ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR AID TO INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: August 5, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

1.4
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5 - I
, , ,
,
Airgi7l'itt.w'ci , 19 74 CONGRESSIONAL RET7ORI) --SENATE S 14259
person's problems or to support programs
to benefit all Americans.
Mr. Caddy, in his libelous book, has at-
tempted to tar such innocent men and
women with the ugly brush of illegal and
unethical action. He implies that the
illegal contributions of corporations?
contributions taken from profits and
given in a hidden and clandestine way?
are similiar to the contributions of
working people given in an open and
recorded way.
Illegal contributions, from whatever
source, are never to be condoned. The
key to understanding the difference is
that those whose money is used in an
illegal contribution from corporate funds
do not know their money has been given
away. Those who voluntarily give their
money openly to help in a political orga-
nization?whether it is through a labor
union or a professional association like
AMA?do know where their money is
going.
Mr. Caddy's book is using the big-lie
technique to attack the right of working-
men and women to participate freely
and openly in the American political
System. I am shocked and dismayed that
this kind of book has ever been put into
print.
In this year of aroused public interest
In the propriety of all political funding
and campaign contributions, this scurri-
lous book attempts to mislead readers
a mariner which must bring shame ev
to Mr. Caddy. He is a lawyer who sh d
know the dangers of making false c-
cusations and should understan he
divisive and ugly results of c ? sing
legal and voluntary political gift with
illegal and involuntary political ayoffs.
Any threat to truth becomes threat
to the body politic. This boot such a
threat, and I do not hesitate denounce
it.
The New Mexican, publis d in Santa
Fe, N. Mex., has recently lished a re-
sponse to Mr. Caddy's c el attack, in
a guest column writte y Mary Sue
Buchly, New Mexico ate AFL-CIO
COPE director.
Mr. president, / a unanimous con-
sent that Miss Hue s article be pub-
lished in the Raw following my re-
marks. I strongly e my colleagues to
read this state t and to take this
_ opportunity to b alerted to the danger
of placing any edence in Mr. Caddy's
effort.
- There beinr o objection, the article
was Ordered ?e Printed in the RECORD,
aa follows:
Mom
Santa Fe New Mexican]
?OFFICIAL ? AFL-CIO DEFENDS POLITICAL
COMrstristrrithas '
` IA reap se to a charge that the AL-
CO's CO Committee on Political Educa-
tion) flag ntly violates the law IS presented
In thie column for vacationing Fred
Buckles Mary Sue Buchly, New Mexico
State CIO COPE director.)
,(By Mary Sue Huchly)
Atm Qtrs.?Politica' contributions and
their e I eta' have been high priority among
the ge 1 public and media for two years.
-A re t,publicatfon authorized by Doug-
las Ca y, who also doubled in brass as de-
fense unael for the Watergate Seven, has
made broad statements rsaative to political
contribtuions by COPE.
There is basically no a,..ument with Cad-
dy's arithmetic; however a serious error
emerges in his book, "' ,e Million Dollar
Payoff."
Caddy erroneously tea COPE ":lag-
Tautly violates the law." - says union me
bers' dues are used to I ther and adv. e
the AFL-CIO position in are poiltica ena.
All funds used by COra, which e used
for political contribution.- are VO tary and
furthermore are neve i7 ; ,hhe on). wages
In any form,
All COPE's funds ca legally identi
lied. COPE's source is ays from fend
raising programs and untary contribu ?
tions on a local, st Ind national level
contributed by wor ople.
The reader sho e luate and make a
comparison of S E otributions versus
corporate indu al cos .ributions. It is a
matter of pub record aat the milk indus-
tries' contr itionC President Nixon
caused an ease in V s cost of milk and
dairy prod s to every sltizen with the only
conssiclera n being gree r unfair profits for
a chose w.
The roleum Indust -s, whose multi-mil-
lion ex political was chest was used in
bell. of President Nix o, produced a ques-
tio e gasoline short, a hut unquestion-
ab high increase in aorporate prate at
t expense of every cas wiser ior the bene-
of a "few corporate be,
The American Medics- Association for dee-
des has totaled multi- million dollar politi-
cal contributions to ,11.1 legislation that
would improve the get sa-al public's health
care.
They opposed Melic a a for 20 years and
today are opposing a fair and equitable
health plan that wmr- a benefit the entire
American population to maintain high
profits.
The list is long of -feted interests who
have used the politicra contribution route
to create anti-public onsumer legislation
and to kill any legislat a efforts that would
protect and improve I o American's lot In
life..
--COPE, through its' vi intary contributions
from 16 million Amen-' n wage earners and
consumers, is one of Iris -few national organi-
zations structured to s; port people-oriented
laws.
COPE does not inni itself in supporting
'labor laws nationally i statewide. We have
supporting su,sh leg-
age which is a fair
,atar of work :for all
an honorable record it
islation as minimum
day's pay for a fair
Americans.
Labor has supporteo
workers so that uvinfx
fury would not put -
welfare rolls. A goer
health care plan that s,
basic health care to
adamantly supported
AFL-CIO. This labor
tire but general.
Labor champions -orkmen's compensa-
tion legislation that la", assist a family wage
earner when he is inj..sed on the job which
allows his family to mil otain some semblance
of a decent living (1.1-ing his recuperative
period.
The political cow
vested interests come
the public and used
best interests. COPE
from corporate profits
the working man who
American.
job safety to :protect
' Ss a r y permanent in-
em on the disabled
and comprehensive
old bring decent and
he public is always
in Congress by the
emern is not restric-
Therefore, it can bs
big business funds s
lineal contributions ,
are paid for by the
,.butions by selfish,
om profits created by
directly against their
ands are not derived
They are derived from
'ares about his fellow
easily identified that
etch are used for po-
e surplus-prolits that
average citizen. Their
own money is used to create legislation that
is negative to the public's best interest.
It is not to say that labor does not believe
in profit motivation. It is not to any that
labor I
osed to the free enterprise system.
we feel it should be universally objec-
nable to use excess profits to the detri-
ment of the general public in the form of
public contributions that will foster price
gouging and enabling legislation that will
minimize public services which could be
beneficial for all.
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR
AID TO INDOCHINA
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, on
July 24, 1974, Mr. Fred Branfman, co-
director of the Indochina Resource
Center, testified before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee concerning
the fiscal year 1975 administration pro-
posals for aid to Indochina. His state-
ment contains a wealth of penetrating
insights and revealing statistical data
about our continuing involvement in
Indochina, including the covert ways in
which our aid still serves to fuel the
unended war there. Because of the rele-
vance of this material to the Congress
consideration of the administration's
fiscal year 1975 request for aid to Indo-
china, I ask unanimous consent that it
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF FREDRIC R. BRANFMAN, CO-
DIRECTOR, THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER
BEFORE THE SENATE FORE/GN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
PRESIDENTIAL COVERT WAR AND MS. AID TO
INDOCHINA, JTJLY 24, 1974
An update and introduction to the Indo-
china Resource Center/Narmic analyses of
the FY 1975 administration aid proposals
for Indochina.
Fredric Branfman is co-director of the
Indochina Resource Center, located at 1322
18th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Its
telephone number is [phone].
The Indochina Resource Center is a
church-sponsored private research group
which regularly monitors dozens of official
documents, newspapers and magazines, and
receives personal correspondence from indi-
viduals on the scene in Indochina.
Mr. Branfman's testimony is based on this
ongoing research, as well as 41/a years ex-
perience in Indochina over the past 7 years.
His most recent visit was a post-ceasefire
trip to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Thailand from April through August, 1973.
He also visited North Vietnam in November,
1912, and spent four years based in Laos as
an educational adviser and writer from
1967-1971.
Mr. Branfman has written widely on Indo-
china. Voices From the Plain of Jars, pub-
lished by Harper and Row, is a moving
description of American bombing in Laos;
"The Presidential War in Laos: 1964-1970", in
Laos: War and Revolution, a Harper and
Row publication, describes U.S. involvement
in Laos during that period; his articles have
also appeared in Harper's, the New York
Times, Washington Post, Washington
Monthly, Newsday, the Progressive, Ram-
parts, and dozens of other newspapers and
magazines around the country. He has also
frequently given testimony to Congressional
committees, including the U.S. Senate Ref-
ugee and Government Operations Subcom-
mittees, and the Rouse Foreign Affairs
Committee.
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
S 14260
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 19n
Presidential covert war and US. aid to
adochina
Contents
Introduction: A solution to our Indochina
Involvement exists
I. Covert war: A challenge to Congress for
the 16170n, p. 1.
IL Congress is betas asked to fund war
In Indochina, p.2.
LEL Covert war: The adeatentration meth-
odology, p. 4.
IV. Covert war: Background, p. 0.
V. Covert war: Basic etrateglc gusts, p.8.
VI. Covert war: Manipulating domesic
opinion to obtain funding. p. 10.
(a) Executive deception on military mat-
ters.
(b) Executive deception on political mat-
ters.
VII. Covert war: A commitment to mu -
row-basecl local administrations. p. 19.
(a) Saigon Zones.
(b) Lon Nol Zones.
(c) Lace.
VIII. Covert wer: The neceasity of Ule.
Military personnel and technology, p 20.
(a) VA. military personoeL
(b) M& war material.
IX. Covert war: Police and refugee p
grains for population control, p. 26.
(a) Police program,.
(b) Refugee programa.
X. Covert war: A tone to speak for tile
Wan& In 29.
nersonrcricni: ? sown-son TO OUR iNDOC.
DIVOLVTAISPCS Wars
The pages which follow document ow
belief that present Administretion policy
In Indochina Is leading to major new mili-
tary confrOntetioias there. We demonstrate
that present U.S. policy Is bringing untold
Misery to the people of Vietnam, unaccept-
able coats to the people of this country, and
cettnot lead to peace.
Before turning to this analysis of present
policy, however, we wish to stress that there
k an alternative that would be accept-dee to
most Americans: observation of the Parte
Agreement.
It is often said that the Paris Agreement
is a mere scrap of paper, since both eldni
are violating it.
To call it a mere scrap of paper. bowevee,
Is to deny that our Involvement in Indo-
china can ever be ended. The great impor-
tance of the Paris Agreement Is that It does
provide an honorable way, indeed tbe only
way, that the war in Indochina can be unded.
For 10 long years the 178 fought in Viet-
nam with no real public hope that the war
would stop. The battles went on and on. with
no political solution in eight.
Now needle, after a million deaths, there
Is tingly a political solution to a war which
-cannot be won on the battlefield, a formal
palate agreement signed by all parties directly
concerned.
This Agreement, moreover, offers a way
that we can end our involvement without it
being said that we reneged on our "oorumite
aunts", were defeated, or "bugged out". It
prOeidee for a relatively orderly political
process by which the Vietnamese people
will be free to choose their own leaders
free of outside political interterence. It is
clop, moreover, that such a political process
will see the emergence for the foreseeable
future of some kind of coalition mechanism
that will prevent any side from claiming
absolute victory or defeat.
To downgrade the importune of the Paris
Agreement, this political solution, is to say
that there can be no political solution to
the fighting. It is to accept the notion that
the war will continue Indefinitely. To mini-
mize the Paris Agreement in any way, there-
fore, is in effect to encourage war.
To stress the importance of the Paris
Agreement, however, ls to be for peace. By
Insisting that both aides adhere to in by
ensuring that our side Is doing everything
possible to at least test the other side's
offer to negotiate, is not only desirable. It is
absolutely necessary U our Indochina in-
volvement Is ever to end.
Such a policy, as we can see in Laos so far,
can work. There Is no Caneon why there
cannot be a Lannlike solution to the
Indochina war, if Congress ensures that our
aid Is not bang used in a way that blocks
implementation of the Paris Agreement.
The Patin Agreement la. quite simply, a
redlista hope for peace in Vietnam- -the
only one that now exists. And It Is a. hope
:for peace which can be reallaed, if we
want it to.
1. COVERT WAR : A MULLS:WM To concaves roe
THR 15705
One cif the dominant, if least understood
facts of this latter half of the 20th century
Is that we have entered an era chracterieed
by a new form of war-making, a phenomenon
we lanai can Presidential covert 'war.
By tins we mean that the Executive offi-
cials of today's superpowers have opted away
from conventional or nuclear 'war and for
war by proan?"low-pronle" war in which
tbey rely on intensive use of technology and
relatively few American personnel to wage
clandestine war abroad.
One of the basic facts of our lives as
Americans is that our Executive branch to-
day Can and does wage war abroad without
the knowledge or consent of the Americon
people.
There are many examples of such Prost-
dentist covert war la recent those from
U.S. Executive intervention in Ethiopia to
the Congo to the Philippines to Iran. The
most dramatic example of such covert war-
making today, however, is Indochina.
