GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT BRIEF ON MALI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01009A002700030007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1961
• Content Type: IR

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NZAMXM~Z N? 3
Geographic Intelligence Report
BRIEF ON MALI
CIA/RR GR L-61-2
March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
i I DiiECLASSIRED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NE XT REViF;"r DATE: 4-98 9--AUTF-i: FIR 70-2
DATE: 241,41 9 PEVIF WER: _0-S 93C0
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SECRET
Geographic Intelligence Report
BRIEF ON MALI
CIA/RR GR L-61-2
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,------
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Population . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ' ' ' ? ' ' ' . . 3
A. Number and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Ethnic Composition . . ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? 4
C. Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
D. Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . 6
III. Political Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
IV. Economic Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
V. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C. Railroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11I
D. Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
VI. Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. External Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Internal Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
VII. Foreign Aid Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Non-Bloc Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Map
Following page
Republic of Mali (29762) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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BRIEF ON 'MALI*
The 4 million inhabitants of the Republic of Mali are scattered
irregularly over a vast, arid, essentially flat land surface. Much
of this land is desert or scrubby grassland on which crops are grown,
if at all, only during a short rainy season. The most widespread use
of the land is as pasture for excessively large herds of livestock.
Annual flooding of the Niger and other rivers permits a type of agri-
culture somewhat similar to that of the Nile Valley, but on a much
smaller scale.
Most of the people of Mali are sedentary farmers of Negroid stock.
Although they are basically similar in background and mores, they are
divided among dozens of tribes, each with its own language or dialect
and parochial loyalties. In northern Mali live several major mulatto
groups, nomadic herdsmen who bear more physical and cultural resemblance
to the people living all around the Sahara -- on the "shore" of the
desert -- than they do to their black compatriots.
This potpourri of diverse peoples creates a problem in the estab-
lishment of a cohesive state, but the Mandingo language is widely used,
either as a mother tongue or as a "trade" language, and permits commu-
nication among a majority of the people. Along with language differ-
ences are ingrained tribal rivalries.
A harsh climate and primitive agricultural methods have handicapped
economic development, although livestock and a few crops, particularly
peanuts, are produced in sufficient quantity to be exported. Most of
Mali's exports and imports in the past have been shipped via the Dakar-
Niger Railroad. Since its rupture by government edict in August 1960,
following the demise of the Mali Federation, some goods have been sent
and received through Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and Conakry in Guinea.
Neither of these routes is satisfactory, but the route through Guinea
is particularly uneconomic.
* This report was prepared in response to a specific request for infor-
mation. It is receiving general distribution because of the current
interest in Mali.
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Mali's foreign trade consists primarily of the export of agricul-
tural products and the import of manufactured or processed goods.
Peanuts and peanut oil represent about 90 percent of the total exports;
imports include processed foods, petroleum products, and construction
materials. Within the country, trade is in the hands of large, European-
based companies, and itinerant traders, some of whom are Syrian-Lebanese,
some African, and some European. The traditional exchange of goods also
continues at local market places on regular market days.
Although most of the people are unschooled peagant farmers, urban
groups have been active politically for decades and have formed an ef-
fective political party which currently controls the government. The
ruling clique is divided between supporters of East and West, but re-
cently leftist approaches toward economic and social goals have become
increasingly attractive.
Government officials in Mali have concluded, or are considering,
foreign aid programs with both Sino-Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc countries.
The Chinese Communists, the Russians, and the Czechs have been partic-
ularly active. Among the non-Communist countries that have already
signed aid pacts, or indicated an interest in supplying aid to Mali
are France, the United States, Ghana, West Germany, and Israel.
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I. Setting
The Republic of Mali, in the heart of West Africa, is entirely sur-
rounded by the French or former-French territories of Algeria, Niger,
Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania (see Map
29762).* Although Mali is more than 1,000 miles in length, varies
from 200 to 600 miles in width, and is twice the size of Metropolitan
France, much of this vast land is so arid and so isolated that it con-
tributes little to the national economy.
The landscape of Mali is one of transition from the Sahara Desert
in the north to grasslands and sparse forests in the south. The few
hills and low, truncated mountains stand out in sharp contrast to the
monotonously flat terrain throughout most of the country. Similarly,
the narrow bands of green vegetation hugging the banks of the Senegal
and Niger Rivers accentuate the brownness of the stark landscape during
the long dry season. Prominent features in the picture of rural Mali
are the mixture of short and tall grasses, the thorny brush, the gnarled
and ungainly baobab trees, and the dusty roads connecting the villages
of adobe houses. In northern Mali, even the roofs are made of adobe;
but in the south, where the heavier rainfall would turn an adobe roof
to mud, each house is topped with thatched grass. In urban Mali, the
imprint of French culture is clearly evident in the architecture and
layout of some of the important towns; in others, the buildings and
urban pattern appear to have survived from the African empires of the
Middle Ages.
II. Population
A. Number and Distribution
Approximately 3,6+3,000 people lived in French Soudan (now Mali) in
1956, the latest year for which fairly complete data are available. The
population density averaged about 3 people per square kilometer (8 per
square mile), but the distribution throughout the 17 cercles, or admin-
istrative regions, was extremely uneven. The 3 Saharan or sub-Saharan
cerc'Les of Timbuktu, Gao, and Goundam made up more than half the nation-
al territory, but together they contained less than 15 percent of the
total population. (See Table 1).**
The overwhelming majority of the people live in the rural areas,
but the number of town or city residents has been growing steadily
Map follows p. 20.
