ecevit's motivation
is less clear, but he is evidently convinced
that an early election will also be to his
party's advantage. Ecevit has become in-
creasingly restive and is eager to take over
the government again.
Erbakan, who opposes an early elec-
tion because his party may lose votes,
has announced that he will appeal the
election decision to the constitutional
court. The court is likely to reject
the appeal.
Candidates for the 450 assembly seats
and 50 senatorial posts must be selected
by April 24. This short time period gives a
distinct advantage to incumbents and par-
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JI..Vr\L 1
BEIBU
6
Khiyam
"'u".
Tayphah gg
Bint Jubayl1
This week, members of Fatah-the
largest and most moderate of the Pales-
tinian organizations--were heavily in-
volved in the fighting for the first time.
Fear that establishment of a Christian
buffer along the entire border with Israel
would eliminate any option for operations
against Israel may account for their par-
ticipation.
So far, President Sarkis' efforts to end
the fighting have been fruitless. His
attempt to send Syrian-dominated
peacekeeping troops into the area met
with strenuous Israeli objections, and his
proposal to introduce some kind of UN
force generated no enthusiasm from
anyone.
Sarkis' best chance at present is to
repair the fractured Lebanese army and
put together an all-Lebanese security
force that could be used to restore
authority in southern Lebanon. The
Israelis have said they would accept such
a solution, and the Syrians could hardly
oppose it. Sarkis took one step in this
direction: recently?by replacing a hardline
Christian officer, General Hanna Said, as
head of the army. His replacement is a
Christian of more moderate persuasion.
Tensions are building once again in
Egyptian-Libyan relations. The signs are
most obvious in the vitriolic propaganda
exchanges of the past two months.
The propaganda war is increasingly
harsh and gives the impression that both
sides are concerned about continuing acts
of terrorism and possible assassination
attempts. The Cairo press has focused on
the arrest of alleged Libyan saboteurs
ordered to carry out bombing and
political assassinations in Cairo last
month in an attempt to disrupt the
Arab-African summit. Egyptian
authorities have charged that bombings in
Alexandria killed three and injured eight.
Cairo's leading daily, Al Ahram, printed
extensive details on the arrest of the
saboteurs and the recovery of a cache of
arms and explosives. The article linked
the agents to the Libyan intelligence office
in Tobruk and to a nearby training camp
at Al Shubah.
Libya's media campaign against Egypt
WORLD TIN 44 - 4 D
Bolivia agreed last week to ratify the
fifth international tin agreement after
earlier threatening to withhold support.
Without ratification by Bolivia, the
world's second-largest tin producer, the
agreement would have expired on June 30.
The UN Conference on Trade and
Development-and the International Tin
Council, which represents 25 countries
and the producers and consumers of about
90 percent of the world's tin-will be
pleased with Bolivia's announcement.
UNCTAD officials have long regarded
the tin agreement a model for other
producer-consumer commodity pacts.
Bolivia had objected in particular to the
,TRIPOLI
dates back to the popular demonstrations
and riots in Egypt in mid-January, when
Libyan radio apparently tried to keep the
demonstrations going by inciting the
students to denounce the government.
Last month, Libyan leader Qadhafi
publicly denounced the Egyptian govern-
ment in scathing terms, and early this
month, the Libyan media campaign
featured a front-page personal attack in a
Tripoli newspaper on President Sadat.
low floor prices in the agreement. The
council agreed to regularize the
procedure for determining floor and ceil-
ing prices-a concession to Bolivia that
provides a face-saving justification for
ratification.
Bolivian officials who tried to hold out
against ratification realize that the
remotely located high-cost tin industry in
Bolivia has much to gain by preserving the
agreement and will probably now press
for higher floor prices. Tin prices have
fallen below the floor prices set by the
council only once during its more than 20
years of existence. Pressures for higher
prices are likely to come to the surface in
July when the newly established
Economic and Price Review Panel meets
in the first of its semiannual sessions to
discuss floor and ceiling prices for tin.
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JGIiRG I
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Some Czechoslovak dissidents promi-
nent in the "Charter 77" human rights
movement that surfaced last January may
be preparing to leave the country. Zdenek
Mlynar. a leading activist, is reportedly
considering emigrating to Austria because
he believes the movement has run its
course.
US diplomats in Prague recently learn-
ed that Mlynar sent his wife to the
Austrian embassy early last week with a
personal message for Chancellor Kreisky.
Mlynar allegedly asked for a position in
the Austrian Academy of Sciences and
said he wants to take with him six to eight
other intellectuals who are members of
the dissident group. Mlynar and his
friends tope to establish a group to study
"Eurocommunism," either in Austria or
Italy.
Mlynk:r reportedly believes that for a
short period the government will allow
dissidents to leave the country, but after
that he expects arrests and further repres-
sion.
