THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01006A000100100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1958
• Content Type: IM

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Copy No.2
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR-GM-10
8 October 1958
THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
K. DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70.2 035377
DATE: '--REVIEWER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission
or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
-&EeREfi
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Since the evacuation of their :remaining holdings off Chekiang Province early
in 1955, the Nationalist position on the China coast has pivoted on 4 heavily
fortified islands and 14 others, only lightly defended, which fringe Fukien
Province. These offshore islands, in association with almost 50 uninhabited
islets and numerous rocks, are distributed among two major aggregations: the
Quemoy group, situated adjacent to the harbor of Amoy, and the Matsu complex,
to the north, lying off the estuary of the Min Chiang (river) and its port of
Foochow. Located midway between these two groups are the Wu-ch'iu Islands, which
are also in Nationalist hands but are of small extent and dubious significance.
Since the most recent Communist bombardment began, over a third of a million
high-explosive rounds have been directed against the Quemoy group. In contrast,
the Matsu complex has received only a few hundred shells containing propaganda
material, and the Wu-ch'iti garrison has reported no hostile activity.
The Quemoy group, by virtue -of its size and position, constitutes the
Nationalist presence in China. These islands have a land area of 54 square miles
or 81 percent of the total offshore territory currently held by Nationalist China.
About 86,000 troops are stationed on the islands in addition to the 47,000
civilian population -- 81 and 76 percent of the respective offshore totals. With
regard to position, Quemoy and its satellite isles can hardly be termed "offshore"
since they are situated squarely astride the entrance to a 300-square-mile
embayment wherein lies Hsia-men Tao (Amoy Island). From this pos=ition, commanding
the deepwater channel to Amoy Harbor, the Nationalists have been able to restrict
the shipping of the once-bustling port and have prevented its use as a naval base.
In addition, Quemoy has provided staging areas for occasional sorties on -the
mainland, bases for the collection of intelligence, and posts for the detection
of Communist air and naval movements --? functions shared with other offshore islands.
The group consists primarily of 47-square-mile Quemoy (Chin-men Tao) and
its smaller neighbor, Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy). Completing the group are 8
islets that lie adjacent to the deepwater channel to Amoy Harbor, 3 of which
are lightly defended and have served as outposts for the larger islands. Another
small island, Tung-ting Hsti (Chapel Island), lies 14 nautical miles* to the south
and 8 miles off the mainland; it is included with the Quemoy group because of its
function as a navigation guide for Amoy-bound vessels.
Hourglass-shaped Quemoy is at no point more than 9.5 miles (about 20,000
yards) from surrounding Communist-held positions. In contrast, the Nationalist
base on Penghu (Pescadores) is 75 miles to the southeast and Taiwan is at a
distance of 103 miles. Quemoy consists predominantly of a series of intensively
cultivated marine terraces50 to 200 feet above the sea. In the east, the
granitic mass of T'ai-wu Shan (hills) rises abruptly from gently rolling terraces
to a maximum elevation of 830 feet, completely dominating the island and surround- 25X6
ing waters. In places, especially in the east and south, the terrace edges are
extremely dissected and fringed by large areas of sandy waste terminating seaward
in broad, gently-sloping beaches.
airfields are capable of handling two-motored transport planes.
Of the estimated 43,000 civilians on Quemoy, including 13,000 refugees,
approximately 60 percent are farmers, who raise sweet potatoes, some small grains
and vegetables, and high-grade poultry and hogs. Most of the remainder is engaged
in offshore fishing. Despite this :Large and varied production, the civilian
population is only 75 to 80 percent self-sufficient in food. Additional supplies,
especially rice, must be imported from Taiwan. Seasonal shortages of drinking
water are also of some concern.
few opportunities for cover against heavy bombardment.
,000-man garrison must seek protection by
greatest concern to defenders. The 7
"digging in;" however, the terraces comprising 75 percent of the surface provide
The vulnerabilities of Quemoy to hostile mainland forces are many and serious.
The position of the island, within range of a semicircle of Communist guns, is of 25X6
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This
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area has become the nerve center of the Chin-men Defense Command, which has
*All water distances mentioned in this report; are expressed in terms of
nautical miles. (1 nautical mile equals approximately 1.15 statute miles.)
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Kao-teng Hsu, the northernmost of the Matsu islands, is only 4.5 miles
southeast of Pei-ling Pan-tao. This barren, half-mile-square island, previously
uninhabited, is little more than a series of rocky hills with a few abandoned
terraces. The indented coastline rises sheer from the sea and provides only two
cove-head beaches, both facing the mainland and easily observable. At one of
these, supplies are laboriously offloaded by means of cableways suspended between
nearby summits. Despite its small size and meager 700-man complement, the island
is essential to Nationalist defenses in the area; in Communist hands, artillery
positioned on Kao-teng Hsu could render the larger islands untenable. The paucity
of landing places on Kao-teng Hsu would be advantageous in the event of attack but
detrimental during a siege.
