GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT SOVIET EXPLORATION AND RESEARCH IN THE ANTARCTIC A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01009A001100090013-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 30, 1955
• Content Type: IR

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Copy No. 115
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOVIET EXPLORATION AND RESEARCH IN THE ANTARCTIC
A Preliminary Appraisal
CIA/RR-GR-84.1
30 November 1955
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
NOC N. A
NO CHANGE ANGE IN CLASS. D
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
REVIEWER: 019360
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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r,'-Vy No0 11
SO VM WWRATION AND RESEARCH IN ' ArrrAECC
A Prelthi f Appraisal
CIA/R-8k 01
Office of Research and Reps
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Fftim
Foreword a o a o o a o o s a o a o 0 0 o e o 0 0 0 0 0 0 o a o o f-i
I. Current Estimates of Soviet Objectives in the Antarctic. . . I
B. Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 a a . a . . . . . 0 A
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FOREW
Supplement A to &R-oar, Se vlet ci4w,c,. aZ R w3c rc iK be
Antarctic, 2 November 19559 was prepared at this time because of the
currency of political and intelligence problems related to the Soviet
interest in Antarctica. It summarizes and analyzes more recent
information that provides additional (1) indications of possible Cloviat
intentions concerning Antarctica, and (2) details concerning Soviet
operational plans and equipment for its scientific and explorations pro-
gram. The supplement bus been written on the assumption that the reader
lade or can gain access to tR-8l# o
Part I brings up to date the evidence of Soviet intentions of
remaining in Antarctica and suggests that unorthodox procedures might
be adopted by the Soviets to suci "aq tter:y r t s." ?,.rw. II prow.,.
details on plans and facilities that confirm our original cutimto
on the depth of Soviet planning. l+breover,o the magnitude of bast. instaL-
laticn being planned tends to confirm the fact that it is aimed at the
est? 'liahment of bases for year-round and long-term oc:cipency.
Since it is pled to iu~o ?-e the facts and estimettes in s
subsequent revision of CR 84, the vteve and comments of interested
readers are solicited.
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sOV F ?ICK AND R. S-IM _ !T Afl! AR C
Supplement A
a:, ~ tnf- : ti ter. of Soviet Objectives the And
So7iet a A.as + me eaaeerning their Antarctic p1 i4sued ?uriw,;
the past oath. he Vrovided additional in4ieation , of Soviet (1) etfort-4:
to buil4 .,,', their. stutu with reference to their ri ata to Ant ti,otj_ aY :
(2.) ii ` do to of r inr, in Antarctica for an ii'iefin1 perto uf-.e
thu oon,"lesion of 'tt: I promo sAdition.., further insight h-ek's
` `" ..~.fra9,:ar1 ~1, cE, :1rg ? s+cX Lnt o gfctI s
de.,vel nt of $.~ riots or g ,im to y of Antarctica.
Y ?bta
e i noe i Mi, tte *wt the siavletr M %y sxtt t to :? 1 ve t l gc*L
{~ :l.iy . .t ?o ss ~ 'ti Nf cti of Rio : ; r than t ?o t?
r w to vi;aah lc -:": t a ona L i.s m warmer t1 11,;S. e_ x
voi. . ;k`cronti, wit ,%
' c.'
a i tom'.. ,~, Stu'. "tii.# 4. Y% ~. ~L' .it ~.A?. , .. >.
i"r ~v , 4? fi~;_
z k 1.oilr T"hl,a
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cult, therefore, to discern the evolution of a careful plan to U=nti
Soviet rights in Antarctica with the rights of all nations insofar
economic and scientific gatr are concerned. Moreover, it is not
inconceivable that the Soviet thil s-. may .t..lt1i taly try to emerge a z
the guardian of International economic f`reedam and the sponsor of
international scientific develop t In the Antarctic a
economic importance of the Antarctic area to all countries and stresses
particul rly the importance of Antarctica in world whaling activitt:> s
in which the USSR is a participant.. Thus, the establishment of atcpp . ?
bases is adroitly tied in with a fundamental Soviet expression of its
clatas policy, in which the protection of economic rights of the S
is identified with the protection of those of all other non-clafmarft
c antries a
Recent Soviet publicity concerning their scientific plans sut' ata
that Soviet scientific interests are also being tied in to the Soviet
memorandum of 1950. The memoranduza underscores the scientific impor-
tance of Antarctica as a favorable base for important meteorological
observations of significance to the whole Nortbarn. Hemisphere. $evern .
