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1.4 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 - I , , , , Airgi7l'itt.w'ci , 19 74 CONGRESSIONAL RET7ORI) --SENATE S 14259 person's problems or to support programs to benefit all Americans. Mr. Caddy, in his libelous book, has at- tempted to tar such innocent men and women with the ugly brush of illegal and unethical action. He implies that the illegal contributions of corporations? contributions taken from profits and given in a hidden and clandestine way? are similiar to the contributions of working people given in an open and recorded way. Illegal contributions, from whatever source, are never to be condoned. The key to understanding the difference is that those whose money is used in an illegal contribution from corporate funds do not know their money has been given away. Those who voluntarily give their money openly to help in a political orga- nization?whether it is through a labor union or a professional association like AMA?do know where their money is going. Mr. Caddy's book is using the big-lie technique to attack the right of working- men and women to participate freely and openly in the American political System. I am shocked and dismayed that this kind of book has ever been put into print. In this year of aroused public interest In the propriety of all political funding and campaign contributions, this scurri- lous book attempts to mislead readers a mariner which must bring shame ev to Mr. Caddy. He is a lawyer who sh d know the dangers of making false c- cusations and should understan he divisive and ugly results of c ? sing legal and voluntary political gift with illegal and involuntary political ayoffs. Any threat to truth becomes threat to the body politic. This boot such a threat, and I do not hesitate denounce it. The New Mexican, publis d in Santa Fe, N. Mex., has recently lished a re- sponse to Mr. Caddy's c el attack, in a guest column writte y Mary Sue Buchly, New Mexico ate AFL-CIO COPE director. Mr. president, / a unanimous con- sent that Miss Hue s article be pub- lished in the Raw following my re- marks. I strongly e my colleagues to read this state t and to take this _ opportunity to b alerted to the danger of placing any edence in Mr. Caddy's effort. - There beinr o objection, the article was Ordered ?e Printed in the RECORD, aa follows: Mom Santa Fe New Mexican] ?OFFICIAL ? AFL-CIO DEFENDS POLITICAL COMrstristrrithas ' ` IA reap se to a charge that the AL- CO's CO Committee on Political Educa- tion) flag ntly violates the law IS presented In thie column for vacationing Fred Buckles Mary Sue Buchly, New Mexico State CIO COPE director.) ,(By Mary Sue Huchly) Atm Qtrs.?Politica' contributions and their e I eta' have been high priority among the ge 1 public and media for two years. -A re t,publicatfon authorized by Doug- las Ca y, who also doubled in brass as de- fense unael for the Watergate Seven, has made broad statements rsaative to political contribtuions by COPE. There is basically no a,..ument with Cad- dy's arithmetic; however a serious error emerges in his book, "' ,e Million Dollar Payoff." Caddy erroneously tea COPE ":lag- Tautly violates the law." - says union me bers' dues are used to I ther and adv. e the AFL-CIO position in are poiltica ena. All funds used by COra, which e used for political contribution.- are VO tary and furthermore are neve i7 ; ,hhe on). wages In any form, All COPE's funds ca legally identi lied. COPE's source is ays from fend raising programs and untary contribu ? tions on a local, st Ind national level contributed by wor ople. The reader sho e luate and make a comparison of S E otributions versus corporate indu al cos .ributions. It is a matter of pub record aat the milk indus- tries' contr itionC President Nixon caused an ease in V s cost of milk and dairy prod s to every sltizen with the only conssiclera n being gree r unfair profits for a chose w. The roleum Indust -s, whose multi-mil- lion ex political was chest was used in bell. of President Nix o, produced a ques- tio e gasoline short, a hut unquestion- ab high increase in aorporate prate at t expense of every cas wiser ior the bene- of a "few corporate be, The American Medics- Association for dee- des has totaled multi- million dollar politi- cal contributions to ,11.1 legislation that would improve the get sa-al public's health care. They opposed Melic a a for 20 years and today are opposing a fair and equitable health plan that wmr- a benefit the entire American population to maintain high profits. The list is long of -feted interests who have used the politicra contribution route to create anti-public onsumer legislation and to kill any legislat a efforts that would protect and improve I o American's lot In life.. --COPE, through its' vi intary contributions from 16 million Amen-' n wage earners and consumers, is one of Iris -few national organi- zations structured to s; port people-oriented laws. COPE does not inni itself in supporting 'labor laws nationally i statewide. We have supporting su,sh leg- age which is a fair ,atar of work :for all an honorable record it islation as minimum day's pay for a fair Americans. Labor has supporteo workers so that uvinfx fury would not put - welfare rolls. A goer health care plan that s, basic health care to adamantly supported AFL-CIO. This labor tire but general. Labor champions -orkmen's compensa- tion legislation that la", assist a family wage earner when he is inj..sed on the job which allows his family to mil otain some semblance of a decent living (1.1-ing his recuperative period. The political cow vested interests come the public and used best interests. COPE from corporate profits the working man who American. job safety to :protect ' Ss a r y permanent in- em on the disabled and comprehensive old bring decent and he public is always in Congress by the emern is not restric- Therefore, it can bs big business funds s lineal contributions , are paid for by the ,.butions by selfish, om profits created by directly against their ands are not derived They are derived from 'ares about his fellow easily identified that etch are used for po- e surplus-prolits that average citizen. Their own money is used to create legislation that is negative to the public's best interest. It is not to say that labor does not believe in profit motivation. It is not to any that labor I osed to the free enterprise system. we feel it should be universally objec- nable to use excess profits to the detri- ment of the general public in the form of public contributions that will foster price gouging and enabling legislation that will minimize public services which could be beneficial for all. ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR AID TO INDOCHINA Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, on July 24, 1974, Mr. Fred Branfman, co- director of the Indochina Resource Center, testified before the Senate For- eign Relations Committee concerning the fiscal year 1975 administration pro- posals for aid to Indochina. His state- ment contains a wealth of penetrating insights and revealing statistical data about our continuing involvement in Indochina, including the covert ways in which our aid still serves to fuel the unended war there. Because of the rele- vance of this material to the Congress consideration of the administration's fiscal year 1975 request for aid to Indo- china, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF FREDRIC R. BRANFMAN, CO- DIRECTOR, THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER BEFORE THE SENATE FORE/GN RELATIONS COMMITTEE PRESIDENTIAL COVERT WAR AND MS. AID TO INDOCHINA, JTJLY 24, 1974 An update and introduction to the Indo- china Resource Center/Narmic analyses of the FY 1975 administration aid proposals for Indochina. Fredric Branfman is co-director of the Indochina Resource Center, located at 1322 18th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Its telephone number is (202) 785-3111. The Indochina Resource Center is a church-sponsored private research group which regularly monitors dozens of official documents, newspapers and magazines, and receives personal correspondence from indi- viduals on the scene in Indochina. Mr. Branfman's testimony is based on this ongoing research, as well as 41/a years ex- perience in Indochina over the past 7 years. His most recent visit was a post-ceasefire trip to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand from April through August, 1973. He also visited North Vietnam in November, 1912, and spent four years based in Laos as an educational adviser and writer from 1967-1971. Mr. Branfman has written widely on Indo- china. Voices From the Plain of Jars, pub- lished by Harper and Row, is a moving description of American bombing in Laos; "The Presidential War in Laos: 1964-1970", in Laos: War and Revolution, a Harper and Row publication, describes U.S. involvement in Laos during that period; his articles have also appeared in Harper's, the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Monthly, Newsday, the Progressive, Ram- parts, and dozens of other newspapers and magazines around the country. He has also frequently given testimony to Congressional committees, including the U.S. Senate Ref- ugee and Government Operations Subcom- mittees, and the Rouse Foreign Affairs Committee. Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 S 14260 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 19n Presidential covert war and US. aid to adochina Contents Introduction: A solution to our Indochina Involvement exists I. Covert war: A challenge to Congress for the 16170n, p. 1. IL Congress is betas asked to fund war In Indochina, p.2. LEL Covert war: The adeatentration meth- odology, p. 4. IV. Covert war: Background, p. 0. V. Covert war: Basic etrateglc gusts, p.8. VI. Covert war: Manipulating domesic opinion to obtain funding. p. 10. (a) Executive deception on military mat- ters. (b) Executive deception on political mat- ters. VII. Covert war: A commitment to mu - row-basecl local administrations. p. 19. (a) Saigon Zones. (b) Lon Nol Zones. (c) Lace. VIII. Covert wer: The neceasity of Ule. Military personnel and technology, p 20. (a) VA. military personoeL (b) M& war material. IX. Covert war: Police and refugee p grains for population control, p. 26. (a) Police program,. (b) Refugee programa. X. Covert war: A tone to speak for tile Wan& In 29. nersonrcricni: ? sown-son TO OUR iNDOC. DIVOLVTAISPCS Wars The pages which follow document ow belief that present Administretion policy In Indochina Is leading to major new mili- tary confrOntetioias there. We demonstrate that present U.S. policy Is bringing untold Misery to the people of Vietnam, unaccept- able coats to the people of this country, and cettnot lead to peace. Before turning to this analysis of present policy, however, we wish to stress that there k an alternative that would be accept-dee to most Americans: observation of the Parte Agreement. It is often said that the Paris Agreement is a mere scrap of paper, since both eldni are violating it. To call it a mere scrap of paper. bowevee, Is to deny that our Involvement in Indo- china can ever be ended. The great impor- tance of the Paris Agreement Is that It does provide an honorable way, indeed tbe only way, that the war in Indochina can be unded. For 10 long years the 178 fought in Viet- nam with no real public hope that the war would stop. The battles went on and on. with no political solution in eight. Now needle, after a million deaths, there Is tingly a political solution to a war which -cannot be won on the battlefield, a formal palate agreement signed by all parties directly concerned. This Agreement, moreover, offers a way that we can end our involvement without it being said that we reneged on our "oorumite aunts", were defeated, or "bugged out". It prOeidee for a relatively orderly political process by which the Vietnamese people will be free to choose their own leaders free of outside political interterence. It is clop, moreover, that such a political process will see the emergence for the foreseeable future of some kind of coalition mechanism that will prevent any side from claiming absolute victory or defeat. To downgrade the importune of the Paris Agreement, this political solution, is to say that there can be no political solution to the fighting. It is to accept the notion that the war will continue Indefinitely. To mini- mize the Paris Agreement in any way, there- fore, is in effect to encourage war. To stress the importance of the Paris Agreement, however, ls to be for peace. By Insisting that both aides adhere to in by ensuring that our side Is doing everything possible to at least test the other side's offer to negotiate, is not only desirable. It is absolutely necessary U our Indochina in- volvement Is ever to end. Such a policy, as we can see in Laos so far, can work. There Is no Caneon why there cannot be a Lannlike solution to the Indochina war, if Congress ensures that our aid Is not bang used in a way that blocks implementation of the Paris Agreement. The Patin Agreement la. quite simply, a redlista hope for peace in Vietnam- -the only one that now exists. And It Is a. hope :for peace which can be reallaed, if we want it to. 1. COVERT WAR : A MULLS:WM To concaves roe THR 15705 One cif the dominant, if least understood facts of this latter half of the 20th century Is that we have entered an era chracterieed by a new form of war-making, a phenomenon we lanai can Presidential covert 'war. By