GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CIA/RR-MR-50
May 1956
N! /T
k~I?-tl.,rF
DAIL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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RIM
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 13. U3C, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ENTIAL
CIA/RR MR-50
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS*
Page
25X1 B
Petroleum-Refinery Location in the Free-World Eastern
Hemisphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Further Changes in the Administrative Map of Communist
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Recent Developments in Geological Research in Communist
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Collaboration in Geographic Research . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
British Antarctic Aerial Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Maps
25X1 B
Eastern Hemisphere: Free-World Petroleum Refineries,
19+6 and 1955 (25238) . . . . . . . . . . . . following . . 6
Eastern Hemisphere: Free-World Movement of Crude
Petroleum, 19+6 (25236). . . . . . . . . . . following . . 12
Eastern Hemisphere: Free-World Movement of Crude
Petroleum, 1955 (25237). . . . . . . . . . . following . . 12
Kurdistan.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Communist China: Administrative Divisions, March 1956
(25333) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . following . . 22
*The individual classification of each article'in this Review is
given at the end of the article.
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PETROLEUM-REFINERY LOCATION IN THE
FREE-WORLD EASTERN HEMISPHERE*
Current Trends
Since the end of World War II a distinct trend has developed in
the location of oil refineries in the Free-World Eastern Hemisphere --
those areas whose economics are not dominated by the USSR. Refineries,
instead of being built in centers of oil production, are now being con-
centrated in consuming areas. Refinery capacity has increased most
in highly industrialized Western Europe, where the demand for refined
products is most urgent. The same trend, however, can be observed in
other less industrialized parts of the Eastern Hemisphere -- in areas
as widely separated as Aden, India, Australia, and the Philippines.
Although the refinery capacity of some oil-producing areas has been
increased, this is the exception rather than the rule.
The current trend in refinery location has several advantages.
A major power gains in terms of strategic considerations, efficiency
of operation, and shipping costs. A small nation realizes a saving
in foreign exchange, increases its level of employment, and in some
instances partly appeases a strong nationalistic desire for economic
independence. Furthermore, advances in the field of refinery design
since World War II make the operation of a small refinery increasingly
practical in countries with limited demands for petroleum products.
-X'This article has been coordinated with the Petroleum Branch,
Materials Division, ORR.
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The movement of crude petroleum in international trade not only
points up the changes that have occurred in the petroleum industry
since World War II but also demonstrates that the Eastern Hemisphere
is practically independent in terms of both crude petroleum and
refined products at the present time. With the increased production
of crude petroleum in the Middle East and the expanding refinery
capacity of Europe and the Far East, only a small proportion of
Eastern Hemisphere requirements is now being imported from North and
South America. In 195+ the estimated demand of the Free-World Eastern
Hemisphere for petroleum exceeded 25 percent of the world total.
This amounted to less than one-half of the requirement of the Western
Hemisphere (9,1+00,000 barrels per day) but more than three times the
estimated domestic demand of the USSR (1,150,000 barrels per day).*
All but a small percentage of the crude petroleum for the multibillion-
dollar petroleum industry of the free areas of the Eastern Hemisphere
is produced in the Middle East. If Middle Eastern oil were lost to
the Free World, a tremendous strain would be placed on the petroleum
resources of the Western Hemisphere.
The current trend in refinery location has not extended to the
Soviet-controlled parts of the Eastern Hemisphere, where refining
capacity continues to be centered in oil-producing areas. Since this
situation is closely related to problems of ownership, management, and
*"World Supply and Demand," World Oil, Vol. 11+1, No. 3, 15 August
1955, pp. 158-159.
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transportation, all of which are dominated by the state, it is not
comparable to that in the Free World.
Advantages of Consumer-Area Refineries
For the industrial nation the location of refineries near at
hand has both economic and strategic advantages. Shipping costs are
reduced, because crude petroleum can be transported at a lower cost
in terms of containers and safety measures required. Furthermore, a
refinery can operate more efficiently in an area with an adequate
supply of skilled labor than in an area where skilled labor would
have to be imported and large numbers of unskilled native laborers
would have to be employed. An industrial location is also favorable
for the installation of new facilities. Site surveys are cheaper,
the expense of shipping building materials is reduced, construction
costs are lower, and construction delays are minimized. From a
European viewpoint, production from a domestic refinery is more
dependable than from one subject to xenophobian whims of an ambitious
small nation.
The relative permanence of a local refinery, combined with its
independence of a single source of oil, is of particular advantage to
a great power in a time of national crisis. Should the normal source
of oil be cut off, the refinery could draw its crude petroleum from a
different part of the world without incurring much loss of time for
plant redesign or reconstruction.
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Smaller nations, anticipating further industrialization, share
with the great powers some of the advantages of having domestic
refineries, such as elimination of dependence on other nations for
refined products, reduced shipping costs, and savings in foreign
exchange. Other advantages apply particularly to the smaller nations.
The construction and operation of refineries provide new opportunities
for employment, and the possession of their own refineries fosters
patriotic pride. Furthermore, with the increased tempo of exploration
for oil, some of the currently underdeveloped nations hope to find
local sources of crude petroleum and eventually to attain complete
oil independence. These hopes may or may not have their origin in a
wave of nationalism that transcends economic practicality.
Technical Changes
Advances in technology, changes in the petroleum-demand structure,
and the increased rate of oil exploration are making it more feasible
for countries with a low level of industrial development to support
refining activity.
Before World War II, a complete refinery capable of producing a
variety of products was necessarily a large plant with a capacity far
in excess of the needs of small countries with relatively low petroleum
consumption. As a result of postwar technological advances, such large
plants are no longer necessary. The complete range of petroleum prod-
ucts can now be produced in refineries of a size that can be constructed
and operated economically by small nations. Countries such as Syria
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and Jordan, which have access to crude petroleum from major pipelines,
are in a position to take immediate advantage of this development.
The combination unit of the Daura refinery, 15 miles south of Baghdad,
Iraq. This 2+,000-barrel-per-day refinery, which began operation in
1955, was designed to provide a full range of products at minimum cost.
The need for greater quantities of fuel oil is becoming a major
consideration in the production from Eastern Hemisphere refineries.
Because of the heavy demand for gasoline immediately after World War
II, refineries were geared to gasoline production. Later the heavy
demand shifted to fuel oils, and low-octane gasoline is now in surplus
supply. One installation in the Middle East is even reported to be
pumping straight-run gasoline back into the ground at the rate of
20,000 barrels per day.* Since the demand for fuel oil both in Europe
*Petroleum Week, Vol. 2, No. 20, 25 November 1955, p. 35.
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and in less industrialized areas continues to grow more rapidly than
the demand for gasoline, interest in increasing the proportion of
fuel oil derived from crude petroleum has been intensified. With
modern refining processes, however, even a small nation can produce
a range of products suited to its needs without the burden of a large
surplus of gasoline. Furthermore, the modern integrated refinery that
makes the wide range of products possible also reduces both capital
outlay and operating expense.
Intensified petroleum exploration during the postwar years has
encouraged hopes for savings in foreign exchange and for eventual
self-sufficiency in petroleum products in countries that are not now
producing adequate supplies of crude petroleum, such as Tunisia,
Libya, Ethiopia, and Greece. As a result, refineries are now being
constructed in locations heretofore thought unlikely or even undesir-
able.
Comparison of 1946 and 1955 Refining Capacity
The trend toward a concentration of refining capacity in con-
suming rather than producing areas is illustrated by a comparison of
1946 and 1955 figures (see Map 25238). Europe's share of the total
refining capacity of the Free-World Eastern Hemisphere rose from
approximately 26 percent in 1946 to 53 percent in 1955. During the
same period, Middle East capacity decreased from about 59 percent to
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30 percent of the total, and Far East capacity increased from 15 per-
cent to 16 percent.*
Although the same trend is indicated by a comparison of absolute
refining capacities, it is less pronounced. In the first place, con-
sumption of refined products has increased enormously since the end
of World War II, and some of the required refining capacity could be
expected to be added at existing refining centers in producing areas.
Furthermore, new outlets for refined products have developed within
the Middle East, which is generally regarded as a producing rather
than a consuming area.
The absolute capacity of Free-World Eastern Hemisphere refining
installations increased from approximately 1,250,000 barrels per day
for 134 plants in 19+6 to 4,500,000 barrels per day for 186 units in
1955.** The rated throughput of 80 European plants in 19+6 was approx-
imately 328,000 barrels per day, as compared with some 735,000 barrels
per day for 11 installations in the Middle East and 181,000 barrels
per day for 37 refineries in the Far East. The remainder of the
*Capacity figures for 19-6 from "19+7 World Oil Atlas," The Oil
Weekly, 30 June 1947, Section 2; figures for 1955 from World Petroleum,
25th Annual Refinery Issue, Vol. 26, No. 8, 15 July 1955.
**Figures refer to rated capacity in barrels per calendar day. In
1946, most war-damaged refineries had not regained their rated through-
put; some were never rebuilt. By 1955, a number of European refineries
designed in anticipation of future demand were producing less than
their full capacity.
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production came from small refineries in Africa and the Canary
Islands. In 1946 Iran's capacity of slightly over 400,000 barrels
per day, which came largely from the Abadan refinery, was greater
that that of all of Free Europe.
By 1955 the refining capacity of Europe had increased to approxi-
mately 2,400,000 barrels per day from 128 refineries, the capacity in
the Middle East had increased to 1,337,000 barrels per day from 18
installations, and Far Eastern capacity had reached about 705,000
barrels per day from 36 refineries. It is significant that major
refineries that have been constructed in Africa, the Middle East,
and the Far East are in areas with a deficit of crude petroleum --
at Durban, South Africa; Aden; Kwinana and Altona, Australia; and
two at Bombay, India. Other new refineries that must rely on
imported crude petroleum are under construction or projected in
Angola, Greece, Turkey, India, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines,
and Japan.
