THE KURDS IN 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01009A002500030006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1960
• Content Type: IR

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
CIA/Bt tit L-60-2
March 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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GEOGRAPHIC I'LISGENCE REPORT
THESIN1952
CIA/BR OR L- 6O-2
March 1960
Office of Research and Reports
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gMe
1. The People . . . . . . . . . . . a . . a a a a . . . . a I
A. Tribal O1 igins ? . . . a . . . ? . . a . . . . . . . I
B. Organization and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . ? '3
C. Attitudes a a a . . . . . . . . ? . . a ? . . a a a lb
II. Tribal Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a . 5
A. Tribal Coalitions . a . . . . . . a a ? . a . . . 5
B. Tribal Disunity . . . ? . . ? . . . . . . . a . O O 5
C. Dissatisfaction With Current Conditions . . . . . . 7
III. Activities of Parent Governments . . . . . . a . . . . . 8
1. Government Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Impact of the Iraqi Revolution . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Continued Government Distrust . . . . a a a . . 11
B. Iraq . a
1. The Unity Theme . ? . a a . a a a a . . . . . a 32
2 a Increasing Pressure in 1959 . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Turkey . a . . . a . . . ? . . . . . . . a ? . . a . 15
D. United Arab Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
I+t~ Y . Kurdish National. MJvementa . a a . . . a . . . . . . . . 19
A. The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism . . . . . . . . ? . 19
B. Nationalism Today . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . 22
C. Prospects for Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Locational Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FoLiowinS Rage
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THE KURDS_M 1M
1. The People
A< Tribal Origins
Kurds are the major element of the population in the mountainous
areas of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, and northwestern Iran
and form a high percentage of the population in the foothills of north-
ern Syria and portions of southwestern Armenia (see accompanying map)
These predominantly Kurdish areas, which have never been a formal
political entity and are difficult to define precisely, are known,
collectively as Kurdistan, the land of the Kurds
The Kurds are an ancient people of mixed Semitic and Caucasian
strains. Early Greek historians and geographers mention people who
appear to have been Kurds and, in some instances, describe them as
living in the area now referred to as Kurdistan Arab writers have
used the term "Kurd" since the IX Centu^yo The isolated mountain areas
inhabited by the Kurds have been largely bypassed by modernization and
the influence of Westernization" Although at one time they were almost
exclusively a nomadic people, many of the present-day Kurds have adopted
a more settled agricultural life, especially along the fringes of their
hill country. Others have migrated to urban areas in search of a live-
lihood and now constitute large, very by income groups in cities such
as Baghdad and Damascus a A few, mostly from influential families, have
been thoroughly Westernized and have become successful economically and
politically. The rank. and file of the Kurds, however, a .we still. isolated
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nomadic and seminomadic agricultural people. They are illiterate and
impoverished and are dependent upon their tribal leader or landlord --
in most instances one and the same person -- for support and guidance.
No reliable figures on Kurdish population are available. Estimates
from countries in which the Kurds reside are all based an inadequate
sampling that may well have been altered to suit political ends. Esti-
mates of the total number of Kurds vary from 3,000,000 to 9,000,0000
It is reasonable to assume that they number between 5 and 5-1/2 million
and are distributed as follows:
Turkey
3,000,000
Iran
1,000,000
Iraq
1,000,000
Syria
150,000
USSR
100,000
In addition to the concentrations found in the predominantly Kurdish
areas, urban centers such as Baghdad,. Beirut, Damascus, and Teheran
have sizeable Kurdish colonies. Isolated groups of rural Kurds are
found in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.
The Kurdish language may be divided into two groups of dialects:
Kurmanji, spoken in northwestern Kurdistan, and Kurdi, spoken in south-
eastern Kurdistan. Hundreds of variant dialects related to these two
major groups are known by their local nacres. Sorani, the dialect used
by most of the important tribes of Iraq and by most nationalist-inclined
Iraqi urban dwellers, is widely understood in the Mahabad area of Iran.
In Iraq, written Kurdish uses a modified Persian script, but the Kurds
of Turkey and Iran do not have their own written language. The Kurds of
the Soviet Union communicate in the Cyrillic alphabet, with some
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additional symbols. Without the unifying influence of a common alphabet,
some spoken dialects have diverged to a point of mutual unintelligibility.
In outlying areas, many Kurds have been assimilated linguistically by
their neighbors to such an extent that their speech resembles Turkish,
Arabic, or Feral more closely than the original Kurdish.
B. Organization and Leadership
The social,, political, and economic organization under which the
rural Kurds live has been banded down through the centuries. Members
of the ruling fancily of a tribe bear the title "Agba" or "Beg," placed
after their name. Another type of tribal leader is the "Sheikh," a
title given to religious leaders associated with xratical orders. Through
a reputation for ability to perform miracles, sheiks have acquired worldly
followings and for all practical purposes have become tribal chieftans.
