LEGISLATION TO CREATE A SECOND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00957A000100100061-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 61
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Legislation to Create a Second Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence
1. This memorandum is in response to your desire to create a second
statutory Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. If a second statutory
position is created, the relative seniority of the two Deputies will hinge,
in large part, on which acts for the Director in his absence. We believe
the range of choice on this question is limited by the existing structure of
the National Security Act of 1947 and the intent of Congress when it created
the Agency through the Act. Attached are three alternative draft bills.
Each deals with this problem in a different way. The first bill (Tab A)
is the most faithful to the structure of the ].947 Act and is consistent with the
intent of Congress when it established the Agency, in its role of the central
coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities of the United States It
provides that the Deputy for CIA would act. for the Director in his absence.
However, we understand that you may want the Deputy for the IC to act
for you in your absence. In our view, and as discussed below, express
legislation to this effect is not a realistic option. Therefore, we have
included two other options: the second bill (Tab B) provides that the Deputy
for CIA would be Acting DCI in the Director's absence, except for IC matters
otherwise delegated; and the third bill (Tab C) simply cre2 tes two Deputies
and is silent on respective duties and seniority. Theoretically, the Director
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could fill in the gaps through delegation. [t is questionable, however,
whether delegation would be appropriate that would contradict the intent of
Congress as expressed in the 1947 Act.
2. Explicit statutory subordination of the Deputy for CIA to the
Deputy for IC would conflict with the structure of the National Security Act
of 1947 and would, therefore, require a fundamental revision of that Act.
It is doubtful whether Congress would accept the necessary changes or even
be willing to address them this year.
3. Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 places on
the CIA the responsibility for advising the NSC on intelligence activities;
making recommendations to the NSC for coordination of intelligence
activities; and evaluating, correlating and disseminating intelligence.
Structurally, therefore, the various authorities and responsibilities which
the Director relies upon in his IC role are derived from the Agency. The
Director exercises them by virtue of his position as head of the Agency.
Indeed, the Act confers only one responsibility on the Director which is
not directly related to his position as Agency head, i.e. the protection of
intelligence sources and methods. Without a wholesale revision of the 1947
Act, the Agency's responsibilities could not be taken out of the Agency and
vested in a new Deputy for the IC. Such a. revision would require placing
in the office of DCI all the responsibilities and authorities currently vested
in the Agency. The press of elections and. the self-imposed discipline of
the Congressional Budget Act make it unlikely that Congress would tackle
such a major reworking of the 1947 Act in the 94th Congress. Even if it
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chose to, it is questionable whether Congress would accept the changes
contemplated. There are those in Congress who would view subordinating
the Agency to an IC Deputy as a blow to the concept of "central" intelligence
and to the independence of the Agency. Friend and foe alike would view
this as a step toward military control of the Agency.
4. The practical side of this problem is clearer if the various roles
of the DCI are considered. As recognized in E.O. 11905, the Director is
the executive head of the CIA, and derivatively, the President's primary
advisor on foreign intelligence, the Chairman of the CFI, and a member
of the Operations Advisory Group. It can be ar ued that the Depute for IC
would be the proper Acting Chairman of the CFI in the DCI's absence. But
it seems clear that the Deputy for CIA should assume the other roles. For
example, it is the Agency which has the responsibility for conducting and
managing covert action and it would not make sense to have the individual
whose responsibility is to give staff support to CFI represent the Agency
on the Operations Advisory Group. This :Ls the thinking behind the approach
taken in the second bill. This bill would make the Deputy for CIA the Acting
DCI in the Director's absence, except for the Director's CFI duties, which
could be performed by the Deputy for IC. There are obvious conceptual
difficulties with such an arrangement. It could still be. argued that Agency
responsibilities were being transferred outside the Agency. There are also
real practical problems involved in dual leadership. Good management
dictates that there be one -ilter-ego for the Director. The President and
the Congress should not be expected to sort out whether a particular
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problem is an Agency or a Community one and thus which Deputy has the
final word. In addition, serious problems could arise in interstitial areas,
with the result that there would be no single authority.
5. If the primacy of the Deputy for the IC is to be achieved in spite
of the 1947 Act, the approach in the third bill, i.e. simply creating a second
Deputy and remaining silent on the question of duties and seniority,' ha
some appeal. From -a legislative d.raftl'ng standp'bint, there`is nothing
inherently wrong with such a statute. It would not, on its face, be disruptive
of the 1947 Act, and it would seem to give the Director maximum flexibility.
However, this by no means would be assured. The construction of the statute
would depend on the supposed intent of Congress in enacting it. Unless
Congress expressly states an intent to give-the"Directo1 full 'discretion on
matters of order of succession, alternative constructions would be possible.
It could be argued that the very structure of the Act indicated Congress'
intent that the Deputy for the Agency would be the senior Deputy. It could
be argued that Congress intended the President to set the order of succession.
This is the case with State Department order of succession (E.O. 10839).
The President also designates the order of succession in the Department
of Defense (10 U . S . C . 134). Another serLous disadvantage with this approach
is that, by leaving the question of precedence unsettled, it could lead to
enduring conflict between the Agency and the IC, especially whenever there
e- f~f
was a change in any' 'three top positions.
6. The real problem with the approach suggested in the third bill is
that it onl'r side-steps the central problem temporarily, and, therefore,
leaves ope z the question whether it would be at all appropriate for the
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Director to transfer Agency responsibilities to the Deputy Director for IC.
If the third alternative was used as a device to make that transfer, we believe
such action would be contrary to the intent of Congress, as expressed in
the 1947 Act. This would leave such a transfer open to political, if not legal
attack.
7. It is not necessary for you to subordinate the Deputy for CIA
to the Deputy for IC in order to implement E.O. 11905 or to strengthen your
role as DCI. These can be accomplished well within the framework of the
National Security Act. The problem comes when it is perceived that the
Director's IC role can only be enhanced by subordinating the Agency. The
more distance a Director puts between himself and the Agency, the more
tenuous his claims to a supra-departmentzl role becomes. Unless we are
prepared to propose wholesale revision of the 1947 Act, or are prepared to
risk further development of an IC concept that is already overreaching its
statutory basis, we should opt for e#er the first draft bill
as the alternative most faithful to the 1947 Act.
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