Between 19+6 and 1955 the Middle East almost doubled its refining
capacity, but its share of the total production of the free areas
of the Eastern Hemisphere declined about 50 percent. The percentage
decline is in line with the current trend toward the location of
refineries in petroleum consuming rather than producing areas. A
portion of the new construction was undertaken to fill the void
created by the closing of the Abadan refinery. The Aden refinery,
for example, was established to provide bunker fuel at a major
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distribution center and relies completely upon imported crude petro-
leum. At present the refinery at Mina al Ahmadi, Kuwait, which is
one of the largest tanker terminals in the world, falls far short
of supplying the demand for busker fuel. Plans are currently being
made to increase production of middle distillates to fill this need
and to supply the fuel-oil demands of markets east of Suez and in
Europe, where current demand is high. It is anticipated that, in
the future, the products of the Mina al Ahmadi refinery will be
absorbed by increasing shipping activity from Kuwait and by increased
demand in Asia. Other new construction within petroleum-producing
areas can be attributed to pressure applied by local governments for
political reasons. In the case of Iraq, the Government pushed for
the construction of a refinery to promote self-sufficiency in petro-
leum products.
The Position of Abadan
The closing of the world's largest refinery at Abadan in 1951
brought about a curtailment in the supply of refined products that
was of great concern in some quarters. The shortage, however, proved
to be of relatively short duration. The rapid recovery of the British
Petroleum Company -- formerly the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company -- to its
earlier position as a supplier of refined products in spite of the
closing of the Abadan refinery was a result of the availability of
increasing quantities of crude petroleum from Iraq and Kuwait, com-
bined with an existing company program for refinery expansion in areas
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of petroleum demand. At the time of the expropriation, blueprints
that were already being prepared for additional new refineries in
Europe, at Aden, and in Australia were advanced overnight from the
planning stage to the construction stage. Until the new facilities
could begin producing, the requirements of markets that customarily
depended on the 500,000-barrel-per-day* Abadan refinery were for the
most part met through purchases from the Western Hemisphere.
When the Abadan refinery reopened under the direction of a
Consortium consisting of British, American, Dutch, and French concerns,
it did not regain its dominant position in the refining industry.
By September 1955, the throughput of the refinery had reached only
158,000 barrels per day. Reliable estimates indicate, however, that
the Abadan production may eventually level off at about two-thirds of
its capacity of 500,000 barrels per day. Markets that formerly
depended on Abadan are now being supplied by new refineries in Europe,
South Africa, India, and Australia and at Aden. Markets are no
longer readily found for the relatively high-cost, low-quality prod-
uct of Abadan.
Major interest today is no longer in the refined products from
Abadan but in the future of Iran's crude-petroleum production. The
production of the refinery has been prorated among the companies that
comrpise the Consortium. A number of these companies cannot market
*Throughput of the Abadan refinery had been increased to 500,000
barrels per day by 191+9.
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the Abadan refined products economically, but they are in a position
to profit from the use of Iranian crude petroleum in their own
refineries. Consequently, the companies are willing to sustain a
loss on the share of refined products that they are required to take
in order to insure continued receipt of Iranian crude petroleum.
They are even trading refined products for additional crude petroleum
to be refined in their plants in the United States.
Movement of Crude Petroleum
The pattern of movement of crude petroleum in the Free-World
Eastern Hemisphere reflects the marked increase in European refining
capacity and the high rate of crude-petroleum production in the Mid-
dle East (see Maps 25236 and 25237). The proportion of crude petro-
leum supplied to Europe by the Middle East increased from 37 percent
of the total petroleum imports in 1946 to 93 percent in 1954, and
the total number of barrels shipped increased 44-fold to approximately
600,000,000.* During the same period the proportion of crude petro-
leum from the Western Hemisphere dropped from 63 percent of the total
to 7 percent, although the number of barrels shipped increased from
24,000,000 to 47,000,000. These shipments are more than offset by
United States imports amounting to an estimated 100,000,000 barrels
of crude petroleum from the Persian Gulf area in 1955. Movement.
*i6 movement figures from International Petroleum Trade, United
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Vol. 16, No. 10,
1947, p. 238; figures for 1955 from unpublished manuscript for Inter-
national Petroleum and estimates from petroleum trade publications.
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figures for 1954 and 1955 also indicate an increase in shipments from
the middle East to the Far East as Indian and Australian refineries
began operation. Proportions of Eastern Hemisphere crude petroleum
originating in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East have remained
relatively constant. In 1954, approximately 87 percent originated
in the Middle East, 9 percent in the Far East, and 3 percent in Europe.
Interhemisphere shipment of crude petroleum is expected to in-
crease in the coming years. In addition to stepped-up imports of
Middle Eastern crude petroleum at North American ports, there is a
strong possibility that Venezuelan crude petroleum will be carried
to Europe as backhaul cargo for tankers returning to the Middle East.
The flow of petroleum products through the Suez Canal provides
an interesting register of petroleum activity in the Free-World
Eastern Hemisphere. Before the nationalization of the Iranian petro-
leum industry, appreciable tonnages of refined products and of crude
petroleum from Iran moved from south to north through the canal.
Immediately after nationalization, south-to-north movement from Iran
ceased, whereas north-to-south movement of refined products increased
sharply. The reopening of the Abadan refinery and the completion of
additional refineries east of Suez brought about a marked decline in
the north-to-south movement of refined products in late 1954 and 1955.
The loss of Iranian crude petroleum in south-to-north movement was
quickly offset by increased shipments from other Persian Gulf coun-
tries. In general the postwar movement of crude petroleum from south
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Scarcely had the Sikang-Tibet Highway been opened when press
releases announced that many sections were to be "renovated and
reconstructed." A June despatch from Lhasa mentioned that 41 bridges
of various sizes were being constructed and that workers were striving
Figure 2. A scene in the Ch'iao-erh Shan, a high
mountain range through which the eastern sector.
of the Sikang-Tibet Highway passes. The peaks in
the background are probably 16,000 to 19,000 feet
high.
to finish them "before the arrival of torrents." The Chinese press
lauded the "advanced experience" of the Soviet Union and announced
that Chinese construction teams were adopting Soviet surfacing
techniques so that the Sikang-Tibet road could be used during the
rainy season. Other reports indicate that road widening, filling,
drainage repairs, and similar reconstruction activities are being
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undertaken. Much of this activity has been reported to be on the
sector west from the Pomi area, one of the last to be finished and
probably hurriedly done. There have also been reports that addi-
tional maintenance work has been done on some eastern sections of
the highway.
Tsinghai-Tibet Highway -- In mid-November 1954 the Communist
press announced that the Tsinghai-Tibet Highway had reached the town
of Nagchhu Dzong (Hei-ho) in northeastern Tibet. It also stated,
surprisingly, that the road was via Ka-erh-mu (Golmo), a remote
locality in central Tsinghai (see Map No. 25119). Previous reports
had implied that the Tsinghai-Tibet road was an improvement and
extension of a road and caravan trail that led southwest from Hsi-
ning, capital of Tsinghai, to the trading center of YU-shu (Jyekundo).
The present Chinese Communist geological explorations in the Tsaidam
Basin may have been a factor in routing the road through Ka-erh-mu
rather than YU-shu.
The initial 500 miles of the road west from Hsi-ning generally
follow a previously constructed road, which probably needed only
slight maintenance to make it usable for trucks. From Ka-erh-mu,
however, the road veers south across the eastern ramparts of the
great Tibetan Plateau with only a caravan trail for an alignment
guide. Central and southern Tsinghai is an extremely barren, high,
desolate plateau, broken only by occasional east-west oriented
mountains and streams. Although this route is generally free of
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difficult passes and mountains, ravines, and deeply entrenched
streams, the high elevations (the plateau at about 15,000 feet and
the mountains rising to 20,000 feet), coupled with intense cold,
frozen soil, and severe gales, greatly handicap construction work.
Also, there are practically no inhabited places in the area; no
wood is available; and food supplies are limited to wild game and
occasional herds of sheep and yaks that are tended by wandering
Tibetan groups.
The 550-mile section of road from Ka-erh-mu to Lhasa was hur-
riedly built. The Communist press stated that work south of Ka-erh-
mu began in June 1954 and that by 15 November road builders had
reached Nagchhu Dzong. The remaining 190 miles to Lhasa were to be
finished by late December to meet the Chinese Communist "target,"
but obviously such a task could not be accomplished in so short a
time. This was as much as acknowledged by the State Council report
of 9 March 1955 on Tibetan transportation, which said:
The Tsinghai-Tibet Highway must carry out further repairs
in a planned manner, selectively improve the sectors where
traffic is difficult and build bridges which are necessary.
Road repairs must follow the principle of economy and
utility and the policy of procuring materials locally and
making improvements step by step, by sectors and at dif-
ferent periods. For the present, repair should be carried
out on the Heho [Hei-hol/Lhasa sector of the Tsinghai-Tibet
Highway.
On 21 November the Chinese press reported that improvement of this
190-mile sector, which was started in mid-July, was "basically com-
pleted" and that efficiency of the highway had been doubled.
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Although the caravan trail from Nagchhu Dzong to Lhasa leads
nearly due south as it winds through the high passes of the Nyenchhen
Thanglha and associated ranges, the Chinese have chosen a slightly
different alignment for the southern sector of the road, probably
to avoid the rugged terrain north of Lhasa. As far as the Kyogchhe
Pass the road probably follows the general alignment of the trail,
but from there it swings southwest, probably along the valley of the
Lha Chhu (headwater stream of the Kyi Chhu), crossing one compara-
tively low pass before reaching the Tolung Chhu valley. Press reports
have mentioned a Yang-pa-ching, which is probably either the locality
or the district where the road turns southeast. This location is near
a place called Zamsar, mentioned by Harrer* as an important caravan
trail junction. From Yang-pa-ching to Lhasa, a distance of 56 miles,
the road follows the Tolung Chhu valley, and terrain obstacles do not
appear difficult.
Lhasa-Zhikatse-Gyangtse Highway -- Most recently the Chinese
Communists have opened a 265-mile road within Tibet that links Lhasa
with the important centers of Zhikatse and Gyangtse. Work on this
road was begun in May and presumably finished in October.
The stretch of road from Lhasa to Yang-pa-ching is known to use
the Tsinghsi-Tibet roadbed, but the alignment of the section from
*Heinrich Harrer, Seven Years in Tibet.
