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December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 4, 1998
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Publication Date: 
November 6, 1952
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020080-5.pdf89.23 KB
Approved For Fease 20 M * . ' . RDP79-O4.O41A000100020080-5 4 urity fn ormatlpn official Diary, Acting DD/I Thursday, 6 November 1952 1. At the Director's meeting, Mr. Dulles and I reopened question of NIE-75's sanguine statement, "There is no present indication that Tudeh can take over by infiltration," and also its failure to discuss the possi- bility that medium sized oil companies as opposed to "small independents" on the one hand and "majors" on the other, might move substantial quantities of Iranian oil. DCI agreed that in these two aspects, the conclusions of the estimate might be considered dubious. At the TAC meeting following, agreed to the suggested 25X1A9a changes and they were unanimously adopted with Admiral Stout, in particular, confirming my personal view as to the availability of tankers, of which Park Armstrong seemed in doubt. There is no question in nay mind but that the question tanker availability and industry attitude was handled on the basis of inexcusably inadequate information. 2. Also at the DCI's meeting, raised the question of distribution of certain highly sensitive materials being procured jointly by ^ and TI. 25X1A29 During the course of the day, an agreement was worked out whereby such material would be shown to Acting DD/I and AD/CI on an "Eyes Only" basis and then destroyed. 25X1A9a 3. With briefed D/DCI on intelligence aspects of a draft revision of NSC 107/2, particularly the changes in NIE-75. L. Attended Senior Staff meeting which concerned itself almost exclusively with intelligence portions of the Iranian paper. Mr. Bohlen was skeptical about the estimate's statement that certain oil companies were becoming "restive," but the principal challenge came from Noyes of Defense vao quite frankly admitted 25X1A9a that he was advocating personal view based on the most alarming cables from Tehran. The revision of the intelligence paragraphs worked out 25X1A9a by State, Defense and - is believed to be cnnsistent with the estimate but at the same time underscores the pessimistic possibilities. Even so, Noyes insisted that the paper could be concurred in by Defense only as a "short-te ?" policy decision. 25X1X7 25X1A9a iprdVe&P~F#Wffa R P9-01041 AO86d 080-5 6. Approved~Lrip for of RR/DE and two assistants, to attend conference on East-West Trade at which officers accredited to all COCOA countries would be present. 7, Told Col. Baird that I would have the DD/I Offices reduce their nominees for the advance business program at Harvard Business School to not more than one per office inasmuch as only one could go from the entire Agency. Because of my personal dual position, I refused to screen them and he agreed to have the final selection to be made by a panel established by himself. will brief the Security Information RAjr.