tins we mean that the Executive offi- cials of today's superpowers have opted away from conventional or nuclear 'war and for war by proan?"low-pronle" war in which tbey rely on intensive use of technology and relatively few American personnel to wage clandestine war abroad. One of the basic facts of our lives as Americans is that our Executive branch to- day Can and does wage war abroad without the knowledge or consent of the Americon people. There are many examples of such Prost- dentist covert war la recent those from U.S. Executive intervention in Ethiopia to the Congo to the Philippines to Iran. The most dramatic example of such covert war- making today, however, is Indochina. During the 1980s, Ladochin& became the symbol of direct U.S. Military involvement to the Third World. Responding to a clear mandate front the American people, Con- gress has moved to end our direct combat involvement in Indochina. By doing so. It has Meanly signaled the end of an era, bring- ing hope to most Americans that Congreas will never allow massive U.S. combat involve- ment in another Third World country. Today. In the mid-1970's, however, ludo- reline ha.' now become the symbol of hull- reef covert U.S. involvement in the Third World. Such covert war, we believe, is ob- jectionable both for morel and practical reasons, anti leads to increasing pressures for direct 17.S. intervention. The time When this country could afford the luxury of supporting "low-profile" wars abroad has clearly pained. Such factors as the teeming crunch on energy and other key resources, the exponential Increase in the coast@ of both modern weaponry and a volun- teer array, rampant inflation and rising labor costs. have reduced American options: Last year. for example, we could not both wage covert War in Indochina and feed the most needy In other parts of the world. The Administration wound up sending Increased "Pood For Peace" Shipments to nand war in Indoehina, up from $208.8 to 8502,8 Million; but only *77 million was made available to the Sahel. where tens of thousands of human beings literally starved to death. We would suggest, therefore, that Con- gress terminating The Executive's unilateral ability to wage covert war is as urgent a teak for the 70's, as was Congress finally coming to grips with U.S. direct combat abreact during the tion. Congressional suspension or reduction of proposed Administration expenditures in Indochina, then, will do rar more than steeply Hignal an end to our otherwise unending in- volvement there. It will also mean that the people of the United States will finally be freed of the burden of supporting world- wide covert war, the people of the Third World finally free to pursue their own des- bales. 0. CONGREaS IS BEING ASKED TO FUND WAR IN INDOCHINA Indochina remains the largest war in the world today. The latest reports, for example, indicate hat 350,000 soldiers on both sides in Vietnam lave been killed or wounded since the cease- :ire. (UPI dispatch, June 11, 1974). 'I'his is }pore than ten times the ofncial casualities a sported during and after the October Mid- nest War. In addition there were 85,000 ((ethane killed and wounded, and 818,000 new refugees in the first post-ceasefire year, ecording to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee t n Refugees; and hundreds of thousands !lore have been killed, wounded or made ceneless in Cambodia since the ceasefire. In all, Indochina may well have had more tar victims created in the last 18 months taan the rest of the world combined. (liven this raging war. Administration aid Inquests for Indochina are clearly intended V. fund war, not produce peace. This fact Ii made clear by the tremendous priority t se Administration puts on Indochina com- pared to other countries, as well as a close a ealysis of its actual requested expenditures. The Indochina Resource Center and NAR VIC, a project of the American Friends Sinnott Committee, have recently submitted Alministration requests to the first such close analysis in the history of the war. Two Si udies we have produced, which we would lite to submit for the record, emphasize the It Rowing points: (1) The Antnini.stratIon is proposing to stead $3.7 billion for Indochina, more than fcr the rest of the world combined (see .ble 1). This will provide 'Mien and Lon 2.64 governments with 90% of their total resources, including all of their war material. (2) Food For Peace to Indochina in FY 74 totalled 49% of worldwide shipments, mean- ; that 0.8% of the world's population re- ce ved nearly half the world's U.S. supplied food (see Table 2). Although some 100,000 persons are estimated to have starved to death in Sahel, for example, Sahel received only 15% or ee of what Indochina received?. be muse Food Per Peace was indirectly used to finance war last year. L3) U.S. aid in Indochina is not leading to stability, but only demands for more money. In PT 74, for example, the Administration bet an with a request for *827.8 million to Smith Vietnam and Cambodia in economic aid (Wet plus Food For Peace). By the end of PT 74 it had allocated $1.52 billion, an Inc 'ease of 27%. This year it is demanding $1-81 billion, an Increase of 40% Over last year's request (see Tables 3 efe 4). ( I) An admitted 88% of this year's aid pronosal is non-humanitarian, non-develop- mental in nature: Le.. 88% is for war. In realty, moreover, only 2% is truly huraani- tartan. Requested military aid to the three AdennistratIon-supported governments is else up this year, moreover. In Fiscal Year 197-, $1.488 billion was allocated; the Ad- ministration is now requesting $2.05 billion, an _lacrosse of 40%. Most significantly, the Adridnistaation is requesting *852 million for "procurement" for South Vietnam, a sum MOrs than double the $369 million pro- grat uned for Fiscal Year 1974. This makes it cies: that the Administration is vastly in- creating Thieun material, in violation of the ore for one" clause of the Parts Agreement and a congressional mandate to reduce our mill axy wending in Indochina. (See Tables 41el). (6. The Administration has blatantly vio- late( a congressional mandate to reduce aid to Indochina in Fiscal Year 1976. Any Con- great tonal attempts to cut aid in FT 75, thee. fore, must be massive. Last year, "In- dochina Postwar Reconstruction" aid was cut Del--"Indochina Postwar Reconstruc- tion", formerly known as "economic aid". Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 Approved For. Release 2005/07/20 ? CIA-RDP79m0,09.5/A000100040047-5 S 14261 A"urfte it 5, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD SENAT _ from a requested $632 million to an alloca- tion of $450 million. 13y unilaterally increas- ing Food For Peace shipments from a re- quested $208 million to an estimated alloca- tion of 002.6 -million, however, the Admin- istration has not only restored outs in eco- 110Mie aid, it has exceeded its original FY .74 request in a blatant violation of congres- sional will. (See Table 3). Indeed, Food For Peace to Indochina last year ($502.6 million) turned out to be more than normal econoinic aid (IPR funds to- talling $450 million). In addition, the Execu- tive possesses a wide variety of other loop- hopea?including the Food and Forage Act, huge amottlits of War Reserve material built up especially for Indochina and over which Congress has little control, ceilingless "ex- cess defense article" and "purchase of local currency" categories and an uncontrolled CIA budget., (6)- The Administration's proposed aid to Indochina can only lead to an escalated war, -While preventing a political settlement. By channeling lavish military aid to the GVN and Lon Nol, the Administration is not leaving the other side any political incentives to negotiate. The U.S. supported GVN has Outlawed the PRO for example, thus leav- ing it no choice but surrender or pushing back militarily in order to force the GVN to seek 'a political settlement. If Administration FY 75 aid requests are, passed, th.e only result will be an escalating war which is directly leading to major new Military confronta- ? tions in Indochina. Such confrontations, moreover; could see the Administration, at- -tempt to renew American bombing and/or send in U.S. ground troops. Only Congress can bring about a very real potential solution: be reducing or suspend- ing aid to Thieu and Lon Nol, Congress could make it in the Administration's in- terest to bring about a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam and Cambodia, as it has done in Laos.- m. COVERT WAR: THE ADMINTSTRAITON METHODOLOGY' , The tact that the Administration is re- questing such niaSSive funding for war in Indochina is not the essence Of its covert "warrtng in Indochina, however. On the con- trary. It is the Administration's direct in- volvement in the internal affairs of Indo- china?through Central of billions in aid and thousands of U.S. Personnel?that char- acterizes Presidential war. . This direct U.S. involvement is of neces- sity disguised or "covert". Congress and the 'American ,people have made it clear they nao longer Wish the U.S. to be involved; such direet American involvement is precluded by the Paris Agreement: and World Opinion has ttirried against further American inter- vention. ' . AS a result, the Administration goes out of its way to hide is involvainefit. AM docu- ments indicating Presidential branch in- volvement are classified. American military perSonnel are disguised as civilians, and are instructed to _avoid non-U.S. mission Contact as rttUeh as Possible. Aclininistratibn spokes- men are instructed' to emphatically deny all reports of t.Y.S. involvement. Leeks are Featly reduced due to the few reporters and - smaller numbers of American personnel in- volved in such a covert war. eliberate, ,attempti ,are made to deceive Congress. ' #s. 0:4nplest" level, this: attempt Involves an Orwellian change in nomenclature. A war , There are also signs thA the Admin- istration may try backdoor funding of Thieu through the World Bank and Overseas Pri- vate Investment Corporation (OPIC) guaran- tees of private American investment in South Vietnam. . .; budget is presenled :,s" Indochina Postwar - Reconstruction"; thie year's fiscal year 1975 budget now calls tn., former "Co:nmodity Import Program," vrriely known as a short- term, war-related, nigetary device to keep the GVN alive, "Foski and Nutrition" and "Industrial Product: on"; food commodities designed to free fur] 3s for local war budgets are called "Food For F eace"; money designed to resettle refugees ii unfarmable land to expand territorial ereatrol of the GVN is called "hurnanitariai " aid. Numerous direct attempts are made, more- over, deliberately to kleprive Congress of re- quested information on April 2, 1971, for ex- ample, Senator Ken nedy revealed that the U.S. Ambassador in Ss igon, Mr. Graham Mar- tin, had interfered with attempts by the Con- gressional investigat-kry service, the General Accounting Office. I i-einnedy reported that:. "The Senate sheus. also be aware of Am- bassador Martin's unwarranted interference in field investigatiot of U.S. foreign aid ex- penditures by invesl i:i-stors of the GAO. Not only has the Ambassador intervened at the highest levels of thr GAO to curb their in- quiries, but he hal repeatedly mscle every effort to restrict the kvestigators' aocess and use of information in. the Embassy Liles. And he has even attempt:kd to censor the transfer of GAO information from Saigon to Wash- ington." On the same day, '.1 course, Kennedy also revealed the well-kro.kwn cable of Ambassador Martin counselling i.hat "it would be the height of folly to yorkinnit Kennedy . . . an honest and detailel answer" to questions presented to the Str.Le Department. A GAO request to investigate U.S. funding of political prlsonerk in South Vietnam met with similar treatment by the State Depart- ment. "The State li.knnartrnent has told the General Accounting Office that it will not be possible for the GAO to make a preposed in- vestigation of politikial prisoners in South Vietnam and other i.P.lions . .." the Washing- tan Star-Rears reported on February 9, 1974. 