FUTURE OF CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00957A000100090002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 23, 1999
• Content Type: LIST

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Future of CIA Relationships with Congress.
B. Membership of Oversight Committees.
C. Letter to President on Congressional Oversight,
D. House Rule Granting Access to Committee Records
to All Members.
E. Article From Progressive Magaz:ane on CIA and Chile.
F. Proposed Joint Committee on CIA with Exclusive Authority
to Receive Information on CIA.
G. Letter to Chairman McClellan on Open Budget for CIA.
H. Legislative Proposal Not Yet Cleared by Executive Branch
For Criminal Sanctions on Unauthorized Disclosure.
1. Letter to Oversight Committee Chairman on Agee Case
and Need for More Effective Criminal Sanctions.
J. Prepared Statement On Nedzi Bill Amending the CIA
Section of the National Security Act of 1947.
K. Prepared Statement by Mr. Colby before the House
Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee.
L. Assorted Legislation Affecting CIA.
M. Summary of Activities of the Murphy Commission Study
of Intelligence, including Covert Action. Final Report
Due to Congress 30 June 1975.
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E~'UTUIRE OF CL's RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS
Statutory Basis
Unlike other intelligence agencies in the major democracies, CIA
is a creature of statute. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 free the Agency from normal reporting
requirements, in order to protect intelligence sources and methods, the
identity of Agency personnel, and the organization and budget of the Agency.
Congressional Oversight - Historical
For the past 27 years the oversight of the Agency operated under
guidelines that only the senior members of the four oversight committees
(Armed Services and Appropriations) were entitled to information on CIA
.clandestine activities and other protected information such as its budget,
organization and personnel.
Cracks in the Dam
While this oversight structure remains essentially intact, it has
been the object of increasing attack in the Congress from junior members
out of jealousy and senior members who feel that oversight is ineffectual
and that they are entitled to full accoss to information on Agency activities
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as it bears upon their responsibilities as an elected member of Congress.
These attacks have narrowed down to three issues:
Guidelines : Questioning the validity of withholding any
information on the Agency from a member of Congress, or other
committees of Congress.
Substantive Intelligence: Questioning the validity of
withholding compartmented information from personal staff
of a member of Congress and not assuring that congressional
committees with an interest are kept fully and currently informed
as contrasted with responding to committee requests for briefings
from time to time.
Routine Agency Management: Questioning the exclusive
jurisdiction of the oversight committees in the areas of the
economy and efficiency with which the Agency is managed.
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providing of certain operational information to the Senate Watergate Committee;
and (4) prolonged debate in the Senate over the so-called "secret war" in
Laos with Senators such as Symington who is on both the Armed Services
oversight Subcommittee and the Foreign Relations Committee, and the
deceased Senator Ellender who was Chairman of the Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, stating publicly that they were unaware of what was going on; both
the effectuality of oversight and the guidelines restricting information on
Agency activities to the oversight committees were seriously eroded..
Legislative Initiatives Changing and Challenging Existing Structure (93rd Congress)
Guidelines:
1. Kissinger/Colby agreement with Chairman Morgan and
the senior members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee
to provide information on certain covert action programs to a
yet unknown structure within the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
2. A change was recently made in the rules of the House
to direct the furnishing to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
(yet an unknown structure for receipt) of information on "intelligence
activities relating to foreign policy. " Chairman Nedzi of the Armed
Services Intelligence Subcommittee agreed to this language as
reflecting the arrangement referred to in (1) above.
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 s, pp Ord ~ [ ! 7, t i P o ~n0o9o0o2-s
4? An amendment to the pending Foreign Assistance Act
before the House 'prohibiting the expenditure of funds by
CIA for operations in foreign countri?s (intelligence collection
activities excepted) without a Presidential finding of their importance
and timely report on the operation ::c the appropriate committees
of Congress specifically including the Committee on Foreign Relations
and Foreign Affairs.
5.. An amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in the
Senate which has been recommitted to committee along the lines
of (4) above with the exception that the reporting somewhat begs
the question as being only to "appropriate committees. "
6. An amendment to bar outright covert action was
defeated on both the Senate and House floor by about a 2 to 1
margin.
7. An amendment to require an open one line item budget
for CIA was defeated on the Senate floor.