In late January, Mlynar and several
other prominent dissidents refused a
government offer to let them leave the
country. He may have had a change of
heart. The regime, which in recent weeks
has maintained strong pressure against
the Charter 77 members, will certainly
welcome any departures.
The US embassy reports that the
Charter '77 activists are deeply concerned
over their inability to rally substantial
domestic support for their cause or to
force greater respect by the regime for
human rights. Mlynar's emigration would
be a major psychological blow to the dis-
sidents, who reportedly have been uncer-
tain about their future since the unex-
pected death last month of one of their
spokesmen, Jan Patocka. There are in-
dications, however, that some dissidents
will try to dramatize their cause on the eve
of the Belgrade preparatory meeting on
European security issues in June.
ITALY
A compromise with Italy's three major
unions on wage curbs has temporarily
eased pressures on Prime Minister Andre-
otti, but political tension is likely to in-
tensify after Easter. Andreotti needed the
cooperation of both the unions and the
political left to continue negotiations for
a $530-million credit from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. At issue was a
decree law under which the government
intended to increase certain taxes in order
to assume some of the social security costs
now borne by business. Labor was an-
tagonized in particular by a section of the
law that prevented some of the tax in-
creases from triggering automatic cost-
of-living hikes.
The dispute came at a time when the
Communist Party and its supporters were
having increased misgivings about the
party decision to support Andreotti in-
directly by abstaining in the parliament.
These misgivings have grown as Andreotti
ty-and as the party made little progress
toward a more formal role in the govern-
ment.
The misgivings of many Communists
were brought into sharper focus during a
recent round of student violence when
some of the students branded the Com-
munists as part of the establishment. The
experience intensified debate in the party
over the merits of its cooperative stance
toward the government. As a result of
that debate and the controversy over the
IMF loan, the Communists can be ex-
pected to demand a larger voice in policy
making as the price for their con-
tinued cooperation.
Although public attention has focused
on the political maneuvering surrounding
the decree, the Andreotti austerity
program, even before the latest revisions,
is inadequate to solve Italy's economic
problems. Industrial labor costs and infla-
tion in Italy are increasing faster than in
any other industrial country, and the lira
is likely to remain weak. F
has gradually implemented an austerity Spanish Prime Minister Suarez suf-
program requiring substantial sacrifices fered a setback last week when the ad-
by supporters of the Communist Par- ministrative chamber of the Spanish
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Stl:Kt I
Supreme Court refused to rule on the
legality of the Communist Party. Key
government leaders want the party
legalized-to strip it of its martyr's status
and expose its electoral weakness. They
do not expect the Communists to obtain
more than 8 percent of the vote, and they
had apparently succeeded in gaining the
support of both the pollitical right and the
military for legalizing the Communists.
The court's refusal to cooperate leaves
the government with several unpalatable
options and raises the prospect of an out-
break of demonstrations and violence as
Spain prepares for its important legislative
election this summer. The government
now could:
? Send the case to the criminal
chamber of the Supreme Court in the
hope that it would prove more
cooperative.
? Create a new court that would
have the special task: of ruling on the
legality of controversial parties and
trade unions.
? Make the decision to legalize the
party by government decree.
? Acknowledge that it lacks author-
ity to make the decision-or simply
procrastinate-leaving the problem to
the next government..
The only decision that would satisfy the
opposition would be for the government
to legalize the party outright. Doing so,
however, risks antagonizing conserva-
tives in the military and security forces
who remain bitter about the Commu-
nists' role during the Spanish civil war.
The Prime Minister is probably not
prepared to take these risks.
The Communist Party has reacted to
the court's decision with controlled anger,
warning that the move: could endanger the
election and calling for opposition support
to pressure the government to legalize the
party. The party is aware that overplaying
its hand now could lead to violent clashes
that would risk destroying the good will
the party has won during the past year
and will probably continue to behave with
restraint, working behind the scenes to
apply pressure and build support for its
Prime Minister Bhutto's opponents, led
by the Pakistan National Alliance, seem
determined to continue their
demonstrations in the hope of forcing him
from office, but they have not yet been
able to create the widespread disorder
that would force the military to move
against the Prime Minister.
In nearly four weeks, more than 100
people have been killed in the
demonstrations, which are focused on the
opposition's charge that the parliamen-
tary election last month was rigged.
Thousands of people have been ar-
rested; the government's figure is
6,000, but the opposition charges that
30,000 have been jailed.
The protesters are concentrating this
week on demonstrations in the Punjab,
Pakistan's most populous and important
province. Although the opposition
probably has greater resources in other
parts of the country, it has little chance of
forcing Bhutto from office unless it can
create serious trouble in the Punjab. The
opposition staged major demonstrations
throughout the country on April 6 and
plans a major effort in Lahore, the provin-
cial capital, on April 9 to protest the con-
vening of the provincial assembly.