'Major attempts are also made to hide Executive involVenie it from the American press. American 'ions are declared off- limits to American isporters Amex Jean per- sonnel are instructed to either avoid or lie to American jounirlists about their real functions. America/ reporters are not given transportation to ?rensitive" areas where American military kir paramilitary advisers are operating. In South Vietnark: for example, Ambassa- dor Graham Martin has restricted press ac- cess to American ki-iticials. On January 30, 1974, for example, The Christian Science Monitor reported ti et: "By itself, the official U.S. mission in South Vietnam . . Is st the largest American mission in the woni.i. No major reductions are expected in forseeable future . ? . (Ambassador Marti'i / is trying to discourage any publicity cones- ling the American pres- ence here . . . Maj Tk. General Joh:a E. Mur- ray, the chief of 'tie Defense Attache Of- fice . . . was recem y told to stop giving interviews. Such reports haw been echoed by the Chi- cago Tribune, whic) k referred on June 9, 1974, to lVlartin's "continning effort to'nestrict the flow of information from official American sonrces tp, the ,ptesr," On February 25, 1974, mereove4 The New ork' Times reported that "the Embassy told u least two private cam- panies?Lear-Siegle r which employs a large force of itircratt, Mechanics here and Com- pirter Science Cotiscration, which works on military and police computer systems?to say nothing public iy about their work, ac- cording to company executives." Attempts to ket journalists sway from Indochina news eici ends to places like Thai- , land, moreover. On January 11, 1974, the Los Angeles Times reported on an infrequent trip to Udorn Airforce Base in Thailand that: "When American reporters asked to talk with members of this American unit (work- ing with Lao and Cambodian pilots) they were told this could not be done without the consent of the Thai government." Given such restrictions on the press, it is remarkable how many reports have leaked out in the past year and a half indicating a pattern of covert American involvement in Indochina reminiscent of, but far greater than, the kind of disguised Presidential in- tervention in Indochina between 1954 and 1962 which led to direct involvement later. The pages which follow present many of these newspaper reports indicating the well- known pattern of Presidential covert involve- ment in Indochina, as well as other reports from direct participants in Indochina after the ceasefire. No one of these reports in and of itself is proof positive of continuing 13.5. covert war. When considered as a whole, however, these reports are clearly a major cause for alarm. The publication of the Pent. gon Papers revealed that newspaper reports about U.S. Involvement in Indochina between 1954 and' 1962 were surprisingly accurate, despite the fact that they were hotly denied by Execu- tive branch officials at the time. Given this history, it would be the height of folly for Congress to ignore the numerous press and first-person reports which have come out of Indochina since the ceasefire. We had to wait nearly 20 years for the Pentagon Papers, during which time a small covert war grew into a massive overt one. It has become more than clear that unless Congress acts to reduce our funding of Presi- dential covert war in Indochina this year, history may well repeat itself. iv. COVERT WAR: BACKGROUND Historically, the American people and Con- gress have taken the Executive's word on matters of public policy. The burden of proof has laid upon critics to disprove Administra- tion claims, rather than an the Administra- tion to provide evidence that it is living up to its word. In the case of Presidential war-making abroad, however, the U.S. Executive branch has clearly forfeited public or congressional trust. For since World War II, it has been revealed countless times that the Executive has been intervening abroad while covering it up at home. In Indochina alone, for example, Execu- tive activities that have now been revealed after being hidden from the American peo- ple and 'Congress for years include: Installing Ngo Dinh Diem in power in 1954, acknowledged within the American Mission as an unpopular dictator who unilaterally cancelled elections in 1956 in violation of the Geneva Accords, while publicly praised as a popular, democratic, sovereign leader (Pen- tagon Papers); withholding information from Congress and the American people about U.S.-directed commando raids against North Vietnam, thus making the Gulf of Tonkin in- oident appear unprovoked (Pentagon Papers); funding and directing Thai and other foreign troops in Laos, in direct viola- tion of Congressional law; secretly bombing Cambodia for 14 months, and falsifying rec- ords so that the U.S. Congress and people 'Would not know; publicly denying the bomb- ing of northern Laos from May 1964 until September 1969 when Congress was first told, and March 1970, when the American people first heard; U.S. oross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia in 1971 and 1972, thus expressly violating Congressional law against sending U.S. ground forces into these coun- tries; carrying out rain-making missions over Indochina while publicly denying that they were being carried out; attempting to cause Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 S 14262 toore Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATI August 1974 nee storms, also not acknowledged untroyeare Mere And, In addition to them arm ofneelty- confirmed arena% activities, there are a wide eatety of other clandestine wily:Mai whieb have been masted ennui:moms persons Mae flestePerson a/Peelle/me but are eta oar-salty denloil by the Execute? !Wench. Then in- clude the sending of military peraounel into Lace and Inatoricting them to wear civilian elothes and carry Cards Monti/Snag them as working for the Agency for laternatIonel Development the rlispetehof U.13.-derected intelligence-gathering Manse int. Chiles *ad North Vietnam from northern Leos, thus jetreertliaing the shaky neutrality of Laos; the UN of CIA-trained Vietnamese to dram like the elLlt and carry out atrocities, to the beam of having these teamed on the ELF; the falai/cation of documents glom to the Moan Man and Vietnamese prat; U.S. eatab.lahad quota which led to the deliberate eateasinee tem of tens of tboleranda of Vietninem under the 11.8.-epoomwed. Ptioenex program. This record of Emma/eve deceit alone nig- gling" that Me U.S. Prealdential brooch may be irearicilsably required to advance evidence that It Is not engaged In similar activities *when rather than requiring criLla to ad- vance domunentetrY proof. Thecase for requiring the Exec.= ve to prove Its non-Involveinent, however. le lea- maseuraely strengthened by &1114.2a-noticed bat trameacknedy important atom sopa tad in .the Loa Amadei Times on May 16. 1974. Tble report states that: eine Air Force law Mice saes it Wised. for neelleary or foreign policy reosorta, to disguise military operations through inaccuram or untrue metal reports. The oonclusiott was seated be a meroorandien to the Seale Armed Serelone Committee in connection with the Committee's investigation neat year of the secret bombing of CemOodiet for 14 months before May, 1970." This shocking contention makes it clear that neither the Congress nor the Americao people can any longer be content with mere denials of Executive covert war in Indocoina. Indeed, logic would demand that the doaeris of' newspaper and flret-peraou reports which follow, indicating Preelderatial civert was la Indochina, should be taken se ti un- with the borden for disproving them .ying upon the Presidential branch. This point, moreover. is strengthened by a consideration of four major strategic eats of Presidential covert war. V. COVERT WAS: BASIC STRATEGIC e.bilLe, The purpose of continued U.S. Exec ante intervention in Indochina La to keep the Pro- visional Revolutionary Cloverament (PRO), Rimier Rouge, and Pathet Lao from power In Indochina. Obtaining funding Of pay the salaries of local military forces, then arms, and provid- ing support for the general economy, it key of course. But DB, personnel ?advising the military forces and police, holding the econ- omy tegether, repairing the aircraft-nue no leas hapintant. For there would be no need for American intervention In the fleet Place if a OVIT our Lou Nol government was able to stand on its own. a Secret bombing of Cambodia and cross- border operations into Ina and Ca/abode' are described in "The While raper on Secret Operations In Laos and Cambodia". Senator Hughes. Cong. Record, September 10, 1973, 13113190. Rain-making missions were recozttly revealed, see Washington Post, May lf t, 1974. The bombing of Northern Laos is described In testimony before the Senate Refugee eub- cbeanti Mee. !trading of Thal mercenaries in Lace was revealed befere the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Cconneittee, illestorm attempts In Science. It Is no cotondencie, for allinselle. that as the Khmer mouge lave continued to gain tanitory and; auppowt In Cambodia, the Washington Poet reported os Jima S WIC that: "Tele Lew U.S.Ambassador la Phnom Paolo John Guntbar Dinia. has in two todadab made it abeedutely dear to Cambo- dian* and tattooers alike In Phnom Penh that be is. in street. runnieng lbs eottotey." Nor is AL surprising teat atter the Adrain- tozation had for years attempted to avoid an epee Areerean boadom in Cambodia. the Wahlogion Poet repotted ca Atm L 1074, that; "The Clunbedian government and the U.S. eemeasy are emomed in a costly peogram ? aid so win the support of eiviiien popula- Men In lesuroete. areas ... The mission now er. the beeieuel largest AU) unit in the world." For Like Issit Is that Presidential coact war a. aliaracterised by the diegideed *tamp( to eie dablereesei technology and personnel to no-nom...toe fee the potieical deficiencies of Mai regimes Lu leadochlan Its main stra- tegic gan?ood be described (1) Cemeliang Marilee through memipuen loon of domestic pobliu opinion,--The prin- t:trial requirement of Presidential covert war lei funding. Neither Congress nor the Ameri- toe peepie would approve funding of Exec- utive war-making in leidoehina In violation of Article 4 of the Pale Agmement, which reads "The United States will not continue in military involvement or intervene In the internal edgers of Solite Vietnam" As a re- sult, The Administration has consistently lend to deceive public opinloo about its real involvement in Indoeinzia. Such manipula- tion of public opinion may enjoy some short- term successes, as when the Adndaletranon managed to spend mon than S3 bellon on war In Indochina In Facia Year 1974. Long- term results. however, are counter-produc- tive. It loam to the wasting of billions of dollars our economy can no longer afford: It poisons the political atmaphere. as the American people gradualy learn they've been deceived. Most importartly, It continues the pervasive concentration of power In the Fin "'dive welch has sirently proved so Maas- toms to this eourere An informed public end ("tonere.. would have kept us out of iminehine In the fleet place, and would today see kiA tiring our resources for healing at ind ,broad. , 2) Ma in talnl narrow-based, military - oriented local admieistrotinne in power?The Administration hart choice to conUnue try- lug to keep in. power those who represent a Lily minority of the people: the civilian rich, the top-ranking military officers and, to some extent, the western-educated. The re- sult 1A either that the Administration feani political competition and opts instead for war, as in South Vietnam: the U.S-supported Aide becomes so weak that the other side refuses to negotiate with It. as in Cambodia; or the U S. Is forced to accept political com- promise. Fre the other side gain In power, and preseeres grow for re-intervention. so 111 Laos. And the resort 18 also increased cor- ruption and war, leadieg to declining local economies and armed farces, twang to to- o-need demands for eld from the U.S. Preen dretiel breech, ut coin US. tecluiology and advisers to militaty otereteone--Cliven, the n? ienialetri t ion's narrow political base in uultian in- us relied to try and compensate by extremely heavy inputs of 1713. 1311118lay riviatrO. " material end funding to de- and field local military forces. This retain such local forces entirely dependent on American logistics and personnel, and In- , ar tably iblerlor to their guerrilla adversaries. rho loath to growing pressures for direct American interventlein?eg, through covert or tart bombing by American pilots. or U.S. Maine landings?ever-increasing coas, and Inc reseed deception at home. ill Practising population control through pel ce and refugee programs?Since U.S. Izrciathee-backad lova administrations can- na Inn popular support, the emphasis in- land has been on physical control of the pot illation. Executive policy hes since the 19.1a resettled nearly 14 million refugees in tress closer to US. Executive contro. in Sot th Vietnam, Cambodia and Leon Under the Nixon Doctrine, however, there has been a toticeably Increased emphasis on police operations, ranging from greatly increased mu naiades and national ID. card programs, to oonstant arrests, to the pen/acid liquids- Um of opponents. This practice, however, ha also proved counter-productive since it vireates the most baste tenets of humanity, 18w lug to world-wide protest, increased ly- ing by American leaders, and the further alit nation of a local population constantly sub !act to masa surveillance, round-ups, ston- y sentencing, and inhuman torture and pelt on =Otero troent. ICE COVERT will: MANWITLATING DOBLEETIC OPTNION TO =SALE EUNDENG 'me key to the Presidential branch's ability to rage covert war Is its ability to obtain fun ling from the Congress and American peo ite. Such funding in turn, derives from the Executive's control over information abo Its activities, e have airway described (see Section in able re) the methods used by the Presidential tom Mt to keep Information about its ally- item from Congress and the American peo- ple. This attempt, however, is only partially suc,easful. and Information frequently leaks out contradicting the Arleinootrationo pub- lic rotation. Ft few exempla of how the Adeneedstrotion hal tried to deceive Congress' and the Ameri- can people Moot the military and political situ item) in Indochina in order to obtain fun, ling foUow: ) Executive deception on military mat- ters 1. Ceasefire Violations--AmerIcan officials core tautly claim that the communists have tato ri the initiative in violating the ceasefire mill eirgy. Yet Representative Peter Peeling- hutten. a major spokesman favoring con- tinued aid to the Thieu government. recently stated on p. 4 of leis May 1.974 report. ^Viet- nam?A Changing Crucible" that: '1 he OVN has Wed well during post- cease-flee maneuvering: Since January 1973 it le J3 added 770 hamlets to the list of those over which it has dominant control, and it has reportedly reduced the number of dis- rupl3d hamlets by well over a third. The COM muttlists meanwhile have lost over 90 hamlets that were under their firm control at tie time of the ceasefire . . 