The sheikh or agha is in essence a feudal baron who represents and
is spokesman for the tribe. He does no physical work but negotiates
with the government, conducts intertribal business, and settles disputes
within the tribe. The tribe supports its leader through systems of
sharecropping and direct contributions. In many cases the tribe has no
title to the land it uses other than traditional grazing rights, not
even to the land surrounding settled agricultural villagers.
Some of the tribal leaders have formally taken legal possession of
tribal lands with a view to safeguarding their income.. Those who did
not or could not take this step have found their income reduced sharply,
often because tribesman refused to adhere to customs of the traditional
feudal organization.
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Co Attitudes
The outstanding characteristic of the Kurds has been the desire to
be left alone to conduct their own affairs, to speak their own language,
and to run their own schools. They have universally resisted attempts
to bring about social and political changes. Nevertheless, there has
been little basic unity in Kurdish areas. Problems are attacked on a
local level, and the resulting solutions are applicable to local situ-
ations only. Suspicion of Arab,'Turkish, or Iranian institutions is
outspoken. Taxes paid for schools and medical facilities that never
materialize are ample evidence to a Kurd that the central government is
not responsive to his desires.
In many instances, leaders who could no longer restrain their ani-
mosity toward central authority have taken arms against the government.
Some of these uprisings have been put down only after considerable
difficulty. The Kurd uses his rifle effectively and takes full advan-
tage of the mountainous terrain in defending his native countryside.
Today, however, the dashing "trigger-happy" horseman is no match for
forces that effectively employ aircraft and unit communications. If
properly equipped and led, the Kurds have a great potential for harass-
ment and guerrilla warfare, but they are no longer capable of meeting
organized armies on terms of equality. Furthermore, scattered villages
within Kurdistan have broken sharply with tradition by refusing to
acknowledge the dictums of their feudal landlords. Even the tribal
leaders, once a turbulent lot, are likely not to take arms against the
government. Under pressure from the Qassim regime, most of the leaders
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in Iraqi have reacted passively or have dodged the issue by departing
the country, only to return later in a passive role. Such nontraditional
reactions are not universal, but they are symptomatic of changes among
the Kurds. The shift away from tradition has been slow in starting,
largely because changes come last to isolated areas such as Kurdistan.
II. Tribal Relationships
A. Tribal Coalitions
Tribal coalitions are continually being formed and reformed. At
times they are concluded tongue-in-cheek as a means to an end, with
little thought of cooperative action. Although some result from long-
standing friendships, others are concluded in a time of crisis in
apparent disregard of former disputes. Tribal attitudes toward their
respective governments -- cooperation, tolerance, or active opposition
-- are adopted with a view toward safeguarding the immediate interests
of the tribe or its leaders. At present, no Middle Eastern government
enjoys the wholehearted support of the Kurdish population, and past
performance indicates that personal ambitions and animosities make
lasting agreements between the tribes or with a government unlikely.
R. Tribal Disunity
The attitude of a Kurdish tribe towards its leaders, other Kurds,
or a government is extremely difficult to define. In day to day life
the Kurd is strongly influenced by tradition and is a master of watchful
waiting; in a crisis he is an individualist, often an opportunist. Not
only are there differences of opinion between the tribes, but a single
tribe is seldom of one mind. To most Kurds a "great Kurd" is a local
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leader and in instances in which a leader's fame has spread across
Kurdistan, this prestige has not brought with it control of intertribal
affairs. The late Omar Khan Shikak was regarded by most Iranian Kurds
and by the Iranian Government as the "grand old man" and was treated with
commensurate social respect, but his influence even within his own tribe
was not complete. Such lack of general support of Kurdish leaders is
indicative of the disunity that exists among the Kurds and has seriously
hampered effective Kurdish organization.
The disorganization and vacillation that characterizes tribal re-
lationships results from a complex association of circumstances. Various
tribes and even groups within a single tribe are in many cases physically
separated from each other by inhospitable terrain. Poor communication
from one settled valley to the next, particularly during the winter,
tends to promote an isolation of thought and action. In addition, trib-
al boundaries cut across international boundaries, and the differences
in political climates in the various countries in which the tribesmen
live further hinders the attainment of Kurdish unity. Past experiences
have promoted varying degrees of distrust and contempt for central au-
thority among the tribes. Some view Soviet motives with the same dis-
taste they accord the motives of the national leaders of the countries
in which they live. Within a tribe, family feuds, often based on polit-
ical issues, are not soon forgotten and constitute a source of major
conflict. Further the restlessness that accompanies the breadown of
traditional values creates a distrust of tribal leadership and destroys
tribal solidarity. Religious affiliations also influence alignment of
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Kurdish elements. Mystic sects, such as the Nagshabandi, have followings
that cut across tribal lines. Although most Kurds belong to the Sunni
Moslem sect, religious conflicts occur between the liberal Alawi and
very conservative Shafi followers within the sect.
