WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011500170001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 29, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
DOE review completed.
DIA review
completed.
Secret
CG WS 77-017
April 29, 1977
Copy
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CONTENTS
1 Africa
Ethiopia-US; France-FTAI;
Zaire; France-Africa;
Mozambique - South Africa
4 Middle East
USSR-Syria; USSR-Israel;
Lebanon; Arab States
6 Asia
Pakistan; Bangladesh
8 Eastern Europe: The Dissident Movement
10 France: Fast-Breeder Reactor Program
12 Spain: Moving Toward Democracy
15 The Concorde: New York Landing Issue
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Ethiopia's leftist military government
turned decisively away from the country's
longstanding close relationship with the
US on April 23 by abruptly ending the
American military presence and expel-
ling some US civilian officials as well.
The move capped several months of in-
creasing denunciations or the US and in-
dications that the Ethiopians were shift-
ing to communist countries as their prin-
cipal foreign patrons.
The affected US personnel were serving
with the military assistance program, the
Kagnew communications station at
Asmara in Eritrea Province, the United
States Information Service, and a naval
medical research unit-all of which were
ordered closed. Early this week, the
Ethiopians ordered the closure of the US
and other Western consulates in Asmara.
The four-day deadline initially given the
affected Americans to leave the country
was later extended to April 30.
In the public statement announcing its
action, the Ethiopian regime made clear
its annoyance with the recent US decision
to halt all grant military assistance to
Ethiopia, along with some other coun-
tries, because of alleged human rights
violations.
The Ethiopians have had some success
in recent months in gaining
military-assistance commitments from
communist countries, and Mengistu is
surely hoping that his military break with
the US will lead to more. The Ethiopian
leader plans to visit Moscow next month
and can be expected to press the Soviets to
provide military support beyond the
package of small arms and defensive
weapons they sold to Ethiopia in
December and the armored personnel
carriers and old tanks they shipped there
last month. Moscow will probably try to
oblige Mengistu with something more but
may be limited by the certainty of further
adverse reaction from Somalia, where the
USSR's major regional interests continue
to be centered.
So far, however, none of the communist
countries has agreed to provide Ethiopia
with adequate alternatives to the large
and relatively sophisticated items it ob-
Ethiopian leader Mengistu
Most of France's military forces based
in the French Territory of the Afars and
Issas may remain there after the colony in
East Africa receives its independence this
summer. A senior French military officer
recently told the US defense attache in
Paris that the French Defense Ministry
expects to keep as many as 4,500 men of
the 6,000-man force in the country at least
until the fall, and possibly for an in-
definite period thereafter.
French planning calls for most ground
forces to stay on, including a light ar-
mored unit, a foreign legion battalion,
and an artillery detachment. The air force
will keep its squadron of F-100 jet fighters
as well as helicopters and several military
transport aircraft at Djibouti airfield.
The French believe their continued
presence in the territory will provide
stability to the area during the transition
period and in the critical months im-
mediately after independence. There are
unconfirmed reports that the French may
have temporarily reinforced their security
forces in Djibouti as a precaution against
violence during next month's election.
A formal agreement must be worked
out with the leaders of the territory to
determine how long French forces will
stay. These forces are already training the
new state's security forces and, if asked,
will be available to help defend against
foreign attack.
Some 500 native troops now serving in
French units will be released from service
and encouraged to join the new national
defense force. Officer candidates are
already being trained in France. Present
planning calls for a security force,
primarily composed of police and
paramilitary units, that will number about
3,000 men.
The senior French officer provided no
details on French plans for the naval
facility at Djibouti, the only remaining
French naval base on the Indian Ocean.
In the past, France has maintained a
sizable naval contingent there, including
major warships, but a number of recent
reports indicate the navy plans to reduce
significantly its use of these facilities
TRENCH TERRITORY OF THE
AFARS AND IS$A
Dj~b~ufl
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DiloIo
President Mobutu's prospects for
riding out the trouble in Shaba brightened
further during the past week as Zairian
troops and their Moroccan allies made
progress in reestablishing the
government's authority in areas that had
been occupied by the Katangan invaders.
On April 25, government forces that
had begun to advance westward from the
Kolwezi area last week recaptured the
town of Mutshatsha; they have since
moved farther west. The Katangans are
offerir.g little resistance, and government
forces are being slowed primarily by mud-
dy roads, damaged bridges, and mines
placed by the invaders. If the Katangans
continue to abandon their positions,
Zairiai and Moroccan troops could in a
matter of days be in Dilolo, the town near
the Angolan border through which many
of the Katangans moved into Shaba.
It is still too early to determine whether
the invaders are scattering into the coun-
tryside to maintain a low-level insurgen-
cy-they are essentially guerrilla
forces--or pulling back toward Angola.
They may be prepared to avoid contact
until after the Moroccans depart.
Mobutu this week also received some
good news concerning hell) for his coun-
try's serious financial problems. On April
26, the International Monetary Fund ap-
proved a standby agreement with Zaire,
making the country eligible for $84
million in loans over the next year provid-
ed the government can meet strict ceilings
on expenditures, credit expansion, and
foreign borrowing.
Even with the IMF and other loans,
Zaire will have to seek additional foreign
assistance and debt relief The crisis in
Shaba has set back the government's
economic recovery program by forcing
the diversion of equipment and resources,
especially transport equipment and fuel,
from the civilian sector to the army.
Whatever the outcome of the current
situation in Shaba, it is clear that Mobutu
faces widespread disaffection in that
region-and probably in other parts of the
country as well. According to a recent
report from the US consulate in Lubum-
bashi, many members of the nongovern-
ment elite in Shaba believe the real crisis
in the country is not the recent invasion
but Zaire's economic and political
deterioration under Mobutu. Members of
this elite, in private comments, have ex-
pressed varying degrees of support for the
Katangans as an anti-Mobutu force and
see little hope for improvement in Zaire as
long as Mobutu remains in charge.
French President Giscard and heads of
state or other representatives of 19
African countries, most of which are ruled
by moderate regimes, met for two days
last week in Dakar, Senegal. Those
African leaders in attendance who have
become fearful of growing Soviet in-
fluence on the continent appear to have
been reassured that France and other
West European states will help protect
them.
It was the fourth such French-African
summit; the meetings were begun by
President Pompidou in 1973 as a means of
Zaire
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Mutshatsha Zambia
+Kolwezi
Lubumbashi.
preserving and, where possible, expanding
French influence in black Africa. The
Dakar meeting-the second summit to be
held in Africa-was attended by
spokesmen for 10 former French
territories and the soon-to-be-independent
French Territory of the Afars and Issas
and 8 former dependencies of Belgium,
Portugal, and the UK.