Table 1 follows on p. i+.
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Population, 1956
Cercle
African
Other a/
Density
(per sq. km.)
Principal Ethnic Groups
Bamako
532,000
1+,306
9
Bambara
Bafoulabe
11+0,000
162
1.
Malinke, Kassonke
Bandiagara
360,000
32
8
I)ogon, Peul
Bougouni
230,000
39
6
Bambara
Gao
2483-000
31+7
0-1
Songhai, Touareg
Goundam
139,000
56
2
Songhai, Peul, Touareg
Issa-Ber
131+,000
26
9
Peul, Bambara
Kayes
123,000
1+11
5
Kassonke, Toucouleur
Kita
115,000
222
3
Malinke, Peul
Koutiala
203,000
81+
11
Minianka
Macina
210,000
359
5
Bozo
Mopti
179,000
229
15
Marka, Bozo, Peul
Nioro
285, 000
151+
5
Marka, Diawara, Peul
San
206,000
99
15
Marka, Bozo, Bambara
Segou
209,000
601+
16
Bambara, Peul
Sikasso
211,000
79
10
Senoufo, Bambara
Timbuktu
112,000
83
0-1
Songhai, Maure, Touareg
3,636,000 7,292
a. Chiefly French.
and now exceeds 250,000 people. The most spectacular growth has been in
the capital city of Bamako, where the population has increased from 6,500
in 1910 to 68,000 in 1956. Bamako is by far the largest community in the
country. To most Malians, it must appear as a metropolis; but it actual-
ly bears a closer resemblance to a county seat in a farming area in the
United States. The other towns, including all of those with more than
10,000 inhabitants, are Kayes (20,000), Segou (17,000), Sikasso (11+,000),
and Mopti (13,000). The ancient city of Timbuktu -- at one time a "port"
for camel caravans crossing the Sahara and, at its height, a city of some
20,000 inhabitants -- today has a population of only about 7,000 and is
but a minor trade center for salt and local produce.
B. Ethnic Composition
The diverse ethnic groups within the boundaries of the Republic of
Mali include several light-skinned nomadic tribes that live along the
edge of the Sahara and numerous sedentary Negroid tribes that inhabit
the remainder of the country (see Table 1).
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The nomadic groups include the Maures, the Touareg, and the Peul or
Fulani. All are Muslim herdsmen, descendents of North Africans who
came across the Sahara and made contact with the Negroid peoples on the
southern rim of the desert. The Maures, who number about 50,000 in
Mali, tend their cattle, sheep, goats, and camels along the southern
margin of the Sahara, in an area lying between the Mauritanian border
and the Senegal and Niger Rivers. They are divided into distinct
castes, and have a reputation for being fiercely independent and gen-
erally unfriendly to outsiders.
The 150,000 Touareg in Mali live primarily in the vicinity of
Timbuktu and within the big bend of the Niger River near the boundary
of Upper Volta. Although many of them are tent-dwelling nomads, some
have become settled to some extent and live in stone or adobe houses.
In their seasonal migrations from pasture to pasture each clan careful-
ly observes the territorial rights of fellow tribesmen. Their culture
includes both Berber and Arab characteristics.
The almost 4-00,000 Peuls (also known as the Fulani) are more widely
scattered throughout Mali, but they tend to be concentrated south of
the other nomadic groups. Throughout West Africa, the Peuls have tended
to reside in the midst of more populous ethnic groups, such as the
Bambara in Mali or the Hausa in Nigeria.
The vast majority of the people of Mali, some 3 million out of a
total of 3.6 million, are Negroid. This group is subdivided into at
least 30 tribes or subgroups, the most numerous of which are the Bambara
(800,000), Marka (265,000), Songhai (210,000), Malinke (206,000), and
Dogon (183,000).
Although estimates vary, the French population of the Mali area in
1955 :Probably numbered about 4,800, of whom 2,600 lived in the Bamako
area. As of October 1960, about 600 French technicians, advisors, and
teachers remained in Mali. In December 1960, 680 French officers and
men were stationed at the army base at Kati, 10 miles from Bamako; and
560 were stationed at the Bamako, Gao, and Tessalit air bases. No in-
formation is currently available on the number of Frenchmen employed by
private interests in the country.
C. Language
The multiplicity of languages spoken by the people of Mali is one
of the liabilities facing the new nation. Although linguistic spe-
cialists have established that there are but six linguistic "families"
in Mali, each of the many tribal groups has its own dialect and many
are not mutually understandable. Dialects of Mandingo, the most wide-
spread language in Mali, are spoken by the Bambara, Malinke, Khassonke,
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and Dioula tribes (about 2,100,000 people). Mandingo is also used as
the "trade language" throughout much of the country. French is the
medium of instruction in the schools, and consequently its use is lim-
ited primarily to the few people who have had some formal education.
As recently as mid-1960, there were only 372 schools in the entire
country.
D. Religion
Religion plays an extremely important role in the life of the aver-
age Malian and significantly influences his behavior pattern. This
pervasiveness of religious tenets or superstitions woven throughout all
phases of Malian life affects the leaders of the government, the market
woman on the corner, the itinerant trader, and the cotton picker in the
field.