C. Dissatisfaction With Current Conditions
Dissatisfaction with the government and present conditions is
widespread among the tribes. Its greatest expression is found in Iraq.
The rise of the UAR and the formation of the union of Jordan with Iraq
were viewed with alarm by Iraqi Kurds, and the propaganda by the Q ssim
government for brotherhood among Arabs and Kurds was considered a fore-
runner of Arab domination. The unrest associated with the Iraqi revo-
lution, the return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani from the USSR,* and the
attempt to assassinate QAssim have intensified political activity among
the Kurds; but no simple pattern of Kurdish sentiment has yet evolved.
Most Kurdish tribes do not support the Qassim government owing to a fear
of Arab nationalism, and the widespread distrust of the Mulla Mustafa is
heightened by his association with both the Iraq Government and the USSR.
Many Kids view Soviet authoritarian techniques., experienced at the time
of the Mahabad Republic,** as an evil equal to the tactics of the govern-
ments of Iran, Iraq,, Turkey, and the UAR.
* Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the rebellious Kurdish leader from the Barzan
area of northern Iraq, fled to the USSR in 1946. After the fall of the
Monarcby in 1958, he was invited to return to Iraq and was responsible
for the repatriation of an estimated 800 Communist-indoctrinated Iraqi
Kurds from the USSR in April 1959.
** The Soviet-supported Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was established on
Iranian soil in December 1945 and disbanded in December 1946. The
Republic, situated east of the Iraqi border and south of Lake Urmia,
encompassed an area scarce7,y more than 100 miles long and 70 miles wide.
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The unpredictable behavior of Kurdish tribes in Iraq is well illus-
trated by one episode in 1959. Pressure from the Qassim government for
land reform, the threat of arrest, and the aggressive policies of Hulln
Mustafa Barzani and of Communist organizers brought about an ineffective
Baradost tribal uprising, followed by the defection of the Baradost,
Harki, and Sindi tribes to Iran and Turkey in the spring of 1959. Shortly
thereafter, in the late summer and fall of 1959, disenchantment with
conditions encountered in Iran and Turkey and promises of food and arms
from the Iraqi government influenced many of these people to return once
again to Iraq.
III. Activities of Parent Governments
A. Iran
1. Government Pressure
In an attempt to control its Kurdish problem, the government of Iran
has used a combination of threats and promises. A patently inconsistent
official policy toward the Kurds has been administered in an even less
consistent manner. The air of contempt that permeates government ap-
proaches to the Kurds is matched by Kurdish contempt in their relation-
ships with government authorities. The degree of control over Kurdish
areas has been in proportion to Iranian military strength, but the rough
terrain and underdeveloped nature of northwestern Iran precludes absolute
control. Given the opportunity, the Kurds are prone to ignore central
authority. The government is well aware that the establishment of the
Republic of 34ahabad on Iranian soil would not have been possible if an
internal force had been on hand to prevent it.
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Poor administration has characterized government contacts in Kurdish
areas for many years. Government representatives, the army in particular,
have been highhanded in their approach to the Kurds. A Kurd is generally
considered dirty, uneducated, uncooperative, unreliable, and generally
inferior to an Iranian. Military comnmders have made arbitrary deci-
sions unmindful of local need, tradition, or the stature of local per-
sonalities; and army units in the field have appropriated Kurdish
property without compensation. Poor liaison within the government has
created further misunderstandings and has additionally complicated
already difficult situations.
The development of Kurdish areas has been slow, educational and
medical facilities have been neglected, and the general welfare of the
people has been of little concern to Teheran. As the younger Kurds
break with tradition and acquire an education, the government has found
the Kurdish problem increasingly difficult to handle. Often-repeated
charges of Iranian corruption and maladministration are given wider and
more prominent distribution among the Kurds, and the generally low
economic level that most Kurds have had to endure for generations becomes
less generally acceptable.
In some quarters of the government the poor state of affairs among
the Kurds is recognized, and occasional attempts have been made to
create a more favorable atmosphere and to improve the quality of intel-
ligence on the Kurds. Discussions were held in April 1958 to consider
setting up a committee to handle Kurdish affairs, the July 1958 revolt
in Iraq brought to the fore a sentiment favoring a reexamination of
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Kurdish policy in Iran, and National Intelligence and Security Organi-
zation (SAVAI#) has urged improvement in the handling of Kurdish matters.