Tung-yin Lieh-tao, considered here as part of the Matsu complex, are the
farthest offshore of the Nationalist-held islands -- 24 miles east of the mainland
and 20 miles south of the nearest Communist-held island. The nearest important
Nationalist-held island, Ch'ang-hsli Shan, is 26 miles to the southwest; and Taiwan
lies 84 miles to the southeast. From this isolated position, the islands can be
of little value beyond the reporting of Communist activity in the San-sha Wan
(Samsa Inlet) region. The Nationalists maintain a weather station and operate a
lighthouse on the main island.
Tung-yin Lieh-tao include two islands -- Tung-yin Shan, only 1.8 square miles
in area, and Hsi-yin Tao, 500 yards to the northwest, which is about one-third its
size. Both are steep, rocky hill lands with scattered cultivated terraces.
Shores are precipitous except for a few tiny cove-head beaches. A concrete ramp
permits small craft to use one of the beaches on Tung-yin Shan. The civilian
population -- 577 on the main island and only 70 on Hsi-yin Tao -- is engaged in
fishing. The Tung-yin Area Defense Command is under nominal control of Chinese
Navy Headquarters on Taiwan, but operational leadership is in the hands of the
commander of guerrilla units totaling :3,000 men. The rugged coastline of the
islands favors the defenders in the event of an amphibious attack., but the poor
equipment of the troops is a definite handicap. The islands are defenseless
against air attacks, and a relatively broad upland on Tung-yin Shan provides a good
drop zone for airborne troops. The is:Lands are also vulnerable to siege; almost
all food supplies are imported and even water is in seasonally short supply. On
several occasions, evacuation of the islands has been considered because of the
extreme difficulties involved in reinforcing or removing the garrison while under
fire.
The Nationalist capability for resupply and reinforcement of any of the
offshore islands is determined to a great extent by prevailing weather conditions
in the Taiwan Strait. During the summer (July through September), when the typhoon
risk is high, traffic from Taiwan to the islands may be completely disrupted for
long periods. Although autumn and winter are generally dry and fair, the advent
of strong northeasterly winds in October ushers in a period of heavy seas which
restrict movement and confine offloading to a few especially favorable, leeward
beach sites. Several islands are completely cut off for weeks or, in the case of
the Wu-ch'iu group, for months at a time. The gentle, variable winds and light
seas of spring (April through June) provide optimum conditions for movement across
the Taiwan Strait; but, in the Matsu area, frequent rain and fog limit visibility
and restrict operations. For the Chinese Communists, seasonal variations in
weather are of far less significance in amphibious operations against the offshore
islands. The distances involved are small, less than 9 miles in the area of Ma-tsu
Shan, and only a little over a mile at Quemoy. There are probably enough suitable
days to complete such operations during any season of the year; most favorable,
however, is the relatively calm spring. In the past, April was usually mentioned
as the start of the "invasion season" in the Taiwan Strait, however, the present
Communist tactic of artillery siege appears best suited to the cooler months when
the turbulent 100-mile-wide strait becomes their ally.
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directed all forces in the Quemoy group. Although any frontal assault against
heavily defended Quemoy would probably sustain heavy losses, the invaders
ground extends from northeast to southwest, with a steep scarp facing east and
Lieh Hsu, only 6.7 square miles in area, is nevertheless the second largest
offshore island. Most of the estimated 5,000 civilians on the island are farmers.
In surface configuration, Lieh Hsu closely resembles the larger island, with
intensively cultivated marine terraces surmounted by scattered hills. The high 25X6
by airdrop and night movement of small craft from Quemoy.
Between Lieh Hsu and the deepwater channel leading to Amoy Harbor, a distance
of 5 miles, are the Tan Islands, a chain of 8 rocky islets surrounded by reefs
and shoals. Together, they are less than a square mile in area; but, in Communist
hands, they would reduce the effectiveness of the Amoy blockade and further tighten
the artillery ring around the Quemoys. Three of the islands have been defended by
lightly armed troop's of the Chin-men Defense Command -- Hu-tzu Hsu with a contingent
of 70, Ta-tan Tao with 1,000, and Ehr-tan with 250. The others are believed to be
uninhabited. Resupply during siege has been accomplished by small boats at night,
but is extremely difficult owing to the lack of suitable landing places. Already,
the shortage of drinking water on the islets has become critical.
Tung-ting Hsu, 13 miles south of the Tan Islands, is a steep-sided rock, less
than 400 yards in diameter, with a lighthouse that was once a useful landmark for
vessels approaching Amoy. Shoal water to the west compels shipping to bear sea-
ward of the island, making it a useful observation post. During recent bom-
bardments, the lighthouse, a temporary barracks, has been partially destroyed.
The garrison of 50 lightly armed troops is almost wholly dependent upon naval
assistance in the defense of the tiny island.