About half of the people of Mali are Muslim, and the remainder
follow various indigenous animistic beliefs. Many people who list
themselves as Muslim also observe animistic practices -- just to be
on the safe side. Fewer than 1 percent of the people are Christian.
The north is considered to be Muslim territory ?-- reflecting the spread
of Islam from North Africa -- and the south is considered animistic. The
boundary, however, is not clear cut and there are enclaves of Muslims or
animists scattered throughout the country. Although animism has re-
treated or gone underground to some extent in the face of aggressive
proselytizing by Muslim and Christian, it still shows vitality, tenacity,
and a capacity to alter alien creeds.
Ancestor worship is the basis of many of the animistic beliefs. The
earliest ancestor -- the link that unites the clan -- is considered to
be a god, and successive generations transmit and embellish myths about
his fabulous life. Among the living members of the clan, the patriarch
is the priest, and he alone is credited with being able to communicate
with souls of the ancestral dead.
In addition to the family cult, many animists adhere to what are
frequently called the "mystery societies." These brotherhoods cross
the boundaries of the family cults and differ in beliefs, rites, and
organization. They also tend to weaken the authority of the family
cults, creating conflict in individual lives between the claims of the
traditional religious organization into which a man was born and the
organization into which he was later initiated.
Among the African animists, illness, death, or other misfortune is
ascribed to many causes including black magic, taboo-breaking, and the
action of spirits or people with special powers, such as sorcerers and
witches. To ward off these evils, the average animist puts great faith
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in the potency of amulets or fetishes. There is scarcely a man who
does not wear an assortment of gris-gris (amulets) to protect him from
specific perils. Divination, also, plays a vital role among animists.
No important decision is made or act undertaken unless the signs are
consulted and prove propitious.
III. Political Development
The Republic of Mali is a direct descendant of several of the most
famous ancient empires of West Africa, one of which was in fact known
as the Mali Empire. The legend of the power and greatness of the Mali
Empire has been passed down and embroidered upon from generation to
generation. Many of the citizens of present-day Mali saw the formation
of the recent Federation of Mali not as the joining of two political
entities but as the revival of the former Empire.
The first of the ancient empires was that of Ghana,* which may have
been established as early as the 1-th century, A. D. The capital of the
first Ghana was at a site about 200 miles northeast of Bamako, capital
of the present Mali. In the 11th or 12th century, Ghana was conquered
by peoples from North Africa and its rulers became converted to Islam.
The Ghana Empire was succeeded by the Mali (or Manding) Empire, which
in turn succumbed at the hands of the soldiers of the Gao or Songhai
Empire in the 15th century. Toward the end of the 16th century the
Songhai Empire split into a number of hostile minor states. The per-
sistence of this fragmentization greatly facilitated conquest by the
French.
The French,' in other words, walked into a power vacuum. They moved
up the Senegal River and down the Niger, a natural invasion route that
offered no major physical obstacles. The French established their first
permanent fort on the upper Senegal as early as 1772; by 1866, Segou
(north of Bamako) on the Niger had been reached; and in 1892, the ter-
ritory became a separate French colony.
Wherever feasible, the French subdivided existing units and placed
their own appointees at the head of the new units. Despite this ma-
neuver, many of the African chiefs managed by various devices to stay
one jump ahead of their conquerors. Some surviving chiefs, for in-
stance, covertly set up straw men to replace themselves in any dealings
with the administration, thus fending off French pressures and penalties.
* There is no more than sentimental connection between the present-day
Ghana and the original Ghana, -- in fact, Kwame Nkrumah and his colleagues
usurped the name much to the chagrin of the people (or at least the edu-
cated people) of what was then French Soudan.
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In the years just before World War II, the French Government intro-
duced a policy of strengthening the chiefs' authority, and the number
of administrative units was drastically reduced. Regions with ethnic,
historical, or economic affinities were combined, and an effort was
made to train the heirs of the surviving hereditary chieftaincies in
special state schools. This policy was counteracted somewhat by the
formation of trade unions, student associations, and similar groups,
which gave organization to the detribalized urban elements and per-
mitted many rural Soudanese to escape from the authority of the chiefs.
Although fledgling trade unions and political discussion groups
were beginning to be formed in the 1930's, they did not really flour-
ish until after World War II. At that time the worsening of an already
bad economic situation, along with the survival of many Vichy-inspired
repressive measures, impelled liberal elements in both France and
French West Africa to press for the elimination of political and eco-
nomic grievances. Late in 1945, the easing of controls and the elec-
tions held throughout French West Africa for overseas representatives
to sit in the French Constituent Assembly caused a flowering of polit-
ical activity. For example, some 800 delegates from all parts of
Black Africa met in Bamako in 19+6 to form a political party that
became powerful throughout French West Africa and Equatorial Africa.
Following World War II, the urban population increased phenomenally.
It was among the floating, detribalized townspeople that one of the
earliest Soudanese parties, the Union Soudanaise, found its most fertile
field. Trade unions, especially among the railroad workers of Bamako,
also developed rapidly, as did student organizations. Both were at-
tracted to the radical platform of the Union Soudanaise, which today is
in almost complete control of the governmental apparatus. The extremism
of these groups was offset or moderated by the presence of an even
larger urban element made up of a stable Muslim middle class, steeped
in Islamic traditions and much less willing to accept new ideas.