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Yang-pa-ching to Zhikatse has been in doubt.* Comments by the Com-
munist press suggest that from Yang-pa-ching the construction teams
followed a small stream that rises in the Kang-ti-ssu Mountains to
the southwest. The climb to the Hsii-ko Pass (possibly at 29?47'N,
90?15'E), which presumably crosses these mountains, is probably
difficult; the elevation of the pass has been reported to be 17,500
feet. Reports state that "picks and drills could not pierce the
frozen earth and ice-covered rock." From the pass it is likely that
the route follows a tributary of the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) to the
main river. Assuming this alignment, the descent does'not appear
very difficult, and maps indicate that for the final 25 miles the
drop in elevation is only 1,000 feet. Since construction workers
have been reported about 60 miles east of Zhikatse, it is probable
that the Tsangpo crossing (now via ferry) is somewhere in the vicinity
of 90?00'E to 90?10'E. The 55-mile-long Zhikatse-Gyangtse sector
follows the Nyang Chhu valley and, other than building numerous small
bridges and culverts, no serious construction problems appear to have
been encountered. Probably much work remains to be done on this road,
*Fragmentary information in Communist press reports indicates
that the section is 155 miles long; that it crosses the Kang-ti-ssu
Mountains via the HsU-ko Pass; and that the pass is 80 miles (pre-
sumably air miles) from Lhasa. The alignment shown on accompanying
map No. 25118 was calculated on the basis of this information, using
a map measurer on the largest scale maps available.
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since the aforementioned State Council report stated that the Lhasa-
Zhikatse-Gyangtse Highway should be built in 1955 "according to crude
standard."
Additional road projects to improve the transportation network
within Tibet have been proposed or are underway. The caravan route
south from Gyangtse to Phari Dzong was opened to traffic in November;
a southward extension to Yatung, a trading center only a few miles
from the Indian border, is reportedly under construction; and the
east-west caravan route across southern Tibet is expected to be
improved and extended to Sinkiang Province.
Significance and Conclusions -- There are several possible
reasons why the Chinese Communists spent considerable amounts of
time and manpower to construct long roads to and within Tibet.
(1) Politically, improved transportation facilities will allow
more complete Communist control over Tibet, which throughout most of
its history has remained outside the pale of Chinese authority.
Significantly, the long-awaited announcement concerning regional
autonomy for Tibet was made in March 1955, when a preparatory com-
mittee for Tibetan autonomy was organized. In the Alice-in-
Wonderland terminology of the Chinese Communists, the grant of
"autonomy" normally indicates that Communist domination over an area
is virtually complete.
(2) Militarily, the road connections from Tibet to China Proper
will enhance Communist capabilities against the nations of South Asia.
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92 94
SOUTHEASTERN TIBET _ "~~ ; S) G H A I We
+--/- I Selected railroad -.?- International boundary, ` ? = l ? . i/
'
\~
demarcated - r r - /
i 1
' (Tanglaegp > r
Peso) v rT ` d.
.
Selected road (Tang
-X- International boundary, 161 *delimited only
^
?~
Major caravan route - - International boundary, r/r j
~ av
- I
? 1
'
\
indefinite r -
'?Y ` `'
'
- - - Selected route or trail -?- Province boundary, China*
II
Selected pass - t--, _ Unsurveyed lake and stream C
.16080 Sot height (inSalt ake
32
0 10 25 50 100 Mlles __ ~C ?\L :1?..~-~.1.. - `
0 10 25 50 100 Kilometers u/~~ rvao c
ag
90
*A, of r October 1955 th Ch se Comnunlsrs abolished L
S k g P P m bly the t
ortion Has in
t
d h
t 1
p
corpora
e
Kgarin i to Tiber and the -t- portion Into Szechwan Since alignment 11
"fsRri of t h e boundares is not known, the boundaries prior I q ' ? g
a
October 1955 a shown.
yr.. P /_.-?"_ \ To ' ` .I. ?.....
?~ '~ Hangzhuag Le
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30
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ka ~^ I "onv Hn o C~.
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16aUD sag 7 1 i 9850".,_
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28
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r
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,?-l~'^ tq"1~ ang Bando..es . not necessarily those
% 4t\
i
AK. `\' Cooch Sr .cognized by the J. S Go ernment.
90 92 94
Approve or a ease
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A possible lever for military and political pressure against Tibet's
neighbors to the south is the fact that most of Tibet's international
boundaries are undemarcated and along certain sectors conflicting
border claims exist. (Cf. "Nagaland -- Area of Dissidence in India,"
pp. 20-25 in this Review.)
(3) Economically, Tibet has little of value other than limited
quantities of wool, hides, medicinal herbs, and a few other minor
products. The Chinese Communists, however, have been sending geo-
logical survey teams to Tibet during the past few years, and it is
quite possible that mineral discoveries may necessitate road links
with China's industrial interior.
(4) As a byproduct, experience and prestige were gained from
these road-building ventures. The wide coverage given these roads
by the international press has undoubtedly caused some people to be
considerably impressed by the fact that the Chinese Communists have
constructed not one but two roads in a region where previously the
lowly yak had been the principal means of transportation. Within
China much has been written about the "heroic" workers who prevailed
over "icy torrents, biting winds, and 5,000-meter mountains."
The publicity given the "opening" of roads to and within Tibet
has obscured their substandard quality and extremely limited traffic
capacity. Assuming that the roads are traveled by day only and that
the Sikang-Tibet and Tsinghai-Tibet roads have a 6-inch gravel base,
the present capacity is estimated to be no more than 120 tons each
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way per day. Press information on the tonnage carried has been
sketchy, but the initial convoy that reached Lhasa using the Sikang-
Tibet route reportedly carried only 35 tons. Because of the distance
involved and the severe operating conditions, probably a third of a
Figure 3. An unlocated sector of the
Sikang-Tibet Highway. Note the narrow-
ness of the road and the precipitous
terrain.
truck's load consists of fuel. Because numerous passes are at ele-
vations of 14,000 feet and higher, truck engines are nearing their
operational limits; some of the highest passes might even necessitate
reloading, and certainly overloading would not be possible.
Although the Tsinghai and Sikang routes are considered to have
equal traffic capacity, probably little tonnage has thus far moved
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over the Tsinghai road. One reason is the condition of the hurriedly
built Ka-erh-mu to Lhasa section, particularly from Nagchhu Dzong to
Lhasa. Also the type of goods sent to Tibet -- tea, clothing, rice,
and construction materials -- would more logically originate in
Szechwan than in the Tsinghai-Kansu area.
In addition to the extensive bridging, widening, surfacing, and
minor realignments needed on many sections of the Tibetan roads, the
Chinese face a very difficult problem of maintenance. Winter storms
and snow will probably block the higher passes and cause traffic
interruptions. Reports of heavy rains and bridge reconstruction
during the summer of 1955 indicate that it is problematical whether
the Sikang route can be kept open at all times during the rainy
season. A very serious hazard of this route is the frequency of
landslides and earthquakes (Figure 3), which could force rerouting
and realignments and cause stoppages of traffic for periods up to
several weeks. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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NAGALAND -- AREA OF DISSIDENCE IN INDIA
The infiltration and conquest of Tibet by the Chinese
Communists in 1950-51 shook the complacency with which India had
regarded her long mountainous northern border.* Either because
the rugged terrain was considered a safeguard against invasion,
or because traditional British policy of leaving peaceful tribes
alone was being followed, some of the territory south of the
MacMahon Line** was not brought under the administration of the
Government of India until 1950, when Indian forces occupied Towang
in the Kameng Frontier Division.
India is now engaged in an urgent program to consolidate her
hold in this strategic area, both physically and psychologically.
The Naga tribes in the isolated northeast, led by the Naga National
Council (NNC), are agitating for an independent "Nagaland." The
resulting incidents of violence are a definite embarrassment and
problem to the Indian Government, which has been obliged to send
troops into the area. Attainment of the goal of Indian unification
is deferred by such occurrences, which also aid Communism in its
efforts to spread its influence in South and Southeast Asia.
*C Chinese Communist Road Development in Tibet," pp. 8-19.
**India's frontier with Tibet in the area extending from the
northwestern corner of Yunnan to the northeastern corner of Bhutan.
The line was marked on a map but not demarcated on the ground at
the time of the Simla Convention in 1914.
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During the era of their rule in India, the British often had to
resort to military action to enforce law and order, particularly in
isolated hill or mountain areas. The Naga tribes were probably even
more persistent in their rebellious actions than the more famous
Pathan tribes near the Khyber Pass. The British sent 18 armed
punitive expeditions against the Nagas in the periods 1832-49 and
1866-87, and this use of force was among the colonial misdeeds of
which the Indians accused the British in pre-Independence days.
Historic precedent, therefore, indicates that the current independence
movement of the Nagas may be wholly indigenous and free of foreign
influence. What is actually happening in the Naga area, however, is
beclouded by the sensitivity of the Government of India to these
"hill incidents" and the resulting restrictions the Government has
placed on news and travel in the area. U.S. service attaches, for
example, have been refused permission to travel through or fly over
Naga territory.
The area inhabited by the Naga tribes lies between the Brahma-
putra and Chindwin Rivers and extends northwestward from Imphal to
about 27 N. The largest concentrations of the tribes are in two
areas: the Naga Hills District of the state of Assam, and the
Tuensang Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
(see accompanying map No. 25213). The first, with 4,276 square miles
and a population (as of 1951) of 205,950, is administered by the
Government of Assam; the second is one of six divisions of the NEFA,
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which is constitutionally part of Assam but is administered by the
Governor of Assam as an agent of the President of India.
The Naga areas follow the long curve of hills that extends from
the northeastern corner of Assam to Cape Negrais in the southwestern
part of Burma. The crests are rarely over 7,000 feet in elevation,
but the parallel arrangement of the long unbroken ridges makes much
of the region inaccessible and communication between valleys difficult.
Furthermore, because the region as a whole lies in the track of the
main Bengal current of the monsoon and the hills generally lie
athwart of or slightly oblique to the normal direction of the winds,
the rainfall is very heavy -- normally up to 80 to 100 inches
annually. The resultant vegetation is dense tropical evergreen
forest at the lower elevations and deciduous forest with some pines
at the higher elevations. Some of the high crests are covered with
grass. The native slash-and-burn agricultural practice, called
"jhuming" in this area, has resulted in very dense secondary scrub
jungle. A similar jungle farther south provoked Wingate's famous
order, "No jungle is to be reported impenetrable until it has been
penetrated."