Although the formal sessions at Dakar
followed a noncontroversial agenda of
economic and developmental topics,
African leaders' concerns over events in
Zaire-and to a lesser extent in the Horn
and in southern Africa-permeated cor-
ridor discussions. Pro-Western leaders
such as Ivory Coast President
Houphouet-Boigny and Senegalese Presi-
dent Senghor see the Katangan thrust into
Zaire as the latestexample of Soviet ex-
pansionism in Africa. Their worry about
their inability to resist has been mounting
since the Angolan war, which they saw as
a Soviet victory over the West.
The pro-Western states were heartened
by the French decision to provide direct
assistance to Zaire, seeing the decision as
welcome evidence that they, too, could
count on France if directly threatened.
The moderate Africans were probably
further encouraged by Giscard's
statements in Dakar that:
? Every African country has a right
to security within its frontiers, no
matter what its political choice.
? Defense agreements between
France and certain moderate African
countries would apply fully if the
security of the African states shouldbe
threatened.
? France would back any African
initiative aimed at continental arms
limitation, an apparent reference to
French concern over an arms race
between moderate and radical
French-speaking states.
Giscard also indicated that he would
raise the question of African security and
development at international meetings,
beginning with the economic summit of
seven industrial powers to be held in Lon-
don early next month.
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MOZAMBIQUE-
E SOUTH AFRICA
Conditions in the Mozambican port of
Maputo are deteriorating rapidly despite
vigorous efforts by South Africa to keep
cargo moving. The South Africans still
depend on Maputo for handling a portion
of their foreign trade.
Shipping agents are now predicting that
none of their companies will use Maputo,
one of Africa's largest ports, by the end of
1977. The port still earns an estimated $40
million annually in foreign exchange for
Mozambique; loss of this revenue would
be a severe setback For the country's
already deteriorating economy.
Equipment in the port works only
sporadically, particularly in the important
ore-handling area. Rail facilities are
broken down and, as a result, ore-loading
operations are haphazard. Ships sched-
uled to carry chrome ore are leaving the
port empty; others are !loading at general
cargo docks. Harassment has made
foreigners reluctant to work in Maputo,
and some freight forwarders have closed
their offices there.
The South Africans are disturbed.
'PRETORIA`.
annes4urg.,.....
John
Although the volume of South African
goods transiting Maputo is now less than
half the amount that passed through the
port in 1975, Maputo at present remains
the closest and best-equipped port to serve
South Africa's industrial heartland. It is
particularly important for the export of
chrome ore from the nearby mines of the
eastern Transvaal. South African ports,
now the main gateways for Rhodesian
traffic and important outlets for Zaire's
copper exports, would be hard pressed to
handle the additional volume that would
result from closing Maputo.
South African Railways, in attempting
to keep the port operating, has supplied
technicians and engineers for maintaining
traffic between Maputo and the South
African border, South Africa has agreed
to make repairs on 19 damaged
locomotives-almost the entire number in
Mozambique's system-and provide 4 ad-
ditional locomotives.
The rapid improvement and growth of
South Africa's own facilities ensure a
gradual lessening of dependence on
Maputo. Ore-loading equipment com-
parable to that in Maputo has been
installed in Durban, and some 400,000
tons of chrome ore reportedly are
being diverted to the South African
port.
New container facilities will begin
operation after July at Durban, Port
Elizabeth, and Cape Town. Richards Bay,
the area's biggest port-development
project, will provide another alterna-
P/C
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USSR-SYRIA
Syria and the USSR apparently re-
solved some of their differences during
Syrian President Asad's five-day visit to
the Soviet Union last week. Relations
between the two countries became
strained last year because of disagree-
ment over Syria's intervention in Lebanon.
On the eve of Asad's visit, the Soviets
apparently delivered several MIG-21 jet
fighters to Syria under existing arms
agreements. This was the first delivery of
a majo ? armament in 1977 and the first
delivery of aircraft in 10 months. After
the 1973 Middle East war, Syria became
the USSR's primary arms customer
among Arab countries. Deliveries in 1976
totaled $290 million and consisted mostly
of sophisticated weapons ordered under
an October 1975 accord.
The visit communique issued on April
22 stated that the two sides had con-
sidered "steps for further raising the
level c f Syrian defenses and called for
"further deepening" bilateral economic
and technical cooperation. These phrases
suggest that the Soviets agreed to supply
Syria with additional arms and economic
assistance. Soviet participants in the
talks, in addition to the top leaders, in-
cluded Marshal Ogarkov, chief of the
General Staff, and foreign aid specialist
Skachkov.
The communique also included a state-
ment that the Palestine Liberation
Organization must be at any reconvened
Middle East peace conference in Geneva
"from the very beginning and on an equal
footing." This language contrasts with
what had appeared to be a recent Soviet
shift away from insistence on Palestinian
representation at the outset; it reflects the
Syrian position.
Asad, in going to Moscow at this time,
clearly wanted to ensure that Syria's
relations with the USSR were patched up
before his talks with President Carter in
Geneva in May. Soviet leaders, for their
part, were anxious to reverse the recent
trend toward cooler bilateral relations in
order to assure Syrian support for greater
Soviet involvement in the peace talks.
Both sides seem satisfied with the out-
come.
Syrian media gave the trip heavy
coverage, stressing the "strategic" nature
of Syrian-Soviet relations and, by exten-
sion, Soviet recognition of the "key" role
Syria plays in Middle East peace
negotiations. The Syrians replayed por-
tions of General Secretary Brezhnev's
banquet remarks, including his statement
that Israel, as well as the Palestinian peo-
ple, has a right to an "independent state
USSR-ISRAEL
The Soviets have taken two unusual
steps to stimulate Israeli hopes that the
USSR will take a more balanced ap-
proach to sensitive Arab-Israeli issues.
The moves appear to be aimed at im-
proving the Soviets' chances of being
accepted as intermediaries in the Middle
East.
Late last week, Soviet military officers
with the UN peacekeeping force in Egypt
entered Israel to visit UN offices in
Jerusalem for the first time since the 1967
Middie East war. The Soviet officers
refused to meet with their Israeli counter-
parts, but the visit could lead to such con-
tacts.
oviets have long been interested in
low-level, unofficial contacts with Israel
that would not impact on their relations
with the Arabs. The Israelis, however,
have been leery of any steps short of
restoring full diplomatic relations.