For the territory as a whole, a counterbalance to urban radicalism
has been supplied by the archaic, conservative :Life among the people of
the vast countryside. Yet even there, despite apparent stagnation, the
traditional leadership and customs are slowly disintegrating. This
process has been accelerated by the spread of education, improvement in
communications, and interparty political struggles.
The growth of regional and ethnic organizations checked the expan-
sion of the Union Soudanaise in the rural areas. Although some of the
tribes provided satisfactory material for party organization, others
such as the Touareg and Songhai are unresponsive to political stimulus
from whatever source. The development of ethnic or tribal parties,
like that formed by the Peuls (who number some 400,000 to 500,000)
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prompted rival tribes to emulate them, the better to oppose their own
hereditary tribal enemies. The considerable development of tribal
parties does not, however, indicate genuine political activity in the
countryside. Politics in the real sense of the term is still confined
to the town.
During the past several years, increasing political pressure con-
comitant with the development of effective political parties and
leaders forced the government in Paris to accede to African demands
for increased self-government. In June 1956 the French passed the
Overseas Reform Act, which allowed the Africans fuller participation
in local and territorial government. To many Frenchmen, the Act was a
radical measure; but, to most African leaders, it seemed merely a
praiseworthy stepping stone in the path to complete control of their
own affairs.
Each of the overseas territories of France was given the option
of immediate independence or of becoming autonomous states within the
French Community. Soudan, in the September 1958 plebiscite, voted to
remain within the Community. In January 1959, however, representatives
from Soudan, Senegal, Dahomey, and Upper Volta decided to unite their
republics into a Mali Federation. Shortly thereafter, Upper Volta and
Dahomey backed out of the Federation. The Mali Federation that remained
(and became independent on 20 June 1960) was a fairly loose amalgam made
up of Senegal and Soudan.
Almost from the inception of the Federation, however, its leaders
espoused viewpoints that were not in harmony. The basic orientations
of the Federation's two major political forces, the Union Soudanaise
and the Union Progressiste Senegalaise, were "out of focus" -- Soudanese
leaders being closer in political outlook to Guinea's Sekou Toure than
to Senegal's Leopold Senghor. The Soudanese were particularly opposed
to the desire of Senegalese leaders to retain close ties with France.
With the secession of Senegal on 20 August 1960, the Mali Federation
was defunct. Soudan proclaimed its own independence as the Republic
of Mali on 21. September 1960 and was admitted to membership in the
United Nations on 28 September 1960.
Following the demise of the Federation, there has been sharp dis-
agreement among Mali's leaders on the question of their country's inter-
national alignment. The extremists would prefer a close alignment with
Guinea and, like that country, would welcome Sino-Soviet assistance on
a large scale. The moderates apparently want to show the world that
the new Mali Republic is truly independent and in no way tied to either
East or West. It was recently reported that President Modibo Keita and
other moderates have succeeded in temporarily containing radical, pro-
Communist action, but it appears doubtful whether the moderates will
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prevail over the long run. It has also been suggested that the position
of the moderates is likely to crumble unless they receive substantial
assistance from the West.
IV. Economic Resources
A. Agriculture
Most of the people of Mali depend, directly or indirectly, on agri-
culture for their livelihood, but the country's extreme aridity presents
a formidable handicap. The vast northern part of Mali -- north of
Timbuktu -- receives less than 10 inches of rainfall annually, but only
the extreme northern tip of the country is true "Hollywood Saharan,"
with virtually no rain and with livestock and plants restricted to oases.
On approaching Timbuktu, cattle of the nomads become more numerous.
Even here, however, the rainfall is still light and highly erratic in
distribution. Consequently, even quick-maturing millets often fail.
South of Timbuktu, a belt of somewhat more plentiful rainfall stretches
almost as far south as Bamako. In this belt, rainfall varies from 20
to 30 inches annually, and the rainy season is about 4 months long.
This belt is important cattle country, and some crops can be grown with-
out irrigation. Farther south, the rainy season gradually lengthens,
the total rainfall increases slightly (14i- inches per year at Bamako),
and sedentary agriculture becomes possible. In the extreme south, the
wet season may last as long as 6 or 7 months; but, because of infertile
soil, the rainfall is less effective than might be expected.
Not only is rainfall sparse throughout most of Mali, but daytime
temperatures are so consistently high that evaporation is intense. As
a result the land is significantly drier than other parts of the world
that receive the same amount of rainfall. The area around Bamako, for
example, receives as much annual rainfall as Washington, D.C., but
during most of the year the aridity is comparable to that of Phoenix,
Arizona.
Because of the deficient rainfall in Mali, the growing of crops
depends to a very great extent on either irrigation or flooding from
the Niger River and its tributaries. The lack of adequate moisture
also has a deleterious effect on the extremely important livestock in-
dustry. Animals are moved frequently in search of better pasture, but
because of overstocking the available land often. is grazed bare and the
soils are both cut and compacted by hoofs. One serious result is severe
erosion during the infrequent but heavy storms.
Millet is the main food crop of Mali, and the Niger Bend area is
the region where millet is cultivated most intensively. Mali (or
Soudan) for some time has been the chief millet granary of French West
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Africa, and some 20,000 tons were customarily exported annually to feed
the population of Senegal and occasionally Niger. A lively trade in
millet has long been carried on between the sedentary farmers and the
nomadic herders, who use it for porridge, as animal fodder, and as the
base for a fermented drink.