Lack of transportation facilities into the area increases its
inaccessibility. The only paved road, which runs from Jorhat to
Palel and passes through Kohima, was built by the U.S. Army during
World War II. This road is in poor to fair condition, and during
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the rainy season is subject to landslides. Most of the other "roads"
of the region are actually only paths, although a few may be
jeepable in dry weather. The immediate region is without any rail
line, although the old Assam-Bengal Railway, now part of the North-
eastern Railway, parallels the Brahmaputra River to the oilfield at
Digboi, with a spur to Ledo. World War II airstrips at Kohima and
Dimapur are both in usable condition, but that at Kohima is not being
used at all, and the 4,000-foot concrete runway at Dimapur, which
accommodates medium-weight planes, is used scarcely more than three
or four times a year.
The term "Naga,"* applied to many of the hill tribes of this
area, is a generic term and does not mean that all groups so desig-
nated are in any way related. It is comparable to the general terms
NOV' and "Kha," which are used in Vietnam and Laos, respectively,
to designate various relatively primitive mountain tribes. The
five chief Naga tribes are the Angami, Ao, Lhota, Sema, and Rengma.
The many differences among the tribes provide evidence that this
area has been the scene of many migrations from various directions.
Examples of the divergences are dialect.and physical appearance.
Dialects vary so greatly that Assamese is often used as a lingua
franca; and whereas the An.gami is tall, has straight eyes, and may
have an aquiline nose, the Serra is typically Mongolian, with a flat
*Naga is a corruption of the Assamese Naga, probably meaning "a
mountaineer," from Sanskrit Nag, a mountain or inaccessible place.
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nose and oblique eyes. Another point of distinction is in methods
of agriculture. The Angamis, for instance, use terraced cultivation,
whereas most of the other tribes practice the primitive shifting
jhuming.
The difficulties facing the Indian Government in its attempts
to unify this area and gain the loyalty of the natives are obvious
when viewed against the background of the physical and cultural
factors. To achieve its purposes, the Government is increasing the
scope of its program. An allotment equivalent to about $20,000,000
has been authorized for the NEFA under the Second Five-Year-Plan.
Among its various development projects, the Plan provides for
construction of 700 miles of jeepable fair-weather roads; building
of small airports for light aircraft; improvement of agricultural
methods and health facilities; and reduction of illiteracy. Comple-
menting these efforts is the psychological approach, which includes
visits and speeches by major officials. Nehru himself, in an attempt
to mitigate tensions, has recently made several speeches in the area.
Hammering on one of his main theses, "unity," he has said that both
hill and plains people belong to the same country and that "geography
compels us to live together." In his speeches, Nehru has attempted
to ingratiate himself with the hill tribes and, referring to his
Kashmiri heritage, has described himself as "a child of the hills."
In spite of these efforts, NNC leaders have continued their-
demands for independence, although recently they have indicated
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willingness to settle for an independent state within India. This
suggestion having been ignored in the recommendations of the States
Reorganization Committee, the Nagas will probably react with more
"hill incidents." It has been rumored that such outbreaks are to
some degree Communist inspired. The president of the NNC and most
of its leaders are Christians and reportedly will have nothing to do
with Communism; but in view of the failure to gain independent-state
status for the Nagas, the NNC may conceivably be tempted. to flirt with
the Communists. Certainly, the isolated character of the area, the
primitiveness of its inhabitants, and its proximity to Tibet and
China would make it a logical target for Communist subversive
activities. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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NEW TRANSCONTINENTAL ROUTE ACROSS SOUTH AMERICA
La Paz
iacha
uro MizquE~yr^!'~rPampajG andeuz
H E \f
ntofagasta
ARGENTINA
San Jose
iRobor?
umb2
PARAGI.
Y 1
Campo Grande
antd5 OCEAN
A new transportation route between the Atlantic and the
Pacific -- the third transcontinental route to cross South America
and the only one north of Argentina* -- is now in operation across
Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. The Brazil-Bolivia Railroad inaugurated
on 5 January 1955 opened up traffic between Corumba in western
Brazil and Santa Cruz de la Sierra in east-central Bolivia, thus
filling in the last gap in a rail-highway system from coast to
coast. One major bridge, spanning the Rio Grande at Rincon about
44 kilometers east of Santa Cruz, remains to be completed; currently,
freight and passengers are carried across this river by ferry.
Before rail service will be available for the entire length of the
route, further mileage must be constructed between Santa Cruz and
*Two transcontinental routes originate in Buenos Aires and ter-
minate at Antofagasta (via northern Argentina) and Valparaiso, Chile.
Railway: in operation
-~-? Railway: projected
.......... Connecting highway
0 50 190, 290 Miles
0 50100 20D Kilometers
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Mizque along the route westward to Cochabamba. At present, a
recently completed road connects Santa Cruz with Cochabamba. Other
improvements, such as reinforcement of the rails east of Santa Cruz,
will be needed to make the roadbed capable of carrying loads heavier
than can currently be handled.
The construction of the Corumba-Santa Cruz line is the ultimate
result of a treaty signed at Petropolis, Brazil, in 1903. To compen-
sate Bolivia for the annexation of Acre Territory, Brazil agreed
under the provisions of the treaty to build a connecting railroad
between Bolivia and a navigable tributary of the Amazon River, thus
giving Bolivia access to a port on the Atlantic Ocean. Only one
small segment of this line was ever constructed -- a 366-kilometer
(227-mile) stretch completed in 1912 that connects the Brazilian
towns of Porto de San Antonio on the Rio Madeira and Guajara-Mirim
on the Rio Mamore near the northern tip of Bolivia. The extension
of this line into Bolivia was abandoned, and a different route to
the Atlantic was proposed in two complementary agreements signed in
1938. Under the first of these agreements, Brazil was obligated to
build the railroad to Santa Cruz, which was inaugurated in January
The second agreement provided that additional mileage be
built by Brazil from Santa Cruz to Cochabamba, which would enable
Bolivia to export much-needed oil to Brazil in repayment for the
construction. This second line, 490 kilometers (304 miles) long and
not yet constructed, will connect with the current Bolivian railroad
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system at Mizque, thereby completing a 1+,000-kilometer (about 2,500-
mile) transcontinental railroad between the Brazilian port of Santos
on the Atlantic and the Chilean port of Arica on the Pacific.
This international route in its present form consists of
segments of several meter-gauge railroad systems and one stretch of
road. Beginning in Santos, Brazil, the Estrada de Ferro Sorocabana
(Sorocabana Railroad) runs for 1+78 kilometers (297 miles) through
the highlands of Sao Paulo state to Bauru. From Bauru, the Estrada
de Ferro Noroeste do Brasil (Northwest Railroad of Brazil) continues
westward over more level terrain for 1,352 kilometers (81+0 miles)
to Corumba, crossing en route a major bridge over the Rio Parana
near Jupia and another over the Rio Paraguai at Porto Esperanca.
At Corumba, 1,830 kilometers (1,130 miles) from Santos, the
Estrada de Ferro Brasil-Bolivia (Brazil-Bolivia Railroad) begins its
680-kilometer (1+22-mile) run to Santa Cruz. Until further construc-
tion has been completed, trucks must be used to connect Santa Cruz
with the Bolivian railroad at Mizque, or at Cochabamba farther west.
The lines across the Altiplano and the Andes in Bolivia and
Chile are all under the administration of the Antofagasta-Bolivia
Railway Co. Ltd. Segments of this system run from Mizque to Cocha-
bamba (151+ kms.; 96 mi.), Cochabamba to Oruro (206 kms.; 128 mi.),
Oruro to Viacha (202 kms.; 125 mi.), and Viacha to Arica, Chile
(418 kms.; 260 mi.); and another line runs southward from Oruro to
the Pacific coast at the port of Antofagasta, Chile (930 kms.; 578 mi.)
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The establishment of a route to the east opens up potentialities
for the economic development of parts of Bolivia that have hitherto
been retarded because of isolation. Santa Cruz, an old colonial
town with a current population of 35,000, is situated in the center
of a rich agricultural region that previously had no good connection
with distant markets except by air. Imports of Brazilian manufactured
goods, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and certain agricultural produce
could be readily absorbed by the expanding markets of this area.
Likewise, Bolivia will be able to ship eastward mineral products,
salt, cattle, and timber, and the products of newly developed
agricultural lands. Markets will be found in the vast areas of
western Brazil, and in Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay via the Rios
Paraguai and Parana. Overseas markets may be reached either via
this river system or by crossing Brazil to Santos. Of most immediate
and outstanding importance is the transportation of products from
the rapidly expanding Bolivian oil industry, centered in the area
south and west of Santa Cruz. Current deliveries of gasoline and
kerosene to Brazil from the refinery in Cochabamba represent only
a small fraction of the proposed shipments, but further development
of Bolivia's large oil reserves should result from recent moves on
the part of the Bolivian Government to modify the 1938 agreement
with Brazil.
With proper management and some needed improvements in facili-
ties, the newly opened railroad will provide Brazil with much-needed
-29-
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oil, stimulate the growth and expansion of new enterprises in east-
ern Bolivia, and contribute materially to a more stable economy for
that country as a whole. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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URANIUM MINING IN FRANCE
Among the nations of the Western World, France ranks next to
the United States and the United Kingdom in raw-material and pile
technology for the development of atomic energy. One indication of
French interest in the atomic-energy program was provided at the
Geneva exhibition of peaceful uses of atomic energy, where France
had 4+9 exhibits. Geological surveys, prospecting for ore, develop-
ment of raw materials, and techniques for ore processing are making
slow but steady progress in France.
The French atomic-energy effort is planned around a series of
5-year nuclear research and development programs aimed at economic
atomic power. It should be noted, however, that the French military
are interested in developing both nuclear weapons and nuclear
propulsion, with research on the latter already underway. Avail-
ability of raw materials is not likely to be a limiting factor to
fulfillment of current French plans.
The major activity centers in and around the Massif Central.
Seven concessions for exploitation of radioactive minerals have
been granted, and exploration is being pushed in several widely
scattered areas. Locations and limits of concessions, mine sites,
operating division headquarters, and concentration plants are shown
on six medium-scale maps available in the CIA Map Library under Call
No. F 251-18 91+563. A textual description of the concessions is
.on file in the Geography Division of CIA.
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The oldest uranium-mining concession in France, dating back to
1929, is the 1,966-hectare Lachaux concession. Deposits in this
concession provided uranium for the Commissariat a 1'Energie Atomique
(CEA) experimental pile, but they are now practically exhausted
except for a small deposit at Bigay.