$. Hearings are planned by the Senate Government Operations
Committee when Congress reconvenes in November to consider
a joint committee to supplant Armed Services Committee jurisdiction
which would extend to all Government activities involving intelligence
gathering including CT-A, I -I,1, cret Service, 1) LA, and NSA.
There are other bills -which would establish similar cornrnit.te: s
either for one House or both: TT-
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Substantitie Intell%l. ace
There have been a number of serious proposals to enact
legislation which would make four committees of Congress,
the Armed Services and foreign, affairs committees, statutory
clients of CIA with authority to be privy to all intelligence
produced by the Agency for the Executive Branch, including the
President, and to perform special analytical studies and estimates
for those committees. Those committees in turn would be
permitted to pass on such information to all members of
Congress and certain staff members. This despite the fact
that the Agency makes every effort to be fully responsive to
all congressional committees for those substantive intelligence
needs which relate to their jurisdiction.
Routine Agency Management
The House Government Operations Committee, whose
predecessor,the Committee on Expenditures in the Government,
actually exerted legislative jurisdiction over the National Security
Act of 1947, has in its charter the authority to examine the
efficiency and economy with which all Federal agencies are
managed. With the retirement of Chairman 11olifield, it is
expected that the new Chai.rina ?. Congress-- an Jack Brooks,
O1: Texas, may -,,ell be ec tt."yinf' to assert some tyre
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of jurisdiction over CIA. He has already gotten in fairly deep
on the disposition of Southern Air Transport and Air America
and it is expected that he would show like interest in the disposal
of other proprietaries by CIA if such action comes to his attention.
If this crack develops it is expected that the Senate Government
Operations Committee, with. a similar charter may push to
exert like jurisdiction.
Ramifications
Clearly the sine qua non of clandestine activities is to protect
the supporting sources and methods. The spinoff from revelations creates
an atmosphere where liaison services and other sources are wary of
continued cooperation and feeds the appetite of those such as former
disaffected employees Agee, if not worse, and Marchetti to tell their
tales. .
The changes already effected in Congress and those with the
likely prospect of success, would e_spa.nd the theoretical access to
sensitive Agency information many fold. Not counting the increase in
staff members who would obtain access as contrasted with the twelve
members of the House oversight structure, we are facing the proposition
o1 inctudi':1,g as :many as 40 additional rrierrrbers of the .Foreign Affairs
Cori- ittee and 4L rno nnber t of the Cioverarrlelit Operations t C)t ]1 7!ttee
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not to count the 87 members of the Appropriations and Armed Services
Committees who may feel that they are at least entitled to equal treatment.
A similar, but less numerous, situation can be envisaged for the Senate.
The Congress as a whole has changed substantially and this
is seen in the actions of the Democratic caucus and in the 94th Congress
may well be duplicated by the Republican conference as the more junior
members seek to get a bigger role. At the same time, those who have
been in the forefront of protecting Agency secrets are probably nearing
the end of their service and their replacements are unlikely to be able
to wield the power and discipline of their elders.
What Will Congress Do?
It appears that due to circumstances outside of their control
the senior members of the CIA Subcommittees are being forced to make
a ccorrmzodations on such issues as access to covert action information,
without being in" a position to argue the merits. The implications of
the agreements already reached on the covert action matter raise a number
of serious problems;
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a. ConstltLlt7.Oiia lAC',' 1 he scheme that is ein Ci vlsed
shares responsibility but not authority. The President has
Certain inherent rights and responsibilities under the Consti-
(j ~ th e field of " iQrl.~'i.~. i affairs ti`dC]. ~1CL
tutlQn to take action Ail LtlE: Bbg11 he
simply does not share with the Congress, and the proposition
should be examined carefully for its possible impairment of
the President's effectiveness. Constitutional responsibility
to the people presumes that it will be efiectively carried out,
not hampered.
b. What are the ramifications if a covert action conies
to the surface? Under the legislation it would appear that the
President and the Congress through its agents must be made
aware of such actions. If one comes to the surface, the
failure to fire the Director of Central intelligence would imply
that they were aware. Are they ready to take the political heat
and subject our institutions to the logical outgrowth of such
admissions, or are they prepared to simply fire a series of
Directors ?