Rice also is a popular and widely used food crop in Mali and in
other parts of West Africa. Its popularity is due, in part, to a French
program to encourage cultivation of irrigated rice at the expense of
millet; rice keeps well, has a higher nutritive value than millet, does
not impoverish the soil as much, and requires less preparation for eating.
Rice production increased significantly during and especially after World
War II, and currently about 180,000 tons are produced each year. Some
rice is currently exported, but no figures are available.
Minor food crops are of wide variety; but, because of regional spe-
cialization, not all crops are produced in all parts of the country.
Nuts from the shea butter tree, African yams, and sweet potatoes, for
instance, are raised primarily in southern Mali whereas wheat and barley
are grown in the Niger Bend area. Among the other crops are corn, peas,
beans, manioc (cassava), potatoes, bananas, and citrus fruits.
Peanuts are, by far, the principal cash crop of the country and are
also used domestically. They are grown in a wide belt along the rail-
road, from the Senegal border as far east as Segou. Climatic conditions,
fluctuations in the guaranteed price, soil exhaustion, the availability
of immigrant agricultural laborers, and the accessibility to and cost of
transport are the elements that govern peanut production. Recently, the
annual export crop of 55 000 tons has had a value of 2,200 million CFA
francs (about $9 million). Most of the production is exported in an un-
refined state because of the limited capacity of the oil-extracting
plant at Koulikoro, the only one in Mali.
Irrigated cotton has been grown successfully in the central delta
of the Niger River under the auspices of the Office du Niger, a semi-
autonomous government agency. Research and experimentation in both
cultivation and marketing methods also have benefited the producers of
the unirrigated cotton who, incidentally, produce far more cotton than
do those using irrigation. The high cost of transportation to the
ocean is a major handicap in the development of cotton exports. Never-
theless, the cotton harvest has increased from 153 tons in 1952 to
6,000 tons in 1959.
Livestock has traditionally been one of the "riches" of Mali. Sta-
tistics vary somewhat, but in 1958 there were an estimated 3.4 million
cattle, 7 million sheep and goats, 330 thousand donkeys, 112 thousand
horses, and 98 thousand camels. Thousands of cattle, sheep, goats, and
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horses are sent each year to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and, to a
lesser extent, to Liberia and Nigeria.
Despite these impressive numbers, the inadequacy of the water and
fodder supplies and the prevalence of animal diseases are serious hand-
icaps to the development of herds. All of Mali. except the area north
of Timbuktu is infested with the tsetse fly, which attacks both man and
animals. Furthermore, many of the animals are worn out by being almost
constantly on the move either to pasture or to market. Their value,
however, cannot be estimated strictly from a monetary angle because
they play a major role in the daily life of their owners. Among many
Malians, herds are almost the sole capital, and animals furnish essen-
tial food, materials for clothing and shelter, and a medium for barter
exchange. The herds are chiefly a measure of wealth and provide little
return in the form of fertilizer, transport, or plow power.
All of the tribes living along the Niger River and its tributaries
use fish for food, and some of the tribesmen are professional fishermen.
The greatest single market for fish is at Mopti, but dried or smoked
fish are sent throughout the country and exported as far afield as Ghana.
More than 30 thousand tons of fish are caught annually in the central
Niger Delta alone, and approximately one-half of this catch is exported
to nearby countries.
B. Minerals
The minerals known to exist in Mali include gold, salt, iron, phos-
phates, manganese, tin, lead, and zinc; but none of these is exploited
in any appreciable amount. At the time of the ancient empires, gold,
was an important article of commerce. Today it; is found in several
parts of the country, but only in small amounts. Salt production sat-
isfies less than one-fourth of the local demand, the remainder coming
from Senegal, Mauritania, and Europe. Iron occurs as magnetite near
Kayes and as nonphosphoric hematite near the railway between Kayes and
Bamako. These deposits are exploited only by the Africans for their
personal use. The phosphates in the remote valley of the Tilemsi River,
80 miles north of Gao in the Sahara, are of poor quality. A potentially
valuable deposit of manganese was found a few years ago near Ansongo in
eastern Mali. Like the deposits of lead, tin, and zinc in the Adrar des
Iforas region of northeastern Mali, the manganese deposits are remote
and not readily accessible.
V. Transportation
Although the transportation pattern of Mali. includes rivers, roads,
a single railroad, and airlines, the limited use of each reflects the
rudimentary state of development of the economy as a whole. The rivers
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have historically been important in the transfer of goods, but their
navigability is severely restricted by seasonally low water. The road
network links all of the important towns and most of the villages, but
most of the roads are practically useless for modern vehicles during
much of each year because they have only natural, unimproved surfaces.
The nation's only railroad has long been the most important link between
Mali and the outside world, but this link recently was broken by Senegal
when it withdrew from the Federation, and no satisfactory substitute has
been found. Air transport is available throughout the economically sig-
nificant part of the country, and is becoming increasingly useful, but
still plays a minor role in the movement of goods and people.
The Niger River is the major artery of water transportation in Mali
and serves the most densely settled part of the country. Complete data
on river traffic are not available, but the port of Koulikoro (the
eastern terminus of the Dakar-Niger Railroad and head of navigation of
the Middle Niger) normally handles some 70,000 metric tons of cargo per
navigation season, including rice, gasoline, cotton, cement, steel, and
skins. Excluding canoes the river fleet on the Middle Niger between
Koulikoro and Gao consists of 4 passenger boats, 20 tow boats, 38 tow
or push barges, and 6 tank barges.