recent Soviet publicity releases through the Hame Service as well sa the huropean Service stress the importance of Antarctic atmospheric processe s
in the general air-mass circulation of the earth and their significznct-
to the improvement of long-ange weather forecaaettngo It is not d.1,fTi-
be li.hked to the Soviet memorandum of 1950,.* which 'underscores
wee content of the memorandum (or note) Is Riven on p. 3 of ;fit
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Continued emphasis is being laid of t km unexplored and unmapped
character of the area in which the Soviets will be active. This is
accompanied by unusually strong emphasis on Soviet exploration
activities.* Tolatikov states categorically: "The exhaustive, all.-
roumd exploration of Antarctica is one of the most important under-
takings of the forthcoming Geophysical. Tear .... Exploration of the
Antarctic Continent itself will p an exceptionally important role..
The propaganda e2pbasis on this part, of the Soviet program may indicate
effort to impress world opinion with the greater magnitude of the
Soviet program and, u1tiasatel;y, the superior results of its activities.
In this inner the Soviets my hope to override any other prior claims
or rights that might be based on the relatively limited activities and,
their modest results obtained thus far,
It would be insufficient., however, to assume that the Soviet
emphasis on exploration and mapping is being undertaken merely to
establish Soviet rights in Antarctica, oLst!kov in his broadcast
revealed what may be a basic r'esson for the. apparent urwtlling ur of
the Soviets to star out an, explicit territorial claim; "c .. it is still
not kacvn what the Antarctic repr ssent:s: ?u itself. Is it really a
cc tinent covered by Were s f ic? j a gr~mV of large :isles, or a whole
archipelago? It is plarsned to solve this riddle of nature by the Jotnt
efforts of the scientists or many c ztries." Hence, until a cyst .tae.
for dlf sa Aston of the z tune of .rv et non_1GY activities so,.
W"84a po 1,8 "a
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geological, physiographic, a topograpb
the &ovlet #
appear to be unwilling to ice the clang of a mass of ice rather
than ssI valuable piece of real estate.
eee y theret e ` vi t
pending the receipt and eta at the reault$ of the activities of e`l
countries the Soviets are likely to restrict their overt political
action to publicizing their n; , pro id .rte; a continuing getxera-k.
account of their ax tivitiea arid. achjevem,;a*:eb d c ter.ing Qth
Antarctic claims along the general I.-Ines re '1ect , in the n t e r.:
1939 and.. '..9'Oa It is not erted t t the Soviets will reveal
epe'lfic geographic a gea~l,agi
the .,r mr. aattvtt!e6
par r'.cu 1y if valuable s tt i. ,c t :r i to a resources. is
obtaineda In that event,, there way Ire a quiet estatilishment of
continuously occupied bases, .1,tiLloved evezrtz &1Ly by the cplolll tatL-%r
of resources and the development or a1r is 3ti s
The linkage of the X aii n Art c .1 disc very (see - , pp
with the Soviet Antarctic pry as been t r conttxed by V.
Bur3diaasov, Deputy Minister of the -aist*+?y or the Merchant Fleet wad
heart cf the Chief A A .inletr iti. of the Noxrthe:n Sea Route, Council
of Ministers, ~ In, & l can Apr?oadcr&t in French d in an
Yh lish-i erjage brv dcsaat tc Xort t ,awr .ca, he (1) n :ration the
e:k xwuvezv t A tas?ct,nsmn 1r 1 - ._;_3.tWslt aa,e r ev?,, which VVw
f o . awe by "wTeditions r tree t 1t - t tea ? France., and other
rie
`r:rwpeet& that t '
"~"t}:,32t ~ p the . '',.X,'. a most
S r?:., is ~ ~ ~ al
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where no hixsa foot has ever tra 11.9"` t ,d C ? f
refers to this area as "t, coastal lire of the + antt exrk beet the
longititude& of 850 a 14)50E,,"
In other words,# it appeara that the cyj.et poiLti.*,1 cou.-.e 0!`
action in Anta ratir.a wtU be to effect, a ft foothold through
gra i aai evolution of "effective s cw.xpatlun." B-t 196O the Wester.
Worms may be confronted vith the fact: that nothing athor?t of a
e,ltction can dislodge the soviets from Antarctica,, Any attewts to
dispute the Soviet c cupatlor legally vca ld be confronted by 'asi
gand reaction that rou1d ;1) } clAism prior dtisos~vy, (2) pit c ~ x
the 5uperi:ority of S' ~Mvts?t xp `1a ;AWiI+.v,~.+y wid mppi aY `w8tsl s in 16a
s" fy
of their activity, (3) enphasi,te the .rxtew tip character of tb,,-~
program wherein aom* of t ht? comeratii g cou_, triP?g Vill not be
t t?'' * .-:gal
claimants (thus reaffirming the right or &V.. aatlaas to the
scientific benefits of the a=rea); and (4) 4 c?. e the Western SLoc,
imperialistic aggression.