Nevertheless, coordinated action has not materialized to any notable
extent. Development programs on the books have been slow in getting
started, and the program for "keeping the Kurds happy" has boiled down
to increased propaganda -- leaving a wide gulf between talk and action.
2. Impact of the Iraqi Revolution
Following the revolution in Iraq in 1958,. the government of Iran
stepped up propaganda aimed at the Kurds. Radio time devoted to Kurdish
broadcasts was increased, with programs originating from Teheran,
Kermanshah, Sanandaj, and, in February 1959, from Rezaieh. By the end
of 1959, Kurdish programs were also being broadcast from Tabriz and
)babad. The chief themes of programs beamed. to the Kurds have been
loyalty to the Shah., Iran as the homeland of all Kurds, and the danger
of Communism. More rapid development for the Kurds has been promised,
and In June 1959 a concession was made in the establishment of the
independent Governorate of Kordestan, which includes an area of western
Iran having a substantial Kurdish population.
A new aspect of the Kurdish situation received wide attention in the
late spring and summer of 1959, when large numbers of Iraqi Kurds crossed
into Iran. A variety of circumstances contributed to these crossings,
chief among them being the pressure exerted upon the Kurds by Iraq. A
more lenient attitude toward the Kurds in Iran and the theme that all
Kurds were welcome in their Iranian homeland probably also played a part,
and the fact that much of the border was loosely guarded facilitated
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immigration. At the time of these migrations, some consideration was
given to the idea of attracting all prominent Kurdish leaders to Iran
and isolating them, thus ending Kurdish national movements once and
for all.
Mindful of the economic plight and restless outlook of displaced
persons, Iran made small donations to tribal leaders arriving from Iraq
The question of arms in Kurdish hands was handled in whatever manner
seemed most expedient at the moment- In some instances, arms were
collected from new arrivals and receipts issued; in other cases, arms
were issued to them. In all cases, an effort was made to watch Kurdish
activities closely and to isolate individual trouble makers. Tribal
leaders were. intensively interrogated shortly after their arrival in
Iran.
During this period, coordination of Kurdish affairs was -- as
always -- deficient and no general policy was evident. Local officials
were often highhanded and arbitrary. The government was not generous
enough in its donations nor convincing enough in its promises to sway
traditional distrust of central authority. When pressures in Iraq were
relaxed, many tribesmen decided to return to home pastures. Most of
their leaders, whether they thought it wise or not, returned to Iraq
with their tribesmen to avoid losing what authority they still possessed.
3. Continued Government Distrust
Iran basically distrusts the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism; armed
Kurds are especially disturbing to Teheran. In government circles the
sentiment is common that the best procedure is to discourage Iraqi Kurds
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from defecting to Iran but to maintain liaison with them within Iraq.
Some doubt persists as to the wisdom of continuing to allow annual
migrations of Kurdish tribes -- such as the Harki -- to Iranian pastures.
The relative efficiency displayed in the November 1959 arrest of some
80 persons said to be part of ,a Communist Kurdish movement based in
Iraq is evidence that a close watch on subversive activity is being
maintained.
The Iranian Government has made little headway in its attempts to
influence the Kurds. The gulf between words and deeds has been too
wide and old tensions remain. Improvements that have taken place tend
to benefit the government as much or more than the Kurds. New roads
may improve the economy of the area, but they also make army movement
and control of the area easier. The project financed by the United
States for the construction of army barracks at Kbaneh on the Iraqi
border has stimulated the economy of a limited area. Of even greater
interest to the Kurds is the fact that by the spring of 1960 the barracks
will accommodate an Iranian Army division deep in Kurdish territory.
Iraq-
B.
1. The Unity Theme
The effort of the Qassim goverment to put an end to the Kurdish
problem in Iraq has centered on the unity theme. Official statements
on the brotherhood of all Iraqis have flooded the press and radio from
the early days of the Qassim government and still continues Much was
made of the &lul la bustafa Barzani 9 s return from the Soviet Union, but
Mulls Mustafa has not been featured since the initial Impact of his
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return died down. Inducements have been offered to gain the cooperation.
of the tribes; but,, with the exception of the limited numbers who have
reacted to the appeal of Communism,, traditional Kurdish dislike for
things Arab remains. The Qassim government has not convinced the Kurds
that prosperity and fair treatment have replaced conditions existing
under previous governments.