These initiatives follow General
Secretary Brezhnev's apparent bow to
Israeli sensitivities in remarks on the Mid-
dle East to the Soviet trade union con-
gress last month. Brezhnev did not men-
tion the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion and did not attack Israel. Some
Israeli officials were pleased that
Brezhnev had spoken only of
"preliminary" Soviet ideas that Moscow
was "not imposing on anyone." His
remarks were calculated to suggest that
the Soviets could play a constructive role
in future Middle East settlement talks.
The Soviets do not appear to be ready
to agree to an early restoration of
diplomatic relations with Israel. Victor
Louis, the unofficial Soviet spokesman,
has privately observed that an Israeli
presence in Moscow would become a
focal point for dissidence and
demonstrations and would assume a
special role with regard to Soviet and
world Jewry. Louis added that the present
level of contacts offers advantages to both
sides.
Thus far, the Israelis have shown no
sign of being persuaded that the Soviets
have changed their pro-Arab policy. The
Israelis will probably not discourage such
Soviet approaches, however. They
presumably believe that any contacts on
their part with Moscow could complicate
Soviet-Arab relations by spreading
distrust among the Arabs concerning the
degree and duration of Soviet support.
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4 t,
Cooperation between Syria and the
mainstream Fatah Palestinian
group-evident recently in southern
Lebanon, where the two parties combined
to check an Israeli-backed military drive
by Christian rightists--was demonstrated
in Beirut this week. Syrian and Fatah
forces worked in close partnership to
secure an area of the city where heavy
fighting had occurred over the weekend
between Syrian troops and Palestinian ex-
tremists.
The fighting had been sparked by the
killing of two Syrian soldiers, which
prompted Syrian peacekeeping forces to
move to clear Palestinian extremists and
Lebanese leftists from the area around
two refugee camps on the outskirts of
Beirut. Firing was heavy at times-the
Syrians using tanks and artillery fire
against Palestinian antitank rocket
launchers and heavy machine guns-and
casualties were heavy, particularly among
civilians caught in the crossfire. After a
cease-fire took effect on April 25, Fatah
forces assisted in patrolling the streets
of the area while the Syrians concen-
trated on a house-to-house search for
weapons.
The Syrian-Fatah cooperation may in-
clude an agreement to move against rad-
ical Palestinian groups in Lebanon in
order to tighten control over rejectionist
fedayeen commandos operatin in both
Beirut and southern Lebanon
ARAB STATES
Finance ministers and central
from 20 Arab countries and the Palestine
Liberation Organization formally es-
tablished the Arab Monetary Fund last
week. The new fund is the first regional
version of the International Monetary
Fund and is intended to complement the
facilities of the IMF.
The agreement on the creation of the
Arab fund, which will operate from Abu
Dhabi, was reached a year ago, but only
recently have a sufficient number of states
ratified it. It will help member states over-
come balance-of-payments deficits,
stabilize Arab exchange rates, facilitate
development of Arab financial markets,
and work toward the eventual unification
of Arab currencies. The fund is initially
capitalized at $900 million, mostly in con-
vertible currencies and, like the IMF, will
offer short- and medium-term facilities at
nominal interest or service charges.
The heaviest claimants on the fund's
resources are likely to be its 13 non-
OPEC members, all of which have
balance-of-payments problems. By add-
ing the facilities of the Arab fund to
those of the IMF, short- and
medium-term funds available for these 13
countries will nearly double in the
aggregate. This excludes IMF compen-
satory financing for export shortfalls of
basic raw materials.
Credit offered to Arab countries by the
Arab Monetary Fund is likely to be made
available with much less stringent
domestic policy conditions than those
demanded by the IMF. Many Arab and
other debtor countries have found IMF
terms objectionable.
The seven OPEC countries that are
members of the Arab fund will, as a bloc,
have voting control. Conservative states
such as Saudi Arabia and radical states
such as Libya, however, probably will be
unable to reach agreement on conditions
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received large amounts of long-term sup-
port or project assistance from the oil-rich
Arab states. In 1976, Arab OPEC
members transferred more than $2.5
billion in bilateral economic aid to non-
OPEC Arab countries. Small additional
amounts were administered by the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Develop-
ment, an Arab League multilateral aid
agency.
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PAKISTAN
Pakistan's beleaguered Prime Minister
Bhutto this week appeared to be moving
closer to an agreement with the opposi-
tion after nearly seven weeks of
demonstrations against him.
Earl} in the week, Bhutto brought to
Islamabad many of the jailed senior
leaders of the nine-party opposition
alliance and apparently offered to give in
to most of their demands. Other opposi-
tion leaders have now joined them and are
studying Bhutto's proposals carefully.
One opposition leader told the press that
the Prime Minister's latest offer deserves
consideration. In the past, the opposition
has rejected Bhutto's proposals quickly.
The opposition may be more willing to
compromise because of new indications of
military support for the Prime Minister.
The opposition has based its campaign on
the assumption that eventually the army
will intervene to remove Bhutto.
Bhutto bought time for the latest
negotiations by imposing martial law on
April 22 in Pakistan's three larg-
est cities-Karachi, Lahore, and Hyder-
abad.
There were clear indications by
midweek that Bhutto's efforts to firm up
military support for his government had
met with some success. On April 27, the
chairman of the joint chiefs and the three
service commanders issued a statement in
support of the present government, and
former army commander Tikka Khan
accepted the post of minister of state for
defense. Tikka has wide influence in the
officer corps.
With the opposition considering Bhut-
to's latest offer and with martial law and
BANGLADESH
General Zia ur-Rahman, military
leader of Bangladesh, took several
steps last week to give his authority more
of a civilian cast and to start the process
of returning the country to some meas-
ure of parliamentary rule. Zia has been
ruling the country under a martial
law administration since he took
power in November 1975 after a mili-
tary coup.
On April 21, Zia took for himself the ti-
tle of president, apparently dismissing
President Sayem, whose resignation was
publicly attributed to "ill health." The
next day, Zia announced that a referen-
dum will be held on May 30 to determine
his acceptability as head of state. He also
scheduled local and municipal elections
for August and a national election for
December 1978.
Zia is likely to carry the referendum; he
has been a moderately successful leader
and appears to be popular with both the
military and civilians. His crackdown on
corruption, smuggling, and inefficiency in
government-has-been well received.