It is believed that after the ICCr s:xh vt occ~a ,t:ion conulf. be
supported by Soviet sVply ships acrd the vha~.-lan; flotillas wittcrzt
recourse to non-Soviet bases mere along the a;,hipping la s ey.z:'e ,t
for emergency needs. This ham &ix y bet n rpbecifted as an
oh e~ * iv
for the operations of the vhal ;,rte fleet and,, i fact y vas a chleved b
the eighth voyage (19;53-%) or the fi t, ..1..lso W reo er;, it iy be"'Iev -;4'
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tat aeugglementary SOViet air e : e '~i. may be Ie to t x. =~
even without the use or A trullAn v Zen~Teund thr--mAgh
alternate arrangements such the use
car and Xerguelen9 or even the of chaff o reee:uar ahipei?
last would be similar tc t1 plan hel-r g do v* 1 ed. - : the u~ a, ,
?'. ig tts frN Zeal tc+ . a So" U4.
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II o eraticna1 Plans
A. 2MWzation and Methodology
The Soviet Antarctic-Complex Ebcpedition is bring organized in two
sections -- continental and maritime, Witbtn these, 12 scientific waits
are being formed, of which the following have been definitely identified:
azrameteorological, geophysical., geological-geographical, hydrological,
by8robiological, and aerial-photography.
It has been emphasized that the Slave whaling ships vu be used
integrally with the expeditionary ships in the wing of weather raid
oceanographic observations. The announcement that the MIS the f`L ;gehip
a ? the l Cpeditie , will tike part in Are-tic as veiL as Antarctic research
is 3notherr indication of the intensity of the Soviet acientific ei'fortG
Thus, the sayae crew and staff vill operate in both polALr? regions during;
the Ii3f program. This is part of the Soviet effort to obtain data that
will make comparison possible bet-veen "conditions existing in the opposite
polar areas of the globe az4, In pa articular y est blish. wbat is in comma
and what unites a aatmospherie prooesses th the Arctic, and the Antarctic,
and in what [aspects] they differ." U. this connection, it vas announced
that three rather than two drift stations vill operate in the Arctic.
SP-4j, SP-5g and SP-6 w IJ be or?g .zed to continue a1c the course
follenred by SP-2 under M. M S eov In .i ~t3-5.1v
Plans for the establishment of a scientific observatwy at o ol-P
the Antarctic stations were aansotaaxced by the Soviets in a broad t t*
mope on 12 November i9 The foUoving day, another broadcast to
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Europe revealed that the "South Pblar CMbservtory" is to be ceded the
Miry, the station at the South Geo etic Pole _ie to be called the
Vostok, and the third statie at t'ae go-cart "FtIe of Relative Inacces3i-
bility" is to be called Sovetskaya,. The first two names hthve been adopted
in boyar of the ships of the BaLlings usei7?I ar o y erdlt? on of 1619-
2102j"-,
On 1 November 1955, further 1thicat i on of the ; th c c," na t i it
it be employed in the Antarctic was suggested in an announcement
giving details of the Arctic plans for the IYu The Arctic program Trill
include not c i y the 3 drift stations, 5 observatories, and 100 land
(pow`) stations.. but also mobile reseorcb detachments and flying labora-
tories. Together, they will make observations at over 500 points."
This suggests the magnitude of areal coverage that may be undertakez, in
the Antarctic. If 500 observation points ware established, it would
amount to one for every 250 square miles within the estimated area of
Soviet activity. One clue to the extent of coverage,, therefore,
be the number of aircraft committed to the continental air detachment,
It is known that 4 airplanes (tic 2) and 2 helicopt ra are being sent
an the first voyage. Assuming that each of the subsequent voyages
delivers a similar caMlement of aircraft,, a total of 30 aircraft
could be committed, not counting aircraft that may be flown from Perth]
Australis. If 25 aircraft were used 20 points per plane would
provide for the total of 500 obsez tier y a not unreasonable assumptiorx.
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D Md. vF: i 11 nee effort an this part a f, h d3 S."4:. d f.k V % i i. J
Oa 1.3 Novezio r,w 1db br c t
R a pb xildin , yards t where it
T Ka r, ra ad to get her m o o tth
4.n ae-xt
the 91wmed long-range tU gtt at b:r; y j.tY ?