Attempts to influence Kurdish political attitudes have sometimes
used the soft approach and at other times, a tough approach. In several
instances, conferences of Kurdish leaders were called to reconcile their
differences and line them up on the side of the government. Khalid
Nagshabandi reportedly toured Kurdish areas for the government, using
his religious influence in an attempt to settle tribal disputes. On
other occasions attempts were made to buy tribal loyalty with cash pay-
ments, many of which were accepted. In the fall of 1958, development
funds were weighted heavily in favor of Kurdish areas and at a later
date extensive improvements for Barzan village were announced. Never-
theless, "Death to traitors" was broadcast as the penalty for defiance
of the unity program.
Baghdad radio has beamed a steady flow of material to the Kurds,
leaning heavily on the "Kurdish fight for freedom" theme. Editorial
comment has stressed mistreatment of the Kurds by the former government,
plots of "imperialists," the plight of suppressed peasants, the benefits
of land reform, and the "downtrodden" condition of the Kurds of Iran.
Testimonials from Kurds, telegrams from Kurdistan, and eulogies for
Kurdish martyrs have appeared repeatedly in Iraqi broadcasts and press
releases.
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Another approach to the breaking of tribal authority has been
pressure for land reform. The feudal attitude of tribal leaders toward
the peasants has been widely publicized, but relatively little has been
done to implement the mission of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.. The
Ministry's activities have apparently been weighted heavily in favor of
appeals to the tribesmen, but at the same time an effort has been made
to avoid changing too much too rapidly.
2. Increasing Pressure in 1959
The spring of 1959 was an uneasy period for both the government and
the Kurds. The government provided basic military training for selected
Kurds but was upset because arms were held by "questionable" tribes. In
May 1959, some tribal lands were taken from several of the leaders in
the Sulaimaniya area; and, in the face of such increasing government
pressure, a number of tribes fled into Turkey and Iran. Among them
were the Baradost tribesmen, led by Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, who had
skirmished with goverrmient forces before seeking asylum in Turkey.. Iraq,
nevertheless, maintained clandestine contact with the refugees; and, in
response to assurances of a softer Kurdish policy, many returned to Iraq
in the late summer and fall of 1959. Returning tribesmen received food,
money, and, in some cases, were reportedly issued arms to defend them-
selves against "Communist bands." Officials of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform also reportedly circulated through Kurdish areas telling tribesmen
to wait patiently for land reform and to respect the property of their
landlords. Earlier in the summer the government bad agreed not to
distribute the lands of the Begzadeh chiefs if they would agree to take
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no more than 5 percent of production as their share and promise not to
molest the workers. In September a new and vaguely worded refugee law
was passed, which stated that no person would be deported to his country
of origin. In October the Ministry of Agrarian Reform announced that
all of its statements would be published in Kurdish as well as Arabic.
Additional attempts to appease the Kurds include announcement of the
addition of Kurdish language, literature, and history to the list of
courses offered at the College of Letters in Baghdad; proposals for an
Academy of Kurdish Language at Sulaimaniya; and the establishment of a
Directorate General of Kurdish Affairs. To date little has been done
to implement the activities of these institutions.
The government of Iraq has attempted to monitor Kurdish activities,
and efforts have been made to provide arms to the Kurds only when they
would be used for purposes acceptable to the government either of Iraq
or a neighboring country. Iraq receives some information on Kurdish
activities through politically indoctrinated informers in Kurdish organ-
izations, in the customs service, in the police, and in the army. No
estimate is available of the depth or reliability of the government?s
penetration of Kurdish affairs. The Communist Party of Iraq and the
Popular Resistance Force have apparently been used to counter tribal
influence, but it has been difficult to identify such activities as
the exclusive product of these or other antitribal organizations.
C. Turkey
Turkey maintains officially that there is no Kurdish problem in
Turkish territory, but there is every indication that the Kurdish problem
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worries the Turks today, as it has for any years. A concerted ''campaiga
to "Turkify" the ids has not succeeded in destroying the identity of
the Kurdish tribes of eastern Turkey. To counter the wilful lack of
cooperation by the Kurds, tight security controls surround all Kurdish
activities within the country.
The Turkish Goverment has attempted to break the tribal system by
bringing Kurds into many phases of national life, by inserting Turks
into Kurdish affairs, and by limiting contact between Turkish Kurds and
Kurds of neighboring countries. The government does not .recograi the
need for annual migrations of Kurds to pastures beyond the national
border, and tribes considered "ustable" have been removed from border
areas. Security forces maintain close surveillance of border areas,
but there is some evidence of conflicts of responsibilities and operations
in the administration of Kurdish affairs. Although a Kurdish section has
been established within the Turkish National Security Service (TNSS),
both the Ministry of Interior and the Turkish General Staff have also
taken an active interest in the activities of the Kurds.