Under Zia, Bangladesh has enjoyed a
degree of stability and prosperity un-
known since the nation's independence in
1971. He has brought the restive army un-
curfews still in effect, Pakistan has been
relatively calm this week, following
clashes on April 22 that were the most
violent so far in the opposition's cam-
paign. The recently imposed censorship of
news dealing with the opposition may also
have contributed to the absence of
large-scale demonstrations.
Failure of Bhutto's present effort could
well bring the reluctant military closer to
intervention. Bhutto probably has now
offered all the concessions he intends to,
and should his opponents continue to hold
out for his immediate resignation, further
negotiations might be seen by all
pointless 7
der control, placing trusted colleagues in
key command positions and personally
defusing several incipient crises. He has
appealed to Bangladeshi nationalism by
standing up to India in various bilateral
disputes.
If Zia is approved, he could claim that
the vote legitimizes his rule and proceed
to abolish the martial law administration.
If he plans to seek elected national office
in the 1978 election, he will need to form
his own political party or win the support
of one of the established parties. The
release of over 700 political prisoners on
April 22, including some influential
politicians, may be intended to improve
Zia's chances of winning support within
existing parties.
Zia must retain the support of the
armed forces to remain in power. For
this reason, he will probably keep, for the
present, his position as army chief of staff.
Zia's assumption of the presidency may
have irked some within the military.
Should he now disband the martial law
administration, leaders of the air force
and navy-who hold some power as dep-
uty martial law administrators-could
become disaffected with Zia's rule. Both
services are small, however; the real
power remains with the army- F
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COLOMBIA
Colombia is facing a number of
political and economic problems that are
likely to cause difficulties for President
Lopez during the remaining 16 months of
his term. The problems have eroded some
of the broad support Lopez enjoyed upon
taking office and have even spawned
rumors of a military coup, but there is no
evidence of a serious threat to the govern-
ment.
Since he came to power in 1974, Lopez
has been determined to redistribute
wealth and reduce the country's high in-
flation. By employing politically risky
measures, such as increasing taxes and
curtailing government borrowing, he
reduced inflation in 1975, but at the same
time he slowed the economic growth rate
to its lowest point in 10 years.
Last year, the influx of large foreign-ex-
change earnings from windfall coffee
prices and illegal narcotics exports helped
to boost the growth rate, but the expan-
sion of aggregate demand rekindled infla-
tion. Real wages continue to diminish,
and unemployment remains high as a
result of the anti-inflation program. The
announcement last month of only a
14.1-percent cost-of-living increase
in wages brought forth renewed threats of
union protests.
Colombia's leftist-influenced labor un-
ions, reacting to the failure of the
President's anti-inflation program, have
encouraged strikes in both the public and
private sectors over the past two years.
Lopez, despite his libertarian concepts,
called out the army to quell the distur-
bances, curtailed some civil liberties, and,
on two occasions, imposed a nationwide
state of siege.
Scandals concerning alleged im-
proprieties on the part of Lopez' sons
have further clouded the political scene
and have focused some of the criticism on
the President himself. Many former
Lopez supporters believe he has failed to
accomplish the goals to which he has
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assigned high priority, and some military 25X6
leaders have been disillusioned by his in-
ability to maintain public order and to
achieve economic stability. Most Colom-
bians, however, retain a strong attach-
ment to their country's democratic in-
stitutions.
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Open manifestations of unrest and dissidence in Eastern
Europe have waned somewhat in recent weeks, but the basic
problems remain.
Eastern Europe: The Dissident Movement
The dissident movement throughout
Eastern Europe varies in intensity from
country to country, but it arises from
similar causes. In Poland it is rooted in
economic problems and is by far the most
volatile; in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, it is essentially still an in-
tellectual movement and nonviolent; in
Romania and Yugoslavia it is small and
disorganized.
The underlying causes of unrest and
dissidence have remained essentially un-
changed for almost 30 years:
? To varying degrees, all regimes in
Eastern Europe are repressive and do
not command the loyalty of the people.
? Ties to the USSR contradict
strong nationalist sentiment and the
emotional and cultural pull of the
West.
? [he economic performance of the
regimes is deficient.
There are new elements contributing to
the current problem in Eastern Europe.
Foremost among them is the Soviet policy
of detente, which has:
? Promoted and legitimized in-
creased interchanges with the West.
? Resulted in a series of agreements
reducing the isolation of the East
European people and raising expec-
tations of more to come.
? Fostered a political atmosphere
makin; it more difficult for the
regimes to deal with internal problems
in authoritarian ways.
? Increased the Soviet stake in
order and stability in Eastern Europe
even as it has brought increased
destabilizing pressures from the West.
The flowering of Eurocommunism in
Western Europe is another new and
troublesome problem for the East Euro-
pean regimes and the USSR-not only
because its leading proponents give verbal
aid and comfort to East European and
Soviet dissidents but, more importantly,
because it appeals to the ranks of ruling
parties in Eastern Europe. The Soviets
and East Europeans are also concerned
that President Carter's statements on
human rights will cause trouble for the
USSR in its own backyard.
Western broadcasts, notably those of
Radio Free Europe, have played a key
role in acquainting East European dis-
sidents, as well as the general population.
with the variety of dissident activities in
Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself.
Accordingly, Western media have been
under strong attack by all the communist
regimes.
Poland
The situation in Poland is by far the
most volatile in Eastern Europe. The pop-
ular mood has remained tense and sullen
since the outbreak of worker unrest last
summer, despite the regime's measures to
dissipate the discontent.
Dissatisfaction is rooted in economic
problems that the regime can neither solve
nor significantly ameliorate any time
soon. Popular discontent extends beyond
economic issues to fundamental questions
about the competence and legitimacy of
the entire system and its leaders.
Poland's intellectuals have established
the Workers Defense League, raised funds
for the families of workers jailed after the
8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
June riots, and are calling for an amnesty
and an investigation of police abuses. The
dissident intellectuals have given some
verbal support to the Czechoslovak dis-
sidents but are largely preoccupied with
their own problems and opportunities in
Poland.
The authorities, who beat a hasty
retreat before the workers' wrath last
summer, have handled the intellectuals
cautiously since autumn. The leadership is
acutely aware that it faces a volatile situa-
tion and that a confrontation must be
avoided.
The regime is trying to prevent the
growth of cooperation between the
workers and the dissident intellectuals,
and party chief Gierek has released some
imprisoned workers and declared a con-
ditional amnesty for others, even-as he has
refused to undertake the investigation that
the Workers Defense League hoped would
provide a focus for more fundamental
criticism.