The Bois Noirs (St. Priest) deposit, about 20 kilometers
southeast of Lachaux, was discovered in 1951 and a 6,340-hectare
concession was granted in July 1954. When machinery becomes available
in early 1956, this deposit may provide a large proportion of French
uranium production. Mining activity is also underway at Viaduc des
Peux and Limouzat, just northwest of the St. Priest concession, and
at Arfeuilles and Noiretable. Within the 177-square-kilometer Grury
concession, which was granted in January 1953, there are several
areas of activity. Near La Faye, north of the old Crot Blanc mine,
a series of galleries and shafts has been dug in a lode containing
concentrations of chalcocite. Near Les Vernays, boring and surface
research continue on a deposit of primary ore. Little is known of
the low-grade vein near Les Brosses. A deposit of primary pitch-
blende, with secondary deposits near the surface, is located at
Bauzot near Issy-l'Eveque. During the preliminary work at this
site three lodes were located. Small secondary deposits have also
been found near Batou. North of the Grury concession, at Outeloup
near Chateau-Chinon, is another mine, details of which are unknown.
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The original La Crouzille concession of 134 square kilometers
was approved in December 1950. In February 1954, a contiguous
northern concession of 193.5 square kilometers was granted, so that
the two concessions cover the entire area between Ambazac and Le
Cerveix. The number of radioactive indices indicates that the
entire North Limousin is rich in ore and that the resources are
extensive enough to be exploitable over a long period of time.
Two concessions in northern Vendee were granted in September
1954; one near Clisson covers 20 square kilometers and the other
near Mortagne totals 289 square kilometers. Both concessions
contain extensive deposits of low-uranium-content ore.
Prospecting is especially active near Bonnat, in Creuse
Department; Le Montet and Montmarault, in Allier; Ardillats, in
Rhone; Barjac, in Lozere; Kruth and Liepvre, in Haut-Rhin;
Golinhac, in Aveyron; and in northern and southern Brittany and
the Pyrenees. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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RECENT ACQUISITIONS OF SOVIET MAPS
Among the Soviet map publications recently acquired by the CIA
Map Library that are of significance to intelligence analysts are
three political-administrative maps dated 1955, a 1955 general
geographic map, a 1954 soils map, a 1953 ethnic map, a new edition
of Atlas SSSR, and the index to the 1954 Atlas Mira. All were
published in Moscow by GUGK (Glavnoye Upravleniye Geodezii i
Kartografii).
The administrative structure of the entire USSR is shown on
Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics) at 1:8,000,000 (CIA Call No. 96685). This
is the most recent available map showing territorial-administrative
divisions for the whole country. It differs little from the 1954
edition, however, since the divisions given are those of 1 October
1954. Boundaries and centers of republics, ASSR's, oblasts, krays,
autonomous oblasts, and national okrugs are given. The base
information includes selected railroads and roads and some physical
features such as sand and marsh areas, but relief is not indicated.
Of particular value is the large number of place names.
Similar in design to the 1:8,000,000 map but more detailed is
Yevropeyskaya Chast' SSSR (European Part of the USSR) at 1:4,000,000
(CIA Call No. 96686). This map, also, shows all administrative units
above the rayon level, along with their centers, as well as a
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greater number of place, names. Cities and towns are differentiated
according to six population categories, and generalized shading
gives some impression of relief. The administrative boundaries of
the same categories are shown on SSSR, Yevropeyskaya Chast', Politiko-
Administrativnaya Karta, a four-sheet map at 1:2,500,000 (CIA Call
No. 96683). This is strictly a wall map, however, vivid in color
and extremely generalized, with few place names. Despite its
larger scale, it is far less useful for research purposes than
Yevropeyskaya Chast' SSSR.
The three administrative maps described, although the most
recent available, are already out of date in some respects. Two of
the more important administrative changes that have occurred since
they were issued are (1) an alteration in the boundary between the
Georgian SSR and the RSFSR and (2) the abolition of two oblasts in
the Tadzhik SSR.
The most detailed general geographic map in its scale range
showing the USSR as a whole is the four-sheet Soyuz Sovetskikh
Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik at 1:5,000,000 (CIA Call No. 97769).
In design and amount of physical and cultural detail it closely
resembles some of the plates in the Atlas Mira. Relief is shown
by tints, contours, and spot heights; and hydrographic features
are given in considerable detail. In addition, the map shows
administrative boundaries down to the oblast level, main roads
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and railroads, many place names, and cities differentiated accord-
ing to six population categories.
The best soils map available for the entire USSR is the six
sheet Pochvennaya Karta SSSR (Soil Map of the USSR) at 1:4,000,000
(CIA Call No. 96986), prepared by the Pochvennyy Institut imeni
V. V. Dokuchayeva Akademii Nauk SSSR (Dokuchayev Soil Institute of
the Academy of Sciences USSR) for use by higher educational
institutions. This represents a considerable advance over the
previous large-scale wall maps of soils. It divides soils into
two large groups: (1) soils of the plains, broken down in turn
into 4+7 types, differentiated by solid colors and patterns; and
(2) soils of mountainous areas, in 16 types, represented by lined
color. The result is a more detailed soils map than any previously
received. For example, 10 types of chernozem soils on plains are
differentiated. The mechanical composition of soils and soil-forming
materials is shown by superimposed patterns.
The ethnic map recently received, Karta Narodov SSSR (Map of the
Peoples of the USSR) at 1:5,000,000 (CIA Call No. 93633), is also a
substantial improvement over previous maps on the subject. Although
it is similar to the small ethnic map at 1:30,000,000 in the recent
Geograficheskiy Atlas, the larger scale made certain refinements
possible. Whereas 63 ethnic groups are differentiated on the atlas
map, 81 are given on Karta Narodov SSSR; for example, in the
ethnically complex North Caucasus area 11 groups are distinguished,
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in contrast to 6 on the atlas map. An attempt has also been made to
show the percentages of the various ethnic groups in the total
population of a given area. It appears, however, that the percentage
of Great Russians in several of the SSR's has probably been minimized
for propaganda purposes. Boundaries are given only for national
administrative units -- SSR's, ASSR's, A.0.'s, and N.O.'s -- and
relatively few cities are located.
The second (1955) edition of the Atlas SSSR* is more up to date
in several respects than the first edition of this small atlas,
published in 1954. The series of changes in oblast boundaries that
took place in December 1953 and early 1954 are included in the later
edition. Also shown are a number of additional railroad lines --
for example, the line from Tayshet to Ust'-Kut west of Lake Baykal
and the Novoalekseyevka-Genichesk-Valok line on the Arabatskaya
Strelka in the Crimea. Some new place names appear, and two new
reservoirs, the Kama near Molotov and the Mingechaur Reservoir in
the Azerbaydzhan SSR, are shown.
Of particular value is the recently received Atlas Mira gazetteer-
index, which was published. several months later than the atlas proper.
This substantial volume of some 572 pages containing more than 205,000
geographical names will greatly facilitate the use of the atlas.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
*See 'Evaluation of Recent Soviet Atlas and Map Accessions,"
Geographic Intelligence Review No. 46, June 1955, for a more complete
discussion of this and other Soviet atlases.
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CENTENNIAL EDITION OF THE
COSMOPOLITAN WORLD ATLAS
A new, expanded edition of Rand McNally and Company's
Cosmopolitan World Atlas* has been published to commemorate the
100th anniversary of the founding of the firm. The volume, dated
1956 although it first appeared late in 1955, does not differ
radically from the atlas carrying the same title that was first
published in 19+9 and revised in 1951 and 1953. The centennial
edition, however, includes new features and improvements of old
ones that will make it a valuable aid for American map users.
The most noteworthy innovation is a 16-page section of continent
maps, which includes general coverage as well as maps for such topics
as natural vegetation, climate, and population density. The main
regional and country maps are basically the same as their vividly
colored, hachured counterparts in the earlier editions, but many
changes have been made in political boundaries and place names.
The place-name adjustments went far toward bringing the spellings
into general agreement with the forms preferred by the U. S. Board
on Geographic Names. Corrections were also made in the single-
sequence index of place names, which now includes some 83,000 entries.
The numerous useful tables ("World Political Information," "World
Climatic and Economic Table," etc.) in the earlier editions have
*CIA Map Library Call No. aA000.R3 1955. The 1+00-page volume
measures 11 1/2" x 14 1/2" x 1 1/2".
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been corrected to reflect the findings of the many censuses taken
throughout the world about 1950.
The coverage of foreign countries is cartographically inferior
to that of several European atlases of comparable scope. The Rand
McNally volume, however, has substantial compensating advantages
in its treatment of place names, extensive index, and wealth of
current statistical data. It is believed that the new atlas will
be widely used for general reference because of these and other
favorable features. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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to north has shown a steady upward trend, interrupted by fluctuations
that reflect the opening of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline in 1951 and
the opening of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline to Banias, Syria,
in 1952.
The circumstances surrounding operation of the Suez Canal may
well affect adversely the prominent position it has held in the
petroleum transit trade. Pipeline transit fees on crude petroleum
to Syria have been increased recently, but Suez transit fees have
been reduced and further decreases have been proposed. This economic
competition could place Egypt in an unpopular position among its
non-petroleum-producing neighbors at a time when it is posing as the
leader of the Arab nations. On the other hand, interference in
canal traffic would be viewed dimly by oil-producing Arab countries.
In spite of anticipated increases in tanker traffic, pilot service
through the canal is below required strength as a result of agreement
between the operating company and the Egyptian Government to increase
the percentage of Egyptian nationals employed as pilots. Although
the number of qualified Egyptian pilots is limited, visa conditions
imposed by Egypt are making it increasingly difficult to recruit
or train pilots other than Egyptian nationals. The position of the
canal after 1968, when operation reverts to Egypt, is open to specu-
lation. Recent launchings of supertankers for service around the
Cap o ' Good Hope, however, may indicate that the grasp of the canal
on the petroleum trade is not so strong as it was once thought to be.
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Conclusion
The expansion of refinery capacity in the years following World
War II has centered in areas of increasing demand for petroleum prod-
ucts. Before World War II, two-thirds of Europets refined petroleum
requirements were imported; at the present time Europe is virtually
self-sufficient in refined products, and the need for very rapid
expansion is past. The value of a domestic refining industry has
become apparent to small nations as well as to industrial powers.