2. Violation of U.S. !ledge to Withdraw Ado sers?The Administration has never re- veal, d Its secret "assurance' when signing the 'nets Agreement that it would withdraw all retntary or civilian advisers to the Viet- nam Ise armed forces within 12 months. This pled et, revealed in a secret memo prepared by Ceorge Aldrich, State Department deputy leg ig inn/see, states in part that: "3 icret?The United States has assured the DRV that we shalt withdraw from South Vlee lam within /2 months from the signa- ture of the agreement an our civilian per- soneil working in the armed forces of the Rein Mk of Vietnam." (Wash. Post, June 4, wre Woen this pledge was revealed by author Tate .3aule. the State Department denied that tetit easeartuece" constituted a firm promise to ite; so. Today, over 17 months after the eigi*tig of that Agreement, some 3,800 Ameri- can civilians continue to work with the Smola Vietnamese Armed Services. Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 5 1974 Approved For Titre , On June 8, 1974, the St. Louis Post- Dispatch reported that at the end of March 1974, 2,643 'U.S. employees contracted to the _Pentagon were working with the South Viet- i,narfieSenrillitary,:p36 were employed directly bY ale Defense Attache Office in Saigon, and 425 "inadeup:the official DAO military con- tingent. : 8. Exaggerating PRG Military Pressure? U.S., and ? GVN officials have blatantly at- tempted to deceive the -American people and Congress about the Thieu government's need for economic and military aid. During Marcia and October, :1978, for example, - Administra- tion spekesnibn trumpeted the idea that a "North VietnameSe offensive" was imminent. To this day, of conree, Mane has materialized. 'Even :more, aerie* was the transparently false attempt to wangle an $474 million supplemental military appropriation for the .43VisT during the spring of 1974. The U.S. Con- : pees was flatly told that if Thieu did not have this money, his army might collapse. On March12, 1974, for exaM516, Assistant ? Secretary Of Defense William `Cements testi- fied_ before the Senate Armed Services Com- mittee: - "Without additional funds the South VietnanneSe forces are _going to be in ex.. itremely 'dire straits here in April, May and ,June. There is just no doubt about it. . . . Weare going tia'riin Out of funds' here in the latter part of this fiscal year Unless we are given additional funds." 14 the event, Of course, the funding re- , quebt was denied. Theoretically, the ARVN alachild thus have been near collapse. In fact, boWeiser, the Wiehirigteri Post reported on May 9, 1974, after the request had been de- nied, that: "(Pentagon sPokesnian) Friedheim also appeared to take a less dire view . . than have some other White House and Defense oflielals. Friedheina toted that . only two ? InoUths remain in the 'current fiscal yea." . 4., Exaggerating Nature of Soviet and Chinese 'Aid?Ambassador Graham Martin has stated that "Our intention all along was to balance the ad given by the Soviet Union and the PeoPles'itepublic of 'China to North Vietnam." ' A_$Conding to the estimates of the 'U.S. De- . fear 17ritellikehce Agency,- itself, however, Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam in 1975 was only 6290 million. T.T.F.t. military aid to the 0,k711 alone in calendar ,year 1973, how- eye, was $2.271 billion, or eight tithes "as When one remembers that the United States alone spent hundreds Of millions in direct expenditures for U.S. military forces, as Well as hundreds_ of millions of dollars more in caMbOdlp, and Laos, the 'United States actually wound' sp outspending the Soviet Union ansi_Clainit I:1' far more in the first Veal. the''CVasaire. Zven more importantly, Soviet and Chinese aid to 'North Vietnam 'decreased by 4'7% from ' 1912 to 173, froth $605 million down to $290 aict to-Men, deereaSed by - 0111; 5% from 1972 to 1978, however, from - 92.683 billion to billion. (See Tables 6 and 7,) mcatirivE? DECEPTION ON POLITICAL MATEL ? AchninistratiOn' -Humanitarian. Con- cern-!--The AdmInistration _continues to Eitre:ps' it Srhmeii1taslaii ConCein' for affairs in $ont,,h'''Vietn*, while castigating the oth- er :fide:for 1,ts lact of ,himianitaripreoncern. OM,Jinie 26,1974; hOweirer, Senator Itennedy revealed' confidential ? 4blei from U.S. 441- bas*tolor iril 4gOn-adirocat=; , that the U.S.- "hold up'. itti contribution to the Tntrriatleirial Bed Cross in an attempt to 'pressure them :not to invite the PrOvi- sional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to an , international, conference to be held, in Geneva in September to &Sousa limiting weapons which are either indiscriminate or cause unnecessary atiffering; on June 23, mpfsintypitiEKRIVETRLER9i517f000100040047-5 4 1974, the Win lthn. reported that the U.S. was opposing UNICEF aid to children in North Vietnam tole PRG zones. And, most serioss:ly, the Administration has still not even basun to remove the many mines still maimir a and killing numerous Vietnamese peasanis in Saigon zones. -2. Political Priso: tars in South Vietnam? On May 28, Setsre-,sry Kissinger supported Graham Martin's -:,iiarge that there is no evidence that Sisigs n is holding large num- bers of political prisoners, and added that "the extensive evideace available to us sim- ply does not susta-n the highly publicized charges that civilia a prisoners are subjected to widespread, systealatic mistreatment ..." (Senator Kennedy nsert, CM., May 28, 1974) On June 7, 1974, however, Representative Abzug inserted 7 to the Congressional Record (p. E3657) a listing of over 100 articles which emeated from Saigon, from western journalists or residents, indicating widespread mistreatment of large numbers of political prison ars; since the Saigon government has no allowed even the Inter- national Red Cm ia to talk freely with civilian detainees, and since It has also turned down requahts for visits by Bishop Thomas Gumbletois of Detroit and other groups and individi !ails, the closing off of the prisons to the outside world (with the ex- ception of a few gilded tours) is cause for alarm, in and of itaelf. The assertion that the U.S. Embassy has "extensive evidence" on the treatment ,if prisoners is curious, since an earlier U S. Embassy study stated that 'U.S. advisers Lad been withci7awn from the prisons since .he ceasefire, and that Embassy informatian was based ,D13. "inter- nal" GVN records. 3. Administratioh Policy in Laos?U.S. of- ficials constantly maintain that they support the coalition goveri ,nerst in Laos. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 13, 1974, for example, Mr. Robert Nooter stated that "the formation A a Provi- sional Governmes 9. of National Union (PGNU) this past kpril represents a bona fide political rescisition of Laos internal differences. 'The UF. supports this effort...". - On June 23, 1974. 'however, Senator Edward Kennedy issued a Dress release, based on a still secret General kccounting Office report, Which revealed in act the Administration has not been suprarting the PGE,TU at all. ' On the contrary. Ti date, all funds had been going to the right wing Royal Lao faction directly, an ominiass throw-back recalling the pattern of past coup-making which has upset political sett toments before in Laos. Kennedy's charg,:a appeared to gain some substance, moreover, by a N.Y. Tines report the next day which indicated that a Vice- Admiral Ray Peet -71ad told a HOILSS commit- tee that U.S. objc-stives in Laos were "to maintain the survival of the polit.cally neu- tral Royal Laotian -Siovernment . . . and to encourage pursuit 1' Laos of objectives com- patible with the United States." ' 4. Administration "Food For Peace" Poli- tics?And there is I r-rsh indication that while pretending to obey a new Congressional pro- hibition against using Food For Peace monies for war, tbs. Administratima is con- tinuing to use loss: currencies generated by the sale of Pood Pc.r Peace commodities for military purposes n South Vietnam and Cambodia, as it has in the past. On lane 20, 19'7,1, for example, The Wash- ington Post reported from Phnom :Penh that: "dongreaSional e Sorts to 'prevent military use' of-funds seii,..E.rated by the Food For Peace pioiram a,Tiparently are being -frus- trated by some ilii;enions bookkeeping to circumvent the irilaht of Congress by simply allowing the fiand,; to pile up unused in a bank account :and then printing an equal annonnt of new kaney to pay soldiers. In Saigon, it also Ma-pa:ars possible -that funds generated by the 3,rogritm could be chan- neled into other -..sin-military areas of the ecofioniy, freeing up equal arnounti of money for military use and thus again frustrating Congress' efforts at control". This tiny sample of Administration un- truths make it clear that manipulation of domestic public opinion lies at the heart of Presidential covert war. For the American people and Congress would clearly not support any further ex- penditures in Indochina were the Adminis- tration to admit the truth of the examples above, i.e., that the Administration was vio- lating the Agreement by not withdrawing its advisers and supporting Thieu's violations of the Agreement, which were not, in turn, occasioned by either communist pressure or Soviet or Chinese aid; and that Administra- tion policy was non-humanitarian, covering up for Thieu's political prisoners, threaten- ing the Laotian peace agreement, and vio- lating a congressional ban on using Food For Peace for military purposes. VII: COVERT WAR; A COMMITMENT TO NARROW- BASED LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS The Administration's decision to attempt to keep administrations like those of Thieu and Lon Nol in power inevitably lead it to practice covert war. For the basic fact is that the narrow- based GVN and Lon Nol administrations can- not reach political accommodations with their adversaries. As a result, continued aid to such administrations simply encourages the perpetuation of war, leading to increase political and economic deterioration, leading to pressures for increased American involve- ment. In fact, it is only when American aid is conditional upon U.S.-backed local admin- istrations reaching a political compromise? even to their relative disadvantage?that the chances for American disengagement in- crease. The most dramatic example of this is Laos, (a) Saigon zones. The major problem facing the GVN today Is political and moral in nature, not eco- nomic. AID officials try to explain the very serious problems in GVN zones as due to rising world commodity prices, the with- drawal of the American presence, and other factors out of anyone's control. In fact, as a comparison with the frugal, well-balanced economy in PRG zones reveals, the heart of the GVN's economic problem is not finan- cial, and these problems cannot be solved by American aid. In a word, there is enough to go around in GVN zones. The problem is that the rich and the military elite are taking far more than their proper share, leaving the majority?the poor?to go hungry. The root cause of GVN problems is the Administration's refusal to chance political competition with the PRG. The primary responsibility for this, of course, lies with the U.S. Executive branch. The U.S., after all, supplies 86.3% of the GVN's income, including all of its ammo, guns and tanks and planes and bombs. (See insert by Senator McGovern, C.R., May 6, 1974). It is fundamentally inane to suggest that despite this preponderant role played by the U.S., it does not have the leverage to ensure that the GVN at least test the PRO's offer to compete politically. Such political competition would appear to be in the PRO's interests. The first step toward forming the National Council of Na- tIonal and -concord, for ex- ainple, would logically be enforcing Article 11 which gives bade democratic freedoms to all Vietnamese. Under Article 11 all Vietnamese would be given freedom of political activity ? (presumably freeing many political prisoners from GVN's prisons), freedom of residence (which would allow the refugees to return home), and freedom 'to organize (which would allow the Third Force and PRG to organize in the cities.) At the same time, the Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 S1424 Approved For ? CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 wiNcoliESSIONAL ? SENATE Augusi Pf woeld be expected to ellow Use Gine similarly to ritgenne in PRO zones. Perhaps because it Ilona tbat the (Wel could not stand up to political competition with the PRO. the U.S. Executive has taken no known steps to push for such a political compromise. Instead, it has given ettescrine prismig support to Thiene whme position includes the following points. The PRO must set a date for e/ectiono be- fore the people can have their denaocratic neat& as outlined in Article 11. (This posi- tion violates the Paris Agreement which sets no cowlitteres on the enforcement oe Ar- ticle 11. It could also only be viewed as an attempt to obstruct any kind of settlement by the PRO, which could bardly be expected to surface its cadre and start campaigning solely on the promise that Thema will allow Article 11 to be enforced.) There Is no "Third F'in"Se..' one of "three espial segments" recognized in entices 12. (On March 25, for example. GVN spoliesnme nut Sao True diselared that "the third fort* is merely an imaginary segment."