There were ease indications in 1957, when a number of tribes began
to` return to traditional grazing areas in eastern and southeastern Turkey,
that the long standing government pressure on the Kurds was beginning to
be reed. The Iraqi Revolution and subsequent unrest, however, have
brought about renewed concern for the ":welfare" of the Surds o Simz ul ta-
neously, discussion of modish affairs in the press was banned, security
was tightened, and it became evident that the Turkish Government was well
aware of its Kurdish problem.
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The refugees who arrived in Turkey from Iraq in the spring of 1959
were closely watched. 'While in Turkey, they were treated in much the
same manner that Turkey has treated other Kurds. For the most part,
the refugees chose repatriation to enforced settlement in interior Turkey.
Since repatriation was considered the easiest solution to the refugee
problem, no effort was made to encourage Iraqi Kurds to cross into or
to remain in Turkey.
Kurds are found in all walks of Turkish life and even hold important
political and military positions. Many nontribal Kurds., however, are
still actively interested in the minority problem. Since the government
is not sure which of these Kurds can be trusted, a close watch is main-
tained on Kurdish university students, on Kurdish political activities,
and on Kurdish factions in the arnr.
A nominal increase in. road building and economic development has
been accomplished in eastern Turkey. Opening the area to road traffic
has probably been promoted -- as in Iran -- with the idea of facilitating
military movement and control rather than of improving Ywxdish welfare.
In the spring of i959, consideration was given to setting up new broad-
casting facilities to increase propaganda directed, toward the Kurds.
D. United Arab ReLulblic
The UAR has approached the Kurdish minority problem by applying
rigid internal controls and by attempting to isolate Syrian Kurds from
nationalistic agitation originating in other countries. The Kurds of
the TTAR unlike those of Iraq and Iran., do not benefit from the relative
freedom of action found In isolated mountain areas or in solidly Kurdish
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areas. As a result. the government has been able to monitor Kurdish
activity with relative ease and is fully capable of dealing with dis-
sident Surds within its borders.
The present Arab nationalist approach of the WR leaves little room
for Surdish aspirations. The trend of the past 30 years, during which
Syrian Kurds experienced less discrimination than wards in neighboring
countries, has recently been reversed. Kurds have been dismissed from
the army, relieved from civil administrative positions., and prevented
from working In industries associated with national defense. Kurdish
students in Damascus have been arrested when they appeared to be active
politically. Charges of taking part in Communist activity are easily
extended to include any activity looked upon with disfavor by the gov-
ernment. Kurdish national identity in the UDR is further limited by strict
control of the press (Kurdish newspapers were banned in December 1958).
At the. same time,, a distinctive Kurdish tribal headgear was outlawed.
Listening to Kurdish language broadcasts has also been. baziued,, but Cairo
Radio beams Kurdish nationalist material to both Iraq, and Iran. . UAR
propaganda aimed at the Kurds has made no promises of Kurdish independ-
ence and is generally more objective than that from Baghdad. In addition,
land reform has reduced the incomes of potentially influential Kurdish
leaders in eastern. Syria,. and harsh penalties. have been, established for.. ,
those who contact Iraqi Kurds.
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37. Kurdish N'atio .?a1 Movements
A. The Rise of Kurdish Rationalism
Kurdish national movements and sporadic insurrections have taken
place over a period of more than one hundred years. Not until the end
of world war i.. however, were the seeds of modern Kurdish nationalism
planted. The defeat of Turkey in 1918 paved the way for Kurdish repre-
sentation in the formulation of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This
document aclmowl ed d the existence of a well-developed Kurdish commu-
nity and called for provisional recognition of an independent Kurdistan
made up of - territory that today cce rises part of Southeastern Tmrk .
The Treaty of S;vres was never ratified,,, and in July 1923 it was re-
placed by the Treaty of Lausanne.. which ignored the Kurdish minority.
In the years that followed, the dream of an independent Kurdistan
was kept alive by conflict between the Kurds and the governments of
Iran, Iraq,, and Turkey.. The Turkish policy of assimilating the Kurds
met with axed Kurdish resistance in 1923 and again in 1925. Many of
the refugees of these unsuccessful outbreaks fled to Syria,. Where the
Hoy'bon Committee (Independence Committee) was formed in 1927 to carry
forward the drive for an independent Kurdistan. In the same year, a
series of outbreaks occurred in the. Mount Ararat district of Turd.
Not until 3.930 was this movement defeated and Mean Nurl Pasha forced
to take refuge in Teheran. In 193T the Kurds were again aroused by
Turkish attempts at assimilation. For almost. a year the conflict flared
the l aim area, where Kurds have claimed that women and children
were massacred as the menfolk fought back from the. hills.. Since that
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time, Tu?kish tactics have continued to be forceful and the official
position has been that the "mountain mks have been fully and peace-
fully assimilated."