During the 1980s, Ladochin& became the
symbol of direct U.S. Military involvement
to the Third World. Responding to a clear
mandate front the American people, Con-
gress has moved to end our direct combat
involvement in Indochina. By doing so. It
has Meanly signaled the end of an era, bring-
ing hope to most Americans that Congreas
will never allow massive U.S. combat involve-
ment in another Third World country.
Today. In the mid-1970's, however, ludo-
reline ha.' now become the symbol of hull-
reef covert U.S. involvement in the Third
World. Such covert war, we believe, is ob-
jectionable both for morel and practical
reasons, anti leads to increasing pressures
for direct 17.S. intervention.
The time When this country could afford
the luxury of supporting "low-profile" wars
abroad has clearly pained. Such factors as
the teeming crunch on energy and other key
resources, the exponential Increase in the
coast@ of both modern weaponry and a volun-
teer array, rampant inflation and rising labor
costs. have reduced American options:
Last year. for example, we could not both
wage covert War in Indochina and feed the
most needy In other parts of the world. The
Administration wound up sending Increased
"Pood For Peace" Shipments to nand war in
Indoehina, up from $208.8 to 8502,8 Million;
but only *77 million was made available to
the Sahel. where tens of thousands of human
beings literally starved to death.
We would suggest, therefore, that Con-
gress terminating The Executive's unilateral
ability to wage covert war is as urgent a
teak for the 70's, as was Congress finally
coming to grips with U.S. direct combat
abreact during the tion.
Congressional suspension or reduction of
proposed Administration expenditures in
Indochina, then, will do rar more than steeply
Hignal an end to our otherwise unending in-
volvement there. It will also mean that the
people of the United States will finally be
freed of the burden of supporting world-
wide covert war, the people of the Third
World finally free to pursue their own des-
bales.
0. CONGREaS IS BEING ASKED TO FUND WAR IN
INDOCHINA
Indochina remains the largest war in the
world today.
The latest reports, for example, indicate
hat 350,000 soldiers on both sides in Vietnam
lave been killed or wounded since the cease-
:ire. (UPI dispatch, June 11, 1974). 'I'his is
}pore than ten times the ofncial casualities
a sported during and after the October Mid-
nest War. In addition there were 85,000
((ethane killed and wounded, and 818,000
new refugees in the first post-ceasefire year,
ecording to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee
t n Refugees; and hundreds of thousands
!lore have been killed, wounded or made
ceneless in Cambodia since the ceasefire.
In all, Indochina may well have had more
tar victims created in the last 18 months
taan the rest of the world combined.
(liven this raging war. Administration aid
Inquests for Indochina are clearly intended
V. fund war, not produce peace. This fact
Ii made clear by the tremendous priority
t se Administration puts on Indochina com-
pared to other countries, as well as a close
a ealysis of its actual requested expenditures.
The Indochina Resource Center and NAR
VIC, a project of the American Friends
Sinnott Committee, have recently submitted
Alministration requests to the first such
close analysis in the history of the war. Two
Si udies we have produced, which we would
lite to submit for the record, emphasize the
It Rowing points:
(1) The Antnini.stratIon is proposing to
stead $3.7 billion for Indochina, more than
fcr the rest of the world combined (see
.ble 1). This will provide 'Mien and Lon
2.64 governments with 90% of their total
resources, including all of their war material.
(2) Food For Peace to Indochina in FY 74
totalled 49% of worldwide shipments, mean-
; that 0.8% of the world's population re-
ce ved nearly half the world's U.S. supplied
food (see Table 2). Although some 100,000
persons are estimated to have starved to
death in Sahel, for example, Sahel received
only 15% or ee of what Indochina received?.
be muse Food Per Peace was indirectly used
to finance war last year.
L3) U.S. aid in Indochina is not leading to
stability, but only demands for more money.
In PT 74, for example, the Administration
bet an with a request for *827.8 million to
Smith Vietnam and Cambodia in economic
aid (Wet plus Food For Peace). By the end
of PT 74 it had allocated $1.52 billion, an
Inc 'ease of 27%. This year it is demanding
$1-81 billion, an Increase of 40% Over last
year's request (see Tables 3 efe 4).
( I) An admitted 88% of this year's aid
pronosal is non-humanitarian, non-develop-
mental in nature: Le.. 88% is for war. In
realty, moreover, only 2% is truly huraani-
tartan. Requested military aid to the three
AdennistratIon-supported governments is
else up this year, moreover. In Fiscal Year
197-, $1.488 billion was allocated; the Ad-
ministration is now requesting $2.05 billion,
an _lacrosse of 40%. Most significantly, the
Adridnistaation is requesting *852 million
for "procurement" for South Vietnam, a sum
MOrs than double the $369 million pro-
grat uned for Fiscal Year 1974. This makes it
cies: that the Administration is vastly in-
creating Thieun material, in violation of the
ore for one" clause of the Parts Agreement
and a congressional mandate to reduce our
mill axy wending in Indochina. (See Tables
41el).
(6. The Administration has blatantly vio-
late( a congressional mandate to reduce aid
to Indochina in Fiscal Year 1976. Any Con-
great tonal attempts to cut aid in FT 75,
thee. fore, must be massive. Last year, "In-
dochina Postwar Reconstruction" aid was cut
Del--"Indochina Postwar Reconstruc-
tion", formerly known as "economic aid".
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
Approved For. Release 2005/07/20 ? CIA-RDP79m0,09.5/A000100040047-5 S 14261
A"urfte
it 5, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD SENAT
_
from a requested $632 million to an alloca-
tion of $450 million. 13y unilaterally increas-
ing Food For Peace shipments from a re-
quested $208 million to an estimated alloca-
tion of 002.6 -million, however, the Admin-
istration has not only restored outs in eco-
110Mie aid, it has exceeded its original FY
.74 request in a blatant violation of congres-
sional will. (See Table 3).
Indeed, Food For Peace to Indochina last
year ($502.6 million) turned out to be more
than normal econoinic aid (IPR funds to-
talling $450 million). In addition, the Execu-
tive possesses a wide variety of other loop-
hopea?including the Food and Forage Act,
huge amottlits of War Reserve material built
up especially for Indochina and over which
Congress has little control, ceilingless "ex-
cess defense article" and "purchase of local
currency" categories and an uncontrolled
CIA budget.,
(6)- The Administration's proposed aid to
Indochina can only lead to an escalated war,
-While preventing a political settlement.
By channeling lavish military aid to the
GVN and Lon Nol, the Administration is not
leaving the other side any political incentives
to negotiate. The U.S. supported GVN has
Outlawed the PRO for example, thus leav-
ing it no choice but surrender or pushing
back militarily in order to force the GVN to
seek 'a political settlement. If Administration
FY 75 aid requests are, passed, th.e only result
will be an escalating war which is directly
leading to major new Military confronta-
? tions in Indochina. Such confrontations,
moreover; could see the Administration, at-
-tempt to renew American bombing and/or
send in U.S. ground troops.
Only Congress can bring about a very real
potential solution: be reducing or suspend-
ing aid to Thieu and Lon Nol, Congress
could make it in the Administration's in-
terest to bring about a negotiated settlement
in South Vietnam and Cambodia, as it has
done in Laos.-
m. COVERT WAR: THE ADMINTSTRAITON
METHODOLOGY'
,
The tact that the Administration is re-
questing such niaSSive funding for war in
Indochina is not the essence Of its covert
"warrtng in Indochina, however. On the con-
trary. It is the Administration's direct in-
volvement in the internal affairs of Indo-
china?through Central of billions in aid
and thousands of U.S. Personnel?that char-
acterizes Presidential war.
. This direct U.S. involvement is of neces-
sity disguised or "covert". Congress and the
'American ,people have made it clear they
nao longer Wish the U.S. to be involved; such
direet American involvement is precluded
by the Paris Agreement: and World Opinion
has ttirried against further American inter-
vention. '
. AS a result, the Administration goes out of
its way to hide is involvainefit. AM docu-
ments indicating Presidential branch in-
volvement are classified. American military
perSonnel are disguised as civilians, and are
instructed to _avoid non-U.S. mission Contact
as rttUeh as Possible. Aclininistratibn spokes-
men are instructed' to emphatically deny all
reports of t.Y.S. involvement. Leeks are
Featly reduced due to the few reporters and
- smaller numbers of American personnel in-
volved in such a covert war.
eliberate, ,attempti ,are made to deceive
Congress. '
#s. 0:4nplest" level, this: attempt Involves
an Orwellian change in nomenclature. A war
,
There are also signs thA the Admin-
istration may try backdoor funding of Thieu
through the World Bank and Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation (OPIC) guaran-
tees of private American investment in
South Vietnam.
. .;
budget is presenled :,s" Indochina Postwar
-
Reconstruction"; thie year's fiscal year 1975
budget now calls tn., former "Co:nmodity
Import Program," vrriely known as a short-
term, war-related, nigetary device to keep
the GVN alive, "Foski and Nutrition" and
"Industrial Product: on"; food commodities
designed to free fur] 3s for local war budgets
are called "Food For F eace"; money designed
to resettle refugees ii unfarmable land to
expand territorial ereatrol of the GVN is
called "hurnanitariai " aid.
Numerous direct attempts are made, more-
over, deliberately to kleprive Congress of re-
quested information on April 2, 1971, for ex-
ample, Senator Ken nedy revealed that the
U.S. Ambassador in Ss igon, Mr. Graham Mar-
tin, had interfered with attempts by the Con-
gressional investigat-kry service, the General
Accounting Office. I i-einnedy reported that:.
"The Senate sheus. also be aware of Am-
bassador Martin's unwarranted interference
in field investigatiot of U.S. foreign aid ex-
penditures by invesl i:i-stors of the GAO. Not
only has the Ambassador intervened at the
highest levels of thr GAO to curb their in-
quiries, but he hal repeatedly mscle every
effort to restrict the kvestigators' aocess and
use of information in. the Embassy Liles. And
he has even attempt:kd to censor the transfer
of GAO information from Saigon to Wash-
ington."
On the same day, '.1 course, Kennedy also
revealed the well-kro.kwn cable of Ambassador
Martin counselling i.hat "it would be the
height of folly to yorkinnit Kennedy . . . an
honest and detailel answer" to questions
presented to the Str.Le Department.
A GAO request to investigate U.S. funding
of political prlsonerk in South Vietnam met
with similar treatment by the State Depart-
ment. "The State li.knnartrnent has told the
General Accounting Office that it will not be
possible for the GAO to make a preposed in-
vestigation of politikial prisoners in South
Vietnam and other i.P.lions . .." the Washing-
tan Star-Rears reported on February 9, 1974.
'Major attempts are also made to hide
Executive involVenie it from the American
press.
American 'ions are declared off-
limits to American isporters Amex Jean per-
sonnel are instructed to either avoid or lie
to American jounirlists about their real
functions. America/ reporters are not given
transportation to ?rensitive" areas where
American military kir paramilitary advisers
are operating.
In South Vietnark: for example, Ambassa-
dor Graham Martin has restricted press ac-
cess to American ki-iticials. On January 30,
1974, for example, The Christian Science
Monitor reported ti et:
"By itself, the official U.S. mission in South
Vietnam . . Is st the largest American
mission in the woni.i. No major reductions
are expected in forseeable future . ? .
(Ambassador Marti'i / is trying to discourage
any publicity cones- ling the American pres-
ence here . . . Maj Tk. General Joh:a E. Mur-
ray, the chief of 'tie Defense Attache Of-
fice . . . was recem y told to stop giving
interviews.
Such reports haw been echoed by the Chi-
cago Tribune, whic) k referred on June 9, 1974,
to lVlartin's "continning effort to'nestrict the
flow of information from official American
sonrces tp, the ,ptesr," On February 25, 1974,
mereove4 The New ork' Times reported that
"the Embassy told u least two private cam-
panies?Lear-Siegle r which employs a large
force of itircratt, Mechanics here and Com-
pirter Science Cotiscration, which works on
military and police computer systems?to
say nothing public iy about their work, ac-
cording to company executives."
Attempts to ket journalists sway from
Indochina news eici ends to places like Thai-
,
land, moreover. On January 11, 1974, the Los
Angeles Times reported on an infrequent trip
to Udorn Airforce Base in Thailand that:
"When American reporters asked to talk
with members of this American unit (work-
ing with Lao and Cambodian pilots) they
were told this could not be done without the
consent of the Thai government."
Given such restrictions on the press, it is
remarkable how many reports have leaked
out in the past year and a half indicating a
pattern of covert American involvement in
Indochina reminiscent of, but far greater
than, the kind of disguised Presidential in-
tervention in Indochina between 1954 and
1962 which led to direct involvement later.