The opposition is also trying to make
more use of organizations of lawyers,
religious leaders, and women in their
demonstrations. They hope the public will
associate these demonstrators with those
who participated in the demonstrations
that brought down president Ayub Khan
in 1969. Police efforts to break up
demonstrations by such groups-especial-
ly women-could well turn more of the
people against the government.
Bhutto continues to emphasize that he
wants a compromise with the opposition,
but he has made no headway. His op-
ponents view his concessions as a sign of
weakness. His most recent offer-to end
the state of emergency if the opposition
would negotiate-was rejected, allNCODED
earlier offer to give the opposition RU
more seats in the National Assembly.
Pakistani election authorities have
begun examining the results of the elec-
tion last month and have already over-
turned the election of one of Bhutto's
former cabinet ministers. Such adjust-
ments, however, are not likely to have
any impact on the opposition or the pop-
ulation at large. The election com-
mission-which was responsible for run-
ning the elections-is itself discredited
because of the widespread evidence of
fraud.
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Soviet oil production will peak in the early 1980s-or
sooner-and sometime in the next decade the USSR may not
only have to cut back on exports but may well have to compete
for OPEC oil.
The Soviet oil industry is in trouble.
During the next decade, the USSR may
find itself not only unable to supply oil to
Eastern Europe and the West on the pres-
ent scale, but it may also have to com-
pete for OPEC oil for its own use. The
Soviets now supply about three quarters
of Eastern Europe's oil needs, and oil ex-
ports to the West now provide nearly half
of total Soviet hard-currency earnings.
Soviet. oil production will soon peak,
possibly as early as next year and certain-
ly by the early 1980s, and a significant
decline will follow. The maximum output
is likely to be between II and 12 million
barrels per day, compared with the 1976
level of 10.4 million barrels per day. Max-
imum levels are not likely to be main-
tained for long, however; the decline,
when it comes, will be sharp.
Reserve and Production Problems
Unlike the US, which has long
restricted production for reasons of con-
servation and profit, the USSR tends to
maximiz,, production. Short-term produc-
tion goals are considered floors, not
ceilings, and rewards are given for ex-
ceeding the goals. The Soviets pay little
regard to long-term productivity. Under
these conditions, Soviet production has
expanded much more rapidly in the last
20 years than that of the US.
This Soviet approach has led to:
? An emphasis on development
USSR: The Impending Oil Crisis
drilling over exploration, with the
result that new discoveries are failing
to keep pace with output growth.
? Overproduction of existing wells
and fields by using rapid water injec-
tion and other methods, with the result
that less of the oil in place is ultimately
recovered.
? New capacity requirements that
soon will run far beyond the Soviet oil
industry's capability.
Efforts to increase production
further-demanded by the goals of the
recently announced five-year plan-can
only worsen the situation and make the
eventual downward slide more rapid.
As the ratio of reserves to output has
fallen, the bulk of Soviet output has come
increasingly from fields approaching ex-
haustion. The result has been an accelera-
tion of development drilling requirements,
which will level off or decline only
when-and if-very large new additions
are made to the producing reserve base.
The Soviets speak of this problem in
terms of the depletion offset-the amount
of new capacity required to offset deple-
tion of old capacity in each five-year plan
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period.
During the 1961-65 plan period, only
1.3 million barrels per clay of capacity had
to be replaced. In 1971-75, a replacement
capacity of 5.1 million barrels per day was
required because of rapid depletion.
Viewed in another way, about 72 per-
cent of 1970 capacity had to be re-
placed by the end of 1975,
The target for the 1976-1980 plan is
10.6 million to 10.8 million barrels per
day of new capacity. Of this, 7.8 million
barrels per day-equal to about 80 per-
cent of the capacity on line in 1975-is to
offset depletion. If depletion is more rapid
than the Soviets expect-their record
suggests that it may well be-con-
siderably more of the 1975 capacity will
have to be replaced.
Problems of defining reserve
categories, as well as Soviet secrecy, cause
uncertainty about the size of the USSR's
oil reserves. Soviet proven reserves are es-
timated at 30 to 35 billion barrels, roughly
comparable with those of the US. There is
no doubt that Soviet proven reserves have
been falling in recent years, and there is
very little chance that enough new oil will
be discovered during the next few years to
improve appreciably the reserves-to-
production ratio.
Although the USSR has abundant
potential reserves in Arctic, East
Siberian, and offshore areas, development
of such reserves is at least a decade away.
Thus, during the next 8 to 10 years,
almost all Soviet output will have to come
from existing fields and from new fields in
existing producing regions.
The DIA estimates that Soviet proven
reserves are in the range of 85 billion
barrels and therefore cannot agree with
the immediacy of an oil crisis in the
USSR as implied throughout this paper.