c. Legal ramifications. What are'the public law, inter-
national law, and private law ramifications resulting from a
procedure which would put the official stamp of approval on
intervention in the affairs of a foreign state?
d. Covert action vs. overt action. The President should not
have to be faced with the extraneous consideration of the notifi-
cation and findings laid out in the Hughes bill. Either the
President has a clear authority to do what is necessary in this
field or he does not. No one would complain if the President
by overt means attempted to influence, say another country's
delegation, so that the outcome would be favorable to the interests
of the United States. The Congress would not share any responsi-
bility and the President would not be required to male a finding
and report his actions to the Congress. if he accomplishes the
same thing "covertly" it doesn't change the constitutional legitimacy
of his action, nor the illegitimacy of Congressional involvement.
e, Definition. The proponents and opponents of the measures
f~ 1.. ? t, t' Covert action
probably have their O:zlii dealniLo of cove r action,
oul include F] Li"ar41117tary cti t i ; o [This would be interes":dn"7
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because such activities are iiott', covered by the War Powers
bill which sets forth specific i-ules for Presidential notification
and congressional approval for regular military action. Under
the Hughes amendment, approval for paramilitary activities
would not require congressional approval, but merely a report
of findings by the President. Till-Is defect could be easily overcome
in the Hughes amendment. ] The two major concerns appear to
surround paramilitary activities and "political destabilization," and
I suggested that perhaps these p .ra.ses should become the
exclusive definition of what is subject to the Hughes-type bill,
thus eliminating many problems.
f. Covert action in Statutes. It was most
unfortunate to acknowledge covert action in the United, States Statues, just
as it was unfortunate to have the revelations in Congress force
the President to acknowledge such actions, The vote in the
House and the Senate defeating amrenc rnents which vrould have
completely prohibited covert actions should be viewed as a con-
sensus that the United States needs this capability. Once this fact
is admitted all the rest falls in line, since in order for-the capability
to succeed what is done must remain secret, and the Congress will
just have to acknowledge this simple .:act and work out its pro-
cedures accordingly.
g. Necessity being the motther of invention, if the Agency's
capability to perform effectively is impaired, the Executive may
be forced to turn to less conventional- instrumentalities which are
in no way subject' to'congressianaf oversight.
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In light of the above developments, it is now time for both the
Executive Branch and the congressional leadership to bite the bullet
and
agree upon an oversight structure for this Nation's secret intelligence
s ervice which will be able to withstand the pressures that are developing.
The most attractive mechanism for this task is a joint committee. Many
of the Age:ncyrs critics in the Congress have advocated such a committee
and its establishment will steal their thunder. Such a joint committee
must include membership from the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations
Committees for the same reason and because much of what the Agency does
in the field of clandestine activities and in the production of intelligence
is of legitimate interest: to these parent committees. The creation of
such a committee would bring along an active full-time professional staff
and attendant problems of interference with .Agency management or assistance
to the Agency depending upon the caliber of the individual. Just as the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, this joint committee should be created
by statute. As in the Atomic Energy legislation, such an enactment would
offer an excellent opportunity to legislate rules relating to the restriction
on dissemination of intelligence sources and methods information and
attendant criminal sanctions and civil injunction .uthority.
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Septembev 1974
CIA SUBCOMMITTEES
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
John L. McClellan (D. , Ark. ), Chairman
John C. Stennis (D. , Miss.) Milton R. Young (R. , N. Dak. )
John O. Pastore (D., R. I.) Roman L. Hruska (R., Nebr.)
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), Chairman
Stuart Symington (D. , Mo.) Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.)
Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) Strom Thurmond (R. , S. C.)
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), Chairman
F. Edward Hebert (D. , La.)
Melvin Price (D., Ill.)
O. C. Fisher (D., Texas)
William G. Bray (R. , Ind.)
Leslie Arends (R., Ill.)
Bob Wilson (R. , Calif. )
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
"SPECIAL GROUP"
George H. Mahon (D., Texas), Chairman
Jamie L. Whitten (D. , Miss.) William E. Minshall (R., Ohio)
Robert L. F. Sikes (D. ; Fla.) Elford A. Cederberg (R., Mich.)
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