The pages which follow present many of
these newspaper reports indicating the well-
known pattern of Presidential covert involve-
ment in Indochina, as well as other reports
from direct participants in Indochina after
the ceasefire.
No one of these reports in and of itself is
proof positive of continuing 13.5. covert war.
When considered as a whole, however, these
reports are clearly a major cause for alarm.
The publication of the Pent. gon Papers
revealed that newspaper reports about U.S.
Involvement in Indochina between 1954 and'
1962 were surprisingly accurate, despite the
fact that they were hotly denied by Execu-
tive branch officials at the time.
Given this history, it would be the height
of folly for Congress to ignore the numerous
press and first-person reports which have
come out of Indochina since the ceasefire. We
had to wait nearly 20 years for the Pentagon
Papers, during which time a small covert
war grew into a massive overt one.
It has become more than clear that unless
Congress acts to reduce our funding of Presi-
dential covert war in Indochina this year,
history may well repeat itself.
iv. COVERT WAR: BACKGROUND
Historically, the American people and Con-
gress have taken the Executive's word on
matters of public policy. The burden of proof
has laid upon critics to disprove Administra-
tion claims, rather than an the Administra-
tion to provide evidence that it is living up
to its word.
In the case of Presidential war-making
abroad, however, the U.S. Executive branch
has clearly forfeited public or congressional
trust. For since World War II, it has been
revealed countless times that the Executive
has been intervening abroad while covering
it up at home.
In Indochina alone, for example, Execu-
tive activities that have now been revealed
after being hidden from the American peo-
ple and 'Congress for years include:
Installing Ngo Dinh Diem in power in 1954,
acknowledged within the American Mission
as an unpopular dictator who unilaterally
cancelled elections in 1956 in violation of the
Geneva Accords, while publicly praised as a
popular, democratic, sovereign leader (Pen-
tagon Papers); withholding information from
Congress and the American people about
U.S.-directed commando raids against North
Vietnam, thus making the Gulf of Tonkin in-
oident appear unprovoked (Pentagon
Papers); funding and directing Thai and
other foreign troops in Laos, in direct viola-
tion of Congressional law; secretly bombing
Cambodia for 14 months, and falsifying rec-
ords so that the U.S. Congress and people
'Would not know; publicly denying the bomb-
ing of northern Laos from May 1964 until
September 1969 when Congress was first told,
and March 1970, when the American people
first heard; U.S. oross-border operations into
Laos and Cambodia in 1971 and 1972, thus
expressly violating Congressional law against
sending U.S. ground forces into these coun-
tries; carrying out rain-making missions over
Indochina while publicly denying that they
were being carried out; attempting to cause
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
S 14262
toore
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATI August 1974
nee storms, also not acknowledged untroyeare
Mere
And, In addition to them arm ofneelty-
confirmed arena% activities, there are a wide
eatety of other clandestine wily:Mai whieb
have been masted ennui:moms persons Mae
flestePerson a/Peelle/me but are eta oar-salty
denloil by the Execute? !Wench. Then in-
clude the sending of military peraounel into
Lace and Inatoricting them to wear civilian
elothes and carry Cards Monti/Snag them as
working for the Agency for laternatIonel
Development the rlispetehof U.13.-derected
intelligence-gathering Manse int. Chiles *ad
North Vietnam from northern Leos, thus
jetreertliaing the shaky neutrality of Laos; the
UN of CIA-trained Vietnamese to dram like
the elLlt and carry out atrocities, to the
beam of having these teamed on the ELF; the
falai/cation of documents glom to the Moan
Man and Vietnamese prat; U.S. eatab.lahad
quota which led to the deliberate eateasinee
tem of tens of tboleranda of Vietninem
under the 11.8.-epoomwed. Ptioenex program.
This record of Emma/eve deceit alone nig-
gling" that Me U.S. Prealdential brooch may
be irearicilsably required to advance evidence
that It Is not engaged In similar activities
*when rather than requiring criLla to ad-
vance domunentetrY proof.
Thecase for requiring the Exec.= ve to
prove Its non-Involveinent, however. le lea-
maseuraely strengthened by &1114.2a-noticed
bat trameacknedy important atom sopa tad
in .the Loa Amadei Times on May 16. 1974.
Tble report states that:
eine Air Force law Mice saes it Wised. for
neelleary or foreign policy reosorta, to disguise
military operations through inaccuram or
untrue metal reports. The oonclusiott was
seated be a meroorandien to the Seale
Armed Serelone Committee in connection
with the Committee's investigation neat year
of the secret bombing of CemOodiet for 14
months before May, 1970."
This shocking contention makes it clear
that neither the Congress nor the Americao
people can any longer be content with mere
denials of Executive covert war in Indocoina.
Indeed, logic would demand that the
doaeris of' newspaper and flret-peraou reports
which follow, indicating Preelderatial civert
was la Indochina, should be taken se ti un-
with the borden for disproving them .ying
upon the Presidential branch.
This point, moreover. is strengthened by a
consideration of four major strategic eats
of Presidential covert war.
V. COVERT WAS: BASIC STRATEGIC e.bilLe,
The purpose of continued U.S. Exec ante
intervention in Indochina La to keep the Pro-
visional Revolutionary Cloverament (PRO),
Rimier Rouge, and Pathet Lao from power In
Indochina.
Obtaining funding Of pay the salaries of
local military forces, then arms, and provid-
ing support for the general economy, it key
of course. But DB, personnel ?advising the
military forces and police, holding the econ-
omy tegether, repairing the aircraft-nue no
leas hapintant. For there would be no need
for American intervention In the fleet Place
if a OVIT our Lou Nol government was able to
stand on its own.
a Secret bombing of Cambodia and cross-
border operations into Ina and Ca/abode'
are described in "The While raper on Secret
Operations In Laos and Cambodia". Senator
Hughes. Cong. Record, September 10, 1973,
13113190. Rain-making missions were recozttly
revealed, see Washington Post, May lf t, 1974.
The bombing of Northern Laos is described
In testimony before the Senate Refugee eub-
cbeanti Mee.
!trading of Thal mercenaries in Lace was
revealed befere the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Cconneittee, illestorm attempts In
Science.
It Is no cotondencie, for allinselle. that as
the Khmer mouge lave continued to gain
tanitory and; auppowt In Cambodia, the
Washington Poet reported os Jima S WIC
that:
"Tele Lew U.S.Ambassador la Phnom
Paolo John Guntbar Dinia. has in two
todadab made it abeedutely dear to Cambo-
dian* and tattooers alike In Phnom Penh
that be is. in street. runnieng lbs eottotey."
Nor is AL surprising teat atter the Adrain-
tozation had for years attempted to avoid an
epee Areerean boadom in Cambodia. the
Wahlogion Poet repotted ca Atm L 1074,
that;
"The Clunbedian government and the U.S.
eemeasy are emomed in a costly peogram
? aid so win the support of eiviiien popula-
Men In lesuroete. areas ... The mission now
er. the beeieuel largest AU) unit in the world."
For Like Issit Is that Presidential coact war
a. aliaracterised by the diegideed *tamp( to
eie dablereesei technology and personnel to
no-nom...toe fee the potieical deficiencies of
Mai regimes Lu leadochlan Its main stra-
tegic gan?ood be described
(1) Cemeliang Marilee through memipuen
loon of domestic pobliu opinion,--The prin-
t:trial requirement of Presidential covert war
lei funding. Neither Congress nor the Ameri-
toe peepie would approve funding of Exec-
utive war-making in leidoehina In violation
of Article 4 of the Pale Agmement, which
reads "The United States will not continue
in military involvement or intervene In the
internal edgers of Solite Vietnam" As a re-
sult, The Administration has consistently
lend to deceive public opinloo about its real
involvement in Indoeinzia. Such manipula-
tion of public opinion may enjoy some short-
term successes, as when the Adndaletranon
managed to spend mon than S3 bellon on
war In Indochina In Facia Year 1974. Long-
term results. however, are counter-produc-
tive. It loam to the wasting of billions of
dollars our economy can no longer afford:
It poisons the political atmaphere. as the
American people gradualy learn they've been
deceived. Most importartly, It continues the
pervasive concentration of power In the Fin
"'dive welch has sirently proved so Maas-
toms to this eourere An informed public
end ("tonere.. would have kept us out of
iminehine In the fleet place, and would today
see kiA tiring our resources for healing at
ind ,broad.
, 2) Ma in talnl narrow-based, military -
oriented local admieistrotinne in power?The
Administration hart choice to conUnue try-
lug to keep in. power those who represent a
Lily minority of the people: the civilian rich,
the top-ranking military officers and, to
some extent, the western-educated. The re-
sult 1A either that the Administration feani
political competition and opts instead for
war, as in South Vietnam: the U.S-supported
Aide becomes so weak that the other side
refuses to negotiate with It. as in Cambodia;
or the U S. Is forced to accept political com-
promise. Fre the other side gain In power,
and preseeres grow for re-intervention. so
111 Laos. And the resort 18 also increased cor-
ruption and war, leadieg to declining local
economies and armed farces, twang to to-
o-need demands for eld from the U.S. Preen
dretiel breech,
ut coin US. tecluiology and advisers to
militaty otereteone--Cliven, the
n? ienialetri t ion's narrow political base in
uultian in-
us relied to try and compensate
by extremely heavy inputs of 1713. 1311118lay
riviatrO. "....kr material end funding to de-
and field local military forces. This
retain such local forces entirely dependent on
American logistics and personnel, and In-
, ar tably iblerlor to their guerrilla adversaries.
rho loath to growing pressures for direct
American interventlein?eg, through covert
or tart bombing by American pilots. or U.S.
Maine landings?ever-increasing coas, and
Inc reseed deception at home.
ill Practising population control through
pel ce and refugee programs?Since U.S.
Izrciathee-backad lova administrations can-
na Inn popular support, the emphasis in-
land has been on physical control of the
pot illation. Executive policy hes since the
19.1a resettled nearly 14 million refugees
in tress closer to US. Executive contro. in
Sot th Vietnam, Cambodia and Leon Under
the Nixon Doctrine, however, there has been
a toticeably Increased emphasis on police
operations, ranging from greatly increased
mu naiades and national ID. card programs,
to oonstant arrests, to the pen/acid liquids-
Um of opponents. This practice, however,
ha also proved counter-productive since it
vireates the most baste tenets of humanity,
18w lug to world-wide protest, increased ly-
ing by American leaders, and the further
alit nation of a local population constantly
sub !act to masa surveillance, round-ups, ston-
y sentencing, and inhuman torture and
pelt on =Otero troent.
ICE COVERT will: MANWITLATING DOBLEETIC
OPTNION TO =SALE EUNDENG
'me key to the Presidential branch's ability
to rage covert war Is its ability to obtain
fun ling from the Congress and American
peo ite. Such funding in turn, derives from
the Executive's control over information
abo Its activities,
e have airway described (see Section in
able re) the methods used by the Presidential
tom Mt to keep Information about its ally-
item from Congress and the American peo-
ple. This attempt, however, is only partially
suc,easful. and Information frequently leaks
out contradicting the Arleinootrationo pub-
lic rotation.
Ft few exempla of how the Adeneedstrotion
hal tried to deceive Congress' and the Ameri-
can people Moot the military and political
situ item) in Indochina in order to obtain
fun, ling foUow:
) Executive deception on military mat-
ters
1. Ceasefire Violations--AmerIcan officials
core tautly claim that the communists have
tato ri the initiative in violating the ceasefire
mill eirgy. Yet Representative Peter Peeling-
hutten. a major spokesman favoring con-
tinued aid to the Thieu government. recently
stated on p. 4 of leis May 1.974 report. ^Viet-
nam?A Changing Crucible" that:
'1 he OVN has Wed well during post-
cease-flee maneuvering: Since January 1973
it le J3 added 770 hamlets to the list of those
over which it has dominant control, and it
has reportedly reduced the number of dis-
rupl3d hamlets by well over a third. The
COM muttlists meanwhile have lost over 90
hamlets that were under their firm control
at tie time of the ceasefire . .
2. Violation of U.S. !ledge to Withdraw
Ado sers?The Administration has never re-
veal, d Its secret "assurance' when signing
the 'nets Agreement that it would withdraw
all retntary or civilian advisers to the Viet-
nam Ise armed forces within 12 months. This
pled et, revealed in a secret memo prepared
by Ceorge Aldrich, State Department deputy
leg ig inn/see, states in part that:
"3 icret?The United States has assured the
DRV that we shalt withdraw from South
Vlee lam within /2 months from the signa-
ture of the agreement an our civilian per-
soneil working in the armed forces of the
Rein Mk of Vietnam." (Wash. Post, June 4,
wre
Woen this pledge was revealed by author
Tate .3aule. the State Department denied that
tetit easeartuece" constituted a firm promise
to ite; so. Today, over 17 months after the
eigi*tig of that Agreement, some 3,800 Ameri-
can civilians continue to work with the Smola
Vietnamese Armed Services.