Outlook for the Next Few Years
From World War II through 1970, the
growth in oil output resulted from Soviet
exploitation of either the Caspian fields
or, after the mid-1950s, of large fields in
the Urals-Volga region. Since 1970, near-
ly all output growth has come from
development of western Siberia, primarily
in the giant Samotlor field. Current
Soviet and US Crude Oil
MILLION BIB
Ilnulujing a small amount of naWral gas liquids
ZEasluding natural gas liquids
I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1
60 65 70
Soviet plans call for holding aggregate
output nearly constant west of the Urals
and doubling production in West Siberia.
A variety of problems will probably lead
to a decline in production west of the
Urals, and production in western Siberia
will fall far short of doubling.
All growth in output through 1980 will
come from western Siberia. In 1976, ap-
proximately 60 percent of west Siberian
output and roughly 20 percent of national
production came from the giant Samotlor
field. Samotlor will reach peak pro-
duction in the next year or so and will
hold peak levels for no more than four
years. It is already experiencing ra-
pid water incursion, and increasing
quantities of fluid-water plus oil-must
be lifted to recover any given quantity
of oil. Although the Soviets are dis-
covering new fields in western Siberia,
they have found no giant fields compar-
able to Samotlor.
One of the Soviets' main problems is
the lack of sufficient drilling capability to
pursue adequate development and ex-
ploration programs simultaneously. The
Soviets have some 1,600 active rigs, about
the same as the US. In terms of meters
drilled, however, the Soviet effort
amounts to only about one fifth that of
the US. In 1971-75, the Soviets drilled a
total of about 52 million meters. In 1975
alone, the US drilled 53 million meters.
1 1 1 1 I I I I I I l I l 1 I
75 76 80 85
projected
Even with a maximum effort, the Soviets
will not be able by 1980 to come close to
drilling the 75 million meters called for by
their current five-year plan.
The poor Soviet drilling record is in
part the result of the fact that 80 percent
of their drilling is done with turbodrilling
rigs that are highly inefficient for deep
drilling or for use in soft formations.
Greater access to advanced Western
technology and rotary drilling equipment
could help alleviate the Soviet drilling
problem.
Pumping Problems
In addition to drilling, the USSR is fac-
ing major problems lifting growing
amounts of water with the oil. In the
1950s, when wells in the Urals-Volga
region began to stop flowing naturally,
the Soviets were forced to begin pumping.
At that time, however, pumping equip-
ment was in short supply. To forestall a
slowdown in the growth of oil output, the
Soviets adopted the practice of injecting
large amounts of water into and along the
edges of each field.
If enough water is forced into a forma-
tion, it raises reservoir pressures so that
wells once again flow without pumping.
The Soviet system differs from the stan-
dard Western technique in that the object
is to increase rather than just to maintain
pressure. Much more water is injected
than oil produced.
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Although massive water injection can
boost production for a time, eventually
the water will break through to the oil-
producing well; when the wells begin to
show water in large quantities, the natural
flow will usually stop, and the wells
must be pumped. In this case conventional
pumping equipment cannot be used;
special high-capacity submersible pumps
are needed because much greater vol-
umes of fluid must be lifted.
Although some West European nations
and the USSR itself manufacture a lower
capacity version of these pumps, the
Soviet, recognize that the only pumps
adequate to deal with their lifting problem
are made in the US. Even in the US, such
pumps are in short supply.
As an alternative to high-capacity sub-
mersible pumps, at least in some fields,
the Soviets are considering wider use of
gas-lift equipment. The kind of projects
they have in mind, however, would require
large-&.-ale imports of US technology and
long lead times.
Longer Term Outlook
The initial falloff, when it comes, will
almost certainly be sharp. Eventually the
Soviets will discover new fields-some
quite large. Given the rapid rate of deple-
tion of existing fields and the technical
difficulties associated with exploration
and exploitation in frontier areas,
however, the oil found in newly discovered
fields probably cannot be produced rapid-
ly enough to do more than temporarily
arrest the rapid slide of Soviet output.
In the early 1980s, a small contribution
to Soviet oil output may come from new
offshore Caspian reserves and from new
discoveries on the Mangyshlak Peninsula
on the cast shore of the Caspian and in the
Pechora region west of the Urals. The
Soviets also hope to find oil in the
northern part of western Siberia's
Tyumen Oblast. Limited exploration in
this region, however, has so far yielded
mainly natural gas and condensate.
Geological conditions favorable to
large future discoveries exist in much of
the Arctic offshore regions-especially in
the Barents and Kara seas-in the East
Siberian lowlands, in the Caspian area,
and perhaps off Kamchatka and Sakhalin
in the Sea of Okhotsk. Production from
most of these areas, however, is at least a
decade away.