The Kurds of Iraq, have been equalls restive. Sheikh t- d, son of
Sheikh Said of the Baban tribe, welcomed the British in 1918 and was
appointed Governor of Southern Kurdistan. Sheikh Dud's personal
, however,, led to an open break with the British in 1919; he
ambitions
was deported, was returned as Governor in 1922,,. but fought continually
against the government from 1924. to 1932. In the Barzan area a confeder-
acy of tribes fighting under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed of Barman
was in 1932 defeated by government forces with the aid of the RAF.
Sheikh Ahmed and his brother 111a Mustafa Barzeni were placed in forced
residence in Sun3,ya. When Iraq Joined the League of Nations in
1932, commitments were wade regarding the welfare of minority grooms;
but the spirit: of these agreements vas, never fully carried out and the
ids fared poorly. In 19W widespread discontent accompanied serious
food. shori;ages in ?dish areas of Iraq. At this time M Ma Nustafa
broke arrest in Sulaimaniya and returned to Barzan village. Negotiations
between the Kurds and the government were interrupted by a pitched battle
bet en Barrzenis and. Iraqi police.. A truce was reached in the spring of
1944, and. Mulls. ,tstafa was pardoned and Sheikh Ahmed released from
custody. The following year the Barzanis again defied the govern a t.
In October 1945, Nally 1ustafa,_ Sheikh Ahmed, and about 1,000 armed
Bar anis were driven into Iran by Iraqi forces supported by Kurdish
stafa and his men. joined Qazi
tribesmen. Shortly thereafter,- Nulls Nu
Mohammad and the habad Republic
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In Iran, the Kurds took advantage of the disrupting influence of
World Wftr.T to divorce themselves from the influence of Teheran. Ismail
Agha Sin'iitko of the Shikkak tribe secured control over the area west of
lake t s. in 1918 and for 4 years ruled supreme. in the area north of
Baleb ja, J'aafar sultan of the Avs: om m tribe vas able to ma nta in his
Independence until 19250 Rego in 1922, however, Reza Sly pressed
a policy.of deporting tribal leaders, which proved effectirou in prevent-
jag or zed outbreaks. With the collapse of the Irani = arcs in 3.941.,
Kurdish leaders seized the opportunity to rise again. 1Od Hamer
Rashid of the Baneb Beg lehs, assumed control of the Serdash-Ranh-SaggiZ
region., which was situated between the. We" controlled by the Russians
and by the British. T .e government vas forced to recognize his author-
ity; but a Kurd -- of Mani Senan -- with Iranian army sup-
portt, forced Rashid to flee to Iraq in 1945-
The most recent and most significant move to establish an Independent
state was the creation of the Kurdi.sb Republic of 1 babad. Tbeice is
little evidence of aggressive Soviet activity. in the early stages of
their occupation of northwestern `an which began in 1941; but in 1.945
the Cep sts de good use of Kurdish nationalist sentiments. The
Xomala, originally a secret Kurdish nationalist organization founded in
l943, was taken over by the Soviets. Soviet pressure gained admittance
to the Mwalfor Qazi Wba=ad in April 1945, and rose rapidly to
party leadership. The Soviets took zi and a number of Kur isb tribal
leaders on a whirlwind visit to the USSR In September 1945 for additional
"guidance." Upon their return, Qaai announced the formation of the
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Democratic Party of Surdistan,. vh ch rapidly replaced the l la and
absorbed its membership. On 11. October 1945,.balla Mustafa Barzani and
his anal. ary.,: which increased to 3,000 man by the end of the month,
entered Iran and, by Stet order, was placed at the disposal of QAzi
Mohr ad. On 15 December 1945, Qazi proclaimed the founding of the
Republic of A bad; a 13. member national parliament was formed; and,.
on 22 January 19 - Qazi Mobammd was elected president of the new
republic. The venture ended in December 19k6 because of tribal opp
sition., a rash of internal dissension, an increasingly aggressive
attitude in Teheran,. the 's`iithdraval of Soviet support, and. the defeat
of l iU b ustafa Barzani and his flight to the USSR.
B. Nationalism
Today the desire for an independent Kurdistan is perhaps strongest
in the minds of the older generation.. When Kurdish comities were
Isolated and before many individual Kurds had found a place in
the political and economic life of their countries, it was a relatively
easy matter to stir a Widish faction into armed protest against the
injustice of the central go a to Present Kurdish leaders, however,.
are for the most part urban dwelling -individuals accustomed to the
amenities of modern living. Their sons have received formal education
and have found places In bvziness or professional circles; thus forming
a politically conscious group that includes most of the true. dish
C - i.sts ? nd anti-C sts. This younger generation feels a strong
attachment to things Kurdish.. but has a growing realization that the
future of the ardss lies in integration in the national scene and not
in continued adherence to traditional values.