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
5 1974
Approved For
Titre ,
On June 8, 1974, the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch reported that at the end of March
1974, 2,643 'U.S. employees contracted to the
_Pentagon were working with the South Viet-
i,narfieSenrillitary,:p36 were employed directly
bY ale Defense Attache Office in Saigon, and
425 "inadeup:the official DAO military con-
tingent.
: 8. Exaggerating PRG Military Pressure?
U.S., and ? GVN officials have blatantly at-
tempted to deceive the -American people and
Congress about the Thieu government's need
for economic and military aid. During Marcia
and October, :1978, for example, - Administra-
tion spekesnibn trumpeted the idea that a
"North VietnameSe offensive" was imminent.
To this day, of conree, Mane has materialized.
'Even :more, aerie* was the transparently
false attempt to wangle an $474 million
supplemental military appropriation for the
.43VisT during the spring of 1974. The U.S. Con-
: pees was flatly told that if Thieu did not
have this money, his army might collapse.
On March12, 1974, for exaM516, Assistant
? Secretary Of Defense William `Cements testi-
fied_ before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee: -
"Without additional funds the South
VietnanneSe forces are _going to be in ex..
itremely 'dire straits here in April, May and
,June. There is just no doubt about it. . . .
Weare going tia'riin Out of funds' here in the
latter part of this fiscal year Unless we are
given additional funds."
14 the event, Of course, the funding re-
, quebt was denied. Theoretically, the ARVN
alachild thus have been near collapse. In fact,
boWeiser, the Wiehirigteri Post reported on
May 9, 1974, after the request had been de-
nied, that:
"(Pentagon sPokesnian) Friedheim also
appeared to take a less dire view . . than
have some other White House and Defense
oflielals. Friedheina toted that . only two
? InoUths remain in the 'current fiscal
yea." .
4., Exaggerating Nature of Soviet and
Chinese 'Aid?Ambassador Graham Martin
has stated that "Our intention all along was
to balance the ad given by the Soviet Union
and the PeoPles'itepublic of 'China to North
Vietnam." '
A_$Conding to the estimates of the 'U.S. De-
. fear 17ritellikehce Agency,- itself, however,
Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam in
1975 was only 6290 million. T.T.F.t. military aid
to the 0,k711 alone in calendar ,year 1973, how-
eye, was $2.271 billion, or eight tithes "as
When one remembers that the United
States alone spent hundreds Of millions in
direct expenditures for U.S. military forces,
as Well as hundreds_ of millions of dollars
more in caMbOdlp, and Laos, the 'United
States actually wound' sp outspending the
Soviet Union ansi_Clainit I:1' far more in the
first Veal. the''CVasaire.
Zven more importantly, Soviet and Chinese
aid to 'North Vietnam 'decreased by 4'7% from
' 1912 to 173, froth $605 million down to $290
aict to-Men, deereaSed by
-
0111; 5% from 1972 to 1978, however, from
- 92.683 billion to billion. (See Tables
6 and 7,)
mcatirivE? DECEPTION ON POLITICAL
MATEL
? AchninistratiOn' -Humanitarian. Con-
cern-!--The AdmInistration _continues to
Eitre:ps' it Srhmeii1taslaii ConCein' for affairs
in $ont,,h'''Vietn*, while castigating the oth-
er :fide:for 1,ts lact of ,himianitaripreoncern.
OM,Jinie 26,1974; hOweirer, Senator Itennedy
revealed' confidential ? 4blei from U.S. 441-
bas*tolor iril 4gOn-adirocat=;
, that the U.S.- "hold up'. itti contribution
to the Tntrriatleirial Bed Cross in an attempt
to 'pressure them :not to invite the PrOvi-
sional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to
an , international, conference to be held, in
Geneva in September to &Sousa limiting
weapons which are either indiscriminate
or cause unnecessary atiffering; on June 23,
mpfsintypitiEKRIVETRLER9i517f000100040047-5
4
1974, the Win lthn. reported that the U.S.
was opposing UNICEF aid to children in
North Vietnam tole PRG zones.
And, most serioss:ly, the Administration
has still not even basun to remove the many
mines still maimir a and killing numerous
Vietnamese peasanis in Saigon zones.
-2. Political Priso: tars in South Vietnam?
On May 28, Setsre-,sry Kissinger supported
Graham Martin's -:,iiarge that there is no
evidence that Sisigs n is holding large num-
bers of political prisoners, and added that
"the extensive evideace available to us sim-
ply does not susta-n the highly publicized
charges that civilia a prisoners are subjected
to widespread, systealatic mistreatment ..."
(Senator Kennedy nsert, CM., May 28, 1974)
On June 7, 1974, however, Representative
Abzug inserted 7 to the Congressional
Record (p. E3657) a listing of over 100
articles which emeated from Saigon, from
western journalists or residents, indicating
widespread mistreatment of large numbers
of political prison ars; since the Saigon
government has no allowed even the Inter-
national Red Cm ia to talk freely with
civilian detainees, and since It has also
turned down requahts for visits by Bishop
Thomas Gumbletois of Detroit and other
groups and individi !ails, the closing off of the
prisons to the outside world (with the ex-
ception of a few gilded tours) is cause for
alarm, in and of itaelf. The assertion that
the U.S. Embassy has "extensive evidence"
on the treatment ,if prisoners is curious,
since an earlier U S. Embassy study stated
that 'U.S. advisers Lad been withci7awn from
the prisons since .he ceasefire, and that
Embassy informatian was based ,D13. "inter-
nal" GVN records.
3. Administratioh Policy in Laos?U.S. of-
ficials constantly maintain that they support
the coalition goveri ,nerst in Laos. Testifying
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on June 13, 1974, for example, Mr. Robert
Nooter stated that "the formation A a Provi-
sional Governmes 9. of National Union
(PGNU) this past kpril represents a bona
fide political rescisition of Laos internal
differences. 'The UF. supports this effort...".
- On June 23, 1974. 'however, Senator Edward
Kennedy issued a Dress release, based on a
still secret General kccounting Office report,
Which revealed in act the Administration
has not been suprarting the PGE,TU at all.
' On the contrary. Ti date, all funds had been
going to the right wing Royal Lao faction
directly, an ominiass throw-back recalling
the pattern of past coup-making which has
upset political sett toments before in Laos.
Kennedy's charg,:a appeared to gain some
substance, moreover, by a N.Y. Tines report
the next day which indicated that a Vice-
Admiral Ray Peet -71ad told a HOILSS commit-
tee that U.S. objc-stives in Laos were "to
maintain the survival of the polit.cally neu-
tral Royal Laotian -Siovernment . . . and to
encourage pursuit 1' Laos of objectives com-
patible with the United States."
' 4. Administration "Food For Peace" Poli-
tics?And there is I r-rsh indication that while
pretending to obey a new Congressional pro-
hibition against using Food For Peace
monies for war, tbs. Administratima is con-
tinuing to use loss: currencies generated by
the sale of Pood Pc.r Peace commodities for
military purposes n South Vietnam and
Cambodia, as it has in the past.
On lane 20, 19'7,1, for example, The Wash-
ington Post reported from Phnom :Penh that:
"dongreaSional e Sorts to 'prevent military
use' of-funds seii,..E.rated by the Food For
Peace pioiram a,Tiparently are being -frus-
trated by some ilii;enions bookkeeping to
circumvent the irilaht of Congress by simply
allowing the fiand,; to pile up unused in a
bank account :and then printing an equal
annonnt of new kaney to pay soldiers. In
Saigon, it also Ma-pa:ars possible -that funds
generated by the 3,rogritm could be chan-
neled into other -..sin-military areas of the
ecofioniy, freeing up equal arnounti of money
for military use and thus again frustrating
Congress' efforts at control".
This tiny sample of Administration un-
truths make it clear that manipulation of
domestic public opinion lies at the heart of
Presidential covert war.
For the American people and Congress
would clearly not support any further ex-
penditures in Indochina were the Adminis-
tration to admit the truth of the examples
above, i.e., that the Administration was vio-
lating the Agreement by not withdrawing
its advisers and supporting Thieu's violations
of the Agreement, which were not, in turn,
occasioned by either communist pressure or
Soviet or Chinese aid; and that Administra-
tion policy was non-humanitarian, covering
up for Thieu's political prisoners, threaten-
ing the Laotian peace agreement, and vio-
lating a congressional ban on using Food
For Peace for military purposes.
VII: COVERT WAR; A COMMITMENT TO NARROW-
BASED LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS
The Administration's decision to attempt
to keep administrations like those of Thieu
and Lon Nol in power inevitably lead it to
practice covert war.
For the basic fact is that the narrow-
based GVN and Lon Nol administrations can-
not reach political accommodations with
their adversaries. As a result, continued aid
to such administrations simply encourages
the perpetuation of war, leading to increase
political and economic deterioration, leading
to pressures for increased American involve-
ment.
In fact, it is only when American aid is
conditional upon U.S.-backed local admin-
istrations reaching a political compromise?
even to their relative disadvantage?that the
chances for American disengagement in-
crease. The most dramatic example of this is
Laos,
(a) Saigon zones.
The major problem facing the GVN today
Is political and moral in nature, not eco-
nomic. AID officials try to explain the very
serious problems in GVN zones as due to
rising world commodity prices, the with-
drawal of the American presence, and other
factors out of anyone's control. In fact, as a
comparison with the frugal, well-balanced
economy in PRG zones reveals, the heart
of the GVN's economic problem is not finan-
cial, and these problems cannot be solved by
American aid. In a word, there is enough to
go around in GVN zones. The problem is that
the rich and the military elite are taking far
more than their proper share, leaving the
majority?the poor?to go hungry.
The root cause of GVN problems is the
Administration's refusal to chance political
competition with the PRG.
The primary responsibility for this, of
course, lies with the U.S. Executive branch.
The U.S., after all, supplies 86.3% of the
GVN's income, including all of its ammo,
guns and tanks and planes and bombs. (See
insert by Senator McGovern, C.R., May 6,
1974). It is fundamentally inane to suggest
that despite this preponderant role played
by the U.S., it does not have the leverage to
ensure that the GVN at least test the PRO's
offer to compete politically.
Such political competition would appear
to be in the PRO's interests. The first step
toward forming the National Council of Na-
tIonal and -concord, for ex-
ainple, would logically be enforcing Article 11
which gives bade democratic freedoms to all
Vietnamese. Under Article 11 all Vietnamese
would be given freedom of political activity
? (presumably freeing many political prisoners
from GVN's prisons), freedom of residence
(which would allow the refugees to return
home), and freedom 'to organize (which
would allow the Third Force and PRG to
organize in the cities.) At the same time, the
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
S1424
Approved For 13.ele.as.e_2005/07/20 ? CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
wiNcoliESSIONAL ? SENATE Augusi
Pf woeld be expected to ellow Use Gine
similarly to ritgenne in PRO zones.
Perhaps because it Ilona tbat the (Wel
could not stand up to political competition
with the PRO. the U.S. Executive has taken
no known steps to push for such a political
compromise. Instead, it has given ettescrine
prismig support to Thiene whme position
includes the following points.
The PRO must set a date for e/ectiono be-
fore the people can have their denaocratic
neat&
as outlined in Article 11. (This posi-
tion violates the Paris Agreement which
sets no cowlitteres on the enforcement oe Ar-
ticle 11. It could also only be viewed as an
attempt to obstruct any kind of settlement
by the PRO, which could bardly be expected
to surface its cadre and start campaigning
solely on the promise that Thema will allow
Article 11 to be enforced.)
There Is no "Third F'in"Se..' one of "three
espial segments" recognized in entices 12. (On
March 25, for example. GVN spoliesnme nut
Sao True diselared that "the third fort* is
merely an imaginary segment."---w inch
means among Ober things that the National
Council of ?Rorictitatiou could not coma
MU being, since it Is to be composed of the
three parts.)