When oil production stops growing,
and perhaps even before, the effects on the
domestic economy of the USSR and on
its international economic relations will
necessitate an effort to find alternative
energy sources.
The USSR has large reserves of coal
and natural gas, but those scheduled for
exploitation over the next decade are east
of the Urals, far from consuming centers
in the western USSR. Distance, climate,
and terrain will make exploitation and
transport difficult and expensive.
Exports of gas will increase, but will not
compensate for the loss of earnings from
the export of oil. Although some substitu-
tion of coal and gas for oil in domestic use
will be possible in the long run, the effect
of such substitution will be minimal in the
short run. Neither hydroelectric power
transmitted from the eastern part of the
USSR nor construction of nuclear electric
plants-mainly in the western
USSR-can be expected to provide much
relief for more than a decade. F
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In his search for recognition as a leader of the Third
World, Cuba's Fidel Castro has switched from supporting
revolutionary movements to assisting established governments
that show some revolutionary promise. In this effort, he works
closely with and sometimes on behalf of the Soviets.
The Cuban Presence in the Third World
Much of what the Cubans have been
doing in Africa and other parts of the
Third World during the past year or two
has roots that go back to the inception of
the Castro regime in 1959. Some of Presi-
dent Castro's tactics have changed, but
his basic motives remain the same:
? Castro wants to play a
larger-than-life role in the world, and
one of his aspirations is to be recogniz-
ed as the leader of the Third World.
? By working against US interests
in Africa, Castro hopes to counteract
what he views as a protracted US cam-
paign to isolate or bring down his
regime.
? Castro,
a confirmed revolu-
A Shifting Foreign Policy
"Proletarian internationalism" is a
duty Castro has always taken seriously.
Almost from the time he assumed power,
he has been involved in sending Cubans
abroad to promote revolution. In the
1960s, this involvement took the form of
support for revolutionary movements
bent on subverting incumbent
governments in Latin America and
Africa.
In the 1970s, the Cubans shifted tactics.
Cuba still supports selected insurgency
movements, but Havana now concen-
trates on assisting governments that have
convinced Castro of their revolutionary
potential. This shift was caused by the
consistent failure of efforts based on sub-
version and violent revolution, and Che
Guevara's downfall in Bolivia in 1967 was
a turning point. Instead of guerrilla ad-
visers and fighters, Cuba now sends
abroad military, paramilitary, economic,
and political advisers and technicians
skilled in a broad range of specialties.
The "armed-struggle" policy had also
caused friction with Moscow, and Castro
realized that a revamping of Cuban ac-
tivities abroad was necessary to bring
Cuba more in line with the USSR. Cuba's
activities abroad today usually comple-
ment Soviet policy, and in many cases the
Cubans are clearly working in close con-
cert with the USSR.
The success of the new approach con-
trasts sharply with the failure of the old.
The tactics of aid have brought more
success than subversion and terrorism.
Cuba has been winning new friends
among the developing nations by
itionary, is convinced that support-
ing revolutionaries abroad is a
moral obligation.
These purely Cuban objectives make it
misleading to regard Castro as simply a
Soviet surrogate, even though Castro's
foreign ventures frequently serve Soviet
ends. The objectives compete with and
probably override Castro's desire for
better relations with the US. The Cubans
are not prepared to sacrifice their
revolutionary world role in the interests of
rapprochement with the US.
The Cubans' focus of activity will con-
tinue to be Africa, although there are
longer-term prospects for an expanded
Cuban presence in the Caribbean. Cuba is
not likely to repeat the folly of the 1960s,
when it backed revolutionary groups
throughout Latin America, but it will con-
tinue to provide limited support to
selected guerrillas.
11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
providing assistance to meet some of their
basic economic and political and, in some
cases, military needs. In Africa, for exam-
ple, Cuba had diplomatic relations with
only 7 countries in 1971. Now it has for-
mal ties with 34 African nations and em-
bassies in 19 African capitals.
The Castro regime-like the
Soviet-tries to convince its Third World
allies that the US is their principal enemy.
In Guyana and Jamaica, the Cubans feed
the fears of local leaders that the US is
attempting to "destabilize" the
pro-Cuban governments there. In Africa,
they try to link the US to racial dis-
crimination, to white supremacy in
Rhodesia and South Africa, and to the
colonial powers that are blamed for all of
Africa's ills. In the Arab world, they
emphasize the US-Israeli relationship and
US military support of Israeli
"aggression" against neighboring Arab
states. Throughout the world, they
resurrect sensitive memories of real or im-
agined US intervention-economic,
political, and military.
The Cubans are so closely wedded to a
policy of hostility toward the US that they
cannot afford to have any normalization
of relations with the US undercut their
"anti-imperialist" reputation. Castro
drew sharp criticism from former
guerrilla allies in the late 1960s and early
1970s for his alleged abandonment of the
"armed-struggle" line. He is not likely to
incur similar criticism simply for the sake
of better ties with Washington.