---w inch means among Ober things that the National Council of ?Rorictitatiou could not coma MU being, since it Is to be composed of the three parts.) %do North Vietnamese must withdrew irteu Eolith Vietnam before the GVN will elm e to *Venom (Again, this positiernis a major vi- *laden of the Parish Agreement. The a itli- drivel of such a condition by the Crated Metes was Clearly one of the major factors WiErah led to the signing of the Agmertamt, which nowhere mentions the presence of the North Vietnamese. In Article 1 of the Agreement esplteltly states that, Vietnam. is eine ehirmtry4 The Administration, by requesting aid to the OVIe deepilet stated attitude toward the Faris Agreement?on seteittisiti of Setting impossible conditions which it knows in ad- vance the other side will not meet?gives the impression that it is not seriously interested lit eiromoting a political settlement lit South Vietnam. Inateada it has *nearly Opted for covert war to keep the PRO from power. 04,16 war, in. turn,. Is the basic reason izir SWIM Vietnanne economic probleres--watich are enormous-Ana result of the war, the HS, supports a GVN which refuses to allow refit- gene to return to their native homes in or war rao seep. This creates a great unpro- ductive Mane of reillioue of people either elialaered neat cities or resettled in acid, land- leen Woe millions of people who must be fed from the outside. As a resent of On wen the V.S. supporta a QIN whichrertneeamtar Aena= aigninesett? portions of Ito Mtn Man &erne. 350,000 civil servants. or 120.000 police All L57 mil- lion of them do not produce and must also be . all well aa fed. As a result of the war, South Vietnam baa seen a 75% Increase in prices last year. a 257 rise this year (ltalttmore Sun. tiny a, 1974); cods reserves have fallen dangerously low, under $100 million (L. A. Times, May 16), South Vietnam had to bring in imports toted- Ung $795 million in 1973. while exporting only $56 million?producing a trade deficit of $71)9 And Bitch 0C.QUOMIO problems. au tarn, have helped increase South Vietnam's ecr- ruptiern problems to epidernie proportions. In recent Meats. Saigon newspaper& have reported a %aim rice smuggling eines:nun out of Vietnam to other Asian countries where Mines are higher Mei Dan Toe, 5/ 11. 5/13 Dien Tin, 5/12a; a timber enitiggling riceneel, which has seen high government canton seize 450.000 acres in the last six zreeths, depriving the government of CIO-- 190 M:Illon in. revenues (Dai Dan Toc, 3/15, 5/18); a scrap metal scandal, which the State Department says involves $20-$40 ? Saigon newspapers say is more like al 2 billion (Ta Swag, 4/10s Dal Dan Ton 4/15. Chicago Tribune, 6/5); a fertilizer soandal, whioli 100-}80 high-ranking edictal& have Kotien rich through speculation, hoarding, anti price manipulation (NY Peek Vete Song Then Lynn Boa Dinh, e/13): 80-150.000 masoonalont welchers drawlieg salaries (Chi- cane Doily News. OH): insonemele camels- no going to the very lowest of ?Cicada for ea/maple a risings& oraessi who stole moany thee ises atappomed to. ge so refugees to Mead hnlhao 4rip1, Ht. Lout* Post-Diagensh. May 12, 1144); Six ARON Generals narasd as war-profiteers, by a Vietnamese Senator eujoying immunity from arrest (LA. Tones. Li 17). The combination of this war economy coupled with thoroughgoing official eorrup- tam hoe produced increasing economic hard - sale ler South. Vietnam ? people. The Beni- nun* Sun reported on May 8, for example, Lust.. "In the northern part at South Vietnam, people are dying of starvation because spec- ulative rico headgear ham made this beide loud tOiJ expensive to buy." Reports of suicide* due to economic prim- ed:0i are becoming increasingly frequent HY Tunes. 6/1; Dien Tin, 5/23). There are Maressiiing reports of crumbling morale, &hostages of baste commodities. massive un- employment. ihe aitisisticies hes bourn= SO serious, In- wie4. that It is unlikely that even if the Ad- io***Unitatiost's AIR regttest was passed this year toot it would serve as more than a mere *.up-gap measure. NO evidence whatsoever has been introduced to support the claim nun Vanning AIM ECL1/11023IndochinaPostwar Remourtruction aid wirtild start South Vietnam on the road to self-sue- ciericy; there Is a general consomme bow- ever. that &UCLA a sum would be a mere tem- porary measure designed to allow the GM to hold itie own for another year?uniees it Is wining to work towards a political compro- mise. The solution to South Vietnam's quite seri- ous economic problems, therefore. is not SIM - ply to give a aubstantial amount Of Food For Peace sod/ or Ladochina Postwar Baconatzuc- host aid. For people are not hungry fOr lark of food. In FY 74 for example, the 01711 re- aolied more Food For Peace ($30.1.8 mJlUi time all of Arno:a $132 =Mika:II Latin Amal- ie& (147.6 million). Bangladesh ($41.4 mil- lion) awl Pakistan ($35.1 million) combined. The problem is that dio Pood For Peace South Vietnam reeeive,d costa too much.? due to war and corrupilon?for those who need it most to purchase it. Lavish Ameri- cen aid can only esurounige war and corrup- tion. and Wanton, hunger. A Massive reduc- tion in American mid will force the CIVN to none about finding a ptditleal- SolUt.100, thereby structurally increasing the rhsoopti LIAAG /fount Vietnam can become self-sunl- nat. es: loch. towards the poLlticalaresia.bow- ner, we fluid tiwt, 011CIS again U.& aid is not neatening the situation, but rather lead- ing to a deterioration in the palate:al climate in (Inn muses. The U.S. perraiture; Them, to push through an ramendinant. for Wm to run for a third term as President causerananotee Nguyen Van tenon, a leading a,ntnconsesuptet Glithone. as resign as heed Of the Swots On dellinun Senisne Vu Van Man. head of the 3n04- 'mist Lotus aroup, they'd his head In protest. eneng Th'eu "dictate-v' and "incompst- , ea Jwillary 10, the NY 'Mae& reported 'I a'. litr Imi MIT zones bad been reduced compennon between two palace cliques, tf? headed by ThJeu's cousin. Huang Duc '-Itt?*.be other by a lien named Nguyen Vow name, leetiyen Van eigar was then reported lirrested five mantes latar because, at least nocreclIng to one cornmeutator. Thieu feared riThi..; power (LA Times, 5/31), ttea nebto, procests?Seeall. Out visible, by tee fee wta dare speak publicly?have con- tinued It hunger Ilrilre by hundreds of 1.974 Bud ihist monks, Cao Ditilsts, and other third foreo political prisoners was reported in Chi Hoe prison In March (NY Times. 2/7, 3412): 20 F os Boo Buddhists cut off the little fin- ger* of their left hands in protest against rest lotions on them (UPI. 6/7); 300 monks were reported demonstrating in the Delta to prot :at arrest of six monks (Philadelphia Inge her, 6/13); 19 Buddhists and Madame tVga Ba Thanh led a march through Saigon corn ig for the release of Thieu's political prisoners (Christian Science Monitor, 5/7); a Hutinhist reception for the families of polit- iesl prisoners was held, though surrounded by p ince (Agence Prance Presse, 5/1) ? (hi Lon Nol series? As bad as the political and economic situ- atlas In (MN zones is, however, the situation in Cambodia for the Lon Nol government is even more hopeless. Ot ee again, the responsibility for the rap- idly deteriorating situation lies with a US. Row etive branch which has preferred to wage covert war in Cambodia rather than attempt to reach a political solution, no mat- ter row distasteful It might find such a pont teal compromise. As the Washington Post reported on June 30, the Lon Nol government is entirely depeotfent on U.S. funds to continue its day- to-df.y functioning: "Cambodia's domesti- cally generated government revenues from taxa in fiscal year 1974 amounted to $54 mill ma?not nearly enough to cover Its $109 mini m military and $80 million civilian budgets.- And, of course, the U.S. Is supply- _ lug all transport, arms, ammunition, and other basic commodities. The basic fact is that Lon Nol controls little more than a few major towns, which can only be supplied by an American airlift or oc casional boat; as a result prices are re- ports d to have risen more than 300%, with foodi tuffs up 4100% in the past year. Specu- lation and corruption are also reported to have risen tremendously (Chicago Daily Newt, 6/12) . In a separate report, the Chicago Tribune reported that millions of dollars of U.S. arms aid has been disappearing into Cam'iodia, much of it turning up with the Sinner Rouge (June 26). The basic military and economic weakness Is re lected above all in Lon Nors political prolnems. His only real base of popular sup- port when. he took power was the teachers and atudents. By now, however, he was long since broken with both. In January 22,000 teachers went on strike, later supported by studints. Students continued demonstrating regularly, culminating in a May 31st march of some 1,500 through the center of town: the _railing of the Cambodian Minister of Education, after being held by demonstrat- ing a:admits. (the identity of the assassin Is not ,et known) symbolizes the major and perhaps irrevocable break between the Lon Nol eovernment and students and teachers. LO7 m Nol, however, has become increasingly Isolated, even within the small coterie of pont: clans with which he surrounds himself. Forced through American pressure to join a coalr ion with Cheng Heng, Sink Matins seed In Tan about a year ago, Lou Nol has pro- gress vely gotten rid of each. This spUt was tinany consummates' recently when Long Bona foamed a new cabinet in the aftermath of the Minister of Education's death. Slx top cabinet Milmala nirit Matak. wa,s ex- cludel from the new cabinet, along with all mem iers of his Republican party. The final cabinet consisted of 7 members. of floret's Socio -Republican party, which supports Lou Non 6 independents; and two array men. Since In Tam bad, long since left, this newest cabinet reshuffle left Lon Not with his ;ear- . row* t political base since the U.S. forced him 'to take in the others a year earlier. Vaster the circumstances then, it is hard to th nit of a single coherent reason why the Congg ess should give any aid to Lon Nol at all, It alone the astronomical sum of $550 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 , Approved For Release 2005/07120 CIA-RDP79-009,57A000100040047-5 - ugust 5, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL R 1;,CORD ? SENATE - mflhidn 'being 'asked for by the Administra- tion for ''F-iscal 'Year 1975. The major justification for our involve- ment il!ir Cambodia originally was that it was nedgeSsify'to Protect T.T.S. ground troops fight- ing in Smith Vietnam. As American troops were progressively 'withdrawn from South Vietnam, the Admin- istration changed its rationale td protecting the Cambodians from -a North Vietnamese in- vasion. During the past few years. however, the North VietriameSe have not been in- volved in the 'fighting 'between Lan Nol and Khmer Rouge troops. As the N.Y. Times re- ported on November 25, n73: , "The Government tells them that they are lighting Vietnamese -1-traders and the soldiers are beginning to discover that that Is not true : . Nobody sees North Vietnam- ese troops in battle any more. The voices that call to Government soldiers from across the battlefields are Ithriier 'tibias, the soldiers say; the bottles are !Gamer bodies." !.1"110 iieW Administration position that lavish :American aid to 1;On. 'WM w11l -show the _other sides that it cannot Win a Military victory, thus pushing- it tovSaMs negotia- tions. There Is no eisidence to Support this point of view, however, and even- less Justin- cellar' for why the United -States should be involVed- in What IS'Iddisi "admitted to be a cdvii- War Either* -taitibo? diens. 'In tact, at in -Labi,-"ternfinued 'U.S. support to Lon NO1 simply lead to morefight- ing, lees likelihood for a political settlement, mad increased costs for the United States. Thus, it is that Lon Nol has lbst territory and people in the past Year, despite a -giant U.S: Military and air pacISage totaling $631.5 million, more than we gave to all of Latin America last year. And thus it is that this staggering amount of Money" not Only accomplished very little last Year, but has seen the Administration ask for almost twice as much for FY 1975 in Carnbacliit ($550.8 million) as it did in 11T--74 (08/.8 ' Csainhodia wliere the U.S. Executive today spends ;vast sums to keep a half-mad dic- tator hi_ power despite his lack of any other , ebSerVpliiie Support, either ettVr-na-lly or in- ternally, is the greatedt example Of our time Of What ,:is wrong about Presidential covert Warfare. AS have sUggested, the time has come for dentress to move 'to terminate sueh war arotind the 'globe. can think of no more aPproPrIate place -to begin than Cambodia. (a) Lath? The one exaMple of how Congress can terminate Presidential covert *at in Indo- china atigeelroinLiibt. 'Striae: 1062 -Laos :Eat been the very Model of the -futility of Presidential covert war. Successive Athericiiii-adiriiiiigfrationa poured In billions of dollars, built up a Meo and then Thai "Secret "Army," and dropped nearly 2 million tons Of bomb-a on Laos, in an Tattempt to keep a small stoup of right- Wing generals under the titular leadership of ,S-ciiyarma Phouma in power. result? A steed? 