%do North Vietnamese must withdrew irteu
Eolith Vietnam before the GVN will elm e to
*Venom (Again, this positiernis a major vi-
*laden of the Parish Agreement. The a itli-
drivel of such a condition by the Crated
Metes was Clearly one of the major factors
WiErah led to the signing of the Agmertamt,
which nowhere mentions the presence of
the North Vietnamese. In Article 1 of the
Agreement esplteltly states that, Vietnam.
is
eine ehirmtry4
The Administration, by requesting aid to
the OVIe deepilet stated attitude toward
the Faris Agreement?on seteittisiti of Setting
impossible conditions which it knows in ad-
vance the other side will not meet?gives the
impression that it is not seriously interested
lit eiromoting a political settlement lit South
Vietnam. Inateada it has *nearly Opted for
covert war to keep the PRO from power.
04,16 war, in. turn,. Is the basic reason izir
SWIM Vietnanne economic probleres--watich
are enormous-Ana result of the war, the HS,
supports a GVN which refuses to allow refit-
gene to return to their native homes in or
war rao seep. This creates a great unpro-
ductive Mane of reillioue of people either
elialaered neat cities or resettled in acid, land-
leen Woe millions of people who must be
fed from the outside.
As a resent of On wen the V.S. supporta a
QIN whichrertneeamtar Aena= aigninesett?
portions of Ito Mtn Man &erne. 350,000
civil servants. or 120.000 police All L57 mil-
lion of them do not produce and must also
be . all well aa fed.
As a result of the war, South Vietnam baa
seen a 75% Increase in prices last year. a 257
rise this year (ltalttmore Sun. tiny a, 1974);
cods reserves have fallen dangerously low,
under $100 million (L. A. Times, May 16),
South Vietnam had to bring in imports toted-
Ung $795 million in 1973. while exporting
only $56 million?producing a trade deficit
of $71)9
And Bitch 0C.QUOMIO problems. au tarn,
have helped increase South Vietnam's ecr-
ruptiern problems to epidernie proportions.
In recent Meats. Saigon newspaper& have
reported a %aim rice smuggling eines:nun
out of Vietnam to other Asian countries
where Mines are higher Mei Dan Toe, 5/ 11.
5/13 Dien Tin, 5/12a; a timber enitiggling
riceneel, which has seen high government
canton seize 450.000 acres in the last six
zreeths, depriving the government of CIO--
190 M:Illon in. revenues (Dai Dan Toc, 3/15,
5/18); a scrap metal scandal, which the
State Department says involves $20-$40
? Saigon newspapers say is more like al 2
billion (Ta Swag, 4/10s Dal Dan Ton 4/15.
Chicago Tribune, 6/5); a fertilizer soandal,
whioli 100-}80 high-ranking edictal& have
Kotien rich through speculation, hoarding,
anti price manipulation (NY Peek Vete Song
Then Lynn Boa Dinh, e/13): 80-150.000
masoonalont welchers drawlieg salaries (Chi-
cane Doily News. OH): insonemele camels-
no going to the very lowest of ?Cicada for
ea/maple a risings& oraessi who stole moany
thee ises atappomed to. ge so refugees to Mead
hnlhao 4rip1, Ht. Lout* Post-Diagensh.
May 12, 1144); Six ARON Generals narasd
as war-profiteers, by a Vietnamese Senator
eujoying immunity from arrest (LA. Tones.
Li 17).
The combination of this war economy
coupled with thoroughgoing official eorrup-
tam hoe produced increasing economic hard -
sale ler South. Vietnam ? people. The Beni-
nun* Sun reported on May 8, for example,
Lust..
"In the northern part at South Vietnam,
people are dying of starvation because spec-
ulative rico headgear ham made this beide
loud tOiJ expensive to buy."
Reports of suicide* due to economic prim-
ed:0i are becoming increasingly frequent
HY Tunes. 6/1; Dien Tin, 5/23). There
are Maressiiing reports of crumbling morale,
&hostages of baste commodities. massive un-
employment.
ihe aitisisticies hes bourn= SO serious, In-
wie4. that It is unlikely that even if the Ad-
io***Unitatiost's AIR regttest was passed this
year toot it would serve as more than a mere
*.up-gap measure. NO evidence whatsoever
has been introduced to support the claim
nun Vanning AIM ECL1/11023IndochinaPostwar Remourtruction aid wirtild start
South Vietnam on the road to self-sue-
ciericy; there Is a general consomme bow-
ever. that &UCLA a sum would be a mere tem-
porary measure designed to allow the GM to
hold itie own for another year?uniees it Is
wining to work towards a political compro-
mise.
The solution to South Vietnam's quite seri-
ous economic problems, therefore. is not SIM -
ply to give a aubstantial amount Of Food For
Peace sod/ or Ladochina Postwar Baconatzuc-
host aid. For people are not hungry fOr lark
of food. In FY 74 for example, the 01711 re-
aolied more Food For Peace ($30.1.8 mJlUi
time all of Arno:a $132 =Mika:II Latin Amal-
ie& (147.6 million). Bangladesh ($41.4 mil-
lion) awl Pakistan ($35.1 million) combined.
The problem is that dio Pood For Peace
South Vietnam reeeive,d costa too much.?
due to war and corrupilon?for those who
need it most to purchase it. Lavish Ameri-
cen aid can only esurounige war and corrup-
tion. and Wanton, hunger. A Massive reduc-
tion in American mid will force the CIVN to
none about finding a ptditleal- SolUt.100,
thereby structurally increasing the rhsoopti
LIAAG /fount Vietnam can become self-sunl-
nat.
es: loch. towards the poLlticalaresia.bow-
ner, we fluid tiwt, 011CIS again U.& aid is not
neatening the situation, but rather lead-
ing to a deterioration in the palate:al climate
in (Inn muses.
The U.S. perraiture; Them, to push through
an ramendinant. for Wm to run for a third
term as President causerananotee Nguyen Van
tenon, a leading a,ntnconsesuptet Glithone.
as resign as heed Of the Swots On dellinun
Senisne Vu Van Man. head of the 3n04-
'mist Lotus aroup, they'd his head In protest.
eneng Th'eu "dictate-v' and "incompst-
, ea Jwillary 10, the NY 'Mae& reported
'I a'. litr Imi MIT zones bad been reduced
compennon between two palace cliques,
tf? headed by ThJeu's cousin. Huang Duc
'-Itt?*.be other by a lien named Nguyen Vow
name, leetiyen Van eigar was then reported
lirrested five mantes latar because, at least
nocreclIng to one cornmeutator. Thieu feared
riThi..; power (LA Times, 5/31),
ttea nebto, procests?Seeall. Out visible, by
tee fee wta dare speak publicly?have con-
tinued It hunger Ilrilre by hundreds of
1.974
Bud ihist monks, Cao Ditilsts, and other third
foreo political prisoners was reported in Chi
Hoe prison In March (NY Times. 2/7, 3412):
20 F os Boo Buddhists cut off the little fin-
ger* of their left hands in protest against
rest lotions on them (UPI. 6/7); 300 monks
were reported demonstrating in the Delta to
prot :at arrest of six monks (Philadelphia
Inge her, 6/13); 19 Buddhists and Madame
tVga Ba Thanh led a march through Saigon
corn ig for the release of Thieu's political
prisoners (Christian Science Monitor, 5/7); a
Hutinhist reception for the families of polit-
iesl prisoners was held, though surrounded
by p ince (Agence Prance Presse, 5/1) ?
(hi Lon Nol series?
As bad as the political and economic situ-
atlas In (MN zones is, however, the situation
in Cambodia for the Lon Nol government is
even more hopeless.
Ot ee again, the responsibility for the rap-
idly deteriorating situation lies with a US.
Row etive branch which has preferred to
wage covert war in Cambodia rather than
attempt to reach a political solution, no mat-
ter row distasteful It might find such a
pont teal compromise.
As the Washington Post reported on
June 30, the Lon Nol government is entirely
depeotfent on U.S. funds to continue its day-
to-df.y functioning: "Cambodia's domesti-
cally generated government revenues from
taxa in fiscal year 1974 amounted to $54
mill ma?not nearly enough to cover Its $109
mini m military and $80 million civilian
budgets.- And, of course, the U.S. Is supply- _
lug all transport, arms, ammunition, and
other basic commodities.
The basic fact is that Lon Nol controls
little more than a few major towns, which
can only be supplied by an American airlift
or oc casional boat; as a result prices are re-
ports d to have risen more than 300%, with
foodi tuffs up 4100% in the past year. Specu-
lation and corruption are also reported to
have risen tremendously (Chicago Daily
Newt, 6/12) . In a separate report, the Chicago
Tribune reported that millions of dollars of
U.S. arms aid has been disappearing into
Cam'iodia, much of it turning up with the
Sinner Rouge (June 26).
The basic military and economic weakness
Is re lected above all in Lon Nors political
prolnems. His only real base of popular sup-
port when. he took power was the teachers
and atudents. By now, however, he was long
since broken with both. In January 22,000
teachers went on strike, later supported by
studints. Students continued demonstrating
regularly, culminating in a May 31st march
of some 1,500 through the center of town:
the _railing of the Cambodian Minister of
Education, after being held by demonstrat-
ing a:admits. (the identity of the assassin Is
not ,et known) symbolizes the major and
perhaps irrevocable break between the Lon
Nol eovernment and students and teachers.
LO7 m Nol, however, has become increasingly
Isolated, even within the small coterie of
pont: clans with which he surrounds himself.
Forced through American pressure to join a
coalr ion with Cheng Heng, Sink Matins seed
In Tan about a year ago, Lou Nol has pro-
gress vely gotten rid of each. This spUt was
tinany consummates' recently when Long
Bona foamed a new cabinet in the aftermath
of the Minister of Education's death. Slx top
cabinet Milmala nirit Matak. wa,s ex-
cludel from the new cabinet, along with all
mem iers of his Republican party. The final
cabinet consisted of 7 members. of floret's
Socio -Republican party, which supports Lou
Non 6 independents; and two array men.
Since In Tam bad, long since left, this newest
cabinet reshuffle left Lon Not with his ;ear-
.
row* t political base since the U.S. forced
him 'to take in the others a year earlier.
Vaster the circumstances then, it is hard
to th nit of a single coherent reason why the
Congg ess should give any aid to Lon Nol at
all, It alone the astronomical sum of $550
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
, Approved For Release 2005/07120 CIA-RDP79-009,57A000100040047-5 -
ugust 5, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL R 1;,CORD ? SENATE
-
mflhidn 'being 'asked for by the Administra-
tion for ''F-iscal 'Year 1975.
The major justification for our involve-
ment il!ir Cambodia originally was that it was
nedgeSsify'to Protect T.T.S. ground troops fight-
ing in Smith Vietnam.
As American troops were progressively
'withdrawn from South Vietnam, the Admin-
istration changed its rationale td protecting
the Cambodians from -a North Vietnamese in-
vasion. During the past few years. however,
the North VietriameSe have not been in-
volved in the 'fighting 'between Lan Nol and
Khmer Rouge troops. As the N.Y. Times re-
ported on November 25, n73:
, "The Government tells them that they
are lighting Vietnamese -1-traders and the
soldiers are beginning to discover that that
Is not true : . Nobody sees North Vietnam-
ese troops in battle any more. The voices
that call to Government soldiers from across
the battlefields are Ithriier 'tibias, the soldiers
say; the bottles are !Gamer bodies."
!.1"110 iieW Administration position that
lavish :American aid to 1;On. 'WM w11l -show
the _other sides that it cannot Win a Military
victory, thus pushing- it tovSaMs negotia-
tions. There Is no eisidence to Support this
point of view, however, and even- less Justin-
cellar' for why the United -States should be
involVed- in What IS'Iddisi "admitted to be a
cdvii- War Either* -taitibo? diens.
'In tact, at in -Labi,-"ternfinued 'U.S. support
to Lon NO1 simply lead to morefight-
ing, lees likelihood for a political settlement,
mad increased costs for the United States.
Thus, it is that Lon Nol has lbst territory
and people in the past Year, despite a -giant
U.S: Military and air pacISage totaling $631.5
million, more than we gave to all of Latin
America last year.
And thus it is that this staggering amount
of Money" not Only accomplished very little
last Year, but has seen the Administration
ask for almost twice as much for FY 1975
in Carnbacliit ($550.8 million) as it did in
11T--74 (08/.8 '
Csainhodia wliere the U.S. Executive today
spends ;vast sums to keep a half-mad dic-
tator hi_ power despite his lack of any other
, ebSerVpliiie Support, either ettVr-na-lly or in-
ternally, is the greatedt example Of our time
Of What ,:is wrong about Presidential covert
Warfare.
AS have sUggested, the time has come
for dentress to move 'to terminate sueh war
arotind the 'globe. can think of no more
aPproPrIate place -to begin than Cambodia.
(a) Lath?
The one exaMple of how Congress can
terminate Presidential covert *at in Indo-
china atigeelroinLiibt.
'Striae: 1062 -Laos :Eat been the very Model
of the -futility of Presidential covert war.