East Germany
The disquiet in East Germany has not
manifested itself in violence or overt
hostile acts against the regime. The
temper in East Germany seems to be less
churlish than in Poland and far less
volatile. There is no evidence that the East
German dissidents are united.
The Honecker regime is greatly con-
cerned about the attraction of the West,
particularly West Germany, for the East
German population. Three out of every
four East German homes receive, and
presumably watch, West German televi-
sion. Millions of travelers from the West
enter East Germany every year. Against
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Zdenek Mlvnar of Czechoslovakia
this kind of "subversion," Honecker's
attempts to create a separate and distinct-
ly East German nationalism have
faltered.
The Helsinki accords have made life
more difficult for the regime. Acting un-
der its provisions, large numbers of East
Germans have applied for visas to
emigrate to the West. The government is
taking steps to discourage such
applications, and it is very doubtful that
many East Germans will be allowed to
leave, no matter what the pressures from
the West. Prominent dissident writer
Reiner Kunze was allowed to leave for
West Germany this month, but this was a
special case, and the regime will use it to
demonstrate that the government has a
positive attitude toward humanitarian
issues.
Some signs of increased worker
restiveness have appeared in complaints
about working conditions, wages, and
hours. Thus far, however, there is little
evidence that the regime feels itself under
great pressure from the workers. A
worsening of the economic situation, as in
other East European countries, could lead
to greater coordination on the part of the
various groups dissatisfied with govern-
ment policies.
Last fall, the regime had some trouble
with clergy in the Lutheran Church and
with a few outspoken dissident intellec-
tuals. In general, the regime's carrot-
and-stick tactics have been relatively
successful in keeping things quiet within
the intellectual community.
Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak dissidents have
taken center stage among East European
dissident intellectuals by their direct
challenge to regime practices regarding
civil rights, as outlined in a manifesto
prepared early last fall but not publicized
until January. The Charter 77 movement,
a mix of well-known oppositionists who
were politically active during the
short-lived "Prague Spring" in 1968 and a
surprisingly large number-more than
600-of other intellectuals and
technocrats, clearly has the authorities
worried.
One Czechoslovak diplomat abroad has
reported that his colleagues have been
nervous about what the Chartists say, par-
ticularly on ideological questions. One
reason the regime is concerned is that the
Chartists represent, in a figurative sense,
the large number of people-perhaps as
many as 500,000-who were purged or
resigned from the Communist Party after
the Soviet invasion in 1968 and whose
political and other rights remain severely
circumscribed.
As apostles of the effort to give
socialism a "human face," many of the
Chartists consider themselves forerunners
of the Eurocommunism of the 1970s. The
government has harassed the Chartists,
arresting several and placing others under
virtual house arrest, but has not initiated a
thoroughgoing crackdown.
The Charter 77 cause appears to have
lost much of its momentum during the
past month. One of the most prominent
dissidents-former party secretary
Zdenek Mlynar-reportedly has become
disheartened and is considering emigra-
tion. Just this week, a Czechoslovak court
upheld the "legality" of Mlynar's dis-
missal from his job in mid-January for
Chartist activity. Despite Mlynar's dis-
illusionment, however, there are in-
dications that some other dissidents may
try to dramatize their cause on the eve of
the Review Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe to be held in
Belgrade in June.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria
The small number of Romanian dis-
sidents have been deeply divided by per-
sonal feuds and different goals, but some
common ground has been found in
Charter 77. The dissidents consist mainly
of artists and intellectuals without
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national prestige. Novelist Paul Goma's
"o3en letter" in support of the Chartists,
his Romanian version of the Czech-
oslovak manifesto, and protests by Roma-
nia's small dissident Baptist commu-
nity are the only recent signs of vitality.
Goma's letter strongly criticized Presi-
dent Ceausescu's personal role and his
authoritarianism. In Romania, Goma
male clear, the problem is not the Soviets
but Ceausescu himself. This personal at-
tack may account for Ceausescu's vitriolic
spe(:ch blasting the dissidents.
Since late March, the Ceausescu
regime has taken a tougher line. A
number of dissidents are now openly
harassed, several have been assigned to
work in factories, and Goma himself
repc?rtedly is under arrest and may be
tried. The regime has also begun a cam-
paign against emigration.
Dissidence in Hungary has been muted
and has produced no signs of serious con-
cern from the regime. A small number of
intellectuals have publicly supported the
Czechoslovak Chartists, but thus far they
have not criticized cond;:tions in Hungary.
There is little active dissent in Bulgaria,
still Moscow's most dependable and
ideologically conformist ally.
Yugoslavia
Opposition to the political establish-
ment in Yugoslavia is unorganized and
factionalized but is worrisome to the Tito
regime. Employment of harsh measures
to suppress the opposition would make it
more difficult for the leadership to argue
that Yugoslavia is qualitatively
"different" from other communist states.
The regime's attitude toward dissent is
colored by its abiding concern about the
nationalities problem; all dissent is seen as
potentially destabilizing.
Although such well-known per-
sonalities as Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo
Mihajlov have long spoken out against
government policies and communist prac-
tices, the intellectuals and students now
criticizing passport policies and suppor-
ting the Czechoslovak Chartists are not
widely known to the general public.
The government has firmly warned dis-
sidents against further public accusations
that it is ignoring the human rights
provisions of the Helsinki accords.
Belgrade's immediate concern is to limit
adverse international publicity, as this
would seriously embarrass the regime as it
prepares to host the Review Conference.
It has circulated the word that there may
be an amnesty for such well-known dis-
senters as Mihajlov before the meeting as
a gesture of Yugoslavia's good intentions
on the human rights front and to blunt
criticism of its performance.
The French have a long-term commitment to a fast-
breeder reactor program, which they hope will reduce their
dependence on imported energy and technology.
France: Fast-Breeder Reactor Program
France is the world leader in fast-
breeder reactor development and is deter-
mined to increase that lead. The French
hope their breeder program will reduce
dependence on foreign energy sources and
provide the country with a major new ex-
port. Neither domestic nor international
pressures are likely to convince France
that the risks associated with the use of
fast-breeder reactors will outweigh those
benefits.
Believing that the growing use of
light-water reactors will overtax uranium
production and enrichment capacity by
the turn of the century, the French have
devoted 20 percent of their total energy
research and development expenditures
and 40 percent of their nuclear effort to
the fast-breeder program.
