Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 29, 2000
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Publication Date: 
November 28, 1952
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020057-1.pdf176.67 KB
Approved For Releas000/09/l2_;,&I&- P41A000W20057-1 Security information Official Diary (Acting DD/I) Friday, 28 November 1952 25X1A6a 1. At morning meeting reported that the secure center for special intelli- gence in the had been set up and was ready to go. Details are set forth'in memorandum from AD/C2, dated 21 November, which is in the files. 25X1X6 25X1X6 25X1 A9ically mentioned possibility of now under clearance. an-25X1 A9a hile, alerted and had AD/IC confer with him. re-25X1A9a ported to me later in the morning and suggested that because of the sensitive nature of such an operation it would not be wise to use someone until fully 25X1 A9611eared. T suggested that the could wait awhile while25XlA2g of 0/SI conducted the initial work I in- 25X1 A6a dicated that there was no immediate rush in terms of days and the project could well be set for after Christmas. Meanwhile, DD/P shops are being alerted and State is quedng regarding contacts with etc. 25X1A6a 25X1X7 3. At morning meeting, DCI in response to questions from DB/CI gave a brief description of the proceedings at the NSC on the 26th. Apparently, DCI did most of the talking, the others present not having read, with the exception of the Joint Chiefs' memo or otherwise done their homework. DCI characterized the 25X1A9- 25X1 A9 oint Chiefs' memo as "silly" and got some degree of agreement as to this from The 'action takenkproved the recommendations of the Senior Staff but did not include any action on the Director's larger project. The President apparent- ly concluded the discussion with the suggestion that DCI will see if he can work things out with the JCS. DCI went on to comment that he thought a good approach henceforth would be through - who seemed to have some understanding of the 25X1 AS problem. In response to my question, he indicated that we should move right ahead withthe staff work necessary to implement Paragraph B, i. e., the terms of reference for summary evaluation and machinery for Itsuch an estimate`" which I once more pointed out could be very broadly interpreted. 25X1A2g I.. Presented 0/NE Board final version of ith the thought that DCI might wish to discuss it with Eisenhower. He only said he would read it and consider the matter. He also did not give me any indication as to whether he wishes this to be co-ordinated with the IAC. 5. Explained that it was none of my business but that I felt extremely con- cerned about the matter; I presented DCI with a page and a half memorandum of my ideas for a prompt and decisive solution to crisis in Iran. 6. Talked briefly with 25X1A9a about the necessity of cutting 0/SI and 0/RR in the Agency discussion of the Board of Estimates Program for 1953, and I told him I had found several instances where I thought the deadlines had been set too early and urged the necessity of making haste slowly so as to get good sub- stance on the critical estimates. This dooamsent is part of an Integraied Approved For Release 2000/09/12A0001 d 32, rued from the rile it must be subfeu a o adiridual syst;matiC rtI taw. ucurily lnform~ii Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP79-Q1041A00010.0020057-1 Official Diary Friday, 28 November 1952 7. Attended USCIB Meeting. Sheldon attended as CIA delegate and in General Smith's absence, General canine presided. At the end of the old USCIB Meeting, the FBI individuals politely, but dramatically, left the room. Off the record, Sheldon briefed the other members present on the de- velopments with respect to Mr. Hoover's protest, the committee's counter- offer, and present impasse. 25X1A9a 8. and I went over the NSC action with respect to the summary evaluation. Expressed the desirability of proceeding im- mediately to outline best possible terms of reference, including in tabular form the detailed percentage of destruction estimates under various as- sumptions as to weapons available and delivered on target. When such terms of reference have been refined, it will then be appropriate to consider who can best answer the questions posed, and out of that consideration, to de- velop machinery aspects of the NSC decision. 9. Conferred with Mr. Sheldon on the following points: 25X1 A9a Mentioned apprehensions a bout Argentine actions and Sheldon agreed to have 0CI review and comment on them. Ap- prised him of the possibility that we might want to go even further and produce a special estimate for the incoming Secretary of State. 25X1A2g Discussed the advantages of as against its weak- nesses and the mechanical difficu es o m ing sure it was good enough to circulate more broadly than it is now. Also outlined to him mfr idea of a weekly "financial statement" type of summary of how U. S. interests had fared in the world on a debit and credit basis. 25X1A9a Discussed memorandum on new types of coaxial cable and possibility of the bloc's obtaining this and thereby enabling itself to curtail drastically its radio communications. This will be brou ht to the attention of the appropriate authorities in- 25X1A9a eluding Continued on discussion of OCI's participation in estimating process. Sheldon still somewhat skeptical but agreed to send a representative to the initial meeting next. Tuesday on SE-31 - Albanian coup prospects, 25X6A 10. Attended OCI briefing on French and Saar political situa- tions. 25X1A6a 25X1 A6a 25X1 A9a 11. Upon advice of and after consultation with- suggested 25X1 A9a that he wire reaction to the 25X1 X6 25X1A9,ssibility. Left to uestion as to whether CIA man should consult with Congen or not. 25X1A9a Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : RD .9-01041A000100020057-1