Successive Athericiiii-adiriiiiigfrationa poured
In billions of dollars, built up a Meo and
then Thai "Secret "Army," and dropped
nearly 2 million tons Of bomb-a on Laos, in
an Tattempt to keep a small stoup of right-
Wing generals under the titular leadership
of ,S-ciiyarma Phouma in power.
result? A steed? 'Acreage in territory
and population by the Pathet Lao; the deci-
mation of the 1Vleo people and heavy losses
by Thai troops; the destruction of much of
What Was one of the most beautiful societies
On the face Of the earth; and thewaste of
peiliap$ more than $10 billion and hundreds
Of American lives. -
4"14:Onghoili-all- those long Years of Presi-
dential,: covert f war' in-Laos, Moreover; the
Main Obstacle to -a- political solution was
elearly "riOt' the taaiant Ira -rather 'd U.S.
Exptutiye, Which wished to bomb the lb Chi
Minh 41,41Jii ediiiEern-Laos 'aid '' War
orcircfri;sAti. IrlafriatiV use ficorTherri?Laot
as Abase' for intelligerice-gaffiering nitgalona
into China and 'gottli VletneM 'and, it was
suggested hi- ?a tragliingtOn'tfar-News' arti-
cle "dated May 21,- 1574, 'to slack the North
Vietnamese' into Laos so as tb tie up some
of their troops Which It was telt might oth-
erwise be used in South ietnam.
In 1973 however, du' to increasing mili-
tary gains by the Paths , Lao and the switch
to covert U.S. involvee-ent in South Viet-
nam, it was the U.S.. Ands changed and
decided to push the Isio right wing to ac-
cept a political settlemen, in Laos.
The result of this, if course, has been
increased stability, a siotential savi:ags of
hundreds of millions ' dollars, and a po-
tential end to Americen involvement in a
war that few Americi 3 ever know about,
let alone desire.
Of course, the U.S. iscision to push for a
political settlement he s also meant that the
Pathet Lao have MELO, considerable gains
politically, and are in if much better position
to one day govern Lao-, But this is a lesson
the American people roust learn. I do not
sense that it has be overly painful for
them.
How long this situps will last, however,
is anyone's guess. The 1.8. Executive branch
ultimately intervened toth in 1958 and 1962
to prevent the Pathet 7.ao from taking pow-
er, and the danger ex :stis that it will do so
this time as well.
The clearest warnins sign yet of this is the
GAO report that the Administration has
continued funneling ail to the Laotian right
wing, in violation cs the Laotian Peace
Agreement.
It is clearly up to :ingress to make the
lesson of Laos stick 1 is stipulating that no
aid go to any projecsi in Laos unless ap-
proved 'unanimously -r all factions in the
Provisional Govern) ins t of National Union
(PGNU).
VIII. COVERT WAR' T.'a NECESSITY CY, U.S.
zrumrrssT pEasokar!).!. AND, TECHNOLOGY
It must be remems-,red that an Admin-
istration like that of ; ? ie GVN or Lon Nol is
not even remotely c ,;-)able of maintaining
their present military 'orce levels.
In part, this is a- mple matter of eco-
nomics. The calm is It capable of raising
more than 15% of its annual income, with
85% coming from tlis United States. As a
result, American funs] s and materiel are nec-
essary to provide all tic wherewithal to keep
the GVN's 1.1 miPim man army and 2,000-
plane air force frosi collapsing. And, of
course, the Lon Nol gr sernment is even more
penniless, making its sen more dependent on
American aid.
American personzu 1, however, are as Im-
portant as U.S. mats lel. If American per-
sonnel were not ;midis :14e to repair aircraft,
handle logistics, play operations, American
equipment would eit: r lie unused or unre-
paired, appear on the rla.ck market of major
cities, or be sold to Lii highest bidder (usu-
ally the PRG of Ki aer Rouge)?in even
greater quantities the A now is the case.
During my trip to Els-uth Vietnam last year,
for example, I was cc: stantly told by Amer-
ican technicians the Thieu's air force and
army would collapse in a matter cif weeks
without American tee iinicians.
(a) U.S. Military personnel
Thailand today ser---ss as both the person-
nel and logistics base of the covert U.S. mili-
tary preseiase in Indos -Una. Virtually all rice,
ammunition and hos Os used in Cambodia
move from Sattabip Fort in southern Thai-
land (LA Times, May ii, 1974.) U.S. personnel
are training in Lao a id Cambodian pilots in
Uidorn and other 13.1, air bases in Thailand
(June 13, 1974). BY, jadier General James
Hildreth, the U.S. ofiser in charge of Udorn
Air Force Base, has tdmitted to :reporters
that the U.S. is sti);, dying reconnaissance
missions from Thane over South Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos LA TIMER, January 11,
1274) ; and U.S. ?Ma: s have admitted flying
recorrnalsssn-ce flight-3 over North Vietnam
as 'well from Thailan S. (See NY Times, April
21, 1973) .
Thailand has aiso srved as a major base
for Air America. Air .Stnerica, the CIA-owned
S 14265
airline, has greatly increased its role in Indo-
china since the Ceasefire. Providing a civilian
"cover," it performs many of the functions
carried out by the U.S. Air Force before the
Ceasefire: deploying local troops, transport-
ing U.S. military and CIA personnel, dropping
arms and supplies to local garrisons. It is no
surprise than Congressman Aspin reported-on
January 9, 1974, that Air America in 1973 had
doubled its contracts over 1972, from $17.7
million up to $41.4 million. The recent an-
nouncement that Air America has been pur-
chased by Thai-American, Inc., was described
as a response to public pressure in Thailand
against the CIA, It remains to be seen if the
functions being carried out by Air America
will also be terminated, or whether instead
they will now simply be carried out by Thai-
American and/or other such companies.
(Washington Post, June 4, 1974)
On March 28, 1974, Senator Harold Hughes
revealed that an average of over 5,000 "hostile
'fire payments" had been made monthly to
U.S. military personnel for activities in Indo-
china: 6,263 in October, 1973, 5,669 in No-
vember, 4,700 in December and 4,015 in Jan-
uary 1974. The Defense Department at the
time explained that such payments were for
"American servicemen who are performing
non-combat activities in Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia and whose presence . . makes
them vulnerable . . . to hostile fire." This
revelation made it clear that U.S. military
personnel, as well as U.S. civilians, were en-
gaged in combat-related activities, although
the Defense Department did not make it clear
what these payments were being given for.
On June 5 Defense Secretary Schlesinger
revealed what at least some of these pay-
ments were for. Testifying before the House
Armed Services Committee, Schlesinger
stated that the U.S. Air Force was flying
some 690 missions monthly out of Thailand
into Cambodia, dropping supplies and am-
munition to Lon Nol troops stationed in out-
lying outposts. The Defense Department later
stated that the 690 figure was high for the
month of August, 1973, and that the average
was on the order of 425 missions a month
throughout 1973. (UPI, June 6, 1974.)
U.S. fighter pilots flying protection for
these supply missions into Cambodia are also
drawing hostile fire pay, sources have re-
ported to the Indochina Resource Center.
Other activities for which U.S. military per-
sonnel could be drawing combat pay vary
from similar sup-ply and reconnaissance mis-
sions into Vietnam and Laos, to clandestine
services as military advisors to local armed
forces.
Within Indochina itself, U.S. personnel
play an indispensable role iA holding the lo-
cal air forces and armies together. The lo-
gistics and technical requirements of keep-
ing together South Vietnam's giant 1.1 mil-
lion-man army and 2,000-plane air force,
for example, make American technicians and
logistics experts indispensable. As I stated
previously, I was told repeatedly on my post-
ceasefire visit to South Vietnam that neither
Lon Non's nor Thieu's armed forces could
function without these men.
American personnel are necessary to repair
the sophisticated aircraft, tanks and other
machines of war which are the mainstay of
the Thieu and Lon Nol armies; to manage
the gigantic logistics flow of billions of dol-
lars worth of arms, ammunition, clothing,
food a,nd the thousands of other items nec-
essary to keep the Lon Nol and Thieu mili-
tars, forces In the field; to carry out the over,
all direction and planning necessary to co-
ordinate ground and air operations, plan out
overall strategic operations, and carry out
other tasks beyond the capacities of the
Thieu or Lon Nol governments.
For example, American technicians have
historically done the detailed and compli-
cated work necessary to analyze recon photos
to select bombing targets for the Thieu and
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
S14266
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENAIE August 5, 1974
LOO NO1 air forces. While It has not yet been
revealed that this has continued since the
Ceasefire. there Is every reason to believe
that the reconnaissance missions currently
being Carried out by American aircraft todei
over Indochina, in violation of the Pare
Agreement, are being used for such target-
ing.
There are increasing indieations, moreover
that American personnel are serving in aci?
visory Capacities in combat situations, in vio-
lation of Congressional law, as well is the
Pare Agreement.
There are numerous reports, roost notably
by the General Accounting Office. that U.S.
military and civilian personnel under the
control fo the CIA have been violating a
Congressional ban against advising Cambo-
dian troops on the ground. The most recent
such reports were filed by the Washington
Poet on March 13, 1974. reporting the activi-
ties of a Major Ondecker who was directing
Cambodian troops at Kampot; and by writer
Bareherd Boyle, who recently returned from
Csoabodia with photographs and mimes of
persons he cheirned were advising Cambodia
troops in combat.
There have also been periodki reports
Within South Vietnam of Americana involved
combat-related roles with the South Viet-
namese armed forces.
The Seaton Globe, for example, reported
On January 27, 1974, that IBM executive Rob-
ert Ransom stated that on a recent trip to
Selith Vietnam that he was told by a forme:
American military advisor that "Americans
are still flying gunships from Da Nang air-
haft . . . often camouflaged under a Red
Crews emblem." David Shipler of the NY
Times reported on 2/25/74 that: "Americari
civilians . . . not only see that the South
Vietnamese get the equipment they wsk for.
but also advise them on what to ask foe...
More direct, overt advice is sometimes giver.
by zealous America* who are still stationeci
111 every province .
There are easo indications of an ongoing
CIA role in Indochina separate from that of
disguised U.S. military personnel Lime the
ellasenre. On July 24, 1973, for exempla,
Taramy Arbuckle of the Washington Star-
News reported that the CIA has been setteug
Up Cambodian paramilitary unite hi several
prairie* in Canabodia, separate and distinct
trona the regular Cambodian army.
And in South Vietnam, U.S. Ambit-emcee
Martin was reported in a May 8, 1974, AP
dispatch to have admitted that an Air Amer-
ica plane had been used to transport North
Vietnamese POWs. Martin only made this
admiselon after, an AP photograph had been
taken of seven North Vietnamese POWs being
led onto the plane. Martin claimed that he
had authorized the flight for 'humanitarian"
reasons to help one wounded prisoacr, and
did not knew about the other six. It is wail-
known South Vietnam that the CIA
has been directly involved ,in the teterroga-
tkin 4nd torture of prisoners since the begin-
ning of the war.
Similarly in Laos, although all Americans
Involved in the war have been reportedly
withdrawn, 500 "civilians" :ameba behind,
and the recent GAO revelation that the Ad-
ministrat1on has been directly funneling
money to tile Laotian right wing in violation
of the Laotian Peace Agreement suggest+, that
the Administration has no more inteetion
of withdrawing its covert personnel from
Laos today than it did in 1962. One's teem
are not quieted by reports such as the March
14, 1974, letter in Rolling Stone from a U.S.
airman stating that "(I am) stationed in a
remote U.S. Air Force bees in Thailand . . .
Receizitly U.S. military forces are being intro-
duced into this area, covertly, and especially
into Vientiane and other Laotian areas.'
The most complete report yet to emerge
since the Ceasefire about American military
activities in Indochina since the Ceasenre Is
that given by Steven M. Davis, who worked
for the Federal Electric Corporation In South
Vietnam from January through June, 1973.
Mr. Davis worked in the top-secret Saigon
'nelecommunications Center of the American
lernbasay. Colonel A. C. Barger of the Defense
Intelligence Ageocry (DIA) In a letter dated
November 7..1973. to Senator George McGov-
ern confirmed that Steven Davis did indeed
work at the Telecommunications Facility
(luring January-June. 1973, and also con-
firmed one of Mr. Davis's charges: that im-
proper security procedures were being used.
Mr. Davis, as reported by Pacific News Serv-
ice reporter Joan Bolden, has reported the
meowing based on hie work at the Telecom-
munications Facility:
More than 100 U.S military advisors are
operating in Cambodia In violation of the
Congressional ban on such activity.
More than 100 more Americans were serv-
ing as meroenaries with the Cambodian
ermed forces, under the control of the CIA.