Midway between the Quemoy group and the Matsu complex, and 71 miles west of
Taiwan are the Wu-?ch'iu Islands, least important of all Nationalist offshore -
holdings. These two islands, only 14 miles southeast of the mainland, provide
useful observation posts for the defense of Taiwan... Both have abrupt, rocky 25X6
coasts and barren, hummocky uplands with general elevations of from 50 to 150
feet. facilities for the offloading
of supplies have been constructed on 250-acre Wu-ch'iu Hsu. The Wu-ch'iu Area
Defense Command, subordinate to Chinese Navy Headquarters. on Taiwan, has maintained
lightly armed guerrilla units totaling about 500 on Wu-ch'iuHs`u and on the smaller
island of Hsia Hsu, 1,400 yards to the southeast. American military advisors
have several times recommended evacuation of the Wu-ch'iuIslands, citing their
indefensibility without adequate naval support, resupply difficulties, chronic
water shortages, and slight strategic value.
Farther north the three routes of access to the port of Foochow are dominated
by islands of the Matsu complex. From the north, shipping to Foochow :must pass
between Pei-ling Pan-tao (peninsula) and Ma-tsu Lieh-tao (islands); from the east,
the route lies between Ma-tsu Lieh-tao and Pai-ch'izan Lieh-tao (White Dogs); and
in the south, between Pai-ch'iian Lieh-tao and the mainland. From these Nationalist-
held islands, traffic entering the Min Chiang estuary and bound for Foochow can 25X6
be observed and intercepted. The hydrography of the Min estuary is a distinct
asset to the Nationalists in their harassment of Communist shipping. The offshore
or centuries, the roadsteads
of Ma-tsu Shan (Nan-kan-yang) in the
north and Hsi-ch'uan Tao (Tung-sha) in the south have been the principal anchorages
and pilot transfer points in the region. Deprived of their use, few large vessels
chance the passage into the Min Chiang.
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The 1,400 civilians on the larger
island and 800 on the smaller -- are predominantly fishermen and farmers, all of
whom are refugees from the Fukien mainland.
Although a few hundred guerrillas are left from earlier days, the garrisons
of Pai-ch'iian Lieh-tao consist primarily of well-equipped regulars of the Matsu
Area Defense Command -- 3,300 on Hsi-ch'iian Tao and 2,300 on Tung-ch'uan Tao.
Both islands are fortified to some degree and could be defended for a brief period
against amphibious assault despite their location within 12 miles of mainland
gun positions. The rolling uplands, however, provide numerous drop zones suitable
for airborne invasion. The islands are highly vulnerable to siege because of
limited and exposed offloading facilities and, on Tung-ch'uan Tao, seasonal water
shortages. Any Communist attempt to seize Pai-ch'uan Lieh-tao probably would lead
to naval engagements in which prompt a:Ld from Taiwan, 82 miles to the southeast,
could be of critical importance. Unlike Quemoy, these islands and others of the
Matsu complex lie far enough offshore to permit defensive maneuvers by defending
naval forces.
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Pai-ch'uan Lieh-tao, the southernmost islands of the Matsu complex, consist
of 1-square-mile Hsi-ch'ui,n Tao, the slightly smaller Tung-ch'uan Tao, and numerous
islets, rocks, and reefs., The islands are characterized by rounded hills, flat to
rolling uplands, and, on Hsi-ch'izan Tao, extensive cultivated terraces. Coasts
are usually rugged and precipitous,
Ma-tsu Lieh-tao, to the north, consist principally of Ma-tsu Shan, keystone
of Nationalist defenses in the Matsu complex, and neighboring Ch'ang-hsu Shan
(Pei-kan-t'ang). Kao-tengHsU (Pei-.sha Tao) is merely an outlying northern defense
point for the group which. includes eight additional islets and numerous rocks and
reefs. Ma-tsu Shan, approximately 4 square miles in area, is the largest island
of the Matsu complex. Although the terrain is predominantly rugged, with steep 25X6
hills rising to over 800 feet and. only a very small proportion of flat land, many
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rock and reci itous,
The principal harbor is at T'ieh-pan in the southwest. Although
better sites are available at Fu-wu and, Ma-tsu, they are easily observed from the
mainland and therefore highly vulnerable to artillery fire. 25X6
Ma-tsu Shan has a civilian population of 4,800, about evenly divided between
farmers and fishermen. The densely populated island produces only about one-half
of its normal food requirements; the remainder is shipped from. Taiwan. The Matsu
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Area Defense Command, responsible for the defense of Ma-tsu Lieh-?tao and Pai-ch'iian
Lieh-tao, maintains
With heavy food requirements and seasonal
water shortages, Ma-tsu Shan is particularly vulnerable to siege. As in the case
of Pai-ch'uan Lieh-tao, however, naval elements could be of crucial importance in
any battle for the islandor its neighbors. 25X6
25X6 Ch'ang-hsu Shan is about three-fourths the size of Ma-tsu Shan and slightly
closer to mainland batteries. Although similar to the larger island, the shoreline
of Ch'ang-hsu Shan is less precipitous, and beach areas are more extensive.
Supplies transhipped from Ma-tsu Shan are
offloaded at the improved harbor at Wu-sha, farther west, where observation from
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of farmers, with the remainder mostly fishermen. Chang-hsu Shan has been termed
an "unsinkable battleship"; but, despite its bristling fortifications and
The island, like Ma-tsu Shan is highly vulnerable to siege.
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