During and for a short time after the rainy season, major segments
of the Niger River are navigable for vessels drawing up to 4 feet of
water. The Upper Niger, from the headwaters in the highlands of Guinea
to the rapids at Bamako, is the first segment of the river to fill each
year because the summer rains begin in the south and move northward.
The Upper Niger therefore rises to a navigable level earlier than the
segments farther downstream. From Kouroussa and Kankan in Guinea, the
Upper Niger and its tributary the Milo are navigable from early July to
December. The Middle Niger, from Bamako to Gao, rises slowly because
the water flows from the main channel into the many marshes and creeks
of the interior delta. As these become filled, the main channel grad-
ually becomes navigable farther and farther downstream. Stretches of
the Middle Niger are navigable from about mid-July until February,
depending on the date of beginning and the length of the rainy season.
The Niger's usefulness as a means of transportation is limited because
the coincidence of the various periods of maximum water rarely lasts
throughout the October-to-February harvest season.
B. Road
About 500 kilometers of Mali's roads have been asphalted, 2,200
kilometers are classed as "permanent" dirt roads, and more than 9,000
kilometers are "seasonal" dirt roads. Within a few weeks after the
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start of the rainy season in June, the "seasonal" dirt roads become
unusable, and many towns are completely cut off from places with which
they had road communication only a few weeks earlier. The large town
of Kayes on the Dakar-Niger Railroad, for instance, is without usable
local roads between mid-July and October. During part of this time,
the nearby Senegal River is navigable but only from Kayes downstream
toward Senegal. Until traffic on the Dakar-Niger Railroad was stopped
recently by government edict, the railroad furnished the sole trans-
portation link with the outside world during the wet months.
The pattern of road trafficability is varied because the wet sea-
son does not start at the same time nor last the same length of time
in all parts of the country. Furthermore, some roads along the Senegal
and Niger Rivers may be flooded during the middle of the dry season
because the lag in drainage brings the rivers to flood stage during
that season, several weeks or months after the rains have ceased. The
rivers then flood the nearby roads, making them impassable.
C. Railroad
The Dakar-Niger Railroad, connecting the busy Atlantic port of
Dakar with the inland towns of Bamako and Koulikoro, was completed
shortly after World War I. At the eastern end of the line the short
rail segment between Bamako and Koulikoro skirts the rapids on the
Niger River and forms a transportation link between the Upper Niger
and the Middle Niger. Soon after its completion the Dakar-Niger
Railroad became the major east-west route, and the rivers and roads
became internal feeder routes. In 1959, before Mali severed relations
with France, goods traffic on the line reached a total of 235,000
metric tons -- 120,000 from Soudan to Senegal, and 115,000 in the
other direction. The main items originating in Soudan were peanuts,
rice, cola nuts, livestock, and construction materials. Goods brought
in from Senegal included processed foods (mostly for Europeans and
urban Africans), petroleum products, construction materials, and
beverages.
After Senegal dissolved its federation with Mali in August 1960,
the Malians closed the Senegal-Mali border and refused to use the
Dakar-Niger Railroad for freight traffic. Instead, they have shipped
the bulk of Mali's commercial traffic to Abidjan, capital of the Ivory
Coast. Transport to Abidjan is more costly because it entails truck-
ing for 300 miles to the railhead in Upper Volta. Furthermore, the
road used has only a dirt surface and, without very unusual maintenance,
will in a short time be seriously damaged by sustained truck traffic.
The biggest problem, however, concerns the transportation of petroleum
products. The maximum that could be handled if Dakar is bypassed is
2,000 tons a month, and Mali's average monthly requirements amount to
3,200 tons.
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An alternative route, to the port of Conakry on the Guinea Coast,
would involve road transport all the way, or road or river transport
to Kankan and then transshipment to a railroad that is in very poor
physical condition. The Upper Niger River, as mentioned previously,
is navigable only between July and December. In October 1960, a
group of 40 Soviet engineers and surveyors began a 3-month study of
the Conakry-Kankan Railroad, an indication that Guinea may be in a
stronger position in the future to influence the direction of Malian
trade. The railroad, however, requires thorough rejuvenation and,
regardless of Soviet help, could not quickly become a major transport
artery.
At least seven towns in Mali have scheduled air service. The
airport runways at Bamako and Tessalit are more than 7,000 feet long
and are surfaced with tar-macadam. Runways at Nioro (5,000 feet
long) and Kayes (4,000 feet) also have all-weather surfaces. Eleven
other airports have dry-weather runways that are more than 3,000 feet
in length. The modern airport at Bamako is capable of handling air-
planes as large as Constellations and DC-7's, and has a well-equipped
control tower. The other fields are less well equipped and most are
served by smaller planes of the DC-3 or DC-I+ class; several can handle
only light planes.
VI. Trade
A. External Trade
In the past, trade statistics for Mali (Soudan) have been grouped
with those of the other states of French West Africa, and therefore it
is not possible to present detailed information on Mali alone. The
available data, however, give at least some indication of the magnitude
and :principal products of Mali's foreign trade.