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The formation of an autonomous Kurdish area, nevertheless, is still
a very real issue in the minds of many Kurds. The name most frequently
associated iith Kvxdish independence moves is is that of MIA i4ustafa
Barzani. Since his return. from the Soviet Union, Mull iustafa has set
himself up as "the leader of the Kurds, " but he is not recognized as
such by many of his fellow Mwde. He is variously reported to be a
C ist,, a foe of Commmouism, a. supporter of Qassiffi, a foe of gasaim,
a nationalist, and an individualist. The last is probably most nearly
correct. The opportunity to in prestige and advance his own material
status has influenced him to give lip service to a number of apparently
conflicting causes. Outwardly., he supports Qassim and from time to
time has received the support of the Qasaim government. It has been
reported on several occasions that Mull a l tafa would break all ties
with the goverment of Iraq if Qasslm were ki,l,led or replaced. Further-
more., there is little doubt that he maintains contact with the and
would be willing to accept Soviet support for his version of an inde-
pendent Kurdistan.
Although, never a very popular person among Kurdish tribal leaders,
Nustafa has apparently made a concerted effort to gain the support
of major tribes In Iraq. His name is also linked to a clandestine move-
meat to draw support from Win,. Syria, and Turkey. Mul a Nuatafal s
association with both Qass:tm and the Soviets has prevented him from
obtaining a wide following among. either Svrdisb tribal leaders or
Communist factions. tstafa and some 50 other persons, however,
have received a license: for the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan.
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which is not only a legal party for the expression of overt political
aims but also a cover for organized clandestine activities.
The Cou mmiat movement appears to be centered in a coalition of the
Democratic Party of Iraq (said to be headed by Mulla Mustafa and some-
times called the United Democratic Party of Iraq) and the Comnamist
Party of Iraq (CFI). The head of the CPI, Hama Abdollah, has report-
edly been a close friend of Mulls, Mustafa since the days of the Republic
of l4ahabed. Others reported to be working for a Co ist Kurdistan
include Khalid Naqphabandi, Colonel Tahir Mustafa Baramani of the Popular
Resistance Force (PRF), and Sheikh Bulayman of the Barzani tribe.
No clear assessment of the Communist strength is currently avail-
able. Some Communist factions have been linked to the clandestine
movement operating in Iran, Syria, and Turkey under direction from Iraq
for the promotion of an independent Kurdistan. In l959, members of a
clandestine network arrested in Iran were thought by Iranian Kurds to
be Communists rather than Kurdish nationalists.
Kurdish nationalist alignments are contradictory. One of the few
points of agreement is the realization that unity is essential to
Kurdish success. Mulls Mustafa has met with Sheikh Latif Barzinja,
Sheikh Rashid of Lolan, and others in attempts to define a Kurdish stand.
Most leaders have favored an independent Kurdistan rather than one
dominated by either Qassim or the Communists. Abbas end Agha of the
Ako tribe reportedly contacted numerous tribes -- including the Dizai,
Harki, and K usao --- in an unsuccessful effort to set up a united
independence move behind Mulla Mustafa. Some leaders, such as Sheikh
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Latif Barzinja, are reportedly going along with Muia Mustafa in the
belief that open opposition now would tend to strengthen rather than
weaken his position. At the same time, Sheikh Latif and Hamid Beg Jaf
are said to be quietly organizing a move to combat all Communist activ-
ity,including the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. Some quarters have
begun to realize that intertribal friction, such as the fight between
the Barzanis and Zibaris over the murder of the son of a Zibari chief,
strengthens the Communist position in Kurdish areas.
C. Pro ecta for Autonomy
In the event of disturbances in Iran or Iraq that would seriously
impair the effectiveness of the respective armies, the Kurds are capa-
ble of assuming control over their tribal areas. If left solely in
Kurdish hands, such a venture would not be effectively organized. Should
circumstances permit, however, the USSR would probably be ready to extend
active support and direction to an autonomy movement. The Communist
press in Iraq is providing for any contingency by calling for fulfillment
of Kurdish national aspirations and, at the same time, condemning Kurdish
nationalistic and separatist tendencies.
At present, all but one of the elements required for Kurdish autonomy
are present -- the forces of violence are represented in the tribes;
potential Kurdish leadership is found in the army, in political circles,
and in professional ranks; and a channel for material support is availa-
ble'through Soviet representation i-;.Iraq. Only the relative stability
of parent governments stands in the sway of active Kurdish separatism.
Should the government of either Iran or Iraq fall, one one result might well
be the establishment 'of a second Kurdish Republic.
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