'Acreage in territory and population by the Pathet Lao; the deci- mation of the 1Vleo people and heavy losses by Thai troops; the destruction of much of What Was one of the most beautiful societies On the face Of the earth; and thewaste of peiliap$ more than $10 billion and hundreds Of American lives. - 4"14:Onghoili-all- those long Years of Presi- dential,: covert f war' in-Laos, Moreover; the Main Obstacle to -a- political solution was elearly "riOt' the taaiant Ira -rather 'd U.S. Exptutiye, Which wished to bomb the lb Chi Minh 41,41Jii ediiiEern-Laos 'aid '' War orcircfri;sAti. IrlafriatiV use ficorTherri?Laot as Abase' for intelligerice-gaffiering nitgalona into China and 'gottli VletneM 'and, it was suggested hi- ?a tragliingtOn'tfar-News' arti- cle "dated May 21,- 1574, 'to slack the North Vietnamese' into Laos so as tb tie up some of their troops Which It was telt might oth- erwise be used in South ietnam. In 1973 however, du' to increasing mili- tary gains by the Paths , Lao and the switch to covert U.S. involvee-ent in South Viet- nam, it was the U.S.. Ands changed and decided to push the Isio right wing to ac- cept a political settlemen, in Laos. The result of this, if course, has been increased stability, a siotential savi:ags of hundreds of millions ' dollars, and a po- tential end to Americen involvement in a war that few Americi 3 ever know about, let alone desire. Of course, the U.S. iscision to push for a political settlement he s also meant that the Pathet Lao have MELO, considerable gains politically, and are in if much better position to one day govern Lao-, But this is a lesson the American people roust learn. I do not sense that it has be overly painful for them. How long this situps will last, however, is anyone's guess. The 1.8. Executive branch ultimately intervened toth in 1958 and 1962 to prevent the Pathet from taking pow- er, and the danger ex :stis that it will do so this time as well. The clearest warnins sign yet of this is the GAO report that the Administration has continued funneling ail to the Laotian right wing, in violation cs the Laotian Peace Agreement. It is clearly up to :ingress to make the lesson of Laos stick 1 is stipulating that no aid go to any projecsi in Laos unless ap- proved 'unanimously -r all factions in the Provisional Govern) ins t of National Union (PGNU). VIII. COVERT WAR' T.'a NECESSITY CY, U.S. zrumrrssT pEasokar!).!. AND, TECHNOLOGY It must be remems-,red that an Admin- istration like that of ; ? ie GVN or Lon Nol is not even remotely c ,;-)able of maintaining their present military 'orce levels. In part, this is a- mple matter of eco- nomics. The calm is It capable of raising more than 15% of its annual income, with 85% coming from tlis United States. As a result, American funs] s and materiel are nec- essary to provide all tic wherewithal to keep the GVN's 1.1 miPim man army and 2,000- plane air force frosi collapsing. And, of course, the Lon Nol gr sernment is even more penniless, making its sen more dependent on American aid. American personzu 1, however, are as Im- portant as U.S. mats lel. If American per- sonnel were not ;midis :14e to repair aircraft, handle logistics, play operations, American equipment would eit: r lie unused or unre- paired, appear on the market of major cities, or be sold to Lii highest bidder (usu- ally the PRG of Ki aer Rouge)?in even greater quantities the A now is the case. During my trip to Els-uth Vietnam last year, for example, I was cc: stantly told by Amer- ican technicians the Thieu's air force and army would collapse in a matter cif weeks without American tee iinicians. (a) U.S. Military personnel Thailand today ser---ss as both the person- nel and logistics base of the covert U.S. mili- tary preseiase in Indos -Una. Virtually all rice, ammunition and hos Os used in Cambodia move from Sattabip Fort in southern Thai- land (LA Times, May ii, 1974.) U.S. personnel are training in Lao a id Cambodian pilots in Uidorn and other 13.1, air bases in Thailand (June 13, 1974). BY, jadier General James Hildreth, the U.S. ofiser in charge of Udorn Air Force Base, has tdmitted to :reporters that the U.S. is sti);, dying reconnaissance missions from Thane over South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos LA TIMER, January 11, 1274) ; and U.S. ?Ma: s have admitted flying recorrnalsssn-ce flight-3 over North Vietnam as 'well from Thailan S. (See NY Times, April 21, 1973) . Thailand has aiso srved as a major base for Air America. Air .Stnerica, the CIA-owned S 14265 airline, has greatly increased its role in Indo- china since the Ceasefire. Providing a civilian "cover," it performs many of the functions carried out by the U.S. Air Force before the Ceasefire: deploying local troops, transport- ing U.S. military and CIA personnel, dropping arms and supplies to local garrisons. It is no surprise than Congressman Aspin reported-on January 9, 1974, that Air America in 1973 had doubled its contracts over 1972, from $17.7 million up to $41.4 million. The recent an- nouncement that Air America has been pur- chased by Thai-American, Inc., was described as a response to public pressure in Thailand against the CIA, It remains to be seen if the functions being carried out by Air America will also be terminated, or whether instead they will now simply be carried out by Thai- American and/or other such companies. (Washington Post, June 4, 1974) On March 28, 1974, Senator Harold Hughes revealed that an average of over 5,000 "hostile 'fire payments" had been made monthly to U.S. military personnel for activities in Indo- china: 6,263 in October, 1973, 5,669 in No- vember, 4,700 in December and 4,015 in Jan- uary 1974. The Defense Department at the time explained that such payments were for "American servicemen who are performing non-combat activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and whose presence . . makes them vulnerable . . . to hostile fire." This revelation made it clear that U.S. military personnel, as well as U.S. civilians, were en- gaged in combat-related activities, although the Defense Department did not make it clear what these payments were being given for. On June 5 Defense Secretary Schlesinger revealed what at least some of these pay- ments were for. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Schlesinger stated that the U.S. Air Force was flying some 690 missions monthly out of Thailand into Cambodia, dropping supplies and am- munition to Lon Nol troops stationed in out- lying outposts. The Defense Department later stated that the 690 figure was high for the month of August, 1973, and that the average was on the order of 425 missions a month throughout 1973. (UPI, June 6, 1974.) U.S. fighter pilots flying protection for these supply missions into Cambodia are also drawing hostile fire pay, sources have re- ported to the Indochina Resource Center. Other activities for which U.S. military per- sonnel could be drawing combat pay vary from similar sup-ply and reconnaissance mis- sions into Vietnam and Laos, to clandestine services as military advisors to local armed forces. Within Indochina itself, U.S. personnel play an indispensable role iA holding the lo- cal air forces and armies together. The lo- gistics and technical requirements of keep- ing together South Vietnam's giant 1.1 mil- lion-man army and 2,000-plane air force, for example, make American technicians and logistics experts indispensable. As I stated previously, I was told repeatedly on my post- ceasefire visit to South Vietnam that neither Lon Non's nor Thieu's armed forces could function without these men. American personnel are necessary to repair the sophisticated aircraft, tanks and other machines of war which are the mainstay of the Thieu and Lon Nol armies; to manage the gigantic logistics flow of billions of dol- lars worth of arms, ammunition, clothing, food a,nd the thousands of other items nec- essary to keep the Lon Nol and Thieu mili- tars, forces In the field; to carry out the over, all direction and planning necessary to co- ordinate ground and air operations, plan out overall strategic operations, and carry out other tasks beyond the capacities of the Thieu or Lon Nol governments. For example, American technicians have historically done the detailed and compli- cated work necessary to analyze recon photos to select bombing targets for the Thieu and Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 S14266 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENAIE August 5, 1974 LOO NO1 air forces. While It has not yet been revealed that this has continued since the Ceasefire. there Is every reason to believe that the reconnaissance missions currently being Carried out by American aircraft todei over Indochina, in violation of the Pare Agreement, are being used for such target- ing. There are increasing indieations, moreover that American personnel are serving in aci? visory Capacities in combat situations, in vio- lation of Congressional law, as well is the Pare Agreement. There are numerous reports, roost notably by the General Accounting Office. that U.S. military and civilian personnel under the control fo the CIA have been violating a Congressional ban against advising Cambo- dian troops on the ground. The most recent such reports were filed by the Washington Poet on March 13, 1974. reporting the activi- ties of a Major Ondecker who was directing Cambodian troops at Kampot; and by writer Bareherd Boyle, who recently returned from Csoabodia with photographs and mimes of persons he cheirned were advising Cambodia troops in combat. There have also been periodki reports Within South Vietnam of Americana involved combat-related roles with the South Viet- namese armed forces. The Seaton Globe, for example, reported On January 27, 1974, that IBM executive Rob- ert Ransom stated that on a recent trip to Selith Vietnam that he was told by a forme: American military advisor that "Americans are still flying gunships from Da Nang air- haft . . . often camouflaged under a Red Crews emblem." David Shipler of the NY Times reported on 2/25/74 that: "Americari civilians . . . not only see that the South Vietnamese get the equipment they wsk for. but also advise them on what to ask foe... More direct, overt advice is sometimes giver. by zealous America* who are still stationeci 111 every province . There are easo indications of an ongoing CIA role in Indochina separate from that of disguised U.S. military personnel Lime the ellasenre. On July 24, 1973, for exempla, Taramy Arbuckle of the Washington Star- News reported that the CIA has been setteug Up Cambodian paramilitary unite hi several prairie* in Canabodia, separate and distinct trona the regular Cambodian army. And in South Vietnam, U.S. Ambit-emcee Martin was reported in a May 8, 1974, AP dispatch to have admitted that an Air Amer- ica plane had been used to transport North Vietnamese POWs. Martin only made this admiselon after, an AP photograph had been taken of seven North Vietnamese POWs being led onto the plane. Martin claimed that he had authorized the flight for 'humanitarian" reasons to help one wounded prisoacr, and did not knew about the other six. It is wail- known South Vietnam that the CIA has been directly involved ,in the teterroga- tkin 4nd torture of prisoners since the begin- ning of the war. Similarly in Laos, although all Americans Involved in the war have been reportedly withdrawn, 500 "civilians" :ameba behind, and the recent GAO revelation that the Ad- ministrat1on has been directly funneling money to tile Laotian right wing in violation of the Laotian Peace Agreement suggest+, that the Administration has no more inteetion of withdrawing its covert personnel from Laos today than it did in 1962. One's teem are not quieted by reports such as the March 14, 1974, letter in Rolling Stone from a U.S. airman stating that "(I am) stationed in a remote U.S. Air Force bees in Thailand . . . Receizitly U.S. military forces are being intro- duced into this area, covertly, and especially into Vientiane and other Laotian areas.' The most complete report yet to emerge since the Ceasefire about American military activities in Indochina since the Ceasenre Is that given by Steven M. Davis, who worked for the Federal Electric Corporation In South Vietnam from January through June, 1973. Mr. Davis worked in the top-secret Saigon 'nelecommunications Center of the American lernbasay. Colonel A. C. Barger of the Defense Intelligence Ageocry (DIA) In a letter dated November 7..1973. to Senator George McGov- ern confirmed that Steven Davis did indeed work at the Telecommunications Facility (luring January-June. 1973, and also con- firmed one of Mr. Davis's charges: that im- proper security procedures were being used. Mr. Davis, as reported by Pacific News Serv- ice reporter Joan Bolden, has reported the meowing based on hie work at the Telecom- munications Facility: More than 100 U.S military advisors are operating in Cambodia In violation of the Congressional ban on such activity. More than 100 more Americans were serv- ing as meroenaries with the Cambodian ermed forces, under the control of the CIA. U.S. teams designated as search groups for U.S. lineeing In Action have included per- &mute whose task is military spying. General Hash, an American captured by in. Chinese during the Paracel Islands fight- ing, was actually an Army Captain advising Thieu urrny units under the guise of a civ- titan employee in charge of monitoring loges- was now to Da Nang. The U.S. was not only eying regular re- calliailaM1100 missions in violation of the Paris Agreement, but U.S. aircraft were bombing in South Vietnam on occasion. U S. Air Form personnel were manning beacons within South Vietnam to guide aerial bombardment of Cambodia and South Vietnam. (b) U.S. War Materiel. The obvious importance of U.S. materiel ead technology In keeping the Thieu &rut Lou Not governments alive need riot be biro:lied here. It is useful to note, however, that the covert practice Of attempting to use im- proved technology to compensate for low morale in no eneratned that the Administra- tion has been attempting to modernize equipment, blatantly violating Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, which holds 'Dist equipment can only be replaced on a "one- lot-one" Muds. Congressmen Agpin recently revealed, in the Cionerentonal Record of June 13, 1974, that the Administration has requested funds violating the "one-for-one" clause of the Paris Agreement in four separate categories, ernely : Funds to modernize the South Vietnamese Air Foes, by replacing the Fe6A with the technically superior P-610. Funds to send in C-1 30e to replace the far smaller C-7 transport aircraft presently in Tunis for 29 A-37B fighters to replace, In pert. the old propeller-driven. single-engine A- Is. Funds modernize 4 transport aircraft by turning them into g-unships. And these examples, of course, are merely 11 addition to Many other reported violations of the "one-fot-one" clause, most notably the Administration plan tO send in 60 F-SEs to replace- the older F-5As. The F-SE is an en- tirely ditTeeent plane tean the F-SA, haying twice the combat radius, nearly twice the aerieleration rate, and carrying nearly a half- ton gresti,r bomb load capacity. On April 7. 