Winning Allies
The Cubans tailor their assistance to
local needs. To political leaders whose
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positions are either in fact or imagination
threatened by assassination or coup, the
Cubars may offer VIP security. This
ranges from technical advice to providing
an all-Cuban bodyguard detachment,
such as the one in Congo that prevented
the overthrow of president Massamba-
Debat during an army revolt in June
1966.
To government chiefs who lack a broad
popular base and must depend largely on
armed might to rule-in Somalia and
South Yemen, for example-the Cubans
offer assistance in developing mass
organizations to marshal popular support.
For other political leaders, mass
organizations are needed as a
counterweight to the military establish-
ment. In countries like Jamaica and
Guyana where traditionalist security
forces express allegiance not to any in-
dividual but to a constitution or other
legal formula, the Cubans offer to
organize and train a "people's militia"
that is more responsive to political
manipulation.
To the ex-guerrilla leader who suddenly
finds himself a chief of state upon the
withdrawal of a colonial power, the
Cubans offer assistance in transforming a
guerrilla army into a professional military
establishment capable of internal police
functions, as well as national defense.
This is being done now in Angola and
Mozambique, with the USSR supplying
the hardware.
If none of these methods of assistance is
appropriate, the Cubans offer a variety of
technological aid that virtually all
developing countries find useful-public
health, public works, agriculture, forestry,
fishing, education, livestock raising,
transportation, and communications.
The Cubans have medical teams
operating in 13 countries and provide
almost all of the public health services
now available in Angola. Cuban military
missions are in nine countries, and Cuban
construction brigades are in at least five.
At times, natural disasters make new op-
portunities, and the Cubans are quick to
take ad iantage of them. Havana sent
earthquake relief to Peru in 1970 and to
Nicaragua-despite acute political
differences-in 1972 and flew in medical
teams and supplies to Honduras after a
hurricane and flood in 1974.
The junior high schools built by Cuban
construction teams in Jamaica and Tan-
zania are modeled after the "schools in
the countryside" in Cuba. The basic unit
consists of a self-contained complex of
buildings sufficient to house, feed, and
educate 500 boarding-school students,
and with enough land to raise vegetables
for their own consumption.
The eightfold increase in production of
the Cuban fishing industry since Castro
assumed power makes fishing technology
another area of expertise to share with
allies. Cuba has had fishing aid
agreements with Peru, Chile (under the
Allende administration), Guyana,
Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Angola,
Mozambique, South Yemen, and possibly
ii , Diplomatic relations with Cuba
Estimated Cuban presence
(non-diplomatic)
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 Fidel Castro with Tanzanian First Vice President Jumbe during recent African tour
Cape Verde. The Cubans generally agree
to train local youths in fishing techniques
in return for a percentage of the catch.
Soviet-Cuban Cooperation
The Cubans have worked closely with
the Soviets on several. occasions where the
Cubans were already inclined to help but
unable to do so for financial or logistic
reasons. The sending of a Cuban armored
battalion, medical brigade, and con-
tingent of pilots to Syria after the out-
break of the Arab-Israeli war in
September 1973 was clearly a joint
Cuban-Soviet effort. Similarly, most
Cubans who were sent to Angola went
without heavy equipment and depended
on supplies from the USSR for outfitting
their units. Castro's recent peacemaking
efforts in the Horn of Africa were almost
certainly undertaken on behalf of the
USSR.
In most of its foreign assistance
programs, however, Cuba is acting as its
own boss, is involved as a result of its own
initiative, and is pursuing its own policy
goals. In no case is Cuba providing
assistance against its will. Although its
isolation and fear of the US have been the
primary force behind Havana's desire to
expand international contacts, Cuba is
also seeking an avenue by which it can in-
crease its influence with Moscow. By
achieving a position of leadership in the
Third World, the Castro regime creates
new options and increases its flexibility in
dealing with the Soviets.
Outlook
A continued increase in Cuban efforts
to reach out around the world over the
next 18 months seems certain, particular-
ly as Castro prepares for the next non-
aligned summit scheduled for Havana in
1979. This will be the most promising op-
portunity Castro has had to assume the
leadership of the Third World since 1966,
when the Tricontinental Conference was
held in Havana.
In the coming months, Cuba is likely to
expand its assistance to include a number
of countries where Cuban aid missions are
not now present. Castro's trip to Algeria,
Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia,
Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola last
month is strong evidence that he intends
to concentrate on Africa. His zest for per-
sonal diplomacy is bound to carry him
again to that continent to consolidate his
political gains prior to the nonaligned
summit in 1979. He gets tremendous per-
sonal satisfaction from his sojourns
abroad and regards his travels as a source
of great prestige for Cuba and for his
regime.