Exports from Mali (Soudan) reached a value of about $10.5 million
in 1959; and the value of its imports has been estimated from $18
million to $20 million. The trade deficit will probably increase in
the :immediate future because of the greater cost of shipping goods
via Abidjan rather than Dakar, as in the past. As of October 1960,
there was also some uncertainty as to whether Mali could continue to
sell its peanuts and peanut oil to France at the usual subsidized
prices. Peanuts and peanut oil represent about 90 percent of Mali's
total exports. Other customary exports include gum arabic, hides and
skins, shea butter, millet, rice, fish, and livestock.
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The principal products imported into Mali (Soudan) in 1959 via the
Dakar-Niger Railroad included groceries and foodstuffs (32,000 metric
tons), petroleum products (28,000), construction. materials (18,000),
beverages (6,000), and motor vehicles (2,000). Additional construction
materials (6,000 metric tons), groceries and foodstuffs (4,000), and
petroleum products (3,000) came in via river transportation. Fiance
has been the leading customer and supplier of both exports and imports.
B. Internal Trade*
Even before France gained control of most of French West Africa,
the economy of that area was essentially one of trading, and French
rule intensified the role of trade in the economy. The raw materials
which French West Africa was encouraged to produce for export were
those wanted by Metropolitan France, and the manufactured goods it
received were those selected by French industrialists and exporters.
The latter were assured of a preferred and virtually closed market and
one in which, for many years, they did not find it necessary to conform
to the needs and tastes of their clients.
The African producers were unorganized and scattered over a vast
area. Perforce, they accepted low prices for their output and took
the consumer goods offered them by traders. Some of the traders were
itinerant Syrian-Lebanese or African Dioula or Hausa tribesmen, and.
some were European, usually French or Greek. The big merchants,
however, were the large trading companies that had installed them-
selves at an early date in French West Africa and had set up a network
of posts and agents throughout the producing areas.
Almost invariably the big trading houses in French West Africa have
been both exporters of African produce and importers of general merchan-
dise. Most of the firms are French, some of which also operate in
British territory; reciprocally, some big British firms have branches
in French West Africa. Of the three great trading companies, known as
the Grands Co toirs, that of the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrri ue
Occidentale (CFAO) is the oldest, having been established in 1887. It
exports produce and imports French manufactured goods, chiefly cotton
cloth,and controls most of former French West Africa's river transport.
It also has consistently run up a comfortable profit. In 1953, a year
* Except where specifically noted, the information presented here on
internal trade is of a pre-independence vintage and refers to all of
French West Africa, not just to Mali. It is believed, however, that
all or most of the information also holds true for Mali. To date there
is a serious dearth of information on trade within the country.
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that the authors of its annual report described as difficult, the CFAO
declared a 30 percent dividend. The second large French firm is the
Societe Commerciale de 1'Ouest Africain (SCOA). It is younger but larger
than the CFAO and is the owner of plantations, department stores, and a
variety of other enterprises. The third of the Big Three is the British
concern, Unilever. Through its African branch, the United Africa Com-
pany, Unilever formed the Compagnie du Niger Francais in Guinea and
Soudan as well as companies in other French territories. Although con-
cerned chiefly with oleaginous products, Unilever has side interests,
particularly in sea transport.
Among the grievances voiced against the big trading companies are
their failure to promote production in a way that is helpful to the
African economy, attempts to establish monopolies, and a tendency to
repatriate their profits and to sell at prices often agreed among
themselves as being the maximum that the traffic will bear. Whether
or not these charges are true is not particularly pertinent; the fact
is that they are widely believed and therefore the companies have a
reputation somewhat similar to that formerly held by the United Fruit
Company in Central America.
:Retailers tend to deal in a wide variety of goods rather than to
specialize in a few products. They might, therefore, be compared to
rural American general stores since they cater to all the small needs
(cotton goods, kerosene, food, etc.) of the peasant farmer. In the
cities, however, certain small, privately owned shops catering to both
European and African customers specialize in such lines as dry goods,
hardwares, and foodstuffs.
In addition, the traditional African markets and peddlers continue
to play an important role in the trading pattern of the country. In
the big towns, markets are held daily. In less important centers, they
are held less frequently. At the country crossroads, old women still
may be found selling a few articles, such as food, to the occasional
passerby. Barter continues to be practiced, and in some isolated re-
gions cowrie shells, millet, or cloth serve as the media of exchange.
Women do most of the selling in markets, whereas the itinerant peddlers
are men.
Until recently there have been no government import, export, or
retail-trade channels. On 29 October 1960, however, the government of
the Republic of Mali set up a trading corporation known as the Mali
Import and Export Company (SOMIEX). This company, under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, was organized to stimu-
late exports of Mali commodities, to provide Mali with various imported
goods at the lowest possible prices, to study sources for imports and
outlets for Mali exports, and to cooperate in the elaboration of import
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and export programs as well as in the preparation of commercial agree-
ments. SOMIEX, alone, is authorized to sell products of state-owned
companies, joint companies, and rural cooperatives, and to provide such
organizations with the usual consumer goods. It is also the only com-
pany authorized to procure items needed for the government.
VII. Foreign Aid Programs
A. Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid
As of mid-November 1960, the Chinese Communists appeared to be in-
terested primarily in assisting Mali in the field of agriculture, rice
growing in particular. Visiting Soviet missions have examined the
Sotuba Dam project near Bamako and may soon make a definite offer to
aid in the development of the dam. The USSR has also shown an interest
in assisting in the work of the Office du Niger. This is the leading
agricultural project in Mali and to date has been handled by the French.