U.S. teams designated as search groups for
U.S. lineeing In Action have included per-
&mute whose task is military spying.
General Hash, an American captured by
in. Chinese during the Paracel Islands fight-
ing, was actually an Army Captain advising
Thieu urrny units under the guise of a civ-
titan employee in charge of monitoring loges-
was now to Da Nang.
The U.S. was not only eying regular re-
calliailaM1100 missions in violation of the
Paris Agreement, but U.S. aircraft were
bombing in South Vietnam on occasion.
U S. Air Form personnel were manning
beacons within South Vietnam to guide
aerial bombardment of Cambodia and South
Vietnam.
(b) U.S. War Materiel.
The obvious importance of U.S. materiel
ead technology In keeping the Thieu &rut
Lou Not governments alive need riot be
biro:lied here.
It is useful to note, however, that the
covert practice Of attempting to use im-
proved technology to compensate for low
morale in no eneratned that the Administra-
tion has been attempting to modernize
equipment, blatantly violating Article 7 of
the Paris Agreement, which holds 'Dist
equipment can only be replaced on a "one-
lot-one" Muds.
Congressmen Agpin recently revealed, in
the Cionerentonal Record of June 13, 1974,
that the Administration has requested funds
violating the "one-for-one" clause of the
Paris Agreement in four separate categories,
ernely :
Funds to modernize the South Vietnamese
Air Foes, by replacing the Fe6A with the
technically superior P-610.
Funds to send in C-1 30e to replace the far
smaller C-7 transport aircraft presently in
Tunis for 29 A-37B fighters to replace, In
pert. the old propeller-driven. single-engine
A- Is.
Funds modernize 4 transport aircraft by
turning them into g-unships.
And these examples, of course, are merely
11 addition to Many other reported violations
of the "one-fot-one" clause, most notably the
Administration plan tO send in 60 F-SEs to
replace- the older F-5As. The F-SE is an en-
tirely ditTeeent plane tean the F-SA, haying
twice the combat radius, nearly twice the
aerieleration rate, and carrying nearly a half-
ton gresti,r bomb load capacity. On April 7.
1974, moreover, the Saigon newspaper Dien
Tin reported that $O American specialists
weuid arrive at Bien 1104 &Ulu* to assemble
tee new F--Ma, within South Vietnam).
The most useful measure of the central
role played by American mabsziel in support-
lag U.S. Presidential covert war In Indochina.
:weever, is simply the sheer quantity of arms
and ammunition being shipped into Indo-
china. As we have pointed out this quantity
15 :sr in excess of what oven the Defense In-
telligence Agency claims is being shipped into
Ii dochina by the Soviet Union and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. (See Table 8.)
Even more to the point, however, is that
the Administration is clearly attempting to
Mee Thieu far more materiel than he needs
to defend himself.
In Fiscal Year 1974 the Administration
al ocated e359 million in funding for the
"procurement" section of Its military aid
to Thieu. In Fiscal Year 1975, however. the
At ministration is requesting more than
twice as much, or $652 million.
it should be noted that Administration
ofecials unanimously state that they do not
erect a major offensive in the coming year.
These vast inputs of covert American per-
soenel and materiel, however, simply do not
milk* to strengthen Thieu or Lon Nol. On
the contrary?by keeping them dependent
on American personnel and resources, there
Ii no chance for the kind of structural
cheneee necessary to fight their opponents.
The result is simply increasing corruption,
sicth and lack of morale?and increasing
ga ns by their opposition, thus leading to
in :reusing pressures for direct American
in ervent ion.
The Indochina Resource Center has re-
ceived a number of reports, one of which is
Ira luded here as Appendix Two, indicating
the US. Marines are standing by to invade
Ca nbodia should Phnom Penh be threat-
ened.
its Executive ?Melees grow more worried,
mereover. they state quite openly their In-
tel lion to resume American bombing should
Saigon or Phnom Penh be seriously threat-
efled.
int November 1, 1973, for example. U.S. Air
Frees Conunander Vogt was quoted in the
LA Times as saying, "Now that we're not
act ually dropping bombs, we must maintain
ow capability to resume such action if we
hate to . . . The whole idea of retaining
these unite in Thailand . . . is to be ready
in ewe the enemy miscalculates and decides
he wants to resume on a massive scale."
Cm December 3rd Defense Secretary
See lesinger was reported as saying that "If
Hanoi ... were to launch an all-out assault
... I believe the President would be prepared
to ome back to Congress and ask for support
of (U.S.) military activities in support of
Sestet Vietnam," And on January 7, 1974,
Schlesinger repeated the threat, adding that
he bought that Congress would agree.
The Administration is not simply threat-
eni ig to resume the bombing by words, how-
ever. This year it has requested the giant
sent of $463 million?more than it is spend-
ing on all of Africa?to maintain American
air units in Thailand prepared to resume the
boribing.
xx. ,40VIRT WAR; POLICE AND REFUGEE PROGRAMS
FOR POPULATION CONTROL
Tae hallmark of Presidential covert war is
its ?implies* on controlling the local popu-
lation. During the 1950s and 1960s, this em-
phesis saw the creation of nearly 14 million
reftgees, according to the DS. Senate Sub-
committee on Refugees, as much of rural
Indoreina was moved away from areas near
null guerrillas towards provincial capitals
and cities where they could be more easily
core roiled. Also, during the 1960s the local
poliee forces in Indochina were vastly ex-
pan led through American aid and advisors
In en attempt to physically prevent the peo-
ple .rom aiding the guerrilla forces once they
wen in areas of government control.
Owe again, American personnel and fund-
ing save the key elements in both police and
referee programs for the last decade, due to
the ack of technical expertise and economic
base of the local administrations. There are
numerous indications that this American
role Is continuing up to the present day.
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
Aiirgitt 5, 1974
(a) Police Programs.
,
The GVN's reliance on pdliee programs to
control the peptilation Since the Ceasefire
has "been Vell-doeinriented. On June 7, 1974,
for exaMple, ei Refla Abzug inserted in
the Congres9innaT RecOrd a listing of more
than 100 articles appearing in the western
press Since the Ceasefire, most emanating di-
reetly from Saigon, which detail the con-
tinuing onerations Of the GVN's police and
prison system.
A wide- variety of western sources have
documented that Saigon's 120,000-man police
force has Continued constant sweeps, post-
curfew round-ups of men, women ;and chil-
dren, constant checks on ID cards and fre-
quent arrests and torture of individuals on
political charges since the Ceasefire:.
In testimony before the House Pacific Af-
fairs Subcommittee on September 13, 1973,
for exainple, I described the police system
in South Vietnam as / saw it upon. my visit
there in June and July, 1973:
- Constant surveillance of the population
as a whole;
Earldom arrests carried out during sys-
tematic sweeps throughout GVN towns and
villages; ?
Detention and torture of numerous incli-
, "Vicitials, without benefit of counsel;
Summary sentencing either by a military -
court or, in most cases, by "administrative
detention" in Which the arrestee has no
counsel or trial;' -
Intprisonment for years Characterized by
lack of proper food, water, and medical care;
and
Increased surveillance and harassment
upon release from prison.
!xtensive documentation has emerged also
of the continued detention of tens of thou-
sands Of politieal Prisoners since the Cease-
fire, as well as a Continuing policy of new
arrests since the Ceasefire.
On September lff, 1973, for example, Rep-
reSentative Abzug entered into the record
of, the 'House 'Mane Affairs Subcommittee
hearing -aft official telegram from the na-
tional Phoenix Directorate ordering all local
Phoenift'officeS to continue" operb,tions. This
teleorain; printed in "Le -Monde on May 17,
19'7L Clearly indicated that the GVN was
cOntinning" to "neutralize," i.e., arrest or as-
salldnate;
The:: Administration openly -intended to
keep funding the GVIkrs pollee- and prison
fiytWir after the Ceasefire. On June 4, 1973,
for efaimp,e; -Senator Kennedy revealed that
the V. Agency for 'International Develop-
Merit *lets- reviegting. $15:2 million for con-
tinued' funding' of the V'N's police and
prison systerti for the Visbal Year beginning
July 1, 1973, i.e., six months after the Paris
Agreement had beensigned. (See the Con-
ssional 'Record, June 4, 1973, 510204.)
Subsequent Congressional action forced the
Adnil/listrittiOn to stop such direct funding
of the-police arid 'prison sratent-Desp '''' this;
however, the fact that 'U.S. funds supply at
least 115% of the GVIT's- income means, of
efnirse, that theShare df maintaining
the Mt's police system Still comes from the
however indirectly.
Tile? complexities of the GPM's' police ap-
paratus, inoreo*er, Aiecetsitate- American ad-
Vice and Support. During the past decade, for
Oicatigke, the U.S. Office Of Public Safety
planned and Minleniented a National ID Card
Ppgrani which - saw the issuance of over 10
xhu1ir,Oi 1T Cards to all Vietnamese over the
e` IS: All Vietnamese are required to
'these Try cards, on pain of arrest. The
r s-are linked to giant computers, in which
fingerprints and bio-dossiers are 'stored, 'le-?.
ted at theVerecomrnunications Directorate.
? tinder the Paris, Agreeinent, the Adminis-
tration was required to withdraw all advisors
to Saigon's police force. In February, 1974,
tiOweVer, one year after the signing of the
Paris Agreement, a team of Americans sent
Approved For Release 205/07
CONGRESSIONAL
aWR9WAye57A000100040047-5 s 14207
Swigen by.the ih dug Airierican Se-
curity Council reported oat:
"A handful of U.S. vilia-n technicians
continue to provide advii , in the operation of
a newly-installed comroter eystean which
keeps tabs on more th- ,1 10 million South
Vietnamese." (From Viet am Report: "Not in
Vain", American Secorii ,? Council, page 8)
The NY Times, in it February 25, 1974,
survey of continuing A erican involvement
in South Vietnam art, the Ceasefirc, re-
ported that:
"Tim South Vietuan -e National :Police
continue to receive regM tf advice from Amer..
leans . . . to high-rank ,g (Vietnamese po-
lice) officers said they .,nd their staffs met
frequently with the its ,,on station chief of
the CIA and his staff-. . Police officials con-
firmed that in some pro' aces American 'liai-
son' men who work witl, ,he police remain on
the job. . . . Local pc,' oemen still refer to
'American police adv: irs'. . Police here
have military functen? and engage in in-
filtration, arrest, inter,,gation and torture
of COmmunists and poi tical dissidents,"
Steven Davis, the Feieral Electric Corpo-
ration employee who Itorked at the Saigon
Telecommunications I rectorate, has re-
ported that on May 14 1973, he saw a mess-
age to local CIA offic in South Vietnam
directing that the Foot ,x program in South
Vietnam was to be trin ferred to the South
Vietnamese National ?olice, thus freeing
local agents under th, control of the CIA
to start new Phoenis programs in South
Vietnam in areas whet., Phoenix had not yet
operated.
(b) Refugee Prograrir.
Since the Ceasefire, the GVN has openly
continued its policy ci concentrating refu-
gees in camps and re o gsing to allow them
to return to their orto nal villages.
On January 25, 1973, tor example, two days
before the Paris Agree rient was signed, the
Washington Post rends t ?,c1. that:
"The South Vietnmiese government will
not permit hundreds ,?7 thousands of refu-
gees from Communist oeld areas to return
to their homes after I e? cease-fire takes ef-
fect and will punish toem if they try, ac-
cording to U.S. officials ikere."
In addition to keel Ing refugees In their
camps, moreover, Gills: oolicy has also aimed
at enlarging its. chair ? ,d territorial control
by forcibly removing refugees to areas un-
inhabited by either sio On March 22, 1973,
and July 5, 1973, for e?-,-aanple, the NY Times
reported "resettle/nen - of several hundred
thousand people in ad effort "to get broader
control."
The result has beet unending misery for
millions of refugees io have been forced
to live on arid, unpvoluctive soil, in areas
where farming is almr-t impossible. On No-
vember 23, 1973, for ample, the Washing-
ton Post reported:
"As if on cue, the rshabitants of Than-
thuy's moldering seal I es come out to plead
with their unexpectec visitors: we are hun-
gry. This land is poo,. We want to go back
to our village. Please sk the government to
let us go home."
Police controls in f.t Ch refugee ca;mps are
tight.
On March 28, 1974 for example, Diane
Jones of the America Friends Service Com-
mittee testified beton, he Senate Appropria-
tions Committee on enditions in refugee
camps she had visrtec :n South Vietnam be-
tween October, 1973, tid February, 1E474. She
reported that:
"These camps lot 1:ed nothing like vil-
lages, but like coneet Iration camps, some of
them totally surromo-red by barbed wire or
bamboo stake fete with tall military
watchtowers on the perimeters . . people
were not allowed beyc nd the camp boundaries
except during certati hours of the day. . .