Castro wants to be in a position to call
in his political IOUs, so that if he
becomes the spokesman for the non-
aligned movement in the 1979 to 1981
period he will have behind him not
just the weight of Cuba but a sig-
nificant part of the Third World as
well. If his plans should be threat-
ened by his relationship with the
US, then the normalization process-
not his drive to expand Cuba's in-
fluence-will suffer
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South Africa and its satellite, Namibia, hope to increase
sales r f uranium concentrate and enriched fuel in the next
decade New mines are to be put into production, and plant
capacity for processing concentrate is being expanded.
South Africa: Growing Uranium Supplier
South Africa-now the third largest
uranium producer in the West with 12
percent of output-plans to become a
major supplier of enriched nuclear fuel by
1986. Neighboring Namibia, a disputed
territory that South Africa has ad-
ministered since World War I, will rank
as a major supplier of uranium concen-
trate in the 1980s; it has about 5 percent
of the West's proved reserves.
At present, the South African uranium
industry is concentrated in the Transvaal
and Orange Free State gold fields. All the
uranium produced is leached from gold
mine tailings. Four large firms produce
almost half of South Africa's output.
South Africa hopes to increase uranium
sales during the coming decade and in-
tends to export most of the product as
enriched fuel. To boost output, South
Africa will have to develop new mines that
Cranium
0epo.'m1,: ?Karibib
are devoted primarily to uranium produc-
tion. Geological studies indicate that
reserves are probably adequate to support
higher output.
Deposits located in a geological forma-
tion running hundreds of kilometers south
of the Free State gold fields could double
the current reserves of 350,000 tons of
uranium metal recoverable at $30 per
pound or less. Ore grade will probably be
low, but the deposits can be mined
profitably by large-scale operations.
Concentration-plant capacity must also
be increased if South Africa is to meet its
sales target. The International Atomic
Energy Agency has already indicated that
South Africa can boost processing from
the present 2,600 tons of uranium metal
concentrate per year to 13,000 tons by
1985.
In order to export more valuable
enriched fuel, South Africa expects to
14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
complete by 1986 an enrichment facility
that could handle most of its uranium out-
put. The government will build an enrich-
ment plant that may eventually have a
capacity to handle about 7,000 tons of
concentrate at full capacity. The plant is
still in the design stage, and some
technical problems with the unique
enrichment process have yet to be worked
out.
South Africa, however, could have dif-
ficulties in finding uranium buyers. Since
the late 1960s, when the US ceased buying
for its strategic stockpile, South African
exporters have not been able to market all
their output. About 5 percent of process-
ing capacity is now idle, and the Nuclear
Fuels Corporation-the private, jointly
owned marketing organization-has been
forced to stockpile 25 percent of output.
Large European enrichment facilities
will be offering stiff competition by 1985.
the South African government is already
considering holding down the capacity of
its enrichment facility. The mining firms
could decide to import Namibian
:cranium that they are developing rather
than expand domestic mine capacity.
Namibia, which South Africa is nur-
turing into carefully controlled indepen-
dent status, is also sure to become a major
exporter of uranium. The deposits west of
Karibib hold between 100,000 and
200,000 tons of uranium metal, and South
African business interests are intent on
maintaining control of these valuable
resources. The Namibian uranium in-
dustry is dominated by large South
African conglomerates together with a
British firm. Current output is low
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because facilities are not complete, and
exploitation of the huge Rossing
deposit-perhaps the world's largest-has
just begun. South African companies,
however, are already building the world's
largest concentrating plant to handle
40,000 tons of ore daily. The uranium
concentrate yield from this plant could
be 5,000 tons annually. It may take a dec-
ade to reach full capacity, and the pace
of development will depend on demand.
The moderates in the Arab world are hopeful that secret
agreements reached at the Taiz summit late last month will
reduce Soviet influence in the Red Sea region.
92
l Developments in the Red Sea Region
Politica
The presidents of Somalia, Sudan,
North Yemen, and South Yemen held an
unusual summit in Taiz in late March and
reached agreements that could undermine
Soviet influence in the Red Sea region.
The attendance of the leftist leaders of
Somalia and South Yemen was a rebuff
to the efforts of Cuban President Castro,
who had tried earlier in the month to
promote a Red Sea alliance of
"progressive" states-Somalia, South
Yemen, and Ethiopia. The overall summit
results are reportedly encouraging to
Arab moderates, led by Saudi Arabia.
A Sudanese diplomat who took part in
the conference at Taiz reports that the
four presidents agreed that:
? They would draw up a list of
development needs to present to
wealthy Arab states, principally Saudi
Arabia.
? The French Territory of the Afars
and Issas should become independent
and join the Arab League.
? North and South Yemen would
draw up lists of military equipment
needed to defend the Bab al-Mandab
Strait against attack; Saudi Arabia
should pay the bills.
