THE TRONDHEIM PROJECT A SWEDISH OUTLET TO THE ATLANTIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 21, 1956
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
-SECRET--
44eFETIN-
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR?GM-5
21 January 1958
THE TRONDHEIM PROJECT
A SWEDISH OUTLET TO THE ATLANTIC
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTft HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission
or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SFECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
:151551tet?
+ftpooNvid For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
The "Trondheim Project" agreement, concluded by Norway and Sweden in
March 1956 and revised in January 1957, is intended by October 1958 to provide
Sweden with an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean in case its line of supply with
the West is cut off by Soviet military action. Sweden's primary interest in
the proposed railroad and road transit facilities is strategic, but theeconomic
importance of the project has not been overlooked.
Although Sweden has attempted to maintain a strict policy of neutrality
by avoiding any type of action that might be interpreted as having military
implications, this emergency step has already led to Swedish Communist charges
of military cooperation with NATO-Norway. Sweden, which for nearly 150 years
has sought to detach itself from Baltic entanglements and Atlantic commitments,
has not been able to ignore the postwar readjustment of Soviet boundaries in
the Baltic, or the extension of Soviet territorial waters to 12 miles -- which
eliminates old fishing grounds -- or attempts by the Soviet Union to create
a neutral belt extending from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea. The highly-
publiciffed Soviet disarmament proposal of November 1956 suggesting the
formation of a 500-mile-wide neutral zone of inspection in Central Europe,
combined with the continuing Communist propaganda aimed at the creation of a
Baltic "sea of peace," indicated increased Soviet attempts to extend the area
of "neutral" states. These efforts culminated on 11 January 1958 in the
Soviet suggestion for the establishment of an atom-free zone to include the
Scandinavian countries of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, as well as Finland --
the ultimate goal being an alignment of neutral Nordic states that would
weaken Western unity. Soviet policy has consistently been directed toward
Closing the Baltic Sea to the warships of non-Baltic powers, thus in effect
guaranteeing Soviet domination of that body of water. The attempt by the
USSR to turn the Baltic into a "Russian Lake," as well as the desired
detachment of Denmark and Norway from NATO membership, has to date met with
negative results. It must be noted, however, that the plan for an atom-free
zone in Central Europe has received 'sympathetic attention in Scandinavia,
Particularly. in Denmark.
Although the international policy of Sweden is dictated by its geographic
Position and traditional policy of neutrality, the need for economic
self-sufficiency, especially in time of war, has led Sweden toward closer
cooperation with its western neighbor, Norway. Since Sweden lacks both oil
and coal, its basic interest in the Trondheim transit facilities is to gain
access to the Atlantic for vital imports of fuels should the Skagerrak and
Kattegat be closed.
In general, the Trondheim agreement provides for the (1) completion of
a highway connection between the two countries, (2) promotion of railroad
traffic on the existing Trondheim connection by making it attractive to
shippers through the elimination of tariff inequities, (3) construction of
additional petroleum port. andstorage facilities in the Trondheimsfjord, and
(4) permission to construct an oil pipeline from the port to Sweden.
Trondheim (63?251N-100251E), which is the chief port for northern and
western Norway and the country's third largest city, is located approximately
50 miles west of the Swedish border. It has an excellent natural harbor that
does not freeze over in winter and is usually ice-free. Norway has now
replaced all the tonnage that was lost during World War II, and by 1953 the
port traffic of Trondheim had reached more than 1,500,000 tons. The port has
a total of about 19,000 feet of wharfage and an estimated military unloading
capacity of 17,400 long tons of general cargo per day.
There are no direct highway connections between Trondheim and Sweden,
only a narrow, winding, gravel road over the mountains, which is blocked by
snow for 9 months of the year -- from October to July. The new highway, when
completed, will parallel the existing railroad and is to be an all-season road.
26547 1.51
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
Appro,THEeaivr.. sr: 1314?4114060R coil CT
A SWEDISH OUTLET TO THE ATLANTIC
C E A NI
ostersund
New highway (alignment approximate).