1974, moreover, the Saigon newspaper Dien Tin reported that $O American specialists weuid arrive at Bien 1104 &Ulu* to assemble tee new F--Ma, within South Vietnam). The most useful measure of the central role played by American mabsziel in support- lag U.S. Presidential covert war In Indochina. :weever, is simply the sheer quantity of arms and ammunition being shipped into Indo- china. As we have pointed out this quantity 15 :sr in excess of what oven the Defense In- telligence Agency claims is being shipped into Ii dochina by the Soviet Union and the Peo- ple's Republic of China. (See Table 8.) Even more to the point, however, is that the Administration is clearly attempting to Mee Thieu far more materiel than he needs to defend himself. In Fiscal Year 1974 the Administration al ocated e359 million in funding for the "procurement" section of Its military aid to Thieu. In Fiscal Year 1975, however. the At ministration is requesting more than twice as much, or $652 million. it should be noted that Administration ofecials unanimously state that they do not erect a major offensive in the coming year. These vast inputs of covert American per- soenel and materiel, however, simply do not milk* to strengthen Thieu or Lon Nol. On the contrary?by keeping them dependent on American personnel and resources, there Ii no chance for the kind of structural cheneee necessary to fight their opponents. The result is simply increasing corruption, sicth and lack of morale?and increasing ga ns by their opposition, thus leading to in :reusing pressures for direct American in ervent ion. The Indochina Resource Center has re- ceived a number of reports, one of which is Ira luded here as Appendix Two, indicating the US. Marines are standing by to invade Ca nbodia should Phnom Penh be threat- ened. its Executive ?Melees grow more worried, mereover. they state quite openly their In- tel lion to resume American bombing should Saigon or Phnom Penh be seriously threat- efled. int November 1, 1973, for example. U.S. Air Frees Conunander Vogt was quoted in the LA Times as saying, "Now that we're not act ually dropping bombs, we must maintain ow capability to resume such action if we hate to . . . The whole idea of retaining these unite in Thailand . . . is to be ready in ewe the enemy miscalculates and decides he wants to resume on a massive scale." Cm December 3rd Defense Secretary See lesinger was reported as saying that "If Hanoi ... were to launch an all-out assault ... I believe the President would be prepared to ome back to Congress and ask for support of (U.S.) military activities in support of Sestet Vietnam," And on January 7, 1974, Schlesinger repeated the threat, adding that he bought that Congress would agree. The Administration is not simply threat- eni ig to resume the bombing by words, how- ever. This year it has requested the giant sent of $463 million?more than it is spend- ing on all of Africa?to maintain American air units in Thailand prepared to resume the boribing. xx. ,40VIRT WAR; POLICE AND REFUGEE PROGRAMS FOR POPULATION CONTROL Tae hallmark of Presidential covert war is its ?implies* on controlling the local popu- lation. During the 1950s and 1960s, this em- phesis saw the creation of nearly 14 million reftgees, according to the DS. Senate Sub- committee on Refugees, as much of rural Indoreina was moved away from areas near null guerrillas towards provincial capitals and cities where they could be more easily core roiled. Also, during the 1960s the local poliee forces in Indochina were vastly ex- pan led through American aid and advisors In en attempt to physically prevent the peo- ple .rom aiding the guerrilla forces once they wen in areas of government control. Owe again, American personnel and fund- ing save the key elements in both police and referee programs for the last decade, due to the ack of technical expertise and economic base of the local administrations. There are numerous indications that this American role Is continuing up to the present day. Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 Aiirgitt 5, 1974 (a) Police Programs. , The GVN's reliance on pdliee programs to control the peptilation Since the Ceasefire has "been Vell-doeinriented. On June 7, 1974, for exaMple, ei Refla Abzug inserted in the Congres9innaT RecOrd a listing of more than 100 articles appearing in the western press Since the Ceasefire, most emanating di- reetly from Saigon, which detail the con- tinuing onerations Of the GVN's police and prison system. A wide- variety of western sources have documented that Saigon's 120,000-man police force has Continued constant sweeps, post- curfew round-ups of men, women ;and chil- dren, constant checks on ID cards and fre- quent arrests and torture of individuals on political charges since the Ceasefire:. In testimony before the House Pacific Af- fairs Subcommittee on September 13, 1973, for exainple, I described the police system in South Vietnam as / saw it upon. my visit there in June and July, 1973: - Constant surveillance of the population as a whole; Earldom arrests carried out during sys- tematic sweeps throughout GVN towns and villages; ? Detention and torture of numerous incli- , "Vicitials, without benefit of counsel; Summary sentencing either by a military - court or, in most cases, by "administrative detention" in Which the arrestee has no counsel or trial;' - Intprisonment for years Characterized by lack of proper food, water, and medical care; and Increased surveillance and harassment upon release from prison. !xtensive documentation has emerged also of the continued detention of tens of thou- sands Of politieal Prisoners since the Cease- fire, as well as a Continuing policy of new arrests since the Ceasefire. On September lff, 1973, for example, Rep- reSentative Abzug entered into the record of, the 'House 'Mane Affairs Subcommittee hearing -aft official telegram from the na- tional Phoenix Directorate ordering all local Phoenift'officeS to continue" operb,tions. This teleorain; printed in "Le -Monde on May 17, 19'7L Clearly indicated that the GVN was cOntinning" to "neutralize," i.e., arrest or as- salldnate; The:: Administration openly -intended to keep funding the GVIkrs pollee- and prison fiytWir after the Ceasefire. On June 4, 1973, for efaimp,e; -Senator Kennedy revealed that the V. Agency for 'International Develop- Merit *lets- reviegting. $15:2 million for con- tinued' funding' of the V'N's police and prison systerti for the Visbal Year beginning July 1, 1973, i.e., six months after the Paris Agreement had beensigned. (See the Con- ssional 'Record, June 4, 1973, 510204.) Subsequent Congressional action forced the Adnil/listrittiOn to stop such direct funding of the-police arid 'prison sratent-Desp '''' this; however, the fact that 'U.S. funds supply at least 115% of the GVIT's- income means, of efnirse, that theShare df maintaining the Mt's police system Still comes from the however indirectly. Tile? complexities of the GPM's' police ap- paratus, inoreo*er, Aiecetsitate- American ad- Vice and Support. During the past decade, for Oicatigke, the U.S. Office Of Public Safety planned and Minleniented a National ID Card Ppgrani which - saw the issuance of over 10 xhu1ir,Oi 1T Cards to all Vietnamese over the e` IS: All Vietnamese are required to 'these Try cards, on pain of arrest. The r s-are linked to giant computers, in which fingerprints and bio-dossiers are 'stored, 'le-?. ted at theVerecomrnunications Directorate. ? tinder the Paris, Agreeinent, the Adminis- tration was required to withdraw all advisors to Saigon's police force. In February, 1974, tiOweVer, one year after the signing of the Paris Agreement, a team of Americans sent Approved For Release 205/07 CONGRESSIONAL aWR9WAye57A000100040047-5 s 14207 Swigen by.the ih dug Airierican Se- curity Council reported oat: "A handful of U.S. vilia-n technicians continue to provide advii , in the operation of a newly-installed comroter eystean which keeps tabs on more th- ,1 10 million South Vietnamese." (From Viet am Report: "Not in Vain", American Secorii ,? Council, page 8) The NY Times, in it February 25, 1974, survey of continuing A erican involvement in South Vietnam art, the Ceasefirc, re- ported that: "Tim South Vietuan -e National :Police continue to receive regM tf advice from Amer.. leans . . . to high-rank ,g (Vietnamese po- lice) officers said they .,nd their staffs met frequently with the its ,,on station chief of the CIA and his staff-. . Police officials con- firmed that in some pro' aces American 'liai- son' men who work witl, ,he police remain on the job. . . . Local pc,' oemen still refer to 'American police adv: irs'. . Police here have military functen? and engage in in- filtration, arrest, inter,,gation and torture of COmmunists and poi tical dissidents," Steven Davis, the Feieral Electric Corpo- ration employee who Itorked at the Saigon Telecommunications I rectorate, has re- ported that on May 14 1973, he saw a mess- age to local CIA offic in South Vietnam directing that the Foot ,x program in South Vietnam was to be trin ferred to the South Vietnamese National ?olice, thus freeing local agents under th, control of the CIA to start new Phoenis programs in South Vietnam in areas whet., Phoenix had not yet operated. (b) Refugee Prograrir. Since the Ceasefire, the GVN has openly continued its policy ci concentrating refu- gees in camps and re o gsing to allow them to return to their orto nal villages. On January 25, 1973, tor example, two days before the Paris Agree rient was signed, the Washington Post rends t ?,c1. that: "The South Vietnmiese government will not permit hundreds ,?7 thousands of refu- gees from Communist oeld areas to return to their homes after I e? cease-fire takes ef- fect and will punish toem if they try, ac- cording to U.S. officials ikere." In addition to keel Ing refugees In their camps, moreover, Gills: oolicy has also aimed at enlarging its. chair ? ,d territorial control by forcibly removing refugees to areas un- inhabited by either sio On March 22, 1973, and July 5, 1973, for e?