In the last few years, refineries have been established in a number
of relatively underdeveloped areas that do not produce crude petro-
leum in significant quantities. In the future the greatest increases
in demand for petroleum products may be expected from countries that
today are considered underdeveloped but are searching for the means
to economic independence. Small refineries constructed in response
to this demand will play an increasingly important role in the eco-
nomic and political life of the Eastern Hemisphere. (UNCLASSIFIED)
14
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KURDISTAN
MEDITERRANEAN B - /
LEBA ANON' ~ K
SEA .r T" A f-N ~.. N I R A N
E G Y P T
- - - Boundary of proposed
Kurdish state submitted
to the UN by the Kurdish
Rizgari Party in 1946
NO/ Ethnic Kurdistan
Kurdistan is an area of ethnic unity divided among four nations --
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Despite this division the Kurds, who
are mostly Sunni Muslims, have managed to retain their identity and
their propensity to revolt against government authority in the face of
repeated defeats. This is in no small measure attributable to the
difficulty of supervising the tribes in their native mountain retreats.
In all of the countries except Syria the Kurds are a dissident element
that might be. swayed by propaganda or promises of assistance from a
foreign country. Kurdish aspirations for autonomy have been nurtured
by the Soviet Union, which is preparing the groundwork for possible
employment of Kurds in any Middle East struggle.
E- -R-E-T
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Most of the Kurds are scattered throughout what they themselves
consider to be "Ethnic Kurdistan" (see map). In Turkey the core of
Kurdistan is the Lake Van Basin, an area of interior drainage rimmed
by steep mountains. Other major concentrations of Kurds lie to the
west and south of Lake Urmia in Iran and in the mountains of Iraq
between the Great Zab and Diyala Rivers. In the Syrian Jazirah, a
string of solidly Kurdish villages inhabited chiefly by forced mi-
grants from Turkey stretches along the frontier between Syria and
Turkey. Although some Kurds live within Soviet territory south of
the Caucasus, this area is not considered a part of ethnic Kurdistan.
The Kurds are essentially a mountain or hill people who live by
a grazing economy that requires careful utilization of mountain and
valley pastures. Rainfall decreases progressively from a high of 60
inches south of Lake Van to a low of 10 to 15 inches in an area
extending from the Jazirah of northeastern Syria southeastward through
Mosul and Kirkuk in Iraq and into Iran. Both the nomadic and sedentary
Kurds have adapted themselves successfully to dry conditions. Some
of the nomadic Kurds, however, are now turning to agriculture, notably
in the Jazirah, which is fast becoming the breadbasket of the Middle
East.
The Kurdish population in Turkey is estimated at 1,000,000 to
1,500,000; in Iraq at 800,000 to 1,000,000; in Iran at about 600,000;
in Syria at perhaps 200,000; and in the USSR at 50,000. Possession
of a common language, customs, and way of life has offset the effect
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of different dialects and lack of political cohesiveness among the
Kurds to the point where hope for a separate nation or autonomous
state is now paramount.
Provision for a Kurdish state was actually incorporated in the
unratified Treaty of Sevres in 1920, but never activated. Instead,
the autonomy won by the Kurds in the twilight of the Ottoman Empire
was abolished by Kemal Atatiirk. Thereafter the Kurds revolted
repeatedly against the Turks -- in 1925, 1929, and 1937. The last
revolt was ruthlessly crushed. To this day, the density of police
posts in the Kurdish area of eastern Turkey is double that elsewhere
in the country. The Kurds of Iraq also were restive and resented the
neglect that has persistently characterized Iraqi policy towards
them. In 1945, some of the Iraqi Kurds revolted under the leadership
of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, but were again defeated. Barzani fled to
neighboring Iran, where he was given the rank of "marshal," was
provided with a Soviet uniform, and identified himself with the
newly formed Soviet-sponsored Kurdish People's Government. This was
the first of the "People's Governments" to be established in southern
Asia with Soviet aid. Although the regime was short lived and
Barzani and others were forced to flee to the Soviet Union for
sanctuary, the idea of a People's Government has not only survived,
but it has also been nurtured and is capable of being reactivated.
The Kurds have given some attention to the economic viability of
the proposed state. For example, in presenting a proposed boundary
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to the United Nations in 1946, they included international boundary
corridors stretching southward to the Persian Gulf and westward to
the Mediterranean. Their idea of what constitutes ethnic Kurdistan
encompasses the grain-raising region of northern Syria, including
the Jazirah, and the oilfield-refinery-pipeline complex of northern
Iraq. Under Kurdish domination, part of the revenue from the oil-
fields, which now finds its way into Iraqi coffers, would contribute
to sustaining the new state. The Kurdish plan also provided for an
economic outlet to the USSR. The idea of Soviet aid in many forms
has not escaped attention and becomes more attractive with the
growing feeling that Kurds are being neglected by the central govern-
ments that now rule them.
The transportation pattern, although adequate for present needs
of the Kurds, would pose a problem for a new state. A united
Kurdistan would have to rely on outlets in the surrounding states.
In this respect, Kurdistan would resemble Austria after the breakup
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Basically the Kurds feel that they must rely on either the
United States or the USSR for help. The British are tied to the
PrOalo-plie neglect the Kurds.
In Iran the meager livelihood of the Kurds often depends on
the whims of the army. The USSR, on the other hand, has not only
helped them in the past but also nurtures their hope for autonomy.
25X6
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To many Kurds, therefore, the Soviet Union appears to be the only
nation whose help they can rely upon in the future.
Soviet interest in the Kurds reveals a serious effort to defeat
the Baghdad Pact. One means of accomplishing this goal would be to
encourage an increase in the tempo of Kurdish lawlessness, thus giving
the impression that key defensive areas in Pact countries were
unstable. Kurdish sheiks in Iraq have recently been approached by
Kurdish Communists carrying anti-Pact propaganda and supporting the
idea of "Kurdistan for the Kurds." Any mistakes made by the central
governments in dealing with the Kurds could again be seized upon by
the Communists to instigate apparently spontaneous uprisings that
might cloak Soviet intentions.
A less obvious attempt to place the Kurds within the Soviet camp
might be made by using the autonomous-area device. The Kurds would
be encouraged to achieve autonomy while remaining within the present
national boundaries. Once autonomy was achieved the Soviets would
be able to function more freely under the guise of appeasing Kurdish
nationalism while they were subjecting groups to Communist domination.
This actually was the case in 19+5 when the Soviets activated their
version of autonomous areas in southern Asia by setting up the
Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan within Iran and at the same time
setting up a Kurdish regime farther south, popularly called the
Republic of Mahabad. The Soviet-style ending to the Republic's
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25X1 C
manifesto -- "Long Live Kurdish Democratic Autonomy" -- has long
been noted, but its significance as fitting into the Communist
administrative pattern for gaining control of peripheral areas has
been ignored. Mahabad established a pattern that is still evolving.
This particular Soviet experiment failed soon after the departure of
Soviet troops from northern Iran in 1946, but the idea of Kurdish
autonomy has prospered and by many Kurds is credited to the Soviet
Union.
The abandonment of the plan for a united Kurdish state or
autonomous states within present national boundaries might still be
realized if the present governments improved economic conditions and
paid greater deference to the Kurdish culture. These are the advan-
tages currently being offered by the Soviets.
In spite of the increasing importance of the Kurds in the Middle
East the flow of intelligence on their area is overgeneralized and
meager.
25X1 C
Consequently it is
increasingly difficult to obtain a well-rounded understanding of
Kurdistan's problems as the area again faces a Soviet threat. (SECRET)
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FURTHER CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
MAP OF COMMUNIST CHINA
During 1955 the Chinese Communists again revised the territorial-
administrative structure of China by abolishing the provinces of
Jehol and Sikang, establishing Sinkiang Province as a full-fledged
"autonomous region," adjusting the Kwangtung-Kwangsi and the Anhwei-
Kiangsu provincial boundaries, and changing one provincial capital.
The internal administrative pattern of Communist China as of January
1956 is shown on the accompanying Map 25333.*
The abolition of Sikang and Jehol continues the practice begun
in 1952 of eliminating those provinces that were of small size,
comparatively small population, or relatively recent origin. Further-
more, with the exception of the short-lived PingyUan, all of the
provinces eliminated to date have been located north of the Great Wall
or in the frontier regions of western China. As a result of the most
recent changes, China now consists of 22 provinces plus the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region,
and Tibet (which is in the initial throes of becoming an "autonomous
region"). The present provincial alignment of China is essentially
the same as that which existed just prior to 1911.
*This map supersedes CIA. Map No. 13516, Communist Administrative
Divisions (December 1954), which accompanied an article entitled
Rem cent Territorial-Administrative Changes in Communist China" in
Geographic Intelligence Review No. 44, February 1955, pp. 34-36.
-FIT
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Announcements that Sikang and Jehol were to be abolished were
made in June 1955, but their dissolution did not take place until
1 October 1955 and 1 January 1956, respectively. Sikang Province --
an area of high mountains and windswept plateaus, with limited areas
of arable land and a predominantly Tibetan population -- was created
in 1928 from parts of Szechwan and Tibet as an outgrowth of the
dispute between Tibet and China. Although Sikang officially extends
west almost to 92?E, actual Chinese authority was restricted to the
area east of the Chin-sha Chiang (upper Yangtze) until the recent
Chinese Communist advance into Tibet. The western portion of Sikang,
called the Ch'angitu (Chamdo) area by the Chinese Reds, will be
incorporated into the future Tibet Autonomous Region. The portion
of Sikang east of the Chin-sha reverts to Szechwan.
Jehol Province, like Sikang, was officially organized in 1928.
In area and population, Jehol ranked as one of the smaller of the
Chinese provinces. Most of its territory consists of barren, jagged
mountains that merge with the Mongolian Plateau in the northwest.
This northwestern area, which has a scattered Mongol population, has
now been incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Southwestern Jehol has been united with Hopeh and the remaining
eastern portion with Liaoning.
The inauguration of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region on
1 October 1955 marked the culmination of a long program designed to
bring the various non-Chinese ethnic groups of Sinkiang under more
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COMMUNIST CHINA
ADMIN
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MARCH 1956
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effective Communist control. Only 5 percent of Sinkiang's approxi-
mately 5 million inhabitants are Chinese, whereas approximately three-
fourths are Uighurs, Turkic people who are followers of Islam.