Existing highway (selected)
Railroad (selected)
Sunds'
seress
Soliden
tyclssels
rweat,
a.
ee Inset A
rklerliamn
1
ALAND,ISLANDg..
/
j. s'
KrIVInahamn
Eger sug6
Sog,d
f .
trlyl'hishamn
Arendal
stad
GOSSISP 5OHOHN
shals
JONA
GOTLAND
? 0 a 7,
4licsnIser
g rrEG
Halm
ewe..
OLAND
)
Boundaries aro not necessarily those
recogrileed by the U. S. Government.
0 100
If
OORNHOLM
1501.
;4,72
International boundary
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
SECRET
NOFORN
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 :SErfiraiRET9-01006A000100050001-1
GkN
Roads, which now terminate at Turifoss on the Norwegian side and Enafors on
the Swedish side, are to be connected by the new road, which will cross the
border near Storlien (63?19'N-12006'E). In addition, the stretch of road
from Stgrdal to Turifoss is being rebuilt. Construction of the highway has
been progressing at a rapid rate, with 1 October 1958 the target date for
completion on both sides of the border. Actually, the work on the Norwegian
side is now completed except for surfacing.
A single-track, standard-guage (4'8-1/2"), steam-operated railroad line,
extends from Hell (63?26'N-100531E) eastward about 40 miles to the frontier,
thus connecting Trondheim with the Swedish network via Storlien. The proposal
for double-tracking and electrifying the railway lacks Norwegian support since
the present railroad, which is. electrified on the Swedish side, currently uses
only a fraction of its total capacity. In order to increase railroad traffic,
rates for transit freight traffic are to be adjusted to eliminate tariff-
computing inconveniences connected with border crossings. This step, in all
probability, will have the effect of encouraging the use of the Trondheim
connection by shippers in both northern and central Sweden.
Oil port and oil storage facilities, with subterranean storage tanks
blasted out of solid rock, will be built at Muruvik and Langstein on the
Trondheimsfjord. In event of a blockade, or with the special permission of
Norwegian authorities, the storage facilities can also be used for other
commodities. Under the revised agreement of January 1957, which extended the
life of the accord from 25 to 50 years, Sweden agreed to accept leases for
these sites in lieu of ownership. The facilities leased, however, will be
operated by a state-owned Swedish company.
Article 4 of the agreement permits construction of an oil pipeline across
Norwegian territory. Although a pipeline from the Trondheimsfjord to Sweden
is considered technically feasible, no plans have as yet been made for its
construction. Nevertheless, authorities believe that the pipeline will
eventually be built.
The economic aspects of the Trondheim transit facilities, which are of
considerable importance, have also posed certain thorny questions. Originally,
the project was obstructed by Swedish commercial interests, who feared that
the new facilities would prove more favorable to Norway. Delay of the project
was, in effect, an attempt to prevent a shift of trade to Trondheim from
Oteborg on the Swedish west coast, Sundsvall on the east coast, and other
vital Swedish ports. According to Norway's initial point of view, which has
since been altered, the oil port was regarded as a defense installation
that should be operated on a "non-commercial" basis and was to be regarded
primarily as a stand-by facility to be utilized fully only in the event of
military emergency. The original plan to set up a Norwegian company to
handle the transit of petroleum products from the Trondheimsfjord to the
Swedish border has been abandoned in favor of a mutually agreeable plan
allowing Sweden to negotiate with a Norwegian company of its own choice.
Municipal authorities of Trondheim have looked with favor on the project
since its realization would bring more business and employment to the city.
Although Swedish sympathies are definitely pro-Western, Sweden remains
uncommitted and is not associated politically with either of the two major
blocs. The completion of the Trondheim project is therefore regarded by
Sweden as an important means of bolstering its military and economic position
and of strengthening its policy of nonalignment. Significantly, it is also
the belief of Swedish officials that, in the event of a nuclear or missile
war between East and West, any motive for an attack against Sweden would be
difficult to find. On the other hand, it is assumed that a war fought with
conventional weapons over a long period would increase the risk of
involvement for a neutral country.
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1
StrlZtfi
bIGFGaik+-
Approved For Release 2000/05/11 : CIA-RDP79-01006A000100050001-1