Another subject of interest to the USSR is the proposal to build a
second airport at Bamako.
A Czechoslovak delegation visited Bamako in October 1960 and dis-
cussed the economic-development needs of Mali in. detail. The Czech.s
offered to construct an international airport at Bamako, build an oil
refinery, and supply 350 trucks. The projects on the agenda of a confer-
ence between Mali and Czechoslovakia in Prague scheduled for November
1960 were the construction of a bicycle and motor scooter assembly plant
and of refrigeration facilities and abbatoirs at Mopti and Gao; the re-
organization of storage facilities at Kayes, the training of Malian
pilots, the donation of light aircraft, the construction of a weaving
mill to utilize Malian cotton, and the construction of the bridges nec-
essary to make the Kankan-Bamako highway an all-weather road. The last
project is worth noting because it correlates well with Soviet proposals
to improve the Kankan-Conakry railroad, with a resultingly close tie
between the economies of Mali and Guinea. During a September 1960 meet-
ing in Prague, the Czechs are reported to have proposed a barter agree-
ment involving an exchange of Czech consumer goods and agricultural
machinery for Malian peanuts and other farm products. Reportedly the
Czechs also offered to provide the Malians with whatever arms the
country might require.
The French have been involved in aid and trade programs in French
West Africa for many years and after World War II embarked on a par-
ticularly ambitious development program. It was financed primarily
from a central,fund known as FIDES (Fonds d'Investissement pour le
Developpement Economique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer --
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Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development of the Overseas
Territories). From 1947 to 1957, FIDES appropriated $79.4 million for
use in Soudan alone. Major operations included road and railroad re-
pair, improvement of health and educational institutions, construction
of hydraulic works, agricultural research, and land development.
During 1960, an estimated 1,200 million francs CFA (approximately
$4.8 million) were earmarked by the French Assistance and Cooperation
Mission for economic projects in the Republic of Mali. In addition,
trade pacts were signed between the two countries, such as the Peanut
Purchase Agreement whereby France obligated itself to purchase and
Mali agreed to deliver stated amounts. On 9 December 1960, an agree-
ment was signed between the French and Malian Governments whereby
France granted to Mali a subsidy of 1,485 million francs CFA (approx-
imately $6 million) for the realization of an economic and social
development program. This program included demographic, geological,
road, and agricultural studies; surveying and mapping; regional devel-
opment projects; well digging; improvement of irrigation facilities;
construction of hydraulic projects; and the building of hospitals and
schools.
The crystal ball is too cloudy to forecast future relations between
France and Mali; but the assistance program agreed upon in December
1960 indicates that, despite past difficulties, the French are seeking
to maintain good relations with Mali. On the other side, there is
evidence of increasing pressure on the part of the Government of Mali
to get as many Frenchmen as possible out of the country -- an attitude
that could be reflected in future French-Malian negotiations. Much
depends on whether pro-French or anti-French elements win out in the
current struggle within the Mali Government.
Negotiations between United States representatives and officials
of the Mali Government in reference to the establishment of an American
aid program were held during October and November 1960. After fairly
long but friendly negotiations, the Mali authorities agreed to accept
United States economic and technical assistance. Mali's needs, as
presented by President Modibo Keita at a meeting held with American
technical experts, include airplanes (especially small liaison planes
and cargo planes for exporting meat), the improvement or construction
of runways, the construction of a second airport at Bamako, road-building
equipment, techniques and e uipment for drilling for water, cheap power
for industrial development (es ecially the construction of the Sotuba
Dam on the outskirts of Bamako, the improvement of livestock, railroad
extension, techniques for cotton-seed pressing, vehicles for security
forces, and an athletic stadium -- a covered athletic stadium.
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Other foreign aid or trade programs include a commercial agreement
between the Republic of Mali and Ghana which, according to the Accra
press, was signed 27 October 1960. Economic cooperation between the
two countries, however, is not yet clearly defined, and only the "broad
lines" of the agreement have been settled. Similarly, agreements for
economic cooperation between Mali and Guinea are "in the making," but
not even the formlines are yet visible. On 4 and 5 December 1960, Mali
and Guinea delegations, headed respectively by Modibo Keita and Sekou
Toure, met and promised close cooperation between the two governments
in political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and security fields.
West Germany has indicated an official interest in aid or trade with
Mali and is reported to have offered trucks and ambulances and to have
displayed some interest in financing a slaughterhouse in Bamako. The
Israelis are already supplying technicians in various fields requested
by the Mali Government, are starting a school for training Mali pilots,
and are involved in building a cement plant and. a radio factory. Israel
also has promised to supply small arms. The Israel-Mali agreements are
particularly interesting because they indicate that, although Mali is a
semi-Moslem country, it has refused to heed Arab protestations about
Israeli activities in Africa.
It would appear that Mali has, or is receptive to, economic-aid or
trade agreements with almost any country except Senegal, her erstwhile
partner in the Mali Federation and a region with which economic ties
had been close for many years. Mali President Modibo Keita recently
stated that, even if present Senegalese leaders were to disappear from
the political scene, Mali leaders would still be unwilling to recon-
stitute the Federation and were convinced that the present Republic of
Mali will enjoy more rapid economic development alone than as a member
of the Federation. This state of mind, of course, does not rule out
economic cooperation between the two countries once current animosities
die down.
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