Paris expects breeder reactors to play
the key role during the second phase of a
long-term, three-stage energy program.
During the first phase, lasting until the
late 1980s, increased energy needs will be
met chiefly by a massive expansion of
WEEKLY SUMMARY
conventional nuclear power. Fast breeders
are to become the main power producers
at that point and remain the workhorse of
the energy program for perhaps several
decades, until controlled fusion or some
other source is available.
The targets are extremely ambitious; by
1990 the French hope to install as much as
10,000-megawatts of fast-breeder
generating capacity. The cost of building
fast-breeder reactors through the
mid-1980s is estimated to be 40 percent
greater than for pressurized-water reac-
tors. Paris is prepared to subsidize the
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construction of several fast-breeder power
stations, believing that low operating
costs will make them competitive with
pressurized-water reactors by the early
1990s.
Unlike light-water reactors, both fuel
fabrication and reprocessing operations
greatly influence the economics of a fast-
breeder system. The French are increasing
their capacity for producing fast-breeder
fuel and are planning an associated
reprocessing facility to be ready in the
early 1980s. Plutonium that is retrieved
from the breeder will be used to make new
breeder fuel. France probably will not
recycle plutonium in conventional reac-
tors to any significant extent before 1985.
Development Program
While the US has funded a broad
breeder research program exploring
several possible solutions to a single
problem, the French have taken a
narrower approach. The minimum
number of steps necessary to reach the
goal of building an economical breeder
reactor have been outlined and strictly
followed.
The showpiece of the program is the
Phenix power station, a. 250-megawatt
demonstration plant that operated for
more than two years with few major in-
terruptions, until late last year, when
problems developed in its heat ex-
changers. The equipment is being
modified, and the plant is likely to be in
operation again by this summer.
The French believe that the Phenix has
fulfilled its role in demonstrating that a
sodium-cooled fast-breeder power station
can function smoothly and safely and
compete with other types of power plants.
In fact, the Phenix has been the most
successful demonstration breeder reactor
to date.
The French are also moving ahead with
Super Phenix, a 1,200-megawatt power
station-funded in part by Italy and West
Germany-to be operational by 1982.
Super Phenix will have a number of
features significantly improved or
different from those of Phenix. The steam
generator, for example, is to be a new
large unit as opposed to the many small
modules used in Phenix.
Because of its unproven features and
because the French program has only a
small research base to draw on for
solutions to unexpected problems, com-
plications and delays in the Super Phenix
schedule are quite possible. French scien-
tists are nevertheless already beginning to
look ahead to the next step-an
1,800-megawatt fast breeder to be com-
pleted in the late 1980s-to be called
the Super Super Phenix.
French Goals
Paris plans to capitalize on its
leadership in the field and become a major
exporter of fast breeders, a logical exten-
sion of the current policy of actively
pushing exports of conventional reactors.
The strongest motivation behind the
fast-breeder program is France's per-
vasive desire to reduce its dependence on
other countries, particularly in the energy
field. France now imports more than three
quarters of its total energy needs. By
producing more fuel than they consume,
breeder reactors would make a welcome
contribution toward reducing this level of
dependence.
Almost as important to French policy
makers is the contribution that the fast
breeder can make to French technological
independence. Paris has always been un-
happy about the fact that its current
nuclear program relies heavily on US
technology.
Future of the Program
The fast-breeder program has not yet
evoked much domestic opposition. An-
tinuclear feeling has been slow to develop
in France; attention thus far has focused
on the conventional nuclear program.
Domestic opposition to the fast breeder
probably will intensify as the associated
risks become more widely assessed by the
press, but such opposition is not expected
to be sufficient to force a major cutback in
the ro ram.
PnG/)D Da
Apr 29, 77
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Although the post-Franco government continues to face
serious, potentially destabilizing problems, the political
liberalization program of King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister
Adolfo Suarez now has considerable momentum behind it,
enhancing the government's chances of getting through the dif-
Jicu,'t transition to a democratic system.
Spain: Moving Toward Democracy
The scheduled election this June of a
parliament with constituent powers will
be an important milestone in King Juan
Carps' effort to put Spain on the road to
political democracy. The new government
will have to surmount a host of political
and .-conomic obstacles, however.
Juan Carlos and his Prime Minister,
Adolfo Suarez, who visits Washington on
April 29, have proved to be a highly effec-
tive political team. The King, aiming to be
a co:stitutional monarch, remains above
the political fray in public, but intervenes
quietly when necessary to get support for
the political reform program, particularly
from the military. He seems to have given
Suarez wide latitude to act on his own, but
the two consult frequently, and the Prime
Minister probably clears major decisions
with the King.
Suarez, for his part, has provided much
of the toughness, dynamism, and political
skill behind the King's program. Suarez
recently passed a critical test when he
legalized the Spanish Communist Party, a
key demand of centrist and leftist leaders
whose cooperation is essential to the
success of the reform program. Many in
the military hierarchy disapproved of the
action, and although they have acquiesced
to avoid a political crisis, relations
between the government and the military
have been strained. The military is likely
to be wary of Suarez in the future.
The Coming Election
The chances are good that the elec-
tion-the first free vote in over 40 years in
Spain-will take place as scheduled on
June 15, and the government will try to
keep the contest fair and open. More than
100 parties are planning election
coalitions of the right, center, or left.
Many polls show an undecided vote of
around 20 percent, and the recent furor
over legalization of the Communist Party
may alarm some Spaniards and cause
them to vote for rightists. Suarez and par-
ty leaders of the center and the left believe
Communist participation in the election
will disclose the party's weakness. Most
polls, in fact, give the Communists only
between 7 and 10 percent of the vote.
The election seems likely to produce a
centrist majority in the lower house,
which will be more important and
probably less conservative than the
senate.
Suarez is almost certain to continue as
Prime Minister, whether or not he runs
for parliament. However, he does not
have to run to stay on the job. He is
responsible only to the King and the ad-
visory Council of the Realm; the King
almost certainly will retain him.
Suarez could remain above the fray,
but he is concerned that the center parties
may need his name to boost their election
appeal. Suarez has apparently changed
his mind several times about running but
is now planning to do so. He reportedly
will announce his candidacy on his return
from the US.
The Prime Minister may soon reshuffle
his cabinet as a tactical move to bring in
some respected nonpolitical figures to
give his government a nonpartisan
appearance during the election-period.