? An enlarged conference on the
Red Sea, including all littoral states
except Israel and perhaps Ethiopia,
should be held in the near future.
These decisions encourage Saudi Ara-
bian hopes that South Yemen and
Somalia can be weaned away from their
close ties with the USSR. The agreements
represent multilateral support for the
bilateral efforts that the Saudis and other
Arab moderates have been pursuing for
more than a year.
The FTAI Question
One of the most troublesome issues in
the Red Sea region is the forthcoming in-
dependence of the FTAI from France,
now scheduled for late June. The Somalis
have long claimed the FTAI, but at Taiz,
Somali President Siad is reported to have
agreed to respect the independence of the
territory in return for an endorsement by
the other participants of Somalia's right
to establish close ties with the territory
following independence and perhaps more
substantial organic links within five years.
Sudanese President Numayri
represented Saudi interests at the Taiz
conference. His agreement to the
Somali-FTAI linkage indicates that he
and the Saudis are convinced that Siad
will move to reduce his ties with the
Soviets and align his foreign policy more
closely with the Arab moderates. The
prime motivation for the Saudis' past
hostility to Somali domination of the
FTAI has been their fear that this would
mean a further spread of Soviet and leftist
influence in the Horn of Africa.
President Siad began to review his ties
with the Soviets following Moscow's deci-
sion to provide Ethiopia-Somalia's bitter
enemy-with military aid. The moderate
Arabs view the increasing radicalism
in Ethiopia and its growing ties with
the USSR with as much concern as they
Apr 8, 77
15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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do Soviet influence in Somalia, and the
agreement in Taiz to an independent
FTAI, aligned with Somalia, was de-
vised at Ethiopia's expense.
Ethiopia, for its part, is strongly op-
posed to Somali dominance of the FTAI
and objects to what it sees as an effort to
mak a the Red Sea an "Arab Lake." Evi-
dence of increased Arab-Somali coopera-
tion and the summit's recommendation
that an independent FTAI join the
Arab League will reinforce Ethiopian
apprehensions.
Membership of an independent FTAI
in tte Arab League would confer added
legitimacy to the new government of the
territory following independence and
wouli reinforce its Arab character. The
Arab League could also serve as a channel
through which friendly Arab countries
could funnel economic and military aid.
Arab support for the FTAI could also
cause strains in Arab-Somali relations-if
FTAI leaders who are now cooperating
with Somalia try to maintain the
territory's independence. The more Arab
aid they receive, the stronger their ability
to resist Somali dominance will become.
Eritrean Insurgency
There was no agreement at the meeting,
according to the Sudanese source, on aid
to the Eritrean insurgents who are
fighting for secession from Ethiopia.
South Yemen shares some ideological af-
finity with Ethiopia and would not agree
to support the possible dismemberment of
a fellow "progressive" state. Sudan,
Somalia, and North Yemen-all for
different reasons and to different
degrees-support the Eritrean rebels.
16 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Although there was agreement at the
meeting on the need for a larger con-
ference of Red Sea states, it is unlikely to
be held in the near future. The Arab states
have made it clear that the present Ethio-
pian regime will not be invited.
Saudi Role
Saudi Arabia is clearly leading the
drive to encourage South Yemen and
Somalia to reduce their ties with the
USSR and is using economic aid as
leverage. Numayri, who undertook the
role at Taiz of Arab middleman, wants to
maximize Saudi aid for his own country
and shares Saudi apprehensions of the
Soviet presence in the area. He has long
suspected that the USSR was supporting
Sudanese dissidents in exile.
The Saudis are optimistic that their
policy of weaning South Yemen from its
Soviet connection will be successful. They
are already giving South Yemen
economic assistance, and the Taiz
decisions indicate they are willing to
finance South Yemeni military
purchases-presumably from the
West-as they are already doing for
North Yemen. A new Saudi ambassador
arrived in Aden on March 28, completing
the establishment of diplomatic relations,
and the two countries are also exchanging
high-level official visits.
The Saudis are having limited success
exploiting Somali unhappiness with the
Soviets. Foreign Minister Saud visited
Mogadiscio this week, ostensibly to in-
augurate a Saudi-financed mosque, but in
reality to pursue the opening to Siad
forged by Numayri at the Taiz conference.
Saud is prepared to offer Somalia sub-
stantial financial assistance. The Soviet
presence in Somalia, however, is so exten-
sive and the Somalis so dependent on
Soviet military equipment and on Soviet
advisers, both civilian and military, that
any inroads will be slow. Siad is still com-
mitted to domestic policies that are more
ideologically compatible with the Soviets
than the moderate Arabs. The Saudis will
have to be sensitive to these con-
siderations if they are to take full advan-
tage of the Somalis' dissatisfaction with
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Secret
Secret
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