-,-aanple, the NY Times reported "resettle/nen - of several hundred thousand people in ad effort "to get broader control." The result has beet unending misery for millions of refugees io have been forced to live on arid, unpvoluctive soil, in areas where farming is almr-t impossible. On No- vember 23, 1973, for ample, the Washing- ton Post reported: "As if on cue, the rshabitants of Than- thuy's moldering seal I es come out to plead with their unexpectec visitors: we are hun- gry. This land is poo,. We want to go back to our village. Please sk the government to let us go home." Police controls in f.t Ch refugee ca;mps are tight. On March 28, 1974 for example, Diane Jones of the America Friends Service Com- mittee testified beton, he Senate Appropria- tions Committee on enditions in refugee camps she had visrtec :n South Vietnam be- tween October, 1973, tid February, 1E474. She reported that: "These camps lot 1:ed nothing like vil- lages, but like coneet Iration camps, some of them totally surromo-red by barbed wire or bamboo stake fete with tall military watchtowers on the perimeters . . people were not allowed beyc nd the camp boundaries except during certati hours of the day. . . The inhabitants of tl- t se camps had to regis- ter with Camp officir?lr, when they left and When they returned, in Xuyen Phuoc camp In Quang Nam province, I talked extensively with a government official who told me his job was politioal control of the population... he showed me stacks of pictures, one picture of each family in the camp . . he said that he had to check daily each family against their family report.... If anyone disappeared without asking permission, he said the per- son's family could be arrested." American policy is directly responsible for such refugee control programs. In Fiscal Year 1974 the Administration ex- pended over $70 million on such refugee pro- grams. In Fiscal Year 1975, it is requesting $116.5 million to continue them, an increase of more than 50%. There are convincing indications, more- over, that American officials are aware of the true nature of this refugee program. In- deed, the evidence indicates that this policy of controlling refugees may be as much a result of deliberate American policy as GVN's desires. A U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee study published one year after the signing of the Paris Agreement, for example, reprints sev- eral internal U.S. documents. One, an official description of refugee resettlement sites in Military Region II, dated October 17, 1973, characterizes 30 resettlement sites as being economically unviable. A letter from the U.S. Consul General in Bien Hoa, Mr. Robert Walkinshaw, dated April 5, 1973, states that: "The people will move into areas that were previously considered marginal, thus secure the area, improve movement and security along major routes of communication, de- velop the agriculture ... and bring economic viability to the country as a whole." And the most thorough and convincing picture yet to emerge of the U.S. role in ref- ugee control was presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 2, 1974, by Mr. Edward Block, an A.ID, refugee official in South Vietnam from April, 1972, until December, 1973. "The real objectives of the 'U.S. mission (Include) to encourage the GVN to hold hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of refugees as dependents of the government rather than allowing them to return freely and peacefully to their original villages . to help the Saigon government to occupy additional territory presently contested or claimed by the PRG. . ." "(This) objective is evidenced by the fact that the GVN continued to keep more than a half million refugees in camps long after the Ceasefire agreement had been signed.. ." "Hundreds of thousands of refugees from the 1972 April offensive are currently being poorly resettled under the same conditions that exist for the 1968-1971 refuees. . "Little or no assistance is provided for land clearing; refugees are often placed in resettlement wnere no land is available; little or no farmland is ever distributed where it is available in many cases, food allow- ances are arbitrarily cut off, causing wide- spread hunger and malnutrition." "The Stieng Montagnards of Binh Long province (were) concentrated for a year and a half in the squalid An Lot refugee camp where they watched more than 300 of their children die like flies." "AID. officials argue that no refugees have come forth to request their return to home in PRG-controlled areas. This argu- ment might as well be no refugees have come forth to commit suicide, because the GVN still maintains a policy of shooting or jail- ing anyone caught moving about in areas outside of its immediate control." "Once the GVN occupies . . , new areas, it wastes little time in seizing this oppor- tunity to utilize refugees for their own coun- terinsurgency purposes, despite possible hazards to the people involved. For example, I know first-hand that in resettlement in Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 110.0"' s 44268 Approved For Ream 2005/07/20 ? CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 tx.RESSIONAL RECORD --SENKa August 5, 1974 Quang Nein province, the OVN has boen bties recruiting children between the ages of 7 and 14 to perform intelligence and detection work within their villages and the surrounding areas." PREBIDENTLAL COVERT WAR: A TINE TO smut roe ENE LIVING There Is no more ominous sign for the f u- ture health of this nation than our present tendency to speak of our Indochina involve- ment as Wit has ended. We rarely speak of It at all. The media rarely carries the many stories filed from Ln. dochina,?Walter Cronkite is reported as saying that we knee we lost the ear, and therefore want to forget it. Time and again, traveling about the country, one L3 told that "people just don't want to hear about Viet- nam:1 any more." To the extent that Vietnam is rani fen ta- me. it is as if it were a long-distant trtigedi one that laid its heaviest burdens on ArnIT I cans. "Vietnam" today means OretaerilY ve'- erans? problems, amnesty, POWE, the ac counting for U.S. Missing-In-Action. Them concerns are understandably real to most Americans. Our Vietnam past haunte 1.15, ahd will for many years to come. The time, however, has clearly come to speak Of the present as well, to reteembei not only the dead but the living. It is time to speak of teas of them:kinds re political prisoners in South Vietnam. sub- jected to torture, hunger, thirst and best1rs/0. at this very moment, people who ineie been Imprisoned without trial or hope or teller. It is tinu? to speak of millions of refugees In Cambodia and South Vietnam whom we helped bomb and force out of their ancestral homes, people who sit Landless and jobless in arid camps today because we still help pre- vent their return to the villages oi their birth, It Is time to speak of the millions more in South Vietnam now being watched, sub' jected to mem round-ups, harassed by a nightmarish police system that we created. And,?most of all?it is time today to speak of the hundreds of thousands a Vleteatuese and Cambodian and Laotians who are alive and whole, but will be dead or maimed a year frtnn tOdity if AdynItestranon aid requests are granted. It Is time to speak of these Lvine.--not only for their mikes, but for oure. I will never forget the words of a Laotian refugee whom I interviewed after he had survived 5 years of our bombing In north- eastern Laos: "In the region of the Plain of Jars, then mole to be a lake of blood and destruction. For there were airplanes and the sound of bombs throughout the aides and the hills An we had were the holes." Mali nation as a whole learned during the 1960s that we could not ignore this lake of Mood. We learned that, for example: To let our Executive leaders destroy aboeed meant that they would not construct a Great or New Society at home; To tolerate Presidential lawlessness in Indochina would lead to Presidential law- lessness in Watergate; and To ignore the CIA's ponce mentality in Vietnam would see this mentality blossom here through data banks, electronic surveil- lance, and countless other loviudon.s of pri- vacy. Much progress lute been made, Mildly. At long last, the principle is lint' etking hold that we have no right to intervene in other nations' internal affairs. We can now uream of the day when our leaders will turn away from interference abroad to meeting the Weide of their own people at home. But for this progress to continue, today 's ongoing Presidential couert war In Indoeeine can no longer be ignored. There is almost unanimous agreement today that we were 'wrong" to get involved In Indochina. Some say this from a legal point of view, others from a moral one, and stet' others groin a practical perspective. But int wally all Americans say it today. What we must also say, however. is that If ebbs Presidential ,00vert involvement was "wrong" in 1934, it In also "wrong" in 1974. For II we are to learn one single lesson from the past 25 yours of U.S. Intervention In Indoehluts, let it ee this: We must confront the lake of blood our leaders are still creattng in Indochina.? no matter how unpleasant, difficult or pain- ful. For it has already begun to yeah across this land, leaving epiritual and physical plebes that will be felt for generations. And, In the end, this lake or blood will either engulf us,?Of purify us and set us tree, RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY ROA NATIONAL CONVENTION ON JULY 6, 1974 Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 30 resolutions were adopted by the Reserve Officers Association at their national con- vention at Atlanta, Oa., July 6, 1974. These resolutions represent the best thinking of the leaders in this outstand- ing organisation dedicated to preserving strong national defense posture. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- tent these resolutions be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the resolu- tions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: IMsotortoNE ADOPTED sr Tilt NATIONAL Cow- veterroo or one Reitrave Orieczas Assocuo now or Tree Marrow Seams, Jtrer 6, 1974 LUTIorti NO. 1: US. EIGHTS Ili THE PAIIAILI CAL Whereas, a recent agreement bas been eemed by the United Staves Secretary of .tato and the Panamanian Foreign Minister to draft a new treaty, terminating the Pan- ama Treaty 01 1903, sad Whereas. the new treaty will eventually transfer and surrender title, control, opera Liao and defense of the Canal and Can Zone to Panama together with other co commons. and Whereas, tile Reserve Officers knee of the United States has previously ed ;Iwo. it supporta the retention of the ted States' rights to utilization, control pro- ',Axton of the Panama Canal, and Whereas. the Constitution of TVA Officers Association of the United tea (Ar- ticle A-2) states that "the objec the As- shall be to support a policy for the United States that will ovide ade- quate National Security and romote the development and execution eof," and Whereas, Rouse Resolutlo , 93rd Con- gress, gives the United Sta full sovereign rights, power and auth in perpetuity oker the canal Zone. Now therefore be it nest interests of the nit United States, the Res tem of the United Ste action and supports gives the United 9 authority , control, the Penarei Canal netutte. ar Be it ferther a,tion be taken without the app rt,Ited states. ......turtor: NO, 2 It CLIN agreements between the Army, Aix Force and the Civil Service Commission, and Whereas, the legal restrictio on these agreements have led to a situat. in which terser management of Army Air Force 'Technicians is becoming lucre ingly dim- gait, and Whereas. It is necessary to concile the personnel management and r patterns cr! technicians as Reserves a Civil Service e nployees, and Whereas, it is also ne and desirable V, tat the military career erns of tech- nicians and other Reserve one and the some, and . Whereas, the Air Force tering as the De- trtment of Defense e utive agent, has 'epared a legislative al (DOD Pro- ram No. 93-21) to ?vide a etatutory hula for the technici' 'rogram which will require technicians be fully qualified wider military stan for the Reserve position to which fled and giving due ? nsideration to the otection of those indi- viduals concerned to a balanced career In ?grain. Now therefore serve Officers States supports cc ncerning the el in Career Pr RE SOLUTION it resolved that the Re- elation of the United e legislative proposals y and Air Force Techni- : nESEEVE RETIRED straw Whereas, ? AL DISABILITY ter 67, Title 10, U.S. Code (f )rmerly nz., Public Law 80-810) pro- veles for r d pay to members of the Re- move co nenta after completing 20 or m re ye satisfactory federal service and ueott a Ing statutory age (currently age 00) but vides neither retired pay nor other be as.riot to attaining such age, and members of the Reserve compo- nit a erred to the Retired Reserve attainment of statutory age see, in ea "in limbo" as to receipt of retired be ill, though otherwise qualified for and fled for such benefits at statutory age and Arhereas. Chapter 67, Title 10, U.S. Code has provisions for those members of the Re- m components transferred to the Retired serve awaiting attainment of statutory age who have subsequently become totally disabled, and Whereas, current members of the Reserve components transferred to the Retired Re- efers after completing 20 or more years of sal tsfactory federal service have reached the noimal peak of their earning capacity and likewise their financial needs, but will nor- me ay be in dire financial straits because of tot el disability and inability to work, and Whereas, it Is both just and right to pro- vide more liberal benefits to the totally dis- abled, and %/heroes. the totally disabled are more likely to forfeit their earned benefits through death, and Whereas, it is deemed that the foregoing would be strong incentive for attaining and rot Lining Reserve component personnel stn ngth in an all-volunteer force or a zero- draft environment, Now therefore be it resolved that the Re- ser, e Officers Association of the United States seal: and support appropirate legislation whicie would provide for all retired benefits for current members of the Reserve compo- nents who suffer total disability not resulting from intentional misconduct or willful ne- glect and are otherwise qualified for retired pay except for not having reached the statu- tory age. emotive-roe No. 4: LEGAL DEFENSE FOR RIBERVISTS 1.1 herelus. the Attorney General of Ohio re- fund to provide legal defense for the Ohio Nat oust Guardsmen on active duty during the /rent State University riots until directed to d 3 so by the governor, and that in the security of the Officers Associa- affirms its previous onal policy which full sovereign eights. ation and defense of Canal Zone in per- e ved that no Executive parting the foregoing of the Confirm of the ARMY AND erg FORCE ELDERva CAREER PlOGRASI ,Vherttbs, the urrent Army and Alt Force iteeerce each an Programs have been in effect for eerie, years without specific statu- tory ',mete based only on administrative Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5