In the new parliament, Suarez' working
majority will be an alliance of Liberals,
Social Democrats, Christian Democrats,
and other centrists, who will probably
control 40 to 50 percent of the seats. He
may have to rely on support from
moderates in the rightist alliance, which
may get 15 to 30 percent of the seats, or
on leftists-who may win a similar share
of seats-depending on the issue at. stake.
After the Balloting
Widespread popular support for
peaceful change and a nearly universal
desire to avoid excesses that could lead to
another civil war will aid Spain in its ef-
forts to become a democracy. Suarez and
the new parliament will still face for-
midable tasks. They must:
? Decide on constitutional changes
necessary to continue dismantling
Franco's authoritarian system and es-
tablish democratic institutions.
? Deal with insistent regional
demands for autonomy.
? Undertake a comprehensive
program to tackle pressing economic
problems.
? Dismantle the state-run syndical
organization and work with free labor
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unions.
? Handle possible demonstrations
and terrorist acts by disgruntled ex-
tremists on the right and the left who
may try to slow or reverse reform.
Although any one of these problems
has destabilizing aspects that could derail
the process of political reform, the
momentum for peaceful change already
built up suggests that the government will
be able to get through the transition to a
democratic society.
Terrorism, Regional Unrest
Both the far right and the far left have
used terrorism this year to try to provoke
a government crackdown that would dis-
rupt the reform program. The govern-
ment has not overreacted; instead, in
March it issued a decree broadening the
King's earlier amnesty to apply to most of
the remaining 200 or so political
prisoners. It also cracked down on rightist
violence.
One problem for the government is the
sympathy among some members of the
security forces for right-wing terrorists.
The government has replaced some reac-
tionary officers and hopes that the efforts
of ultraconservatives will now be chan-
neled into the election campaign. The ul-
tra-right may still resort to violent
protest, but tensions have eased and
protest is unlikely to disrupt the election.
A major threat to orderly political
progress is the demand for regional
autonomy. Demonstrations, strikes, and
terrorist acts in the Basque and Catalan
regions are manifestations of discontent
over Madrid's slowness in addressing
regional demands.
The government has made a few con-
cessions since Franco died in 1975, but
Suarez maintains that in the face of
strong opposition from the military, only
a democratically elected parliament can
go further.
Terrorist acts by separatist groups
could spark a reaction from the right that
would threaten the government's political
liberalization program in. the country as a
whole. At least for the present, however,
most of the regional opposition groups
appear willing to wait until after the new
parliament is elected to see what will be
done about their demands for autonomy.
A Challenge From Labor
The cooperation of labor is crucial to
overcoming Spain's political and
economic problems, and the Suarez
government has been slow in responding
to labor's pressing demand for free and
legal unions. Labor unions were legalized
last month, but the right to strike is still
limited. The hated government-run
Spanish Syndical Organization-the only
legal union under Franco-has not yet
been abolished.
The strongest and best organized of the
newly legal unions are the Communist-
dominated Workers Commissions. The
Communists have had considerable
success in using economic grievances to
start strikes that have then taken on
political overtones of opposition to the
government. In recent months, however,
the Workers Commissions have avoided
actions challenging the government in
order to facilitate legalization of the Com-
munist Party.
The chief rival labor organization is the
Socialist General Union of Workers,
which is struggling to regain the dominant
position it had in the labor movement
before Franco. It too has exercised
restraint in recent months. Labor
cooperation in political reform, however,
could dissolve if the government tries to
impose rigid austerity without sufficient
consultation with the legalized and feisty
unions.
Economic Problems
Suarez has been gambling that the
economy will not take a major turn for
the worse before the June election so that
he can postpone unpopular corrective
measures until he has an elected parlia-
ment to share responsibility for them.
Spain is plagued by rampant inflation,
high unemployment, a large balance-of-
payments deficit, and slow economic
growth. The new parliament will be preoc-
cupied with framing a constitution and
will probably be slow to agree on a com-
prehensive program that addresses these
economic problems. Hence, remedial
measures are not apt to be adopted in
4p
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time to have an impact this year, and real
growth in gross national product is unlike-
ly to surpass the meager 1.7-percent rise
of Iasi. year.
Inflation continues at one of the highest
rates in the West. Following three years of
doubl?-digit increases, prices rose 20 per-
cent in 1976 and could rise even more this
year i'the increase during the first quarter
of thi!, year continues.
Sharp increases in unit labor costs un-
derlie Spain's high inflation rate. Wage
increases have averaged about 30 percent
annually since 1973; neither the Suarez
government nor its predecessors have
been willing to contain wage growth for
fear of sparking serious labor unrest.
Investment by domestic and foreign
companies in Spain remains acutely
depressed. With business profits down,
considerable excess capacity available,
and political uncertainties clouding the
horizon, investment in 1977 probably will
decline again, for the third year in a row.
Thus, unemployment, already near 6 per-
cent, threatens to worsen.
Spain's balance of payments has
deteriorated drastically since 1973, main-
ly because of the international recession
and the greatly increased cost of imported
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
oil. Even if recent oil conservation
measures prove effective, this year's trade
deficit will approach the $8.8 billion
recorded in 1976, the largest among
members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
So far, Spain has covered its current-
account deficit largely by public borrow-
ing abroad. The external debt consequent-
ly rose over $4 billion last year, to a total
of $12 billion. Debt service during 1976
amounted to 16 percent of export earn-
ings. While the debt is still considered
manageable, the trend this year will again
be to rely upon foreign borrowing in addi-
tion to drawing down reserves.
The payments problem underlies some
trouble spots in Spanish-US relations.
Spain has embarked on a large nuclear
energy program to lower dependence
upon costly imported fuel and is heavily
committed to using US-made reactors.
At present, the program is being held
up because US firms have not received ex-
port licenses for eight reactors, associated
equipment, and enriched uranium fuel for
Spain. Madrid has temporarily halted the
signing of any contracts with US nuclear
equipment suppliers, hoping to persuade
the US not to place new restrictions on
nuclear materials.
Spain could find other suppliers, but
the ensuing delay and modifications
necessary to adapt to non-US reactor
designs would be a serious setback to the
Spanish nuclear power program.
The recent US decision to formulate an
orderly market agreement on shoes also
concerns Spain. If the US Congress re-
jects the forthcoming presidential plan,
then the US International Trade Com-
mission's recommendation for quotas will
become effective this summer. Suarez
considers the recommendation protec-
tionist and damaging to Spanish exports.