The inhabitants of tl- t se camps had to regis-
ter with Camp officir?lr, when they left and
When they returned, in Xuyen Phuoc camp
In Quang Nam province, I talked extensively
with a government official who told me his
job was politioal control of the population...
he showed me stacks of pictures, one picture
of each family in the camp . . he said that
he had to check daily each family against
their family report.... If anyone disappeared
without asking permission, he said the per-
son's family could be arrested."
American policy is directly responsible for
such refugee control programs.
In Fiscal Year 1974 the Administration ex-
pended over $70 million on such refugee pro-
grams. In Fiscal Year 1975, it is requesting
$116.5 million to continue them, an increase
of more than 50%.
There are convincing indications, more-
over, that American officials are aware of
the true nature of this refugee program. In-
deed, the evidence indicates that this policy
of controlling refugees may be as much a
result of deliberate American policy as GVN's
desires.
A U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee study
published one year after the signing of the
Paris Agreement, for example, reprints sev-
eral internal U.S. documents. One, an official
description of refugee resettlement sites in
Military Region II, dated October 17, 1973,
characterizes 30 resettlement sites as being
economically unviable.
A letter from the U.S. Consul General in
Bien Hoa, Mr. Robert Walkinshaw, dated
April 5, 1973, states that:
"The people will move into areas that were
previously considered marginal, thus secure
the area, improve movement and security
along major routes of communication, de-
velop the agriculture ... and bring economic
viability to the country as a whole."
And the most thorough and convincing
picture yet to emerge of the U.S. role in ref-
ugee control was presented to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on July 2, 1974,
by Mr. Edward Block, an A.ID, refugee
official in South Vietnam from April, 1972,
until December, 1973.
"The real objectives of the 'U.S. mission
(Include) to encourage the GVN to hold
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of
refugees as dependents of the government
rather than allowing them to return freely
and peacefully to their original villages .
to help the Saigon government to occupy
additional territory presently contested or
claimed by the PRG. . ."
"(This) objective is evidenced by the fact
that the GVN continued to keep more than
a half million refugees in camps long after
the Ceasefire agreement had been signed.. ."
"Hundreds of thousands of refugees from
the 1972 April offensive are currently being
poorly resettled under the same conditions
that exist for the 1968-1971 refuees. .
"Little or no assistance is provided for
land clearing; refugees are often placed in
resettlement wnere no land is available;
little or no farmland is ever distributed where
it is available in many cases, food allow-
ances are arbitrarily cut off, causing wide-
spread hunger and malnutrition."
"The Stieng Montagnards of Binh Long
province (were) concentrated for a year and
a half in the squalid An Lot refugee camp
where they watched more than 300 of their
children die like flies."
"AID. officials argue that no refugees
have come forth to request their return to
home in PRG-controlled areas. This argu-
ment might as well be no refugees have come
forth to commit suicide, because the GVN
still maintains a policy of shooting or jail-
ing anyone caught moving about in areas
outside of its immediate control."
"Once the GVN occupies . . , new areas,
it wastes little time in seizing this oppor-
tunity to utilize refugees for their own coun-
terinsurgency purposes, despite possible
hazards to the people involved. For example,
I know first-hand that in resettlement in
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
110.0"'
s 44268 Approved For Ream 2005/07/20 ? CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5
tx.RESSIONAL RECORD --SENKa August 5, 1974
Quang Nein province, the OVN has boen bties
recruiting children between the ages of 7 and
14 to perform intelligence and detection work
within their villages and the surrounding
areas."
PREBIDENTLAL COVERT WAR: A TINE TO smut
roe ENE LIVING
There Is no more ominous sign for the f u-
ture health of this nation than our present
tendency to speak of our Indochina involve-
ment as Wit has ended.
We rarely speak of It at all. The media
rarely carries the many stories filed from Ln.
dochina,?Walter Cronkite is reported as
saying that we knee we lost the ear, and
therefore want to forget it. Time and again,
traveling about the country, one L3 told that
"people just don't want to hear about Viet-
nam:1 any more."
To the extent that Vietnam is rani fen ta-
me. it is as if it were a long-distant trtigedi
one that laid its heaviest burdens on ArnIT I
cans. "Vietnam" today means OretaerilY ve'-
erans? problems, amnesty, POWE, the ac
counting for U.S. Missing-In-Action.
Them concerns are understandably real to
most Americans. Our Vietnam past haunte
1.15, ahd will for many years to come.
The time, however, has clearly come to
speak Of the present as well, to reteembei
not only the dead but the living.
It is time to speak of teas of them:kinds re
political prisoners in South Vietnam. sub-
jected to torture, hunger, thirst and best1rs/0.
at this very moment, people who ineie been
Imprisoned without trial or hope or teller.
It is tinu? to speak of millions of refugees In
Cambodia and South Vietnam whom we
helped bomb and force out of their ancestral
homes, people who sit Landless and jobless in
arid camps today because we still help pre-
vent their return to the villages oi their
birth,
It Is time to speak of the millions more in
South Vietnam now being watched, sub'
jected to mem round-ups, harassed by a
nightmarish police system that we created.
And,?most of all?it is time today to speak
of the hundreds of thousands a Vleteatuese
and Cambodian and Laotians who are alive
and whole, but will be dead or maimed a year
frtnn tOdity if AdynItestranon aid requests
are granted.
It Is time to speak of these Lvine.--not
only for their mikes, but for oure.
I will never forget the words of a Laotian
refugee whom I interviewed after he had
survived 5 years of our bombing In north-
eastern Laos:
"In the region of the Plain of Jars, then
mole to be a lake of blood and destruction.
For there were airplanes and the sound of
bombs throughout the aides and the hills
An we had were the holes."
Mali nation as a whole learned during the
1960s that we could not ignore this lake of
Mood. We learned that, for example:
To let our Executive leaders destroy aboeed
meant that they would not construct a
Great or New Society at home;
To tolerate Presidential lawlessness in
Indochina would lead to Presidential law-
lessness in Watergate; and
To ignore the CIA's ponce mentality in
Vietnam would see this mentality blossom
here through data banks, electronic surveil-
lance, and countless other loviudon.s of pri-
vacy.
Much progress lute been made, Mildly. At
long last, the principle is lint' etking hold
that we have no right to intervene in other
nations' internal affairs. We can now uream
of the day when our leaders will turn away
from interference abroad to meeting the
Weide of their own people at home.
But for this progress to continue, today 's
ongoing Presidential couert war In Indoeeine
can no longer be ignored.
There is almost unanimous agreement
today that we were 'wrong" to get involved
In Indochina. Some say this from a legal
point of view, others from a moral one, and
stet' others groin a practical perspective. But
int wally all Americans say it today.
What we must also say, however. is that
If ebbs Presidential ,00vert involvement was
"wrong" in 1934, it In also "wrong" in 1974.
For II we are to learn one single lesson
from the past 25 yours of U.S. Intervention
In Indoehluts, let it ee this:
We must confront the lake of blood our
leaders are still creattng in Indochina.?
no matter how unpleasant, difficult or pain-
ful. For it has already begun to yeah across
this land, leaving epiritual and physical
plebes that will be felt for generations.
And, In the end, this lake or blood will
either engulf us,?Of purify us and set us
tree,
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY ROA
NATIONAL CONVENTION ON
JULY 6, 1974
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 30
resolutions were adopted by the Reserve
Officers Association at their national con-
vention at Atlanta, Oa., July 6, 1974.
These resolutions represent the best
thinking of the leaders in this outstand-
ing organisation dedicated to preserving
strong national defense posture.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
tent these resolutions be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tions were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
IMsotortoNE ADOPTED sr Tilt NATIONAL Cow-
veterroo or one Reitrave Orieczas Assocuo
now or Tree Marrow Seams, Jtrer 6, 1974
LUTIorti NO. 1: US. EIGHTS Ili THE PAIIAILI
CAL
Whereas, a recent agreement bas been
eemed by the United Staves Secretary of
.tato and the Panamanian Foreign Minister
to draft a new treaty, terminating the Pan-
ama Treaty 01 1903, sad
Whereas. the new treaty will eventually
transfer and surrender title, control, opera
Liao and defense of the Canal and Can
Zone to Panama together with other co
commons. and
Whereas, tile Reserve Officers knee
of the United States has previously ed
;Iwo. it supporta the retention of the ted
States' rights to utilization, control pro-
',Axton of the Panama Canal, and
Whereas. the Constitution of TVA
Officers Association of the United tea (Ar-
ticle A-2) states that "the objec the As-
shall be to support a policy
for the United States that will ovide ade-
quate National Security and romote the
development and execution eof," and
Whereas, Rouse Resolutlo , 93rd Con-
gress, gives the United Sta full sovereign
rights, power and auth in perpetuity
oker the canal Zone.
Now therefore be it
nest interests of the nit
United States, the Res
tem of the United Ste
action and supports
gives the United 9
authority , control,
the Penarei Canal
netutte. ar
Be it ferther
a,tion be taken
without the app
rt,Ited states.
......turtor: NO, 2
It CLIN
agreements between the Army, Aix Force
and the Civil Service Commission, and
Whereas, the legal restrictio on these
agreements have led to a situat. in which
terser management of Army Air Force
'Technicians is becoming lucre ingly dim-
gait, and
Whereas. It is necessary to concile the
personnel management and r patterns
cr! technicians as Reserves a Civil Service
e nployees, and
Whereas, it is also ne and desirable
V, tat the military career erns of tech-
nicians and other Reserve one and the
some, and
. Whereas, the Air Force tering as the De-
trtment of Defense e utive agent, has
'epared a legislative al (DOD Pro-
ram No. 93-21) to ?vide a etatutory
hula for the technici' 'rogram which will
require technicians be fully qualified
wider military stan for the Reserve
position to which fled and giving due
? nsideration to the otection of those indi-
viduals concerned to a balanced career
In ?grain.
Now therefore
serve Officers
States supports
cc ncerning the
el in Career Pr
RE SOLUTION
it resolved that the Re-
elation of the United
e legislative proposals
y and Air Force Techni-
: nESEEVE RETIRED straw
Whereas, ?
AL DISABILITY
ter 67, Title 10, U.S. Code
(f )rmerly nz., Public Law 80-810) pro-
veles for r d pay to members of the Re-
move co nenta after completing 20 or
m re ye satisfactory federal service and
ueott a Ing statutory age (currently age
00) but vides neither retired pay nor other
be as.riot to attaining such age, and
members of the Reserve compo-
nit a erred to the Retired Reserve
attainment of statutory age see, in
ea "in limbo" as to receipt of retired
be ill, though otherwise qualified for and
fled for such benefits at statutory age
and
Arhereas. Chapter 67, Title 10, U.S. Code has
provisions for those members of the Re-
m components transferred to the Retired
serve awaiting attainment of statutory
age who have subsequently become totally
disabled, and
Whereas, current members of the Reserve
components transferred to the Retired Re-
efers after completing 20 or more years of
sal tsfactory federal service have reached the
noimal peak of their earning capacity and
likewise their financial needs, but will nor-
me ay be in dire financial straits because of
tot el disability and inability to work, and
Whereas, it Is both just and right to pro-
vide more liberal benefits to the totally dis-
abled, and
%/heroes. the totally disabled are more
likely to forfeit their earned benefits through
death, and
Whereas, it is deemed that the foregoing
would be strong incentive for attaining and
rot Lining Reserve component personnel
stn ngth in an all-volunteer force or a zero-
draft environment,
Now therefore be it resolved that the Re-
ser, e Officers Association of the United States
seal: and support appropirate legislation
whicie would provide for all retired benefits
for current members of the Reserve compo-
nents who suffer total disability not resulting
from intentional misconduct or willful ne-
glect and are otherwise qualified for retired
pay except for not having reached the statu-
tory age.
emotive-roe No. 4: LEGAL DEFENSE FOR
RIBERVISTS
1.1 herelus. the Attorney General of Ohio re-
fund to provide legal defense for the Ohio
Nat oust Guardsmen on active duty during
the /rent State University riots until directed
to d 3 so by the governor, and
that in the
security of the
Officers Associa-
affirms its previous
onal policy which
full sovereign eights.
ation and defense of
Canal Zone in per-
e ved that no Executive
parting the foregoing
of the Confirm of the
ARMY AND erg FORCE ELDERva
CAREER PlOGRASI
,Vherttbs, the urrent Army and Alt Force
iteeerce each an Programs have been in
effect for eerie, years without specific statu-
tory ',mete based only on administrative
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040047-5