With the return of four hsien (counties) from Kwangsi to Kwang-
tung in May 1955 the Kwangtung-Kwangsi provincial boundary has
reverted to its pre-1952 alignment. This transfer leaves Kwangsi
without access to the sea.
The second boundary adjustment shown on CIA Map No. 25333
involves the provinces of Anhwei and Kiangsu. Either in late 195+
or early 1955 -- the exact date is not definitely known -- two hsien
of Anhwei were transferred to Kiangsu and two hsien of Kiangsu to
Anhwei, resulting in a realignment of their common boundary. Trans-
fer of the two hsien from Anhwei to Kiangsu possibly was made in
order to place flood-control installations along the Hung-tse Hu
under one provincial administration. There is no obvious reason for
the shift of two hsien from Kiangsu to Anhwei.
The capital of Hopei has been removed from Pao-ting (Ching-yiian)
to Shih-chia-chuang (Shih-men), 80 miles to the southwest. The new
location is at the junction of the Peking-Hankow railway with the
lines that go west to Shansi and east to Shangtung. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH
IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
Shortly after the first of this year, Chou En-lai called for a
special 12-year program to "organize science" in China by the end of
the Third Five-Year Plan (1967). In so doing, he focused attention
on Peiping's difficulties in developing geologic research capabilities
adequate for the task of providing the natural resources required to
support the industrial program of the Communist regime. Although
most of the industrial-development programs outlined in the First
Five-Year Plan (1953-57) are based primarily on mineral reserves
proven prior to the Communist take-over, the regime continues to
press one theme recurrently -- the "rational" geographical distri-
bution of industrial enterprises throughout China, especially in the
currently underdeveloped areas of the interior.
To support this objective, geological surveying and exploration
teams have been sent to nearly every province of China during the
past few years, and periodic reports have been made of mineral
discoveries in the less-industrialized regions of China. Some of
the more ambitious claims have concerned a "large copper deposit" in
Kansu that is said to compare with the best deposits in Yunnan; a
discovery in Northeast China advertised as "certainly one of the
largest known molybdenite deposits in the world"; and the confirmation
*This article has been coordinated with the Office of Scientific
Intelligence.
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(also made a decade earlier by the Japanese) of "two huge deposits"
of iron ore near Pao-t'ou. Discoveries of phosphorus have also been
reported in Kiangsu and Szechwan, manganese in Kweichaw and Hunan,
oil in Tsinghai and Sinkiang, and coal in nearly every province.
Despite these claims, Chou's recent directive suggests that
the Chinese geologists are not achieving the goal of discovering
the right resources at the right time and in the right place. He
has, therefore, turned sorcerer and has decided to whip his scientific
apprentices into line for the ambitious plan of "approaching the
most advanced world level in a number of scientific fields ... by
the end of the Third Five-Year Plan [1963-1967]." He maintains that
a "long-term scientific development plan must be mapped out, the
annual plans for implementing this long-term plan in 1956 and 1957
must be formulated, and the initial groups of scientists which must
be immediately mobilized in the implementation of the long-term plan
and the two annual plans must be determined."
Every year since the initiation of the First Five-Year Plan,
pressure for geological research in support of industrialization
has been increased. At a recent geological conference the decision
was made to increase the amount of geological surveying in 1956
beyond the total for the 3 years from 1953 through 1955. Priority
will be given to the search for new deposits of iron ore, manganese
and nonferrous metals, and oil and oil-shale. Emphasis is being
placed on the resources needed for the new iron and steel centers
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scheduled to be built in Southwest and Northwest China. The current
location of research institutes in the coastal areas of China is
condemned as "irrational," and a new distribution is planned that will
conform with the proposed western orientation of industry.
Geological research and the training of technical cadres is
being carried out by a large number of scientific and technical
organizations in China. A nationwide reorganization of geological
and geophysical surveys and research institutes was begun in 1952,
and the system of research organizations developed by early 1953
remains substantially unchanged. The research effort is carried on
through three channels: (1) the Academy of Sciences and its research
institutes, (2) the research institutes and experimental stations
supervised by the various ministries under the State Administrative
Council, and (3) the scientific departments of universities and
colleges throughout China.
The forced draft under which the Chinese scientific effort has
been operating can be gauged by the increasing number of research
institutes under the supervision of the Chinese Academy of Science.
The number of research institutes of the Academy was increased from
17 in 1950 to 23 in the following year. By late 1953 the Academy had
36 research institutes with 1,725 "research" workers. In 1955, Kou
Mo-jo, President of the Academy, announced that it had 41 research
institutes and 2,063 workers, and that 60 additional research
institutes under the various ministries had more than 3,000 workers.
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Although research workers in the Academy's Department of Biology,
Geology, and Geography totaled only 764 in 1955, it is perhaps
significant that two-fifths of the research program of the Academy
was at that time assigned to the Department.
Research organizations under the Ministries of Water Conserva-
tion, Geology, Fuel Industry, and others have greatly expanded their
secondary technical-school programs in response to the need for re-
search workers. Early in 1955, the Ministry of Fuel Industry
(abolished in July 1955) reported 29 schools with about 15,000 students
specializing in studies relating to hydroelectric power, coal mining,
thermoelectric power, and petroleum. The Ministry of Water Conserva-
tion claimed to have 2,600 students in 8 schools, and the Ministry of
Geology announced it had 1,800 students in 5 schools. Other ministries.
operating schools include the Ministry of Heavy Industry, the First
Ministry of Machine Industry, the Ministry of Railways, and the Minis-
try of Engineering and Construction.
Geologists are also being trained in the higher educational
institutions of China. Five-year geology courses are offered in the
geology departments of Nanking and Peking Universities and of at
least 5 engineering or technical colleges: Chungking University,
Central-South Mining and Metallurgical College, Northeast Geology
College, Peking Geology College, and Peking Petroleum College.
The immediate need for mineral resources to meet the requirements
of industrialization has apparently led the Chinese Communists to place
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increasing emphasis on short-term training. Because 4 or 5 years
are required for training top-grade geologists, they cannot be turned
out as rapidly as they are needed. Consequently colleges and uni-
versities, such as Peking Geology College and Nanking University, as
well as technical schools under the various ministries, are giving
"special" courses with the limited objective of training medium- or
low-grade technicians. Such training is usually concentrated on
specific skills such as surveying, prospecting, drafting, and bore
analysis -- skills that can be put to immediate use. Even during
their training period, students are assigned to field-practice proj-
ects to assist in the actual work of prospecting or general survey-
ing. "Over 60 percent of the existing geological prospecting and
surveying teams," says a young geologist in China Reconstructs,
"consist of young workers and students who are continuing their
training in the field, in spare-time study courses run by qualified
technicians and experts. Some have entered the work after perhaps
a 3-month training course following their graduation from secondary
school ...."
Despite their large numbers, the scientists and special techni-
cians have thus far been unable to fulfill their quotas for the
"planned discovery" of mineral resources, and the projected industrial
developments have lagged. In a report issued in the summer of 1955,
the Minister of Heavy Industry attempted to rationalize the slow
progress of industrialization. After emphasizing the dependence of
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the ferrous-metals industry on an adequate supply of raw materials
and noting the large-scale geological prospecting undertaken since
the initiation of the first Five-Year Plan, the Minister complained
of the low technical quality of past geological work. "Although
deposits of some metals have been discovered in quantity in the
coastal areas," he points out, "in those areas in which we wish to
set up factories, resources have not yet been found in sufficient
quantities." Despite the effort of the Ministry of Heavy Industry
to organize an efficient geological prospecting force, he concludes
that "because of the low scientific and technical level, the quality
of the work has also been low."
The attention given in Chou's directive to the treatment of
intellectuals suggests that the poor living and working conditions,
low salaries, and lack of opportunities for promotion and public
recognition in the past have probably contributed to the "position-
.alism"* and lack of research effectiveness that Chou now decries.
Scientists, on the other hand, have apparently countered increasing
political indoctrination and regimentation with substantial passive
resistance. Chou warns against the "estrangement" that has developed
between some intellectuals and the Party and notes that certain
intellectuals have taken a conservative or even antagonistic attitude
*Positionalism: the fear of losing personal status characterized
in part by an ultraconservative adherence to the status quo, suspicion
of fellow workers, and unwillingness to work cooperatively.
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toward Socialism. To this, Kou Mo-jo adds that such backward elements
possibly comprise 13 percent of the intelligentsia. Scientists have
also been attacked repeatedly for their failure to combine theory
with practice and to gear research work to national needs. Critics
also complain of a lack of congeniality between some veteran scientists
and young scientists. "The younger generation," they claim, "often
demands too much of the veterans in too great a haste, or unilaterally
stresses the practical application value of science and the future
prospects of individuals." As for the veteran scientists, "those
deeply influenced by positionalism may even have apprehensions about
the overall planning by the leadership," and may "like to do things
alone and dislike to work with others, keeping busy for nothing and
becoming narrowminded." During Chou's 12-year program, these morale
problems will evidently be dealt with -- and probably aggravated --
under the decision of the Communist regime to raise the level of
political reliability by further regimentation of scientific personnel.
China's research personnel can hope for little relaxation in
the crash program for training technical cadres.. Kou Mo-jo was quick
to follow Chou's lead in calling for the intensification of the
training program. Pointing to the past successes of shock cadres
among production workers and soldiers, he exhorts intellectuals to
develop similarly their latent powers. For example, although experi-
ence has shown that an instructor can handle at most 4 or 5 apprentices,
he suggests that the training of 10,500 postgraduates within the next
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12 years under the Academy program could be doubled simply by
doubling the number of apprentices. To this he adds that "within
certain limits increased burdens for the instructors are good for
the instructors themselves, ... it is necessary to think harder ...
and consequently the teachers' abilities increase more rapidly."