Spain's interest in this issue is keen
because the country's trade deficit with
the US has averaged $1.6 billion since
1974. About 20 percent of all Spanish
shoe production goes to the US--more
than one fourth of total Spanish exports
to the US.
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A refusal of New York landing rights for the supersonic
Concorde would almost certainly result in French retaliation.
French unions would refuse to service US airlines serving
France, and the French government might tighten controls on
some US businesses operating in France.
The Concorde: New York Landing Issue
The French view the Concorde-the
product of 15 years of effort and an ex-
penditure of almost $3 billion by France
and the UK-as an unquestioned
technological success. Support for the
program comes from governmental, in-
dustrial, and social power groups that
rarely come together with such unanimity
on one issue.
As the French see it, opposition in the
US to New York landing rights is an
attempt to thwart West European hopes
for additional access to the leading
gateway to North America. When the
US pulled out of the competition to
produce a supersonic transport, France
and the UK persevered and completed an
aircraft that meets the requirements
specified when the program got under way
in the early 1960s.
Response to Denial
In the event of an adverse decision on
Concorde landing rights, French labor
unions have already announced plans to
refuse service to US airliners operating in
France and would take the lead in
organizing demonstrations against the US
decision. They probably would also
attempt to lead a boycott of US-made
products. Aside from the possible disrup-
tion of US air carrier service, the actual
economic effects would probably not be
great.
The French government would strongly
criticize an adverse decision but would
rely primarily on a strong court case to
win landing rights. The French case con-
tends that the New York - to - Paris run
allows for reduced takeoff weight. Lower
weight and adjusted takeoff procedures,
the French maintain, will reduce noise
level sufficiently to meet New York re-
quirements. The French government
would not begin retaliatory measures un-
less the legal battle were lost.
If the court battle is lost, the French
could apply pressure in several other
areas. The French might, for example,
pull back from the closer ties that have
been developing between their aircraft in-
dustry and US manufacturers, even
though the French aircraft industry would
suffer more than its US counterparts.
Other French actions could include foot-
dragging in multilateral trade
negotiations and moves to tighten
French controls on some US busi-
nesses.
The New York Question
Although the Giscard government is
not naive about the constitutional powers
of local authorities in the US, French of-
ficials have difficulty comprehending the
latitude of independent decision making
that such local governments exercise.
Many in France would attribute some of
the pressure against landing rights for the
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Concorde to US aircraft manufacturers
and airlines that fear competition. Many
are convinced that a US-built supersonic
transport would not have encountered
such obstacles as those the Concorde
faces. Arguments against noise and other
environmental hazards are seen as little
more than a facade.
Staking out and maintaining a strong
position on landing rights is a political im-
perative for the current French leadership.
President Giscard is already under fire
from both Gaullists and politicians on the
left, who believe his willingness to
Typical Four-Engine Long-Range
Aircraft Noise Levels
EPNdB1(Average)
120 r-
Take-off Approach
1. EPNdB is effective perceived noise decibel
weighted for acoustic frequency end duration,
Data compiled by the Federal Aviation Admin-
Istration at Dulles Airport.
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cooperate with the US will lead him to
press less forcefully than he might
otherwise for landing rights.
New York landing rights are essential if
trance and the UK are to get a limited
return on their Concorde investment.
Each year, more than 9 million persons
cross the North Atlantic-the world's
most heavily traveled international air
route. Most of the passengers transit New
York; perhaps as many as 500,000 are
busine;smen and wealthy tourists, who
can pay the higher Concorde fares, which
are now about 20 percent above regular
first-class fares.
Because of the limited number of Con-
corde aircraft and the vast potential of the
North Atlantic market, a competitive
Concorde service from Paris and London
to New York would probably have only a
slight mpact on US and foreign carriers
on the same route. The precarious finan-
cial condition of many international air-
lines, however, has led them to view any
possible loss of revenue-no matter how
small--with alarm. Under the most op-
timisti_ assumption, the Concorde would
probably carry 30,000 passengers annual-
ly to and from New York in the first year
or two of operations. Much of this
business would come from persons likely
to have used Air France and British
Airways.
Implications of New York Decision
A decision by New York to allow the
Concorde to land there would shore up
the limited existing Concorde service, add
to the acceptance of the aircraft by
travelers, and accelerate the selective ex-
pansion of supersonic routes. It might
also lay the groundwork for a second
production run. A denial of landing rights
would hamper sales of the remaining Con-
corde aircraft and make a second produc-
tion run less likely.
Because of the built-in delays of litiga-
tion and the unquestioned importance of
North Atlantic routes for the Concorde,
no early change is likely in the
British-French decision to cease assembly
when the current production run of 16 air-
craft is completed. Of these, five have
been sold to the captive market of Air
France and four to British Airways.
Currently, Iran Air holds purchase op-
tions on two Concordes, and China's
national airline has options on three.
In its limited commercial service to
date, the Concorde's technical perfor-
mance has been excellent, and passenger
sales have been quite good. Routes now
include Air France service three times a
week between Charles de Gaulle Airport
near Paris and Dulles Airport near
Washington. The French airline also
operates weekly Concorde flights between
Paris and Caracas via Santa Maria in the
Azores and twice-weekly service between
Paris and Rio de Janeiro.
British Airways provides thrice-weekly
Concorde service between London's
Heathrow Airport and Dulles. British
Airways also offers a weekly flight
between London and Bahrain.
The Concorde has attracted more
passengers than originally projected. Air
France has reported that in recent months
the average load factor on the Paris-
to-Rio run has been slightly above 70 per-
cent. On service to Washington, an even
higher average load factor has been
reported-about 80 percent. If these high
load factors were combined with greater
utilization, the present Concorde fleet
would meet direct operating costs and
make a contribution to fixed costs, in-
cluding some return on development
allocations.
No matter what New York decides, Air
France and British Airways will continue
existing Concorde service. The vast sums
needed to develop the aircraft have been
spent, and only relatively small subsidies
will maintain service.
The British Airways service to Bahrain
was established as the first leg of a route
to Australia via Singapore. Despite some
domestic resistance, Australia seems to
favor a Concorde landing, probably in
Melbourne. Other possible Air France
service includes Buenos Aires as an exten-
sion of the Rio de Janeiro service. Both
airlines are considering a new route to
Johannesburg. Such a service would re-
quire an intermediate stop somewhere in
central Africa.
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500170001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500170001-8
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500170001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500170001-8
Secret
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Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A011500170001-8