The 12-year scientific program is the most recent move to
mobilize Chinese scientists to serve national production goals. It
represents a continuation, with even greater intensity, of a period
in Chinese technical science that has been marked since 1950 by
increasing restrictions on independent research, by reducing the
administrative control exercised by scientists over their own research
activities,, and by insistent criticism that scientists are not
ideologically enlightened as to the importance of making the training
of young cadres their major long-term task. At least during the
current Five-Year Plan, Chinese Communist scientists are not likely
to have time to add much to the basic or theoretical aspect of
economic geology. Nevertheless, planners evidently hope to make good
their pre-conditions of time and place for the discovery of new
resources by pressing the geologists' noses more firmly to the grind-
stone and turning the wheel faster. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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COLLABORATION IN GEOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
Review of a Regional Study of the Venezuelan Andes
For more than a decade, geographers have been emphasizing the
need for collaboration among the various disciplines within the social
sciences in the preparation of regional reports. Doubts concerning
the value of this approach or its practical application should be
dispelled by a recently published study of the Venezuelan Andes.*
In preparing the study, social scientists from two nations and govern-
ment and private agencies pooled their resources. The result is an
outstanding regional study. Though primarily of interest to those
having a professional need for information on Venezuela, the volume
is well worth the consideration of anyone interested in regional
studies generally or in an interdisciplinary approach to the solution
of social and economic problems.
The authors have collected and analyzed a great mass of data on
an area about which relatively little has been written. The study,
therefore, helps to fill a sizable gap in our basic intelligence on
a major part of Venezuela, but it is the interdisciplinary approach
and the manner of presentation that are the highlights of the book.
By combining their methodologies and observations, the authors have
produced an integrated study of broader scope and greater depth of
*Problemas Economicos Sociales de los Andes Venezolanos Parte
I (Economic and Social Problems of the Venezuelan Andes, Part ti,,
published by the Consejo de Bienestar Rural, [19551, 331 pp. (in
Spanish).
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understanding than would have been possible within any one of their
individual disciplines. The scores of ground and aerial photographs,
the graphs and charts, and the many finely executed maps add immeasu-
rably to the worth of the volume.
The study has been divided into two parts. Part I is primarily
a description of the physical and cultural characteristics of the
region, but it also presents analyses, conclusions, and recommendations
concerning economic problems. Part II, to be published later as a
separate volume, will consider human relations and social and demo-
graphic problems.
The Consejo de Bienestar Rural (CBR -- Council of Rural Welfare)
which published the work, is jointly financed by various agencies of
the Venezuelan Government and by the Associacion Internacional
Americana, a philanthropic organization founded by Nelson Rockefeller
and aided financially by a group of foreign oil companies having
interests in Venezuela. Six principal authors, with the active col-
laboration of at least 19 research workers and 18 government and
private organizations, pooled their talents, energy, and methodologies
in this undertaking. The authors are Dr. Henry Sterling, professor
of geography at the University of Wisconsin, who directed the work;
Dr. Milton Barnett, professor of anthropology at the same university;
Dr. Bertram Ellenbogen, rural sociologist of the state of Wisconsin;
Dr. Roberto Lizarralde, geographer; Dr. Louis Heaton, agricultural
economist of the CBR; and Dr. Miguel Alminana, CBR economist. The
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other collaborators, most of whom were Venezuelans, included agri-
cultural and forestry engineers, agricultural economists, anthro-
pologists, sociologists, statisticians, cartographers, translators,
and photographers.
The ambitious objective of this study is to present the histori-
cal development, geographic background, and present status of the
economic and social problems of the rural zones of the Andean states
of Tachira, Merida, and Trujillo -- an area of about 30,000 square
kilometers containing 800,000 inhabitants. In the last chapter of
the study, the authors suggest additional investigations that need
to be undertaken.
Methodology
The methodologies used in this study constitute a noteworthy
contribution to the social sciences. Since the investigation had
geographic, economic, and sociological aspects, which though inter-
related are usually treated separately, certain procedures were
devised to assure adequate compilation and comparison of the data.
These procedures, combining the techniques of general reconnaissance
and intensive investigation, were tested in an experimental study of
one small part of the Andean region. Another purpose of this pilot
study was to evaluate the basic statistical data previously compiled.
After the results of the pilot study were analyzed, the work on
the whole area began. The geographers undertook an extensive recon-
naissance, the delineation and explanation of the patterns of
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distribution of both physical and cultural elements of the landscape,
and the compilation of general and detailed maps. More than 10,000
aerial photographs were used in the cartographic work.
The two economists, the sociologist, and the anthropologist made
relatively intensive surveys in various representative zones, visiting
all areas accessible by vehicle and some that could be reached only
on muleback. Questionnaires and individual interviews were used in
establishing representative samples for the quantitative analysis of
predetermined factors.
In the final compilation, each specialist prepared the sections
relating to his own discipline. Because of the interdisciplinary
character of the work, however, all of them participated in the dis-
cussion and extensive revision of the text and illustrative materials.
Content
The first chapter presents a concise history of the Venezuelan
Andean area from the pre-Conquest period to the present. The authors
trace the penetration by conquerors and colonizers of this vast
mountainous area and briefly discuss the political evolution of the
three Andean states. The emphasis throughout is on the economic
life of the Andean people -- landholding systems, principal crops,
trade, the search for mineral deposits, and the founding of cities
and towns. The authors also dissect some widespread but false notions
concerning the Andes, and succinctly present what they believe is the
true situation. Some of the exploded ideas are: "The Andes are
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excessively eroded;" "The Andes are overpopulated;" and "The Andes
are able to feed all of Venezuela."
Chapter II is concerned with physical and cultural aspects,
including the configuration of the terrain; the climate; the soils;
the density, distribution, and mobility of the population; the
transportation network; the political subdivisions and their signifi-
cance; and the land-use pattern. Here the approach and techniques
of the geographers become most evident.
This chapter is lavishly and effectively illustrated with photo-
graphs and maps that have been compiled with meticulous attention to
detail by cartographers with a flair for original design. One of
the most effective and meaningful is entitled Routes of Communication
and Degree of Accessibility to the Highways. The map, in addition to
showing the usual road and railroad network, illustrates travel time
in mule-days between isolated zones and the highways. This simple but
unusual device boldly emphasizes one of the more difficult problems
of the Andean area -- the lack of an adequate rural road network.
Other principal maps in this chapter portray relief and drainage,
"ecological zones" (actually humidity and altitude zones), rural and
urban population, population mobility, political divisions, crops,
pasture, forests, and areas not being used for agriculture.
Chapter III covers a wide range of information on farms and
farming. Opening remarks note that the life of many Andean farmers
is difficult, primarily because they do not or cannot use modern
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agricultural methods. The land-ownership pattern, which is discussed
at some length, is also a major agricultural liability. There are
large and small farm holdings, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, laborers,
and, in some areas, a heterogeneous mixture of all of these. In an
attempt to clarify this complex situation, the authors have included
four excellent maps that show the sizes of farms in various parts
of the region. Because of the diversity of agricultural methods,
land use, and stages of development, the authors have discussed each
type of farm individually -- those producing coffee; sugarcane; cattle;
and "food crops," such as potatoes, corn, and wheat. Illustrating
each discussion is a large-scale map of a representative farm showing
the land-use pattern. The maps reveal that even on the specialized
farms other crops are grown in addition to the principal one.
In Chapter IV, the agricultural economy of the region as a whole
is briefly examined, with emphasis on the overall crop production and
the principal agricultural systems. For each system, the problems
involved in the accumulation and use of capital are mentioned, as
well as labor requirements and the quality of the product. The char-
acteristics, use, and volume of credit are analyzed; and finally the
distribution of agricultural products is considered. Maps in this
chapter include a series based on the areas devoted to the major crops.
One of the original cartographic representations is a map of credit,
a subject rarely shown on maps. Another unusual map, bearing the
rather cryptic title Structure of the Distribution, indicates the
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locations of communication stations, market places, food-processing
plants, and commercial establishments such as stores. The final map
illustrates the movement, of manufactured and agricultural products.
Chapter V presents a brief analysis of the nonagricultural
aspects of the Andean economy, thus completing the regional panorama.
Extractive industries (forestry and mining), manufacturing, commerce,
the industrial and commercial financial structure, and wages and
earnings are considered, with emphasis on the effect of each on the
rural economy. The single map in the chapter shows the location of
mines and mineral resources.
In the final chapter, entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations,"
the authors note that this study is fundamentally a reconnaissance
report, to be used as a point of departure for more intensive studies
of land ownership, population mobility, credit, markets, industrial
development, and other topics. They recommend that attention be
focused on specific problems and on possible corrective measures as
necessary steps in the development of programs to alleviate the
economic and social ills of the region. (UNCIASSIFIED)
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BRITISH ANTARCTIC AERIAL SURVEY*
Details have become available regarding the British 1955-56
aerial survey program in the Palmer Peninsula region of Antarctica.**
The work was carried out by Hunting Aerosurveys Limited, a private
United Kingdom concern, on behalf of the Governor of the Falkland
Islands and Dependencies. Some 60,000 square miles were covered,
including parts of the peninsula and adjacent islands. The final
selection of areas to be surveyed was, of course, influenced by
weather and ice conditions.
The program had three main phases: (1) ground control,
(2) aerial photography, and (3) airborne magnetometer survey.
Ground-control work was apparently limited to the taking of astro-
fixes. The vertical aerial photography, which evidently was flown
only for areas for which ground control had been established, will
presumably be suitable for use on stereoscopic plotting instruments.
The magnetometer survey was to provide data on the intensity of the
earth's magnetic field and possible clues to the location of mineral
deposits. Most of the ground-control work was apparently completed
in January 1956, and the emphasis was then shifted to the aerial
photography and magnetometer survey.
'T'his article has been coordinated with the Office of Scientific
Intelligence.
**A brief article on British plans for this survey appeared in
Geographic Intelligence Review No. I.8, December 1955.
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The surveying party consisted of some 50 men, and the equipment
included 1 ship (the Oluf Sven) a 950-ton freighter), 2 helicopters,
1 tractor, and 2 "Canso" (Catalina amphibian) aircraft. The aircraft
were produced in Canada especially to meet the needs of Polar work.
Having a range of 2,000 miles, the Cansos were able to cover the
entire survey area from the main base on Deception Island. Heli-
copters were used in establishing ground control and were particularly
effective in overcoming the problems created by shelf glaciers and
terminal ice cliffs, which in the past have prevented landings along
many sections of the Palmer Peninsula coast.
As far as is now known, the findings of the survey will eventually
be published as new or revised sheets by the Falkland Islands Depend-
encies Survey, which has maintained and may still maintain map series
giving incomplete reconnaissance coverage of the Palmer Peninsula
area at 1:100,000, 1:200,000, and 1:500,000. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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